True and False Confessions: the Efficacy of Torture and Brutal
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
'I-Bates (18577-18976)'
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 2D31IMl999 ACTION MEMO Clt-1232-03 30 September 2003 FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE .L DepSec Action --~ FROM: General Richard 8. Myers, CJCs~C/(f'( SUBJECT: Service Deployment Force Ratios 1 In response to your inquiry . the following information is provided. 1 As you know. Services' Force Rotation Goals were discussed at length during ELABORATE CROSSBOW m, culminating in a brief to you on 15 September. As a result, a common method of force deployment ratio measurement has been agreed upon: number of months deployed versus number of months non deployed. • As \Ve have discussed, force ratios will continue to differ by Services for a variety of reasons, and each Service builds its force deployment ratio goals based on the competing demands of long-standing global contingency commitments, sustaining readiness and managing force tempo. , Current Service Ratio -Goals (by Service) are: • Navy I :3: 6 months deployed for every 18 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is each fleet unit. • Marines I :3: 6 months deployed for every l 8 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is a battalion. • Anny I :4: 6 months deployed for every 24 months nonwdeployed. Unit of measure is a brigade. • Air Force 1:4: 3 months deployed for every 12 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is the Air Expeditionary Force. • Recommend an upcoming session be set aside to meet with Service Chiefs to further explore underlying force rotation goal rationales. RECOMMENDATION: OSD and CJCS staffs coordinate meeting with Service Chiefs regarding force rotation goal rationales. -
Case 2:15-Cv-00286-JLQ Document 182-5 Filed 05/22/17
Case 2:15-cv-00286-JLQ Document 182-5 Filed 05/22/17 Exhibit E Case 2:15-cv-00286-JLQ Document 182-5 Filed 05/22/17 1 2 3 4 Interrogating the Enemy 5 6 7 The Story of the CIA's Interrogation of Top al-Qa'ida Terrorists 8 9 10 (Working Title) 11 By James E. Mitchell, Ph.D., 12 Architect of the CIA Interrogation Program 13 14 With Bill Harlow 15 1 MJ00022577 Case 2:15-cv-00286-JLQ Document 182-5 Filed 05/22/17 1 long time ago not to be offended by this sort of posturing. It frequently went away when 2 you got on the ground and started working. 3 4 The operational psychologist told me that our task on the way over was to rough out a 5 design for the cell where Zubaydah was to be held. We were told that, because of his 6 importance as a potential source of intelligence and the severity of his injury, the cell 7 needed to be lighted 24 hours a day. Closed circuit TV cameras were also required. We 8 wanted Zubaydah focused on the interrogators and for the cell to not be a source of dis- 9 tracting stimulation, so we recommended they paint it white. Speakers were needed so 10 music could be played, mostly as sound masking for security reasons because the 11 guards were located just outside the door, but also, if ordered, as an irritant to wear on 12 him if he chose not to cooperate. -
My Debate with Marc Thiessen
David FraktProfessor Barry Law School Reserve JAG Officer and Former Guantanamo defense counsel Posted: September 18, 2010 01:40 PM My Debate with Marc Thiessen Earlier this week, I debated General Michael Hayden (USAF, retired), former director of both the CIA and NSA, and Marc Thiessen, former Bush speechwriter and current columnist for the Washington Post, as part of the "Intelligence Squared" Debate series from New York. I was joined by Stephen Jones, an accomplished attorney best known for defending Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City Bomber. The specific proposition debated was whether terrorists (or more accurately suspected terrorists) should be treated as enemy combatants, as opposed to handling within the traditional criminal justice system, but the debate covered a wide range of issues in the conduct of the war on terrorism. According to the audience, Stephen and I won the debate handily. For those interested in seeing or hearing the debate, it will be televised on the Bloomberg News Channel starting Monday, and it will also be available soon as a podcast from NPR, or you can watch the unedited version of the debate here. For the most part, Thiessen and Hayden voiced the usual Bush Administration talking points. Thiessen is the author of the bestselling book "Courting Disaster: How the C.I.A. Kept America Safe and How Barack Obama Is Inviting the Next Attack" which Jane Mayer of the New Yorker described as the "unofficial Bible of torture apologists." Thiessen's basic argument was that the detention and interrogation practices of the prior administration were effective, as proven by the fact that there have been no successful terrorist attacks domestically since 9/11. -
Day Two of Military Judge Questioning 9/11 Accused About Self-Representation
Public amnesty international USA Guantánamo: Day two of military judge questioning 9/11 accused about self-representation 11 July 2008 AI Index: AMR 51/077/2008 On 10 July 2008, military commission judge US Marine Colonel Ralph Kohlmann held further proceedings to question the men accused of orchestrating the attacks of 11 September 2001 about their decision to represent themselves at their forthcoming death penalty trial in the US Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Amnesty International had an observer at the proceedings. The primary purpose of the hearings was to inquire of each of the accused individually about whether they had been intimidated before or during their arraignment on 5 June 2008 into making a choice to represent themselves, or whether this decision had been made knowingly and voluntarily. Judge Kohlmann had questioned two of the accused, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Ali (‘Ammar al Baluchi) and Mustafa al Hawsawi at individual sessions held on 9 July (see http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/076/2008/en). He had scheduled sessions for the other three men, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid bin Attash and Ramzi bin al-Shibh on 10 July. In the event, Ramzi bin al-Shibh refused to come to his session. It seems unlikely that the military judge will question him again on the matter of legal representation until the issue of Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s mental competency is addressed at a hearing scheduled to take place next month (see http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/074/2008/en). Both Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Walid bin Attash denied that they had been intimidated or that any intimidation had taken place. -
WTH Are Deaths of Despair? Nobel Prize Winner Sir Angus Deaton on the Other Epidemic
WTH are deaths of despair? Nobel Prize winner Sir Angus Deaton on the other epidemic Episode #52 | May 21, 2020 | Danielle Pletka, Marc Thiessen, and Sir Angus Deaton Danielle Pletka: Hi, I'm Danielle Pletka. Marc Thiessen: And I'm Marc Thiessen. Danielle Pletka: Welcome to our podcast, What the Hell Is Going On? Marc, what the hell is going on now? Marc Thiessen: We're talking about deaths of despair. Danielle Pletka: Oh, that's cheerful. Marc Thiessen: Well, you're right, it's not cheerful, Dany. I mean, look, we are now experiencing the worst economic devastation since the Great Depression. We have more than 33 damage is not being borne by the elites, who work in the information economy and who can telework and do everything by Zoom. It's being borne by those at the middle and the bottom of the economic ladder. For what Trump called the forgotten Americans. People, who were finally doing better under him for a while, and now, all of a sudden, that progress has been wiped out. Danielle Pletka: The phrase, deaths of despair, that we're using, comes from this new book out by Anne Case and Angus Deaton, two economists from Princeton University. It was actually Dr. Case who coined this term, deaths of despair, in talking about people who've really lost all hope. I think that our image of the Depression is one where we see people walking across the dust bowl with all their family belongings on the back of a cart and their ragged children, the iconic photos of this. -
Articles Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions About the Pre-2001 Period by Don Rassler
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 6 Articles Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions about the pre-2001 Period by Don Rassler Abstract There has been a modest amount of progress made over the last two decades in piecing together the developments that led to creation of al-Qaida and how the group has evolved over the last 30 years. Yet, there are still many dimensions of al-Qaida that remain understudied, and likely as a result, poorly understood. One major gap are the dynamics and relationships that have underpinned al-Qaida’s multi-decade presence in Pakistan. The lack of developed and foundational work done on the al-Qaida-Pakistan linkage is quite surprising given how long al- Qaida has been active in the country, the mix of geographic areas - from Pakistan’s tribal areas to its main cities - in which it has operated and found shelter, and the key roles Pakistani al-Qaida operatives have played in the group over the last two decades. To push the ball forward and advance understanding of this critical issue, this article examines what is known, and has been suggested, about al-Qaida’s relations with a cluster of Deobandi militant groups consisting of Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Harakat ul-Jihad Islami, Harakat ul-Ansar, and Jaish-e-Muhammad, which have been collectively described as Pakistan’s Harakat movement, prior to 9/11. It finds that each of these groups and their leaders provided key elements of support to al-Qaida in a number of direct and indirect ways. -
Ordinanza Che Istituisce Provvedimenti Nei Confronti Delle Persone E Delle Organizzazioni Legate a Osama Bin Laden, Al Gruppo «Al-Qaïda» O Ai Taliban
Ordinanza che istituisce provvedimenti nei confronti delle persone e delle organizzazioni legate a Osama bin Laden, al gruppo «Al-Qaïda» o ai Taliban Modifica del 27 aprile 2012 Il Dipartimento federale dell’economia, visto l’articolo 16 della legge del 22 marzo 20021 sugli embarghi, ordina: I L’allegato 2 dell’ordinanza del 2 ottobre 20002 che istituisce provvedimenti nei confronti delle persone e delle organizzazioni legate a Osama bin Laden, al gruppo «Al-Qaïda» o ai Taliban è modificato secondo la versione qui annessa. II La presente modifica entra in vigore il 1° maggio 2012.3 27 aprile 2012 Dipartimento federale dell’economia: Johann N. Schneider-Ammann 1 RS 946.231 2 RS 946.203 3 La presente mod. è stata pubblicata in via straordinaria il 30 apr. 2012 (art. 7 cpv. 3 LPubl; RS 170.512). 2012-0849 1 Provvedimenti nei confronti delle persone e delle organizzazioni legate RU 2012 a Osama bin Laden, al gruppo «Al-Qaïda» o ai Taliban Allegato 2 (art. 1, 3 cpv. 1 e 2, art. 4 e 4a) Sono aggiunte le iscrizioni seguenti: A. Elenco di persone fisiche appartenenti o associate ai Taliban (131 persone) TI.A.160.12. Name: 1: ABDUL SAMAD 2: ACHEKZAI 3: na 4: na Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1970 POB: Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Samad Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghan Passport no.: na National identification no.: na Address: na Listed on: 2 Mar. 2012 Other infor- mation: Senior Taliban member responsible for the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices (IED). Involved in recruiting and deploying suicide bombers to conduct attacks in Afghanistan. -
Unclassified//For Public Release Unclassified//For Public Release
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE --SESR-Efll-N0F0RN- Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010 Guantanamo Review Dispositions Country ISN Name Decision of Origin AF 4 Abdul Haq Wasiq Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 6 Mullah Norullah Noori Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 7 Mullah Mohammed Fazl Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 ), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 560 Haji Wali Muhammed Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 ), as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further review by the Principals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention facility in the United States. AF 579 Khairullah Said Wali Khairkhwa Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 753 Abdul Sahir Referred for prosecution. AF 762 Obaidullah Referred for prosecution. AF 782 Awai Gui Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 832 Mohammad Nabi Omari Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 ), as informed by principles of the laws of war. AF 850 Mohammed Hashim Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement appropriate security measures. AF 899 Shawali Khan Transfer to • subject to appropriate security measures. -
Survey of Terrorist Groups and Their Means of Financing
SURVEY OF TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR MEANS OF FINANCING HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services Serial No. 115–116 ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 31–576 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 VerDate Mar 15 2010 14:03 Dec 06, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 G:\GPO PRINTING\DOCS\115TH HEARINGS - 2ND SESSION 2018\2018-09-07 TIF TERRO mcarroll on FSR431 with DISTILLER HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina, MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Vice Chairman Member PETER T. KING, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California NYDIA M. VELA´ ZQUEZ, New York FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD SHERMAN, California STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York BILL POSEY, Florida MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin DAVID SCOTT, Georgia STEVE STIVERS, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota ANN WAGNER, Missouri ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado ANDY BARR, Kentucky JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania BILL FOSTER, Illinois LUKE MESSER, Indiana DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan SCOTT TIPTON, Colorado JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio MIA LOVE, Utah DENNY HECK, Washington FRENCH HILL, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California TOM EMMER, Minnesota JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey LEE M. -
The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009): Overview and Legal Issues
The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009): Overview and Legal Issues (name redacted) Legislative Attorney August 4, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R41163 The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009): Overview and Legal Issues Summary On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) pertaining to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism. Military commissions pursuant to the M.O. began in November 2004 against four persons declared eligible for trial, but the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld invalidated the military commissions as improper under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). To permit military commissions to go forward, Congress approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), conferring authority to promulgate rules that depart from the strictures of the UCMJ and possibly U.S. international obligations. Military commissions proceedings were reinstated and resulted in three convictions under the Bush Administration. Upon taking office in 2009, President Obama temporarily halted military commissions to review their procedures as well as the detention program at Guantánamo Bay in general, pledging to close the prison facilities there by January 2010, a deadline that passed unmet. One case was moved to a federal district court. In May 2009, the Obama Administration announced that it was considering restarting the military commission system with some changes to the procedural rules. Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009) as part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2010, P.L. 111-84, to provide some reforms the Administration supported and to make other amendments to the Military Commissions Act, as described in this report. -
Global War on Terrorism and Prosecution of Terror Suspects: Select Cases and Implications for International Law, Politics, and Security
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM AND PROSECUTION OF TERROR SUSPECTS: SELECT CASES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND SECURITY Srini Sitaraman Introduction The global war on terrorism has opened up new frontiers of transnational legal challenge for international criminal law and counterterrorism strategies. How do we convict terrorists who transcend multiple national boundaries for committing and plotting mass atrocities; what are the hurdles in extraditing terrorism suspects; what are the consequences of holding detainees in black sites or secret prisons; what interrogation techniques are legal and appropriate when questioning terror suspects? This article seeks to examine some of these questions by focusing on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), particularly in the context of counterterrorism strategies that the United States have pursued towards Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) since the September 2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington D.C. The focus of this article is on the methods employed to confront terror suspects and terror facilitators and not on the politics of cooperation between the United States and Pakistan on the Global War on Terrorism or on the larger military operation being conducted in Afghanistan and in the border regions of Pakistan. This article is not positioned to offer definitive answers or comprehensive analyses of all pertinent issues associated with counterterrorism strategies and its effectiveness, which would be beyond the scope of this effort. The objective is to raise questions about the policies that the United States have adopted in conducting the war on terrorism and study its implications for international law and security. It is to examine whether the overzealousness in the execution of this war on terror has generated some unintended consequences for international law and complicated the global judicial architecture in ways that are not conducive to the democratic propagation of human rights. -
1. October 19, 2011 To: Robert Nicholson, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Re: Letter in Support of Private
October 19, 2011 To: Robert Nicholson, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Re: Letter in Support of Private Prosecutions Filed Against George W. Bush for Torture We, the undersigned human rights non-governmental organizations and individuals, are writing this statement in full support of the private prosecutions against George W. Bush, former President of the United States, being lodged on behalf of three former Guantánamo detainees, and one current detainee, who allege that they were tortured by U.S. officials, and seek a criminal investigation and prosecution against Mr. Bush upon arrival in Canada, for substantive breaches of the Canadian Criminal Code and United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The criminal cases submitted under sections 504, 269.1, 21 and 22 of the Canadian Criminal Code, and the Indictment with an appendix of supporting material attached thereto, (collectively, the “Bush Dossiers”) set forth reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a person who is scheduled to be present on Canadian territory has committed an act of torture. The Case Against George W. Bush The Bush Dossiers allege that George W. Bush, in his capacity of former president of the United States, bears individual responsibility for acts of torture and/or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment committed against detainees held in U.S. custody or rendered to other countries by the U.S., in that he ordered, authorized, condoned, planned or otherwise aided and abetted such acts, or failed to prevent or punish subordinates for the commission of such acts. As set forth in detail in the Bush Dossiers, including through documentary evidence in the form of inter alia official memoranda issued by Mr.