No Torture. No Exceptions
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
15-L-1645/0 0 0 /194
(b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TS::SC'l' Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for IS'.'1 10024 OPENING REPORTER : On the record RECORDER: All rise. PRESIDENT: Remain seated and come to order. Go nhead. Recorder. RECORDER: This Tribunal is being conducle<l at 1328 March 10, 200 ; on board C.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bav. Cuba. The following personnel are present: Captain (b)(6) United Slates Navy, President Lieutenant Colonel b) 6) • t..:nited States Air Force. Member Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) United States Marine Corps. Member Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) , United States Air F11rce, Personal Re pre sen ta the Language Analysis.+.--,...,..,,.,.---. (b)(6) ......... ..,.... Gunnery Sergeant (b)(6) l nited States Marine Corps. Reporter Lieutenant Colonel'-P!!~~) --"" . United States Anny, Recorder Captain (b)(6) 1:; c ge Advocate member »fthe Tribunal. OATH SESSION 1 RECORDER: All Rise. PRESIDE!\T: The Recorder will be sworn. Do you, Lieutenant Colonel j(b)(6) I solemnly swear that you will faithfully pcrfonn the duties as Recorder assigned in this Tribunai so help you God'' RECORDER: I do. PRESIDENT: The Reponer will now be :;worn. The Recorder will administer the oath. RECORDER: ()o you Gunnery Sergeant l(b)(6) ~wear or affinn that y<•u will faithfully <lis~: harge )'Our duties as Reporter assigned in this Tribunal ro help you God? REPORTER: I do. PRESIDENT: The Translator will be sworn. JSN #10024 Enclosure (3) Page I of27 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 15-L-1645/0 0 0/194 (b }( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TS:lSCJt RECORDER: Do you swear or affinn that you will faithrully perform 1he duties ofTranslaror in the case now in hearing so help you God? TRANSLATOR: I do PRESIDEN I': We will take a brief recess now in order in lo bring Detainee into the room. -
Day Two of Military Judge Questioning 9/11 Accused About Self-Representation
Public amnesty international USA Guantánamo: Day two of military judge questioning 9/11 accused about self-representation 11 July 2008 AI Index: AMR 51/077/2008 On 10 July 2008, military commission judge US Marine Colonel Ralph Kohlmann held further proceedings to question the men accused of orchestrating the attacks of 11 September 2001 about their decision to represent themselves at their forthcoming death penalty trial in the US Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Amnesty International had an observer at the proceedings. The primary purpose of the hearings was to inquire of each of the accused individually about whether they had been intimidated before or during their arraignment on 5 June 2008 into making a choice to represent themselves, or whether this decision had been made knowingly and voluntarily. Judge Kohlmann had questioned two of the accused, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Ali (‘Ammar al Baluchi) and Mustafa al Hawsawi at individual sessions held on 9 July (see http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/076/2008/en). He had scheduled sessions for the other three men, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid bin Attash and Ramzi bin al-Shibh on 10 July. In the event, Ramzi bin al-Shibh refused to come to his session. It seems unlikely that the military judge will question him again on the matter of legal representation until the issue of Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s mental competency is addressed at a hearing scheduled to take place next month (see http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/074/2008/en). Both Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Walid bin Attash denied that they had been intimidated or that any intimidation had taken place. -
Government Turns the Other Way As Judges Make Findings About Torture and Other Abuse
USA SEE NO EVIL GOVERNMENT TURNS THE OTHER WAY AS JUDGES MAKE FINDINGS ABOUT TORTURE AND OTHER ABUSE Amnesty International Publications First published in February 2011 by Amnesty International Publications International Secretariat Peter Benenson House 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW United Kingdom www.amnesty.org Copyright Amnesty International Publications 2011 Index: AMR 51/005/2011 Original Language: English Printed by Amnesty International, International Secretariat, United Kingdom All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publishers. Amnesty International is a global movement of 2.2 million people in more than 150 countries and territories, who campaign on human rights. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. We research, campaign, advocate and mobilize to end abuses of human rights. Amnesty International is independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion. Our work is largely financed by contributions from our membership and donations CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 Judges point to human rights violations, executive turns away ........................................... 4 Absence -
Video-Recorded Decapitations - a Seemingly Perfect Terrorist Tactic That Did Not Spread Martin Harrow DIIS Working Paper 2011:08 WORKING PAPER
DIIS working paper DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 Video-recorded Decapitations - A seemingly perfect terrorist tactic that did not spread Martin Harrow DIIS Working Paper 2011:08 WORKING PAPER 1 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 MARTIN HARROW MSC, PhD, Consulting Analyst at DIIS [email protected] DIIS Working Papers make available DIIS researchers’ and DIIS project partners’ work in progress towards proper publishing. They may include important documentation which is not necessarily published elsewhere. DIIS Working Papers are published under the responsibility of the author alone. DIIS Working Papers should not be quoted without the express permission of the author. DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 © Copenhagen 2011 Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler Layout: Ellen-Marie Bentsen Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN: 978-87-7605-449-6 Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk 2 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 CONTENTS Abstract 4 Introduction 5 Decapitation as a weapon 5 Video-recorded decapitations 2002-2009 8 The reproductive dynamics of terrorist tactics 11 The accessibility of video-recorded decapitations as a tactic 12 Effectiveness of terrorism – impacting two different audiences 14 Why not video-recorded decapitations? 18 Iraq 18 Afghanistan 19 The West 20 Conclusion 21 List of References 23 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 ABSTracT Video-recorded decapitations have an enormous impact, they are cheap and easy, and they allow the terrorists to exploit the potential of the Internet. -
The Oath a Film by Laura Poitras
The Oath A film by Laura Poitras POV www.pbs.org/pov DISCUSSION GUIDe The Oath POV Letter frOm the fiLmmakers New YorK , 2010 I was first interested in making a film about Guantanamo in 2003, when I was also beginning a film about the war in Iraq. I never imagined Guantanamo would still be open when I finished that film, but sadly it was — and still is today. originally, my idea for the Oath was to make a film about some - one released from Guantanamo and returning home. In May 2007, I traveled to Yemen looking to find that story and that’s when I met Abu Jandal, osama bin Laden’s former bodyguard, driving a taxicab in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen. I wasn’t look - ing to make a film about Al-Qaeda, but that changed when I met Abu Jandal. Themes of betrayal, guilt, loyalty, family and absence are not typically things that come to mind when we imagine a film about Al-Qaeda and Guantanamo. Despite the dangers of telling this story, it compelled me. Born in Saudi Arabia of Yemeni parents, Abu Jandal left home in 1993 to fight jihad in Bosnia. In 1996 he recruited Salim Ham - dan to join him for jihad in Tajikistan. while traveling through Laura Poitras, filmmaker of the Oath . Afghanistan, they were recruited by osama bin Laden. Abu Jan - Photo by Khalid Al Mahdi dal became bin Laden's personal bodyguard and “emir of Hos - pitality.” Salim Hamdan became bin Laden’s driver. Abu Jandal ends up driving a taxi and Hamdan ends up at Guantanamo. -
Interrogation, Detention, and Torture DEBORAH N
Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture DEBORAH N. PEARLSTEIN* INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1255 I. EXECUTIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE: COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND T O RTU RE ....................................................................................................1257 A. Vague or Unlawful Guidance................................................................ 1259 B. Inaction .................................................................................................1268 C. Resources, Training, and a Plan........................................................... 1271 II. ExECuTrVE LIMITs: FINDING CONSTRAINTS THAT WORK ...........................1273 A. The ProfessionalM ilitary...................................................................... 1274 B. The Public Oversight Organizationsof Civil Society ............................1279 C. Activist Federal Courts .........................................................................1288 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................1295 INTRODUCTION While the courts continue to debate the limits of inherent executive power under the Federal Constitution, the past several years have taught us important lessons about how and to what extent constitutional and sub-constitutional constraints may effectively check the broadest assertions of executive power. Following the publication -
Print: Bush's Plan to Erode Our Liberties
Print: Bush's Plan to Erode Our Liberties http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070625/huq/print Bush's Plan to Erode Our Liberties by AZIZ HUQ June 8, 2007 Early this week, judge advocates halted two prosecutions in the Guantánamo military commissions established under the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA). This is not the first setback the Administration's second-tier court system has hit; the Supreme Court invalidated an earlier iteration of the commissions in 2006. And it won't be the last. But while this week's setback likely will be speedily surmounted, it casts an unexpected light on the MCA's real purposes, and what's at stake when the Bush Administration plays politics with national security. Understanding the significance of this week's ruling means delving into a bit of procedural arcana. The devil in the MCA is, almost literally, in the details--and unless we attend closely to the rococo details of the statute, we'll miss the ways in which the Administration intends to slowly erode our liberties. At the beginning of this week, the military commissions' two judges--Army Col. Peter Brownback and Navy Capt. Keith Allred--dismissed charges filed against Omar Khadr and Salim Hamdan. The rulings focused on a question of categorization--basically, the judges found that Khadr and Hamdan had been wrongly classified. But how did this happen? The MCA, which created the military commissions, states that only an alien who is an "unlawful enemy combatant" can be tried in a military commission. It also defines "unlawful enemy combatants" in tremendously sweeping terms to include anyone who has "materially supported hostilities." Many civil libertarians, including myself, expressed grave concerns about the scope of this provision. -
Pakistan's Terrorism Dilemma
14 HUSAIN HAQQANI Pakistan’s Terrorism Dilemma For more than a decade, Pakistan has been accused of sup- porting terrorism, primarily due to its support for militants opposing Indian rule in the disputed Himalayan territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Until September 11, 2001, Islamabad was also the principal backer of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan has now become a key U.S. ally in the war against terrorism, it is still seen both as a target and staging ground for terrorism. General Pervez Musharraf ’s military regime abandoned its alliance with the Taliban immediately after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. U.S. forces were allowed the use of Pakistani air bases for operations in Afghanistan. Pakistani intelligence services provided, and continue to provide, valuable information in hunting down Taliban and al-Qaeda escapees. The Pakistani military is cur- rently working with U.S. law enforcement officials in tracking down terrorists in the lawless tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. In a major policy speech on January 12, 2002, Musharraf announced measures to limit the influence of Islamic militants at home, including those previously described by him as “Kashmiri free- dom fighters.” “No organizations will be able to carry out terrorism 351 352 HUSAIN HAQQANI on the pretext of Kashmir,” he declared. “Whoever is involved with such acts in the future will be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or outside the country.”1 Musharraf ’s supporters declared his speech as revolutionary.2 He echoed the sentiment of most Pakistanis when he said, “violence and terrorism have been going on for years and we are weary and sick of this Kalashnikov culture … The day of reckoning has come.” After the speech, the Musharraf regime clamped down on domes- tic terrorist groups responsible for sectarian killings.3 But there is still considerable ambivalence in Pakistan’s attitude toward the Kashmiri militants. -
Torture and the Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of Detainees: the Effectiveness and Consequences of 'Enhanced
TORTURE AND THE CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DE- GRADING TREATMENT OF DETAINEES: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ‘EN- HANCED’ INTERROGATION HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION NOVEMBER 8, 2007 Serial No. 110–94 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 38–765 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Aug 31 2005 15:46 Jul 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 H:\WORK\CONST\110807\38765.000 HJUD1 PsN: 38765 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MAXINE WATERS, California DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah ROBERT WEXLER, Florida RIC KELLER, Florida LINDA T. SA´ NCHEZ, California DARRELL ISSA, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MIKE PENCE, Indiana HANK JOHNSON, Georgia J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio STEVE KING, Iowa LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM FEENEY, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas ANTHONY D. -
Leaderless Jihad West Point Ctc Summaries
ALL FEl INFflRNITIuII CONTAINED NEPEIN Tl1JCLPSIFIED DATE O1 LI 5l DIm1shn WEST POINT CTC SUMMARIES IC LEADERLESS JIHAD Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century flivcrsit\ Pclms\ 1\ jnia Press 2015 The Islamist terrorist threat is radicalization Dr Marc Sageman MD global rapidly evolving process Islamic terror networks of the twenty-first century are before it reaches its Ph.D is forensic psychia more fluid and violent end The most effective trist and government coun becoming independent unpredictable than their more structured forebears that conducted countermeasure to tcrtcrrorism consultant He This book builds combat the homegrown holds various academic and die 9/11 attacks The present direat in the West has upon Dr Sagemans terrorist threat is evolved from infiltration outside trained includ by terronsts to the professional positions previous volume interrupt Scholar in Residence against ivhom international cooperation and border radicalization process ing at Understanding Ter before effective it reaches its the York Police protection are to homegrown self-financed New Depart ror 1\Tetlrorks 2004 vioient end Senior Fellow the self-trained terrorists Dr Sageman describes this ment at and utilizes die same scattered network of wannabes Research In global homegrown Porcign Policy approach of apply- as leaderless ihad The that form this stitute and Clinical Assistant groups ing the scientific method to the study of terronsm movement are physically uncoimected from al Qaeda Professor at the University Whereas in his book the author worked -
Global War on Terrorism and Prosecution of Terror Suspects: Select Cases and Implications for International Law, Politics, and Security
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM AND PROSECUTION OF TERROR SUSPECTS: SELECT CASES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND SECURITY Srini Sitaraman Introduction The global war on terrorism has opened up new frontiers of transnational legal challenge for international criminal law and counterterrorism strategies. How do we convict terrorists who transcend multiple national boundaries for committing and plotting mass atrocities; what are the hurdles in extraditing terrorism suspects; what are the consequences of holding detainees in black sites or secret prisons; what interrogation techniques are legal and appropriate when questioning terror suspects? This article seeks to examine some of these questions by focusing on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), particularly in the context of counterterrorism strategies that the United States have pursued towards Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) since the September 2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington D.C. The focus of this article is on the methods employed to confront terror suspects and terror facilitators and not on the politics of cooperation between the United States and Pakistan on the Global War on Terrorism or on the larger military operation being conducted in Afghanistan and in the border regions of Pakistan. This article is not positioned to offer definitive answers or comprehensive analyses of all pertinent issues associated with counterterrorism strategies and its effectiveness, which would be beyond the scope of this effort. The objective is to raise questions about the policies that the United States have adopted in conducting the war on terrorism and study its implications for international law and security. It is to examine whether the overzealousness in the execution of this war on terror has generated some unintended consequences for international law and complicated the global judicial architecture in ways that are not conducive to the democratic propagation of human rights. -
The Value of Claiming Torture: an Analysis of Al-Qaeda's Tactical Lawfare Strategy and Efforts to Fight Back, 43 Case W
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 43 | Issue 1 2010 The alueV of Claiming Torture: An Analysis of Al- Qaeda's Tactical Lawfare Strategy and Efforts to Fight Back Michael J. Lebowitz Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael J. Lebowitz, The Value of Claiming Torture: An Analysis of Al-Qaeda's Tactical Lawfare Strategy and Efforts to Fight Back, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 357 (2010) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol43/iss1/22 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. File: Lebowitz 2 Created on: 1/9/2011 9:48:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:09:00 PM THE VALUE OF CLAIMING TORTURE: AN ANALYSIS OF AL-QAEDA’S TACTICAL LAWFARE STRATEGY AND EFFORTS TO FIGHT BACK Michael J. Lebowitz* I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 357 II. CLAIMING TORTURE TO SHAPE THE BATTLEFIELD .............................. 361 A. Tactical Lawfare ........................................................................... 362 B. Faux Torture ................................................................................. 364 C. The Torture Benchmark ...............................................................