ALL FEl INFflRNITIuII CONTAINED NEPEIN Tl1JCLPSIFIED DATE O1 LI 5l DIm1shn

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LEADERLESS JIHAD

Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century

flivcrsit\ Pclms\ 1\ jnia Press 2015

The Islamist terrorist threat is radicalization Dr Marc Sageman MD global rapidly evolving process

Islamic terror networks of the twenty-first century are before it reaches its Ph.D is forensic psychia more fluid and violent end The most effective trist and government coun becoming independent unpredictable than their more structured forebears that conducted countermeasure to tcrtcrrorism consultant He This book builds combat the homegrown holds various academic and die 9/11 attacks The present direat in the West has upon Dr Sagemans terrorist threat is evolved from infiltration outside trained includ by terronsts to the professional positions previous volume interrupt Scholar in Residence against ivhom international cooperation and border radicalization process ing at Understanding Ter before effective it reaches its the York Police protection are to homegrown self-financed New Depart ror 1\Tetlrorks 2004 vioient end Senior Fellow the self-trained terrorists Dr Sageman describes this ment at and utilizes die same scattered network of wannabes Research In global homegrown Porcign Policy approach of apply- as leaderless ihad The that form this stitute and Clinical Assistant groups ing the scientific method to the study of terronsm movement are physically uncoimected from al Qaeda Professor at the University Whereas in his book the author worked from previous of oth and eacb other yet form violent virtual social move Pennsylvania among dataset of 172 terrorist subjects in .LeaderleisJilad ment Ihe most effective countermeasure to combat ers Dr Sageman joined the he has built database of over 501 terrorists from this homegrown terronsm threat is to the Central Intelligence Agency mterrupt which to draw conclusions

in 1984 He spent year on UNDERSTANDING THE PATH TO RADICALISM the Afghan Task Force then Dr with anecdotal about he faced second Pakistani went to Islamabad from 1987 Sageman begms an story as generation growmg Ahrned Oniar Saeed the man convicted of in London Whde media accounts of to 1989 where he ran the Sheikh up typically

U.S midatcral with kidnapping WinY Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl fer simplistic model to explain why one chooses programs The author follows his hfe from accounts of his Dr that the trne is the Afghan Muj alacdin and early terrorism Sageman argues story chddhood from and friends later nuanced and different New Delhi from 19899 In famdy to accounts much more complex Despite

of Omar Skedebs life from fellow nunates Ins accounts from fellow nid even 1991 he resigned from the dunug fiunily friends nunates Several accounts in the mediahe Omar himself to his toward violence agency to return to medicine impnsonment explain path was such nice the conventional wisdom Oinars reveals the of the radicalization Since 1994 he has been in the gnybetray story centrality

that there is with terror In this book Dr seeks to private practice of forensic inherenily something wrong process Sageman develop ists Other accounts Omars terrorist career into this radicalization and devise and clinical psychiatry and explain insights process

as the natural result of ahenation and discrimination recommendations to it has had the opportunity to practical interrupt

evaluate about 500 murder HOW TO STUDY TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ers Afier 9/11 Dr Sageman Dr that the fruitftd method for for that seeks Sageman argues most middle-range analytical approach began collecting biographi the study of terrotism and the radicalization process to bridge the gap between biographical micro-level cal material on about 500 al involves the of the scientific accounts of terrorist and broad Qaeda terrorists to test the rigorous application subjects sociological

method using such tools as statistics sampling theory macro level explanations of tcrronsm This middle validity of the conventional survey techniques measurement and data analysis range approach anns to study the relationships of wisdom on terrorism He is The scientific method helps avoid biases inherent in terrorists in context their relationship with each the author of the bestselling several common approaches to the study of terrotism other their relationship with ideas present their Understanding Terror Networks Por example the popular biographical approach as environment and their relationship with people and University of Pennsylvania seen ni the previous chapters stor1 of Aluned Oiuar organizations outside of their group Press 2004 Saeed Sheikh overly emphasizes the individual and In LeaderlessJihad the author limits the scope of his ignores situational factors On the other hand study to what he terms global Islamist terrorists broad root causes approach examining the social of which the is al most recognizable quantity Qaeda conditions that lead individuals to become terrorists and its affiliated social movement As he puts it the is ovedy deterministic and static Dr Sageman calls

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HOW TO STUDY TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONT

500 in his for the Memorial Institute trir the Prevention of Itirrorisms Itir subjects sample are the men responsible Sep- MIFF tember 11 2001 attacks and all those who like them threaten ronsm Knowledge Base or the National Counterterrorism Centers

the United States and the West behalf uf World Incidence these incident-based un larger community NCTC Tracking System

the vanguard trying to establish certnn vision of an Islamist tools lend themselves to the stndy of certain general trends in

utopia Dr Sageman constructed this data set from scratch utiliz- terrorism such as the frequency of terrorist operarions They

ing captured documents court records investigative journalism typically do not offer the appropriate level of granularity to study

academic publications and other open source informarion While the radicalizarion process the authors primary goal

he could have used an existing open source database such as the

THE GLOBALIZATION OF JIHADI TERROR

In chapter two Dc Sageman makes distincrion between al Qaeda author also notes that there is tremendous diversity of beliefs and

the orgairization and the broader jihadi social movement While doctrines widun fins Salafi movement Must Salafis advocate die

he feels that using the term al Qaeda to describe both the social peaceful transformation of society through face-to-face preach

movement and the specific organizarion muddles our thinking on ing Otherssuch as the Egyprian Muslim Brotherhoodcall

the subject he fears itis too late to overcome popular usage of the for the creation of vanguard polirical party to compete at the

term Al Qaeda originally referred to the name of the organization polls Over rime some factions of this movement eschewed the

formed by Osama bin Laden whose members swore allegiance ballot box and missionary work beheving the state could never

him and his heutenants Dr be These instead chose bqyatin Arabic to designated Sage captured through peaceful means groups

man argues that this corewhat he calls al Qaeda Centralhas violence to broadcast their message

faded in in result of the of importance recent years as closing Among those who called for violent jihad debate emerged training camps in Afghanistan the halt of financial transfers and in the 970s about whether to focus their efforts on the near

the capture or killing of key personnel However while al Qaeda local the far Israeli enemy the ruler or enemy the state at Central is constrained the looser social movement is expanding that time Sayyid Qutb and his main disciple Muhammad Abdcl The al Qaeda social movement consists of informal terrorist Salam Faraj were two of the most eloquent thinkers to advocate networks the that mobihze take violent across globe people to up violent jihadist tacrics at this rime Paraj argued that the move jihad Whdc these groups are not linked organizarionally they ment could not take on the far enemy unril the near enemy was are part of larger terrorist campaign and are linked together by defeated However by die mid-1990s die followers of Qutb and mutual of and feelings sobdarity general ideology had overthrown of their and became Paraj not any governments

Dr Sageman contrasts the al Qaeda brand of terronsm with earher frustrated hardline faction emerged from this movement which

terrorist that included and that the far this the but movements anarchism anti-colonialism argued enemyin ease \Mist especially Al left-wing radicalism Qaedas terronsm like other fourth wave the United States and Prancewas propping up the near enemy

religions terrorist movements is built ou the belief that the world Those jihadis that took up the strategy of expelling the far enemy

has decayed into morass of greed and moral depravity While from the Middle East comprise theg/sboillslamist terrorists and are

most global jihadists today generally follow Salafist ideology the primary subjects of this book Groups that continue to target

referring to revivahst Islamist ideology that blames Western the near enemysuch as Hamas or Hezbollahare beyond the

influence for corrnpring the virtuous Muslim communitythe scope of the authors study

THE JIHADISTS PROFILE

In this chapter Dc Sageinan walks through some of the most invasion generation The most visible portion of this wave arc

common myths about what drives individuals to terrorism and second and third generation inamigrants in Europe who come from

compares these theories against his data lower socioeconomic status than their predecessors However Dc

admits that know htile about the third of Sageman we very wave Poverty One of the most popular explanations for terrorism is global Islamists that come from the Middle East poverty although the data shows that the al Qacda social movement

is solidly middle class However differences in this socioeconomic Brainwashing knother popular theory of terrorism is that indi

composition are evident over time Dr Sageman divides the global viduals are brainwashed either by their religion famdies cultures

Islamist terrorists into three waves to explore this generarional or Islamic schools Dc Sageman challenges the religions version

nft The first wave which represents the old guard who fought of the brainwashing hypothesis by arguing diat the vast majority

against the Soviets in Afghanistan and who form the core of in of terrorists arc not well-educated in religion Only one quarter

ahnost divided between class of his when and Qaeda Central was equally upper sample was deeply religious they were young

and middle class The second wave comprises those who joined roughly two-thirds was secular Again there is gcncrarional

the jthad in the 1990s often motivated by the suffering of Muslims divide While the first wave came from relatively pious famibes

in Bosnia Cheehnya IKashmir and the Philippines This grnnp the second and third waves are conspicnnns for their lack of

was largely middle class The third wave represents the post-Iraqi formal religious upbringing Another version of this hypothesis

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THE JIHADISTS PROFILE CONT states that terrorists are brainwashed by their schoolswhat Ut Bad or mad Another popular explanation posits that terrorists act

calls the madrassa 13 Sageman theory However only percent as they do because there is something wrongwith them personally of the attended madrassa In the author sample fact suggests There are flvo versions of this argument that they are inherently that lack of formal likely makes more cnniinal that abnormal religious training subjects bad or they are psychologically mad susceptible to radical interpretations of the Quran topic he Ur Sageman finds only small meidence of arrests or imprison

later in the book covers nient in his sample of terrorist subjects There were many eases

of second and third wave terrorist subjects who committed petty Immature and ignorant Another com crimes but this most often was in an effort to self-finance their mon misconception about terrorists re the data did reveal evidence of operations Additionally not any lated to the brainwashmg theory holds above levels of mental disorders global Islamist ter that xvith weak average among they are nave young men ronsts The only subject in his sample who showed signs of being or vulnerable mmds who are easily influ or ivas Abu Musab who headed enced their elders The sociopath psychopath al-Zarqaivi by average age at al the end of his terrorist in Qaeda in Iraq AQI at eareet which subject joined the jihad the

authors is which sample 25 goes against what matters then While Ut Sagemnnis analysis has challenged

the naiveté hypothesis However he does much of the conventional wisdom about terrorists the data also

note that the of those in the average age offers insight mto common situational variables present when third wave is closer to 20 years suggesting that the pool of global subjects joined terrorist organization One of the freiuent themes

Islamist terrorists is Ut also getting younger Sagenmn points out was that of being an expatriate About 60 percent of the terrorist that the majority of his sample attended university whereas only 10 subjects in the sample were livmg in country in which they did

of Muslims the Middle East does This discredits percent young not grow up and another 20 percent were second or third genera the that terrorists and the because notion are ignorant join jihad lion Muslim immigrants in the Westin total 84 percent of Ut

do not know better in they my Sagemans sample was the diaspora This finding is consistent

with other studies on terronsm The IRA started in pub in Bos Lack of responsibility Conventional wisdom would suggest that the Tamil in Sn Lanka receive from to become terronsts because do not ton Tigers support diaspora people are more likely they communities in Londoii and Toronto and Basque separatists find have my responsibilities such as famdy or job which might sanctuary in France steer them an ay from terronsin However the majority of Ut held Sagemans sample professional or semi-professional jobs Ur Sageman finds that joining the global Islamist terrorist move and about three-fourths of the terrorists were married Again ment is based to large degree on friendship and kinship About there is variation with of terrorist over time greater percentage tno-thirds of those in the sample siere friends with others who subjects that are unemployed or unmarried in the emerging third joined the jthad or had some connection to terrorism while about of wave jthadis one-fifth of those in ins sample were dose relativessons brothers

first cousinsof people who already had joined terrorist organi SexnalfrnstrationUe Sageman does not take the variants of this zation Dt about the lack of Three-fourths of his marned Sageman was surprised apparent any argument very seriously sample was top-down recruitment into al Qaeda Rathem the global and about tu u-thirds had ehddren often man The author be program Islamist terrorist social movement forms through the spontaneous heves that the sexual frustration hypothesis shows that we are so of informal of trusted self-organization bunches guys friends eager to believe that terrorists are different we will believe almost from the bottom-up The Hamburg cell and the 7/7 London at anything about their morivations tackers sought out al Qaeda not the other way around

RADICALIZATION IN THE DIASPORA

Ue Sageman argues that the 9/11 attacks and especially the invasion among these dimensions of radicalization and an individual need of mark watershed in the evolution of the each become radicalized Iraq global jthadist not complete step to fully threat to the West The threat ri no longer foreign fanatics but Moraloutrage ha nearly all of their writings speeches and memoirs rather individuals \vho grew up the West and became radicalized global jthadists discuss the suffering of fellow Muslims Images there Rather than hardening uational borders against an outside videos and discussions of Muslims suffering woridwide are the threat an effective comiterterrorism strategy should seek to under most common acts that trigger moral outrage for terrorist sub stand the of radicalization and devise process measures to prevent jects This sense of moral outrage is often experienced vicariously its reaching the pomt of violence In this chapter Ut Sageman with terrorist subjects speaking out for their fellow brothers even his model for the more fully develops four-pronged understanding though they have not experienced the act personally Ut Sageman radicalization process moral outrage interpretation as war against states that the media is the primary vehicle for broadcasting moral Islam resonance with personal experience and mobilization through violations This is especially true for the second and third wave networks Tins is not sequential model there are many interactions

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RADICALIZATION IN THE DIASPORA CONT

of terronsts whom have been mobilized by images from Bosnia involved in this perceived struggle they are far more hkely to join

Kashmir Cheehnya and now Iraq the global jihadist cause The author notes that he role of local

grievances are most evident in Europe where diaspora Muslims Wzragainst Islam Dr Sageman argues that sense of moral out do not fare as well as their host counterparts for number of rage alone is insnfficient to mobilize an inclividnal to join the jihad in reasons explored the next chapter Individuals need to interpret moral violations certain context

that affects them personally to be mobilized to violence To the Mobilized by networks Dr Sageman argues that mobilization

the West is networks is that transform global jiliadists percieved to through key ingredient can angry

in be engaged an apocalyptic war against young Muslims into terrorists In the previous chapter he argued

Joining the jihad is Islam Tliis is the backdrop for the self that the global jihad was typically collective process based on

typically collective heroes of the Islamist Intimate have influence appomted global friendship or kinship groups strong on process based on terrorist movement who view themselves members All of the terrorist subjects in Dr Sagemans sample friendship and kinship evil cabal of from informal networks of either as waging war against an emerged young Muslims as

Local grievances Jews and Crusaders that is mampnlatmg face-to-face groups or virtual online groups Wlide the author

especially police the world Dr Sageman argues that all focuses on the role of the internet in another chapter here he actions to perceived in global Islamist terrotist ideologies sliare considers only offline groups Many of the terrorist networks be unfair by Muslim moral reductionism which ascribes the authors from Muslim communities are sample emerged neighborhood gangs

principal driver in the simple canses and their implied remedies student associations or study groups that formed around radical radicalization process to complex events This simplicity makes mosques mere twelve Islamic ins Ututions in the world gener

them easy to grasp explain and accept ated about half of Dc Sagemans sample of terrorist networks

In this Islamist terrotism is about the nature of this due to the role of sense global more how The disproportionate finding is

terrotists feel than about how they thinktherefore imagery kinship and friendship in joining the jihad There is tremendous

and emotions are more important than concepts amount of self-selection involved in the radicalization and mo

bilization and formation former friends processes dunng group Resonance with personal experience Many people are exposed and acquaintances inevitably peel off from the group as radical to the jihadist interpretation but most do not internalize it Dr interpretations harden As these informal networks become more Sageman argues that an individual is far more likely to adopt the ideologically homogenous the group acts as an echo chamber jihadist interpretation if it resonates ith ones everyday experi encouraging escalation of grievances and behefs in conspiracy ences Local gtievanees often inflicted through police actions give to the point of hatred In group love breeds out group hate Dc global moral violations new relevance and immediacy Through Sageman uses the Madrid train bombers as an example of die this mechanism the moral outrages from the local and global intensity of group ties The young men did not carry out suicide contexts reinforce each other and are viewed as part of the same attacks but later committed form of group sincide when Spanish wholea Islam When Muslims feel war against young personally with surrounded their police arrest warrants apartment THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE

Dr that there far fewer factor that has the Islamist terrorist Sageman argues are homegrown global primary galvanized global

Islainist terrorists in die United States dian in Europe due to dif movement However dus does not explani die difference in levels

ferences in the radicalization in their radicalization the IJnited States rate of respective Muslim of and Europe Rather Dc

in communities He argues that this is the primary reason that the Sageman suggests that the high level of local moral violations

United States has not experienced terrorist follow-np to the 9/il Europe contribute to the greater sense of radicalization there In

events despite U.S counterterrorism officials boasting of successes particular European approaches to policing have caused alienation

in the Global \Var on Terror In Europe there have been over among Muslims communities Dr Sageman contrasts European

2300 arrests related to Islamist terrorism since September 11 2001 law enforcement efforts with community policing efforts in

compared to only abont 60 in the United States When put in per the United States where the aiim is to develop police force that

capita terms among respective Mnsbm populations the rate of ar is not only reflection of the community but an integral part of

rest for terrorism charges is six times higher in Europe than in the it Fair example the population of New York City is about one-

United States Dc Sageman also adds that terrorist suspects in the third foreigu-born and so is the New York Police Department

United States arrested at much caner ni die evolution forces ni are stage NYPD Howe er police Europe are predominately

of their plots than in Europe so the numbers are not the result of Caucasian with the result that white police officers are patrollmg

in more aggressive law enforcement efforts Europe local immigrant enclaves which are predominately North African

or South Asian Muslim Furthermore after the 7/7 bombings in Dr the of radicalization in Sageman compares dynamics Europe London British authorities created an additional set of problems and the United States using the four-pronged outline presented by making mistakes such as the killing of Brazdian expatriate in the previous chapter First looking at the Muslim sense of on suspicion of terrorism and the shooting of two Bangladesh moral outrage he suggests that the invasion of Iraq has been the Muslnns with no link to terrorism

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THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE CONT

Dr Sageman suggests that several features promotes grassroots voluntansm which anchors citizens in their

of American culture the and offers of local In help prevent community sense empowerment Europe

American Muslim from believ social voluntarism and population howevei perceived rigidities discourage

ing in the war agamst Islam rnterpreta leads to apathy and an expectation that the state should step in

tion of post-li/li events The American and provide social services

national myth of ameltmg pot promotes The interpretation of war against Islam also resonates more pohcies that are more accepting of for with Muslim European audience because of differences in the eigners and their integration into society histories of Muslim immigration to Europe and the United States than Europe Essence-based European Muslim Americans are solidlyuppermiddle class and professionals nationalism often promotes policies that while Muslim Europeans are predoniinately unskilled laborers that discruniuatc against Muslims and other came to Europe as economic migrants As the Muslim population foreigners in the name of preserving in Europe has expanded labor restrictions have disenminated certain national heritage Dr Sageman against foreign workers The unemployment rate among young also uses data to show that Mus polling Muslim males about three times than European is two to higher lim Americans are stronger believers in the comparable unemployment rate in die native population the idea of the American Dream 71 Dr Sageman does note that European governments are start percent than the American general public ing to understand this problem although it has been difficult 64 percent Jowever polls in Europe issue to tackle When the French government passed legislation show that Muslims European complain in to loosen the labor market spring 2006 widespread protests far more about economic discrimina from students and labor unions caused the government to shelve tion and exclusion than their Amencan the Dr that this clear project indefinitely Sageman argues sent counterparts American uidividualism alsu message to young immigrants who are de facto excluded from makes it harder for Muslim Americans to the economy Differences in welfare policies across the Atlantic interpret their world in collective terms also impact the process of radicalization In the United States to such as part of war against Islam Fi receive welfare payments an individual must show that he or she Dr that American nally Sageman argues is actively looking for employment How ci er generous welfare society is generally viewed as more open policies in Europe remove the urgency to find regular work and and the economy is more dynamic than allow greater leisure time to become full-time Islamist terrorist in Europe The emphasis on individual wannabes As Dr Sageman states the harmEd effects of idleness responsibility and the openness of societe and boredom cannot be overstated

TERRORISM IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET

The growth of the Internet has dramatically transformed the online communications include Since 2004 chat rooms structure and dynamic of the evolving threat of global Islamist the Hofttad Group in the Neth and web forums on terrorism by changing the nature of terrorists interactions In erlands the Toronto 18 suspects the Internet have been Dr discussed the of face-to- die Crevice ease in the United Chapter Sageman importance the primary engine of face interaction and mobilization through networks He does Kingdom and the April 2005 radicalization among discount the role of but rather Cairo Khan al-Khalth the global Islamist not personal interactions argues bombing terrorists that interaction via the Internet is able to serve many of the same among others Dr Sageman ar functions the radicalization However the nature of that the increased of process gues usage The Internet provides this influence is often misunderstood terrorism who online communication methods by analysts relatively safe tend focus websites central environment for fence- to on passive displaying terronst propaganda was not planned by any sitters to explore and do-it-yourself bomb makmg instructions The real engine of organization Rather it is simply terrorist fantasies and radicalization on the Internet comes from online communication the result of the growth in the aspirations without systems such as email listserves and especially forums and that Internet and heightened monitor physically committing to

It is the of these tools that of traditional an organization rooms interactivity is important ing more terronst

meeting places such as radical Dr Sagemans argues that beginning in around 2004 communi forces While this shift toward virtual mobili cations and Islamist terrorists shifted mosques by police inspiration among global has resulted in of zation was not planned it number significant from face-to-face interaction to the Internet Prior to this most changes in the global Islamist terrorist landscape The average terrorist networks and plots were result of personal connee of terrorist in Dr for his age subjects Sagemans onginal sample tions The Madrid bombers were inspired by document posted 2004 book was 26 while the average age of those dettined since on the influential Global Islamic Media Front GIMF website in 2006 is 20 This is significant decrease and reflects the enhanced December 2003 Other terrorist plots after this point that utilized WESTPOINTCTCSUMMARIES

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TERRORISM IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET CONT

role of computer-literate youth in the global Islamist terrorist these same ptineiples apply to terronst web forums and chat

Another noticeable is in the role of The Internet innocuous for movement change women rooms provides relatively entry point

Previously females were conspicuously absent from the ranks of fence-sitters to explore terrotist fantasies and aspiratious without

Islamist terrorists there is evidence show terrotist As online form global However some physically committing to group groups in ing that women are increasingly active jihadist chat rooms and and interact over time mutual sharing makes them feel ever closer

in some cases have even played central role in the radicalization to each other in virtual process simdar to what was described

process In the Hofstad case women lured potential recruits into earher as in-group love As the online dialogue intensifies and

their informal network and motivated their men to become more becomes more violent the group hardens their beliefs through

in active-culminating the murder of Theo van Gogh Another process called the illusion of numbers Participation is active

noteworthy change facilitated by the Internet is that there is an individuals seek out chat rooms most compatible with their views

inversion of power in the global Islamist terrorist movement and abandon those they disagree with Whereas in physical ter

it is the followers and rotist cell the debates and Nowadays unknown sympathizers engaged group ideology strategy face-to-face

in that and other online forums whose actions in the virtual world terrotists with their mice and rooms matter not vote computer

die actions of central al Qaeda leaderslup Computer-mediated select die view diey like Coinpeinig terroust ideologies mid lead

communications make the evolving leaderless jthad possible ers coexist peacefully online without the need to eliminate each

in according to Dr Sageman Online interactions also empower loner other as is often the case offline terrotist organizations In

jihadi wannabes who are only lone wolves offiine sense leadership of the virtual jihad has been democratized and

may be up for grabs Dr Sageman cites the case of Younis Tsouli Dr Sageman references several studies that have concluded that the famous Irhabi0fl7 Terrotist 007 in Arabic as an onlme jihadi computer-mediated communications can provide greater group With no pnor history of terrotist activity Tsouli was invited to intimacy than offline groups Por example some studies have two forums us 2004 Ic immediately demonstrated that bccausc of the of the jom password protected early apparent anonymity became prolific participant in both forums and people started to which contributes Internet people are more likely self-disclose defernng to him mostly due to his technical proficiency with the to strong feelings of intimacy The most obvious example is the Internet as opposed to his ments in combat Tsouhi soon became growth of online dating although Dr Sageman points out the more key role player in die virtual jiliad even earning praise from Abu pernicious results of this finding Hundreds of suicidal Japanese Musab arrested and now in al-Zarqawi Though eventually serving teenagers unknown to each other have met online special fo 10-year prison sentence the career of Yonnis Tsouli demonstrates rums and met up the next day to collectively commit suicide The the inversion of power in the age of the Internet mutual support of the group gives such individuals the courage to

commit acts they niay not has otherwise done alone

THE RISE OF LEADERLESS JIHAD

In mid-2007 several commentators on terrorism argued that we has unleashed local resurgence yes the term is correct in this

of al Central The National of Taliban-related and attacks in are seeing resurgence Qaeda July 2007 context bombings Afghanistan

Estimate The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland also shares that this is limited of Intellgenee However Dr Sageman argues marriage

this alarmist tone Dr Sageman is skeptical of the claim of re convenience and says that Pushtun al Qaedaineinbers have dual

surgent al Qaeda He concedes that al Qaeda Central leadership allegiance and that if push comes to shove they will again betray

has regrouped somewhat in the bederally Administered tribal the foreigu Arab fighters

Area FATA of Wazinstan Pakistan but has not developed to However the long-term trend does not favor al Qaeda Central anywhere near die pre-9/1 scale Dr Sageman argues that we are according to Dr Sageman The rapid succession of al Qaeda seeing limited consolidation of al Qaeda Central hut that this is military commanders since 9/11Abu Hafs al Masri Khalid far from resurgence Numerous litfie al Qaedas have sprung up Sheikh Mohammed Abu Paraj al Libi Hamza Hamsa Rabia Ab everywhere in the worldsuch as the al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb dur Rahman al Muhajir Abdel Hadi al Iraqi indicates that the AQIMbut these are only al Qaeda in name trying to acquire operational leaders are still nienibers of die first wave Moreos er the groups reputation by association In fact great debate has much of the al Qaeda Central leaders as of mid-2007 were only emerged terrorist chat rooms among leaders and followers of middle-level leaders earher As first couple years wave leadership the former Algetian GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication has diminished second and third wave terrorists have not stepped et le with traditional leaders the Combat many rejecting adop in to replenish the ranks The lack of organizational depth in al tion of the al name Still Dr concedes that there Qaeda Sageman Central different conclusion than that offered Qaeda suggests Al are some wortisome trends Qaeda has markedly improved its by the alarmists Rather than resurgence Dr Sageman argues media say and die organizatious propaganda ennpaigus have that the organization is shrinking and contained operationally increased noticeablymostly due to its production arm As Sthah However while al Qaeda Central is in hiding and degraded the al Al Qaeda also seems to be spearheading campalgn of terror us CJaeda social movement is alive and well fueled by the American The virtual between al and the Taliban Afghanistan merger Qaeda invasion and occupation of Iraq

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THE RISE OF LEADERLESS JIHAD CONT

The infonnal groups forming the post-9/ 11 and post-Iraqi third rorism policies targeting al Qaeda

of terrorism but with few Central The of the wave are self-generating very excep breakup global The merger between tions em no longer establish any physical link to al Qaeda Central al Qaeda network the hostile local al Qaeda and the Woridwide eovmterterrorism and enhanced border environment the of na policies security hardening Taliban in Afghanistan have made of these members of travel As tional and the is many skeprieal foreign borders availability only marriage of convenience result these networks have begun to conduct operations inside of the Internet has spawned vast As such it is likely their own borders The attacks in Casablanca Spain London and but disconnected global network only temporary Amsterdam successful of this of likeminded terrorists The In are examples homegroivn trend phenomenon however the thousands of arrests of terrorist plotters woridwide ternet is key lubricator of this

Operational leaders show the widespread nature of the threat Todays terrorist plots movement Howeve the common within al Qaeda Central have no or only faint link to al Qaeda Central While the global agenda of the tlurd wave found are still drawn from the Islamist terrorist has increasedDc estimates that on the Intemet is anti pool Sageman basically old guard Second and the third consists of thousands of individuals while the which is ivave Wstem political violence third wave terrorists

have not stepped second wave had only few hundred terroriststhere has been the lowest common denominator in to replenish the norieeable deterioration in the quality of operations and tradeeraft of the various ideologies of global organizations ranks over the last few years Homegrown terrorists are self-trained and Islamist terrorism Dc Sageman self which limits their effeeriveness To that the third financed operarional some argues among wave The greatest obstacle

to successful terrorist extent this has not mattered smee recent European terrorist attacks there is little evidence of grand operation is not finance appear to have been low cost operarions The greatest obstacle coordinated international plan or but technical expertise to terronst operation is not finance but expertise lhis lack of coherent political strategy terror teehineal expertise and training is the most significant consequence ist attacks have their own mtemal The leaderless and

link disconnected structure of third ave networks inability to up widi al Qaeda Central logic but thats it The leaderiess of the Islamist These link with and disconnected structure of the global new gmups become dangerous when they up Jihad constitutes at the trained bomb maker as the London 7/7 bombers did However global jihad constitutes at the same same time its strength even training does not guarantee success as the London 7/21 lime its strength survivability and survivability and

its demonstrated and its weakness adaptability and group adaptability Gaek weakness lack of clear of clear direction and strategic The concept of the leaderless jihad is the result of these bottom- direction and strategic goals up homegrown terronst networks shaped by top-down eounterter goals

COMBATING GLOBAL ISLAMIST TERRORISM

In this chapter Dr Sageman offers several counterterrorism Sageman puts it This need not be long war unless American insights and pohcy recommendations to mitigate the threat of policies make it so global Islamist terrorism The threat emanating from the leaderiess Several of Dr Sagemans policy recommendations aim to take the jihad is not existential he argues so the goal should therefore be glory out of terrorism and dimmish the sense of moral outrage to contain it at its present state and allow self-limiting features of that drives young Muslims toward terrorism Por more than 150 the Islamist terrorist movement to run their course Because global terronst for individual years people have joined organizations and the potential long-term threathostility against the United States collective glory and to build better world on behalf of an imag growing beyond the few thousands in the al Qaeda social movement med community successful eounterterrorism strategy should to encompass tens of millions of Muslimsis far more senous therefore take the glory and thrill out of termrism The Rewards than threat the to Islamist any present approach fighting global which and ranks terrorists the forjustiee Program posts by price terrorism beyond the present situation is die real challenge Dv the U.S will for their has been government pay capture general Sageman draws up containment strategy for the twenty-first failure and instead tums nobodies into heroes Dv Sageman most century which draws several parallels between fighting global vocally opposes self-congratulating press conferences at which Islamist extremists and the Cold War Al Central waging Qaeda in government officials celebrate their newest victories the global is hunted everywhere and has only continued to make enemies war on terrorism better alternative he says would lie to treat Tliis failure to attain is tlie reason tlie protected sanctuary very in terrorists as common criminals there is no glory being taken third wave has evolved out of necessity as leaderless jthad to prison in handcuffS The key to this movements continued existence will lie its ability

To diminish the sense of Muslim moral outrage Dv Sageman says to attract young Mushms to its ranks The sources of its appeal that the single-most effective step the U.S em take is to remove are not rmiversal but are sustamed by American actions perceived

American troops from Iraq The invasion and occupation of Iraq to lie part of war agamst Islam Without this fuel young Mus has galvanized the third wave of global Islamist terronsts since bins will no longer find their global Islamist terrorist elders to lie images of the American military fighting in Muslim lands triggers cool and will move onto neiver hopes and aspirarions As Dv

WESTPOINTCTCSUMMARIES

ACLURM046392 FB1045292 LEADERLESS JIHAD

COMBATING GLOBAL ISLAMIST TERRORISM CONT

moral outrage and inspires sympathizers to jom the movement rope should also be reformed to successful counter- Another step would be for the U.S to make good faith attempt better reflect the communities in terrorism strategy to broker solution to the Israeli-Palestmian conflict Dr which The local Sageman they operate po should seek to take

says that credibility is key factor in this arena Muslims understand lice should never be viewed as the thegloryoutof terrorism that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is compbcated but the appearance enemy by the Muslim community

of an honest broker is all that is required of the United States In Dv Sageman cites US Department The demographics addition counterterrorism efforts must exclusively focus on the of Homeland Seeunty-led regional of police force

perpetrators and not on more general segment of the population fusion centers as positive cx should reflect the

Tins difficult in the of leaderless the of collaboration and inte communities in which is age jiliad suice spectrum ample it operates The of activities of those associated with the movement ranges from gration between federal and local poiice force should tacit support to active plottmg of attacks Distinguishmg who is law enforcement This agencies be seen as part of

terrorist and who is not in this dynamic is not easy However provides an ideal mix of federal the community as to overzealous law enforcement activities that alienate the Muslim expertise on terrorism with local opposed an enemy of it community are counterproductive Dr Sageman concedes that knowledge of the community

winning over the hardhners is next to impossible but that it is Dr also calls for of scientific research Sageman greater fi.inding feasible to influence the fence-sitters on terrorism Just as the federal government initiated nationwide

The author also recommends pohcy actions to counter the enemys projects on Soviet studies in the 1950s and 1960s to develop

appeal Howevei Dr Sageman eschews Western-directed counter- expertise to deal with our adversary it should embark on similar

messaging efforts that over-intellectualize the fight The data shows projects in terronsm studies The current government-sponsored

that terronsts are far from ideologues or religious scholars The centers of excellence on terrorism are isolated from the rest

lack of religious education is most sttiking in the third wave of of the academy and do not yet attract the best graduate students

global Islamist terrotists who constitute the leaderless jthad These Dr Sageman also says that excessive government secrecy hinders

subjects are typically poorly educated and do not understand the the collection of relevant data on terrorism Some government

in Quran yet we seek to engage diem intellectual debates about die concern with secrecy is legitimate But homeland seeutit3 was

legitimacy of an extreme interpretation of religious message Dv not compromised by the declassification of large parts of the

believes itis the role of the \Xbst tell Muslims what of K.halid Sheikh Ramzi bin Sageman not to interrogation Mohammed al-Shibh

is Islam and what is not This should be an internal debate among and others for the 9/11 Commission report strategic approach

Muslims The author hopes that more non-violent Muslims will more grounded in scientific research would serve eounterterror

enter this debate in online chat rooms and other offime forums ist officials well For example the weapons of mass destruction

but it is the of non-Muslims of the NSCT offers recommendations based not place to promoteand potentially WMD portions

discreditsuch voices Young Muslims need alternate local heroes on hypothetical worst-ease scenarios whde ignoring the empirical

within their conmiunitiesespecially in Muslim European enclaves data on terrorists using WMD While the NSCT emphasizes the

and the Middie East where such heroes are rare Dv Sageman also nuclear terrorist threat Dr Sageman says that the far more senous

calls for better Amenean public diplomacy The U.S would do well threat in terms of feasibihty and destructive potential is from live

in to condemn putative allies diat eonTunit atrocities against Muslims biological agents used terrorist tools In the past there have been

in the the the six name of Global War on Terror such as Russian such non-state-sponsored attempts to use biological weapons

intervention Better American citizens and faded al in in 2000-2001 in Cheehnya educating only attempt by Qaeda Afghanistan

about the global Islamist terronst threat would also go long way was earned out by terrorist group The odds are that WMD

what Dv calls the attack the United States from of the well- to gettingpast Sageman bogeyman approach on might come not any

However domestic democratic polities get in the way of this as known terrorist groups already monitored by authonries but from

afford be sofr terror informal the focus of such such pundits cannot to seen as on an group not yet scrutiny Groups

as single-issue extremists may fly under the radar of government Dr Sageman further calls for policies to eliminate real and perceived authorities and the sort of strategy embodied by the NSCT may diserimmation against Muslims The global Islaniiist terrotist inter prove ineffective against them pretation appeals to certain Muslims because it resonates with their

personal experiences This is mosily Western European problem The complexity of solutions offered by Dv Sageman should alert

for the melting pot mentality and the Ametican dream whether the reader that there is no simple solution to global Islamist ter

myth or reality partially protects the United States The French at rorism Because the threat of al Qaeda is self-limiting in terms of

tempt to hberahze labor markets the spring 2006 was good first both structural capability and appeal homeland security is best

step although the government ultimately shelved it afrer students accomplished through strategy of bringing to justice real terror

and labor unions protested the move Unfortunately according to ists containing potential terrorists and exercising restraint with

Dr Sageman this sent negative message to European immigrant respect to the Muslim community Only then will the leaderless

communities and particularly young Muslims Police forces in Eu- jdiad expire poisoned by its own toxic message

WEST POINT CIt SUMMARIES The views expressed in thi.s document are those the author and

not the the the other st US MilitaG Academ Department oJ Aezrp or anj US agenu ACLURM046393 FB1045293