DOCSLIB.ORG

Video-Recorded Decapitations - a Seemingly Perfect Terrorist Tactic That Did Not Spread Martin Harrow DIIS Working Paper 2011:08 WORKING PAPER

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Video-Recorded Decapitations - a Seemingly Perfect Terrorist Tactic That Did Not Spread Martin Harrow DIIS Working Paper 2011:08 WORKING PAPER DIIS working paper DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 Video-recorded Decapitations - A seemingly perfect terrorist tactic that did not spread Martin Harrow DIIS Working Paper 2011:08 WORKING PAPER 1 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 MARTIN HARROW MSC, PhD, Consulting Analyst at DIIS [email protected] DIIS Working Papers make available DIIS researchers’ and DIIS project partners’ work in progress towards proper publishing. They may include important documentation which is not necessarily published elsewhere. DIIS Working Papers are published under the responsibility of the author alone. DIIS Working Papers should not be quoted without the express permission of the author. DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 © Copenhagen 2011 Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler Layout: Ellen-Marie Bentsen Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN: 978-87-7605-449-6 Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk 2 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 CONTENTS Abstract 4 Introduction 5 Decapitation as a weapon 5 Video-recorded decapitations 2002-2009 8 The reproductive dynamics of terrorist tactics 11 The accessibility of video-recorded decapitations as a tactic 12 Effectiveness of terrorism – impacting two different audiences 14 Why not video-recorded decapitations? 18 Iraq 18 Afghanistan 19 The West 20 Conclusion 21 List of References 23 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 ABSTracT Video-recorded decapitations have an enormous impact, they are cheap and easy, and they allow the terrorists to exploit the potential of the Internet. With these advantages, the tactic would have been expected to quickly spread across the globe as a favored tactic. Yet, years after its invention in 2002, this has not happened. This paper using evolutionary theory finds that video-recorded decapita- tions have not caught on for locally specific reasons: in the West because the tactic is less accessible than one might expect; in Iraq because of the unwillingness to be associated with Zarqawi, and in the Afghan context, it has not spread because it is mainly relevant for mobilizing resources from abroad, which is not a priority for the Taliban. These are however situational variables, and just as suicide bombings took years to spread, there may be campaigns of video-recorded decapitations as conditions change. DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 INTrodUCTION tral claims: First, any kind of terrorism is the contingent outcome of the availability of the In 2002, Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and be- material and immaterial resources necessary headed in Pakistan. The horrific live footage of under the given environmental constraints. the decapitation quickly spread on the Inter- Second, for terrorism to exist beyond the in- net causing widespread shock and revulsion, dividual attack, it must be able to reproduce but also a realization that an effective new the resources it depends on. Third, terrorism terrorist tactic had emerged. Video-recorded reproduces itself by making an impact on two decapitations are neither technically demand- different audiences, a constituent audience ing to carry out nor do they require a lot of and an enemy audience. Fourth, terrorist phe- money, training or weapons. Added to that the nomena can be divided into two ideal types, prevalence of Internet with reasonable band- emergent terrorism and instrumental terror- width now makes it possible to disseminate ism. Terrorist tactics, which work well against video content, even if TV-networks will only the enemy audience, do not necessarily work air extractions of the decapitation videos or well to mobilize resources from a constituent not at all. In other words, it seemed that the audience, and vice versa. The priority between perfect terrorist weapon for the information the two depends on the type of terrorism, in- age had been invented. It was therefore to be strumental or emergent. expected that decapitations the following years The immediate aim of the paper is to estab- spread to Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Thai- lish why the tactic of video-recorded decapita- land, and India. It was however only in Iraq tions did not spread. More broadly, the paper that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, two years later, aims to contribute to the understanding of why in 2004 again took up video recording the some tactics are selected and others are not, and decapitations and disseminating them on the how and why terrorist tactics spread. The paper Internet. Within Islamist circles, this created a is divided into four sections: first, a brief ac- prominent status for Zarqawi, who produced count of how decapitations have been used and a shocking 11 decapitation videos in Iraq in interpreted as a weapon of terror. Secondly, an 2004. Other groups quickly adopted the tactic. account of the evolution of the video-recorded However, already the following year the num- decapitations 2002-2009; thirdly, a theoreti- ber of videoed decapitations dropped to five in cal discussion of the evolutionary dynamics of all of Iraq, followed by only two in 2006. This terrorist tactics; and finally, an empirical ex- is odd because earlier research shows that ter- amination of the contentious performances in rorist tactics are subject to intense copying and three critical venues where it would have been strong mechanisms of selection: aircraft hijack- expected to see video-recorded decapitations: ings (Holden 1986), suicide bombings (Pape Iraq, Afghanistan and the West. 2005) the use of certain homemade explosives (Clarke and Soria 2009). Yet despite the obvi- ous advantages, video-recorded decapitations DECAPITATION AS A WEAPON did not spread dramatically: Why? This paper conducts an analysis based on The existing literature on decapitations focuses evolutionary theory; the foundation for any predominantly on the functionality and the evolutionary analysis is that the phenomena use in history of decapitations, especially on we find necessarily have passed a survival con- the symbolic effect of mutilating the body, and straint. For this paper, this involves four cen- the use of power by the authorities in exercising DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 extreme violence. The use of decapitations as group (Burke 2004: 214-218). However, even an effective and symbolic tool for underlining though the letter provides an insight into the power and causing fear is therefore well known considerations of Islamist militants, the frac- historically (Lentini and Bakashmar 2007). For tured nature of the Islamist militant landscape example the 14th century mogul ruler, Tamer- means that the existence of the letter alone does lane, decapitated several hundred thousands not explain why the practice of video-recorded and raised pyramids of the severed heads in the decapitations has stopped. sacked city of Isfahan to persuade other cities Charles Tilly has studied different conten- to surrender at the first warning (Chaliand and tious performances of social movements cov- Blin 2007). It was also common practice by ering several centuries of development and English monarchs to exhibit severed heads at change. He notes, “In any particular regime, the Tower of London. More recently, decapita- pairs of actors have only a limited number of tions have been used by criminal organizations performances at their disposal. We can con- in Mexico (Campbell 2006), and by right wing veniently call that set of performances their extremists in Russia (Arnold 2009). Given the repertoire of contention” (Tilly 2003: 45). historical experience it is less surprising that Video-recorded decapitations can thus be con- modern Islamist militants adopted decapita- sidered as part of the repertoire for Islamist tions as a tactic, than why they would choose militants. For Tilly, it is the contentious per- to back away from it, especially once the tactic formances which primarily define the conten- has been developed and adopted. tious phenomenon. Nonetheless, the conten- Some of the reason for the apparent backing tious performances within the same movement away from the use of video-recorded decapita- can change and mutate over time – starting as tions may be found in internal disagreements student protests that turn into violent clashes, within the ranks of militant Islamists about that mobilize unions to file complaints and the appropriateness of decapitations. In 2005 organize strikes, which might strengthen civil a letter was made public, which had been in- society and motivate the regime to enter into a tercepted by US forces, from Ayman al-Zawa- democratic debate (Tilly 2008). According to hiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, cautioning the Tilly, contentious performances are often based latter to shoot hostages rather than decapitat- on shifting alliances and are selected by actors ing them in order not to alienate potential sup- based on the availability of ‘repertoires’, ‘po- porters (Zawahiri 2005). The letter has fostered litical opportunity structures’ and the strength some debate on the strategic considerations of of the actor. The value of the ‘repertoire’ for at least part of the militant Islamist movement the contentious actors is that they do not need stressing the schism between maximum effect to invent courses of action from time to time on the enemy and the risk of alienating poten- – repertoires vary from very weak models to tial supporters (McCants and Brachman 2006; rigid formats that allow complex operations Hegghammer
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 15-L-1645/0 0 0 /194
    (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TS::SC'l' Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for IS'.'1 10024 OPENING REPORTER : On the record RECORDER: All rise. PRESIDENT: Remain seated and come to order. Go nhead. Recorder. RECORDER: This Tribunal is being conducle<l at 1328 March 10, 200 ; on board C.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bav. Cuba. The following personnel are present: Captain (b)(6) United Slates Navy, President Lieutenant Colonel b) 6) • t..:nited States Air Force. Member Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) United States Marine Corps. Member Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) , United States Air F11rce, Personal Re pre sen ta the Language Analysis.+.--,...,..,,.,.---. (b)(6) ......... ..,.... Gunnery Sergeant (b)(6) l nited States Marine Corps. Reporter Lieutenant Colonel'-P!!~~) --"" . United States Anny, Recorder Captain (b)(6) 1:; c ge Advocate member »fthe Tribunal. OATH SESSION 1 RECORDER: All Rise. PRESIDE!\T: The Recorder will be sworn. Do you, Lieutenant Colonel j(b)(6) I solemnly swear that you will faithfully pcrfonn the duties as Recorder assigned in this Tribunai so help you God'' RECORDER: I do. PRESIDENT: The Reponer will now be :;worn. The Recorder will administer the oath. RECORDER: ()o you Gunnery Sergeant l(b)(6) ~wear or affinn that y<•u will faithfully <lis~: harge )'Our duties as Reporter assigned in this Tribunal ro help you God? REPORTER: I do. PRESIDENT: The Translator will be sworn. JSN #10024 Enclosure (3) Page I of27 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 15-L-1645/0 0 0/194 (b }( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TS:lSCJt RECORDER: Do you swear or affinn that you will faithrully perform 1he duties ofTranslaror in the case now in hearing so help you God? TRANSLATOR: I do PRESIDEN I': We will take a brief recess now in order in lo bring Detainee into the room.
    [Show full text]
  • Video-Recorded Decapitations - a Seemingly Perfect Terrorist Tactic That Did Not Spread Martin Harrow DIIS Working Paper 2011:08 WORKING PAPER
    DIIS working paper DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 Video-recorded Decapitations - A seemingly perfect terrorist tactic that did not spread Martin Harrow DIIS Working Paper 2011:08 WORKING PAPER 1 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 MARTIN HARROW MSC, PhD, Consulting Analyst at DIIS [email protected] DIIS Working Papers make available DIIS researchers’ and DIIS project partners’ work in progress towards proper publishing. They may include important documentation which is not necessarily published elsewhere. DIIS Working Papers are published under the responsibility of the author alone. DIIS Working Papers should not be quoted without the express permission of the author. DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 © Copenhagen 2011 Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler Layout: Ellen-Marie Bentsen Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN: 978-87-7605-449-6 Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk 2 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 CONTENTS Abstract 4 Introduction 5 Decapitation as a weapon 5 Video-recorded decapitations 2002-2009 8 The reproductive dynamics of terrorist tactics 11 The accessibility of video-recorded decapitations as a tactic 12 Effectiveness of terrorism – impacting two different audiences 14 Why not video-recorded decapitations? 18 Iraq 18 Afghanistan 19 The West 20 Conclusion 21 List of References 23 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 ABSTracT Video-recorded decapitations have an enormous impact, they are cheap and easy, and they allow the terrorists to exploit the potential of the Internet.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan's Terrorism Dilemma
    14 HUSAIN HAQQANI Pakistan’s Terrorism Dilemma For more than a decade, Pakistan has been accused of sup- porting terrorism, primarily due to its support for militants opposing Indian rule in the disputed Himalayan territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Until September 11, 2001, Islamabad was also the principal backer of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan has now become a key U.S. ally in the war against terrorism, it is still seen both as a target and staging ground for terrorism. General Pervez Musharraf ’s military regime abandoned its alliance with the Taliban immediately after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. U.S. forces were allowed the use of Pakistani air bases for operations in Afghanistan. Pakistani intelligence services provided, and continue to provide, valuable information in hunting down Taliban and al-Qaeda escapees. The Pakistani military is cur- rently working with U.S. law enforcement officials in tracking down terrorists in the lawless tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. In a major policy speech on January 12, 2002, Musharraf announced measures to limit the influence of Islamic militants at home, including those previously described by him as “Kashmiri free- dom fighters.” “No organizations will be able to carry out terrorism 351 352 HUSAIN HAQQANI on the pretext of Kashmir,” he declared. “Whoever is involved with such acts in the future will be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or outside the country.”1 Musharraf ’s supporters declared his speech as revolutionary.2 He echoed the sentiment of most Pakistanis when he said, “violence and terrorism have been going on for years and we are weary and sick of this Kalashnikov culture … The day of reckoning has come.” After the speech, the Musharraf regime clamped down on domes- tic terrorist groups responsible for sectarian killings.3 But there is still considerable ambivalence in Pakistan’s attitude toward the Kashmiri militants.
    [Show full text]
  • Torture and the Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of Detainees: the Effectiveness and Consequences of 'Enhanced
    TORTURE AND THE CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DE- GRADING TREATMENT OF DETAINEES: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ‘EN- HANCED’ INTERROGATION HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION NOVEMBER 8, 2007 Serial No. 110–94 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 38–765 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Aug 31 2005 15:46 Jul 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 H:\WORK\CONST\110807\38765.000 HJUD1 PsN: 38765 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MAXINE WATERS, California DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah ROBERT WEXLER, Florida RIC KELLER, Florida LINDA T. SA´ NCHEZ, California DARRELL ISSA, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MIKE PENCE, Indiana HANK JOHNSON, Georgia J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio STEVE KING, Iowa LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM FEENEY, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas ANTHONY D.
    [Show full text]
  • Leaderless Jihad West Point Ctc Summaries
    ALL FEl INFflRNITIuII CONTAINED NEPEIN Tl1JCLPSIFIED DATE O1 LI 5l DIm1shn WEST POINT CTC SUMMARIES IC LEADERLESS JIHAD Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century flivcrsit\ Pclms\ 1\ jnia Press 2015 The Islamist terrorist threat is radicalization Dr Marc Sageman MD global rapidly evolving process Islamic terror networks of the twenty-first century are before it reaches its Ph.D is forensic psychia more fluid and violent end The most effective trist and government coun becoming independent unpredictable than their more structured forebears that conducted countermeasure to tcrtcrrorism consultant He This book builds combat the homegrown holds various academic and die 9/11 attacks The present direat in the West has upon Dr Sagemans terrorist threat is evolved from infiltration outside trained includ by terronsts to the professional positions previous volume interrupt Scholar in Residence against ivhom international cooperation and border radicalization process ing at Understanding Ter before effective it reaches its the York Police protection are to homegrown self-financed New Depart ror 1\Tetlrorks 2004 vioient end Senior Fellow the self-trained terrorists Dr Sageman describes this ment at and utilizes die same scattered network of wannabes Research In global homegrown Porcign Policy approach of apply- as leaderless ihad The that form this stitute and Clinical Assistant groups ing the scientific method to the study of terronsm movement are physically uncoimected from al Qaeda Professor at the University Whereas in his book the author worked
    [Show full text]
  • Global War on Terrorism and Prosecution of Terror Suspects: Select Cases and Implications for International Law, Politics, and Security
    GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM AND PROSECUTION OF TERROR SUSPECTS: SELECT CASES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND SECURITY Srini Sitaraman Introduction The global war on terrorism has opened up new frontiers of transnational legal challenge for international criminal law and counterterrorism strategies. How do we convict terrorists who transcend multiple national boundaries for committing and plotting mass atrocities; what are the hurdles in extraditing terrorism suspects; what are the consequences of holding detainees in black sites or secret prisons; what interrogation techniques are legal and appropriate when questioning terror suspects? This article seeks to examine some of these questions by focusing on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), particularly in the context of counterterrorism strategies that the United States have pursued towards Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) since the September 2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington D.C. The focus of this article is on the methods employed to confront terror suspects and terror facilitators and not on the politics of cooperation between the United States and Pakistan on the Global War on Terrorism or on the larger military operation being conducted in Afghanistan and in the border regions of Pakistan. This article is not positioned to offer definitive answers or comprehensive analyses of all pertinent issues associated with counterterrorism strategies and its effectiveness, which would be beyond the scope of this effort. The objective is to raise questions about the policies that the United States have adopted in conducting the war on terrorism and study its implications for international law and security. It is to examine whether the overzealousness in the execution of this war on terror has generated some unintended consequences for international law and complicated the global judicial architecture in ways that are not conducive to the democratic propagation of human rights.
    [Show full text]
  • No Torture. No Exceptions
    NO TORTURE. NO EXCEPTIONS. The above sketch by Thomas V. Curtis, a former Reserve M.P. sergeant, is of New York Times an Afghan detainee, Dilawar, who was taken into U.S. custody on December 5, 2002, and died five days later. Dilawar was deprived of sleep and chained to the ceiling of his cell—techniques that the Bush administration has refused to outlaw for use by the CIA. Further, his legs were, according to a coroner, “pulpified” by repeated blows. Later evidence showed that Dilawar had no connection to the rocket attack for which he’d been apprehended. A sketch by Thomas Curtis, V. a Reserve M.P./The 16 January/February/March 2008 Introduction n most issues of the Washington Monthly, we favor ar- long-term psychological effects also haunt patients—panic ticles that we hope will launch a debate. In this issue attacks, depression, and symptoms of post-traumatic-stress Iwe seek to end one. The unifying message of the ar- disorder. It has long been prosecuted as a crime of war. In our ticles that follow is, simply, Stop. In the wake of Septem- view, it still should be. ber 11, the United States became a nation that practiced Ideally, the election in November would put an end to torture. Astonishingly—despite the repudiation of tor- this debate, but we fear it won’t. John McCain, who for so ture by experts and the revelations of Guantanamo and long was one of the leading Republican opponents of the Abu Ghraib—we remain one. As we go to press, President White House’s policy on torture, voted in February against George W.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of the Confession of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in the Development of Themes for the Interrogation of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorist Suspects
    An Analysis of the Confession of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad An Analysis of the Confession of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in the Development of Themes for the Interrogation of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorist Suspects Louis C. Senese and Philip A. Mullenix The evolution of strategies for the By definition, interrogation themes are interrogation of Islamic fundamentalist the arguments (when presented in monologue terrorists has been a challenge to United fashion by the interrogator to the subject) States military and intelligence case officers which provide reasons and excuses to for multiple reasons. Traditional doctrines psychologically (not legally) justify a subject’s covering the interrogation of criminals and behavior. By rationalizing a subject’s behavior military prisoners do not apply well enough to within the framework of that subject’s the unconventional and extremist enemy mentality and beliefs, the interrogator encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. facilitates the subject’s task of self incrimination. Effective interrogation is complicated by Al Qaeda’s proactive education of its An exceptional opportunity has terrorist agents on countermeasures which emerged to study the conduct, motives, are detailed within the Al Qaeda Jihad mentality, and beliefs of the Islamic Training Manual. The Manual is a fundamentalist terrorist from the words of one combination of political/religious indoctrina- of Al Qaeda’s most prolific terrorists. On 10 tion as well as a tactical handbook on matters March 2007, during his Combatant Status ranging from
    [Show full text]
  • The Pearl Project the Truth Left Behind
    The Pearl Project The Truth Left Behind Inside the Kidnapping and Murder of Daniel Pearl THE INTERNAtiONAL CONSORtiUM THE CENTER FOR ICIJ OF INVEStiGAtiVE JOURNALISTS PUBLIC INTEGRITY SHOW CONTENTS The Pearl Project The Truth Left Behind Inside the Kidnapping and Murder of Daniel Pearl 4 Author’s Note 12 Key Findings The Pearl Project spent more than three years investigating the roles of 27 men linked to the 2002 kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl 16 Part 1: Finishing Danny’s Work Pakistani and U.S. officials are led to the remains of Daniel Pearl four months after his kidnapping by a miltant arrested for an unrelated hotel bombing. 25 Part 2: Baiting the Trap After “shoe bomber” Richard Reid tries to blow up a jet in late 2001, Pearl investigates if Reid had ties to a radical Pakistani cleric, Sheik Mubarak Ali Shah Gilani, and tries to arrange a meeting with him. 31 Part 3: Trapping the Journalist British-born Omar Sheikh, once jailed for allegedly kidnapping Western tourists, offers to introduce Pearl to the extremist Muslim leader Sheik Mubarak Ali Shah as part of a trap to kidnap the journalist. 38 Part 4: Finding a Safehouse Omar Sheikh recruits a team to kidnap Pearl, finds a Karachi safe house to keep Pearl in captivity, and hires messengers to tell the world of the kidnapper’s demands. 46 Part 5: Kidnapping the Journalist Pearl is picked up on Jan. 23, 2002, for a promised introduction to a radical cleric, but is instead taken to a remote area where guards chain him to an old car engine in a small building.
    [Show full text]
  • IMAGINE a WORLD Without Hate™
    IMAGINE A WORLD without hate™ VIDEO EDUCATOR’S GUIDE The Anti-Defamation League Honoring 100 Years. Fighting Hate. Building a Better World. Barry Curtiss-Lusher, National Chair Barbara B. Balser, Centennial Chair Abraham H. Foxman, National Director Kenneth Jacobson, Deputy National Director Clifford Schechter, Director, National Development Esta Gordon Epstein, Chair, Education Committee David Waren, Director, Education Division Lorraine Tiven, Director of Education Programs Jennifer E. Smith, Director, National Special Projects Beth Yohe, Associate Director, Training and Curriculum © 2013 Anti-Defamation League All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system for any purposes other than intended and described in this publication without permission in writing from the publisher. Anti-Defamation League 605 Third Avenue New York, NY 10158-3560 (212) 885-7700/885-7800 (212) 867-0779/490-0187 (Fax) www.adl.org IMAGINE A WORLD WITHOUT HATE™ VIDEO EDUCATOR’S GUIDE ABOUT THIS GUIDE In honor of its Centennial Year in 2013, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) launched the Imagine a World Without Hate video and action campaign, and we invite you and your classroom to participate. After 100 years of fighting bigotry and fostering respect, we are celebrating our successes, while at the same time recognizing that there is still much more work to be done. The theme for our Centennial is Imagine a World Without Hate—a dream we hope to make a reality.
    [Show full text]
  • On Assignment: a Guide to Reporting in Dangerous Situations
    On Assignment: A Guide to Reporting in Dangerous Situations The publication of this handbook was made possible by the following contributors: Andrews McMeel Publishing CNN The Ethics and Excellence in Journalism Foundation The Gannett Foundation The Poynter Institute Table of Contents On Assignment: A Guide to Reporting in Dangerous Situations I. Introduction.......................................................................1 II. Who is at Risk?................................................................ 5 III. Covering Conflict............................................................7 Training.................................................................................................... 8 How do you decide whether it is best to blend in or be clearly identified as a journalist while working in a combat zone? by Charles Hanley..............................................................................8 Security Training Courses.................................................................8 Biochemical Courses.......................................................................10 Security Training Firms....................................................................10 Security Literature............................................................................14 Funding for Security Courses..........................................................14 Protective Gear......................................................................................15 Body Armor......................................................................................15
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan / Alan Wachtel
    ALAN WACHTEL © 2009 Rourke Publishing LLC All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publisher. www.rourkepublishing.com PHOTO CREDITS: ARIF ALI/AFP/Getty Images: pp. 11, 35; Terry Ashe/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images: p. 26; Bernard Bisson/Sygma/Corbis: p. 25; Margaret Bourke-White/Times Life Pictures/Getty Images: p. 18; Getty Images: pp. 24, 37; ASIF HASSAN/AFP/Getty Images: p. 7; Aman Khan/istock: p. 19; Banaras Khan/AFP/Getty Images: p. 40; Danish Khan/istock: p. 14; Saeed Khan/AFP/Getty Images: pp. 28, 31; Library of Congress: pp. 13, 17; John Moore/Getty Images: p. 8; narvikk/istock: p. 29; Daniel Pearl Foundation: p. 34; AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images: pp. 5, 39; Christian Simonpietri/Sygma/Corbis: p. 22; Ron Summers/istock: p. 21; Transport Security Administration: p. 32; U.S. Marine Corps: p. 33; Wojclech Zwierzynski/istock: p. 12. Cover picture shows supporters of opposition leader, Benazir Bhutto, during an anti-government protest in November 2007. (Mohsin Raza/Reuters/Corbis) Produced for Rourke Publishing by Discovery Books Editor: Gill Humphrey Designer: Keith Williams Map: Stefan Chabluk Photo researcher: Rachel Tisdale Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wachtel, Alan, 1968- Pakistan / Alan Wachtel. p. cm. -- (Countries in crisis) ISBN 978-1-60472-352-6 1. Pakistan--Juvenile literature. I. Title. DS376.9.W33 2009 954.91--dc22 2008025141 Printed in the USA CONTENTS Chapter 1: Return of the Exiles 4 Chapter 2: Land and Early History 10 Chapter 3: Independent Pakistan 16 Chapter 4: The Bhuttos 24 Chapter 5: The Musharraf Years 30 Chapter 6: A Dangerous Place 36 Timeline 43 Pakistan Fact File 44 Glossary 46 Further Information 47 Index 48 3 CHAPTER ONE RETURN OF THE EXILES n the fall of 2007, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Supreme Court Igovernment was getting ready opposed Musharraf’s wish to remain for elections.
    [Show full text]