DIIS working paper DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 Video-recorded Decapitations - A seemingly perfect terrorist tactic that did not spread Martin Harrow DIIS Working Paper 2011:08 WORKING PAPER 1 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 MARTIN HARROW MSC, PhD, Consulting Analyst at DIIS [email protected] DIIS Working Papers make available DIIS researchers’ and DIIS project partners’ work in progress towards proper publishing. They may include important documentation which is not necessarily published elsewhere. DIIS Working Papers are published under the responsibility of the author alone. DIIS Working Papers should not be quoted without the express permission of the author. DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 © Copenhagen 2011 Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler Layout: Ellen-Marie Bentsen Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN: 978-87-7605-449-6 Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk 2 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 CONTENTS Abstract 4 Introduction 5 Decapitation as a weapon 5 Video-recorded decapitations 2002-2009 8 The reproductive dynamics of terrorist tactics 11 The accessibility of video-recorded decapitations as a tactic 12 Effectiveness of terrorism – impacting two different audiences 14 Why not video-recorded decapitations? 18 Iraq 18 Afghanistan 19 The West 20 Conclusion 21 List of References 23 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 ABSTracT Video-recorded decapitations have an enormous impact, they are cheap and easy, and they allow the terrorists to exploit the potential of the Internet. With these advantages, the tactic would have been expected to quickly spread across the globe as a favored tactic. Yet, years after its invention in 2002, this has not happened. This paper using evolutionary theory finds that video-recorded decapita- tions have not caught on for locally specific reasons: in the West because the tactic is less accessible than one might expect; in Iraq because of the unwillingness to be associated with Zarqawi, and in the Afghan context, it has not spread because it is mainly relevant for mobilizing resources from abroad, which is not a priority for the Taliban. These are however situational variables, and just as suicide bombings took years to spread, there may be campaigns of video-recorded decapitations as conditions change. DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 INTrodUCTION tral claims: First, any kind of terrorism is the contingent outcome of the availability of the In 2002, Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and be- material and immaterial resources necessary headed in Pakistan. The horrific live footage of under the given environmental constraints. the decapitation quickly spread on the Inter- Second, for terrorism to exist beyond the in- net causing widespread shock and revulsion, dividual attack, it must be able to reproduce but also a realization that an effective new the resources it depends on. Third, terrorism terrorist tactic had emerged. Video-recorded reproduces itself by making an impact on two decapitations are neither technically demand- different audiences, a constituent audience ing to carry out nor do they require a lot of and an enemy audience. Fourth, terrorist phe- money, training or weapons. Added to that the nomena can be divided into two ideal types, prevalence of Internet with reasonable band- emergent terrorism and instrumental terror- width now makes it possible to disseminate ism. Terrorist tactics, which work well against video content, even if TV-networks will only the enemy audience, do not necessarily work air extractions of the decapitation videos or well to mobilize resources from a constituent not at all. In other words, it seemed that the audience, and vice versa. The priority between perfect terrorist weapon for the information the two depends on the type of terrorism, in- age had been invented. It was therefore to be strumental or emergent. expected that decapitations the following years The immediate aim of the paper is to estab- spread to Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Thai- lish why the tactic of video-recorded decapita- land, and India. It was however only in Iraq tions did not spread. More broadly, the paper that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, two years later, aims to contribute to the understanding of why in 2004 again took up video recording the some tactics are selected and others are not, and decapitations and disseminating them on the how and why terrorist tactics spread. The paper Internet. Within Islamist circles, this created a is divided into four sections: first, a brief ac- prominent status for Zarqawi, who produced count of how decapitations have been used and a shocking 11 decapitation videos in Iraq in interpreted as a weapon of terror. Secondly, an 2004. Other groups quickly adopted the tactic. account of the evolution of the video-recorded However, already the following year the num- decapitations 2002-2009; thirdly, a theoreti- ber of videoed decapitations dropped to five in cal discussion of the evolutionary dynamics of all of Iraq, followed by only two in 2006. This terrorist tactics; and finally, an empirical ex- is odd because earlier research shows that ter- amination of the contentious performances in rorist tactics are subject to intense copying and three critical venues where it would have been strong mechanisms of selection: aircraft hijack- expected to see video-recorded decapitations: ings (Holden 1986), suicide bombings (Pape Iraq, Afghanistan and the West. 2005) the use of certain homemade explosives (Clarke and Soria 2009). Yet despite the obvi- ous advantages, video-recorded decapitations DECAPITATION AS A WEAPON did not spread dramatically: Why? This paper conducts an analysis based on The existing literature on decapitations focuses evolutionary theory; the foundation for any predominantly on the functionality and the evolutionary analysis is that the phenomena use in history of decapitations, especially on we find necessarily have passed a survival con- the symbolic effect of mutilating the body, and straint. For this paper, this involves four cen- the use of power by the authorities in exercising DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:08 extreme violence. The use of decapitations as group (Burke 2004: 214-218). However, even an effective and symbolic tool for underlining though the letter provides an insight into the power and causing fear is therefore well known considerations of Islamist militants, the frac- historically (Lentini and Bakashmar 2007). For tured nature of the Islamist militant landscape example the 14th century mogul ruler, Tamer- means that the existence of the letter alone does lane, decapitated several hundred thousands not explain why the practice of video-recorded and raised pyramids of the severed heads in the decapitations has stopped. sacked city of Isfahan to persuade other cities Charles Tilly has studied different conten- to surrender at the first warning (Chaliand and tious performances of social movements cov- Blin 2007). It was also common practice by ering several centuries of development and English monarchs to exhibit severed heads at change. He notes, “In any particular regime, the Tower of London. More recently, decapita- pairs of actors have only a limited number of tions have been used by criminal organizations performances at their disposal. We can con- in Mexico (Campbell 2006), and by right wing veniently call that set of performances their extremists in Russia (Arnold 2009). Given the repertoire of contention” (Tilly 2003: 45). historical experience it is less surprising that Video-recorded decapitations can thus be con- modern Islamist militants adopted decapita- sidered as part of the repertoire for Islamist tions as a tactic, than why they would choose militants. For Tilly, it is the contentious per- to back away from it, especially once the tactic formances which primarily define the conten- has been developed and adopted. tious phenomenon. Nonetheless, the conten- Some of the reason for the apparent backing tious performances within the same movement away from the use of video-recorded decapita- can change and mutate over time – starting as tions may be found in internal disagreements student protests that turn into violent clashes, within the ranks of militant Islamists about that mobilize unions to file complaints and the appropriateness of decapitations. In 2005 organize strikes, which might strengthen civil a letter was made public, which had been in- society and motivate the regime to enter into a tercepted by US forces, from Ayman al-Zawa- democratic debate (Tilly 2008). According to hiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, cautioning the Tilly, contentious performances are often based latter to shoot hostages rather than decapitat- on shifting alliances and are selected by actors ing them in order not to alienate potential sup- based on the availability of ‘repertoires’, ‘po- porters (Zawahiri 2005). The letter has fostered litical opportunity structures’ and the strength some debate on the strategic considerations of of the actor. The value of the ‘repertoire’ for at least part of the militant Islamist movement the contentious actors is that they do not need stressing the schism between maximum effect to invent courses of action from time to time on the enemy and the risk of alienating poten- – repertoires vary from very weak models to tial supporters (McCants and Brachman 2006; rigid formats that allow complex operations Hegghammer