Measuring the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Countering Transnational Criminal Organizations
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2019-03 MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION IN COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS Ortiz, Leah Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62280 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION IN COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS by Leah Ortiz March 2019 Thesis Advisor: Erik J. Dahl Second Reader: Thomas C. Bruneau Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) March 2019 Master's thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION IN COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 6. AUTHOR(S) Leah Ortiz 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The United States government has utilized leadership decapitation strategies to counter illicit or insurgent organizations since the kingpin strategy was first developed in the late 20th century by the Drug Enforcement Administration. Most critical analysis of this strategy, however, deals with terrorist organizations rather than transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). This thesis looks to the findings in these critical studies that may also be relevant to countering TCOs and, based on them, asks: what are the main factors that determine the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in countering TCOs? This thesis applies the four factors found in the literature to impact vulnerability to leadership decapitation—institutionalization, popular support, history of violent rivalry, and law enforcement efforts—to four TCOs. It finds that Medellin and Cali cartels did not gain an advantage from any of the factors. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) received protection from leadership decapitation from three of the four factors but ultimately was defeated. In the final case, the Sinaloa cartel, all four factors were present to provide the organization with protection from decapitation. These results are important for governments and law enforcement organizations to understand as they work to defeat TCOs. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Transnational Criminal Organizations, leadership removal, leadership change, leadership PAGES decapitation, measuring effectiveness, Cali Cartel, Medellin Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel, 101 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, Colombia, Mexico, popular support, law 16. PRICE CODE enforcement, violent rivalry, institutionalization, kingpin strategy, cartel, counter-TCO, TCO 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION IN COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS Leah Ortiz Lieutenant, United States Navy BA, University of Tennessee Knoxville, 2012 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (WESTERN HEMISPHERE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 2019 Approved by: Erik J. Dahl Advisor Thomas C. Bruneau Second Reader Afshon P. Ostovar Associate Chair for Research Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The United States government has utilized leadership decapitation strategies to counter illicit or insurgent organizations since the kingpin strategy was first developed in the late 20th century by the Drug Enforcement Administration. Most critical analysis of this strategy, however, deals with terrorist organizations rather than transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). This thesis looks to the findings in these critical studies that may also be relevant to countering TCOs and, based on them, asks: what are the main factors that determine the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in countering TCOs? This thesis applies the four factors found in the literature to impact vulnerability to leadership decapitation—institutionalization, popular support, history of violent rivalry, and law enforcement efforts—to four TCOs. It finds that Medellin and Cali cartels did not gain an advantage from any of the factors. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) received protection from leadership decapitation from three of the four factors but ultimately was defeated. In the final case, the Sinaloa cartel, all four factors were present to provide the organization with protection from decapitation. These results are important for governments and law enforcement organizations to understand as they work to defeat TCOs. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION OF A TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION .............................1 A. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 1. Defining Effectiveness ....................................................................3 2. Utilizing Terrorism Research to Analyze TCOs .........................4 3. Defining the Critical Internal Factors in Predicting Effectiveness ...................................................................................6 4. Defining the Critical External Factors in Predicting Effectiveness ...................................................................................8 5. Examining the Consequences .....................................................10 B. HYPOTHESES ........................................................................................11 C. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................12 D. OUTLINE .................................................................................................13 II. MEDELLIN AND CALI CARTELS: SETTING THE PRECEDENT FOR LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION SUCCESS .........................................15 A. THE MEDELLIN CARTEL AND PABLO ESCOBAR ......................16 B. THE CALI CARTEL AND THE RODRIGUEZ OREJUELA BROTHERS .............................................................................................18 C. INDICATORS FOR LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION .....................19 1. Institutionalization .......................................................................20 2. Popular Support ...........................................................................23 3. Rivalries and Alliances ................................................................24 4. Law Enforcement Efforts ............................................................26 D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................27 III. THE FARC AND COLOMBIA: A DECAPITATION SUCCESS .................29 A. THE RISE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (1948–1998) .................................................................30 B. COLOMBIA’S CHANGING COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES. .........................................................................................34 1. Colombia’s Counterinsurgency Efforts (1980–1998) ...............34 2. The FARC under the Pastrana Administration (1998– 2002) ..............................................................................................35 3. The FARC under the Uribe Administration (2002–2010)........37 4. The FARC under the Santos Administration (2010–2018) ......41 C. THE ROLE OF DECAPITATION IN DEFEATING THE FARC ........................................................................................................44 vii 1. Institutionalization .......................................................................44 2. Popular Support ...........................................................................47 3. Rivalries and Alliances ................................................................49 4. Law Enforcement Efforts