Dead Heroes and Living Saints: Orthodoxy,
Nationalism, and Militarism in
Contemporary Russia and Cyprus
By
Victoria Fomina
Submitted to Central European University
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Supervisors: Professor Vlad Naumescu Professor Dorit Geva
CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary
2019
Budapest, Hungary Statement
I hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions and no materials previously written and / or published by any other person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference.
Victoria Fomina
Budapest, August 16, 2019
CEU eTD Collection
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Abstract
This dissertation explores commemorative practices in contemporary Russia and Cyprus focusing on the role heroic and martyrical images play in the recent surge of nationalist movements in Orthodox countries. It follows two cases of collective mobilization around martyr figures – the cult of the Russian soldier Evgenii Rodionov beheaded in Chechen captivity in 1996, and two Greek Cypriot protesters, Anastasios Isaak and Solomos Solomou, killed as a result of clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriot protesters during a 1996 anti- occupation rally. Two decades after the tragic incidents, memorial events organized for Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou continue to attract thousands of people and only seem to grow in scale, turning their cults into a platform for the production and dissemination of competing visions of morality and social order. This dissertation shows how martyr figures are mobilized in Russia and Cyprus to articulate a conservative moral project built around nationalism, militarized patriotism, and Orthodox spirituality. It argues that the public appetite for the radical model of self-sacrifice embodied in these new martyr cults developed in response to the social anomie and perceived erasure of traditional values that bind communities together in the wake of the rapidly changing economic and political organization of everyday life. The contribution of this dissertation is two-fold. First, through a transnational ethnography of martyr veneration, it reveals the formative role the notion of self-sacrifice plays in shaping nationalist and political imaginaries in contemporary nation-states. It develops a typology of communal ethical responses to the figures of victims, martyrs, and heroes and outlines the distinct forms of commemoration they engender. Second, it offers an in-depth account of the heterogeneous Russian and Greek Cypriot nationalist-conservative movements and reconstructs the moral visions at the root of their mobilizations. It demonstrates that the popular appeal of moral conservatism, while not unrelated to economic ills and hostility towards ethnic Others, cannot be entirely reduced to either of these factors. Rather, it represents a collective attempt to imagine a new moral community grounded in religious transcendence and reconstruct a public culture marked by passion, emotionally charged symbols, and militaristic CEU eTD Collection vigor.
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Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible without the help, guidance, and support of the people who surrounded me during my doctoral studies. I am very grateful to Vlad Naumescu, a considerate and dedicated supervisor, who encouraged me to think past conventional disciplinary boundaries, experiment with different methods and approaches, and develop my own theoretical perspective. His astute comments left a strong impact on this dissertation. Equally, I appreciate the kindness and support Vlad extended to me throughout these years. I also would like to thank Dorit Geva for her support and encouragements, sharp and insightful comments, and for pushing me to strive for clarity and theoretical precision. I am also deeply indebted to the mentorship and help of Dan Rabinowitz.
Aaron Kappeler and Alina Cucu have provided an invaluable support and a continuous intellectual dialogue throughout the writing process as well as important theoretical interventions that greatly enriched my work. I am grateful to all the members of the Sociology and Social Anthropology Department for creating a friendly and stimulating intellectual environment. Alexandra Kowalski, Judit Bodnar, Prem Kumar Rajaram, and Jean-Louis Fabiani have offered constructive feedback and posed challenging questions at different stages of my studies. I am also very grateful to my colleagues Volodymyr Artiukh, Ana Chiritoiu, Ezgican Ozdemir, and Rik Adriaans for the endless conversations, exciting debates, and thought-provoking comments.
I would like to thank Dan Sperber for an engaging conversation over the years and for encouraging me to pursue my intellectual curiosities beyond the classical anthropological approaches. I also am deeply indebted to Thomas Rooney, whose rigorous comments and dedication to clarity helped me become a better writer. In the Fall of 2018 I spent a semester at the University of Edinburgh, where I greatly benefited from the advice and mentorship of Tom Boylston as well as from conversations and exchanges with the members of Anthropology of Christianity Working Group.
This research would not have been possible without the funding generously provided by CEU and the Wenner-Gren Foundation. Some parts of Chapters 2 and 6 have previously appeared in my article “Between Heroism and Sainthood: New Martyr Evgenii Rodionov as a Moral Model in Contemporary Russia,” published in History and Anthropology 29(1): 101-120. My discussion of commemorative practices has greatly benefited from the comments provided by the journal’s anonymous reviewers.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ...... ii
Acknowledgements ...... iii
Table of Contents ...... iv
List of Figures ...... vi
List of Abbreviations ...... viii
1. Introduction: Death and Nationalist Mobilization ...... 1
1.1. Martyr Cults and Cultures of Memory in the Historical Context ...... 6
1.2. Sacrifice and Modern Thought ...... 13
1.3. Dissertation Structure and Contribution ...... 21
PART I Violent Death and Social Activism ...... 27
2. He Chose the Cross: Soldier Evgenii Rodionov as a Moral Model in Post-Soviet Russia ...... 27
2.1. Heroism and Sainthood in Post-Soviet Russia ...... 31
2.2. Mobilizing Around the New Martyr ...... 37
2.3. The Mother of a Soldier ...... 49
2.4. Converging Visions of Morality ...... 56
2.5. Concluding Remarks ...... 66
3. Anastasios Isaak and Solomos Solomou: Bikers, Heroes, Martyrs ...... 69
3.1. International Audience: Isaak and Solomou as Martyrs for Democracy and Freedom 73 CEU eTD Collection
3.2. Domestic Audience: Isaak and Solomou as Embodiments of Greek Ethnic Virtues ... 83
3.3. The Rise of ELAM and the Culture of Public Memorial Events in Cyprus ...... 99
3.4. Concluding Remarks ...... 109
PART II Transformations: From Social to Spiritual Action ...... 111
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4. A Holy Warrior: Militarization of Orthodoxy and Spiritualization of Militant Patriotism in Russia ...... 111
4.1. A Military Saint ...... 117
4.2. Parading the Dead ...... 127
4.3. The Moral Pedagogy of Martyrdom ...... 136
4.4. Concluding Remarks ...... 150
5. “Bikers Do Not Forget”: The Initiative in Memory of Isaak and Solomou ...... 153
5.1. The Politics of Bikes ...... 155
5.2. Transmitting Historical Memory ...... 163
5.3. “It’s kind of Heroic, Isn’t It?”: The Cultivation of Ethical and Political Subjectivities ...... 175
5.4. Concluding Remarks ...... 185
PART III Sainthood and the Varieties of Ethical Engagements ...... 188
6. A Folk Saint: Popular Veneration of Evgenii Rodionov in Russia ...... 188
6.1. Popular Veneration ...... 190
6.2. The Culture of Patriotism ...... 203
6.3. Lessons in Courage ...... 217
6.4. Concluding Remarks ...... 224
7. “Evgenios o Rossos”: Saints as Transnational Mediators Between Orthodox Churches ...... 227
7.1. Russian Cultural Presence in Cyprus ...... 232
7.2. A Russian Soldier in a Greek Cypriot Church ...... 244
7.3. The Exemplarity of Sacrifice ...... 260 CEU eTD Collection
7.4. Concluding Remarks ...... 273
Conclusion ...... 278
References ...... 291
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List of Figures
2.1. Liubov’ Rodionova by her son’s grave in Satino-Russkoe……………………………...28 2.2. “Requiem” (2000-2002) by Valerii Balabanov………………………………………….41 2.3. The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers march in protection of the Russian army and the Russian people (February 23, 2005, Moscow) ……………………………………………….43 2.4. The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers and Zavtra editorial collective in a joint campaign in defense of the slogan “Orthodoxy or Death!” …...………………………………….…….43
2.5. Popular versions of Evgenii Rodionov’s icons…………………………….…………….58 2.6. A painting devoted to Rodionov by Maksim Faiustov……………………….………….58 3.1. Photographs taken by Costas Kyriakides documenting the moment of Isaak’s murder as
displayed at The Bulletin web-site……………………………………………………………77 3.2. Solomos Solomou climbing up the Turkish flagpole……………………………………84 3.3. A commemorative poster for Solomos Solomou……………………………….……… 96 3.4. ELAM’s demonstration in commemoration of Isaak and Solomou, August 14, 2013…. 96
4.1. Sergei Poliakov, the vice-president of the International Association of “Al’pha” veterans and Liubov’ Rodionova at the memorial event for the members of the Russian Special Forces units in Snegiri. May 28, 2016………………………………………………………………123 4.2. Members of the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club at the event “Put’ Voina” devoted to Rodionov in Penza. May 24, 2015…………………………………………………………. 130 4.3. Liubov’ Rodionova with the members of the Night Wolves Groznyi branch in Bamut, next
to the site of Rodionov’s original burial. September 2015………………………………….130 4.4. Roman Iliushkin with Evgenii Rodionov’s icon at the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius after the
completion of his Crimea and Sevastopol’ tour together with the Serbian football team. CEU eTD Collection September 2014…………………………………………………………………………….134 4.5. Roman Iliushkin with the Serbian volunteers at the “We Want Peace!” exhibition. Donetsk, 2015…………………………………………………………………………………………134 5.1. Procession in Memory of Isaak and Solomou…………………………………………..157
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5.2. The logo of The Initiative in Memory of Isaak and Solomou. The slogan reads: Bikers Do Not Forget………………………………………………………………………………….. 157 5.3. Members of The Initiative during the memorial procession for Isaak and Solomou. Agiou Dometiou check-point, August 2017…………………………………………………….….166 5.4. The cover of The Initiative’s Leaflet “How Dare You, Bikers!!!” …………………….180 6.1. Cross by Evgenii Rodionov’s grave. Satino-Russkoe, May 2016………………………190 6.2. Emblem of the Russian airborne troops by Rodionov’s grave. Satino-Russkoe, May 2016…………………………………………………………………………………………190
6.3. Rodionov’s icon and a border-guard hat. Satino-Russkoe, May 2016……………....…190 6.4. Memorial service by Rodionov’s grave. Satino-Russkoe, May 2016……………….….193 6.5. Cadets from Sviato-Alekseevskii monastery by Evgenii Rodionov’s grave. Satino- Russkoe, May 2016……………………………………………………………………….…193 6.6. Lay believers reading the akathist by Rodionov’s grave. Satino-Russkoe, May 2016… 198 6.7. Natalia, Angelina, and Sergei after the concert devoted to Rodionov. May 18, 2018….206 6.8. The participants of the sambo tournament devoted to Rodionov. Saint-Petersburg, Suvorov
School, December 2014………………………………….……………………….……...….220 7.1. Book Cover “Russian Neomartyr and Soldier of Christ, Saint Evgenii Rodionov.” … 228 7.2. Book Cover “Saint Evgenii Rodionov. A Russian Soldier. For Children.”…………… 228 7.3. Fr. Symeon in his office at St. George Monastery…………………………….……….. 247 7.4. Icon of Evgenii Rodionov created by Georgios Petrou in 2009……………………… 252 7.5. Map of Greek Cypriot Churches celebrating Evgenii Rodionov………………………. 261 7.6. The Museum of the Dead and Missing in Xylotymbou………………………………… 263 7.7. The Icon of Evgenii Rodionov created by Mihalis Hadzhimihalis for St. Dimitrios
Church……………………………………………………………………………………... 268 CEU eTD Collection 7.8. The mural of Evgenii Rodionov at St. Dimitrios Church………………………………. 270
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List of Abbreviations
AKEL Progressive Party of Working People DISY Democratic Rally DPR Donetsk People’s Republic DRAFLEA Department of Relations with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies ECHR European Court of Human Rights EFAEFP The United Association of the Autonomous Student Union Fractions ELAM National Popular Front Movement EOKA National Organization of Cypriot Fighters EU European Union FSOS Fund in Support of Orthodox Sportsmen ICC International Criminal Court IS Islamic State MMA Mixed Martial Arts NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NWMC Night Wolves Motorcycle Club OCC Orthodox Church of Cyprus P.A.KT. Pancyprian Anti-Occupation Movement ROC Russian Orthodox Church ROEC Russian Orthodox Educational Center TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus UN United Nations UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
CEU eTD Collection WWII World War II
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1. Introduction: Death and Nationalist Mobilization
On May 23, 1996 a group of Chechen militants executed four captive Russian soldiers near the
village of Bamut. One of the young men, nineteen-year-old private Evgenii Rodionov1 was
beheaded, allegedly for his refusal to take off his cross and convert to Islam. In August of that
same year, in Cyprus, Anastasios Isaak, a 25-year-old Greek Cypriot refugee from Famagusta
was beaten to death during violent clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots that unfolded
at an anti-occupation rally. Three days later, Isaak’s cousin, Solomos Solomou was shot dead
by the Turkish military while protesting his cousin’s murder at the so-called “Green Zone”
separating Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus from the rest of the island. Tragic deaths at the
hands of enemies turned these young men, who were promptly labeled “martyrs,” into objects
of popular admiration and veneration in their respective communities. Two decades after the
incidents, memorial events organized for Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou, continue to attract
thousands of people and only seem to grow in scale, turning commemoration of these figures
into a platform for the production and dissemination of competing visions of morality and
social order. In this dissertation, I draw on these two cases of new martyr cults to show how
martyr figures are mobilized in contemporary Russia and Cyprus to articulate a conservative
moral project constructed around nationalism, militant patriotism, and Orthodox spirituality.2
Over the past two decades both Russian and Greek Cypriot nationalisms have undergone
CEU eTD Collection substantial transformations. In the 1990s, following the social and economic turmoil produced
1 I use the American Library Association – Library of Congress (ALA-LC) standards (without diacritical marks) for the romanization of all Russian and Greek terms and names, except for the names of public figures and geographical locations that have a standardized form of reference in the English-speaking press. 2 The names of all informants were anonymized, with the exception of public figures and people who gave interviews in their official capacity.
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by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implementation of market reforms, Russia
witnessed a powerful resurgence of grassroots oppositional nationalist movements that ranged
ideologically from Soviet reconstructionists to fundamentalist Orthodox, and neofascist
movements (O’Connor 2006). However, with Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power and growing
appropriation of conservative and patriotic discourses by the state, by the mid-2010s this
nationalist opposition scene was essentially subsumed by a state-authorized conservative
culture of patriotism (Kolstø 2016; Laruelle 2015b, 2016a). In Cyprus, by contrast, the state-
sponsored public culture of nationalism and anti-occupation protest that emerged in the wake
of the 1974 Turkish invasion and partition of the island, started to gradually decline after the
republic’s accession to the EU in 2004 (Charalambous et al. 2014, 2017; Yakinthou 2008). The
softening of the government’s line on the Partition question and the perceived replacement of
nationalist ideology with EU-promoted discourses of “democracy” and “the rule of law,”
produced a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Greek Cypriot public, creating fruitful terrain
for the emergence of new nationalist protest movements.
By telling in parallel the stories of the genesis of Rodionov’s and Isaak and Solomou’s cults
and tracing their oscillations between subversive, politicized symbols of struggle for social and
historical justice and pedagogical devices used for the moral education of society, I delve into
the complex relationship between grassroots conservative movements and state authorized
nationalism. Rodionov’s cult, which in its inception presented a powerful platform for
criticizing the Russian military establishment and state policies toward Chechen War veterans, CEU eTD Collection has lost much of its subversive potential over the last decade and gradually transformed into an
abstract model of patriotism – a public symbol of the conservative statist ideology promoted
by the ruling United Russia Party (Laruelle 2009). The figures of Isaak and Solomou, by
contrast, remain closely associated in the popular imagination with the unremitting issue of the
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island’s division, their commemoration serving as a platform for anti-systemic nationalist
movements to voice vehement protest against the bi-zonal federative solution to the Cyprus
issue advocated by the Republic of Cyprus’s government (Katsourides 2013).
The models of sacrifice embodied in hero and martyr cults are not fixed. They develop and
transform in response to the changing social realities and acquire new meanings and forms, as
they move to a new locale. Evgenii Rodionov’s cult, presents a particularly rich case for
exploring the latter dimension, as the soldier’s veneration extended to the broader Orthodox
world, including Ukraine, Serbia, Greece, and Cyprus. The veneration of Rodionov by the
Greek Cypriot community provided me with an opportunity to transform my analysis from a
comparison of two local cults to an extended case-study that illuminates the transnational
dimension of martyr veneration in the Orthodox world. By following Rodionov’s cult to the
island, I unpack the transnational linkages between Greek Cypriot and Russian Orthodox
communities that enable the circulation of representations and theological discourses between
them. Through tracing the metamorphoses the narrative of Rodionov’s martyrdom undergoes
as it travels from post-Soviet to the post-colonial context and from one audience to another, I
outline the role local cultures of memory, hagiographic canons, and political predicaments play
in shaping martyrical representations. I thus use the juxtaposition of Rodionov and Isaak and
Solomou’s cults to delve into the production of different models of martyrdom and to see if
and how these models acquire a potential to transcend their local contexts and win new
audiences. CEU eTD Collection
Death and the role played by rituals associated with the dead as well as their function in the
(re)constitution of society have historically been a central topic in anthropological theory (e.g.
Bloch and Parry 1982; Danforth 1982; Heo 2018; Lomnitz 2005; Metcalf and Huntington 1991;
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Parry 1994; Scheper-Hughes 1993). Recently, death and veneration have gained renewed
attention both from scholars and the popular press due to the growing public fascination with
the phenomenon of suicide bombing and martyr cults across the Middle East and wider Islamic
world (e.g. Atran 2010; Asad 2007; Edwards 2017; Khosronejad, eds. 2013). While the
conversation has been largely confined to a singular religious tradition and the diverse ethno-
cultural contexts it embraces, as the above-mentioned cases demonstrate, martyr cults are by
no means limited to Islam’s practitioners. In fact, the idea of self-sacrifice is central to the
constitution of modern nation-states regardless of whether they have an official religion or
formally define themselves as “secular.” In this dissertation, I address this classic theme by
exploring the relationship between Christian and nationalist notions of sacrifice as they come
to be articulated in the contemporary cults of heroes and martyrs in Russia and Cyprus. Through
an ethnographic analysis of the commemorative practices of Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou,
I investigate the place sacrifice occupies in the imagery of contemporary nation-states as well
as the militant models of morality it nourishes. In what follows, I examine the different forms
of collective mobilization around these martyr figures, ranging from popular religious
veneration to grassroots nationalist protest rallies, and state organized memorial services. I ask
what visions of good life and death inform the representations of Rodionov and Isaak and
Solomou and what the popularity of these militant figures in Orthodox communities reveals
about the moral and social imaginaries of contemporary Russians and Greek Cypriots.
In their introduction to the seminal volume Death and the Regeneration of Life, Bloch and CEU eTD Collection Parry (1982: 7) underscore the productive and generative power of mortuary rituals, which
revitalize the resources “culturally conceived to be most essential to the reproduction of the
social order.” As they (1982: 15) points out, mortuary rituals that connect death to rebirth and
negate the linear historical event of death through casting it as part of “a cyclical process of
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renewal” are crucial to the preservation of political and social structures. By denying the
rupture in the social system caused by the fact of death, such rituals seek to reestablish
continuity and legitimize traditional authority by incorporating the dead into “the
depersonalized collectivity of ancestors which is the source of the continuing fertility of the
living” (ibid.: 11). In contrast to “traditional” societies, contemporary Western cultures where
“the individual is given a transcendental value … and is conceived of in opposition to society”
are not confronted by the same challenge of continuity, Bloch and Parry (1982) argue. As they
(1982: 15) put it, “…while man’s [sic] nature may seem as immutable, the existing social order
is not. It is therefore not surprising that in this context the symbolic connection between death
and fertility should be far more weakly stressed…”
While Bloch and Parry might be correct to conclude that in the regular funeral rituals of
contemporary Western societies the fertility symbolism is not as manifest, their passing
observation overlooks the centrality of commemorative rituals for the “special dead,” whose
death is construed as a sacrifice for society, to the imaginaries of modern nation-states. Often
operating with an essentialized conception of the nation as an eternal community united by
blood, history, and culture with a shared connection to territory, modern nation-states make
active use of public commemoration of heroes and martyrs. As Benedict Anderson (2006
[1983]: 26) points out in his discussion of cenotaphs and the tombs of Unknown Soldiers,
preoccupation with death and immortality is central to nationalist imaginings. By giving certain
deceased people special honors, these memorial rituals establish their belonging to the CEU eTD Collection pantheon of national heroes – an act that symbolically connects individual instances of sacrifice
to an uninterruptable historical chain. Sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2000: 125) analyzes
such rites as a practice of anamnesis – “an act of recalling a past which gives meaning to the
present and contains the future.”
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Building on Bloch and Parry’s (1982) argument about the connection between mortuary rituals
that reframe death as rebirth and images of transcendent social order, I suggest that the
proliferation of martyr-veneration in modern nation-states goes hand in hand with the
resurgence of primordial visions of the nation and revanchist social movements that anticipate
a rebirth of the national culture and a return of lost national glories. In this context,
commemorative rituals serve both to assert the continuity of the nation by establishing
connections between modern sacrificial figures and national heroes of the past as well as to
promise the moral renewal of society, inspiring their audiences through the examples of heroes.
I argue that the public memorial events organized for martyr-figures in Russia and Cyprus
reflect an attempt of moral conservative constituencies in both countries to generate an
affective public sphere, charged with nationalist and religious symbols and organized around
the themes of patriotism, sacrifice, and memory.
1.1. Martyr Cults and Cultures of Memory in the Historical Context
At first glance, Russia and Cyprus might seem to be unlikely choice of contexts for a
comparative analysis of social processes. A reemerging power whose territory stretches across
Eurasia, Russia has been aggressively reasserting itself in the global arena starting from the
late 2000s. In contrast, Cyprus is a small island nation in the Mediterranean, which, since its CEU eTD Collection ascension to the European Union in 2004, has become increasingly dependent on its European
neighbors, both in terms of formulating its economic agenda and setting foreign policy goals.
Russia’s turbulent transition to “free-market capitalism” in the early 1990s brought about a
social and economic catastrophe that crippled the entire country, whereas for Cyprus rapid
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capitalization in the late 1970s came in the form of an “economic miracle” that transformed a
largely rural society into a financial hub with booming tourism and construction industries
(Theophanous 2016). While Russia is experiencing a powerful Orthodox revival, marked by
the zealotry often characteristic of neophyte believers, in Cyprus, the Orthodox tradition was
never interrupted by an atheist political regime and continues to be a central and taken for
granted feature of everyday public and private life. These differences aside, the two countries
nonetheless share several key features. They both are notable for the complex entanglement of
ethnic and religious identities as well as the growing popularity of nationalist and anti-liberal
discourses. Both nation-states have relatively recently lost a significant portion of their
territory, with the memory of this loss exercising a powerful influence on their respective
nationalisms, endowing them with a militant revanchist/irredentist ethos. When confronted
with the challenges of “Westernization” and rapidly changing cultural and social landscapes,
conservative constituencies in both countries have resorted to the Orthodox tradition for supply
of vocabulary and arguments to articulate their critiques of “the West” and its “secular liberal”
values. Finally, both nation-states have been actively invested in cultivating their local cults of
heroes to instill the value of self-sacrifice in the youth and to protect them from the “harmful”
influences of Western culture.
Another feature that Russia and Cyprus share is lively cultures of memory grounded in
Orthodox traditions of saint and martyr veneration and secular forms of hero commemoration
derived from it that are central for the reproduction of their respective ethnic and confessional CEU eTD Collection identities. By “the cultures of memory,” I understand here the cultural repertoires that actors
draw on as they organize memorial events as well as the specific aesthetic and political
sensibilities that accompany them. The notion of sacrifice and martyrdom in the Russian and
Greek Cypriot contexts is closely entangled with the national struggles and local conceptions
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of sovereignty. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has canonized several historical figures
representing monarchial power – from the 11th century martyred princes Boris and Gleb, who
became the first Russian saints (Lenhoff 1989:4) to the 13th century prince Aleksander Nevskii,
and the last Russian Tsar Nikolas II. In Cyprus, prominent figures that sacrificed for the
national cause, although not formally canonized, are often labeled ethic martyrs
(ethnomartires) or hero-martyrs (iroes-martires), such as Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus,
who was executed in 1821 for his support of the Greek War of Independence, or the members
of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) who waged guerilla war against the
British between 1955-1959.
In pre-revolutionary Russia saints’ relics, dispersed across different localities, formed the
imperial religious geography, as possession of the relics placed a community “on par with other
holy sites throughout the Russian empire and the Orthodox world at large” (Green [1975] 2010:
13). Feasts held on saints’ memory days and public celebrations organized for miracle-working
icons (some of them nation-wide) played central roles in forming communities of faith in
imperial Russia (Shevzov 2007). While religion in Russia was confined to an underground,
private sphere following the Bolshevik Revolution, the theme of self-sacrifice and
commemoration of heroes persisted as an integral part of the Soviet public culture. Many
scholars have pointed out the continuities between the Orthodox tradition of saint veneration
and the Soviet heroic iconography (e.g. Bonnell 1997; Kharkhordin 1999; Steinberg 2002).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia witnessed a powerful religious revival that was CEU eTD Collection accompanied by the growing public visibility and rising political power of the Orthodox
Church (Knox 2005a). Since the 1990s, the ROC has actively tried to reclaim its role as the
guardian and enforcer of moral norms (Stöckl 2016). In addition to the restoration and
promotion of older religious practices, such as cross processions and saint feasts, aimed at
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popularizing saint veneration among the public, the Church has actively participated in war
commemoration and state memorial events for national heroes, trying to forge a community of
memory centered around the ethics of self-sacrifice (Haskins 2009; Rousselet 2015).
In Cyprus, the Orthodox Church has historically played a central role in the formation of
national identity that many Greek Cypriots see as synonymous with Orthodox faith. In the
absence of a national system of governance until 1960, due to the successive Crusader,
Venetian, Ottoman, and British occupations, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (OCC) emerged
as the central political institution on the island. During the Ottoman rule between 1571 and
1878, The Orthodox Church held a privileged position, functioning as a political representative
of the Greek flock and a mediator between the Turkish rulers and local population (Sant Cassia
1986). Passionately supporting the cause of enosis or union with Greece, the Church was also
at the forefront of the 1955-1959 anti-colonial struggle against the British, providing
ideological as well as logistical support to the guerilla warfare of the National Organization of
Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) (Novo 2013). Following the establishment of an independent Cyprus
in 1960, Archbishop Makarios III became the first president of the new republic. In the wake
of mounting inter-communal tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Makarios adopted
a more moderate stance on enosis, promoting the ideal of an independent Cyprus instead. In
1974, the right-wing paramilitary group EOKA B, backed by the military junta in Greece,
orchestrated a coup aimed at overthrowing Makarios’s government and achieving enosis with
Greece. The infamous coup resulted in the Turkish invasion under the pretext of protecting CEU eTD Collection Turkish Cypriot population and occupation of almost 40% of the island’s territory – a national
tragedy that continues to shape Greek Cypriot political imagination. As many anthropologists
working on Cyprus have pointed out, the centrality of the notions of “witnessing” and
“sacrifice” to structuring Greek Cypriot historical memory (Bryant 2004, 2010, 2012;
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Papadakis 1998, 2003, 2008; Sant Cassia 1999, 2005, 2009). The affirmation of Cyprus’
Orthodox heritage through the veneration of saints and commemoration of heroes who have
sacrificed for the Greek Cypriot play a key role in (re)producing Greek Cypriot nation as a
community of memory. Clergymen are closely involved in both practices, as in addition to
organizing public religious celebrations and feasts for the saints that until today remain a
prominent part of Greek Cypriot communal life, they also participate in the memorials
(mnimosino) organized for national heroes, performing the memorial service for the dead and
delivering sermons.
To understand the present-day conservative mobilizations around new martyr figures in Russia
and Cyprus, one has to examine them in the context of local cultures of memory described
above. The subjectivities of many of the actors who constitute the heterogeneous, post-Soviet
conservative scene in Russia were strongly influenced by the pathos and aesthetics of the late
Soviet public culture, elements of which they now creatively combine with the ritual tradition
of the Orthodox Church. During the 1990s, following the rapid withdrawal of the state from all
spheres of life, including public culture, the Church alongside with other cultural enthusiasts,
stepped in to fill the void, organizing their own public events aimed at moral and patriotic
education of society. Likewise, in the Greek Cypriot case, many of the participants constituting
Isaak and Solomou’s cult grew up under the so-called “Den Ksehno!” (I do not forget!)
educational policy that put emphasis on cultivating love and knowledge of the occupied
territories lost during the invasion among the students and encouraged young people to take an CEU eTD Collection active political stance by participating in anti-occupation protests and memorial events. Given
the historical centrality of saint and hero veneration and public memorial cultures to Russian
and Greek Cypriot nationalisms, it is hardly surprising that in both countries emotionally
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charged commemorative events came to be viewed by the conservative movements as a major
pedagogical tool for reviving traditional values in society.
The articulations of moral conservatism and militant nationalism in Russia and Cyprus,
although generated by starkly different political and socio-economic circumstances, and
framed through distinct cultural and historical tropes, nevertheless assume a familiar form: a
nostalgia for past national glory and heroic images of struggle and self-sacrifice coupled with
a vehement rejection of secular modernity and its moral narrative of compromise and
moderation (Keane 2013). This yearning for a homogenous moral community united by shared
values and customs also coincides in both cases with a resurgence of militant masculine
identities. Such a picture is hardly limited to the cases under investigation and would be readily
recognized in many countries across Europe and North America from the United States to
Hungary to Poland, and Ukraine. However, by limiting my study to the processes of building
a conservative public culture centered around the imagery of heroism and sacrifice in Russia
and Cyprus and placing the interaction between religion and nationalism at the center of my
enquiry into moral conservatism, I seek to explore how distinct cultural and socio-political
contexts have given rise to very similar forms of militant nationalist identity.
Under the broad rubric of “moral conservatism,” I unite here a diverse array of social
movements that tend to converge around issues of national honor, Orthodox faith, family
values, and traditional gender roles. In contrast to the terms like “right-wing,” “far-right,” or CEU eTD Collection “reactionary” that correspond to a specific vision of the political and ideological spectrum, the
notion of “moral conservatism” functions as an umbrella term for a broad range of groups
(including the ones mentioned above) that emphasizes what I consider to be their central feature
– the moral agenda that inspires their participants and that many of them view as distinct from
11
and having precedence over “politics” and “the political.” “The moral,” in this context, is often
opposed to “the modern” – a specific vision of the secular-liberal lifestyle that understands it
as lacking transcendence and privileging individual over communities, pleasure over
commitment, consumption over socially-useful work, and, ultimately, indulgence over self-
sacrifice. In many moral conservative discourses, the notion of “sacrifice” becomes the central
trope that reasserts the moral duty to honor the memory of the sacrifices of national heroes by
being ready, if necessary, to follow their path in the defense of one’s homeland and culture.
Despite placing the notion of “the moral” at the center of my analysis, I do not seek to intervene
in the prolific debates happening in the anthropology of morality and ethics aimed at arriving
at more nuanced definitions of the terms (see Laidlaw 2010, 2014; Lambek 2010a, 2010b;
Keane 2010). Instead, through examining the values and virtues martyrs and heroes represent
to different audiences, I delineate historically specific cultural models of sacrifice in Russia
and Cyprus and analyze the local forms of engaging with sacrificial figures across secular and
religious contexts. Consequently, for the purposes of this dissertation, I chose to not
differentiate between “morality” as a system of abstract codes and “ethics” as forms of their
articulation in practice (Laidlaw 2002). I use both terms interchangeably to refer to practices
that are defined by “at least somewhat conscious orientation toward conceptions of what is
good, proper, or virtuous” (Rogers 2009: 11) as well as to emic discourses aimed at assessing
social action through the prism of these notions. I use the concept of “ethical tradition” to refer
to the historically specific visions of good life and death as well as the ideas about how the CEU eTD Collection living ought to relate to the different categories of the dead they entail. By focusing on the
moral dimension of contemporary conservative movements, I seek to capture the specificity of
the current historical conjuncture as one in which activists are increasingly framing their
political concerns as moral ones, seeking to address social ills through a moral revival of a
12
community. With this tack, I illuminate not only how different social actors conceive of “the
moral,” but also where this increasing preoccupation with morality stems from and what
distinct forms of social contestation it might produce. Finally, by focusing on the cults of
martyrs and heroes in Russia and Cyprus, I try to explore how the notion of sacrifice became
so central to the moral and political vision of twenty-first century conservative movements and
what type of political subjectivities heroic and martyrical discourses produce.
1.2. Sacrifice and Modern Thought
In their edited volume on sacrifice, Zachhuber and Meszaros (2013) describe this intangible
concept as “an obsession of modernity,” pointing out the powerful capacity it has for capturing
public imagination in the West. In contemporary Western discourses, the idea of “ultimate self-
sacrifice” conveys great ambiguity, as it is associated both with such highly praised individual
qualities as selflessness and dutifulness and with the idea of dreadful violence inflicted on a
victim (Eagleton 2018:2; Zachhuber 2013: 13), with expression of boundless love for
humanity, as in the familiar image of crucified Christ, and with the outburst of blazing hate that
destroys both self and others, as in the shocking effigy of suffering and chaos left in the
aftermath of a suicide bombing (Asad 2007). In the late 20th century, in the wake of terrorist
attacks around the world, often perceived as religiously motivated, the term “martyrdom” came
to represent to many the dangers a religious worldview allegedly harbors – irrationality,
CEU eTD Collection zealotry, and blind fanaticism (ibid.). While this process has contributed to problematization
of self-sacrifice in contemporary debates, the ambivalence of the notion and anxiety over
separating the “good” and productive death (sacrifice) from a “bad” and destructive one
(suicide) is hardly novel or confined to modernity. As Bloch and Parry (1982:17) observe, the
13
denunciation of suicide as “bad” and anti-social death has historically been present in many
societies.3
Yet, the idea of sacrifice remains an inherent component of secular ethics, as modern nation-
states, are frequently bound to demand from their citizens rather costly renunciations and to
promote readiness to sacrifice as an important civic virtue (Muehlebach 2012; Zachhuber
2013). In his insightful essay on sacrifice, Michael Lambek (2007) points out the central role
an original act of sacrifice – a gift, which can never be fully reciprocated – plays in initiating
an entire system of communal ethical exchange. Such a reading of sacrifice is central to the
Christian tradition that casts Jesus’s death on the cross as a voluntary sacrificial act that brought
redemption to humanity and that frames martyrdom as imitatio Christi – individual moral
responses to the original sacrifice of God. Similarly, the sacrifices of heroes are often construed
as a continuation of the feats of past national heroes. One can even go as far as to suggest that
the persistence of sacrificial mentality in the ideology of the modern nation-state reveals a
continuity between the religious and secular moral cosmologies, the offering-demanding
God(s) being replaced by the modern cult of the nation.
Far from being mere objects of ritual worship, figures of heroes and martyrs are also mediums
of transcendence in so far as they are taken to be exemplars of remarkable virtues and
praiseworthy moral principles (Hawley 1987). The modes of engagement with exemplars vary
dramatically across time and space, some of them producing an infinite multiplicity of CEU eTD Collection contextually activated meanings (Humphrey 1997), others entailing a convergence around a
specific set of cultural values (Bandak 2015; Robbins 2015) or ethos (Greenblatt, MacIntyre
3 As Bloch and Parry (1982:17) put it, “the horror with which suicide is so often regarded is that it is an act which, by its apparent similarity, almost parodies the death which is the ultimate manifestation of altruistic self- abnegation.” 14
cited in Laidlaw 2014, 84). It is in the pedagogical dimension of these cults that the continuity
between Orthodox practices of saint worship and state traditions of heroic commemoration is
most strongly visible (Christou 2006; Fedor 2013; Kharkhordin 1999, 261, 2016; Kormina and
Shtyrkov 2011; Limberis 2001; Moss 2012: 97; Steinberg 2002).4
The extension of religious vocabulary and imagery to nationalist practices and the
establishment of rhetorical connections between sacrifices for God and the nation as well as
equations between the figures of saints and heroes is a common and well-documented
phenomenon in Orthodox countries (Green [1975] 2010; Lenhoff 1989; Karaiskou 2013,
Kharkhordin 1999; Papadakis 2003; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015: 75). Much of the
scholarly investigation into nationalist sacrificial discourses, however, has been marked by a
one-sided focus towards either uncovering the continuities between religious and nationalist
practices in respect to their social functions or deconstructing nationalist attempts at
“appropriating” religious symbols (e.g. Bellah 1967; Hedetoft 2009; Slezkine 2018). Such
enthusiasm for demonstrating nationalism’s “religious” roots has prevented some researchers
from taking seriously the differences between the Christian-Orthodox and nationalist
cosmologies and seeing the limits of religious metaphors as they are applied outside of the
ecclesiastical context. Without denying the continuities that exist between state memorials for
heroes and the Orthodox practice of martyr-worship, I argue that there is also an important
difference between these two commemorative traditions in relation to how they construe the
meaning of the sacrificial act. While self-sacrifice is construed as a morally praiseworthy act CEU eTD Collection across different historical and cultural contexts, it is also praised for very different reasons. The
answer to the question, “What is moral about the sacrifice of one’s life?” changes depending
4 As Moss (2012:5) points out in her exploration of the history of the Christian concept of martyrdom, the first representations of Christian martyrs were themselves strongly connected to the lineage of pre-Christian heroes. 15
on how one understands the nature of life and death, the ontology of the self and its relationship
to the physical body, i.e. what happens to these entities in course and in the aftermath of the
sacrificial act. The perceived ethical relevance of any phenomenon within a particular cultural
tradition depends upon its distinct conception of the self – of what is internal and external to it
– for, as Talal Asad (2003: 78) observes, “various conceptualizations of agency make possible
distinct way of relating to oneself, other people and the world.”
When employed in the nationalist context, Christian martyrical images surely perform a certain
kind of rhetorical labor, enacting the parallelism between the righteousness of national heroes
and that of saints as well as between the immanence of national and religious “truths.”
However, the analogy largely exhausts itself at that point, as the title of “martyr” when applied
to national heroes hardly implies an allusion to sainthood. Unlike the Christian martyrs proper,
who through their ordeals are believed to have achieved sainthood, transforming themselves
from human agents into divine ones, gaining the powers of intercession and even retaining
occasional visiting privileges to the earthly world, the posthumous status of heroes is
commonly that of persons whose existence has ceased.5 Different individuals, of course, might
have diverging understandings of death and many would even intuit that a dead person’s soul
continues to exist in some form, as the Orthodox doctrine commands. However, in contrast to
the vivid and alluring image of a saint’s blissful eternal existence in the heavenly world, the
potential life-after-death that is reserved for the common people is imagined in much vaguer
terms and usually involves an assumption that a deceased person’s presence in the earthly CEU eTD Collection world and his capacity to influence the state of affairs in it are terminated. While saints and
martyrs are often referred to in the Greek language as zontanei, meaning literally “the living,”
5 In his book The Cult of The Saints: Its Function in Latin Christianity Peter Brown (1981:6) underlines that the powers of intercession to the earthly matters the martyrs were imagined to possess powerfully set them apart from the Pagan cult of heroes. 16
heroes are described as athanatei – “the immortal” – a subtle linguistic difference that is
suggestive of incommensurability between the ways in which transcendence of the earthly life
is imagined in the two contexts. This nontrivial difference in the imagined posthumous status
of the sacrificial figures has far-reaching consequences for the Christian-martyrical and
secular-heroic ethics of commemoration and their respective prescriptions for how the
community should respond to a sacrifice.
In contrast to the Christian practice of martyrdom, where the moments of sacrifice and its
vindication co-occur (as the righteous life and death are seen as the end in itself), in the secular-
nationalist context self-sacrifice is often thought of as a costly but necessary instrumental act
carried out on behalf of the collective. A hero is usually motivated by the desire to change the
state of affairs in the “outer” world, his sacrifice thus being dependent on external events for
its vindication – e.g. success of the cause he died for or acknowledgment of his deed by living
comrades followed by their commitment to continue his struggle. By contrast, the Christian
notion of sacrifice follows the logic of transformation that is directed at oneself (Hubert and
Mauss 1964): by accepting a righteous death a man moves closer to God, receives a token of
divine grace and becomes a saint. A martyr’s death is thus perceived by believers as an
ambiguous event that entails both a loss and a gain and presents simultaneously an occasion
for sadness and for joy. The experience of pain and suffering that is believed to have
transformative power is commonly considered to occupy the central place in the moral
landscape of the Christian religious tradition (Perkins 1995: 142 ). Once suffering itself is seen CEU eTD Collection as a type of ethical action (Asad 2000: 30) and a necessary condition for exercising virtue (Asad
2003: 87), it is not just the cause of a martyr’s sacrifice (witnessing to the truth of Christ), but
also the manner and the fact of his or her death itself that are seen as morally relevant, for the
17
inward change they bring in a subject. Although the Christian conception of suffering is not
unrelated to the Stoic philosophical tradition, it also departs from it in significant ways.
Unlike the Stoics, Christians did not reject the body and ignore its distressing experiences; on
the contrary, they sought to actively engage with them; understood as a transformative and self-
assertive experience, suffering was seen as “spiritually profitable,” as a practice that needed to
be actively lived through (Perkins 1995: 142). While the Stoic ideal of virtue was the ability to
control one’s body and disregard its impulses, the Christian tradition located virtue in passion
– not in rising above suffering, but in gracefully going through it. Such a view is in a stark
contrast to the naturalistic understandings of pain that emerged in the post-Enlightenment
world, pain being construed in modernity as the opposite of action, evoking the idea of
weakness, passivity, and inability to counteract it (Asad 2003: 107). As Talal Asad (2003: 107)
succinctly puts it, “the secular Christian must now abjure passion and choose action. Pain is
not merely negativeness. It is, literally, a scandal” (2003: 107).
Building on these key differences in the understanding of suffering and death, I distinguish
between three competing paradigms for thinking about and responding to a violent death,
which I identify somewhat schematically as humanitarian, heroic, and Christian-martyrical
traditions, each relying on its own distinct repertoire of commemorative discourses and
practices. When treated as ideal types, the categories of “victim,” “hero,” and “martyr,”
correspond to three distinct (albeit occasionally converging) cultural paradigms for CEU eTD Collection understanding bodily suffering and its relationship to the individual self: secular humanitarian
ethics, which views all suffering, regardless of its cause, as evil that must be alleviated (Asad
2003; Carlson 2010); heroic ethics, which often follows the logic of Stoic philosophy and tends
to neglect and disregard physical suffering viewing it as external to the self (Perkins 1995;
18
Smith 1997); and Christian ethics, which largely relies on charismatic readings of suffering,
identifying it with divine grace and emphasizing its potential to transform the self (Perkins
1995).6 These distinct ways of thinking about the ontology of life and death, the moral value
of suffering and its relationship to the individual self thus function as epistemes (Foucault 1966)
determining the conditions of possibility of commemorative discourses and practices within
different historical traditions.
The cultures of commemoration that stem from the three ethical paradigms thus vary
considerably in their social logic and in the ways they mobilize images of sacrificial figures to
evoke different responses in the audience. Humanitarian campaigns, for instance, often employ
the gruesome and stirring imagery of victims’ suffering with the goal of instilling in the
audience socially-oriented emotions of empathy and indignation that would inspire it to take
an action to alleviate the suffering (Carlson 2010; Fassin 2011; Fehrenback and Rodogno
2015). Christian-Orthodox iconography, in contrast, tends to avoid the overtly naturalistic and
graphical depictions of the martyrs and focuses instead on conveying a holy person’s inner
nature, the practice of saints’ veneration mainly having a purpose of inciting a self-oriented,
inner-ward spiritual action and disengaged contemplation in the believers (Carlson 2010). The
heroic commemorative culture falls in the middle of this continuum of cultivation of outward
(aiming at the transformation of the external world) and inner-ward (aimed at the
transformation of one’s self) directed impulses.7 Mediated either through the graphic imagery
CEU eTD Collection 6The coarse and schematic distinction made here between the three ethical paradigms is, of course, ideal-typical and fails to give justice to the complexity and heterogeneity of discourses and practices of understanding and relating to the suffering of Others across different historical traditions. Nevertheless, I find it analytically useful for grasping the ethos of different commemorative practices and their respective intended social functions. 7 The line between these directionalities in not always clear cut, since the preoccupation with the moral transformation of the self is rarely independent from some larger political project of social engineering. However, the distinction I am trying to get at here is the one between a response to the dead as historical figures and mobilizations aimed at addressing a specific historical situation, in the context of which the death occurred, versus the evocation of the dead as exemplars of abstract moral virtues and the commemorative rites aimed at the individual ethical self-cultivation through engagement with these exemplary figures. 19
of a broken body testifying to the gravity of a heroic feat, or through the militant aesthetics of
bodily strength, a fallen hero’s image can be used both for instilling in the community the
feeling of indebtedness and inspiration to avenge the hero and for providing the public with an
exemplar of virtue to emulate.
The three types of commemorative traditions are thus guided by distinct logics of engagement
with the subjects of violence and prescribe diverging ethical responses to their deaths. The
humanitarian framework that interprets violent death as a violation of right to life incites the
citizens to express their protest against it through publicly condemning violence, petitioning
institutions, fundraising for the victim’s families, and organizing vigils. The heroic framework
interprets death as a sacrifice for collective and thus imposes an ethical obligation on the
community on whose behalf it was carried out, obliging it to repay its debt to the hero through
commitment to his memory, continuation of his struggle in one form or another, and, in some
cases, through an imitation of his feat. And finally, the Orthodox Christian-martyrical
framework treats death as witnessing to faith through which a person transcends his human
nature and becomes a saint. The Christian practice of saint veneration does not entail an
obligation of memory towards the holy figures. Rather, the saints are represented as the
mediators of the divine with whom the believers are encouraged to cultivate personal
relationships based on reciprocal exchange of favors and promises, while their vitas are offered
to the public as models of pious lives. As I will argue throughout this dissertation, the mode of
engagement with a dead figure that each framework affords plays an important role in CEU eTD Collection determining an appeal of different commemorative practices to various social groups.
The three paradigms described above exist side by side in contemporary Orthodox
communities as possible alternatives for responding to violent death, enabling one and the same
20
individual to relate very differently to the figures of victims, heroes, and martyrs with the
maintenance of this categorical distinction being contingent on the different techniques of
mediating these figures’ suffering and death. Through an examination of different forms of
collective mobilizations around Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou and their emotional ethos,
aesthetics, symbolism, and political framing, I uncover how communities choose among the
available conflicting cultural frameworks for responding to violent death. Rather than trying to
tease apart the political and the spiritual, or the secular and religious elements in these two
modern martyr cults, my research seeks to examine the social logic of different types of
mobilizations around Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou: What ethical traditions and cultural
repertoires of action do they draw on? How do the actors involved in the events construe the
meaning and purpose of commemorative acts? Why do some forms of mobilization prove more
durable than others?
1.3. Dissertation Structure and Contribution
The dissertation consists of three sections (each featuring one chapter from the Russian and
one from the Cypriot case) that trace the development of different forms of mobilizations
around Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou. Part I, Violent Death and Social Activism, is devoted
to exploring the early social responses to the deaths of Rodionov in Russia and Isaak and
Solomou in Cyprus, which in both cases were marked by a protest character and an impulse to
CEU eTD Collection change social realities and challenge the political status-quo. Putting the chapters in dialogue,
I explore the distinct historical configurations of socio-political and cultural factors in Russia
and Cyprus, which determined the failure of “humanitarian” mobilizations that drew on the
rhetoric of human rights and victimhood around Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou and their
quick replacement with nationalistic ones, framed through the heroic ethos of sacrifice and
21
honor. Chapter 1 follows the historical development of Rodionov’s cult in Russia between 1996
and 2010, positioning the solder’s veneration in relation to two social processes – the crisis of
Russian patriotism and resurgence of Orthodox faith in the public arena. I argue that the anti-
establishment flavor of Rodionov’s cult made the church authorities wary of appropriating this
otherwise highly attractive soldier’s image. Instead, Rodionov’s figure was largely promoted
by politically oriented actors (often adherents of a radical conservative and nationalist
ideology), who employed the soldier’s image mainly to protest the government’s handling of
the Chechen conflict and to articulate a moral critique of the social realities of post-Soviet
Russia. Chapter 2 contextualizes the short-lived “humanitarian” mobilization around Isaak and
Solomou in the late 1990s in relationship to the post-1974 tradition of civic anti-Turkish
occupation protests. I argue that the waning appeal of the “humanitarian” mobilization around
the two heroes and its increasing substitution with a nationalistic one was conditioned both by
the perceived historical ineffectiveness of international legal bodies and increasing frustration
with the structural inequality inherent to humanitarian politics (Fassin 2011). I then proceed to
discuss the nationalist mobilization around Isaak and Solomou that started to powerfully
resurge after 2008 with the emergence of the right-wing National Popular Front Movement
(ELAM). Denouncing the “hypocrisy” of the political establishment and accusing state
authorities of deliberately trying to erase the public memory of Isaak and Solomou, the
movement’s members present themselves as the only faithful followers of the two heroes’
behest, promising to vindicate their sacrifices through an active fight for the removal of the
Turkish military and settlers from the island. CEU eTD Collection
The chapters in Part II, Transformations: From Social to Spiritual Action, explore the evolution
of Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou’s cults since the late 2000s. They trace the gradual
transition from the forms of mobilization aimed at political activism to the commemorative
22
practices oriented at the moral transformation of the self. The emergence of these self-directed
forms of commemoration is associated with an important shift in the logic of moral critique of
modernity. While the discourses of anti-systemic nationalists in Russia and ELAM in Cyprus
focus largely on economic deprivation and social marginalization as key maladies driving the
moral disintegration of the community, the actors involved in the mobilizations oriented at the
moral transformation (of the self and the society) often cite the general increase in welfare and
“hedonistic” lifestyles as the sources of stagnation of individuals’ moral and spiritual
development.
Chapter 3 traces the transformation of Rodionov’s cult in the late 2000s and explores the way
recent social and political developments in Russia, including the powerful resurgence of
patriotic and spiritual rhetoric at the level of state officials and the media rebranding of the
Russian army have contributed to the popularization of the soldier’s cult. By examining how
Rodionov’s image is being employed as a didactic tool for patriotic education, I shed light on
the increasing interconnection between Orthodox faith and militaristic models of patriotism in
Russia. I argue that the convergence of heroic and martyrical aesthetics and the defiant model
of morality that Rodionov’s cult represents is indicative of a dual process of militarization of
Orthodoxy and the spiritualization of patriotism and military service. In Chapter 4, I explore
the largest form of mass mobilization around the figures of the two Greek Cypriot heroes – the
bikers’ Initiative in memory of Isaak and Solomou. Established in 2008, the Initiative’s motor-
procession has rapidly grown into the largest yearly bikers’ event in Cyprus, attracting around CEU eTD Collection 2000 motorcyclists. I identify the convergences and differences between ELAM’s and the
Initiative’s frameworks and argue that the massive success of the bikers’ events is determined
by the fact that it offers a moderate version of a nationalistic protest, in which anti-systemic
23
rhetoric and rebellious flavor are successfully combined with official state discourses on human
rights and democracy.
The final part of my dissertation, Sainthood and the Varieties of Ethical Engagements, develops
a transnational analysis of martyr veneration in Russia and Cyprus and recovers the historical
connections between the two sites by tracing the circulation of discourses on morality and
spiritualism between Russian and Greek Cypriot Orthodox communities. The section consists
of two chapters exploring the veneration of Rodionov in Russia and Cyprus. Chapter 5
investigates the compatibilities and tensions between the Soviet-heroic and Orthodox-
martyrical traditions, as they come to be articulated in Rodionov’s veneration in Russia.
Drawing on an ethnographic account of the practices observed at the yearly celebration
organized for the soldier at his grave-site in Satino-Russkoe village, I discuss the liminal
commemorative practices that Rodionov’s ambiguous status as “uncanonized saint” and his
dual perception as “dead” hero and “living” saint generate. In the final part of the chapter, I
explore the new emerging forms of commemoration that blur the line between religious and
secular rites using the example of the memorial concerts organized in soldier’s honor by an
Orthodox creative collective. Chapter 6 examines the nature, scale, and reasons behind
Rodionov’s veneration in Cyprus. Through reconstructing the micro-history of the
establishment of the soldier’s cult on the island, I illuminate the channels for the introduction
of new cultural representations through which believers learn about new saints and mechanisms
enabling the further transmission of these representations. In contrast to the other saints of the CEU eTD Collection Russian origin popularly known among Greek Cypriots, Rodionov does not possess a
reputation as a miracle-worker with the consequence that his slow popularization on the island
bears a largely top-down character. The priests encouraging the soldier’s veneration offer
Rodionov’s figure as an exemplar of faith that is meant to remind lay practitioners of the
24
sacrificial ethos of the Orthodox tradition and to show them that witnessing to one’s faith
through martyrdom is not a thing of the past, but a possible choice every Orthodox believer
might find himself confronted with.
Ultimately, by showing how the cults of martyrs and heroes serve as a vehicle for the
development of belligerent nationalisms and militant models of masculinity embraced by
conservative young men in Russia and Cyprus, my research contributes to broader, cross-
disciplinary debates on the resurgence of nationalism, revanchism, and militant masculine
identities around the globe (e.g. Geva 2018; Holmes 2000; Pasieka 2017; Pilkington 2016).
While Bloch and Parry (1982) stress the central role of mortuary practices in the reassertion
and consolidation of the existing social order, in her influential study of the movement of dead
bodies in post-Socialist space, Katherine Verdery (1999) shows how social rituals involving
reburial and the movements of monuments can be used to demarcate and cement its
transformation. In the case of post-Socialist Europe, this transformation itself was, however,
often envisioned as a return to one’s authentic form of being, a “natural” course of a nation’s
historical development violently interrupted by the construction of the USSR and the Soviet
bloc. The contestation over the celebration and commemoration of specific historical figures
thus always reflects the struggle over competing readings of history and visions of morality
and social order in the present.
By focusing on the figures of martyrs as bearers of national ideals, I aim to produce a nuanced CEU eTD Collection account of the heterogeneous Russian and Greek Cypriot nationalist movements that takes
seriously the moral imagination, ideology, and values that animate them. I argue that the
unwavering popularity of heroic and martyrical figures in Russia and Cyprus and the contested
mobilizations around them represents more than just the two communities’ attempts at dealing
25
with an uneasy historical legacy. It reflects the longing for models of heroism adaptable for
contemporary situations and a sacrificial morality that compels its practitioners to honor and
remember the sacrifices of the past to prepare themselves for matching acts of courage. This
trend needs to be understood in reference to the perceived moral collapse, atomization, and de-
spiritualization of society that are often linked discursively to the domination of secular
Western liberal ethics. In such a context, religious and nationalistic discourses that build around
the imagery of self-sacrifice, heroism, and communal struggle emerge as appealing ideological
alternatives for the people seeking to demarcate their own transcendent horizons of
significance.
CEU eTD Collection
26
PART I Violent Death and Social Activism
2. He Chose the Cross: Soldier Evgenii Rodionov as a Moral Model in Post-
Soviet Russia
The story of Evgenii Rodionov’s earthly life is short and straightforward. He was born in 1977
in a small village of Chibirley in Penza oblast’, finished high school in the Kurilovo village in
the outskirts of Moscow, and when he turned eighteen years old he was conscripted into the
Russian army and deployed to the Chechnya-Ingushetia border as part of the Frontier Guard
Special Forces (in 1996, the final year of the First Chechen Campaign). After about a month
of service Rodionov alongside with his three other fellow soldiers was taken hostage by
Chechen militants during an attack on their block-post and after one hundred days of captivity
he was executed on his nineteenth birthday.
The history of Rodionov’s posthumous existence is, however, more complex and appears to be
far from ending. Evgenii Rodionov could have shared the fate of thousands of other young men
who perished in the Chechen conflict and were largely forgotten by the broader Russian society
had it been not for one detail – a small metal cross Rodionov happened to be wearing when he
was captured which played a fateful role in this soldier’s story. After more than three months
of brutal torture and a resolute refusal to provide an address of a close relative, where a ransom
demand could be sent, Rodionov was offered a choice: to take off his cross– quite an CEU eTD Collection uncommon adornment for the young people at the time – and convert to Islam or to die. The
soldier chose the cross and for that was beheaded on 23 May 1996.8 Although the
8The details of Rodionov’s execution are known from the testimony that his mother Liubov’ Rodionova claims to have obtained from the soldier’s killer Ruslan Khaikhoroev (Smirnov 2012).
27
Figure 2.1. Liubov’ Rodionova by her son’s grave in Satino-Russkoe. Source: http://rublev.com/blogi/mat-soldata
other three soldiers shared his lamentable fate, none of them came to be as known and
appreciated by the Russian people as Evgenii Rodionov – the boy, who “chose the cross.”
Right after the hostage-taking incident all four captured soldiers were declared deserters by
their army commanders, who sought to avoid assuming responsibility for their lives.
Rodionov’s story would have never gone viral and the circumstances of his death publicly
known if it was not for his mother, Liubov’ Rodionova, who refused to believe that her son
was a deserter and personally went to Chechnya determined to uncover his fate. Upon arrival CEU eTD Collection Rodionova was met by her son’s commanding officer, who reluctantly admitted that the
conclusion about desertion was too hasty, that the soldiers must have been taken prisoner and
that there was nothing he could do for them. Desperate to save her son’s life, Liubov’
mortgaged her apartment – the only property she had at the time – and started the searching on
28
her own. She walked back and forth through almost all of Chechnya going from village to
village, often without any escort, trying to find any leads on the soldiers’ whereabouts. Liubov’
managed to personally meet with many Chechen militant commanders wanted by the Russian
army at the time. After one such meeting went wrong, her companion – a father, who was also
looking for his missing son – was shot dead; Liubov’ herself was brutally beaten, barely
escaping death.9 Even when it became clear that her son was no longer alive, Liubov’ continued
looking, determined to bring him back no matter what. And so she did, after almost nine months
of ceaseless searching, when she finally managed to meet with the soldier’ murderer – a
notoriously known Chechen militant commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev, who narrated to her the
circumstances of his execution and, in exchange for a $ 4000 ransom, agreed to reveal the
location, where the bodies of the four murdered soldiers were buried (Smirnov 2012).
Rodionov’s story in itself is not unique. Towards the final years of the first Chechen campaign
the Chechen militants’ practice of kidnapping Russian soldiers with the goal of exchanging
them for Chechen prisoners was already on the track of rapidly transforming into a lucrative
and merciless business model of abductions for ransom. 10 However, the role Rodionov’s
mother played in the story, the determination, strength of spirit and the boundless love (Liubov’
in Russian means precisely this – ‘love’) she has demonstrated touched many people and
certainly played major role in the initial interest the public and the mass media took in the
soldier’s case.
CEU eTD Collection
9 These details are known from my interview with Rodionova (April 2013). 10 In the next three years following the first Chechen campaign, the kidnapping industry expanded in Chechnya to such an extent that its revenues far superseded those of the sale of oil (Tishkov 2004: 114, 125). The increasing commercialization of the practice led to the substantial expansion of the potential victims’ pool. As a result, what started as a crime of opportunity targeting Russian military personnel, international journalists, and aid workers transformed a sophisticated scheme involving meticulous planning and a careful selection of victims (often Russian civilians residing in Chechnya or adjacent regions) (Phillips 2009). 29
A couple of years after Liubov’ have returned to Russia and managed to finally properly bury
her son in a small cemetery in a village of Satino-Russkoe, a group of journalists from a
conservative Orthodox media platform Russkii Dom came to the village to cover the restoration
of a local church. Upon hearing from the local villagers about Rodionov, the crew decided to
make a small reportage about him. The story of a young soldier, who refused to save his life at
the cost of denouncing his faith, aired on Russkii Dom in 1999. It caused a strong resonance
and caught the attention of the editorial collective of the Zavtra newspaper – a prominent
conservative outlet, whose ideology presents a peculiar mixture of communism, Russian
nationalism, imperialism, and Orthodox mysticism (Suspitsina 1999). The newspaper
correspondent, who met with Liubov’ to collect her testimony, was deeply moved by the
soldier’s story and the ordeals his mother went through. He shared with the public the details
of Liubov’’s difficult predicament – having spent all of her savings on the searching, she could
barely make ends meet and was about to be evicted from the apartment that she had mortgaged
– and ended the article with a call to the readers to help the mother of the hero (Iuriev 1999).
The publication triggered a powerful public response, people from all over Russia sending
letters of support to the newspaper and donating money for Liubov’ with a result that the
Zavtra’s editorial staff had shortly collected an amount of money necessary to help Liubov’
buy back her apartment and to put up a tall wooden cross on the soldier’s gravesite. Numerous
other publications have followed and as the details of Rodionov’s gruesome execution became
publicly known, the soldier came to be perceived by many Russians as a symbol of heroism
and spiritual strength, some Orthodox nationalists going as far as demanding his official CEU eTD Collection canonization as a martyr.
In this chapter I will explore the early mobilizations around Rodionov that happened between
the 1990s and early 2000s and flesh out how the soldier’s figure was appropriated by different
30
actors in pursuit of various social and political agendas. I argue that the broad appeal of the
image of the soldier-martyr to the Russian public at the time was determined both by the need
for contemporary exemplars of sainthood and by the opportunity for the moral
problematization of the post-Soviet realities that Rodionov’s story created. To those among the
Russian public who were left dissatisfied with the social and political outcomes of their
country’s transition to democracy and who perceived the 1990s and the times of a moral
collapse and social disintegration the example of the soldier’s “sacrifice” offered hope for the
moral revival of the Russian society.
2.1. Heroism and Sainthood in Post-Soviet Russia
Rodionov’s cult developed in Russia at the moment when the state and society were undergoing
a fundamental political, economic, and ideological transformation and the brutal and protracted
conflict that unfolded in Chechnya after the fall of the Soviet Union revealed some of the ugliest
sides of this historical process. The lack of planning and poor managerial capacity of the central
authorities, political apathy of the public, open cynicism of economic elites, who were actively
profiteering from the conflict, and complete chaos and dissention in the army led to a tragically
high number of casualties among the Russian federal troops and the Chechen civilian
population alike (Russel 2007: 72; Tishkov 2004: XI, 160; Oushakine 2009: 131). As the cause
of the Chechen campaign lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public, there was little
CEU eTD Collection room for heroization of the soldiers participating in it – they were either identified with a
repressive and violent force of the state, or (as most of the soldiers on the ground were young
high school graduates whose socio-economic situation did not allow them to avoid being
drafted to the army) they were seen as unfortunate victims of circumstance doomed to become
cannon fodder. Thus, the soldiers occupied a precarious position vis-à-vis the rest of the
31
Russian society, on whose behalf they fought, killed, and died and by whom those lucky enough
to come back from the battlefield were subsequently left behind as cripples begging on street
corners (Oushakine 2009; Sieca-Kozlowski 2013). Regardless of one’s stance on the Chechen
campaign, the image of the soldiers fighting there evoked an uneasy feeling – of either
complicity in the crimes perpetrated by their hands or guilt towards these abandoned defenders
of the motherland – prompting the desire to avert the gaze and making the Chechen war and its
participants material for an active collective forgetting long before the conflict was finished
(Danilova 2014).
In his study of historical representations of Russian captives in the Caucasus, Bruce Grant
(2009) shows how in the 19th century, at the height of Russian military exploits in the Caucasus,
captivity emerged in the Russian literature and arts as a prominent trope representing the gifts
of civilization offered by the imperial power. The kidnapped body, he (2009: XVII) argues,
became a powerful symbol of “sacrifice made for the advancement of newly captured lands.”
In the 1990s – the period marked by the disintegration of the Soviet empire and a widespread
questioning of the imperial project and the costs of sustaining it among the Russian public –
the popular narratives of captivity, however, took on a slightly different valence. As Ram
Harsha (1999:9) points out, the Russian discourses about violence in Chechnya emphasized the
tension between the state and its people, casting the common Russians as victims of imperial
power, “caught in the spiral of violence resulting from Russian military aggression and
Chechen reaction.”11 The 19th century romanticized narratives that emphasized exchange and CEU eTD Collection featured moments of recognition of shared humanity between the imperial agents and their
captors (Grant 2009: 98) were replaced in the late 1990s by the shockingly brutal videos of
11 The ambiguous positionality of a Russian captive who is alienated both from his captors and the repressive imperial power was equally present in the 19th century literary tales of captivity (Harsha 1999:10). 32
hostage torture and executions and stories of violence told by the rescued kidnapping victims
(Lentini and Bakashmar 2007; Tishkov 2004; ). With about 1,200 Russian soldiers still listed
as missing / prisoners of war after the end of the First Chechen campaign (Trusevich and
Cherkasov 1996:4), captivity thus came to represent to many Russians a “wasted” sacrifice and
the tragedy of the reluctant imperial agents left behind by the disintegrating state.12 Rodionov’s
story and the unexpected publicity it received, provided nationalist and patriotic circles with
an opportunity to talk about this tragedy and demand that the sacrifice of the Russian soldiers,
if not redeemed, is at least acknowledged by the broader society. Challenging the dominant
narratives of violence/ vice/ passive victimhood surrounding the Russian soldiers, the patriotic
media platforms adopted Rodionov’s story to offer the public an example of a young soldier,
who, they claimed, lived, served, and died with dignity.
The emergence of the soldier’s cult also coincided with the active religious revival in Russia
and a triumphant return of Orthodoxy into the public sphere. This period was notable for an
unprecedentedly large number of canonizations and the Orthodox Church’s active efforts to
produce and promote new role models for contemporary Russian believers (Christensen 2012).
The new historical and moral narrative advanced by the Church aimed both at a radical
reinterpretation of the Soviet past and a distancing from its ideals, and the exposure and
denouncement of the perceived moral depravity of the post-socialist Russia. Orthodox
spirituality, which puts equal emphasis on individual piousness and collective salvation
(Kharkhordin 1999: 79-80; Stöckl 2001: 132-133), thus became an alternative to the repressive CEU eTD Collection and faceless socialist model of society and to the perceived cynical and antisocial liberal
ideology of individualism and moral permissiveness.
12 Danilova (2014) observes that the documentaries about the Chechen conflict released in 1990 depicted Russian soldiers as hero-martyrs and as victims of the cynical and greedy political and military elites. 33
The hagiographies of the new saints reflect the struggles of different groups within the Church
to deal with the uneasy question of the Soviet past and the place of religion in it. Some of the
new saintly figures were meant to emphasize a rupture between the Soviet and post-Soviet
periods and to condemn the atheist regime’s violent persecution of Orthodox believers
(Kormina 2013a). This vision was embodied in the large group of canonized saints called “the
new martyrs and confessors of Russia,” which mainly consisted of the Orthodox clergymen
and lay believers who fell victim to Soviet repression (Christensen 2012, 2017; Kormina
2013a; Rock 2011; Rousselet 2011). As Kathy Rousselet (2011:159) points out, conservative
and patriotic discourses often present these new saints as moral exemplars embodying
collective values embedded in the Russian cultural tradition, like faithfulness, self-sacrifice,
and resistance against the temptations of the secular world. Other new cults, by contrast, present
an attempt to establish a historical continuity of the Orthodox tradition from pre-revolutionary
Russia to the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Such is the case with the cult of Matrona of
Moscow, a 20th century eldress (staritsa) famed for her visionary powers, canonized in 1999.
Jeanne Kormina (2013a) points out that Matrona’s hagiographies are deeply embedded in the
realities of every-day Soviet life, while popular legends about the saint also assert her
connection to the dramatic moments of Soviet history. Thus, some versions of Matrona’s life
claim that Joseph Stalin visited the eldress in September 1941, when Moscow was about to be
occupied by the German troops, to ask her advice on whether he should surrender the city.13
Kormina (2013a:420) interprets this narrative as an attempt to stress the continuity of Orthodox CEU eTD Collection tradition throughout the Soviet era and to cast ROC “as a bridge connecting different episodes
of Russian history and giving coherence to the national historical narrative.”
13 Although this episode is excluded from the saint’s official hagiography, it is often present in publications produced by secular publishing houses (Kormina 2013a). 34
While Matrona’s cult remains highly popular among the Orthodox believers in Russia, few
among the large group of saints canonized as “the new martyrs and confessors of Russia,” are
known and venerated by the public. The mass canonization made it difficult for the believers
to learn about the lives of the individual saints, while the absence of identifiable remains and
individual burial sites14 – a material dimension that is central to the popular veneration – made
it hard for the believers to establish personal connections with these figures (Kormina 2013a;
Rock 2011). More importantly, the new martyrs who suffered at the hands of NKVD alongside
their numerous atheist compatriots, failed to provide a compelling model of sainthood to
contemporary believers (Kormina 2013a; Rock 2011). In contrast to these new martyrs, who
represent the conflict between the Soviet and Orthodox models of morality, the figure of
Evgenii Rodionov, just like that of Matrona, merges the two, asserting the continuity and
compatibility between the Soviet and Orthodox values. The model of morality personified by
Rodionov – a dutiful soldier and a faithful believer – proved appealing to the large segment of
the contemporary Russian believers because, I argue, it successfully accommodated both the
Orthodox doctrine with its spiritual and mystical dimensions and the ethical ideals inherited
from the Soviet past: comradeship, loyalty, and faithfulness to one’s moral standards.
The editorial staff of the Zavtra newspaper and its editor-in-chief – a well-known nationalist
writer and a vehement critic of Boris Yeltsin’s and (until recently) Vladimir Putin’s regimes
Aleksandr Prokhanov, the Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers – an ultra-Orthodox brotherhood CEU eTD Collection renowned for its radical nationalist and militaristic views (Rock 2002) – and several prominent
clergymen, including archpriests Aleksandr Shargunov and Dmitrii Smirnov, were among the
first to openly speak in support of Rodionov’s canonization. Their pleas prompted the Russian
14 Most of these saints are believed to be buried in a mass grave in the Butovo Polygon near Moscow. 35
Orthodox Church’s Synodal Commission for the Canonization of Saints to review the soldier’s
case. However, after a protracted investigation the proposal to canonize Rodionov was
eventually rejected by the Commission in 2004, stirring a series of bitter debates among the
clerics and the lay believers alike regarding the nature of martyrdom and heroism and the
possibility of telling one from the other. 15 The major reasons for denying canonization as cited
by the Commission’s secretary Maksim Maksimov in an interview to Tserkovnyi Vestnik on
January 25, 2004 were the lack of evidence that Rodionov led a conscious churchly life and
the difficulty of confirming the circumstances of his death. A video allegedly featuring the
soldier’s beheading proved impossible to verify and the only available testimony regarding the
circumstances of the soldier’s death was that of Liubov’ Rodionova, who has not personally
witnessed the execution. The only person who could have confirmed the story – Rodionov’s
executioner Ruslan Khaikhoroev – by the time the investigation has started was no longer
alive.16 The fact that the investigation was taking place in the mist of the Second Chechen
Campaign has significantly complicated the matter, making the search for potential witnesses
among the local Chechen residents practically impossible.
Commenting on the decision, Maksimov, emphasized that “canonization is not giving away
rewards to everyone who has suffered” and that the Orthodox Church never canonized those
killed in war just to “inspire the army and raise the soldierly spirit” (Tserkovnyi Vestnik, January
25, 2004). This position was subsequently heavily criticized by the clergymen supporting
Rodionov’s canonization. Thus, during the discussion of the Commission’s decision on CEU eTD Collection
15 The Commission did not frame its verdict as an explicit rejection, but rather stated that Rodionov’s canonization is impossible at the given moment due to the lack of evidence confirming the circumstances of his death. 16 Ruslan Khaikhoroev is reported to have died on September 8, 1999. The newspaper accounts of Khaikhoroev’s death diverge, some sources claiming that he died from the wounds received in a battle with the federal forces in Dagestan, while others stating he was killed by his fellow co-villagers in Bamut as a result of a blood feud (Encyclopedia Terroristica, n.d. Retrieved August 11, 2019 (http://terroristica.info/node/1328)).
36
Orthodox radio Radonezh on February 8, 2004, archpriest Aleksandr Shargunov pointed out
that detailed testimonies of an inter vivos conscious churchly life are unavailable for many
martyrs celebrated by the ROC and interpreted the Commission’s decision as politically
motivated, alleging that it was driven by the fear of hindering the attempts at peace-building in
Chechnya.
Despite the absence of the canonization decision, Rodionov continues to be an object of popular
veneration with thousands of pilgrims visiting his grave in Satino-Russkoe on May 23. Many
believers in Russia and in the larger Orthodox world (including Cyprus, Greece, Serbia, and
Ukraine), continue to paint icons of him, compose hagiographic narratives of his life, devote
him songs and poems and pray to him in hope of intercession. In Russia Rodionov was
pronounced a folk saint, glorified, as his mother put it, “by the people’s church” and particularly
loved by the representatives of the military and law enforcement professions and the
patriotically-minded youth.
2.2. Mobilizing Around the New Martyr
The story of Rodionov’s feat publicized in late 1990s was well received in the Russian
conservative patriotic circles. The conservative scene at the time comprised representatives of
diverse ideological camps, ranging from dogmatic Marxist-Leninists and Neo-Stalinists to the
CEU eTD Collection Soviet regime sympathetic Russian nationalists and anti-communist nationalists, identifying
themselves with ideas of Orthodoxy and monarchism (O’Connor 2006: 94). Despite the
internal ideological contradictions, the post-Soviet conservative and patriotic movements
shared many concerns and demonstrated remarkable unity in their unrelenting opposition to
Perestroika, rejection of the Western cultural influences, criticism of Yeltsin’s regime, and
37
bemoaning of the moral degradation of the society and Russian people’s loss of spirituality
(O’Connor 2006). Aleksandr Prokhanov, the editor-in-chief and main ideologue of Zavtra
bridged the ideological divide by adopting the imperial and statist ethos of both pre-
Revolutionary Russian Empire and the Soviet regime and effectively combining the ideas of
radical Russian nationalism with mystical religiosity, thus securing the newspaper’s appeal to
a broad group of readers on the conservative spectrum. With its print run ranging in different
years between 70, 000 and 100, 000 copies, Zavtra that positions itself as “the newspaper of
spiritual opposition”17 persists to be one of the largest and most influential broadsheets of the
nationalist press.
Given the ideological orientation of Zavtra and the newspaper’s pro-Russian stance on the
Chechen campaigns, it is hardly surprising that its editorial collective displayed interest in the
story of a Russian soldier, who was said to have died for faith. Iurii Iur’ev18 – a free-lance
correspondent, who authored Zavtra’s first publication about Rodionov, himself a former navy
officer and an Orthodox Seminary student at the time, arranged his first interview with Liubov’
in February 1999. During our conversation in 2016, he told me he was initially motivated by
personal curiosity and desire to learn more about the biography of Rodionov, of whom he
learned from the Russkii Dom reportage. However, once he met the soldier’s mother, the focus
of his article has quickly changed.19 Shaken to the core by the horrors Liubov’ had to go
through to find and bring her dead son’s body back, he felt compelled to narrate her story and
sketch out her portrait: CEU eTD Collection
17 Zavtra has been running under the subtitle “The Newspaper of Spiritual Opposition” until 2000, when the subtitle was changed to “The Newspaper of the Russian State” – a shift reflecting the conservatives’ increasing identification with Vladimir Putin’s regime (see Chapter 4 for further discussion). 18 Iurii Iur’ev is a correspondent’s pen name that I continue to use throughout the dissertation on his request to protect his anonymity. 19 The article about Rodionov was published in Zavtra on February 15, 1999 under the title “The Russian Martyr.” However, Iuriev’s engagement with religious issues in the text was limited by the allusion to martyrdom in the title and a passing mention of Rodionov’s religiosity, as he referred to the soldier as “a young confessor of Christian faith.” Instead, the article’s main focus and its protagonist was Liubov’ and her tribulations in Chechnya. 38
As I was listening to Liubov’ Vasil’evna, my eyes grew misty and at times it seemed as if Mother Russia from a war-time poster was looking at me – not formidable and invocatory, but calm and exhausted one. She spoke quietly, without any pathos ... No analyst from the General Staff and no militant field commander knows about the Chechen war more than this woman does. She personally knows every notable participant of this heroic battle, just like she knows its every Judah (Zavtra, February 15, 1999).20
The readers’ response to Iuriev’s publication and his call to help Liubov’ had taken the Zavtra
staff by surprise. This is how the newspaper’s publicist and Aleksandr Prokhanov’s son Andrei
Fefelov, who himself later authored several publications about Rodionov, remembers the
events:
We put up a big carton box in the newspaper’s office at Komsomol’skaia Square with a sign saying that we are collecting donations to help Evgenii’s mother … and an endless flow of people has started. Endless! … It was people from different social backgrounds with different amounts of money, coming to the office because the money transfer system was not developed well yet. … And some people were coming with very modest donations – those were hard times for the entire country 21 – but nevertheless they managed to spare something to give. 22
Andrei says that in this powerful public reaction he at the time saw a mystical sign. As he put
it, to him and to the people sharing the newspaper’s conservative ideology the appearance of a
new saint in the face of Rodionov and his immediate popular (narodnoe) recognition in the
“dark” period of late 1990s was a sign that the Russian history “was not finished yet”:
At that period, it seemed like all [social] layers were being folded: the great Russian literature was disappearing, Russian culture was disappearing, statehood was disappearing ... the Russian church was disappearing ... – a devaluation of all moral values. The ground was shaking under the feet and he – Evgenii – emerged right at this period, the darkest and the gloomiest one. 23
The representation of Rodionov as the last symbol of purity and hope in the “corrupt” times of CEU eTD Collection
decaying Russian statehood is representative of the broader conservatives’ discourse on the
20 All quotes from Russian and Greek language newspapers as well as interviews are the author’s own translations. 21 The events took place in Winter – Spring of 1999, when Russia’s economy was at the peak of a deep recession that followed the 1998 financial crisis. 22 From my interview with Andrei Fefelov (May 2016). 23Ibid. 39
period of the 1990s. In a similar vein, reflecting back on the political state of Russia in the last
decade of the 20th century Aleksandr Prokhanov asserted in 2012 that “the deed of the nineteen
years old young man – a solder – at the time when around there was only ugliness, traitors, and
helplessness redeems the entire inaptly handled anti-terror operation of the First Chechen
Campaign.”24 The numerous publications that appeared in Zavtra since 1999 often present
the soldier as an exemplar of “true” faith and patriotism juxtaposed to the demagoguism of the
political establishment. For instance, in his article from May 18, 2011 Fefelov asserted that
none of the numerous pro-Kremlin youth movements will ever adopt Rodionov’s image as
their symbol because its presence would expose their own hypocrisy and “destroy the fiction
of [their] synthetic patriotism.”25
The moral model of a person who fulfills his patriotic duty despite being abandoned or betrayed
by the state gained prominence in Russia during the late 1990s and early 2000s. For instance,
the 118 sailors and navy officers, who died in the 2000 Kursk nuclear submarine accident, were
often described in the media discourses as “martyrs.” The submarine sunk during the drill
exercises on August 12, following two blasts caused by a spontaneous discharge of a practice
torpedo that killed most of the crew and left twenty-three survivors trapped and awaiting rescue
in the 9th compartment of the boat (Barany 2004). The Russian government refused the help
offered by the British and Norwegian navies immediately after the incident and undertook its
own unsuccessful rescue effort. By the time the Russian authorities finally allowed the
Norwegian team to participate in the rescue operation on August 21, the sailors were already CEU eTD Collection dead. The sailors’ deaths were popularly blamed on the Russian authorities who failed to use
all the available means to save them and systematically misinformed the public about the
24 Prokhanov, Aleksandr. 2012. “Khozhdenie v Ogon’.” Zavtra, January 14. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (http://zavtra.ru/blogs/hozhdenie-v-ogon-24). 25 Fefelov, Andrei. 2011. “Evgenii-Voin.” Zavtra, May 18. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (http://zavtra.ru/blogs/2011- 05-3181). 40
Figure 2.2. “Requiem” (2000-2002) by Valerii Balabanov. Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Реквием_(триптих)
details of the accident and the course of the rescue efforts (Barany 2004). Orthodox painter
Valerii Balabanov united Rodionov and Kursk’s stories into a triptych “Requiem” that he
completed in the early 2000s. The work (see Figure 2.2) consists of three paintings – “Star of
Bethlehem,” “Prayer about the Sailors of Russia,” and “Prayer about a Russian Warrior” –
which Balabanov described in an interview to Russkaia Narodnaia Liniia (December 9, 2003)
as “paintings-prayers” symbolizing “the Repentance Days” of Russia.26 Both in Rodionov and
Kursk sailors’ stories martyrdom came to represent commitment to one’s duty to defend the
Fatherland despite the fact that it is governed by a “traitorous” regime that places little value CEU eTD Collection on the lives of its defenders. In the early 2000s such a model of martyrdom resonated well with
26 Stefanov, Sergei. 2003. “Rekviem.” Russkaia Liniia, December 12. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (https://rusk.ru/st.php?idar=1001013). 41
many nationalists and conservatives, who found themselves in opposition to the ruling regime
and were trying to articulate their model of patriotism.
Another organization that was closely involved in the campaign for Rodionov’s canonization
is The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers – an ultra-conservative brotherhood founded in 1992
and headed by Leonid Simonovich-Nikshich (Rock 2002). The brotherhood’s ideological
outlook presents a complex mixture of Orthodox fundamentalism, Russian nationalism, anti-
Semitism, and apocalypticism that preaches an imminent approach of the final battle between
the true believers and the forces of the Satan (usually identified by Nikshich as the Jews,
communists, and the West). Oriented both towards Orthodox mysticism and militant social
activism, the Banner-Bearers have adopted Rodionov’s image as a symbol of their crusade
against liberalism and multiculturalism.
Massive cross processions with Orthodox icons and banners and public prayers – the group’s
habitual means for fighting their “spiritual warfare” against the enemies of the Russian people
and Orthodox faith – provided yet another platform for promoting the image of the new martyr
(see Figure 2.3). While the brotherhood representatives frame their processions as “sacral”
religious acts aimed at obtaining God’s benevolence, connecting their practices to the pre-
Revolutionary Russia’s tradition of cross processions, their provocative and rarely short of
eccentric public appearances, seem to be carefully staged and designed to capture public and
media attention. Dressed in black paramilitary-style outfits decorated with army symbols and CEU eTD Collection medals, the Banner-Bearers are always invariably present at the celebration of Rodionov’s
memory day held at the cemetery near the Satino-Russkoe village. Throughout the late 1990s
and early 2000s, the large banners with the soldier’s icons were often accompanying the
42
Figure 2.3. The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers march in protection of the Russian army and the Russian people (February 23, 2005, Moscow). Source: http://www.pycckie.org/galereya/foto_gal_23-02-05/art23-005.jpg
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 2.4. The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers and Zavtra editorial collective in a joint campaign in defense of the slogan “Orthodoxy or Death!” Source: http://drakula.org/sv_horugv/10/16072010.shtml Zavtra July 7, 2010
43
numerous public events the brotherhood organized or participated in, especially the ones
related to the Chechen conflict. Thus, Rodionov’s icons were symbolically placed in the
forefront of the protest demonstration organized by the brotherhood on August 20, 2003 in
defense of coronel Budanov – a decorated hero of the Second Chechen Campaign, who was
deprived of his military rank in 2003 and convicted to ten years in prison for kidnapping and
killing an eighteen years old Chechen girl El’za Kungaeva in 2000.27
From 2004 onwards, the brotherhood also actively mobilized Rodionov’s image for the
numerous public events organized by different nationalist and patriotic forces, including (to
name just few examples) the 2004 massive demonstration “Russia against Terror” organized
in the aftermath of the Beslan school siege, the Russian Marches – nationalist rallies held yearly
on November 4 since 2005, and the 2007 demonstration in Moscow against the City Council’s
initiative to name one of Moscow’s streets after the first president of the Chechen Republic
Akhmad Kadyrov. 28 In February 2010, together with the notorious for its radicalism
Movement Against Illegal Immigration, the Brotherhood organized a demonstration in
memory of the Pskov’s 6th Company (a group of Russian paratroopers celebrated as heroes of
the Second Chechen Campaign), in course of which Rodionov’s images were again
27 Budanov’s highly publicized case triggered a lot of controversy in the Russian society, as many nationalists and patriots interpreted his imprisonment and criminal prosecution of some other Russian soldiers and commanders for the killing of civilians in Chechnya as the state’s betrayal of the army. Budanov was later released on parole in January 2009 to the great indignation of many Chechens (2017. “Budanov Iurii Dmitrievich.” Kavkazskii Uzel, 27 September. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/62371/)). On June 10, 2011 the ex- coronel was assassinated in Moscow by a Chechen Islamic activist Iusup Temerkhanov. His murder stirred a new
CEU eTD Collection wave of protest among the Russian nationalists in which the Banner-Bearers took active part. 28Aside from this case, Rodionov’s image has featured in two other urban toponymic controversies with ethnic connotations. In 2013 the head of the Russian Muftis Council, to the great outrage of Russian Orthodox and nationalist activists, spoke against the Orthodox Movement’s “Holy Russia” request to the Moscow Prefecture to name one of the city’s streets after Rodionov, describing it as an “anti-Chechen” and “anti-Islamic” act. In June 2016, Rodionov’s figure was mobilized again during a controversy over St. Petersburg Toponymic Committee’s highly unpopular decision to name one of the city’s bridges after Akhmad Kadyrov. Commenting on this initiative, Archpriest Dmitrii Vasilenkov (2016), pointed out that “If Akhmad Kadyrov’s bridge is to appear [in Russia], then Evgenii Rodionov’s street should be allowed to appear as well” (“Po Ulitse Evgeniia Rodionova k Mosty Akhmata Kadyrova!” Russkaia Narodnaia Liniia, June 7. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (http://ruskline.ru/news_rl/2016/06/07/po_ulice_evgeniya_rodionova_k_mostu_ahmata_kadyrova1/)). 44
symbolically present; in March of the same year a separate protest devoted to Rodionov was
organized by the brotherhood in Moscow to once again voice the demands for the soldier’s
canonization.
During the summer of 2010 Rodionov’s image used by the Banner-Bearers and the Zavtra
newspaper for their joint campaign in defense of the slogan “Orthodoxy or Death!” actively
used by the brotherhood and some other conservative Orthodox movements and acknowledged
“extremist” by the decision of one of the Moscow’s district courts on December 21, 2010.29
The Zavtra editorial collective and the Banner-Bearers put on the provocative “Orthodoxy or
Death!” black T-Shirts produced by the art-studio affiliated with the brotherhood and made a
group photo to circulate in the media. In the center of the picture, which was later published on
the front page of Zavtra’s July issue (see Figure 2.4) were Aleksandr Prokhanov and Leonid
Simonovich-Nikshich holding a middle-sized icon of Rodionov, whose image was meant to
symbolize the “true” meaning of the slogan – preparedness to die for Orthodox faith, as
opposed to a call to attack non-Orthodox people, as the less imaginative federal experts on
verbal extremism had concluded. While both Zavtra and the Banner-Bearers made a
considerable contribution to publicizing Rodionov’s story, the brotherhood’s aggressive tactics
of attracting media attention and promoting the soldier’s figure, resulted in a certain stigma
being attached to Rodionov’s cult. Given the brotherhood’s radical ideology and its public
advocacy for the canonization of several other (arguably more controversial compared to
Rodionov) historical figures, like Count Dracula, Grigorii Rasputin, and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, CEU eTD Collection the Banner-Bearers’ close involvement in Rodionov’s cult only further discredited it in the eyes
29 Although this decision was later overruled by another court (Liublinskii Distric Court) on April 21, 2011, the slogan still features on the Federal List of Extremist Materials available at the Ministry of Jurisprudence’s official website. For an in-depth discussion of the controversy see Engström (2015). 45
of many Orthodox believers, who came to associate it either with radical nationalism or with
the so-called “marginal” streams of Orthodoxy.
Another unlikely example of a social activism that stemmed from an engagement with
Rodionov’s story is that of Roman Iliushkin – an icon-painter, who was commissioned to create
the icon of the soldier for his potential forthcoming canonization. Roman had first heard about
Rodionov in April 2000, when he was approached by the bishop Savva Krasnogorskii30 with a
request to make the soldier’s icon. Passionately interested in the connections between
Orthodoxy and militaristic virtues, Roman had already created a number of iconic images of
warrior-saints in the past and felt honored to become the first icon-painter to receive the
blessing of the patriarchate to make an icon of the martyred soldier. Bishop Savva’s request
came almost a year after Roman had returned to Moscow from Belgrade, where he went in
Spring 1999, in the mist of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, to demonstrate his solidarity with
the Serbian people and to deliver a symbolic gift to the Serbian Patriarch Pavle – an icon of the
martyred Russian Tsar Nicolas II.
As Roman started working on Rodionov’s image, he could not help but be influenced by his
recent experience in the besieged Belgrade and the still fresh memories of the horrors of war.
During our conversation in May 2016, he told me that the memories evoked by the soldier’s
story darkened his feeling of pride and excitement about Rodionov’s glorification:
I felt some kind of bitterness from the fact that I am making an image of a person – a young man, who was younger than myself, who did not get a CEU eTD Collection chance to see much in life, and who was executed on the day of his nineteenth birthday. … I had inside me some kind of subconscious wish that not only this image, but the images of all neo-martyrs of all wars were made only by icon-painters. … As I was making this icon, I was realizing that such things should not happen. It is some kind of injustice of the universe: why are there
30 At the time the bishop served as head of ROC’s Department for Cooperation with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies. 46
wars and interethnic conflicts, in the course of which young, full of life- power soldiers, whose image I now have to paint, perish? I had an ambivalent feeling in my soul and I started wondering what can I do so that we have fewer of such contemporary neo-martyrs? The ambiguity of the notion of martyrdom that emerges from this statement was characteristic
of many of my informants’ discourses. The title of a “martyr” is often being applied in this
context both in its literal, doctrinal sense to evoke the idea of sainthood, and metaphorically to
refer to someone who had sustained an unjust and undeserved suffering. As a result of this
ambiguity, Roman could not find the joy and consolation in Rodionov’s example, as it
happened to him when he engaged with the vitas of other warrior-saints whose images he had
created before. Instead, the icon-painter found himself overcome by an impulse to take an
action and change the world around him to prevent the new incidents of martyrdom from taking
place.
The process of creating the icon inspired Roman to visit Chechnya to see for himself the site
of the soldier’s martyrdom. In 2000, at the outset of the Second Chechen Campaign, he traveled
to Chechnya, visiting several different frontier posts and bringing icons and presents to the
soldiers serving there. Roman said he was touched to learn that the soldiers he met there knew
of and honored Rodionov’s deed, and he reported to be particularly excited seeing some of
them reading the soldier’s hagiography.31 Aside from familiarizing with the uneasy life of the
Russian servicemen, the tour to Chechnya also made Roman realize the extent of the
humanitarian disaster happening there. The exposure to the plight of the Chechen civilian
population led him to radically reconsider his perception of the conflict. CEU eTD Collection
31 The first hagiographic account of Rodionov’s life called “New Martyr for Christ warrior Evgenii” compiled by Father Georgii (Khanov) was published in 1997 with the blessing of the Patriarch Aleksii II. 47
One encounter that has particularly affected Roman was with Beslan – a twelve years old
Chechen boy living in a village near the Argun gorge, the site of some of the fiercest battles of
the Second Chechen Campaign. Upon hearing that the icon-painter was visiting their village
Beslan, who himself was dreaming of becoming a painter, but had neither pencils nor paper to
draw on, passed on a request through a local mullah, asking if Roman could give him some of
his paraphernalia. The meeting with Beslan inspired Roman to become a humanitarian activist
and organize a series of exhibitions of children paintings upon his return to Moscow called
“War Through the Eyes of the Children of Chechnya. The Children of the Argun River Gorge.”
The donations collected during the exhibitions had subsequently helped Roman organize the
delivery of humanitarian aid to several Chechen villages. The fact that his activism did not find
much sympathy among some of his acquaintances and the general public in Russia did little to
dissuade Roman from the righteousness of his new course of action:
Many people were crying when they looked at it [exhibition]. Others were accusing me, saying that I am trying to help the children whose fathers killed Evgenii Rodionov, killed our children. But by that time, I had already removed the glasses of hate. During my first visit to Chechnya I saw them [Chechens] as enemies, who had killed the Russian soldier, whose name is sacred to me and to thousands of my compatriots … But when I saw the eyes of this boy, Beslan, when I saw that in that village the war had burned to the ground the school this boy used to attend, the hospital … that the traces of destruction were all around … In the eyes of this boy I saw the answer to the question that had been tormenting me: “What can be done so that we don’t have any more new martyrs?”
Since his first visit to Chechnya Roman has been engaged in what he calls “applied
peacemaking,” traveling to the conflict zones around the globe, brining aid and gifts to the
civilians in besieged religions and organizing exhibitions in Moscow to inform the public about CEU eTD Collection the plight of children during war. Roman told me that he devotes his activism to “the memory
of Evgenii Rodionov and hundreds and thousands of his peers who died before and after him.”
48
2.3. The Mother of a Soldier
As evident from the previous discussion, the personality and experience of Liubov’ Rodionova
were central for the publicization of Rodionov’s story. Until the present day Liubov’ continues
to play important role in the soldier’s cult. She is always present at and helps with the
organization of the yearly memorial event organized by her son’s grave-site in Satino-Russkoe
cemetery; she also frequently attends the numerous secular and religious events held in the
soldier’s honor throughout Russia. When I first met Liubov’ in April 2013, she was still
struggling to reconcile the private memories of her son with the cherished, but also alienating
images of him as a national hero and as a Christian saint. A communist party member and a
former staunch atheist, Liubov’ used to strongly oppose her son’s decision to wear a cross,
fearful that such public display of religiosity that was not common for the young men at the
time would make him an object of mockery from his peers. Yet, upon learning about the
circumstances of Rodionov's death and struggling to come to terms with the loss, she herself
turned to religion. Liubov’ came to gradually accept the idea of God and of life after death,
albeit she still does not consider herself a “proper” believer: she does not attend the church
regularly, nor does she rigidly observe any of the Orthodox rites.
The walls of Liubov’’s small and modest apartment in the village of Kurilovo are decorated
with her son’s photographs and icons; the mother carefully stores all the books, hagiorgraphies, CEU eTD Collection icons, paintings, and letters that the soldier’s venerators from all over the world send to her as
gifts. Liubov’ has personally visited many of the churches in Russia, Ukraine, Cyprus, and
Greece, where her son is celebrated as a saint and she maintains close and friendly relationship
with many Orthodox priests who venerate the soldier. Yet, she still sees her son first and
49
foremost as a national hero, who should be praised for his dutifulness and loyalty, while the
claims about his sainthood, Liubov’ admits, is something she does not fully understand and
occasionally feels uneasy about. She is still struggling to understand and accept some of the
Orthodox rites connected to saints’ veneration, and certain practices – especially those
connected to the dismemberment of bodies and circulation of relics – she cannot help but find
appauling and unethical. After having spent months wandering on her own around the war-torn
Chechnya in search of her son and having to ransom his body literally by pieces in order to be
able to finally bring him home, nothing scares her more than the thought of some overzealous
venerator on a quest for relics attempting to disturb the soldier's grave:
I have been looking for him [Rodionov] for so long, putting his remains together bone by bone... Do you think I would ever allow anyone to dig him up and put him apart by pieces? I have a very negative attitude towards relics... How can one, if he respects, how can he put someone apart by pieces? This is a body! And God did not just create a soul, but a body too... This is just business for some people and I will never let them make use of my son in this way while I am alive... I would like everyone to leave Zhenia32 alone! 33
Liubov’ insists that she has never asked for or had any interest in the formal canonization of
her son. Although she did appear to testify in front of the Commission for Canonization (an act
she now regrets bitterly), her decision to do so, she said, was motivated by the desire to raise
awareness about the events in Chechnya, rather than to advocate for her son’s case:
I just told the truth [to the Commission], I wanted the world to know who the Wahhabists are, how foul the [Russian] government is, how dirty and horrible this war was... That the state threw young boys there and forgot about them and about their mothers and fathers. This is what I wanted and that is it... I don’t need anything, I am not asking for money from anyone ... But then there were questions [from the Commission’s members] like CEU eTD Collection “What did he [Rodionov] die for?” “Did he die praising Christ or cursing his executioners?” What is this? A delirium of sick people – sick people... 34
32a nickname derivative from the Russian name Evgenii. 33From my interview with Liubov’ Rodionova (April 2013). 34 Ibid. 50
Liubov’ was deeply offended by the suspicion with which her testimony was treated by the
Commission as well as by the scrutiny and criticism to which her personal moral principles
were subjected to in course of the public debate that unfolded in the aftermath of the
Commission’s decision. In an open letter written years later, for the occasion of the 20th
anniversary of her son’s death, which several nationalist and patriotic media outlets ventured
to publish, Liubov’ expressed her resentment towards the members of the Commission, who
failed to independently investigate the circumstances of the soldier’s death and grounded their
argument on questioning her credibility as a witness:
Who was stopping them back then, when there was a complete mayhem in Chechnya ... who was stopping them from going there and verifying the information? They did not go. They were too scared. Instead they have thrown millions of questions at me demanding proofs. And tens of young and not so young churchmen, who have put on cassocks and fancied themselves priests, promoted themselves by discussing me, saying: “she says the wrong things, speaks the wrong way, believes in God the wrong way and may be does not believe at all, since she is a communist!” Yes, I am a communist. Yes, I am a Soviet person and yes, I have studied the moral code of a communist. But this did not stop the Savior from finding me... If God has not condemned me, who should I be scared of?!
Mindful of the resonance her letter have caused among the Orthodox public and trying to clarify
her position, in a conversation that took place shortly after the letter’s publication Liubov’ told
me that she does not hold a grudge against the Church and that her harsh formulations were
aimed at denouncing the general trend of bureaucratization of the state and ecclesiastical
structures and their lack of will to match up their words with real deeds. While the opinion and
judgment of the Church authorities is of little interest to her, Liubov’ does value and respect
the response of the common people, saying that to her the soldier’s status of a folk saint is the CEU eTD Collection
highest possible:
I do not see any sense in this stupid word – “canonization.” There is something sticky, something bad about it. There is a word “glorification” (proslavlenie) – it is something that goes through the heart. But canonization
51
– ok, they will put a stamp on it, and so what? What will it change for me? – Nothing.35
Liubov’ considers herself a patriot and despite having lost her only son in the Chechen conflict,
she has never taken an anti-militaristic stance, convinced that the Chechen War was necessary
for the preservation of the constitutional order and integrity of the Russian state. Rather, the
object of her incessant critique are the “criminal” policies of Yeltsin’s regime, Russian military
commanders’ wasteful attitude towards the lives of the soldiers on the ground, pervasive
corruption and incompetence in the army structures, and the indifferent attitude of the state and
the broader society towards the soldiers, who have died or sustained heavy injuries while
fulfilling their military duty.
Liubov’’s perception of post-Soviet Russia reflects the shock and disorientation the generation
brought up within the Soviet system have experienced when witnessing the dramatic curtailing
of the supporting state structure from many domains of life. In the military sphere, in the
context of the First Chechen Campaign fought by the poorly trained and badly equipped
conscripts, the collapse of the old systemic and symbolic order (Oushakine 2009) was marked
by the state officials’ attempts to reframe the damage sustained by the soldiers as a private,
rather than state matter. Liubov’ had sensed this reframing acutely when while trying to set up
the searching effort in Chechnya, she heard from every military official she turned to for help
that there was nothing that they could do for “her son.” In a biography compiled by Smirnov
(2012: 74) Liubov’ remembers how on one such occasion, desperate to make a state official CEU eTD Collection acknowledge at least a token of responsibility for Rodionov’s life, she yelled in response “Stop
calling him ‘my son!’ He was my son until he turned eighteen, now he is also your soldier.” In
35From my interview with Liubov’ Rodionova (April 2013).
52
an interview to Mir Novostei on December 9, 2015 she further reflected on the tragic
consequences of her own and other mothers’ inability to adjust to the new realities:
I was not the only one. It was about eighty of us, mothers looking for their sons in Chechnya … But I still cannot understand why there was so few of us, since there were about 1,200 boys missing. It was not just the story of my small family, but of thousands of families, the history of the country. ... I asked this question to the mothers of the boys who were executed together with Zhenia. Each had her own reason: they had no money or could not leave their other children and husbands. But the main reason was that we trusted the state. We, by our upbringing deeply Soviet people, trusted that we will not be abandoned in need. We counted on the commanders, on searching commissions. I still cannot forgive myself for this. It was too late that I realized that things had changed. Had I sold my apartment sooner, maybe I could have managed [to save Rodionov]. And there were many such naïve people like me.36
The feeling of betrayal by the state and society, and bitterness over the lack of acknowledgment
of their sacrifices is pervasive among the Chechen war veterans and their families. Serguei
Oushakine (2009: 164) in his ethnography of the Chechen war commemoration in the Russian
city of Barnaul, describes the struggles of war veterans and the dead soldiers’ relatives to
negotiate the payment of compensations from the state as “exchange of sacrifices.” He argues
that the protracted, exhausting, and often humiliating battles with the local bureaucracies in
which the veterans and the mothers engaged were more than a struggle for entitlement, but an
attempt to establish an acknowledgment and symbolic recognition of their sacrifices that was
otherwise denied to them by the state and broader society due to the ambiguous moral and legal
status of the Chechen campaigns and to the collapse of the old (Soviet) symbolic order, within
which individual acts of servitude used to be rendered meaningful.
CEU eTD Collection
Liubov’ has fulfilled her motherly duty: she has managed to clear the name of her son and his
comrades from the accusation of desertion and brought all the four bodies back to Russia – an
36 Alekseeva, Marina. 2015. “Den’ Geroev Otechestva: ‘Iunost’ Razmerom S Krest.” Mir Novostei, December 9. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (https://mirnov.ru/obshchestvo/den-geroev-otechestva-yunost-razmerom-s-krest.html). 53
act that eventually rendered the widespread public acknowledgment to the sacrifices of these
four soldiers. Yet, Liubov’’s struggle for recognition did not stop there, since what she hopes
to achieve is a structural action on behalf of the state that would substantially change the
predicament of the people who have been affected by the Chechen war:
My [monthly] pension is 12,000 rubles37 and for my son this year for the first time I got 7000, before – only 2000. This is how the state valued the life of my son. This is horrible! I wrote a letter to Putin, but there was no response. I was not asking for myself, I was asking him to address the local authorities to make them – whether they want it or not, in a compulsory manner – pay attention to the families of dead soldiers: there are widows with children, there are different situations... There are very old mothers and many are lonely like myself. What awaits me? A nursing home? Why? What did I do to deserve this? What is my fault before the state? And why did I suddenly become a burden to it? I want to finish my life with dignity, being able to afford to buy flowers to bring to Evgenii’s grave, to buy food, medicine... So that I only have my pain to carry, but not the humiliation, because when they are together – it can simply crush some people.38
Having hands on experience of the hardships and horrors of war, Liubov’ is often taken aback
by the fact that her son is singled out and commemorated individually as a martyr, while
thousands of other soldiers and their families remain forgotten. While Liubov’ does not like
the publicity and often shuns big official events, at times she does try to make her voice publicly
heard: she openly talks about her experiences of the Chechen conflict hoping that this could
help drawing attention to the problems of the conflict’s veterans and their families. Since her
return from Chechnya Liubov’ has been actively engaged in humanitarian work – first in
Chechnya with the soldiers deployed there, then in the Moscow region with the Chechen War
veterans in need of assistance. Liubov’ has completed more than sixty tours to Chechnya
delivering presents and humanitarian aid for the military personnel; during each visit she brings CEU eTD Collection along a large box filled with copper crosses that she puts with motherly care on the necks of
the soldiers, so that they remember her son’s example and draw strength from it – she explains.
37 Approximately 290 euro. 38 From my interview with Liubov’ Rodionova (April 2013). 54
For the past several years Liubov’ has also been engaged in a by far unsuccessful struggle for
the recognition of the graves of the soldiers who died in Chechnya as military burial sites – an
act that would put them under the protection and care of the local municipalities. “Zhenia was
protecting all of the huge Russia and now they are refusing to take care of a small piece of land
where he is buried. I am the only one left protecting that land, but what happens after I die?”39
– She asks bitterly.
Liubov’’s practice of honoring her son’s memory, personal as it might be, is largely outward
directed. As she explained to me, for her glorification “is always an action, just like love, or
labor, or virtue.” Such an action, she believes, is only meaningful when it can bring some
practical use to others. The conspicuous lack of this pro-social dimension in the actions of both
nationalist and religious activists, who take on the initiative to organize events in her son’s
honor is something that Liubov’ cannot reconcile with:
Kaluzhskaia Eparchy once invited me to a meeting. There were different brotherhoods, a priest, and several businessmen at that meeting. I said to them: “Ok, so we will talk now, then leave and this is it. Why don’t we make each our meeting productive somehow? There is a center for disabled people, let’s make a summerhouse for them, so that they could sit outside together during the summer.” And the result was zero!40
Awareness of the fact that the public events and meetings rarely materialize into concrete
actions made Liubov’ weary of getting involved with formal associations or unions. In the early
2000s, when Rodionov’s story was at the pick of public visibility, Liubov’ was contacted by
the representatives of several different parliamentary parties, who, aware of the respect and
authority she enjoys among the Russian public, wanted to enlist her as a member. To each CEU eTD Collection
Liubov’ replied that she would consider it only after the party representatives help fund and
join her on her next trip to Chechnya – a proposition no one dared to accept.
39 From my interview with Liubov’ Rodionova (May 29, 2016). 40 From my interview with Liubov’ Rodionova (April 2013). 55
Dedicated, straightforward, and outspoken, Liubov’ is well known and respected among many
Orthodox, nationalist, and patriotic circles. Yet, the very thing that brings her the respect and
admiration of the people becomes an impediment – some speculate – for the Church’s official
acknowledgment of the soldier. This is a position Father Konstantin – a priest, who was
involved in the Synodal Commission for Canonization’s investigation and who came to know
Liubov’ quite closely while collecting the biographical information about Rodionov – shares:
When invited to different big public events connected to various anniversary celebrations of secret services or border guards, Liubov’ from the big scenes denounced many important and powerful people, for instance, general Lebed’. 41 ... She has exposed a lot of well-known people and it was clear that if she becomes a mother of a saint, her words will get an even greater weight, so the churchly authorities were too scared to set it [canonization] in motion while his mother is alive. At least I think so. None is questioning his [Rodionov’s] deed, but Liubov’’s publicity and her uncompromising position in relation to many issues are inconvenient... So the issue got stalled. 42
Instead of trying to live up to the expectations that people might have from a mother of a saint,
Liubov’ chose to remain faithful to her duty as a mother of a soldier the way she understands
it – defending the interests of the veterans and carefully guarding her own son’s memory. As
she has put it in one interview, “people say that I am a mother of a saint. But I was a mother of
a soldier... I would like to live my life in such a way that Zhenia would not be ashamed of me”
(Rus’ Derzhavnaia February 2003). 43
2.4. Converging Visions of Morality
CEU eTD Collection 41 General Lebed’ has been heavily criticized and accused of betrayal by the Russian nationalists for the signing of the controversial Khasavyurt Accord with the leader of the Chechen Independence Movement Aslan Maskhadov on August 31, 1996 – a ceasefire agreement that effectively marked the end of the First Chechen War (Tishkov 2004: 183-184). Liubov’ Rodionova’s public denouncement of Lebed’ is connected to the fact that despite the requests from the relatives, the return of the soldiers, who had been taken prisoners in Chechnya, was not been made a precondition for the treaty. At the time of the signing of the accord more than 1,200 soldiers were reported to have been taken prisoner (Trusevich and Cherkasov 1996:4). 42 From my interview with Father Konstantin (May 2016). 432003. “Mat’ Sviatogo.” Rus’ Derzhavnaia, February, Retrieved July 6, 2019 (http://rusderjavnaya.ru/news/fevral_2003/1-0-80). 56
The veneration of a soldier who fell victim to the Chechen conflict is bound to have some
political connotations, which makes it tempting for the commentators to explain away
Rodionov’s cult as a case of “political” martyrdom and appropriation of religious imagery for
the consolidation of collective identity, sacralization of a group’s cause, and demonization of
perceived enemies (Fedor 2013: 167; Richters 2013: 71). Yet, it is my contention that in
Rodionov’s case the introduction of martyrical imagery largely came to serve a very different
purpose. This soldier’s commemoration in Russia became a case of a collective rethinking of
the place of morality and values in the contemporary society, and the religious imagery in the
accounts of the young man’s life and death was mainly employed to index the soldier’s moral
superiority vis-à-vis the rest of the Russian society and articulate the social critique of the
political realities of the post-Soviet Russia. While Rodionov did become a much cherished
figure among the Russian nationalists and the Orientalizing imagery of the Chechen insurgents
as savages occasionally runs through the narratives and visual images of the soldier’s death
(see Figure 2.6), the majority of accounts, I have encountered are nonetheless more complex.44
They often move away from the problem of inter-ethnic relations, casting as its main ‘Other’
the Russian state and its bureaucratic regime (Bodin 2009), which made Rodionov a soldier,
deployed him to the war zone without sufficient military training and then left him for dead not
only refusing to undertake any rescue efforts but also trying to pin the blame on Rodionov
himself. In this context the praising of Rodionov’s unbreakable “spiritual core” (dukhovnyi
sterzhen’) and his ability to remain faithful to the values no one around him seemed to adhere
to anymore became a way to narratively construct the soldier’s moral agency and assert his CEU eTD Collection spiritual superiority not only vis-à-vis his executioners, but also vis-à-vis the state and the rest
of the Russian society. As the poet Pavlov (2009: 23) put it in his poem “From Cross to Cross”
44 This conclusion is drawn based on the analysis of the 32 in-depth interviews with Rodionov’s venerators I have carried out between 2014 and 2016 as well as on the discourse analysis of four different versions of published biographic accounts of the soldier’s life and more than 20 separate newspaper articles discussing Evgenii Rodionov’s death published between 1999 and 2016. 57
Figure 2.5. Popular versions of Evgenii Rodionov’s icons Source: https://alchetron.com/Yevgeny-Rodionov
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 2.6. A painting devoted to Rodionov by Maksim Faiustov. Source: http://ruskline.ru/analitika/2012/05/23/o_vernosti_krestu_hristovu/
58
devoted to Rodionov, “betrayed by everyone he betrayed no one: neither his friends, nor
Russia, nor his faith.”
Martyrological narratives, featuring powerful imagery of pain and suffering, have great
potential for eliciting strong emotional reaction – empathy for a victim and outrage against his
persecutors – the effigy of suffering always tacitly and sometimes overtly pointing beyond the
frame, to the Other responsible for inflicting the pain (Bryant 2012: 348). Yet, in Rodionov’s
case the finger of blame is often turned upon the Russian society itself, which explains the
cautious attitude of some state officials towards the popular veneration of Rodionov. Liubov’
Rodionova, who became a frequent guest at public events and talk shows and who rarely
restrains herself from speaking her mind openly when asked to reflect upon her son’s story,
avoids talking too much about the atrocities of the Chechen militants she has witnessed and
often prefers to use the occasion to bring up the internal problems of the Russian society, like
the growing decay in the army, the state’s neglect of the war veterans, and what she perceives
as the moral corruption of the young generation. In one interview she admitted that years after
the tragedy she no longer knows who she hates more – “those who took Zhenia’s life or those
who betrayed him and left him to torture and humiliation” (Rodionova cited in Dubova 2006:
n.a.).
I argue that an important reason why the image of Rodionov – an innocent looking young man
with a cross on his neck (see Figure 2.5) – has resonated so well with the post-Soviet Russian CEU eTD Collection public was because it presented an opportunity for the internal ethical problematization of the
Russian society and for producing a moral model of a common Russian person that was much
needed in a period that was perceived by many as one of a complete moral breakdown (Zigon
2011: 5, Ries 2002: 276-7) and erasure of familiar ethical boundaries. In contrast to the Great
59
Patriotic War, which still remains a foundational historical referent for the Russian heroic
imagination, the badly mishandled Chechen conflict was hard to represent as a noble cause,
while the series of scandalous media exposures of the atrocities perpetrated by Russian soldiers
against the civilian population in Chechnya and of corruption and debauchery inside the
Russian army made it hard for the public to associate the image of a soldier with virtue or
innocence (Belin 2002; Tishkov 2004: 139). Adding the element of spirituality to Rodionov’s
story opened up the possibility for abstracting his “testimony” and making his death about
something other than the inglorious Chechen conflict, largely perceived as a dirty and pointless
war waged for the Russian elites’ economic and political interests (Russell 2007: 72, 111;
Oushakine 2009: 151).45
The cross and the Orthodox faith in the context of the soldier’s story became a kind of a
placeholder for the moral ideals, a proof that Rodionov was not a voiceless victim and a
mindless instrument in the hands of the corrupt army commanders but rather a well-formed
personality with his own convictions, integrity, and sense of duty and dignity. In this respect
there is a strong continuity between Rodionov’s representations and Soviet heroic images
personifying the ideal of the New Man, which emphasized individual will, integrity, and mental
and physical strength (Fritzsche and Hellbeck 2009: 305). The Soviet pedagogical model,
which put special emphasis on the individual’s spiritual and moral development, relied heavily
on teaching by example. The biographies of extraordinary personalities and narratives of
fictional characters were offered to the Soviet public as one of the means of spiritual CEU eTD Collection
45 The decontextualization strategy and shift of attention to abstract values such as dutifulness, bravery, and loyalty is generally characteristic of the public commemoration of the Chechen conflict military casualties. While such a strategy commonly has an effect of downplaying the human cost of the conflict and ignoring “the identities and sacrifices of the soldiers who lost their lives in it” (Danilova 2014: 69), the commemoration of Rodionov that is permeated by the discourses of sacrifice visibly departs from the general trend, as in his case the downplaying of the historical circumstances of the soldier’s death was used not to disregard the cause of the sacrifice but rather to reassign it. 60
development and cultivation of moral virtues (Fritzsche and Hellbeck 2009: 317–320;
Kharkhordin 1999: 247-250, 2016). In this context it is hardly surprising that Rodionov is often
compared not only to the Christian martyrs, but also to the heroes of the Soviet era. Thus, priest
Dmitrii Dudko – spiritual father of the Zavtra newspaper, known for his Stalinist and
nationalistic views – in a commentary to Russkii Dom (January 1999) compared Rodionov’s
deed to the feat46 of the iconic Soviet partisan Zoia Kosmodemianskaia47, arguing that both
acts were motivated by “faith”:
He [Rodionov] lived in very hard times, perhaps even harder than the Soviet era of Godlessness. Godlessness is easier to bear, the [moral] depravation – much harder. But he preserved faith even in the times of depravity. Faith is intrinsic to the Russian people, it sleeps, but in certain moments awakens. … Even in the Soviet times, when the hour of danger had come, it awoke in people. Zoia Kosmodemianskaia is also a feat of faith, even if it was faith in communism – [still] a faith in something holy...48
The preoccupation with morality in general is evident from the way Liubov’ talks about her
son’s deed, emphasizing that he was driven by the ethical considerations, which for her
personally cannot be reduced to religious faith:
I cannot bear to hear it, when people say that he died for Christ. I cannot agree with this, because he did not become a traitor either. That was only the first step, the second would be shooting one’s own people... I am convinced that Zhenia and his friends – they died for the ideals, and they had them – childish, pure... they died for their motherland, not for an oil pipe!49 They did not know that there was some kind of fuss about the oil pipe – they were the frontier guards, they were sent there to protect, to not let the evil pass and they, full of faith that they are carrying out an important mission, they fulfilled it.50
CEU eTD Collection 46 The Russian word podvig is used both to describe a heroic act and a deed of a martyr (Regamey 2007). 47 For an overview of the centrality of Kosmodemianskaia figure to the Soviet representations of martyrdom and an analysis of the continuities between Soviet and post-Soviet discourses on sacrifice see Minkova (2018). 48 Dudko, Dmitrii. 2000. “Sim Pobedishi.” Russkii Dom, January. Retrieved July 7, 2019 (http://www.pycckie.org/sv_horugv/5/10.shtml). 49 The stories about underground oil refineries in Chechnya and illicit oil trade carried out with the involvement of the Russian oligarchs were prominent in the media throughout the two Chechen Campaigns, often giving birth to conspiracy theories implicating unscrupulous Russian businessmen with close ties to the Kremlin in lobbying and sponsoring the prolongation of the conflict (Ericson 2011: 100-104; Zasoursky 2002: 115 – 161). 50From my interview with Liubov’ Rodionova (April 2013). 61
In this statement Liubov’ is alluding to a very general model of morality in which, as the
powerful opposition between ideals and the oil pipe tellingly illustrates, human life and actions
should be determined by beliefs and values, and not by material interests alone.
One of the reasons cited for the rejection of Rodionov’s canonization was the absence of
evidence that he led a conscious churchly life. Yet, this did not become an impediment for the
wide-scale popular veneration of the soldier because unlike the clergy, the general public had
little interest in scrutinizing Rodionov’s beliefs and his knowledge of the Orthodox doctrine: it
was enough to know that he had some kind of convictions and moral aspirations and was able
to remain faithful to them till the end – a quality, many complain, contemporary Russian youth
drastically lack. Thus, for instance, the fact often mentioned in different biographic accounts
of Rodionov’s life – that he continued to wear the cross that was given to him by his
grandmother when he was eleven years old despite being actively mocked for it by his peers
and teachers and reprimanded by his atheist mother (Bodin 2009:144) – is often brought up not
just to praise the young man’s religiosity, but to emphasize the integrity and strength of his
character and his ability to resist social pressure.51 The way Liubov’ talks about her son’s final
decision not to comply with the demands put forth by his captors reveals a similar concern with
moral strength and integrity:
I think that people should speak about the deed, about dignity, courage, and honor. I often think why would he [Rodionov] come down on his knees and beg them to spare his life? Why? He was never bullied or humiliated by anyone in his life. And now some dirty churok52 bullies him and he would fall at his feet? No, he would not. And he did not. Honor and dignity are not empty words to me.53 CEU eTD Collection
51 Khanov, Georgii. 2002. Bestsennyi Podarok. Materi Soldata, Liubov’i Vasilevne Rodionovoi, Posviaschaetsia. Dnepropetrovsk: 2002. Rodionova, Liubov’. 2008. “My Nuzhny Nashim Voinam.” Pp. 219 – 238 in Nauka Pobezhdat’. Moskva: Danilovskii Blagovestnik. 52 A derogatory term used in colloquial Russian to refer to the people from Caucasus or Central Asia. 53 From my interview with Liubov’ Rodionova (April 2013).
62
The model of Rodionov’s martyrdom, the way it appears to be predominantly articulated in the
public discourses, is thus not that of dying for God or even sacrificing for the nation; it is rather
a model of manhood that builds around the ideals of individual dignity, self-control, and
readiness to stand by one’s ideals.
It is for this reason that Rodionov also came to be particularly loved by the Afghan war veterans
– the generation that was raised on the Soviet ideals and one that generally does not display
much interest in faith or religious matters. Many of Rodionov’s supporters like to recount an
episode of a World War II veteran, who reportedly came to the soldier’s grave site, took off
the military medal that was awarded to him for courage and left it on the grave saying: “He
saved the soul of Russia.” A theologically versed reader could read this episode through the
prism of “religious” mythology, claiming that Rodionov is an archetypal victim whose
voluntary self-sacrifices expiates and purifies the society. Yet, it seems to me that the moral of
the soldier’s story, as it is being told for edifying purposes, is much simpler and more down to
earth: Rodionov is pointed out as exemplar because his act proved the relevance of the
conventional moral prescriptions that were actively challenged in society at the time. It is in
this sense of giving hope for a moral revival of the community and showing that there is still
room for moral heroism in the modern world, that the soldier is said to have saved “the soul of
Russia.”
As Rodionov died in the context of a military conflict, disentangling his testimony – whether CEU eTD Collection it was that of love to God or loyalty to the nation – becomes practically impossible. People
familiar with the chronicles of the Chechen war infer that taking off the cross and converting
to Islam could not have possibly been the only demand put before the soldier by his captors.
Choosing to stay alive most likely would have meant for him agreeing to fight on the
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separatists’ side and passing the so-called “loyalty test” by executing his fellow captured
soldiers, which problematizes the statement that Rodionov’s choice was simply between his
life and his religious beliefs. But this does not present a problem for many of Rodionov’s
venerators because it is not just Orthodox piety that is being valued by the people in the
soldier’s example but his courage and his refusal to trade off any of his values and loyalties.
The soldiers who were unable to withstand torture and ended up switching sides and fighting
against the Russian federal forces are often mentioned as counterexamples to Rodionov. One
such case that received broad publicity is that of Konstantin Limonov and Ruslan Klochkov,
who converted to Islam, joined the insurgents and ended up working as guards in the Chechen
camp for the Russian army prisoners and participating in multiple episodes of torture and
executions of captive soldiers (Karamysheva 2001). Limonov subsequently ended up among
the group of Russian soldiers who were exchanged for the Chechen prisoners. Zavtra article
from February 16, 1999 reports that upon meeting his mother, who just like Liubov’ Rodionova
traveled to Chechnya to find her son, the soldier publicly proclaimed: “I do not have a mother,
I have only Allah. I am not Kostia, I am Kazbek.”54 Upon hearing this and learning of her
son’s crimes, his mother reportedly stated that she wished she had found him among the dead.
Commenting upon this episode, Liubov’ said that as much as she laments her son’s death, she
is thankful that he did not do something of the sort to save his life (ibid.).
What is being morally condemned here is not conversion as such or the fact of giving up one CEU eTD Collection theological dogma for another, but the act of denouncing one’s moral and social personhood
by rejecting the elements of one’s identity that are viewed as being constitutive of it – civic,
54 Iur’ev, Iurii. 1999. “Russkii Muchenik.” Zavtra, February 15. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (http://zavtra.ru/blogs/1999-02-1672). 64
national (ethno-confessional), and ultimately, familial affiliations. Many find this episode as
appalling as the gruesome recordings of torture and beheadings of the captive Russian soldiers
by the Chechens that broadly circulate on the Internet, because they see it as reflecting a moral
and a social death, a transformation of a person into a beast driven exclusively by his survival
instincts. Rodionov thus comes to embody a militant model of martyrdom that has less to do
with the Orthodox notions of humility and submission to God’s will but gravitates more
towards the Stoic ideal of a noble death (Smith 1997: 23), asserting such values as individual
dignity, moral strength, and loyalty. Life in this context is understood to be sacrificed not only
for God, but for a certain ideal of what a human life should be, while death is represented as an
outcome not of a pious impetus to transform oneself into something better (a human agent into
a divine one), but of a refusal to be reduced to something that is lesser than one’s imagined
self: a traitor, a coward, or an apostate.
The critique of the Post-Soviet social order and its malaises so prominent in the discourses on
Rodionov’s martyrdom throughout the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s reflects a
pervasive trend of nostalgia and longing for spirituality and moral order in the Russian society
that was induced by the social and political transformations that followed the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The Russian concept of spirituality (dukhovnost’) is only tangentially connected
to religiosity and comprises a whole range of mental and emotional phenomena, including an
individual’s ethical, creative, cultural, and intellectual aspirations and potentialities
(Luehrmann 2013: 552). Many of the standards that used to determine this dimension of social CEU eTD Collection existence in the late Soviet era have been dramatically marginalized after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, leading many Russians to experience the period of the democratic transition as
that of not only bespredel – moral limitlessness (Kon 1996: 205), but also as that of
bezdukhovnost’ (spiritualness).
65
Although certain forms of skepticism and cynicism were equally present in the Soviet times,
in the late Soviet era the object of public distrust was mainly restricted to the political elites,
who were suspected of pursuing their own financial interests at public expense, while the myth
of the “decent” and “honest” common Soviet people largely remained intact (Ries 2002: 277).
This dynamic was, however, reversed in the 1990s, as the market reform that was happening
at the background of the collapsing state structure and heavy criminalization of the society, had
substantially expanded an average Russian person’s pool of possible (legal and not quite so)
strategies towards self-enrichment. In her ethnography of the post-Soviet Russian moral
discourses Nancy Ries (2002) points out the centrality of tropes of cynicism, greed, and
corruption, which often come coupled with a lingering suspicion that everyone around is being
engaged in some form of cheating or shady economic activities, to her informants’ perception
of the Russia’s early capitalist realities. It is in reference to this perceived spiritual deprivation
that the growing appeal of religion and nationalism as ideological alternatives to the Western
modernity in post-Soviet Russia should be understood. The radical exemplars of morality
embodied by the figures of heroes and martyrs become particularly appealing in such context
of a perceived spiritual holocaust, because they bear a promise of a new beginning and a moral
revival of a society (Lambek 2007), as nothing asserts the primacy of the ideal over the material
quite as radically and poignantly as an act of an ultimate self-sacrifice.
2.5. Concluding Remarks CEU eTD Collection
The elements of outward-directed humanitarian and heroic mobilizations that were present in
the insipient stage of Rodionov’s cult – in the form of Zavtra newspaper’s efforts to help
Liubov’ Rodionova and the Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers’ attempts to mobilize the
66
soldier’s image for their campaigns against the Russia’s external (Chechens, immigrants, the
West) and internal (liberal politicians, oligarchs, ROC’s liberal wing) enemies – proved to be
short-lived. The context of the Chechen conflict and Rodionov’s positionality in it curtailed the
possibility of the development of a full-blown humanitarian protest in response to the death of
a Russian soldier, as its repertoire of action – human rights discourses, references to the Geneva
Conventions, and appeals to the international legal bodies, like the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) – was largely reserved to the Chechen civilian population, predominantly
perceived (both internationally and in Russia) as the main victim of the conflict. In addition to
that, Liubov’ Rodionova’s ardent pro-war position coupled with her public denouncements of
the Committee of Soldier’s Mothers of Russia for their anti-militaristic activism, made any
mobilization around Rodionov articulated in civic or humanitarian terms unlikely, with the
result that the soldier’s image was exclusively appropriated by the conservative Orthodox and
nationalistic groups.
As the conservative actors at the time were more preoccupied with their opposition to Kremlin
and its social and cultural policies, rather than with the Chechen conflict as such, the distinctly
anti-Chechen discourses in Rodionov’s commemoration did not get much proliferation either.
With the notable exception of the Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers, such sentiments were
soon subsumed by more general discourses on morality, aimed at a reflexive assessment of the
moral state of the post-Soviet Russia. Rodionov’s martyrdom thus emerged in the discourses
of conservative and patriotic activists as a sacrifice for the nation and as a model of morality CEU eTD Collection that asserts the primacy of one’s ideals, beliefs, and commitments over the bare life. Strong
anti-systemic flavor and firm groundedness in the critique of the Russian state’s social and
political realities persisted to be one of the defining features of the discourses accompanying
Rodionov’s cult during the first ten years of its existence. This trend, as I shall show in Chapter
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4, was nearly completely reversed in the 2010s, due to the Russian political establishment’s
increasing appropriation of patriotic, nationalist, and moral-conservative rhetoric (Laruelle
2009).
As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, using the example of the commemoration of Isaak
and Solomou in Cyprus, a humanitarian mobilization around violent death is more likely to
develop in cases and locales, where the language of human rights and the practice of appealing
to the international community has been historically present. Yet, even in such favorable
contexts, mobilizations around the narratives of victimization often do not last, as they offer
little chance for its participants to engage with the figures of martyrs as moral models. In the
countries, where social change is unlikely and hope in the efficiency of appeals to international
institutions is low, a mobilization that frames death as a sacrifice and that emphasizes a
community’s obligations towards national heroes and martyrs has a greater and more lasting
appeal to the public.
CEU eTD Collection
68
3. Anastasios Isaak and Solomos Solomou: Bikers, Heroes, Martyrs
On August 2, 1996 a column consisting of more than 200 motorcyclists from all over Europe
set off from Berlin, marking the start of a nine days long international march against the
occupation of Northern Cyprus. The bikers had a long ride ahead and an ambitious goal in
mind: to drive through continental Europe, reach Cyprus, cross the Green line dividing the
island, and reach the coastal town of Kyrenia located in the occupied Northern part. By starting
from the previously divided city of Berlin, passing through Nicosia – the current last divided
capital of Europe – and further across the ceasefire line to Kyrenia, the bikers were hoping to
carry across Europe the message of protest against the division of Cyprus and a demand for the
freedom of mobility across the island. The marathon went under way with a motto “From Berlin
to Nicosia, united Europe – united Cyprus.” This procession, which until now remains one of
the biggest anti-occupational demonstrations to take place in Cyprus, was organized by the
Cypriot Motorcycle Federation to commemorate the twenty-second anniversary of the 1974
Turkish invasion and the subsequent partition of the island into the Republic of Cyprus and the
self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). On August 11 the bikers had
finally reached Cyprus, where they were joined by a large number of Greek Cypriot protestors
wishing to participate in the final part of the rally. The bikers’ intension to commit an
unauthorized crossing to the TRNC territory had been widely advertised in the media prior to
the beginning of the march and by the time the protestors arrived in Cyprus, the atmosphere on
CEU eTD Collection the island was already tense. The Turkish Cypriot authorities were preparing to respond to the
perceived provocation and publicly declared their intention to shoot anyone attempting to
violate the republic’s borders. Large numbers of Turkish Cypriot and Turkish citizens,
including members of the Turkish ultra-nationalist group Grey Wolves, started gathering along
the Turkish side of the Buffer Zone for a counter-demonstration.
69
As the tension was mounting up, the Greek Cypriot authorities, fearful of a potential outbreak
of violence and pressured by the UN Secretary General to de-escalate the situation, made a
decision to cancel the final part of the rally. The President of the Republic Glafkos Clerides,
who had previously been expressing his active support for the procession, addressed the
demonstrators, encouraging them to disperse.55 Notwithstanding the president’s last-minute
plea, large numbers of Greek Cypriot demonstrators, determined to carry on with the protest,
moved into the UN Buffer Zone at different points of the Green Line. At the Dherynia
roadblock, not far from the village of Paralimni, a group of protestors left their motorcycles
behind and proceeded on foot, breaking through the UN cordon and forcing their way across
the ceasefire line. Among this group was Anastasios (Tasos) Isaak, a 25 years old refugee from
Famagusta, whose family settled in Paralimni village after the Turkish invasion.
Upon entering the Buffer Zone, Greek Cypriot protesters found themselves confronted by a
significantly outnumbering them group of counter-demonstrators waiting for them across the
Green line, heavily armed with guns, rifles, stones, and batons.56 As the counter-demonstrators
moved to the buffer zone a large-scale physical confrontation unfolded, stones being thrown
from both sides and several shots being fired at Greek Cypriot protestors. In the midst of the
chaos, Isaak spotted a Greek Cypriot protestor, who got entangled into a barbed wire fence and
was receiving a heavy beating from the counter-demonstrators. Isaak came to the rescue and
managed to set his compatriot free, but only to find himself cut off from the rest of his group
and surrounded by the counter-protestors, whose rage has now turned upon himself. Isaak made CEU eTD Collection a desperate attempt to break his way out and run, but failed and fell on the ground, after which
he was violently assaulted by the group of counter-demonstrators. The beating continued
55European Court of Human Rights. Case of Isaak vs. Turkey. Final judgement, 24 June 2008. 56Ibid. 70
uninterrupted for approximately five minutes, the entire gruesome scene being recorded and
photographed by the media representatives covering the protest.57 By the time the United
Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) officers were finally able to make their way through
the crowd, Isaak was already breathless.58
The funeral ceremony for Isaak, which took place in Paralimni on August 14, became a national
event for Greek Cypriots and was attended by more than three thousand people, including
President Glafkos Clerides and the top government representatives. The funeral service was
delivered by the Cypriot Orthodox Church’s Archbishop Chrysostomos himself.59 The funeral
ceremony evolved into another spontaneous demonstration, which culminated in a yet another
tragic episode. A group of about three hundred Greek Cypriots forced their way into the buffer
zone to protest the killing of Isaak by putting a memorial wreath and a Greek flag on the spot
of his murder. Once in the Buffer Zone, some of the protestors started moving towards the
Turkish ceasefire line that was guarded by the TRNC soldiers. Suddenly Solomos Solomou –
a 26 years old auto mechanic from Paralimni and a second cousin of Isaak – separated from
the crowd and ran towards the ceasefire line, bypassing the UNFICYP officers, who tried to
stop him, and forcing his way across the fence to the TRNC territory. Ignoring the warning
cries from the crowd and his concerned compatriots’ desperate pleas to come back, Solomou,
with an unfinished cigarette still smoking in the corner of his mouth, decisively came up to the
Turkish flagpole located next to the sentry box and started climbing it with the intention to
remove the Turkish flag to protest his cousin’s murder. As he was confidently climbing up the CEU eTD Collection pole moving up towards the flag, the young man was gunned down by several shots fired from
57 The photographs of the incident taken by a Greek Cypriot photographer Constantinos Kyriakides show that at least eight uniformed police officers from the Turkish Cypriot side were present near Isaak during the attack, some of them participating in the beating and others passively watching, making no effort to intervene. 58European Court of Human Rights. Case of Isaak vs. Turkey. Final judgement, 24 June 2008. 591996. “Violence erupts at funeral of Greek Cypriot.” The Irish Times, August 15. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (https://www.irishtimes.com/news/violence-erupts-at-funeral-of-greek-cypriot-1.76953).
71
the Turkish side, receiving three fatal wounds in his mouth, neck, and stomach.60 Solomou’s
lifeless body slipped down the pole and fell on the ground right before the eyes of the petrified
crowd and the bewildered cameramen filming the protest.
The incident produced another wave of outrage both in Cyprus and internationally, as the
leading TV channels around the globe broadcasted the footage of Solomou’s murder. The day
of Solomou’s funeral was announced the day of a national mourning in Cyprus, the tragic
events at the bikers’ rally being labeled by Greek Cypriots as “the black August of 1996.” Soon
after the incidents the houses of both cousins were visited by the president of the Republic of
Cyprus and the president of Greece. As a symbolic gesture of respect for Isaak’s “sacrifice”
the government of Greece assumed the responsibility of the godparent for Isaak’s daughter,
who was born shortly after her father’s death and was named Anastasia, in his honor. In Cyprus
and Greece, the two young men, whose deaths were described as sacrifices for the ideal of
freedom were labeled “hero-martyrs” (iroes-martires) and quickly turned into the new symbols
of the Greek national spirit and anti-occupational struggle.
In this chapter I explore two distinct, but interrelated forms of collective mobilizations around
Isaak and Solomou – what I label a “humanitarian” protest, framed through the discourses of
human rights, justice, and democracy and a nationalist mobilization spearheaded by the far-
right National Popular Front (ELAM). I outline the reasons for the waning of humanitarian
protest and its gradual replacement with a nationalist mobilization built around the notions of CEU eTD Collection heroism, sacrifice, and struggle. I argue that ELAM’s mobilization is densely rooted in the
culture of protest and remembrance that formed in Cyprus in the wake of the 1974 Turkish
60 Four more people, including the two members of UNFICYP staff and two Greek Cypriot protestors, were wounded during the shooting.
72
invasion and reflects both a nostalgia for and an attempt to revive the tradition of public
commemorative events that shaped the political subjectivities of its members, but suffered a
radical decline in the early 2000s.
3.1. International Audience: Isaak and Solomou as Martyrs for Democracy and Freedom
Competing with the nationalist conception of violent death as a sacrifice demanding
vindication is a secular-liberal notion of biological life as a basic and inalienable human right
and that casts corporeal and psychological violence as intolerable and unjustifiable events
(Asad 2003). This notion lies at the heart of humanitarian politics that is meant to alleviate
suffering and protect life wherever possible. More than just an effect of the global and local
institutional policies, humanitarianism it is also a moral language that is assumed to be shared
by the majority of players in the international arena, thus creating an illusion of a global moral
community that needs to be informed of the suffering and that can be called upon to alleviate
it (Fassin 2011). When defined as a sacrifice, violent death appeals exclusively to the members
of the community on whose behalf it was carried out; when seen as a crime against humanity
– it becomes a matter of concern (at least in theory) for the entire global moral community and
a potential cause for an intervention of transnational institutions. The politics of
humanitarianism rely on a particular structure of sentiments, which can be traced back to the
post-enlightenment sensibility: a distaste for physical violence and aggression, cultivation of CEU eTD Collection compassion and empathy, and a moral imperative to intervene at the sight of the plight of
Others (Asad 2003; Boltanski 1999; Fassin 2011). This centrality of the emotional dimension
to the humanitarian politics, accounts for the focal role that the medium, which communicates
the painful event to the audience and which is meant to have some persuasive potential, play
73
in it. It is not my intention here to scrutinize and expose the volatile sentiments that give birth
to the modern, notoriously erratic politics of compassion. Instead, I unpack in this section how
the presence of humanitarianism as a form of biolegitimacy in international politics (Fassin
2011) and the specter of the global moral audience that can be appealed to affect the locally
produced representations of suffering and death. I then proceed to explore how the images and
narratives deliberately tuned to the sensitivities of the international “humanitarian” audience
fit into the overall economy of representations of violent death in contemporary Cyprus.
The popular presence of human rights discourses in Cyprus is largely conditioned by the
island’s decades long history of being subject to continuous international intervention. It is also
reinforced by the republic’s present-day precarious position on the global political arena, as it
has to rely on the international institutions and the regional “big” powers for the guarantee of
its sovereignty. The United Nations’ peace keeping force had a visible presence on the island
since 1964, after a violent conflict unfolded between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities
between 1963 and 1965, shortly after the establishment of the independent republic of Cyprus
in 1960. From its very inception, the intercommunal conflict was largely framed in legal terms
and was structured alongside the issues of rights, political representation, and territoriality
(Demetriou and Gürel 2008: 6). From the 1974 Turkish invasion onwards the discourses of
human rights and the collective victimization of the Greek-Cypriot population by Turkey were
the key leitmotifs structuring the Cypriot political rhetoric, this trend being further amplified
by Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004, as the democratic values and human rights principles CEU eTD Collection became part of the official state ideology.
The human rights discourses in contemporary Cyprus mainly revolve around the question of
freedom of movement and the issues of displacement, refugees, and the missing persons. The
74
political rhetoric of the government, civil society organizations, and grassroot nationalist
movements alike converge in their condemnation of the 1974 Turkish invasion as a violation
of international law and Greek Cypriots’ human rights for which Turkey should be held
accountable. The international community, which, many Greek Cypriots believe, has the power
and the authority to bring Turkey to answer and compel it to make reparations and withdraw
its troops from the island, thus became the main addressee of the Greek Cypriot post-conflict
political discourses (Demetriou and Gürel 2008: 11). The representations of death and suffering
that are central for these discourses, are often employed in this context both as evidence of the
crimes and atrocities committed by the Turks and as a testimony to the “open wound” on the
Greek Cypriot social body that would not heal until the historical injustice is fixed (Bryant
2012: 348).
Given the prominence of humanitarian discourses and the political context in which the
incidents of Isaak and Solomou’s deaths occurred, it is hardly surprising that the first wave of
mobilization around these figures was wrapped in the language of human rights discourses.
The photographs and video footages documenting Isaak and Solomou’s deaths were initially
employed in forensic purpose. The photos capturing the killing of Isaak helped establish the
identities of the six perpetrators – two Turkish Cypriots and four Turkish settlers. Even though
the evidence against the suspects was shared with the TRNC authorities, no arrests were made.
Similarly, the video footage of Solomou’s murder helped to identify three shooters – two
members of the Turkish military staff and one individual in civilian clothes, who was later CEU eTD Collection identified as Kenan Akin, a Turkish settler, who at the time held the position of a minister in
the TRNC administration. Despite the warrant issued for his arrest by the Interpol and the
International Criminal Court (ICC), Akin was never brought to justice and no charges against
him or any other suspected shooters were pressed by the TRNC authorities. Frustrated by the
75
inaction of the TRNC authorities, the families of Isaak and Solomou decided to appeal to the
international community for help and filed a suit against Turkey to the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR). In 2008 the court finally ruled in their favor, finding Turkey guilty of
violation of two aspects of the Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (a
violation of the right to life and of failure to conduct effective investigation into the deaths of
Isaak and Solomou) and obliging it to pay compensations to the families of the two fellows.
The photographs and videos of Isaak and Solomou’s murders received an equally wide
circulation outside the doors of the criminal justice institutions, the Greek Cypriot advocacy
groups abroad broadcasting the videos at different political events and press-conferences
organized with the goal of raising awareness about the Cyprus issue. Commemoration of Isaak
and Solomou, who themselves were part of a nonviolent protest movement aimed at drawing
the world’s attention to the Cyprus problem, thus became a platform for making a new appeal
to the international community. In the aftermath of the incident two big stands with Isaak and
Solomou’s portraits, photographs capturing their final moments, and brief descriptions of the
events of 1996 were installed by the Pancyprian Anti-Occupation Movement (P.A.KT.) in
Nicosia at the Ledra Palace checkpoint connecting the Greek and the Turkish sides. This
installment was part of a long-term weekend sit-in demonstrations at the Ledra Palace that were
launched in the Fall of 1996 in response to the murders of Isaak and Solomou61 and aimed at
putting pressure on TRNC by disrupting the flow of tourists crossing to the occupied North.62 CEU eTD Collection
61 The demonstration was also caused by the murder of Petros Kakoulis, a 50-years-old Greek Cypriot refugee who was shot by the Turkish soldiers in October 1996 after accidentally wandering into the Buffer Zone (Amnesty International Report 1997 – Cyprus. 1 January 1997). 62 1997. “Checkpoint protest economic blow to occupation regime.” Cyprus News Agency, September 20. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (http://www.argyrou.eclipse.co.uk/Memory.htm). . 76
Figure 3.1. Photographs taken by Costas Kyriakides documenting the moment of Isaak’s murder as displayed at The Bulletin web-site. Source: http://www.geocities.ws/CapitolHill/3974/tasos.html
This checkpoint holds a special symbolic significance for Greek Cypriots, as it has been
continuously used a site of anti-occupational demonstrations and protests of the relatives of the
people who died or went missing during the 1974 invasion (Demetriou and Gürel 2008;
Demetriou 2012) 63 . Displayed in this strategic site, this visual testimony to the recent
intercommunal violence is more than just another memento of the anti-occupational struggle:
it seeks to inform, caution, and perhaps even shame the travelers (mostly foreign tourists), who
wish to visit the occupied North, thus contributing to the TRNC’s economy and its battle for
CEU eTD Collection international recognition (Psaltiset al. 2014: 73).
63 The demonstrators – mostly widows and mothers of the dead and missing soldier’s – actively used photographic images of their sons and husbands during these demonstrations. For further analysis of visual representations of the missing people in Cyprus see Sant Cassia (2005) and Hoak-Doering (2015). 77
A Greek Cypriot web-site called The Bulletin64, which appeared shortly after Isaak’s and
Solomou’s deaths and which seems to be largely oriented towards the international bikers’
audience, presents a paradigmatic example of the employment of the imagery of suffering as a
form of exposure of the atrocities of the Other. One of the site’s web-pages displays several
images taken by photographer Costas Kyriakides at the time of Isaak’s murder. The page
description provided by the site invites the viewers to see “a shocking series of photos showing
the barbarian Turks murdering the innocent biker” and promises that these “amazing series of
photos, excellently executed by a Cypriot photographer will shock all” (Bulletin, 12 September
1996). As can be seen on the Figure 3.1, computer graphics was used to modify the original
images and encircle the figure of one of the attackers with a thick red line, as the author of the
accompanying text invites the readers to follow the assailants’ actions and witness their
“barbarity”:
Follow the hooded executioner in the red circle as he comes in with clear and definite intent, raised baton brought down with force and precision on the neck of the surrounded and immobilized victim on the ground. ... Try mastering the dignity required to admit that such incidents do not belong to the world order that humanity is striving for at the close of the twentieth century, at least not from an ally of the West and definitely not from an imminent member of the European Union. ... Follow the red circled hood and try to look deep into the eyes of the uniformed men and others bending over the helpless body of the Greek Cypriot protesting for Justice and respect for Human Rights. … Look deep into those eyes and ask yourselves how many more years will such thugs be allowed to abuse your tolerance and apathy and how many more innocent deaths will it take till the resolutions adopted on Cyprus by the international community are implemented and end the tribulations of this island's peoples? (Bulletin, 12 September 1996)
This passage reveals a telling shift from preoccupation with the sufferer to that with his CEU eTD Collection offenders. While such a narrative strategy is clearly instrumental to the authors’ goal of
demonizing the perpetrators and their entire national collective, this trend also reflects the
humanitarian frame’s limited capacity for engaging with the figures of the victims. Although
64 Retrieved June 26 (http://www.geocities.ws/CapitolHill/3974/index-2.html). 78
the humanitarian ethics start from the presumption of singularity, as it asserts the sanctity of
every human life, in practice it leaves little room for individuation: the subject of a humanitarian
intervention is the suffering state, to which the shared human condition makes us all potentially
vulnerable, and its engagement with specific individuals is limited to the moments of these
individuals’ victimization. Moreover, in the context of humanitarian activism, the victim-
centered perspective, which mediates to the public the dramatic experience of suffering to
provoke empathy for the afflicted individual and indignation against the perpetrators, loses
much of its relevance when it comes to retrospectively addressing the suffering that has passed
and no longer requires an intervention. The records of violence and suffering inflicted thus
become a testimony to the moral character of a perpetrator and an evidence of a transgression
committed, but the question of what the suffering endured might suggest about the victim
largely falls outside of the scope of the humanitarian frame. By contrast, the martyrical and
heroic frames, recover agency in suffering as they often hold the intensity of the pain withstood
as evidence of an actor’s spiritual strength and commitment to the cause.
Written entirely in the English language, The Bulletin is clearly oriented towards the
international audience from whom it seeks to elicit solidarity and social action. The brief
narrative of the circumstances of Isaak’s and Solomou’s deaths featuring on the site is
concluded with a following direct appeal to “the bikers of the world”:
We call upon YOU, the bikers of the world, to show unity and alliance to your fellow bikers in Cyprus. Make the Cyprus problem and the facts of August 11th and August 14th known to your friends and relatives. Raise the awareness of the Cyprus problem and CEU eTD Collection the killings of two Greek Cypriot bikers in such a brutal and barbaric way in the 21th century. Don't accept it! Don't just talk about it! ACT about it! Demand from YOUR Government, the United Nations, the European Community, the rest of the world to find a solution to the problem. Demand that they force the illegally present Turkish troops to leave Cyprus. Demand that Cyprus is returned to its rightful owners, the CYPRIOTS!
79
YOUR government is giving money to these barbarians. They give YOUR money to them, to buy guns and occupy lands they don't own, kill and rape people, throw people out of their own houses. Make your government stop this funding. I'm sure you can think of better ways to waste your OWN money (Bulletin, August 14, 1996).
What is interesting about the Bulletin’s rhetoric is not the audience it appeals to, which is
vaguely defined as the UN, European Community or “the rest of the world,” but the techniques
of mediating suffering it employs and the type of emotional chords it seeks to strike. The
graphic rendition of suffering present in the outlet’s discourse is an outcome of more than just
forensic thoroughness needed to mediate the facts to the relevant competent bodies. Rather, it
seeks to exert an emotional effect on those it appeals to by mediating to them in the most
immediate way the naked reality of suffering.
The discourses of “human rights” and “justice” feature prominently in the state officials’
speeches delivered at the yearly memorial service for Isaak and Solomou. The notion of death
as a crime coexists in these discourses with the notion of death as sacrifice, Isaak and Solomou
being represented as martyrs for freedom, democracy, and human rights. As the Minister of
Agriculture put it in his memorial speech, Isaak and Solomou “continued the long tradition of
those who fight for freedom, without swords, bullets, and weapons [but] only with faith in the
law and desire for freedom.”65 Greek Cypriots are thus called upon to remember, honor, and
emulate by deeds of a matching virtue, Isaak and Solomou and all the “immortal dead heroes,
who selflessly, courageously, and bravely threw themselves at the forefront of the unequal
struggle and sacrificed as defenders of democracy, territorial integrity, independence and CEU eTD Collection sovereignty of the country.” 66 The vindication for the sacrifices of the heroes is thus imagined
65 From the Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment Fotis Fotiou’s speech delivered in Paralimni at the memorial service for Isaak and Solomou on August 6, 2006. Retrieved June 26, 2019 (http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/agriculture.nsf/All/817D6FCCA7441B43C22571C0003D46AF?OpenDocument). 66Ibid.
80
not in punitive terms – as a historical triumph of Greeks over Turks and the expulsion of the
Turkish settlers, but in restorative ones – as a triumph of rule of law over lawlessness and
consolidation of the values of democracy and human rights on the entire island.
While the humanitarian framework of response to a violent death has a strong potential for
producing a mobilization aimed at an international audience, its mobilizing powers have a
limited lifespan, as humanitarian action is largely aimed at the provision of response to the
ongoing emergences (Fassin 2011). The persuasiveness of appeal and the mobilizing capacity
of the suffering past, however, expires fast as the time passes and new crises gain their
momentums. Moreover, the humanitarian framework for mobilization affords a very limited
repertoire of action for the local actors, restricted to advocacy and awareness raising
campaigns. To the segments of the population most likely to take part in public action – young
and often nationalistically-minded people with an active political position and an appetite for
social change – such frame of action has a limited appeal, not least due to its historical
inefficacy in the Cypriot case. Despite the decades-long protests and lobbying campaigns no
sustainable effort has been undertaken by the international community to either resolve the
issue of the missing persons or bring the people responsible for Isaak and Solomou’s deaths to
justice. The perceived fruitlessness of appeals to the international community combined with
deep-rooted mistrust of the West produced a feeling of disempowerment among Greek Cypriot
nationalists, who see this dependence on Western powers and inability to take an autonomous
action as detrimental to their national dignity. CEU eTD Collection
As I will show in the following sections of this chapter, to the actors involved in mobilizations
around the sacrificial figures, the form of the mobilization – the type of practices and discourses
it affords – is as significant as the cause of the mobilization itself. In Cyprus, the mobilizations
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that build around sacrificial imagery and romanticized visions of heroism, struggle, and honor
have a stronger appeal to young people, as they offer an exciting and engaging subculture that
builds around the notions of action and adventure, rather than those of loss, mourning, and
pleas for help. In contrast to the short-lived humanitarian protests, such mobilizations not only
do not lose their appeal to people over time, but have a potential to take roots and evolve into
a lasting practice, giving birth to a new tradition. Didier Fassin (2011: 3-4) points out the
profound structural inequality between the givers and the receivers of aid and between those
who empathize and those whose suffering is to be empathized with inherent to the humanitarian
reason. The major pitfall of the humanitarian politics, he argues, and the cause of resentment it
so often unintentionally breeds among the very people it targets is the fact that within the frame
of a humanitarian intervention, its subjects are destined to remain forever just that – passive
recipients of aid never able to reciprocate the help generously provided. In contrast to the
protests framed in humanitarian terms, which do not offer its participants much but an
opportunity but to ask that their rights are observed and hope that the powerful Others will hear
their plea and intervene, a nationalist mobilization provides the actors with an opportunity to
claim their rights, even if only in a symbolic way. In what follows, I turn to the examination of
the heroic narratives of Isaak and Solomou, which are being construed by Greek Cypriot
nationalists and the alternative framework for mobilizing around the violent death they create.
On the one hand, by stressing Isaak and Solomou’s bravery and praising their determination
and commitment to the cause, the heroic narratives and discourses recover the agency of the
two fellows and subvert the depersonalizing effect of the humanitarian frame, which recognizes CEU eTD Collection the two young men only as victims, but not as individuals. On the other – by making a personal
commitment to fight for the two heroes’ cause and to vindicate to their sacrifices, they recover
the communal agency by refusing to shift responsibility for getting justice to the shoulders of
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the international legal institutions and affirming their own duty towards their fallen
compatriots.
3.2. Domestic Audience: Isaak and Solomou as Embodiments of Greek Ethnic Virtues
The deaths of Isaak and Solomou which were personally witnessed by many Greek Cypriots
and televised to the entire nation, have deeply shaken the Greek Cypriot community and
triggered a lasting public discussion on the meaning of patriotism, anti-occupational struggle,
and individual heroism. To many Greek Cypriots the two young men and their ultimate
commitment to the cause symbolized a hope for the continuation of anti-occupational struggle
and a possibility of the island’s reunification. Just like Evgenii Rodionov in Russia, the two
fellows, endowed with the honorable title of “hero-martyrs,” quickly became an object of folk
admiration, their dramatic deaths becoming a subject of the contemporary Greek Cypriot heroic
epics.
In contrast to the humanitarian discourses, which present Isaak and Solomou as passive victims
of Turkish aggression, the heroic narratives recover their protagonists’ agency by praising their
decisiveness and bravery and depicting them as the doers of their own tragic, but noble fates.
The notions of passion, craziness, militant idealism and radical refusal to compromise are the
common themes running through the poems and songs devoted to the two heroes. The images
CEU eTD Collection of Solomou nonchalantly climbing up the Turkish flagpole with a cigarette in his mouth have
become iconic (see Figure 3.2). The young man’s seemingly playful attitude towards death and
his demonstrative disregard for the impendent danger, have revived in the public the memories
of the fading tradition of romantic radicalism embodied in the motto “Freedom or Death!” that
was prominent during the years of anti-colonial struggle against the British. A refrain from a
83
Figure 3.2. Solomos Solomou climbing up the Turkish flagpole. Source: https://wiki.phantis.com/index.php/File:Solomos_Solomou_climbing.jpg
popular song written by Greek folk singer Dimitris Mitropanos in memory of Solomos
Solomou, called “Always Smiling” runs:
The ones who become friends with Death, Go away with a cigarette in their lips, Surrendered to their crazy dreams, Always smiling, always smiling,
CEU eTD Collection Always smiling and deceived. This motif of an extraordinary bravery that borders on madness also features in “He was Crazy”
song written in 2009 by popular Greek singer Notis Sfakianakis and dedicated to Solomou.
The song lyrics feature the following passages:
He was crazy and for that deserves the glory
84
And for that he was betrayed to a kiss of death. … He was crazy and they fired a bullet Because the cowards always attack the unarmed. But he, the immortal, returns with the air. They, the immortals, never go, they always live!
The visual and narrative representations of Isaak and Solomou echo the heroic aesthetics that
shape the commemoration of EOKA fighters and emphasize the guerilla members’ youth,
bravery, and above all their unbreakable spirits and readiness to die for the cause of liberation.
The songs devoted to both Isaak and Solomou that widely circulate on the Internet are often
accompanied with video clips, which present a compilation from the photographs and video
footages of their killings. When viewed against the background of hopeful lyrics and joyful
and assertive sounds of the Greek folk motifs, the violent imagery takes on a somewhat
different undertone. While the dramatic scenes still preserve much of their tragic pathos, placed
in the aesthetics of a heroic narrative the very same gruesome images now come to convey a
positive message of hope and struggle, rather than a grim narrative of victimhood and despair.
If the representations of Isaak and Solomou intended for the international audience mainly seek
to assert the victimhood and righteousness of the two fellows (and by extension the entire Greek
Cypriot community) vis-à-vis the barbarity and cruelty of the Turks, those meant for internal
consumption are more oriented towards delineating a model of virtue. Efthymiou (2014:5)
describes the post-1974 Greek Cypriot nationalism as constructed around the theme of
victimhood and representations of the nation as “feminine and in need of protection” by the
Greek Cypriot men. The Greek Cypriot representations of suffering are thus closely connected CEU eTD Collection
to the production of politicized masculinities and “the operation of the broader masculine
discourse of a defensive Nation” (Efthymiou (2014: 11-12). In this context, the heroic
representations of Isaak and Solomou embody a model of masculinity defined by bravery,
physical strength, and preparedness to defend the embattled Greek Cypriot nation. Similarly to
85
Evgenii Rodionov’s representations in Russia, the model of morality exemplified by Isaak and
Solomou is based on ideals of selflessness and heroism (presented as “traditional” Greek) and
is explicitly opposed to the Western liberal ideology of individualism and pragmatism. In
contrast to the humanitarian frame, within which the international community and the global
institutions (EU, UN) emerge as potential saviors and generous benefactors, the heroic
narratives of Isaak and Solomou’s deaths reveal suspicion towards the Western powers. The
latter are often portrayed in nationalist discourses either as hypocrites condemning Turkish
aggression in words, but unwilling to act to circumvent it, or, in extreme cases, as manipulators
complicit in the orchestration and maintenance of the islands’ division. The fact that the
murders of both Isaak and Solomou happened right before the eyes of the UN peacekeeping
forces and representatives of international media outlets, but yet resulted in no sanctions against
Turkey, is often brought up to sustain the claim of Western powers’ lack of genuine
commitment to Greek Cypriot cause. To the ultra-nationalists the commemoration of Isaak and
Solomou became an occasion for denouncing both the hypocrisy of the West and the meekness
and inactiveness of the Cypriot government sometimes depicted as “Western puppets” as well
as for condemning the Turkish aggression.
The official memorial ceremony for Isaak and Solomou takes place every year on the first or
second Sunday of August. It starts with a religious service in the Church of St. Demetrius in
Paralimni, after which a large procession moves to the village cemetery, where the two heroes’
graves are located. Several government representatives always take part in the event, putting CEU eTD Collection wreaths on the graves and delivering speeches. For some time, after the political heat of the
1996 events had withered, the memorial events for Isaak and Solomou were rather modest in
scale and largely limited to friends and relatives of the two fellows and a few representatives
of different political and civic associations. While the protest nationalist dimension has always
86
been inherent to Isaak and Solomou’s commemoration, over the first several years of the cult’s
existence it did not have a visible presence at the memorial events and was largely confined to
political discourses and artistic representations of the events of 1996. This dynamic started to
change in the mid-2000s, as nationalist football clubs and The United Association of the
Autonomous Student Union fractions (EFAEFP) started to attend the commemorative events
for Isaak and Solomou. EFAEFP essentially serves as an umbrella organization for several
autonomous Greek Cypriot student associations around the globe. It was formed in 1987 out
of the members of the Greek Cypriot student associations in Athens (DRASISKES),
Thessaloniki (P.E.O.F.), and the U.S. (D.E.P.) with the goal of uniting and coordinating their
efforts in protecting the interests of the students and fighting for the removal of the occupation
in Cyprus. 67 Right after the tragic events of the 1996 anti-occupation march, the EFAEFP
members showed interest in Isaak and Solomou’s story, the association’s branches abroad
organizing awareness raising campaigns and memorial processions to honor Isaak and
Solomou in their cities.
Although the Student Unions Association’s mobilization around Isaak and Solomou was to an
extent directed at foreign audiences, it never fully incorporated the victimization narrative
inherent to the humanitarian frame. Since EFAEFP’s most active branches were in Athens and
Thessaloniki, the representations of Isaak and Solomou produced by the student unions were
largely directed at the Greek audience, whose solidarity was already assumed and did not need
to be won over. Rather, the goal of the mobilizations was to raise awareness about the continued CEU eTD Collection occupation in Cyprus and to protest any attempts of settlement that would entail a federative
solution. On the tenth anniversary of Isaak and Solomou’s death, EFAEFP organized a massive
67 Five more independent student movements from different cities in Cyprus and abroad later joined the association. 87
commemorative event in Thessaloniki attracting about 1,500 people. During the event a
documentary film about the two heroes produced by the Student Union was shown and
information leaflets on the events of 1996 and the recent political developments in Cyprus
circulated. According to the Union representative, after the success of the event in
Thessaloniki, the relatives of Isaak and Solomou, who were invited to attend as honorable
guests, asked the Union members to help with the organization of the yearly memorial event
in Cyprus, as they were unhappy with the Cypriot state’s lack of involvement. From 2007 the
EFAEFP’s presence at the memorial events for Isaak and Solomou in Cyprus has formalized,
the Union representatives delivering speeches by Isaak and Solomou’s graves every year.
From 2008 onward, due the emergence of other groups actively engaged in the promotion of
Isaak and Solomou’s memory in Cyprus, the Union’s involvement in the organization of the
event in Paralimni has declined. Nevertheless, its representatives are always present at the
memorial event (even if in much smaller numbers) and participating in the march to the
cemetery and the wreaths-laying ceremony.
The nationalist mobilization around the figures of Isaak and Solomou in Cyprus powerfully
resurged in 2008, with the increasing public visibility of newly established ultra-nationalist
movement National Popular Front (ELAM). The organization actively promotes the two hero-
martyrs as exemplars of Greek spirit and virtue on their web-site and from mid-2000s onwards
its members always have a visible presence at the yearly memorial services held for Isaak and
Solomou. Criticizing the government’s inability to get justice for the wrongful deaths of Isaak CEU eTD Collection and Solomou, ELAM makes their own pledge to the two hero-martyrs, promising that their
“sacrifices will not be forgotten and will not be allowed to go to waste” and that the anti-
occupational struggle “will continue unabated until the Greek flag is raised above the Turkish
88
outpost in every occupied city and village, finishing the work of Solomos” (Ethniko Laiko
Metopo, August 11, 2014).68
ELAM was officially established as a political movement in 2008 and was formed on the basis
of the previously existing on the island Cypriot branch of the Greek far-right party Golden
Dawn, with whom it still maintains a close affiliation and whose ideology it largely shares
(Katsourides 2013; Law 2014: 87). ELAM’s political program presents a harsh anti-federalist
line in respect to the resolution of the Cyprus problem, an unconditional demand for the
withdrawal of the Turkish troops and settlers and the return of the occupied territories as well
as a zero-tolerance policy for immigration and promotion of political and financial
autonomization of Cyprus. In 2011 ELAM officially obtained the status of a political party,
winning 1.08% of votes in the national elections (Katsourides 2013). While ELAM chiefly
remains a politically marginal group, its electoral success has been visibly growing, the party
receiving 3.71% of votes in the 2016 national elections and gaining two seats in the House of
Representatives. During the 2019 European Parliament elections ELAM was able to
substantially improve its performance, gaining 8.25 % of votes, compared to only 2.7 in 2014.
Despite being heavily criticized by the liberal media and labeled “extremist” by some human
rights groups, ELAM retains its appeal to many nationalistically minded Greek Cypriots and
enjoys the endorsement of the Cypriot Orthodox Church. Archbishop Chrysostomos II69 has
publicly given ELAM members a positive characteristic, describing its members as “educated CEU eTD Collection
68 Retrieved June 26, 2019 (https://elamcy.com/oi-ethnikistes-den-proskynoun-isaak-solome-den-ksechno- fotoreportaz/). 69 Archbishop Chrysostomos II is known for his radical social conservatism and is often criticized by the liberal media for his (rather frequent) “homophobic” and “racist” remarks. Commenting upon ELAM’s entry to parliament in 2016, he expressed his satisfaction with the election results, adding that “other voices will be heard now” and that “many times you need extremists so the others are more careful” – a position that sparked another wave of critic from the liberal media outlets (2016. “Cool welcome for ELAM from Archbishop (Updated).”Cyprus Mail, May 26. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (https://cyprus-mail.com/old/2016/05/26/cool- welcome-elam-archbishop/)). 89
persons who are sincerely interested for their country” and proclaiming his support for their
views on the issue of immigration (Chrysostomos II cited in Katsourides 2013: 17).
ELAM first became politically active in the early 2000s in response to the preparing 2004
referendum for the UN-backed reunification agreement known as “Anan plan.” Like many
Greek Cypriot nationalists, ELAM members advocated for a “no” vote and denounced the plan
that was subsequently overwhelmingly voted down by Greek Cypriots. The group’s official
entry to the political arena took place in 2008 and coincided with the election of Demetris
Christofias – a member of the communist Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) – as a
president. Christofias’ compromising position on the resolution of the Cyprus question and his
commitment to the renewal of negotiations for the bi-zonal federative solution that would
equally accommodate the Turkish Cypriot interests70 were perceived by many Greek Cypriots
as a defeatist stance and a betrayal of national interests (Katsourides 2013), triggering a surge
of anti-Western and anti-governmental moods among the Greek nationalists. Christofias’
unpopular political vision led to the resurgence of anti-Turkish sentiments and decline of trust
in the government that was suspected of advancing a solution dictated to it by the West and the
EU. The ideas of Greek national identity being under threat by the perceived challenges of both
Westernization and Islamization feature prominently in ELAM’s discourses on morality and
ethnic politics. The latter challenges are often presented as closely interrelated, as Greek
nationalists blame the “Western” policies of tolerance and multiculturalism promoted by EU
for the growing number of immigrants of Muslim origin in Cyprus and the country’s “weak” CEU eTD Collection position in negotiations with the Turkish North. Greek Cypriots’ attempt to construct their
national identity vis-à-vis these two historical and civilizational Others gives rise to a peculiar
70Christofias advocated for a system of rotating presidency between Greek and Turkish communities and the legalization of 50, 000 Turkish settlers currently residing in the Northern part; the same terms of solution were earlier articulated in the 2004 Anan plan for the island’s reunification, which was overwhelmingly rejected by Greek Cypriot population during a referendum. 90
coupling of traditionalist and modernist discourses, the two discursive strategies being
alternately employed as means of distinction and self-legitimization depending on the identity
of the opponent one has in mind (Argyrou 1996: 12). While the identification with the Western
modernity and democratic values is being evoked when contrasting the self to the “Orient” and
“barbaric” Islamic societies, the rhetoric of tradition, authenticity, and national honor are being
emphasized when talking about Greek superiority over the “morally corrupt” and “mellow”
liberal West. These occasionally contradictory, but by no means mutually exclusive, ethical
trajectories meet together in the heroic representations of Isaak and Solomou, who are
portrayed as both the martyrs for the ideals of democracy and human rights barbarically
violated by the Turks, and as exemplars of altruism and Greek ethnic virtue, who remained
uncorrupted by the “Western” culture of individualism and consumerism and sacrificed their
lives for the nation.
Although ELAM does not explicitly position itself as a youth movement, its membership
appears to mainly comprise people in their 20s and 30s and its propaganda and recruitment
efforts are strongly oriented towards the young people, especially high school and university
students (Christou and Ioannidou 2014). The movement has junior branches in several
educational institutions across Cyprus, whom it actively involves in the organization of
memorials for Isaak and Solomou and other national heroes. Preoccupation with educating the
youth and passing on “traditional” Greek ideals and values to the new generations is high on
the movement’s political agenda. As Rebecca Bryant (2001) points out, classical education that CEU eTD Collection emphasized Greek heritage has been historically closely linked in the Greek Cypriot context to
the idea of ethnic reproduction and understood as means of shaping not just ethnic, but also
moral subjects. The government’s attempts to reform the educational system in accordance
with the Western standards that intensified in the early 2000s were thus perceived by many
91
Greek Cypriots as a direct existential threat to their community. Frustrated with the perceived
marginalization of the memorials for national heroes in the Greek Cypriot society, ELAM made
the involvement of youth into commemorative events and the cultivation of commitment to the
memory of the island’s struggles an important dimension of their movement’s activism.
Commemoration of national heroes, like Isaak and Solomou, in this context provides an
occasion to offer the public exemplars of patriotism every Greek Cypriot is encouraged to
emulate.
The notion of resistance that features prominently in ELAM’s discourses is not limited to anti-
occupational struggle, but also entails a broader idea of the need to protect Greek cultural
identity and fight against the “corrupting” effects of the Western liberal ideology, to which
Hellenocentric education that would teach “respect for the struggles of our ancestors” is offered
as a solution (Ethniko Laiko Metopo, September 8, 2014). 71 Thus, in an address to the school
students published on ELAM’s web-site in September 2014, the organization calls upon the
young people to be vigilant and to resist the “false” values imposed on them by the new pro-
federation curricula promoted by the educational institutions. The message concludes with the
following militant appeal: “Difficult times are coming and we need to resist by any means. If
youth remain indifferent, then everything is over, no one is going to fight. Raise high the
banners of the nation, demand our future and make sure that you will win” (Ethniko Laiko
Metopo, September 8, 2014).
CEU eTD Collection The challenge of Westernization and the perceived growing cultural influence of liberal values
and multiculturalist ideology are seen by ELAM as a threat to the national survival no less
grave then that posed by Turkey. Moreover, anti-Westernism is often directly connected to the
71 Retrieved June 26, 2019 (https://elamcy.com/kali-scholiki-chronia/). 92
anti-Turkish sensibilities, as the militantly oriented nationalists, who fail to find much active
support among their compatriots, often blame the hegemony of the “Western” ideology of
individualism and hedonistic consumerism for the obliteration of the Greek national
consciousness and the undermining of Greek Cypriots’ determination to commit to a costly
struggle against the occupation. As Efthymiou (2014) points out, the feeling of ontological
security in the wake of Cyprus aсcession to the EU and the opening of the check-points led to
a significant decline of the ideology of dense on the national level and a waning of fighting
spirit and militaristic values among the Greek Cypriot public. ELAM’s active work for the
resurrection of the heroic culture and its ideals of selflessness, bravery, and readiness to fight
in the public life thus presents an attempt to leverage the unfavorable political situation by
winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the young generation.
The images of heroes in this context do more than simply provide a model for imitation.
Allusions to the sacrifices carried out on behalf of the entire nation help establishing a
relationship of personal indebtedness and responsibility towards the heroes from every
individual member of the community, inspiring them to continue the struggle. The propagation
of heroic values is also designed to thwart the perceived trend of cynicism and skepticism
towards heroic ideals among contemporary Greek Cypriots. During the interview in 2016,
Geadis Geadi, who has been part of ELAM from its very inception and now serves as its
spokesperson, complained to me about the dismissive comments Greek Cypriots sometimes
make about Solomos Solomou, trivializing his final feat by ascribing it to mental illness or a CEU eTD Collection drug problem. Pointing out that few among the “crazy” would dare to repeat Solomou’s feat
with the guns of the Turkish soldiers pointed at them, Geadis concluded by evoking the
community’s duty of memory:
I think that we must respect them [Isaak and Solomou]. They showed to us that we must not put our guns down, we must not
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stop fighting for our rights and for our people. Because heroes – they are not fighting to become celebrities, they are fighting for us and I think that we must bring people there [to the memorial event] to remember them and not let them be forgotten by the rest of people. Because if you forget the heroes, it’s like you kill them twice. It is just a regular death, if you forget them, but if you keep them in your memory – they are still alive.
The Cypriot society thus comes to be construed in ELAM’s discourse through a moral divide
between those who honor their duty of memory towards the heroes and those who choose to
forget, seduced by the potential benefits the politics of reconciliation might bring. The latter
camp was labelled by Geadis “the new Cypriots” – a term nationalists use to refer to the
supporters of the ideology of Cypriotism that envisions belonging to the Cypriot state in civic,
rather ethic terms:
They [New Cypriots] believe that we must forget those things [the inter-ethnic conflict], that we are not Greek Cypriots – that all people here Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, no matter when they came to Cyprus, are all Cypriots. But our nation – Cyprus – does not exist like that, there is no Cypriot nation! And they say that those things [memorials] are bad for us and that they don’t work for the union of the people in Cyprus and they want to forget everything and they say that the Turks are friends … They want to forget our heroes, to forget whatever happened here, but we don’t agree, we will never forget! I don’t agree and I don’t allow for the people to forget, not only Isaak and Solomou, but all the heroes. Because the heroes, they gave their lives for us, to protect us and to protect their land, their families… It is for our heroes that we speak nowadays Greek, if it was not for these people – we might be speaking Turkish or not exist at all.
An article featured on ELAM’s website that describes the organization’s “pilgrimage” to the
monument of an EOKA fighter Evagoras Palikarides72, which remains unattended by the CEU eTD Collection municipal authorities, expresses a similar concern about collective forgetting. The author
laments that modern Greek Cypriots “live in the times when the youth are selling out everything
72 Palikarides joined The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) when he was seventeen years old and took active part in the anti-colonial struggle; he was executed by the British authorities in 1957 (2006. Council of Historic Memory of the EOKA Struggle 1955-1959. Ministry of Education and Culture, July 8. Retrieved June 30, 2019 (https://lekythos.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/10797/4412)). 94
to the rotten system, devaluing the sacrifices of our ancestors” and points out that the Greek
nationalists are the only ones who remain faithful to the duty of memory (Ethniko Laiko
Metopo, June 22, 2014). 73 Such a discourse is strikingly similar to that of the Russian
conservatives who are prompt to point out the lack of patriotism and commitment to the
national values among the young people. When confronted by the perceived crisis of moral and
patriotic education, both Russian and Greek Cypriot nationalist enthusiasts thus saw a solution
in reviving the culture of public memorials of heroes and martyrs, believing that it can promote
the “right” values among young people.
The presence at the memorial events for EOKA heroes and Isaak and Solomou offers ELAM
an opportunity not only to demonstrate to the public their adherence to national ideals, but also
to show off their mobilizing capacity. Pointing out that Isaak and Solomou’s memorial is
“difficult” in terms of mobilizing people (as it takes place in mid-August, a holidays season
when the Greek Cypriots employed outside of the tourist industry often opt to escape the
overheated island and travel abroad), Geadis emphasized that ELAM is the only political party
that always manages to bring its youth branch to the events. Such a commitment appears to
bring its political revenues. Thus, ELAM was able to develop a good relationship with Solomos
Solomou’s father, Spiros, who publicly expressed his support for the party on various
occasions. During 2013 presidential elections, he officially supported ELAM’s candidate
Georgios Charalambous. One of the promotional statements from the election campaign
circulated by ELAM featured a photograph of Spiros Solomou 74 standing together with CEU eTD Collection Georgios Charalambous and Geadis Geadi and a quote from “the father of the ethnomartyr
73 Retrieved June 26, 2019 (https://elamcy.com/syntirisi-mnimeiou-evagora-pallikaridi-stin-pafo/). 74 Spiros Solomou had also officially supported Geadis Geadi’s candidature during the 2014 elections to the European Parliament. 95
Figure 3.3. A commemorative poster for Solomos Solomou CEU eTD Collection
Figure 3.4. ELAM’s demonstration in commemoration of Isaak and Solomou, August 14, 2013. Source: http://national-pride.org/2013/08/14/πορεία-στη-μνήμη-των-εθνικών-μαρτύρων/
96
Solomos Solomou,” which ran: “the ELAM members hear the call of my son from above”
(Hrisi Avgi January 20, 2013).75
When presenting the EOKA fighters and Isaak and Solomou as models of ethnic virtue, ELAM
hardly has an agenda as ambitious as inspiring a wide-scale public imitation of the heroes’
deadly sacrifices. Rather, they are trying to promote a particular vision of how the
contemporary Greek Cypriot community should ethically respond to the sacrifices of their
national heroes. A heroic act, by definition individual and unmatchable by most people, rarely
causes widespread imitation, but rather has an effect of emanation, as a hero’s sacrifice touches
the hearts of people and inspires them to live a more conscientious and ethical life, so as to be
worthy of the sacrifice made in their name. Michael Lambek (2007) in his insightful essay on
sacrifice, points out the central role an original act of sacrifice – a gift, which can never be fully
reciprocated – plays in initiating an entire system of communal ethical exchange. The historical
succession of heroes and the emerging new exemplars, like Isaak and Solomou, thus help
“recharging” the sacrificial morality and reasserting the system of duties and obligations that
lies in the foundation of the communal ethical life. A heroic act of an individual opens up a
possibility for a moral renewal of the entire community through a collective action in response
to the sacrifice. Consider an inscription on one of the posters devoted to Solomos Solomou (see
Figure 3.3), which states:
Solomos sacrificed and reminded us that there is occupation in Cyprus, which remains semi-occupied by the barbaric Asian raiders for 38 years now and we all have a duty to reclaim justice for this place. None of us has a right to erase his sacrifice. He died fighting for the only just solution. Liberation. We have CEU eTD Collection a duty to continue his struggle until the final vindication. Solomos, I will not forget. Turks, I will make you pay.
75 Retrieved June 26, 2019 (http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/sto-pleuro-tou-elam-o-pateras-tou- ethnomartura-solwmou-solwmou). 97
Unlike the humanitarian frame of response to a violent death, which leaves the victim’s
community members few options for participating in the process of administrating justice, the
nationalist discourses of duty and honor are more inclusive. By envisioning vindication as a
historical revanche rather than just punishment of responsible individuals they open up a
possibility of a personal engagement for every concerned individual, who through fighting for
a hero’s cause can now imagine himself as actively participating in his vindication.
The ideas of individual action and struggle and militaristic aesthetics are foundational to
ELAM’s culture: the movements’ demonstrations and anti-occupation marches often present a
group of physically fit young men dressed in black paramilitary uniform marching along the
streets chanting military hymns and slogans (Christou and Ioannidou 2014: 131). As the group
appears to have a particular flair for theatrics, its appearances at public ceremonies rarely pass
without a scandal. In 2013, during the yearly memorial event for Isaak and Solomou, ELAM
members staged a burning of the Turkish flag in front of a Turkish outpost. By doing so they
claimed to be continuing the work of Solomou, “passing the message to the Turkish dogs” that
one days they will return and “won’t let no sacrifice to be forgotten” (Greek National Pride,
August 14, 2013).76 Another incident that triggered a wide public condemnation happened in
August 2015, when ELAM members allegedly disrupted a memorial service for Isaak and
Solomou by throwing bottles of water and shouting insults at two government ministers, whom
they called “traitors” and “supporters of federalism.” Commenting upon the incident, Geadis
denied the party’s connection to the provocations, arguing that ELAM members fell victim to CEU eTD Collection misidentification by unscrupulous journalists. He suggested that it was in fact some other
people – perhaps football club fans or bikers coincidently also dressed in black t-shirts – who
had assaulted the state representatives. Admitting that ELAM has a close relationship with
76Retrieved June 26, 2019 (http://national-pride.org/2013/08/14/πορεία-στη-μνήμη-των-εθνικών-μαρτύρων/). 98
many football clubs, who constitute a significant share of the party’s voters, Geadis rushed to
point out that ELAM supporters or not, the fans coming to the event with a club represent that
club and not the party.
While ELAM members are keen on juxtaposing themselves – “men of action” – to the state
officials and mainstream politicians, who they regard as “idle talkers” and accuse of failing to
bring justice to Isaak and Solomou, in practice the party’s political repertoire of action has so
far been largely limited to the symbolic action. This observation allows drawing (at this point
speculative) conclusion that the perception of a certain form of struggle as “real” and “active”
by its participants often has little to do with political consequentiality. Rather, it is the
“stylistics” – types of practices, emotional expressions, and discourses that a specific form of
mobilization affords – that ultimately determine its appeal and attractiveness to participants.
This is not to suggest that ELAM’s popularity is determined by the lucky choice of a political
practice alone. In fact, as I will show in the concluding part of this chapter, it is was the
combination of romantics of street action with institutional politics that secured the expansion
and consolidation of this newly emerged party.
3.3. The Rise of ELAM and the Culture of Public Memorial Events in Cyprus
The view of ELAM as an external force that intervened into the developing cult of Isaak and
CEU eTD Collection Solomou and appropriated the images of the two heroes for the promotion of its own political
agenda, although not uncommon among the public and political commentators, is, however,
deeply misleading. A brief look at the history of ELAM reveals that the movement is as much
a product of the Cypriot culture of public commemorations (and Isaak and Solomou’s cult in
particular), as it is now its active creator. The story of the role of memorial events in ELAM’s
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formation was narrated to me by Geadis. I met him in August 2016, just a couple of months
after ELAM managed for the first time to surpass the 3.6% voter electoral threshold and enter
the House of Representatives. Still exhilarated by the party’s recent success, which he
described as “legendary” and which took by surprise the political commentators and the party
supporters alike, Geadis recounted to me the story of the movement’s brief political career. The
origin of the party traces back to the early 2000s when a small group of Gold Dawn
sympathizers headed by Christos Christou – a Greek Cypriot radiologist, who had been an
active member of Golden Dawn during his studies at the Technological Educational Institute
of Athens – inspired by the Greek example, decided to establish a similar movement in Cyprus.
They named it ingeniously after its forerunner “Golden Dawn: Cypriot Kernel.”
Geadis recalled that during the first four years of its existence, between 2004 and 2008, the
Golden Dawn of Cyprus presented a very small and closed group of about 25 people, which
extended slowly and reluctantly – exclusively through friendships and trusted personal
connections. According to my interlocutor, it was at the yearly memorial events for Isaak and
Solomou (and for some other notable national historical dates) that many of these friendships
and connections were forged:
ELAM was made from those people, who made the memorials for Isaak and Solomou. From those memorials we know each other and it was from the memorials for Isaak and Solomou and the Turkish Invasion memorials that the idea to create ELAM came about. Most of us, we weren’t members of any political movement … because we disagreed with all the other political parties, we did not want to go with them, that’s why we had the idea to create ELAM, so that to bring back to our minds these CEU eTD Collection two heroes and other crimes that Turkey did in Cyprus. 77
As prior to ELAM’s appearance at the public arena the leading role in the organization of
memorial events in Cyprus belonged to the EFAEFP, many of ELAM’s current members had
77 From my interview with Geadis (August 2016). 100
previously been either members or close associates of the nationalist student movement,
attending and offering logistical support to the memorial events it organized. Geadis himself,
who at the time was studying Computer Science in Cyprus College, could not become a formal
member of the union because the latter did not have a branch at his university, but he recalled
being closely involved in the movement’s activities, adding that such was the case for many
current members of ELAM.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s the Greek Cypriot culture of participation in the national
memorial events was already a declining one, compared to its state prior to the 1996 tragic
incidents at the bikers’ rally, which caused the governmental support and the public enthusiasm
for this type of events to substantially wane. In the 1990s Cyprus has experienced a wave of
revival of civic activism related to the 1974 conflict, which manifested in the creation of
numerous religious, youth, and nationalist conservative associations united under the umbrella
of the “anti-occupation movement” and institutionalization of different refugee associations
(Ioannou 2013). This process was accompanied by the resurgence of nationalist discourses and
the return of the centrist-right forces to power (Democratic Rally (DISY) party has been in
office between 1993 and 2003). At the same time, that period was marked by a rapid economic
and cultural modernization and Cyprus’s increasing reorientation towards the West, which
culminated in the island’s ascension to the EU in 2004, as well as by proliferation of the
reunification discourses on the governmental level, which led to the decline of public
participation in the anti-occupational events in the period between late 1990s and early 2000s. CEU eTD Collection Although the 2004 Anan plan triggered another wave of public mobilization with strong
nationalist undertones, it quickly dissolved after the plan was rejected at the referendum. An
important impetus for the creation of ELAM was the nostalgia for the late 1990s type of
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massive public mobilizations and the sense of community it generated, which is remembered
by Geadis with a manifest affection:
I remember the Turkish invasion memorial that we went to when we were students and I remember that all the people went there, the place was full of people. … People from all over Cyprus used to come to that memorial and every place in Cyprus and all the schools came down and they each competed to bring more people. And on those nights, you see on Nicosia road a lot of cars and motorcycles... It was not an organized movement – it was [coming] from the people. Let’s say we were in school and we say “20 of July – we will go to Ledra Palace.” Everyone, without any movement, without anything, all the people just knew that 20 of July we go there. No one was somewhere else. Until 1996 it was like that, after – the government tried to stop that.
From the very moment of its inception ELAM (known as the Golden Dawn of Cyprus back
then) was actively organizing of its own memorial events and various protest rallies modeled
after the post-1974 anti-occupation demonstrations. According to Geadis, the struggle for the
resurrection of the public tradition of participation in the memorial events and demonstrations
remains high on ELAM’s agenda:
We try to bring back the people to those memorials. Because the people now, they start to forget what happened on our land, they stop fighting for our rights. ELAM wants to get the people out of their houses and take them to the street. ELAM wants to make people to start fighting, to try for our hopes and for whatever belongs to us.
In 2004 ELAM members for the first time attended the memorial event for Isaak and Solomou
as a separate group, wearing black T-Shirts and waving Greek flags. Geadis asserted that the
prime motivation for ELAM members’ attendance of the memorial is a personal sense of duty
towards the heroes. “We do it for our honor … we don’t do it for politics or something,” he CEU eTD Collection
explained, adding that he is certain that even if ELAM as a party was not organizing those
memorials, most of its members would still attend them individually. From a compact, just
three-rows-long column consisting of 10 persons during their first march in honor of the two
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heroes in 2004, the number of people joining ELAM’s ranks at Isaak and Solomou’s memorial
has grown up to 400 in the last several years.
The watershed moment for the group’s ability to boost the scale of their public events and
attract new followers was 2008, when it has formally registered as a political movement under
the name of People’s National Front (ELAM). The change of the name (which was connected
to the Cypriot authorities’ refusal to register the party as “Golden Dawn”) and the acquisition
of the official status of a political organization helped the group to improve its public image,
at least among some segments of Greek Cypriot society. Although the party has never
denounced its ties to the Golden Dawn, the new name has substantially eased the task of social
outreach for ELAM, helping it acquire, if not a better publicity, at least a benefit of a doubt on
behalf of the public. The party thus managed to move outside of the shadow cast upon it by the
infamy of the Golden Dawn, the mere presence of whose logo on the flyers and leaflets
distributed by ELAM activists would previously prompt the passersby to immediately direct
those flyers straight to the nearest garbage bin. According to Geadis, once the Golden Dawn
logo has been replaced with ELAM’s emblem, the same leaflets with the exactly same content
started enjoying a much greater success and even yielding some agreement from the readers.
The attitude towards ELAM’s public presence has also substantially changed:
In 2004 the police and the government, they saw us as aliens. It was the first time that we went there [Isaak and Solomou’s memorial] organized, … it was the first time that they saw us and they felt strange – the government, the police, even the people – it was something strange for them. … Year by year they started
CEU eTD Collection to see us differently. … Between 2004 and 2008 we had a lot of problems from the police because we were not a legal party and the police was afraid of us, after we became a political party they stopped causing us problems ... The people started … coming close to us and the number of members started growing. It was the main idea, one major reason for us to become a political party – to protect our people, to not have the problems from the police and for the public to feel free to come to our memorials.
103
One distinct feature of ELAM’s political discourse is the juxtaposition between the “honest”
and “noble” practice of street action and the “corrupt” and “duplicitous” conventional
institutional politics, which is articulated through a chain of semantic oppositions between
“honor” and “dishonesty,” “strength” and “weakness,” “bravery” and “cowardice,”
“conformism” and “protest.” The idea of political impotence and lack of will ascribed to the
Greek Cypriot political establishment is expressed in the notion of “politics of a good kid” (i
politiki tou kalou paidiou), understood as the republic government’s tactic of trying to please
the UN and the foreign regional powers by blindly following their recommendations in hope
that their “good” behavior will eventually be rewarded with international help in the resolution
of the Cyprus problem or concessions on behalf of Turkey. This political course is also closely
associated in the nationalist discourse with the strategy of pursuing reunification at the cost of
Greek national interests and fostering the erasure of social memory in Cyprus in the name of
reconciliation:
The government wants the people to not do anything because the strong foreign countries, the UN – they want Cyprus to be quiet, they want to find a solution, like federalism, so they can do whatever is better for them. … We want to bring the people back, we want to make the people start fighting, we want to be strong again. We don’t accept that we are a small country and that we must shut up. Even if we are small, we must be big, we must shout, we must fight for our rights. Even if you don’t win anything, at least you will be proud. I will be proud that I fight, that I don’t stay back and say, “who cares.” At lease I am proud, at least I do whatever I can.
Public participation in the memorial events and protest rallies is represented in this context as
a noble and brave emancipatory act of reclaiming political agency and demonstrating to the CEU eTD Collection republic’s government and the international community the Greek Cypriot people’s
determination to stand by their national values and political vision.
104
Given the close-to-insulting connotation the notion of the “political” has acquired in ELAM’s
discourse, it is hardly surprising that throughout our conversation Geadis constantly tried to
underline ELAM’s radical difference from the rest of parliamentary parties, for instance by
expressing his preference for calling ELAM a “movement” rather than a “party.” Trying to
dispel the suspicions of dishonesty and self-interest that in his mind the title of a politician
automatically warrants, Geadis kept stressing his disinterest in the social and financial benefits
a political career can yield, pointing out time and again that he is “a normal person, not a
politician”:
We [ELAM] don’t have a dream to be politicians, we don’t have a dream to be someone special … members of parliament and like that. We have big goals. … We don’t do something because we must – for the camera and for the people – we do something because we feel that. We do it for ourselves first of all and I think that’s why we are different.
Geadis believes the Greek Cypriot public is aware of ELAM’s difference from the rest of
political organizations, as ELAM’s position and practice appear to have struck a chord with the
voters. Moreover, the popular success of ELAM (moderate as it is) has a potential to transform
and leave a lasting trace in the Greek Cypriot political culture, as other parties try to copy
ELAM’s style and rhetoric to attract voters. Unconcerned with the potential threat of
competition, Geadis sees the other parties’ attempts at mimicking ELAM’s discourses and
tactics of mobilizing people on the streets, as a positive trend that reflects his party’s agenda-
setting potential:
We don’t care if they [other parties] do something. It is our goal – we want the people to go out from their houses and fight, so if CEU eTD Collection those parties come close to us and start to make something – it is good. Maybe we will lose some votes, but, as I said, we don’t do this for politics or to have seats [in the Parliament], we do it for our country and if some parties come close to us – we see that we are right and we see that something is changing because we are there with the issues that we press.
105
While the acquisition of the parliamentary party status helped ELAM to expand its support
base, its increasing entanglement with the institutional politics had also cost the movement
some of its old allies. Thus, despite the ideological proximity and ELAM’s best efforts, the
party’s attempts to establish collaboration with EFAEFP – the student movement to which
many ELAM members share ties – proved largely unsuccessful. Aside from one joint march
for the 20th of July memorial organized several years ago with Geadis’ personal mediation, the
EFAEFP (whose leadership has changed after that) refused to cooperate with ELAM, citing its
wish to remain independent from any political party. The final fallout between ELAM and the
Student Union happened in 2010, when, according to Geadis, the EFAEFP prohibited ELAM
members from joining its yearly memorial of the Turkish invasion held on 20th of July at Ledra
Palace in Nicosia ELAM used to attend in previous years. After ELAM’s 2010 march to Ledra
Palace was unexpectedly cut short by the police cordon, presumably acting on instructions from
the EFAEFP 78, the party managed to secure for itself the right to organize the future yearly
memorial at the Ledra Palace, forcing EFAEFP (to whom it has extended an invitation to join,
which was turned down) to relocate their event.
Geadis did not try to hide his frustration over such a divisive state of affairs: “Even though we
are the only party with whom they have the same goals for the national problem, now we are
the worst party for them! Why is it like that? Why they don’t want us!?” He ascribed the
78 In the aftermath of 2010 incident ELAM and EFAEFP has exchanged several public statements with mutual
CEU eTD Collection accusation of misrepresenting the incident. On July 22, 2010 ELAM issued a statement on its web-site, in which it briefly described the incident and accused the EFAEFP (and the president of Kyrenia Refugee Association, who co-participated in the organization of the event) of backing off on its previous agreement of letting ELAM representatives speak at the event, of entering in an “unholy alliance” with the police and trying to divide the anti- federalist block, and of lacking a true interest in the anti-occupational struggle (full text statement can be found at http://ethnikolaikometwpo.blogspot.hu/2010/07/blog-post_755.html (retrieved January 21, 2017). On the next day EFAEFP published a dry response, in which it denied being in prior consultation with ELAM and giving its leaders a permission to speak at the event; the statement made no references to the allegations of asking the police to prevent ELAM members from entering the site of the event and concluded by a reminder that EFAEFP events are open to all Cypriot citizens (full text statement can be found at http://efaefp.net/?p=381(retrieved January 21, 2017)). 106
EFAEFP’s uncooperativeness to the political intrigues of the other parliamentary parties. He
alleged that despite the proclaimed political independence, some of the union leaders have
close connections to the “big” parliamentary parties and that these parties are interested in and
finance the existence of EFAEFP because this organization “takes” some potential members
from ELAM and “makes them deactive with politics.” What is interesting about this statement,
aside from the conspirological insinuation it makes (which I was not able to either confirm or
refute), is the shift in the way the notion of the “politics” is being deployed. While Geadis has
previously described ELAM’s moral superiority over the rest of political parties in terms of the
movement’s close ties to the common people and its outstanding capacity for street
mobilization, ELAM’s advantage over EFAEFP is now being conceived in terms of the
former’s participation in institutional politics and ability to influence it:
It [EFAEFP] was a strong movement many years ago, but now they declined and they have few people. In the beginning, when we made ELAM that movement was bigger than us, now we are bigger than them… Ok, they are just a student movement, they don’t have something planned… It is different with ELAM, we have a plan, and we have a strategy: we want something – we will do that. They just go to the streets and shout slogans, express whatever they are feeling and that’s it – they don’t have a plan.
Such dual valuation of the “political” and self-representation as both an underdog, whose
outsider status gives it a moral superiority over the rest of political forces bogged down in the
“corrupting” power institutions, and as an actor willing to get on the inside and transform the
political institutions from within, is a characteristic of feature of contemporary populist
discourses (Barr 2009). ELAM thus has managed to occupy a unique mediatory position, as
its (recently gained) access to legislative powers endowed it with a political capacity greater CEU eTD Collection
than that of the grassroot nationalist movements, while its rootedness in street mobilizations
and popular support secured it a leverage in the parliament.
107
ELAM has also given the post-1974 culture of memorials and anti-occupational rallies, which
it is actively trying to resurrect, a new – or, perhaps, one should say old – twist. While
continuing to treat the public memorial events as a self-purposeful practice that brings the
community together and secures the transmission of national values to young generations,
ELAM has also been actively trying to recover the protest dimension of the memorials, turning
them into an instrument of leveraging politics at the institutional level. In this sense ELAM
presents a radical break from the post-1974 popular nationalist culture, which radically asserted
its autonomy and separation from institutional politics. Popular Greek Cypriot nationalism of
1980s and 1990s was characterized by a strong anti-establishment ethos and a general dislike
of the Cypriot state and its symbols (Trimikliniotis 2005: 40). Despite actively partaking in the
institutional politics ELAM has still preserved its old discourse of moral separation across the
different domains of politics, expressed through a spatial opposition between “the streets” and
“the cabinets,” as the capacity to mobilize people on the street still remains ELAM’s major
advantage over the rest of political parties. As Geadis put it: “we keep our political, our
parliament seat, but we keep also the seat on the street, the other parties don’t do anything like
this, they cannot take the people to march on the streets and make something strong, make
some activism.”
ELAM thus presents an interesting case for exploring how different historical and political
momentums and cultural and aesthetic dispositions are coming into play in the creation of a
new type of nationalist mobilization. Although the party undoubtedly shares a great number of CEU eTD Collection common features with other nationalist and far-right movements that have been on the rise in
Europe since the 2000s (e.g. Holmes 2000; Ioannou 2014; Mudde 2007, 2016; Wodak,
KhosraviNik, and Mral 2013), ELAM is as much a manifestation of the global right-wing
momentum as it is a product of the historical evolution of the Greek Cypriot nationalist culture
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of public mobilization. Among the factors commonly cited as the driving force behind the
upsurge of ELAM’s success are the protracted economic crisis (2007-2008, 2012-2013), the
growing rate of unemployment among young people, and the increasing number of labor
migrants from Third World counties (Ioannou 2014; Katsourides 2013). However well-
grounded, the economic-centered explanatory models offer little insight into why the popular
mobilizations take on the shape that they do and rarely inquire into the role the shape itself (the
discourses and practices inherent to a mobilization) might play in sustaining a movement’s
appeal. Following Efthymiou (2014: 110), who connects the emergence of ultra-nationalist
groups and movements in Cyprus to the opening of borders and perceived decline of the
fighting spirit among the Greek Cypriots, I maintain that in order to understand the nature of
the present-day Greek Cypriot nationalism, one needs to look beyond the usual suspects and
take seriously the historical imagery and the moral aspirations underpinning it. It seems to me
that the persistence of Greek Cypriot nationalist nostalgia for honor, glory, and the fighting
spirit, is only tangentially conditioned by the economic factor and has a closer affinity with
other processes, like the society’s general frustration with the EU framework of governance,
the changing cultural landscape of the country, and the loss of faith in the government’s and
the international community’s capacity to resolve the issue of the island’s division.
3.4. Concluding Remarks
CEU eTD Collection Isaak and Solomou’s cult, which started as a mobilization framed in humanitarian terms aimed
at eliciting a response from the international community, has soon transformed into a local
heroic cult predominantly oriented towards the domestic audience. This process happened at
the backbone of a general decline of humanitarian mobilizations in Cyprus, with the inter-
ethnic conflict entering the “frozen” stage and the de-facto separation of the island becoming
109
an uncomfortable, but lasting status quo. The ensuing nationalist mobilizations around the
conflict have been going through alternating phases of ritualistic commemorations oriented
towards the sustenance and cultivation of Greek ethnic subjectivity and politicized protests
aimed at influencing the political course of the Greek Cypriot government and its strategies of
resolving the conflict. I suggest that the success (understood here as historical longevity) of the
nationalist mobilization around Isaak and Solomou, as compared to its humanitarian
counterpart, needs to be understood in reference both to the changing political climate and the
growing frustration with the inaction of the international community as well as to the nostalgia
for the post-1974 culture of nationalist protest and memorial events that formed
the political subjectivities of an entire generation of Greek Cypriots.
The cult of Isaak and Solomou presented the Greek Cypriot public with an opportunity to revive
the public culture of hero commemoration by offering to the young people contemporary role
models who, unlike the iconic EOKA fighters, were part of the conflict that remains relevant
to the present day. The nationalistically-minded activists also used the commemoration of the
two fellows as an occasion to open up a public conversation about the place of memory in the
life of present-day Greek Cypriot community as well as to reassert its centrality for the
upbringing of the young generations. The ethos of duty to remember the heroes’ sacrifices and
to honor them through the continuation of the national struggle inherent to the mobilization
framed in heroic terms proved to have a broad appeal to the Greek Cypriot public.
Nationalistically-minded student associations and the right-wing ELAM movement CEU eTD Collection successfully capitalized on this public sentiment, mobilizing the figures of Isaak and Solomou
to promote their militant political visions.
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PART II Transformations: From Social to Spiritual Action
4. A Holy Warrior: Militarization of Orthodoxy and Spiritualization of
Militant Patriotism in Russia
On April 27, 2016, on the eve of the 20th anniversary of Evgenii Rodionov’s death, a
conservative think tank Izborskii Club held a special plenary session entitled “Warrior Evgenii
Rodionov as a Symbol of Heroism and Sainthood in Contemporary Russia.” The meeting
featured the club’s chair Aleksandr Prokhanov, representatives of the Orthodox Church,
cultural intelligentsia, military and business communities, as well as several heads of the
regional administrations. It concluded with a presentation of a petition addressed to Patriarch
Kirill requesting the revision of the decision on Rodionov’s canonization. The petition was
signed by a number of prominent clergymen and political officials, including President Putin’s
advisor Sergei Glaz’ev, State Duma deputy Evgenii Fedorov, president of the Academy of
Geopolitical Problems Leonid Ivashev, and mayors of the cities of Krasnogorsk and
Kuznetsk.79 The context, in which this new public plea for the soldier’s canonization emerged,
differed radically from the social and political climate that animated the original mobilization
around Rodionov’s figure in the late 1990s. In contrast to the first campaign for the soldier’s
canonization that was driven by a socially and ideologically disjointed group of actors largely
perceived by the broader society as politically marginal, now the request was coming from a
consolidated and influential expert community which had succeeded at establishing itself as the CEU eTD Collection
new conservative elite.
79 The full text of the petition can be found at http://katyusha.org/view?id=92 (retrieved June 26, 2019). 111
Established in 2012, the Izborskii Club positions itself as an intellectual community that aspires
to become a prominent actor on the Russia’s “cultural front” and to partake in the development
and shaping of the state’s patriotic politics. The Club’s ideology, which presents a merging of
the traditions of Soviet imperialism and political Orthodoxy, is imbued with the ethos of moral
conservatism, Russian nationalism, and uncompromising anti-liberalism (Laruelle 2016a:
632). 80 From the perspective of the development of post-Soviet Russian nationalism, the
Izborskii Club is a unique phenomenon, as it exemplifies the first successful attempt at an
institutional organization of a large (and ideologically diverse) group of self-identified
nationalist and conservative thinkers with the goal of cooperating with and influencing the
authorities (Laruelle 2016a: 627). The club’s membership comprises an ultraconservative wing
of Vladimir Putin’s supporters, many of whom have close ties to the political establishment
and the military-industrial complex. The club also appears to possess substantial financial
resources that are likely to be coming both from the individual contributions of its members as
well as from the direct support of the government (Laruelle 2016a: 633-634).81
The text of the petition devoted to Rodionov praises Patriarch Kirill for his “patriotic efforts”
of “rejoining the Russian world” and bringing Russia back to its Orthodox roots. It further
suggests that Rodionov’s example and the public conversation about “sainthood and feats of
faith in contemporary times” it opens up can be apposite means for fighting the “anti-Russian
and anti-Orthodox forces that had unleashed a new campaign against … the Russian Orthodox
Church.” The petition concludes by stating that Russia has a dire need in a symbol of a “young CEU eTD Collection holy hero-warrior” and that the feat of Rodionov is “an exemplar of strength of spirit of a
Russian warrior worthy of all-people’s and all-churchly glorification.” Over the course of the
80 For a comprehensive overview of the Club’s ideology and history of its establishment see Laruelle (2016). 81 In 2015 the Club was awarded 10 million rubles presidential grant for the non-profit organizations to develop the ideology of the Russian World (Russkii Mir). 112
past decade, due to the changing socio-political context and the waning relevance of the issue
of inter-ethnic conflict in Chechnya, Rodionov’s cult has thus lost much of its protest
dimension. In this chapter I trace the historical evolution of Rodionov’s representations from a
subversive image asserting the moral superiority of a common Russian person over the corrupt
political and ecclesiastical elites to a public symbol of the conservative statist ideology,
asserting the ideal of unity of Orthodoxy, patriotism, and the Russian nation in the late 2010s.
I argue that the changes in the soldier’s cult reflect the broader transformations of Russian
nationalism over the past two decades that was marked by the gradual decline of anti-systemic
movements and their absorption by the state-promoted model of patriotism. The growing
convergence between Orthodox and military aesthetics and values created a memory-centered
conservative public culture that became a new platform for the popularization of Rodionov’s
cult.
The events of the so-called Russian Spring marked by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and
the Russian intervention into the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine prompted many previously
oppositional conservative and nationalist intellectuals to reassess their attitudes towards Putin’s
regime and move under the government’s banner. The political trajectory of Aleksandr
Prokhanov and his newspaper Zavtra, which played a crucial role in promoting Rodionov’s
cult in the late 1990s, present a paradigmatic example of such an ideological journey from the
base of a staunch opposition to the regime to a more loyalist position. Marlene Laruelle (2016a:
629) defines the position of such newly converted regime supporters as “systemic opposition,” CEU eTD Collection as their support for Putin’s politics does not entail a full acceptance of the ideology of the
presidential party United Russia or the official governmental line, which they perceive as too
liberal, weak, and centrist.
113
In an interview published in Zavtra on December 24, 2015 and devoted to the 25th anniversary
of the newspaper, Prokhanov admitted that Zavtra’s gradual ideological drift towards a more
systemic position started in the early 2000s, when, in his opinion, Russia was able to squeeze
liberalism out of itself: “I came to understand that we [the conservatives] are the majority
[now], we are the state and the liberals – the opposition. We are carrying the genesis of the
state. We are the bearers of the idea of statehood.”82 It was at that moment that Prokhanov
decided to change Zavtra’s subtitle from “the newspaper of spiritual opposition” to “the
newspaper of the Russian state.” Despite this symbolic change of identification, Prokhanov
admitted, the newspaper remained oppositional for many years to come (ibid.). The newspaper’
attitude towards Putin oscillated from enthusiastic support of his rhetoric on order and security
during the Second Chechen Campaign to bitter disappointment with the regime in the post-war
period, when Putin failed to organize radical reforms and oust the “liberals” and “oligarchs”
from power. The watershed moment happened in 2014, with the unfolding of the Ukrainian
crisis, when, as Prokhanov put it, “the new Putin started to emerge” (Zavtra, Dec 24, 2015) –
the one the newspaper came to eventually embrace as the “bearer of the new Russian idea of
statehood.”
The “new” Putin and his politics of aggressive reassertion of Russia on the geopolitical arena
won over the hearts of many nationalists both across the left and the right spectrum, who now
came to be unified under the imperialist agenda (Laruelle 2015b, 2016b). While the events of
2014 can be construed as a tipping point that marked the collapse of protest nationalism in CEU eTD Collection Russia, this transformation did not happen overnight. Rather, it was brought forth by the
structure of state-supported nationalist politics that the Putin government has been carefully
82 Prokhanov, Aleksandr. 2015. “My Zhili v Unison s Epokhoi.” Zavtra, December 24. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (http://zavtra.ru/blogs/25-let-zavtra). 114
crafting starting from the early 2000s. Putin’s ascent to power marked a proliferation of
patriotic discourses on the official level, with the tropes of love for one’s homeland, self-
sacrifice, and pride in Russia’s historical feats forming the backbone of United Russia ideology.
In contrast to the 1990s and the early 2000s, when nationalistic discourses were largely
confined to the oppositional (and often politically and socially marginalized) groups, starting
from the second half of the 2000s the rhetoric of patriotism gradually became a dominant trend,
penetrating nearly every sphere of social life, most notably educational and cultural politics.
Laruelle (2009: 194) describes this process of state appropriation of nationalistic discourses as
the politics of “managed nationalism.” The goals such politics pursues are twofold: on the one
hand, the state mobilizes popular support for the ruling party United Russia by effectively
incorporating and synthesizing the political imagery of various nationalistic trends (Soviet
nostalgia, romanticized visions of imperial Russia, Orthodoxy, anti-globalism and anti-
Westernism); on the other, by monopolizing nationalist discourses, it effectively suppresses the
uncontrolled popular nationalist mobilizations that are often oppositional and anti-systemic in
flavor (Laruelle 2009). 83 Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, the state program of
nationalism, which was fundamentally moderate compared to its counterparts offered by the
oppositional movements, developed largely in parallel with the popular streams of nationalism.
However, as the Kremlin’s nationalistic rhetoric and politics became more aggressive and
assertive in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, systemic nationalism became the new mainstream,
shrinking the protest nationalist scene and uniting the major conservative thinkers under the
state banner. CEU eTD Collection
83 One common feature of the contemporary Russian popular nationalist movements is their extra-parliamentary (Laruelle 2009: 49) character: they display little interest in getting involved in a democratic system of representation and tend to privilege street action over other forms of political engagement. 115
Andrei Fefelov – Zavtra publicist whom I interviewed about the newspaper’s involvement in
the promotion of Rodionov’s cult in May 2016 – construed the political changes that have been
happening in Russia starting from the early 2000s as a process of gradual overcoming of the
schism between what he labeled “the state” and “the country” (i.e. the people), which emerged
during Yeltsin’s administration. Rodionov’s glorification, he said, sprung from “the country”
and his recognition by the state in the late 1990s would have been not just unthinkable, but
degrading: “It would have been wrong, even somehow ugly, if let’s say it was Yeltsin who had
declared Evgenii a hero.” Andrei believes that Rodionov’s eventual formal recognition by the
state and the Church is imminent and will happen in the nearest future.
The increasing public visibility of the representatives of the conservative-nationalist circles,
within which the soldier’s cult emerged, and the normalization of their rhetoric on state,
military, and religion have certainly contributed to the popularization of Rodionov’s cult. From
a phenomenon that throughout the late 1990s and the early 2000s was largely confined to
heavily ideologized and politicized social circles, Rodionov’s veneration has expanded over
the past decade to the conservative social groups, who are more oriented towards cultural
production and education rather than political activism per se. Patriotically-minded high school
teachers, sport section coaches, musicians, and artists, had found Rodionov’s story to be an
indispensable pedagogical tool for promoting patriotic values in the broader Russian society.
The increase of the patriotic rhetoric in the public discourse, combined with a concerted action CEU eTD Collection on behalf of the government to modernize the army and improve the professional level of
servicemen84, resulted in a growth of support for the army and a more positive image of the
84 Over the period between 2003 and 2013 Russia’s military spending had doubled, the military budget shares in 2014 and 2015 constituting 3.8 and 3.5 % of GDP respectively (Oxenstierna 2016: 2). 116
military among the Russian public, producing a spike of interest in the military careers among
young people (Robertshaw 2014: 307). 85 This politics resulted in the proliferation of
patriotically-oriented cultural events, including concerts, historical reconstructions, World War
II and (to a lesser extent) Afghan and Chechen wars memorials, and led to a mushrooming of
civic military-patriotic associations and youth clubs. The state-promoted patriotic culture,
which builds around the themes of patriotism, militarism, religion, and conservative morality
thus helped to create a new platform for the development of the soldier’s cult: patriotically and
religiously oriented young men searching for contemporary exemplars of heroism and virtue.
To this young generation of Rodionov’s venerators, the soldier represents a militant and a
masculine model of religiosity that they try to emulate through cultivating in themselves the
qualities they ascribe to Rodionov – bravery, courage, and spiritual strength.
4.1. A Military Saint
From its very inception Rodionov’s cult has been densely embedded into the network of
Orthodox priests and believers directly or tangentially related to military circles. Most of the
Orthodox clergymen promoting the soldier’s veneration that I have encountered in the course
of my research are either currently involved in the work with the army and military units or
used to hold a military profession in the past. From 1994 onwards, the Orthodox Church has
been actively involved in establishing formal cooperation with the army. The image of a
CEU eTD Collection warrior as a righteous defender of the motherland and Christian values and the ideal of an
ultimate self-sacrifice in the name of one’s nation feature prominently in the Social Conception
85 Citing the Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu University World News reported on July 17, 2015 that the number of applicants to higher education institutions of the Russian Ministry of Defense had doubled compared to 2014 – a dynamic that can be attributed to the governments’ efforts at raising the prestige of its Military Academies (Vorotnikov 2015). 117
of the Church, which establishes a direct connection between the Christian notion of self-
sacrifice and the military men’s sacrificial service (sluzheniie) (Richters 2012: 59). In 1995 the
Church’s special Department of Relations with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement
Agencies (DRAFLEA) was established. It was meant to proselytize and attend to the spiritual
needs of the servicemen and their families, as well as to promote the positive image of the
military in the broader Russian society.86
As the image of Rodionov – a dutiful soldier and a faithful believer – made for a good
illustration of the values DRAFLEA is trying to promote, it has always been supportive of the
idea of the soldier’s canonization. In fact, it was with the mediation of Archbishop Savva
(Volkov) of Krasnogorsk, who headed the department between 1995 and 2001, that the
investigation of the Synodal Commission for Canonization into the soldier’s case was opened.
The Archbishop’s successor, Father Dmitrii (Smirnov), who headed the Department between
2001 and 2013, is also an outspoken supporter of Rodionov’s canonization. Father Dmitrii,
who is known for his radical conservative and nationalist position, support for the ideals of
pan-Slavinism, and public attacks against atheism and secular liberal values, maintains an
active work for disseminating his ideas to the public and educating the young generations. In
addition to frequent appearances on Russian TV channels and participation in debates and talk
shows on a wide range of topics, Fr. Dmitrii host his own Orthodox TV and radio talk shows87
and maintains an Internet blog, where he shares video recordings of his sermons. He has been
actively using his media popularity for promoting Rodionov’s story, making a series of CEU eTD Collection sermons about the soldier and interviews with Liubov’ Rodionova. Despite the Church’s
refusal to canonize Rodionov, Fr. Dimitrii continues to call for the popular veneration of the
86 For a brief review of the history of institutionalization of Orthodox chaplaincies within the Russian Military Forces see Richters (2012). 87 “Besedy s Batiushkoi” (TV channel “Soiuz”), “Dialog pod chasami” (TV Channel “Spas”), “Blagoveschenie” (radio “Radonezh”). 118
soldier, claiming that an eventual formal recognition of his sainthood is inevitable.88 During
his program on Radonezh on November 20, 2016 – the day when Rodionov’s name day is
celebrated – Fr. Dmitrii, reflecting upon the significance of the soldier’s fame in Russia and
the larger Orthodox world, stated that Rodionov “showed to the entire world how Orthodox
Christians should die.”89
The increasing convergence between Orthodox and military cultures, which has been on the
rise after the collapse of the Soviet state, has produced a renewed public interest in the ideals
of martyrdom and radical self-sacrifice in Russia. The proliferation of public discourses on
sacrifice, heroism, and spiritual strength helped sustain the relevance of the soldier’s cult long
after the public interest in the Chechen campaign had withered. From a contested symbol of
the Chechen war, Rodionov’s image thus transformed into a more general exemplar of a Russia
military virtue that rests on the ideals of patriotism and faith.
Over the years Liubov’ Rodionova has developed close friendships both among the military
and the clerical circles. To the extent that her health and her tight schedule allow her, Liubov’
regularly attends secular and religious commemorative events held for her son across Russia.
On May 28, 2016, shortly after the celebration of the 20th anniversary of Rodionov’s death, I
accompanied her to the celebration of the border guards’ professional holiday in a small village
near Moscow called Snegiri, where Liubov’ was invited to give a short speech during the
official part of the ceremony. The event was organized by the Russian Federal Security CEU eTD Collection
88 In a video sermon he published on his blog on May 23, 2011, the fifteenth anniversary of Rodionov’s death, he called upon the people to continue to mention Rodionov in their prayers and glorify the soldier’s name. 89 2016. “Protoierei Dmitrii Smirnov: Voin Evgenii Rodionov Vsemu Miru Pokazal, Kak Dolzhny Umirat’ Pravoslavnye Khristiane.” Russkaia Liniia, December 26. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (https://rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=76614).
119
Service90 and featured a number of prominent speakers. The ceremony was held on the territory
of the World War II open air memorial complex adjacent to the Lenino-Snegiri Military
Historical Museum, dedicated to the feat of the Russian 16th army, which participated in the
containment of the German offensive during the 1941-1942 battle of Moscow. Across the small
islands of young pine-tree plantings, scattered around the tanks, armored vehicles, and
monumental sculpture exhibited at the memorial complex, the event organizers put up make-
shift memorials for the representatives of the Special Forces. They attached a memorial band
to every tree and placed a sign featuring the name, rank, and dates of birth and death of the
servicemen, who fell in line of duty.
Liubov’ first came to the memorial complex in 2009, when her son’s name was added to the
list of decorated heroes (mostly representatives of elite Special Forces units) honored at the
event; she has been attending the memorial event every year since then. In 2015, a local border
guard’s union sponsored an installment of a memorial stone for Rodionov at the memorial
complex with an engraving reading “Holy martyr Evgenii, pray to God for us.” When I got to
the memorial complex I found Liubov’ standing next to a recently planted thuja tree with
Rodionov’s name on it. The memorial event attracted a large group of attendees: friends,
relatives, and colleagues of the fallen servicemen, military veterans as well as the official
representatives of the border guard forces and the military establishment. Liubov’ seemed to
feel at home with the crowd. Our slow walk through the memorial park was continuously
interrupted by people wishing to greet Liubov’, some of them old friends, others more distant CEU eTD Collection acquaintances she herself could not immediately recognize. “Good to see you, Liubov’
Vasil’evna,” a jolly middle-aged man cheerfully hailed her from a distance. “Don’t you
90 Starting from 2003 the Border Force of Russia has been working under the auspices of the Russian Federal Security Service. 120
remember me?” he added noticing a puzzled look on her face, “We once shared a ride in an
armored troop-carrier in 1996!”
The official ceremony started with a memorial service for the dead delivered by an Orthodox
priest. After the service the representatives of different Special Forces units and patriotic
charitable funds delivered speeches to commemorate the fallen servicemen. Many of the
speeches drew on the historical imagery and frequently alluded to past Russian military feats
as they tried to assert the centrality of the ideals of servitude and sacrifice to the Russian ethos.
The event coincided with Vladimir Putin’s visit to Mount Athos that was meant to mark the
1,000th anniversary of the presence of the Russian Orthodox monks in Greece. The visit
received wide coverage in the Russian media, many conservative and patriotic outlets casting
it as a landmark event signaling the restoration of the Russian leadership in the Orthodox world.
This visit, alongside with Russia’s other recent “feats” on the global arena, including the
military intervention in Syria and Eastern Ukraine, were frequently mentioned by the speakers
as modern examples of Russia’s successes. In contrast to the lengthy performances of the other
speakers, Liubov’’s speech was short and succinct. She expressed her appreciation of the idea
of the Regiment of the Immortals – the massive procession in memory of those who had died
during the World War II that was first held in 2012 in Tomsk and quickly turned into a new
popular tradition in many cities across Russia (Gabowitsch 2018) – and expressed hope that
one day the fallen soldiers of the Special Forces will be given a similar honor and that their
relatives will be able to march with their portraits in their own regiment. CEU eTD Collection
The pathos and the rhetoric of the event were representative of the contemporary Russian
patriotic discourse, in which the nationalist ideas of Russian greatness are mixed with a
messianic image of Russia as a bastion of Orthodox faith and morality. The image of Rodionov,
121
a warrior – both in a literal and in a spiritual sense – has proved to be a good fit for the new
Russian model of patriotism, which is oriented both towards the conservative morality and
Orthodox spirituality and to a militarized model of masculinity. During the memorial event in
Snegiri Liubov’ was closely followed by a filming crew, shooting yet another documentary
about Rodionov on FSB’s request. When exchanging her impressions from the
commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the soldier’s death in Satino-Russkoe with Roman,
the film director, Liubov’’s pointed out the importance the balance and harmony between the
spiritual (dukhovnoe) and the military elements at the memorial event have to her, adding that
it upsets her when either side appears to prevail or dominate. “This is precisely what we are
trying to convey in the film,” Roman said enthusiastically. He went on to explain that the idea
that Rodionov was not just a soldier, but a warrior of spirit will be a central leitmotif of his
work.91
The brief encounters I had with the military men present at the event appeared to attest to the
prominence of the interest the latter have in religious affairs. A colonel of the “A” Center (an
FSB special forces counter-terrorism unit), whom Liubov’ introduced to me as her “good
friend,” greeted us by using the religious formula “Christ has risen!” Before I had a chance to
respond or introduce myself, the cheerful grey-haired man put a splash of myrrh on my
forehead in a business-like manner and handed to Liubov’ and myself several pocket-size
laminated icons he had brought from his recent visit to Mount Athos. “Do you know that the
president and the patriarch are in Athos today?” – he asked addressing Liubov’. “Can you CEU eTD Collection imagine what will happen if someone gives him Zhenia’s icon there?” she replied with laughter.
“I think that would be very good” – answered the colonel with a serious face, apparently failing
to detect the notes of sarcasm in Liubov’’s voice. It was not the first time I heard Liubov’ bring
91 The documentary “My Son Private Rodionov” (Moi Syn Riadovoi Rodionov) was released in 2017. 122
Figure 4.1. Sergei Poliakov, the vice-president of the International Association of “Al’pha” veterans and Liubov’ Rodionova at the memorial event for the members of the Russian Special Forces units in Snegiri. May 28, 2016. Source: http://www.specnaz.ru/articles/236/13/2434.htm
up the issue with the events’ guests in the context of talking about the president’s much
discussed visit to Athos. Given the lack of formal recognition of Rodionov’s saintly status in
Russia, the image of the president receiving her son’s icon from a Greek monk seemed comic
to her. In contrast to those who enthusiastically welcome the emerging new political culture
marked by the heightened presence of religious and patriotic discourses on the level of
governmental officials, Liubov’ remains skeptical of the bureaucrats’ sincerity and dismissive
of the culture of shallow patriotism their discourses breed. To a remark from a decorated
Chechen war veteran, who praised the president and the patriarch for restoring the Russian CEU eTD Collection tradition of faith and turning the people to a more “conscious” religious practice, Liubov’
replied by citing a satirical passage from a contemporary Russian poet Nikolai Zinoviev, who
observed that in contrast to the Soviet people, who believed in God, albeit secretly, the
contemporary Russians secretly disbelief.
123
The geopolitical developments of recent years, including the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and
the Russian military intervention in Syria has contributed significantly to the resurgence of
interest towards the figure of Rodionov, particularly in the military and para-military circles.
Thus, Liubov’ told me that she had been lately contacted by many of Rodionov’s venerators
who wished to stop by her place to venerate the cross the soldier was wearing when he was
executed.92 Some current servicemen even asked for Liubov’’s permission to take the cross as
a protective talisman on their assignment journeys to the conflict zones. Between 2014 and
2016, with Liubov’’s permission, her son’s cross was taken by the different units of the
Ministry of Emergency Situations on their humanitarian trips to Crimea, Donbass, and Syria.
The Russian intervention in these geopolitical conflicts thus has created the new conditions for
the mobility of Rodionov’s cult through Orthodox networks, as combat volunteers traveling to
the contested places have adopted the figure of this holy warrior as their patron saint. For
instance, the members of the patriotic border-guard union Rubezh, who sponsored the
installment of a memorial stone for Rodionov at the memorial complex in Snegiri, also made
efforts to spread the word about the new saint in Eastern Ukraine. Rubezh was established by
a former border guard Vladimir Ivochkin and a small group of his veteran friends in 2013. The
Union’s main goal is to offer the veterans of the border guard forces an opportunity to continue
serving their country through socially useful and patriotically-directed activities. Since the
beginning of the violent conflict there in 2014 the veteran organization has been actively
involved in collection and delivery of humanitarian aid to the disputed regions of Donetsk and CEU eTD Collection Luhansk. Many of Rubezh’s members believe that prayers to Rodionov in the moments of
92 Liubov’ recovered the cross in 2016 from St. Nicholas Church in Moscow’s, run by Aleksandr Shargunov, where she had donated it shortly after bringing Evgenii’s body back to Russia. As she explained in an interview to an Orthodox media outlet Pravoslavie (May 23, 2016), the church had too many restrictive rules, which limited people’s access to the relic (it was made accessible to the public only on Sundays and for a limited number of hours) (Filatov 2016). In a private conversation Liubov’ later admitted to me that her decision to retrieve the cross was also connected to the unease she still feels about the religious veneration of her son. 124
danger have protected them in course of their perilous journeys to the frontline. As the union’s
leader Vladimir, whom I met him on Rodionov’s memory day in Satino-Russkoe in 2016,
explained to me, the creation of the monument in Snegiri was motivated both by the desire to
immortalize and publicly commemorate the soldier’s heroic act and to express the union
members’ personal gratitude to Rodionov, whom they consider their patron saint. During each
trip93 to the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk the veterans took with them large packs of printed
laminated icons of Rodionov in different sizes and formats, which they offered as gifts to the
border guards at the Russian and Ukrainian checkpoints, to the Orthodox parishes and local
residents, as well as to the soldiers and volunteers they encounter in the combat zone.
According to the Rubezh members, Rodionov is well known and revered among the Orthodox
believers in Eastern Ukraine, who immediately recognize him from the icons and willingly
accept these holy gifts. “At the frontline, where every minute a mine or a shell can hit you, the
guys take Evgenii’s small icons and put them inside their bullet proof vests and just go around
like that with them,” Vladimir explained. A friend of Vladimir’s who was present during our
conversation, himself a Chechen war veteran, added that he believes in the soldier’s sainthood
and prays to Rodionov daily, always using one and the same formula: “warrior martyr Evgenii
save and protect our country and the Russian people, help the people of South-Eastern Ukraine,
Novorossiya and Russia.”
The discourse and practices of Rubezh members are representative of the ethos of patriotism
and conservative morality that has been on the rise in Russia during the past decade. In addition CEU eTD Collection to the collection and delivery of humanitarian aid to the east of Ukraine, the Union is engaged
in social work with orphanages in Moscow oblast’, the organization of World War II memorial
93Between 2014 and 2016 the group has completed nine successful visits to the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 125
events, and military-patriotic education of school children. The union members visit high
schools to lecture about military life and teach students some practical skills (handling fire
weapons, etc.) and organize outdoor patriotic events, like the military game Zarnitsa.94 Much
of the Union’s activities are aimed at overcoming the perceived crisis of the military culture in
post-Soviet Russia and changing people’s negative stereotypes about servicemen. Thus, the
Union members make a point of spending their professional holiday – infamous for the frequent
incidents of hooliganism and indecent public behavior by the celebrating servicemen – with
dignity, by doing socially useful deeds. As Vladimir stated, expressing his frustration with the
level of culture among the military, “Many spend the holiday [border guards’ day] binge
drinking, and the celebration ends even before lunchtime. And the journalists rush to the city
parks to take pictures of the drunken guys bathing in the fountains. One gets an impression that
this is all what the holiday is about, that this is how all the border guards are” (Kolomiets 2014).
Dissatisfied with the drunken acts of debauchery they had witnessed during the public
celebrations in the Moscow’s parks, the Union members decided to start organizing their own
event at the Lenino-Snegirevski memorial complex, inviting other interested veterans to join
them. Their alternative event, which consists of commemorative speeches, laying flowers at
the memorials for the Soviet soldiers and visiting the orphanage in the nearby city of Dedovsk,
proved popular.95 The local newspaper Istrinkie VSeti (June 4, 2015) reported that the number
of the participants of the event in Snegiri was growing every year and included not only the
veterans from the Moscow oblast’ but also visitors from Astrakhan’, Naberezhnye Chelny,
Briansk, Vladimir, and Saint-Petersburg.96 CEU eTD Collection
94 A team-based war game that became prominent in the 1970s and practiced widely in high schools and summer Pioneer camps across the Soviet Union (Sperling 2009:229). 95 The event is separate from the official memorial ceremony organized by the FSB, which is largely limited to honoring the fallen heroes of the elite special forces units. 96 Aleksandrova, Irina. 2015. “Veterany Vstretilis’ u Pogranichnogo Stolba.” Istrinskie VSeti, June 3. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (https://istravest.ru/articles/4350/). 126
4.2. Parading the Dead
As Katherine Verdery (1999) has shown in her seminal study on the political life of dead
bodies, the movement of bodies and other proxies indexing specific historical figures (statues,
portraits, icons) was central to the process of reordering social and political cosmologies after
the collapse of socialism. In addition to reburials, demolition of old statues, and erection of
new ones, the post-Soviet period in Russia was marked by the revival of the Orthodox tradition
of cross processions with icons and banners, as well as movement of relics across the country
to give believers in different cities a chance to venerate specific saints. At the same time, the
images of the dead heroes are being actively mobilized in secular commemorative events to
forge a new community of memory. In 2012, during the Victory Day celebration a group of
activists in Tomsk marched in a column with the portraits of their relatives who participated in
the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Dubbed “Immortal Regiment” (bessmertnyi polk) the
event proved massively popular nationwide, the number of cities organizing their own
regiments growing every year. According to the organizers’ estimates in 2013 Immortal
Regiment marched already across 120 Russian cities, while by 2018 the number of participants
across Russia reached 10,4 million people (Bessmertnyi Polk, n.d.). 97 The critical public
debates around the event triggered among other things by the state’s appropriation of the
project despite the grassroots activists’ resistance (Fedor 2017; Gabowitsch 2018) did little to
curb the public enthusiasm for the procession. Over the past seven years the Regiment became
an integral part of Victory Day celebration in Russia as well as across the post-Soviet space CEU eTD Collection and other countries that are home to the Russian-speaking diasporas.
97 July 6, 2019 (https://bessmertnyy-polk.ru/statistika/). 127
Julia Fedor (2017) analyzes the Immortal Regiment through the prism of “vitality,”
emphasizing the event’s capacity to revitalize the WWII commemoration in Russia by asserting
the participants’ personal connection to history through their kin and personifying the memory
of the war via portraits of the veterans, fusing together the elements of celebration and
mourning. Over the past few years, commemoration of the Great Patriotic War (and not only)
became heavily moralized, as the liberal commentators’ concern over the growing presence of
militarized rhetoric and practices at the memorial events were interpreted by the conservative
constituencies as an attack on the “sacred” holiday and memory itself. In this context, the public
acts of commemoration function not just to cement a specific vision and evaluation of history,
but also to signal the moral position of the commemorators and their commitment to
remembrance. As Fedor (2017: 332) points out, through displaying a public commitment to the
memory of the war and to its transmission (via noticeable presents of young children, often
dressed in military uniform at the parade) the event serves to assert the vitality of the Russian
nation that is contrasted to the “degeneracy” of the West, where the memory of the WWII and
the Soviet Union’s role in it is allegedly being actively erased. Similarly, in the case of
Rodionov’s commemoration and the public display of his icons or portraits, the soldier’s
venerators try not so much to promote a specific narrative about the Chechen war (as was often
the case in the late 1990s), but to rally around a specific set of values they ascribe to Rodionov
– most often a connection between military identity and Christian virtue.
In 2015 The Night Wolves Motorcycle Club (NWMC) that is actively involved in the CEU eTD Collection organization of patriotic events mobilized Rodionov’s figure for the promotion of its
conservative agenda. The club initially emerged as a counterculture and anti-establishment
group in the late 1980s, rallying around the ideals of freedom and democracy (Zabyelina 2019).
However, since the 2000s the club has been increasingly expressing its ideological
128
identification with the political position of the ruling United Russia party and its vision of
nationalism as well as with Orthodoxy and traditional values.98 The organization receives a
generous financial support from the government in the form of grants for different social
projects. The Night Wolves have about 70 branches in different Russian cities as well as several
chapters abroad; in addition to organizing regular bike shows and festivals, the club is actively
involved in the patriotic education of the youth as well as organization of public
commemorative events and processions.
Liubov’ Rodionova has a close relationship with the Club’s leader Aleksandr Zaldostanov and
the bikers often accompany her on her trips to Chechnya and to different events devoted to her
son’s memory. Liubov’ in turn often takes part in the patriotic events organized by the Club,
like for instance the opening of a memorial to the border guards on Volokolamskoe highway
in 2015 (Nochnye Volki December 19, 2015).99 As Rodionova put it in an interview that
featured on the Night Wolves’ website (October 16, 2015),
I never miss a single bike-show. Aleksandr [Zaldostanov] always invites me to these wonderful celebrations. Together with the Night Wolves we collect money and buy wheel-chairs for the guys who need it. We have many common projects. I am always under the protection of the Night Wolves.100
In 2015 the Night Wolves organized a motor pilgrimage “Volga – Russian Path,” devoted to
the 70th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War. Between May 23 to May 30 the bikers visited
monasteries and churches in Saratov, Alekseevka, Kuznetsk, Penza, Sanaksara, Diveevo,
Murom, Kideksha, Suzdal’, Kostroma, Rostov, Pereslavl’, Sergiev Posad, and Moscow. The
bikers took with them the icons of Aleksandr Peresvet and Rodion Osliablia, the monks who CEU eTD Collection
participated in the 1380 Battle of Kulikov, as well as those of the 18th century admiral Fyodor
98 In December 2014 the US and Canadian governments introduced sanctions against the club from its active supports of pro-Russian forces during the conflict in Ukraine (Zabyelina 2019). 99 Retrieved June 27, 2019 (https://nightwolves.ru/bc/news/2374/). 100 Retrieved June 27, 2019 (https://nightwolves-ru.livejournal.com/158237.html). 129
Figure 4.2. Members of the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club at the event “Put’ Voina” devoted to Rodionov in Penza. May 24, 2015. Source: http://pravoslavie58region.ru/index.php?loc=evgeniy-rodionov-obzor-24-31-05-2015.htm
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 4.3. Liubov’ Rodionova with the members of the Night Wolves Groznyi branch in Bamut, next to the site of Rodionov’s original burial. September 2015. Source: https://nightwolves-ru.livejournal.com/tag/Евгений%20Родионов
130
Ushakov and Evgenii Rodionov to present as gifts to the monks and nuns of the monasteries they visited. One of the central goals of the bikers’ pilgrimage was the promotion of the ideal of Russian army (russkoe voinstvo). The Night Wolves’ website describes the latter concept in the following way: Russian voinstvo is in all times the men, for whom physical strength is as important as the spiritual one. Spiritual strength is the foundation of Orthodox theology that transpired the lives of the entire nation [narod] – from princes to serfs – and that shaped worldview and social life … . Service to the Fatherland was understood not as a service to the ruling top, political party, but as a service to high ideas, the bearer of which were the Russian people united in the earthly church.
Placed next to the figures of other military saints, Rodionov’s figure was thus mobilized during
the Night Wolves’ pilgrimage, not to commemorate the Chechen war per se, but to offer the
public a contemporary exemplar of a holy warrior and this way assert the continuity of the
tradition of the Russian voinstvo.
When planning their route, the bikers deliberately chose to stop by the village of Chibirley,
where Rodionov was born, and the city of Kuznetsk, where he attended middle school.
Spreading the word about the soldier was an important part of the pilgrimage. Aside from
visiting monasteries in the several cities they passed through in the course of their pilgrimage
the bikers also organized meetings with local youth, telling them about their organization and
about Rodionov’s feat.101 In Penza, the bikers organized an event at the local ethnographic
museum entitled “The Warrior’s Path,” which featured the narratives of Peresvet and Osliablia,
Ushakov, and Rodionov’s lives as well as a screening of a documentary about Rodionov. The
Night Wolves’ blog post102 describing the pilgrimage emphasizes the pedagogical potential of
CEU eTD Collection Rodionov’s story:
The story of Evgenii Rodionov and his feat should be one of the central themes in the upbringing of the young generations. The most important thing to say about warrior Evgenii is that he participated in the suffering for Christ.
101 Such events were organized in Saratov boarding school at Ioanovskii Monastery in Saratov, at the Kuznetsk school #4 that was named after Rodionov, and at the youth center Patriot in Kostroma (Russkaia Doroga, n.d.). 102 Russkaia Doroga, n.d. Retrieved June 27, 2019 (http://rusdoroga.su/volga/). 131
They killed him because he was a Christian. … The significance of his martyrical feat is that it shows that there still is Christian dignity and human dignity in the world where …there is a public screening of a blasphemous movies, public desecration of icons in the Moscow city center, and degrading of a man in the form of omnipresent [moral] corruption of children and young people.
By referencing the perceived recent attacks on Orthodoxy – the screening of the movie Matilda
telling the story of the affair between young Nikolas II and ballerina Matilda Kseshinskaia103
and Pussy Riot’s infamous performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in 2012, the author
tries to demonstrate the significance of the moral model personified by Rodionov to
contemporary Russia. This model that emphasizes a defiant commitment to spirituality, faith,
and traditional values is represented as crucial for the Russian national survival, as the above-
mentioned “attacks” are portrayed in the Night Wolves’ discourse as part of informational war
waged against Russia by its enemies.
In this context, the bikers represent their public events as a tool for counteracting foreign cultural influence: Such pilgrimages and their coverage in mass media serve as a weapon against informational-propagandist war that is being waged against Russia by its enemies with the goal of destroying spiritual paradigms and realizing the ideas of materialist, consumerist culture. The spiritual foundation we are searching for to resurrect our motherland lies in sainthood. It is a source of spiritual revival of the country.
Just like in the case with the Immortal Regiment, The Night Wolves’ public display of icons
and images thus serves to assert the vitality of the Russian nation through asserting its
commitment to memory and respect for the feats of the ancestors and the values ascribed to
them. CEU eTD Collection
Another actor, who has contributed to the dissemination of information about Rodionov both
103 The announcement of the film caused a wave of protest from Orthodox audiences who venerate Nikolas II as a saint and who denounced the movie as blasphemous (Rokita 2018). 132
in Russia and outside its borders is Roman Iliushkin – the icon painter, who created the first
icon of the soldier and whose humanitarian activism was discussed in Chapter 2. In 2014, with
the approval from the Synodal Commission, Roman took the original of the soldier’s icon on
a tour around Crimea and Sevastopol, organized for a Serbian football team. Just like many
other activities aimed at the cultural exchange with Serbia that Roman is involved in, the tour
was sponsored by the charitable fund “12,”104 established by the famous Russian film director
Nikita Mikhalkov. Not without pride, Roman noted that Mikhalkov himself, took a special
interest in his icon of Rodionov and even venerated it on one occasion. Although Roman does
not have much interest in football, he explained to me that he appreciates the cultural potential
of this sport and pointed out that international football meetings can be a good platform for
educating the youth about history and forging ties between nations. Since 2012 Roman, in
cooperation with the fund “The Union of Serbian and Russian People,” has been actively
involved in the organization of friendly matches between Serbian and Russian youth football
teams in the city of Sergiev Posad in Moscow Oblast’. The matches are devoted to the memory
of Dmitrii Popovich – a seventeen-years-old Serbian medical student, who was gunned down
in 2004 on the streets of Grachanitsa, a Serbian enclave in Kosovo, by an Albanian extremist.
Much like Rodionov in Russia, Popovich’s figure is well-known in the Serbian football scene,
as the young man’s family sponsors an organization of yearly football tournaments in his
memory. Roman said that he often commemorates Rodionov and Popovich together in his
prayers and when the occasion to organize a tour for the Serbian delegation around Crimea and
Sevastopol came up he thought it would be fitting to take Rodionov’s icon along. CEU eTD Collection
104 The fund is named after Mikhalkov’s 2007 movie “12” – a Russian remake of the Sidney Lumet’s iconic “Twelve Angry Men” (1957). In addition to providing social support to the vulnerable categories of the population the fund sponsors events and initiatives aimed at “cultural and moral development of the society.” 133
Figure 4.4. Roman Iliushkin with Evgenii Rodionov’s icon at the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius after the completion of his Crimea and Sevastopol’ tour together with the Serbian football team. September 2014. Source: https://сергиев-посад.рф/роман-илюшкин-выставка-в-посольстве/
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 4.5. Roman Iliushkin with the Serbian volunteers at the “We Want Peace!” exhibition. Donetsk, 2015. Source: http://danilovskie-vesti.ru/news/media/2018/4/12/na-vojnu-s-ikonoj/
134
In 2015, again with the support of Mikhalkov’s fund, Roman organized a tour around the
People’s Republic of Donetsk105 with a photo-exhibition “We Want Peace!” that featured
photographs from different years documenting the destruction caused by the military conflicts
in Serbia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Syria, and Iraq. A central item of the exhibition was
Roman’s icon of Rodionov, which was displayed in the middle of the exhibition hall on an
improvised altar. Roman told me that he was touched to see the exhibition visitors’ crying and
making a sign of cross in front of the icon. During his stay in Eastern Ukraine, he also made a
tour around the churches of Donetsk and nearby villages, always taking the icon with him and
offering it to the local parish members for veneration. Roman says he was struck to see how
many people in Eastern Ukraine recognized Rodionov and claims that he saw entire families,
including small children, coming to the churches specifically to venerate the soldier’s icon. He
is convinced that in the course of its journeys the icon had consoled and inspired many people:
Young guys upon seeing [Evgenii’s] image realized that even if they die, their death would most probably contribute to the same cause as Zhenia’s [death] did. They are also wearing crosses over there; they are Orthodox. They felt some kind of reassurance that with the arms in their hands they are protecting the motherland, the same way Zhenia did during his life back there in Chechnya. They are protecting now the peace and our motherland over there, where the new border between the good and the evil now lies.
For Roman Rodionov appears to symbolize not just “the Russian world,”106 but a larger, pan-
Orthodox brotherhood. This is visible from the way he recounts his impressions from his
encounter with the Serbian volunteers fighting in Eastern Ukraine and their joint participation CEU eTD Collection
105 Roman visited Donetsk, Torez, Debal’tsevo, Ilovaisk, and Snezhnoe. 106 The notion of Russkii Mir, emerged in the late 1990s within the circles of conservative Russian intellectuals and has gradually became institutionalized as a tool of Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy throughout the 2000s (Laruelle 2015c). It received a renewed public visibility with the unfolding of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, as the duty to defend the Russian-speaking population was used as a discursive strategy for legitimizing the annexation of Crimea and Russian intervention in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 135
in the opening ceremony for the monument to the Unknown Soldier in a small town of
Amvrosievka in Donetsk region:
Evgenii’s icon was at the opening of the monument. And during the entire ceremony this image was held by a Serbian militiaman (opolchenets) Deian Berich – a legendary sniper. … And from the other side the icon was held by my own son, who had recently completed his service in the ranks of the Russian army. It was a kind of Serbian-Russian brotherhood. And next to the icon, among the flags of the Donetsk Peoples’ Republic, stood the Serbian Banner, which I brought there and the Banner of Russia… […] And Zhenia’s image was a special spiritual turning force of the entire ceremony. It was all happening right by the side of a freshly dug grave, because this was not just an opening of a memorial but also a reburial of the remains of Soviet soldiers who died during the Great Patriotic War near Donbass. It held particular symbolism for the hundreds of attendees... Among the attendees were militiamen – Donbass’ protectors, children, members of the search clubs and among them the icon of a Russian soldier – who died in a faraway Chechnya, died for the cause of peace and protection of his Fatherland, for our Orthodox motherland.
The public response to Rodionov’s icon in Donetsk oblast’ led Roman to consider taking the
icon along with his photo exhibitions more often. He expressed regret for not being able to take
it to Luhansk oblast’ and said that one of his biggest dreams is to take the icon to Serbia one
day. As he explained, he has a lot of friends among pro-Russian Serbian politicians, who had
long been inviting him to visit with his latest photo exhibition. “This exhibition will do a lot of
good, it boosts Russia’s image and helps the cause of peacemaking,” he concluded.
4.3. The Moral Pedagogy of Martyrdom
The issue of patriotic education became an increasingly significant topic on the government’s CEU eTD Collection agenda in the early 2000s. Over the past 15 years, the state funding of patriotic initiatives
increased exponentially from 130.78 million rubles budgeted the first State Program of
136
Patriotic Upbringing realized between 2001 and 2005107 to almost 1.9 billion directed for the
implementation of the fourth version of the program that is meant to cover the timeline between
2016 – 2020 (Goode 2016). The original program of Patriotic upbringing designed in the early
2000s was rather general in scope and had a distinct civic orientation, as it was designed to
address the social crisis that unfolded in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union. The program
was oriented at combating the perceived negative social trends among the youth (substance
abuse, criminality, political cynicism, and social apathy) through raising the cultural level of
young people, inculcating in them respect for the state and the army, and preparing high school
students for the mandatory military service (Glanzer 2005; Golunov 2011: 1; Laruelle 2009:
177). The spread of “color revolutions” across the post-Soviet space between 2003 and 2005
increased the urgency of political education of the young generations in the government’s eyes.
As a result, the second program of patriotic upbringing (2006-2010) and those succeeding it,
acquired a distinct nationalistic focus and an orientation towards historical education, as they
aimed to mobilize the youth in defense of traditional values and Russian history (Golunov
2011:2). The ideas of love for one’s Motherland and pride in its successes and respect for
history and traditional values were at the core of the vision of patriotism advanced by the state
programs. The programs envisioned the inculcation of patriotism to be carried out through a
diverse range of methods, many of them borrowed directly from the Soviet pedagogical
repertoire: organization of history reconstruction events and military games, excursions to the
notable historical sights and museum exhibitions, and the so-called “lessons in courage” –
history oriented extra-curricular patriotic events that became institutionalized during the CEU eTD Collection Brezhnev era and started to be actively reintroduced into the state schools’ curriculums in the
107 Postanovlenie ot 16.02.2001 #122 o gosudarstvennoi programme “Patrioticheskoe vospitanie grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 2001-2005 gody.” Retrieved June 27, 2019 (http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901781482). 137
early 2000s (Chernikova 2011). Rodionov’s story became a frequent subject of such lessons
and other school activities, including student dramas and poetry nights.
The patriotic turn in the state’s youth policy also led to a mushrooming of different types of
military patriotic clubs, some of them organized with the direct support of governmental grants
and formal military associations, others having a more grassroots nature and run by individual
enthusiasts – often war veterans or former servicemen (Laruelle 2015). The Russian Orthodox
Church, which has been trying to consolidate its position as the guardian of the societal morals
in post-Soviet Russia (Stöckl 2016) became another active actor in the implementation of the
new educational policies and the promotion of military and patriotic values among the youth
(Laruelle 2009:170; Rousselet 2015).108 While the Church’s attempts at formal involvement
with the primary and secondary education institutions stirred a lot of controversy and were met
with hostility by the some members of the public (Köllner 2016), the unregulated
extracurricular activities organized by (mostly informal) networks of patriotic youth clubs
offered a fertile terrain for the dissemination of religiously imbued visions of patriotism among
young people. According to the statistics provided in a report by Iuliia Pavliuchenkova (n.d.),
vice-chair of the Moscow Patriarchate Synodal Department for Youth Affairs, in 2010 the share
of clubs with an Orthodox profile comprised 27%. The militarized model of morality
represented by Rodionov, which incorporates both the masculine values of honor, strength, and
perseverance and the spiritual virtues of faith and self-sacrifice has proved popular within the
Orthodox paramilitary subculture. The coordinators of different military-patriotic clubs often
CEU eTD Collection offer Rodionov as an exemplar to their students and organize events featuring Liubov’
Rodionova (Sibireva 2005); several clubs have even been named after the martyred soldier.109
108 Patriotism is identified as one of the key dimensions of the Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (2000) (Rousselet 2015: 50). 109To name just a few: Orthodox Military-Patriotic Club “Voin” (Warrior) in memory of Evgenii Rodionov in Murmansk (2012), Orthodox Military-Patriotic Club “Vitiaz’” in mem. of E.R. in Ukhta (2012), OMPC “Voin” 138
The numerous athletic and military-patriotic associations (some of them grassroots, others –
established with the support of the state), which emerged over the past two decades thus formed
yet another platform for the proliferation of Rodionov’s cult. One such example is the Saint-
Petersburg based martial arts club Suvorovets 110 , which organized several tournaments
dedicated to Rodionov’s memory between 2013 and 2016. The club works under the auspices
of the Suvorov Fund – a charitable foundation supporting patriotic initiatives, founded in 2012
by a private entrepreneur Airat Gafurov. Airat, who is both the manager and the sole benefactor
of the fund, had been involved in patriotic initiatives and organization of different sports
competitions and educational evens for the youth on and off for about fifteen years before he
decided to establish the fund. Himself a graduate of the Suvorov Special School and later of a
Military Academy, he told me he wanted to create an organization that would promote the
patriotic values inherent to the military training among contemporary youth. In addition to
running the martial arts club, which offers training in boxing, Tai boxing, kickboxing, and
mixed martial arts both for children and adults, Airat’s fund also sponsors an officer’s club
Chest’ Imeiu, which serves as a platform for different types of social and cultural events for
the former servicemen and currently enlists about 900 members.
Airat told me that the idea to organize the martial arts tournament in memory of Rodionov
came from his friend, head of the Saint-Petersburg’s Federal Penitentiary Service, who has
been actively collaborating with the fund and who happened to hold Rodionov in a very high CEU eTD Collection
in mem. of E. R. in Voronezh (2012), Evgenii Rodionov Teenage Club in Khabarovsk (2015), Evgenii Rodionov’s Children Druzhina in Tiumen’ (2015), Evgenii Rodionov Cossack Military-Patriotic Club “Young Scout” in Zolotarevka, Penzenskaia Oblast’ (2015), Evgenii Rodionov Orthodox Youth Club in Kuznetsk (2013). Additionally, several secondary schools with a military profile have been named after Evgenii, including the cadet school in Sudino, Yaroslavkaia oblast’ (2016) and a secondary school # 4 in Kuznetsk (renamed after Rodionov in 2009). 110 The club is named after Aleksandr Suvorov, the 18th century Russian legendary military commander. 139
regard. While preparing the script for the first tournament dedicated to Rodionov in 2013 Airat
himself developed a deeper interest in the soldier’s story. He had personally met Liubov’
Rodionova, whom he grew to admire and regard as “a symbol of a mother …and of service to
the fatherland.”111 Pleased with the way the first tournament went, Airat decided to turn the
event into a new club tradition and host it yearly on Rodionov’s memory day. The tournaments,
whose audience in different years ranges between 100 and 300 people, serve as an apt platform
for popularizing Rodionov’s figure in athletic circles. Each tournament starts with an
introductory speech, during which the event host narrates Rodionov’s story to the audience and
reflects upon the significance of the soldier’s deed; all the participants are given t-shirts with
Rodionov’s image and special informational flyers about the soldier are distributed among the
audience.
Commenting with regret on the lack of moral values among contemporary youth, Airat blamed
the trend on the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the old moral exemplars –
pioneers and Komsomol members – were replaced by “false images,” as “some Rambos,
bankers, and criminals became the new heroes.” A staunch communist and a great Russian
patriot, as he described himself, Airat admitted to having little interest in the religious
dimension of Rodionov’s cult, but emphasized that Rodionov presents an important exemplar
for the young people:
One should raise the young generations on the example of Zhenia’s feat, spread the word about him. What we need today are heroes, who are close to us, those who had grown up among us. A person had given his life in the name of the honor and independence of his fatherland. It is a godly deed, it CEU eTD Collection shows moral principles, convictions, and strength of spirit.112
111 From my interview with Airat (July 2016). 112 From my interview with Airat (July 2016). 140
Although Airat acknowledged the positive role of the state policies in reviving the interest in
sports and martial arts among young people, he remained highly critical of the overall
realization of the governmental program of patriotic education, arguing that most of its
promises “remained only a concept on paper.” According to Airat, the program’s
implementation was monopolized by “bureaucrats and careerists,” while the “real” enthusiasts,
who have the military experience and a genuine desire to develop patriotic education were
never consulted or offered any support for their initiatives. At the time Airat himself was barely
making ends meet and had been recently forced to indefinitely suspend the operation of his
martial arts club, as he can no longer afford to pay the rent for the gym. Due to the lack of
financing, the frequency and scale of his martial arts tournaments also went down.
Airat’s discourse on morality and patriotism is ridden with seeming contradictions. Himself an
ethnic Tatar, Airat told me that he considers himself Russian113 and added that he condemns
any attempts of dividing people into Russians and non-Russians based on the ethnic principle.
At the same time, when commenting on the resurgence of interest in sports among the youth,
he observed with a visible satisfaction that there has been a substantial growth in the number
“Slavic” martial arts clubs – a niche that, he claims, has been mostly occupied by the people of
the Caucasian or Central Asian decent (kavkaztsy) over the past two decades:
They [kavkaztsy] get it with the mother’s milk – the warrior’s spirit and so on. Their parents force young men to train whether they want to or not. And they in general have an internal need in it. But for us, Russians [Rossiian] martial arts had been sidelined for a long time. People were more interested in ball dancing, tennis, and skiing… Now this is all being revived, even though there is no support from above – it is all the initiative of the coaches – the people, who
CEU eTD Collection believe in inculcating healthy lifestyle, rejecting alcohol and smoking, prioritizing upbringing – respectful attitude towards old people, women…
This seemingly paradoxical position is symptomatic of the way the markers of ethnic and
confessional belonging are being used in the post-Soviet context as proxies for designating a
113 he used the term Rossiianin, which, in contrast to the term Russkii, signals civic, rather that ethnic identity. 141
person’s moral and cultural orientation. The term “Slavic” for Airat appears to be synonymous
with “traditional,” that is based on a set of basic moral ideals and principles. His comparison
between the Slavic and the Caucasian clubs aims not so much to underscore the ethnic divide,
as to point out the loss of moral principles and lack of ideology among contemporary Russians:
We have a lot to learn from the guys from the Caucuses. We are so often offended by the way they behave [towards Russians] but how can they respect us? If they come here and they see this drunken debauchery, children abandoned by their parents, elderly parents abandoned by their children. In the Caucuses there are no abandoned children, no orphanages – it should be like that here too. […] Unfortunately for us everything is now guided by material interests … everything is done only for the money, but this is wrong, just wrong! There should be some kind of ideology in the basis of everything, some kind of faith, respect for parents and neighbors, love for the motherland. Once we have this – everything will be in the right place.
Airat emphasized that for him personally Rodionov is not a saint, but “a patriot of his
motherland who remained faithful to his military duty until the end” and that his interest in the
soldier’s story is largely conditioned by the pedagogical potential he sees in it. Yet, the
difficulty of adapting the soldier’s image for edifying purposes was not lost on Airat and he
admitted that the circumstances of Rodionov’s death raise several uneasy questions about the
Chechen campaign. Calling the Chechen war “a graphic example of how dirty politics can be,”
Airat pointed out that it is not easy to explain to the young people why the former militants,
who once fought on the insurgents’ side, are now being awarded with apartments and cars by
Ramzan Kadyrov, while the Russian veterans are being denied the basic social security benefits
and sometimes cannot even get a preferential transport pass. Given the uncomfortable political
connotations, Airat suggested that in order to send the right message to the youth through CEU eTD Collection
Rodionov’s story, it is best to leave the political context out and focus the audience’s attention
on the soldier’s deed:
There is no need to explain all the complexities to them [young people], no need for them to know whose fault it was and who did wrong what. They need to know that a soldier is a soldier, he has to remain a soldier in any
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situation and fulfill his military duty – this is what they need to know. Otherwise, if one starts questioning if it is a good or a wrong act, if one should follow an order that might be wrong or given by the wrong people – this is not right. This creates a precedent. … In Evgenii’s case, it was a concrete situation. How he ended up at that war in the first place is a whole other issue. But one should assess his deed through this very narrow slit.
The employment of Rodionov’s figure as a pedagogical tool is thus closely associated with the
disembedding of the soldier’s death from the historical context of the Chechen war and a shift
of attention towards Rodionov’s personal qualities and choices. As the topicality of the
Chechen conflict waned and the conservative discourses shifted from criticism and open
opposition to the state to a more pro-systemic position throughout the late 2000s, Rodionov’s
image was gradually turned into a public symbol of the Russian conservative statist ideology,
which asserts the unity of Orthodoxy, patriotism, and Russian nationhood.
Far from being just a patron saint of the military, Rodionov, is also regarded as an example of
morality that patriotically and militaristically oriented young men find particularly relevant. As
Caroline Humphrey (1997: 43) points out in her seminal study of exemplar-based moral
practices in Mongolia, exemplars do not just offer specific conceptions of how one ought to
act, but also open up a discursive space for deliberating ideals and making commitments to
“certain ethnic modes of being.” To those among Rodionov’s venerators, who view the figure
of the soldier as their role model, Rodionov’s example provides an occasion to ponder over the
nature of spiritual strength and ways through which it can be developed.
Roman – the representative of the Saint-Petersburg based Fund in Support of Orthodox CEU eTD Collection Sportsmen (FSOS) 114 – told me that Rodionov presents an important role model for the athletic
youth because he himself was a sportsman115 and because he had proved by his example the
114 The fund also has branches in Moscow and Krasnoiarsk. 115 Rodionov practiced boxing during his school years (Fefelov, Andrei. 2006. “Krest Sviatogo Evgeniia.” Zavtra, May 24. Retrieved July 6, 2019 (http://zavtra.ru/blogs/2006-05-2461)). 143
superiority of spiritual over physical strength. I met Roman in May 2015 in Satino-Russkoe
during the celebration of Rodionov’s memory day, which he attended together with the FSOS
delegation. The fund was created in 2014 by a group of patriotically oriented former
professional sportsmen and practicing martial arts coaches with a goal of uniting and offering
support to the Orthodox athletic organizations. In addition to sponsoring the organization of
championships and competitions in popular martial arts (fit boxing, Greco-Roman wrestling,
Tai boxing), the fund tries to popularize the “traditional” Russian sports like pugilism and to
resurrect the tradition of sport festivals (mass competitions in agility and strength) through
organizing public celebrations and historical reconstruction events. According to Roman, the
ideal of martyrdom is not only compatible with the values of sportsmen, but is in fact inherent
to the ethos of the profession:
The professional sportsmen know this axiom well: power can be overcome by skills, and skills by spirit. Evgenii in this case is a good example and there is a lot that one can learn from him. It is not enough to pump muscles and learn to control them; it is important to acquire fearlessness, prudent bravery, faith in victory, and the root of these all is being prepared to die. … Only the one, who is prepared to die, achieves victory116 – both the sportsmen and the military know it.
In the model of moral pedagogy outlined by Roman there appears to be no clear-cut distinction
between a martyr as an exemplar of the ultimate strength of spirit (a trait the professional
sportsmen need to cultivate to succeed) and as a role model, whose radical act of self-sacrifice
should inspire imitation. Rather, the former is seen as a first step towards the latter.
To illustrate his vision Roman used the example of Nikolai Leonov – a young man, who, he CEU eTD Collection claims, was inspired by Rodionov’s example and was able to move “from an athletic to a
spiritual victory.” In 2014 Nikolai, a Ukrainian karate and kickboxing champion, volunteered
to join the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) military forces. He was killed on May 26, 2014
116 This phrase is an allusion to the refrain from a popular 19th century military song. 144
during the fierce battle for the Donetsk airport, which resulted in numerous casualties among
the DPR’s forces. A Cossack and a theological seminary graduate, Nikolai wrote and
performed songs in the genre of Orthodox rap and was known in some conservative Orthodox
circles (both in Ukraine and Russia). Just a few months before his death Nikolai had written a
song devoted to Rodionov titled “My little brother,” in which he declared his admiration for
Rodionov’s feat and his desire to share the soldier’s fate. One of the song’s refrains featured
the following lyrics:
I am dreaming of telling them, just like you did, my brother: “You can take off the cross from my chest only together with my head.” I am dreaming of appearing just like you did, brother, before God And humbly, with tears, kiss Him. I have no doubts that you, brother, are in Heaven, There are tears of joy and grief in my eyes, Brother, one can only dream of such a death…
After Nikolai’s death, many of his fans came to regard this song as prophetic, pointing out that
by joining the armed struggle in Eastern Ukraine Nikolai had followed Rodionov’s sacrificial
path. Although Nikolai’s fame is nowhere close to that of Rodionov, he is relatively well-
known and respected in the circles of Orthodox sportsmen and military clubs.
A quest for transcendence and a higher purpose that would inspire the spirit is a theme that
came up frequently during my conversations with Rodionov’s venerators from athletic circles.
According to Roman, an active search for ideology is endemic to the modern athletic and para-
military subcultures, some young men turning to Orthodoxy, others to paganism and some to
other alternative cosmologies. “It is evident that everyone understands that mere physical CEU eTD Collection strength is not enough to achieve victory,” he summarized. In the course of my field research,
I have indeed encountered many young men who either turned to or strongly developed their
previously existing passive interest in Orthodox faith after they started practicing sports or
participating in para-military training. Such is the example of Sergei, a twenty-one-year old
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Transport Construction student at Emperor Alexander I St. Petersburg State Transport
University, whom I met in May 2015. Sergei is a professional athlete and member of FSOS;
he also belongs to St. Petersburg’s Orthodox monarchist circle “Tsarskii Dom Riurika.”
Sergei was born and grew up in a small provincial town of Belovo in Kemerovskaia oblast’.
He said that his parents were atheists and he recalled hearing a lot of jokes from his father, who
was a staunch communist, about the superstitiousness of religious people. When Sergei was
fifteen, his life took a rough turn after he unexpectedly lost both his parents in a car accident.
After the tragedy Sergei was adopted by his aunt, an Orthodox believer, who gradually made
him convert. Although Sergei started practicing sports long before he turned to religion, he said
that the sport in itself was not enough to fill in the void and help him cope with the anger he
felt after the loss of his parents; it was Orthodox faith that helped him get off the bad track and
change his life around:
Later, when I turned to God, I started praying for the first time. I saw my aunt pray, heard the melody and I decided to try as well. Morning, evening prayers, then I started reading psalms, and my conscience (sovest’) started to awaken, I started seeing all my past mistakes – the ways in which I hurt my relatives – and I started asking for forgiveness. For about a year I was like this and then I decided to go take communion. It was on Christmas; before that I met the priest and started going to an Orthodox club, we were reading the bible there. […] People in school did not recognize me anymore because before I was always aggressive and grumpy, but now I was cheerful and kind. I started making friends.
The parish Sergei had joined in his hometown had a distinct monarchist orientation. During his
final years of high school Sergei developed a profound interest in monarchist ideology, which CEU eTD Collection
he continued to pursue after he moved to St. Petersburg by joining the local monarchist circle.
He said that he likes people, who are “oriented towards a common vector, especially the idea
of serving Russia” and he believes that the idea of service or monarchy is something that is
urgently needed to unite the people, especially the disparate athletic community:
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The sportsmen these days – they practice, but they have no ideology. Why are they practicing? They just do it for practice’s sake – to be able to punch someone, for instance, if one has to. But it is important to have some higher purpose and this is what we are trying to do. […] Sport as such unites people, but if there is also some kind of underlying ideology to it – then it is just beautiful! One can be a [professional] sportsman only until his 50s and in some kinds of sport careers end even sooner, so a person, who lives only for victories in sports – it is hard for him. A higher purpose is needed. Everything will end and there should be something higher, like God’s kingdom in Orthodoxy – the rest is just means towards it, it comes and goes.
Commenting upon the legacy of the Soviet ideology of athleticism and healthy life style
(zdorovyi obraz zhizni), Sergei acknowledged its positive pedagogical influences, arguing that
it promoted ideals like “strength, perseverance, dignity, and nobility.” However, he claimed
that this ideology was essentially stoic in its orientation and, as such, deprived of any spiritual
or moral content. In contrast to the Soviet athletic practices, which, according to Sergei, had
some redeeming qualities, the transformation athletic culture has undergone in Russia since the
1990s is something the young man rejected altogether: “We started to be oriented towards the
American practices, have commercial fights, [promote] victory at all costs, but now the moral
dimension is coming back. Now people act respectfully towards competitors – in the US they
try to humiliate, to brag. We don’t do it…” Sergei described the athletic events and historical
reconstructions (of the Romanovs and Riurik’s eras) that FSOS organizes in cooperation with
“Tsarskii Dom Riurika” as an attempt at reviving the Russian culture of athleticism and
awakening the conscience of the people by showing to them what the Russian military
brotherhood means and what it used to be like.
Sergei has a strong interest in history and politics and reads abundantly during his free time – CEU eTD Collection
a habit, he says he inherited from his father, who was an eager collector of history books,
mostly of communist orientation. After moving in with his aunt Sergei got more exposed to a
different perspective and developed an interest in the pre-Revolutionary Russian history.
Sergei’s personal spiritual ideal is the image of Cossacks and their ideology of servitude – to
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God, tsar, and the fatherland. Yet, he remains skeptical of the contemporary attempts at
resurrecting Cossack traditions, saying that few modern Cossacks understand the real meaning
of the institution and treat it as a game or a show, which gives them an opportunity to “dress
up and to cling with their swards.” Sergei is convinced that the practice of martial arts is
inherent to Orthodox faith:
In orthodoxy it is bad to assault someone, but to defend someone or oneself – there is a commandment “to lay down one’s life for one’s friends” – it is not a sin, it is a sign of honor. And practicing sport is a type of military patriotic education, because it teaches to overcome difficulties – both physical and moral, to overcome oneself, when one is tired. It cultivates one in a moral sense – to act calmly and adequately in different situations.
Sergei told me that Orthodox faith changed the experience of sport for him, helping him to
develop humility and learn how to control his anger and how to win and lose with dignity. He
is convinced that Rodionov is a saint, who had died just like the ancient Christian martyrs –
refusing to denounce his faith. Sergei recalled that he had first heard about Rodionov when he
was in his final year of high school: a priest from the monarchist parish Sergei attended invited
a Chechen war veteran, who narrated to the parishioners Rodionov’s story. The veteran claimed
to have personally known Rodionov during his military service and to have read the bible
together with him at a military check-point. Although Sergei soon discovered that many of the
things the veteran had sad were “lies,” he was nonetheless intrigued by the character of the
veteran and his kind and gentle demeanor, which somehow set him aside from the rest of the
veterans Sergei encountered:
Somehow he [the veteran] inspired me. At that moment I was at a crossroads;
CEU eTD Collection I started doubting my faith, thinking about other religions – Islam, Buddhism – but after that meeting my faith in Orthodoxy consolidated. I saw an example of faith. Anton Men’shin [the veteran], despite being a military man was kind and gentle. […] He was radically different from other veterans, he was a believer and talked about God and I felt like he could be trusted.
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Sergei became curious about the story told by the veteran and started searching for information
about Rodionov on his own. The readings convinced him in the martyrical nature of the
soldier’s death. Sergei said that to him Rodionov exemplifies the ultimate strength of spirit that
he himself would like to possess:
He [Rodionov] was loyal to his oath, to the country. […] He stood until the end and was glorified in God’s eyes, he suffered for God’s cause. This is an example of sacrifice – “to lay down one’s life for one’s friends”117 – this is the most important example. He was not afraid – this is the most important thing for me personally. I often wonder, if I happened to be in a similar position, would I be able to do the same? He could, so I should be able too! Sergei was not the only young men I heard wondering if he’d be able to do the same when
commenting on Rodionov’s story. Always left unanswered, this question was usually followed
by reflections on how the spiritual strength that helped the soldier withstand his ordeal can be
developed. Sergei emphasized that the courage Rodionov demonstrated is not something a
person has by default but has to be cultivated both through the upbringing and through an
individual effort of disciplining oneself.
Rodionov is not the only exemplar Sergei turns to for inspiration in his process of physical and
moral self-cultivation. He takes a lot of interest in the hagiographies of military saints, and
particularly likes the stories of John the Russian118 and Nicetas the Goth.119 He added that
“these more ancient saints” are not as popular in the athletic circles as Rodionov and are “more
for the people who are already deep into Orthodoxy and willing to learn more.” According to
Sergei, it is Rodionov’s contemporaneity, the possibility to imagine the circumstances of his
life and to meet his mother, that make him more relatable than the martyrs from the past: “It is CEU eTD Collection
117 John 15: 13. 118 A saint of Ukrainian origin who has taken prisoner during the 1710-1711 Russo-Turkish War and spent his life as a slave to the head of Turkish cavalry without renouncing his Christian faith (Morun 2019). John is broadly venerated as a miracle worker in the Orthodox world, particularly in the Greek Orthodox Church. 119 A 4th century Christian martyr and a Gothic soldier who took part in the Gothic civil war between the pagan Athanaric and the Christian Fritigem (Orthodox Church in America, n.d. Retrieved July 1, 2019 (https://oca.org/saints/lives/2013/09/15/102615-greatmartyr-nicetas-the-goth). 149
hard to imagine the ancient saints, we did not live in those times. But here we have our
contemporary person, who went on a cross. This is both shocking and interesting for an
ordinary man.”
Rodionov’s story, when used as a didactic tool, thus has a dual application. As a patron-saint
of the military, the soldier functions as a public symbol of patriotism that asserts the unity of
Orthodox faith and the Russian state and promotes the ideals of service to and love for one’s
motherland. As a modern exemplar of a holy warrior, Rodionov also provides a masculine role
model for the religious and militaristically-oriented young men, who selectively identify in the
soldier the qualities they would like to develop in themselves as they engage in a deliberate
process of ethical self-cultivation. This convergence between heroic and martyrical aesthetics
and military and religious cultures reflects the dual process of militarization of Orthodoxy and
spiritualization of patriotism and military service.
4.4. Concluding Remarks
Following the social and political transformations Russia has undergone over the past decade
Rodionov’s cult has gradually lost much of its subversive political symbolism and mobilizing
potential and found a new platform within the base of the systemic conservative movements.
The public display of Rodionov’s portraits and icons thus became increasingly decoupled from
the commemoration of the Chechen war or attempts to make a statement about it. Instead the CEU eTD Collection soldier’s image is often put next to other historical figures representing the unity of faith and
military profession to assert the historical continuity of the Russian military tradition.
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The increasing militarization of the society and the rise of the religious trend within the
military, paramilitary, and athletic cultures, has produced a strong demand for new masculine
exemplars of virtue. Rodionov’s military identity, young age, and contemporaneity made him
an apt role model that is appealing both to the nationalistically-leaning enthusiasts within the
Orthodox community and to the militaristically-minded young men interested in religion.
Militaristically and patriotically oriented Orthodox priests and believers (especially young
men) find in Rodionov a masculine example of sainthood that conveys strength, vigor, and
active resistance. At the same time, many of the former and current military servicemen and
members of different military-patriotic clubs and unions (some of them practicing believers,
others – people only vaguely familiar with the Orthodox doctrine) have an occasion to
rediscover through this soldier’s cult a new transcendent horizon of significance and reaffirm
the spiritual importance of their uneasy service. This parallel process of militarization of
Orthodoxy and spiritualization of patriotism creates a new conservative public culture, centered
around commemoration of military victories as well as heroic and martyrial figures and
promotion of the ideal radical self-sacrifice as the key national virtue.
This new culture successfully channeled the discontent and concerns about the moral
disintegration and de-spiritualization of society into either state-sponsored, or grassroots, but
non-oppositional conservative movements, whose repertoire of action is mostly limited to
organization of and participation in patriotic events and development of volunteerism.
Although united by the patriotic sentiments, appreciation of the military culture, and longing CEU eTD Collection for a strong state, the new public sphere that unites these movements is far from being
homogenous. It comprises a diverse set of actors with divergent evaluations of the Soviet and
contemporary Russian histories, distinct attitudes towards Putin’s government, and often
conflicting political ideologies. Some, like the members of the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club,
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openly support the ruling United Russia party, militantly defend the growing public influence
of ROC, and, as some commentators suggest (Harris 2018; Zabyelina 2019), effectively act as
a proxy of the Russian government. Others, like Airat, remain disinterested in religion and
criticize the state for failing to support grassroots patriotic initiatives. Despite these differences,
they largely converge in their pedagogical mission, as they mobilize heroic figures, like Evgenii
Rodionov, to promote the virtue of the military service and to assert its centrality to national
survival, both in spirituals and physical terms.
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5. “Bikers Do Not Forget”: The Initiative in Memory of Isaak and Solomou
The commemoration of Isaak and Solomou gained a renewed vigor in 2008, when an
organization devoted to the two heroes – The Initiative in Memory of Isaak and Solomou
(Protovulia Mnimis Isaak-Solomou) was established. The Initiative was created by a group of
Greek Cypriots, who were disappointed with the fact that little was being done by the
government to uphold the memory of the events of 1996 in Cyprus. Dissatisfied with a modest
memorial service held yearly on Isaak and Solomou’s graves, they decided to organize an event
that would have a greater public visibility and would remind Greek Cypriots about the meaning
of Isaak and Solomou’s sacrifices. The Initiative members chose to honor their heroes by
following in their footsteps and organizing a bikers’ procession that would start from different
cities across Cyprus, pass along the Green line and terminate at the cemetery of Paralimni
village where Isaak and Solomou are buried. The Initiative defines its main goals as the struggle
against the Turkish occupation, the preservation of Isaak and Solomou’s memory and
“transmission of the message of their sacrifices” (Poreia Eleftherias n.d.).120 The organization
is thus committed to the continuation of the institution of motorcycle processions as symbolic
means of claiming their “right to life and respect to human rights and freedoms” and protesting
the continuing Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus.
From a modest procession of no more than 200 motorcycles in 2008, The Initiative’s march
quickly developed into the major bikers’ event in Cyprus in the next few years. The first CEU eTD Collection
procession held in 2008 was not advertised to the broader public and had its participants
recruited through organizers’ personal networks. Once the event proved successful and capable
120 Retrieved June 27, 2019 (https://isaaksolomou.com/). 153
of attracting media attention, The Initiative’s creators decided to boost the scale of the
procession by advertising their next event beforehand on TV, radio, and social media and
inviting as many people as possible to join the cause. Already in 2009, the procession drew as
much as 900 attendees, the number of the participants growing steadily every year. Over the
past few years between 1500 and 2000 bikers have been taking part in the procession every
year. The procession attracts different kinds of people – from high school and university
students to parents with small children and the entire extended families, who come by car
enclosing the procession. While the majority of the participants are Greek Cypriots,
occasionally foreigners residing in Cyprus – mainly Russian and British nationals – join the
event as well.
Drawing on the interviews with The Initiative’s members carried out between 2015 and 2016
and observations made at the memorial events organized for Isaak and Solomou, in this chapter
I explore the political vision underlying The Initiative’s agenda and the imageries of sacrifice,
heroism, and patriotism that inspire its participants. If Rodionov’s cult in Russia, has lost most
of its protest potential with the declining significance of the issue of the Chechen conflict, the
figures of Isaak and Solomou in Cyprus still remain closely associated in the popular
imagination with the unremitting issue of the island’s division. As a result, the transition from
the forms of mobilization aimed at political activism to the commemorative practices oriented
at the moral transformation of the self is less pronounced in Isaak and Solomou’s case.
CEU eTD Collection I argue that The Initiative’s mobilization around Isaak and Solomou oscillates between the
public protest aimed at achieving a political outcome and commemorative practices oriented at
the cultivation and moral transformation of the self and engagement with martyrical figures as
private moral exemplars. As the bikers’ political demands of the withdrawal of Turkey from
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the island and bringing to justice Isaak and Solomou’s murderers are unlikely to be met in the
nearest future, the protest undergoes an increasing ritualization, turning instead into a form of
symbolic commemoration. As the bikers chose to model their commemorative events after the
original anti-occupation demonstration of 1996, the Initiative’s processions resemble a protest
in form. However, as I will show in the following sections of this chapter, its participants are
mainly motivated not by the desire to achieve a specific political outcome, but by nostalgia for
and an effort to revive the culture of public commemorative events that shaped their political
subjectivities but suffered a radical decline in the early 2000s. I suggest that the Initiative’s
public events are thus best understood not as a goal-oriented practice, aimed at achieving social
change, but rather as a self-purposeful activity that is valued by its participants for its own sake,
as it offers them an opportunity to socialize, express their political and moral sentiments, and
become part of an exciting public culture.
5.1. The Politics of Bikes
The Initiative consists of about 40 active members. It maintains a web-site devoted to the
history of the 1996 anti-occupational protest and Isaak and Solomou’s’ participation in it and
manages a Facebook page, which at the moment of writing had gained more than 20,000
“Likes” and which is frequently updated with photographs from processions and songs, video-
clips, and posters devoted to Isaak and Solomou. The Initiative’s main activity consists in the
CEU eTD Collection organization of the yearly three-day long motorcycle procession that usually takes place in the
first or second week of August. The entire event is divided into two parts. The first part usually
starts on Friday and lasts two days – the bikers start driving from Pafos, the coastal city in the
Western part of Cyprus and ride alongside the entire length of the Buffer Zone to Dherynia
check-point. During this part, the participants make stops at the historically significant
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landmarks of Cyprus, including the imprisoned graves121 and the statue of liberty in Nicosia
and put flowers and wreaths to the monuments. On Sunday, when the memorial service for
Isaak and Solomou is usually held, more people join, as bikers start driving from different
location in Cyprus towards Paralimni. St. Dimitrios church, where the official memorial service
for Isaak and Solomou is held, is usually already over-crowed by the time the bikers arrive, so
only several representatives of The Initiative (10 to 20 people) join the ceremony while the rest
of the procession proceeds straight to the Paralimni cemetery. The event ends with the bikers
driving back to the Dherynia roadblock, where a small group of the participants enters the
Buffer Zone under the supervision of the UN personnel and puts wreaths on the spots where
Isaak and Solomou were murdered.
In 2016, to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Isaak and Solomou’s deaths, The Initiative
organized a procession that started in Berlin and aimed to recreate the route of the original 1996
bikers’ march. About 40 of The Initiative’s members participated in the ten-day ride that started
from the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on July 16. The procession passed through Prague,
Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Thessaloniki, and Athens and ended in Nicosia on July 27. In
Greece, where the participants spent several days, they attended a meeting with President
Prokopis Pavlopoulos. In Nicosia, the participants were also greeted at the Presidential Palace
and invited to a meeting with the Republic’s President Nicos Anastasiades. On July 30th the
bikers held their usual Cyprus-wide memorial rally that ended at the Paralimni Cemetery. On
the evening of the same day The Initiative for the first time organized a concert in memory of CEU eTD Collection the two heroes at Tasos Markou Municipal Stadium in Paralimni.
121 The burial site of the thirteen EOKA members located in the Central Jail of Nicosia. Nine of the liberation movement fighters were hanged by the British authorities and four others died in action. Seeking to avoid public funeral for the EOKA fighters the authorities buried them in a small cemetery located on the prison premises. For a detailed analysis of the site and its symbolic significance see Toumazis (2017: 92-95). 156
Figure 5. 1. Procession in Memory of Isaak and Solomou. Source: https://www.facebook.com/Isaaksolomou/
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 5.2. The logo of The Initiative in Memory of Isaak and Solomou. The slogan reads: Bikers Do Not Forget. Source: https://www.facebook.com/Isaaksolomou/
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The Initiative positions itself as an independent group; it is self-financed and puts a significant
effort into guarding its autonomy. Its only form of collaboration with the authorities is limited
to the coordination with the road police, which is unavoidable for providing security for an
event of such a scale. Deeply mistrustful of institutional politics, the group actively tries to
avoid any form of involvement or association with the state institutions and political parties,
who it suspects of trying to appropriate the memory of the two heroes for the promotion of
personal agendas. All of The Initiative members I have spoken to insisted that the government,
which advocates for the bi-zonal federal solution, is not interested in keeping the memory of
Isaak and Solomou alive; on the contrary, as The Initiative’s representative Xenios put it, it
makes every effort “to keep historical memory to a low profile” to keep the people’s spirit
down. Consequently, many of The Initiative’s members see the politicians and state officials
who show up at the memorial service and give speeches as hypocrites trying to capitalize on
the heroes’ popularity among the common people and boost their political support by
displaying their patriotism without doing “anything that has real value for this.”122
I first met Xenios for an interview in August 2015. In his late-twenties, Xenios is an energetic
and jolly young man, who invests a lot of effort into balancing his full-time job at one of
Nicosia’s banks and his family duties with his involvement in The Initiative. He emphasized
that the organization and coordination of the mass procession takes a lot of work and
preparation throughout the year. Having been part of The Initiative from its very inception,
Xenios is adamant about protecting the organization’s autonomy and preventing its cooptation CEU eTD Collection into the local political structures:
When you participate in the existing system with media and the politicians you can’t control the corruption that comes to you and no one would like to do corrupt things or put some shadow on their name, so it is better when you do things on your own. ... We don’t want to drag ourselves into anything that
122 From my interview with Xenios (April 2015). 158
has to do with this system… When people of influence get involved like the church or a political party comes to cooperation with us then they want to have an influence on what we are doing. But what we are doing comes from us for us.
To prevent others from exploiting their event and the memory of the two heroes for other
agendas The Initiative has designed a strict rule: anyone wishing to take part in the procession
should wear the same white T-Shirt with The Initiative’s symbols, leaving behind any other
marks of distinction – be it a football club emblem or a political party sign. Such a measure
also helps foster a sense of unity among the participants, as the bikers’ march, as Xenios put it,
is “the only anti-occupation campaign [in Cyprus] that does not divide people.”
The Initiative goes to a great length to position itself outside of the institutional politics, taking
special care to separate itself not only from the mainstream political organizations but also from
the more radical movements, like ELAM, who organizes a separate march and a demonstration
in memory of Isaak and Solomou. Unlike ELAM, whose members have a long track record of
disturbing public order and causing scandals, The Initiative tries to avoid any conflict with the
authorities and prevent any provocations or confrontations with the police. To this end it has
designed strict rules of conduct, which are carefully explained to the participants before the
event and the violation of which leads to a culprit’s immediate expulsion from the procession.
As Xenios explained, it is particularly important for The Initiative to make sure that none of
the march participants acts hostile or shouts insults or threats towards the Turks, as it fears that
a public scandal might undermine the organization’s image and the cause it seeks to promote.
In contrast to ELAM – a movement that primarily targets the audience at home – The Initiative, CEU eTD Collection
faithful to the purpose and the spirit of the original anti-occupational procession of the 1996,
seeks to appeal to the public at the domestic and international levels alike, and hence takes
extra care to avoid being labeled “ultra-nationalist,” “extremist,” or “racist.” Andreas, one of
the masterminds behind the establishment of the movement, explained to me that at the early
159
stages The Initiative struggled to establish a respectable public image and avoid being conflated
with radical nationalist groups. Even the choice of the white color for the members’ T-shirts,
he said, was directed by the desire to separate themselves from the “extremists,” who
conventionally chose black for their attire.
While The Initiative and ELAM might hold diverging views on what constitutes an acceptable
repertoire of protest action, the discourses of their members reveal that the two groups appear
to share very similar political and historical imagery, as their understandings of the “meaning”
of the two heroes’ sacrifices and visions of their vindication largely converge. Both groups
dream of the resurrection of the Greek national spirit, uncompromisingly reject the bi-zonal
federative solution of the Cypriot question, advocate for the closure of check-points on the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot border and demand the end of the occupation and the expulsion of
the Turkish settlers from the Northern part. Just like ELAM, many of The Initiative’s members
insist that the Cypriot issue should not be construed as a conflict between Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot communities. Many of The Initiative’s members I interviewed stated
repeatedly that they do not have any problem with the Turkish Cypriots. Rather, it is Turkey
and the presence of the Turkish settlers on the island that they identify as the core of the
problem.
The emphasis on peaceful coexistence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots prior to the conflict
plays a prominent role in Greek Cypriot political discourse. As Papadakis (2005) argues, such CEU eTD Collection a historical narrative postulates an absence of irreconcilable contradictions between the two
sides and makes it possible to imagine a peaceful future on the “liberated” island. At the same
time such rhetoric attempts to erase the inconvenient memory of interethnic conflict and
atrocities committed by the Greeks against the Turkish Cypriots, thus producing a flat and
160
historically inaccurate representation of the conflict, reducing the Cypriot issue to the problem
of Turkish occupation. Consequently, many of The Initiative’s members consider the bi-zonal
federal solution and the notion of “reunification” advanced by the government to be illegitimate
and insist that the problem should be reframed as that of the Turkish “invasion” and
“occupation”, which can only be resolved through the “liberation” of the island and the removal
of the Turkish troops and settlers from the island. Frustrated with the prominence the
vocabulary of reunification and peaceful bi-communal coexistence has achieved in the official
governmental discourses over the past two decades, The Initiative members make a point of
using a more “honest” language in their interviews, leaflets, and printed materials, talking about
“invasion, settlers, war-crimes, and occupation.”123
The Initiative has a number of other traits in common with ELAM, including disaffection from
the mainstream politics, lack of trust in the institutions and self-presentation as a “pure”
movement unstained by the ties to the “corrupt” political establishment, as well as the longing
for heroism and direct action. While The Initiative’s members are less aggressive in their
critique of the incumbent government, compared to ELAM, many of them have little respect
for the current administration and are convinced that it is willing to sell out national interest in
the name of fostering dialogue with the Turkish side and avoiding conflicts. Many were
disappointed with how their meeting with President Anastasiades went and felt like the
president’s administration was not genuinely open for a dialogue. The meeting with the
president, which was requested a month in advance, was unexpectedly confirmed only two CEU eTD Collection days prior to the event after several of The Initiative’s requests and reminders were left
unanswered – an attitude many of the bikers have interpreted as disrespectful. Some were also
upset with the president’s reaction to Anastasia’s request to bring the perpetrators of her
123 From my interview with Kostas, August 2016. 161
father’s murder to justice and her proposal to make that a condition in the negotiations with the
Turkish Cypriots that were happening at the time. The president stated that such a move would
be pointless because the Turkish Cypriot side would never accept it and asserted that there is
nothing the government can do to prosecute Isaak and Solomou’s killers.124
I argue that the memory-centered mobilizations of ELAM and the Initiative, which both gained
momentum in the late 2000s and have many similarities, should be understood in the context
of the political transformation Cyprus has experienced since its ascension to the EU in 2004.
The change in the educational politics and the official governmental position on the problem
of the island’s division and the proliferation of discourses of reunification and bi-communal
co-existence left many nationalistically-minded Greek Cypriots baffled, and feeling like the
government is backing down on the national values and interests (Bekerman and Zembylas
2012; Charalambous et al. 2014; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2011: 11). At the same time,
the increasing financialization of the island and the Greek Cypriots’ change of lifestyle and
their growing appetite for conspicuous consumption created a pervasive feeling among many
Greek Cypriots that the island’s traditional morals and culture are under threat.
While the financial crisis of 2012 – 13 marked an important set-back in the Cypriot economy
and led to a significant increase in unemployment, particularly among the youth, the
consequences in Cyprus were not as drastic as in neighboring Greece and the Cypriot economy
quickly started to recover (Hardouvelis and Gkionis 2016). In contrast to ELAM, which CEU eTD Collection actively capitalizes on the issue of economic hardship and unemployment among young Greek
Cypriots, the discourses of The Initiative’s participants mainly present a moral critique of the
islanders’ material opulence. While none of my informants condemned financial success as
124 Prom my interview with Maria, August 2016. 162
such, many displayed a concern about the effect it has on the national spirit, suggesting that the
quest for material well-being and consumptive lifestyle has weakened Greek Cypriot’s
commitment to the ideal of national struggle against the occupation. In the following section
of this chapter I explore how The Initiative members think about the transformations the island
had undergone over the past decade and a half, the moral significance of memory, and the
ideals of sacrifice and heroism.
5.2. Transmitting Historical Memory
Eleni first joined the bikers’ procession in 2011 together with her husband, whose cousin was
involved in The Initiative. Now in her late 20s, Eleni was just eight years old when the events
of 1996 took place. During our conversation she recalled seeing the footage of Isaak and
Solomou’s murders on TV and told me that it left a strong and morbid impression on her, which
years later motivated her to join the bikers’ marches:
Once I learned that this [procession] was happening in memory of Isaak and Solomou, I did not think twice. I immediately realized that it was not something party-related, or something that has to do with politics, but is something pure – I became a member of this initiative without any second thoughts. The notion of “purity” of motives and goals that is discursively juxtaposed to the imagery of
corruption and self-interest that are believed to determine contemporary politics came up
frequently in the course of my conversations with The Initiative’s members. Such anti-elitist
rhetoric and a claim on moral superiority through demonstration of selflessness and absence CEU eTD Collection of material interests, which became an emblematic feature of the right-wing populist
movements across Europe (Jansen 2011; Mudde 2007), is yet another major point of
intersection between ELAM and The Initiative’s ideologies.
163
Unlike the elder participants of the procession, Eleni does not have the memories of the 1974
invasion and was too young during the protest of 1996 to fully grasp its historical significance
at the time. For her the participation in the procession became a form of coming closer to those
turbulent events. She told me that walking up to the Dherynia check-point for the first time
made her become aware that the occupation is very “close” and that the threat of the conflict
breaking out again is rather real:
I realized that my homeland is under occupation. I saw the Grey Wolves on that day and the armed Turkish soldiers who were there [on the other side of the Buffer Zone], waiting for us to make a single mistake, for the events of 1996 to be repeated. … Before I never realized that they are there and that they are ready…
Eleni’s commitment to the preservation of the heroes’ memory and her belief that the Greek
Cypriot community needs to be awaken and forced to confront its current political predicament
drove her to get closer involved with The Initiative. In 2012 she became The Initiative’s press
representative.
Both of Eleni’s parents are refugees from the Northern part of Cyprus and during the procession
she always wears the white T-shirt with the name Agia Triada – her father’s native village –
printed on it. Many of the organization’s members are, like Eleni, the descendants of the
refugees from the North. When commenting on the issue, Eleni stressed that although many
refugees and their children participate in the processions, one should not get an impression that
the refugees are not the only ones trying to change something in Cyprus. Many Greek Cypriots,
among them those who did not have to flee the invasion of 1974, still participate in the anti- CEU eTD Collection occupational struggle, she asserted.
As The Initiative’s experience demonstrates, mobilizing young people who do not have the
personal memories of the conflict and violence proved much easier than engaging the older
164
generations, or the immediate participants of the 1996 events. Very few of the bikers who were
part of the 1996 anti-occupational march participate in The Initiative’s processions. One of
them is Andreas – one of The Initiative’s creators and the organization’s informal leader.
Andreas participated in the 1996 motor procession from Berlin and had experienced first-hand
the chaos and violence that broke in the aftermath of the rally; he also personally witnessed the
murder of Solomos Solomou on August 14th. As Andreas explained to me, many of the
participants of the original procession still remain wary of the idea of organizing and
participating in anti-occupational demonstrations, as they fear the repetition of the events of
1996. For the same reason very few residents of Paralimni, Isaak and Solomou’s home village,
take part in the procession and commemorative events. While some of the Paralimni residents,
especially those who are friends and acquaintances of Isaak and Solomou’s families, show up
at the yearly memorial service in the St. Dimitris church, the majority of the attendees both at
the memorial event and at the processions come from other parts of Cyprus – mostly the cities
of Nicosia, Limassol, and Larnaca.125 Eleni ascribed this trend to the fact that due to the
village’s proximity to the occupied territory, Paralimni residents, many of whom are refugees
from the North, have a profound fear of any type of political turmoil: “I think that people there
[in Paralimni], who lived through these events [1996 rally] right outside of their houses are
more scared. It stayed with them psychologically that the Turks are close and that, if they go
do something, they and their houses are in danger.”
According to Eleni, it was the general atmosphere of fear of backlash for any collective political CEU eTD Collection action that led to the waning of the anti-occupation movement after the events of 1996. It was
not until the second half of the 2000s, when the younger generation unburdened by the direct
125 In the course of my research with The Initiative I have not met a single biker from Paralimni and none of the organization’s members I have asked about it could think of a procession participant from the village. 165
Figure 5.3. Members of The Initiative during the memorial procession for Isaak and Solomou. Agiou Dometiou check-point, August 2017 Source:https://www.facebook.com/Isaaksolomou/photos/a.1057120904422413.1073741851. 303824716418706/1057418384392665/?type=3&theater
experience and personal memories of the conflict picked up the torch, that the protest
movement started to resurge again. For the same reason, Eleni explained, the families of Isaak
and Solomou were very reserved about the idea of The Initiative in the beginning. It took a few
years and several successful processions that did not result in any violence or disorder for The
Initiative’s members to manage to establish a friendly and trustful relationship with the two
families. In 2016 Isaak’s sister Andrea and his daughter Anastasia, who both previously
restrained from participating in the processions, agreed to join the trip from Berlin. To many CEU eTD Collection
of The Initiative’s members the participation of Isaak’s relatives had a great symbolic and
emotional significance, as it made them feel closer to their heroes.
166
Several of The Initiative’s participants told me that they got so close to Andrea and Anastasia
during the ten days ride that they came to regard them as family. As Eleni recalled, having to
perform a song written by a popular Greek singer Haris Aleksiou in 1997 and devoted to
Anastasia called Helidonaki (“Little Swan”) in front of Anastasia during the trip was a powerful
emotional experience for her. Eleni had known and loved the song from early childhood. She
learned it on her father’s request, who made it a precondition for allowing her to start attending
guitar play lessons. Eleni told me that when she was asked to perform the song before Anastasia
for the first time, she was so moved and overcome with emotions that she could not finish the
song. Anastasia liked Eleni’s performance so much she later asked her to perform the song
again on numerous occasions and insisted that Eleni replaces the professional singer who was
invited to perform the song at the memorial concert organized by The Initiative in Paralimni
on July 30th.
The issue of transmission of historical memory is of particular concern to Eleni, who teaches
ancient Greek History in the middle school, and thus constantly confronts this problem in her
professional life. Every year, on the eve of the anniversary of Isaak and Solomou’s deaths, she
organizes a special session meant to teach the students about the events of 1996. Eleni
emphasized that she does not aim to cultivate negative sentiments towards the Turks and the
Turkish Cypriots among her students. Rather, her goal is to educate the young people about the
historical events and the island’s current political predicament, she claimed:
I don’t preach hate, I don’t believe in the hate of Turkish Cypriots, but I do feel anger that this situation is happening in my country. I tell this to my CEU eTD Collection students, inform them on the historical events, so that they all understand that what was going on in 1996 is still here. … Now, if you start going towards the checkpoint and you keep going or do something – you are in danger. You are not free in your own homeland. We have to show an ID at the check-point – what kind of situation is this? … [As an Initiative] we do not preach hate. We preach historical memory, so that people do not forget and do not think that everything is going ok and that one can go to the North, show their ID and think that this is natural.
167
Eleni said it is the ideals of selflessness and sacrifice that she is trying to pass on to her students
through the examples of Isaak and Solomou and other Greek Cypriot heroes:
I tell the kids that the example of heroes is that we sacrifice for our fellow men (anthropous) because our fellow men are our homeland. Homeland is not chairs and walls – it is people who live in this place. … Because what is the enemy afraid of? He is afraid of a person who is not afraid to die. The love of life is the most valuable thing and, if you are not afraid to die, you show to the others that you are not thinking about yourself – this is what I tell the kids. I tell them that the example of heroes is that we understand that a person is the most important thing, we help our fellow men and love our homeland because our homeland is us.
Eleni used to be involved in political activism long before she joined The Initiative. While
doing her BA studies in Athens, she was a member of Protoporia – a Greek Cypriot student
movement associated with the governmental Democratic Rally (DISY) party (Katsourides
2015). However, upon her return to Cyprus, she became very disillusioned with the movement
and the politics of DISY, as she realized that there was a lot of careerism and little room for
idealism and genuine desire to bring about a change there. She eventually decided to quit. Eleni
is concerned that the official politics of the government is making young people politically
passive and disengaged, forcing them lose faith in the possibility of change:
The Greek Cypriots have in their DNA, like every Greek person, a desire for justice and freedom. And now young people do not want to learn about history. Why? Because they know that even if they start a movement about some issue, they cannot do anything. We have this feeling inside. This is what the government is trying to make the Cypriots believe: “We cannot do anything about the situation [occupation]. We are alone, we are a small country, we did not have help from abroad in 1974, in 1996 no one helped either, so do not try to do anything because they will kill you.” If we accept this situation – it seems like everything goes well: we can go out, go party, go on with our lives… This is the message the government sends. CEU eTD Collection
The essentialized vision of Greekness as inherently imbued with such moral qualities as desire
for freedom and justice that emerges from Eleni’s statement is also accompanied by an implicit
recognition that, much like the genes, these inherent moral qualities need the right environment
to come to be expressed. In this context the government’s politics of reconciliation comes to
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be perceived as a threat not only to the political future of the island but also to the very moral
essence of the nation. Such politics, Eleni believes, produces in Greek Cypriots a general
unwillingness to bear costs or suffer any form of discomfort in the name of political action. To
illustrate the situation, she described how during the symbolic closure of the check-points in
Nicosia that The Initiative organizes as part of its yearly procession, some Greek Cypriots, in
contrast to the tourists patiently waiting for the event to end, often display impatience, irritation,
and frustration over the fact that they have to wait to cross to the Northern part.
Several other members also shared their perception that their initiatives sometimes meet more
understanding and support among foreigners than among their fellow citizens. They mentioned
with disappointment the ongoing negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
governments regarding the possibility of reopening the Dherynia check-point where the murder
of Isaak took place. They viewed such a move as disrespectful towards the memory of Isaak
and Solomou. Many of the Greek Cypriots, however, welcomed the negotiations, as reopening
the check-point can substantially reduce the time of commuting across the border for the
region’s residents, cutting the 17 kilometers distance they now have to drive to cross to the
Northern part to just 800 meters. One of my informants, Maria, was particularly disappointed
with the lack of protest on behalf of Dherynia and Paralimni residents, who she claimed want
the check-point to be opened for economic reasons, as it might attract the tourists looking for
an easy access to the Northern territory to the area. “No one wants to keep it closed except for
the families [of Isaak and Solomou] and us,” Maria observed bitterly, adding that The Initiative CEU eTD Collection is determined to do whatever it takes to keep the check-point closed. Andreas made a similar
pledge stating succinctly “One cannot open a check-point where two Cypriot citizens were
169
killed. If they open it – we will try to close it – it is that simple.” 126
Eleni was not the only one among The Initiative’s members to display a preoccupation with
the issue of moral and political education of the younger generations. Many others also
considered the transmission of the historical memory of the events of 1996 to the youth as one
of the central parts of The Initiative’s agenda. Xenios was very young when the events of the
1996 anti-occupational demonstration took place. Neither he nor any of his family members
were present at the demonstration and, like many other Greek Cypriots, he learned about the
incidents by seeing them on TV. Watching the covering of Isaak and Solomou’s deaths left a
lasting impression on him, he said, pointing out that he considers these episodes part of his
personal historical memory – a kind of memory, he said, that should stay and be passed on
from parents to children. Xenios observed with regret that to the people significantly younger
than himself even this mediated form of familiarizing with the dramatic events of 1996 is
unavailable, as they are no longer an object of ongoing public discussions in the media. Thus,
Xenios argued, it is up to The Initiative to make sure that the wo heroes and their sacrifices are
not forgotten:
We are trying to pass the message that we should not forget our heroes, we should pass the meaning of their sacrifices to the new generations, to the students, to those, who never lived these facts the way we did. For example, if someone is 16 years old now, he did not see it on TV the way we did. So what we want to do is to carry this message to the new generations, for them not to forget. We hope that we are going to succeed in it.
CEU eTD Collection Anna, one of The Initiative’s elder participants, also displayed a concern with how the erasure
of historical memory affects young people’s perception of the political situation. In her 50s,
126 The checkpoint was eventually opened on November 12, 2018 (2018. “Cyprus Opens First New Border Crossings in Years.” BBC News, November 12. Retrieved July 10, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world- europe-46182370)). 170
Anna has vivid memories of the 1974 invasion and the horrors of war and displacement. She
has never been to the Northern part of Cyprus since the conflict erupted and said that although
there are places and monasteries in the North she would like to visit again, she would not do
so as long as she has to go through a check-point and show her ID. Since the opening of the
crossings in 2003 the issue of having to present one’s ID to cross to the North was heavily
politicized among the Greek Cypriots, who viewed it as an act of legitimation of TRNC
(Dikomitis 2005; Efthymiou 2014:149). To the post-war generations, Anna lamented, traveling
to the North is much easier, as the act of presenting their passport to the border control to cross
to the North does not have the same political significance to them. Anna joined the 2016
procession from Berlin together with her husband, as they both have a long history of
participating in anti-occupational protests. Being one of the few participants to have personal
memories of the Turkish invasion and to be old enough in 1996 to understand the political
seriousness of the clashes in the buffer zone, Anna said the procession had a very special
meaning for her and even more so for her husband, who participated in the 1996 anti-
occupational protests.
Echoing other members of the Initiative I have interviewed, Anna spoke of the organization’s
mission as that of “awakening” the people and countering the politics of the government that
is trying to keep people politically apathetic and focused on the hedonistic pleasures their daily
life has to offer. According to Anna, the post-war period was marked by a dramatic increase in
the proliferation of “materialistic” and “self-centered” attitudes, as many Greek Cypriots, CEU eTD Collection enabled by the rapid social and economic transformation Cyprus was experiencing, focused on
finding their place in the booming economy and enjoying the previously unavailable consumer
goods and services. Shortly after the devastating 1974 invasion the Cypriot economy entered a
stage of a steady growth, often referred to as “the Cyprus Miracle.” This process was
171
accompanied by fast urbanization and a dramatic reorientation of the economy from agriculture
and fishing to tourism and service industries (Theophanous 2016). Several of Cyprus’ former
agricultural regions rapidly developed into gentrified urban areas and party-paradises for
tourists and wealthy Greek Cypriots, leaving many locals feeling like the nation’s morals are
also experiencing a fast transformation.
Anna sees a hidden agenda behind this drastic increase of Greek Cypriots’ quality of life,
suggesting that the government facilitated it in order to “distract” the people with hedonistic
concerns and “make them forget” about the ongoing occupation. 127 She asserted that the
government is not doing much to preserve the memory of Isaak and Solomou because “they
don’t want heroes” and fear examples that might inspire the people to fight. Anna also
commented on the fact that many of the self-proclaimed Greek-Cypriot patriots are not actually
willing to defend the national interests of the country, claiming that many of those “who shout
that Cyprus is great” actually support the demolition and foreclosure of the army as an
institute128 – a problem that is close to Anna’s heart, as her husband is in the military.
It is in this condition of pervasive feeling of societal indifference that extreme ideas, like those
propagated by ELAM, become appealing to those few who still identify with the national cause,
Anna claimed. The issue of extremism is the one she had thought a lot about and discussed at
length with her husband, as their younger son used to be drawn to ELAM’s ideas; he even
considered joining the movement when he was 16. While she finds the party too radical, Anna CEU eTD Collection
127 Such an opinion is not uncommon in Cyprus. Christou (2006: 294) in her research on understanding of the country’s national goals among Greek Cypriot secondary school students reports that the majority of the students saw their community’s economic prosperity as a major obstacle to the resolution of the Cypriot issue and as a threat to the nation’s fighting spirit. 128 Following Cyprus ascension to the EU and the peaceful opening of check-point enabling Greek Cypriots to cross to the North, the Cypriot ideology of defense and militarization suffered a major setback, which lead to the substantial cuts in the defense budget and a widespread public questioning of the purpose of the institute of the National Guard (Efthymiou 2014:187). 172
told me, her husband has a more sympathetic attitude to it and sometimes wonders if a
movement like ELAM is what is needed to change the situation in the Greek Cypriot society.
Anna’s son’s infatuation with ELAM did not last long and upon seeing the movement’s
proclivity for engaging in street violence he soon lost his enthusiasm for becoming a member.
When reflecting upon what could draw her son to ELAM in the first place, Anna said that he,
just like the most of ELAM’s members, pertains to the minority of Greek Cypriots, who want
to make a difference and who lack the political means to do so. Such people, she added, need
guidance and alternative means of expressing their position. According to Anna, The Initiative,
which is less radical and not tainted by involvement in party politics, can offer one such
alternative.
Unlike most of The Initiative’s members I have spoken to, who insisted that their goal is
nothing other than the “liberation” of the island, Anna’s political vision was a lot more
pragmatic, but at the same time radical, as she advocated for the abandonment of hopes for
reunification and recognition of the de facto existing separation of the island:
I don’t have false beliefs or false pretenses that Cyprus will be free of the Turks – this is bullshit. It will never be free because our politicians don’t want it to be free. So, if I have to live with what I have today, I think, it is best to separate it completely and have two different countries. Let the people get used to it. Because what they are doing now is the government is waiting for the older generations to die. Once the old generations, the ones who have the memories, die – no one would want to go live to the occupied areas because they don’t know it. They would not want to go there. So, if this is it – separate it, don’t let people hope. They [the government] might not want to separate it completely, their goal is to have rotating Turkish – Greek Cypriot CEU eTD Collection presidents, but I don’t want that. … I don’t want to have the Turks coming and going – I don’t want to be coming to the hospital and have to wait in line for the Turkish Cypriots because they are a minority. I would rather pass this message: “Enough! This is the freedom we can have.” I cannot send the message that we want Cyprus to be free because we don’t want Cyprus to be free. … Let us keep our history. We are Greeks, we are Greek Cypriots and we have fought through the centuries to keep our identity.
173
Anna’s position is not something one can often hear being openly voiced in Cyprus. However,
it is only radical in so far as it calls for the recognition of the existing reality. While few of the
self-identified nationalists would acknowledge that they support the status quo, in practice they
often actively contribute to its reproduction by rejecting any possibility of compromise in the
negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot side. During the 2004 referendum the Greek Cypriots
overwhelmingly voted “no” on the UN-backed Anan plan for reunification and it appears that
the majority of Greek Cypriot population remains wary of the bi-communal federative solution.
A reunification at the cost of instituting rotating presidency, endowing the Turkish Cypriots
with equal rights, and integrating them into Greek Cypriots community is not something many
Greek Cypriots support. Anna therefore questioned the sincerity of those Greek Cypriots who
insist on their claims on the occupied territory and continue to visit the Northern part to see the
property that once belonged to them or their parents, arguing that most of these people would
not want to relocate to the North should the reunification happen: “They go [to the North] to
show that they care, that this land is ours. Ok, it is ours, but can we go live there? Do we want
to?”
The bikers’ commitment to the transmission of historical memory of conflict in Cyprus is thus
only tangentially related to a hope that this memory can later become a basis of political
mobilization or anti-occupational struggle. Instead, they tend to view memory as a basis for the
formation and reproduction of a specific type of ethical and political subjectivity – one that
builds around the notions of patriotism, social altruism, and desire to defend one’s community. CEU eTD Collection The rapid cultural changes Cyprus experienced in the past few decades not only led to
weakening of the Greek Cypriot ideology of struggle and militant commitment to memory of
victims and desire of vindication, but also threatened the very basis of this subjectivity. Many
Greek Cypriots experienced the growing prominence of the Western capitalist ideals of
174
individualism and consumerism and incorporation of cultural pluralism into state ideology as
undermining solidarity and the traditional notion of the community (Efthymiou 2011:127;
Ioannou 2014: 110). Consequently, they came to view the commitment to memory that they
felt is being actively undermined by the new state policies as the last frontier in the fight for
the preservation of national consciousness and morals.
5.3. “It’s kind of Heroic, Isn’t It?”: The Cultivation of Ethical and Political Subjectivities
One aspect of The Initiative’s practice that drew my attention during the conversations with its
participants was a conspicuous lack of a strategic political dimension in the organization’s
activities. Despite the proclaimed goals of fighting for liberation, justice, and the restoration of
the rule of law on the entire territory of the island, none of my interlocutors could explain how
they envision the latter to be achieved, and few viewed it as possible in the first place. Few of
the Initiative members I interviewed believed that they could successfully impact government’s
policies, and none expected the meeting they had with the President of the republic to result in
any policy change. When asked about their political vision, all my interlocutors insisted that
while each individual member might have their own political views, The Initiative as an
organization does not put forth any political position and does not advocate for any specific
solution to the Cypriot problem. The only thing that unites The Initiative’s members, they
claimed, is a commitment to the memory of Isaak and Solomou and a desire for Cyprus to be
CEU eTD Collection free. The commitment to raising awareness through large-scale motor processions that it has
inherited from the original bikers’ movement, in the context of The Initiative, has thus lost
much of its instrumental dimension and from a tool of political struggle turned into a form of
symbolic action. While the participants of the 2016 march from Berlin I spoke to said they
were moved by the interest and display of solidarity they have seen from the people on the
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streets in the cities they have passed through, they were also rather skeptical about the
possibility of an intervention from the European states that would bring a solution to the Cyprus
problem. This inability to imagine a political action in response to the protest led to the gradual
ritualization of the bikers’ practice, transforming the procession into a pilgrimage rather than a
form of street politics.
The Initiative members’ position reflects the major contradiction of contemporary Greek
Cypriot nationalism that eschews the possibility of compromise and pledges an eternal
commitment to the struggle for the island’s liberation, but simultaneously lacks the capacity to
imagine how the latter can be achieved here and now. The Initiative’s anti-systemic ethos and
its members’ tendency to explicitly denounce all things political, only further exasperates this
trend. One of my informants, who was present during The Initiative members’ meeting with
President Anastasiades, told me that the President asked the bikers about their vision and
suggestions for the resolution of Cyprus problem and about what they think the government
should do. To that Andreas replied: “Mr. President, we are not politicians, we just want you to
do what is best for the island. We are not politicians and nor do we want to do politics.” This
episode illustrates well the seemingly paradoxical position of The Initiative members, who
invest a lot of energy and time into getting public visibility and demand that their voices be
heard, and yet lack a clearly formulated political vision and concrete suggestions and solutions
when asked about it.
CEU eTD Collection I argue that the Initiative’s processions represent not an instrumental political action aimed at
yielding a response from authorities or broader society, but as a ritualized activity performed
for its own sake. More of a subculture than a political movement, The Initiative creates a
community and a space for cultivating an ethical and political subjectivity that is defined by
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commitment to memory of the heroes and victims of the Turkish invasion, upholding of
“traditional” Greek ethnic virtues, and preparedness to sacrifice for one’s country. To the
people participating in the processions, the bike ride is more than just a form of making a
publicly visible political statement; it is also an engaging, adventurous, and at times challenging
endeavor, which provides an occasion for social bonding, self-realization through overcoming
difficulties, and simply fun. Many of The Initiative members I have spoken to said that the
group is like family to them and that they feel like they can always count on each other. As
Kostas, a law school graduate and a long-lasting member of the organization put it, “we feel
very close to each other, we have bonds, we are a team – that’s what makes The Initiative so
strong – we feel like brothers.” Kostas joined The Initiative in 2009, after he finished his BA
studies in Greece and returned to Cyprus. He has been good friends with The Initiative’s
organizers long before 2008. A descendant of the refugees from Famagusta Nicolas grew up in
Limassol and met many of guys who later formed The Initiative’s core collective during his
army service.
For many, participation in The Initiative is also a form testing oneself. The three-day ride is a
challenge not everyone can meet; usually about 40 to 50 people participate in the first part,
most of the demonstrators joining only during the last day. “The first part is not an easy one,”
Xenios confessed, adding that be it a rainy day or the hottest day of the summer, the bikers
keep going, they do not make stops and never change the route. While the format of the event
– motor procession – was inspired by the desire to recreate the original procession of 1996, CEU eTD Collection Xenios also admitted that the appeal of the idea of bikers’ protest in general and the allure of
adventures and romantics of the road played important role in young men’s decision to preserve
the “historical” form of the event:
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because of the bikes we give a different potential to this thing. It is something stronger than either marching or singing, or anything else. It is because bikers usually have a different sense of freedom in their minds.
Alongside the shared political aspirations and symbols the biker culture itself also serves as a
cohesive element in The Initiative that creates a sense of community among the processions’
participants. As Andrew Maxwell (1998) has demonstrated in his research of motorcyclist
subculture in post-industrial urban America, biker lifestyle and the shared and intense
experience of bonding joint motor rides generate has a powerful potential for creating new
identities and neatly tied communities. Similarly, Jill Dubisch’s research (2004) on the
motorcycle pilgrimage to the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, DC reveals the motor
rides’ potential to establish a shared identity and a sense of community among the people with
disparate historical experiences – the veterans who survived the combat, their families and
friends, and the bikers who support the cause but have no personal connections to the conflict.
“Through the shared journey and the hardships of the road, the presumed common goals of the
pilgrimage, the common bonds of biker culture and of veterans’ experience a sense of
communitas may be created,” she (2004:118) argues. The remarkable success of The
Initiative’s events among Greek Cypriot public thus appears to be conditioned not simply by
the cause it is organized for, but also by the appeal of the practice of motor processions itself
and its capacity to induce powerful emotions and unite its participants into a community of
memory. As Xenios himself pointed out, a lot of people decide to join not least because this
procession is the biggest biker event in Cyprus. However, it would be incorrect to think that CEU eTD Collection the “the majority of people come just for the bikes,” he added.
As discussed in Chapter 3, nostalgia for the pre-1996 tradition of anti-occupational events and
the feeling of community and shared struggle it produced, played an important role in
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mobilizing ELAM activists. A similar sentiment was pervasive among The Initiative’s
participants. Maria, who has been part of The Initiative since 2011 was eighteen years old when
Isaak and Solomou were killed. She was on holiday with her boyfriend in Paralimni back then
and despite her mother’s warnings went to the check-point to join the anti-occupational rally.
Once she heard in 2010 that a bikers’ procession was organized in memory of Isaak and
Solomou she immediately wanted to join. She could not, however, participate at the time as
she had neither a bike nor a person who could take her. Maria remembered with warmth the
20th of July anti-occupational demonstrations in Nicosia she attended during her school years.
All classes would be cancelled on that day and all the students would be brought to Ledra
Palace, where they would sing songs and recite chants. “Now you don’t see any school children
there – sometimes university students, but not many,” she observed with regret.
Maria’s school experience during the late 1980s – mid-1990s was strongly shaped by the so-
called “I don’t forget!” (“Den Ksehno!”) educational policy that came to dominate Greek
Cypriot curricula starting from the mid-1980s (Charalambous et al. 2017: 163). This policy,
which in the 1990s gained an even more militant character (renamed appropriately into “I
know, I don’t forget and I struggle!”) started to gradually decline since 2003, as Cyprus was
about to join the European Union. With the election of the pro-unification left-wing
government in 2008, the ideal of peaceful coexistence and cultivation of mutual respect and
cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities formally became part of the
Greek Cypriot educational policy (Charalambous et al. 2014, 2017). When talking about how CEU eTD Collection her school experience compares to that of her niece, who at the time of our conversation was
in the 8th grade, Maria expressed her disappointment with the fact that the message of memory
and struggle in school education has been replaced with the rhetoric of peaceful co-existence:
What they teach now – I might be wrong, but I don’t agree with this – is that there is a solution, that we should live in peace with our “brothers” Turkish
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Cypriots … but I don’t know if this “brother” is a Turkish Cypriot or a Turk! I don’t know if he was born in Turkey before 1974 and then took over property from my people. If they [the Turkish settlers] leave, then we can try to live together.
Despite her frustration with the political changes happening in Cyprus, Maria insisted that The
Initiative is not trying to resurrect the tradition of the anti-occupational protests, or “inspire
people” to do any protest or political action independently of The Initiative.” “I am not sure we
are trying to do something similar to the anti-occupational events,” she concluded after
pondering the issue for a moment, adding that the organization’s main goal is the preservation
of Isaak and Solomou’s memory.
The media materials produced and distributed by The Initiative, however, project a somewhat
different impression. One of the organization’s leaflets (see Figure 5.5) depicts a motorcyclist
riding his bike, his left hand with a fist high in the air, the so-called “Greek Cypriot” flag – an
unofficial flag showing the yellow map of Cyprus transposed upon the Greek white-cross flag
and used by the nationalists as a symbol of the struggle for the unity with Greece (enosis) –
attached to the back of his motorcycle. The text on the leaflet addresses the Greek Cypriots
calling them to resist the selfish and pragmatic concerns, which undermine the communal
spirit and divide the society, and to regain political agency and power through a united action:
The struggle is communal only when it starts in the house of every person. A clenched fist can break iron when united with that of a neighbor. Independent of the muscle strength. The path is difficult and not because there is a misfortune, but to the contrary. We like the golden debt-ridden cage and live among kings as if slaves. Incapable little men we are unworthy of attention for them when counted one by one. One is nobody, thousands are everything. Remember this. CEU eTD Collection
This leaflet can be read as an appeal to Greek Cypriots to remember their heritage and its moral
ethos and to leave behind (even if just for a moment) the comfort of everyday life and embark
on a heroic quest for glory and adventure.
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Figure 5.4. The cover of The Initiative’s Leaflet “How Dare You, Bikers!!!”
While the event might seem rebellious in flavor, with the romantic ideals of heroism, action,
and struggle shaping the ethos of the procession, the political vision of the struggle The
Initiative promotes is far from radical and is mainly framed in terms of human rights and
international justice discourses. As Xenios put it:
We are doing what we are doing with peaceful means and we think that this is enough. We do not ask to start a war, a fight or a struggle against the Turks CEU eTD Collection or do something similar, but it is our right to struggle against the Turkish occupation following the rule of law of all countries, that’s it. ... Our people like everyone else are just looking to have some basic human rights in our country.
The Initiative’s ideological core thus incorporates the two conflicting trajectories of the post-
1974 Greek Cypriot nationalism: the nostalgic longing for the militant ideals of struggle and
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resistance and the traditional Greek ideals of (mostly masculine) virtue that had structured
Greek nationalism during the anti-colonial struggle and the first years of the post-independence
period; and the modern political vision of a peaceful and unified Cyrus that started developing
after the Turkish invasion and partition of the island and that rests on the ideas of humanism,
democracy, and the rule of international law. Miranda Christou (2006), in her insightful
ethnography of the nationalist education in Greek Cypriot high schools, points out that this
pursuit of the conflicting visions – the attempt to bring up the fighting spirit and the principles
of honor the Greek heroes of the past have possessed, while also trying to instill in students
respect for the values of democracy and rule of law – create a lot of dissatisfaction and
confusion among the young generation. The youth is being called upon to be strong and to fight
and at the same time is being constantly cautioned against doing anything that would subvert
the political status quo. One of the student informants Christou (2006: 295) cites expressed his
indignation at the teachers, who give the students the heroes of 1955 and 1974 as exemplars to
imitate and at the same time prevent them from taking any independent political action: “They
tell us about all these heroes, they put them up on a pedestal; they tell us that we can do
something but when we start doing it, they try to stop us!”
Christou (2006) reports that, when asked, many of the students cited Isaak and Solomou as
examples of “real” heroism, perhaps, because in course of their protest action they both have
chosen to disregard the cautions and warnings of the authorities and were able to not just talk
about values of “honor” and “freedom,” but to act on them. A similar respect and admiration CEU eTD Collection of the ability to act on one’s beliefs is visible in the narrative of Solomou’s final moment, which
is put up on The Initiative’s web blog:
The Hellenic descent of Solomos, the memory of his cousin’s sacrifice, did not let him tolerate humiliation and showed him the path of honor. ... The Greek fellow overpowers everyone who hinders him, refuses to hear the call of all those cautioners who tell him to step back and moves forward alone on the path
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of honor. He walks in the midst of the occupied territories and joins the pantheon of our Cypriot heroes. ... Here the two sides of the Cypriot society collide. On the one side – those who have given in to the material wealth, well-being and not caring attitude. The other – those who inspired by the principles and values of our centuries-long Greek history. ... The heroes gave that what is considered to be the supreme good in the civilized world – human life – in order to achieve their goal. Freedom is the most noble goal in life. Freedom in Cyprus means the expulsion of the occupying Turkish troops that keep us away from our occupied land. It means hard work, struggles, sacrifices. It means Tasos Isaak and Solomos Solomou. It means to not retreat and to ask not less than the liberation of our land (Poreia Eleftherias n.d.).129
This description once again reflects the perceived internal divide in Cypriot society – between
those who seek to compromise and those who want to continue fighting, between those driven
by the pursuit of personal wellbeing and those inspired by the ideals of heroism and sacrifice.
It also aims to shame and condemn those who lack the “noble” aspirations and are unwilling
to take the risk and sacrifice in the name of something greater. It is this rebellious element of
the two heroes’ acts – their ability to neglect the pragmatic constrains (security, law) most
people are subject to – that makes them so inspiring for the contemporary Greek Cypriot young
people. During the interview Xenios retold me with a dosage of visible excitement the moment
when Solomou, ignoring the concerned shouts coming from the crowd, started climbing the
flag pole while still enjoying his cigarette, as if it was a casual act. Upon concluding the story,
he added, looking at me inquiringly: “It is kind of heroic, isn’t it? I mean the picture – you
could see... It was dramatic the way that he denied everything, even death… He knew that he
could die, but he still did it.”
Fascination with bravery and longing for heroism was prominent in the discourse of most of CEU eTD Collection
The Initiative members I spoke two. Kostas, who has a strong interest in history, stated that
129 Retrieved June 30, 2019 (https://isaaksolomou.com/αύγουστος-1996/). 183
Greek history offers many examples of heroes – “people who could avoid death, but they did
not because they believed that freedom is more important than life itself”:
Isaak and Solomou were very young and they were ordinary people, like me, and that is what makes it so special. It is a message for us that ordinary people can become heroes and stay firm for what they believe. I think that when people do such actions, when they die for freedom or dignity … – they become semi-Gods. That’s my belief because they left the daily problems of life and they sought something bigger … That’s very encouraging to us because it proves that we can do things bigger than us, if we choose. So, I was always fascinated by those examples and I think that they are what we need to imitate, we need to live according to the principles and the ideals they died for. … They showed us how we should live our lives.
According to Xenios, Isaak and Solomou, who “did not hesitate to put their lives at risk and
ultimately paid the highest cost in order to claim the freedom of their country” should serve as
examples for all Greek people. Xenios and Costas’ vision of sacrifice echoes Eleni’s assertion
of preparedness to die as an ultimate virtue – a vision that reflects the hero-centric logic of the
Greek Cypriot nationalist discourses. “In western civilization to live is considered to be the
most sacred and valuable right each human has,” Xenios stated, explaining that the ultimate
form of ethnic virtue and the key precept of “the Greek heritage” is then “to be decisive to
donate the most sacred right in order for your country to enjoy its Freedom.” These statements
are very similar to the assertions of Evgenii Rodionov’s venerators in Russia provided in the
previous chapter, which cast preparedness to sacrifice one’s life as the main source of strength
and precondition for the national survival. Both in the Russian and Greek Cypriot cases self-
sacrifice is often represented as a national trait that distinguishes their societies from the
Western culture that they see as lacking such an ideal. CEU eTD Collection
I argue that the success and appeal of The Initiative’s events to the young audience lies in the
fact that its format proved highly apt for incorporating the two contradictory ethical orientations
on which the modern Greek Cypriot nationalism rests: the romanticized impulse for freedom
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and active struggle, which finds expression in the bikers’ culture, and the civic ideals of
democracy and rule of law, visible in the protest’s framing through the human rights discourses.
Isaak and Solomou, who are less radical than the anti-colonial guerilla fighters of 1955-1959,
but more active than the faceless victims of 1974, provide a concrete and tangible model of
struggle and heroism. As the cause of the two hero-martyrs remains relevant to the present-day
political predicament of Cyprus, modern Greek Cypriots can easily imitate their heroes by
keeping their cause alive through joining the bikers’ march. Moreover, the very practice of the
procession, the efforts and commitments the participation in it takes, give one an impression
and a sense of having taken a “real” action and the moral satisfaction that comes with it, which
many Greek Cypriots, tired of political rhetoric and “empty talk,” are looking for.
5.4. Concluding Remarks
If in the case of ELAM the ethical and the strategic dimension of collective practices are closely
intertwined, The Initiative’s processions seem to be increasingly decoupled from the pursuit of
concrete political goals. Public commemorative rituals, in this context, are meant not so much
to prompt a reaction or intervention from the European countries or Greek Cypriot authorities
as they are meant to shape the participants’ moral and political subjectivities. As Christou
(2006: 298) succinctly observes, “The political subjectivity of the new generation of Greek
Cypriots is constituted through a historical definition of struggle that oscillates between armed
CEU eTD Collection resistance and the silent persistence of memory.” In the context when the ideals of armed
resurrection are no longer thinkable and the possibility of change through a collective political
action falls short of being believable, memory itself comes to be seen as a form of political
action.
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Anthropologists working on Cyprus have long pointed out the special political and moral
significance of the notion of memory is imbued with in the Cypriot context (Bryant 2004, 2010;
Papadakis 1998, 2003, 2008; Sant Cassia 2005, 2007, 2009). Remembrance of the national
heroes and national wounds has historically been presented in the Greek Cypriot education
both as an ethical duty and a civic responsibility of an individual (Papadakis 1998, 2003).
However, in contrast to the Russian case, where since the late 2000s the state has taken up the
leading role in the production of a new, hero-centered culture of memory through organization
of spectacular military parades, erection of monuments, and funding of educational patriotic
projects, in Cyprus there is a growing perception that the incumbent government has little
commitment to upholding the memory of the conflict. Consequently, the moralization of the
issue of memory in Cyprus is mostly coming from the grassroots activists, like ELAM and the
Initiative, who are trying to remind the society of its duty of memory. Participation in the
Initiative’s processions thus provides the bikers with an opportunity to both express their moral
and civic position through a public commitment to the memory of the heroes and to imagine
themselves as actors in the national struggle.
In this context the figures of Isaak and Solomou emerge not just as heroes’ whose sacrifice
demands vindication, but also as moral exemplars, whom the bikers are invited to follow.
Similarly to the Russian young men’s engagement with the figure of Evgenii Rodionov,
exemplarity in the case of Isaak and Solomou does not presuppose direct imitation – after all
The Initiative takes security very seriously and does its best to prevent any provocations or CEU eTD Collection actions that could lead to a direct confrontation in the Green Zone. Rather, Isaak and Solomou
are taken as contemporary exemplars of Greek character and ethnic virtues – patriotism,
bravery, and loyalty – the traits Initiative’s participants are trying to cultivate in themselves.
The commemorative events are also aimed at the moral transformation of the broader Greek
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Cypriot community and the revival of the above-mentioned values and respect for them within
it through cultivating a commitment to memory.
Being less radical and militant compared to ELAM, the biker’s processions hold a broad appeal
to young Greek Cypriots who do not identify with the far-right views but who are trying to find
a suitable way of expressing their nationalism and their frustration with the political status quo.
When commenting upon the contemporary Greek Cypriot youth’s political subjectivities
Christou (2006:300) argues that in many cases for them nationalism – is “is the longing for a
purpose, any national purpose, as long as it is strongly asserted and passionately pursued.” The
Initiative’s processions offer the young people just such a “passionate” and “exciting” way of
publicly expressing their commitment to the national cause and participating in the imagined
historical struggle of the Greek nation. The Initiative’s refusal to formulate a concrete political
agenda other than the vague notion of “liberation” also contributes to its popularity as it
mobilizes large numbers of people, who hold divergent views on how specific issues produced
by the island’s division should be settled. By focusing instead on the sacrifices of Isaak and
Solomou, The Initiative thus manages both to escape the stigma of being a “political”
movement and to sustain its appeal to a broad public that is otherwise divided by politics. Just
like Evgenii Rodionov’s commemoration in contemporary Russia that is oriented less towards
settling the historical scores related to the Chechen conflict and more towards producing a
militant model of morality, the bikers’ procession in memory of Isaak and Solomou mostly
aims to establish a community of memory and create space for the production and expression CEU eTD Collection of a militant ethical and political subjectivity. Much like in the Russian case, such a subjectivity
is explicitly framed in opposition to the values of individualism, materialism, and consumerism
through embracing radical idealism and asserting the notion of self-sacrifice as an ultimate
national value.
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PART III Sainthood and the Varieties of Ethical Engagements
6. A Folk Saint: Popular Veneration of Evgenii Rodionov in Russia
While there undoubtedly exists a strong historical continuity between the Orthodox rites of
martyrs and saints’ veneration and the secular nation-state practices of heroes’ commemoration
in respect to the role they play in the affirmation of communal identity and dominant beliefs
and values (Brown 1981; Fedor 2013; Green [1975] 2010; Lenhoff 1989; Limberis 2011;
Kharkhordin 1999; Rousselet 2015; Smith 1997; Steinberg 2002), there is also a substantial
difference between these two types of commemorative traditions. By commemorative
traditions I understand here the distinct ways of construing the meaning of a sacrificial act,
thinking about the ontological nature of life and death, and imagining the posthumous fate of
the sacrificial figures. In contrast to the heroes, who are largely being thought of as “dead”
persons, the martyrs are believed to be “living” saints, this nontrivial difference in the imagined
ontological status of the cult figures resulting in two distinct ethical models of commemoration.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the commemoration of heroes largely builds around the notion of a
collective duty to remember (Danilova 2015; Sant Cassia 2006) – a community’s symbolic
form of paying off its debt to the individuals who had sacrificed their lives for it. By contrast,
the veneration of saints and martyrs, who are imagined to have already received the highest
reward possible, is organized around the principle of reciprocity and a personal relationship
that lay believers develop with their patron-saints (Green [1975] 2010:41). While the Orthodox
tradition encourages the commemoration of saints, the lay believers bear no collective CEU eTD Collection obligation to remember and venerate all the saints known to the Church. Instead, they pick a
number of the saints based on their hagiographies, miracle-working reputation, or simply name
(if they happened to be named after one) and turn to them in the moments of need, read their
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vitas hoping to find there an answer to their own moral dilemmas, pray to them in hope of
intersession, and make commitments and promises to them (Rey 2012).
The borderline case of Evgenii Rodionov, who is commemorated both as a hero of the Chechen
war and as an Orthodox saint and exemplar of faith, makes the tension between the two ethical
models of commemoration sketched out above particularly apparent. In this chapter I
investigate the convergences and tensions between the Orthodox-martyrical and the Soviet-
heroic commemorative traditions as they come to be articulated in Rodionov’s cult. By placing
this juxtaposition at the center of my analysis, I aim to develop an understanding of the soldier’s
cult that would move beyond the characterizations operating with such reified categories like
“secular” and “religious”, or “political” and “spiritual”, famously (and convincingly) criticized
by anthropologist Talal Asad (2003: 25) for their ahistoricity and limited analytical utility.
Instead, I am interested here in exploring how the discourses and practices pertaining to
different commemorative traditions come together in Rodionov’s cult and how the public
parading of the soldier’s image for patriotic purposes co-exists with very private and personal
ways of engaging with him as a saint.
This chapter explores the multiform popular practices of Rodionov’s veneration and
commemoration that range from prayers and pilgrimages to the soldier’s grave to the
organization of memorial concerts and “lessons in courage” devoted to Rodionov. Building on
the interviews with the Rodionov’s venerators I flesh out the diverse ways in which different CEU eTD Collection actors engage with the soldier’s saintly figure. To many of his venerators, Rodionov is both a
distant and unattainable exemplar of faith and a close friend whose presence, support, and
protection they believe to feel in their every-day lives. The pedagogical and the devotional
dimensions of the cult are thus closely intertwined, as the soldier’s veneration provides the
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believers with a platform to both express their moral beliefs and enact their faith through
cultivating a personal relationship with a saint.
6.1. Popular Veneration
The largest yearly commemorative event for Rodionov takes place by his grave in the village
of Satino-Russkoe on May 23 – the day of the soldier’s birth and death. The celebration
attracts a large and diverse group of visitors, including the priests coming to serve the
memorial service, pilgrims from all over Russia coming to pray to this new saint in hope of
intercession, Chechen war veterans, current military servicemen and members of different
patriotic youth organizations wishing to pay tribute to the fallen hero.130 Liubov’’ is always
there warmly welcoming the visitors and inviting everyone to help themselves with modest
treats – tea and buckwheat kasha with stewed meat131 – served to the guests at an improvised
field kitchen. The inscription on the tall wooden cross towering over Rodionov’s grave reads:
Here rests the Russian soldier Evgenii Rodionov, who defended his Fatherland and did not
abjure Christ, executed near Bamut on May 23, 1996.” The gravesite itself is covered with
the wreaths and emblems of different military unions and associations as well as different
versions of Rodionov’s icons (see Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). The monotonous melodic sounds
of the Orthodox chanting alternate with the dynamic and lively rhythms of the military marches
delivered by cadet orchestras and the simple melodies of popular soldierly songs narrating the
CEU eTD Collection joys and difficulties of a serviceman’s life coming from an amateur concert organized in front
of the cemetery.
130 The number of visitors varies across years from a few hundred to two or three thousand. 131 Meal commonly served in the army. 190
Figure 6.1. Cross by Evgenii Figure 6.2. Emblem of the Russian airborne Rodionov’s grave. Photograph by the troops by Rodionov’s grave. Photograph by author, Satino-Russkoe, May 2016. the author, Satino-Russkoe, May 2016.
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 6.3. Rodionov’s icon and a border-guard hat. Photograph by the author, Satino- Russkoe, May 2016.
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Sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2000:29) interprets such a merging of religious and
nationalist symbols, which she views as a characteristic feature of religiosity in modernity, as
a dual process of “the ethno-symbolic homogenization of traditional religious (confessional)
identities and ... the neo-religious recharging of ethnic identities” (p. 161). While seemingly
organic at the surface, this convergence between nationalist and Orthodox ritual practice,
aesthetics, and symbols, is, however, fraught with numerous tensions and contradictions. Many
of these tensions stem from Rodionov’s ambiguous status as an uncanonized saint and his dual
perception as a “dead” hero and as a “living” saint. For example, despite the fact that several
versions of a prayer service to the “holy martyr Evgenii” have been compiled and published
(albeit without ROC’ authorization), the majority of Orthodox priests who visit the soldier’s
grave choose to serve panikhida there (see Figure 6.3) – a standard memorial service for the
deceased. In contrast to moleben – a prayer service that addresses a saint directly and calls him
or her to intercede before God on behalf of the congregation – panikhida is a prayer service
directed to God, in course of which the priest and the congregation pray for the salvation and
peaceful rest of a diseased person’s soul. Despite choosing a service that is due to an ordinary
deceased person rather than a saint, in a brief sermon addressed to the congregation that follows
the rite, many priests would often refer to Rodionov as a “martyr” and conclude their speech
with a direct address to him: “Holy martyr-warrior Evgenii, pray to God for us.”
This ambiguous practice largely stems from the desire of individual priests to avoid openly
CEU eTD Collection violating the churchly protocols and the risk of being accused of arbitrariness for venerating an
uncanonized saint. The concern the priests have about bringing upon themselves the wreath of
churchly authorities, is not ungrounded. The few priests who decided to display the soldier’s
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Figure 6.4. Memorial service by Rodionov’s grave. Satino-Russkoe, May 2016. Source: http://zavtra.ru/blogs/o-svyatosti-evgeniya-rodionova
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 6.5. Cadets from Sviato-Alekseevskii monastery by Evgenii Rodionov’s grave. Satino-Russkoe, May 2016. Source: http://www.specnaz.ru/articles/237/21/2468.htm
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icons in their churches were subsequently reprimanded by their superiors and forced to remove
the icons (Boikov 2010; Russkaia Narodnaia Liniia, February 18, 2010).132 Even the Union of
Orthodox Banner-Bearers – an organization independent from the Church that has been
militantly advocating for Rodionov’s canonization since the 1990s – practices caution in
displaying their banners (horugvi) on which Rodionov is presented as a saint. As their
representative whom I have met at the memorial event explained to me, while the Union always
brings their banners with Rodionov for the events and cross processions organized in
cooperation with lay organizations, especially the military, they leave them behind when
attending the events held together with the Church “so as not to annoy the Churchly
authorities.”
Father Nikolai – one of the earliest outspoken advocates for Rodionov’s canonization – has
been coming to Satino-Russkoe to serve panikhida by the soldier’s grave almost every year for
the past 17 years. He was among the first to start publicly advocating for the glorification of
Rodionov, whom he learned of in the late 1990s from the news report aired on Russkii Dom.
He had met with Liubov’’ Rodionova soon after that and had written several articles about her
and Rodionov’s story that he published in Zavtra newspaper under a pen name. Before
becoming a priest, Fr. Nikolai used to be a marine officer and he admits that it was partially his
military background that made Rodionov’s story resonate so strongly with him:
For those of us, like myself, who served in the military in the 1990s – we all are familiar with this situation when you, without any means or capabilities, are being pushed into these intractable, hopeless [conflict] situations. … War is a form of horrible betrayal and torture and those who experienced it in their CEU eTD Collection own skins know full well the situation [in Chechnya] these soldiers were in, in the conditions of that war, when they were not acknowledged as heroes but, to the contrary, were dragged through the mire. Underequipped, undertrained – the army was abandoned…
132 2010. “Kogo i Pochemu Pugaet Mirotochenie Ikony Evgeniia Rodionova?” Russkaia Narodnaia Liniia, February 18. Retrieved July 6, 2019. 194
Despite being firmly convinced that the soldier is a saint and that miraculous help can be
solicited via payers to him, Fr. Nikolai nevertheless maintained that it is not proper for an
individual priest to perform a moleben to Rodionov until the formal decision of canonization
is made, condemning such practice as “a dangerous act of subversion of churchly discipline
and authority.”
During the memorial celebration in 2015 I witnessed another priest publicly comment upon
this apparent contradiction between beliefs and practice. Upon completing the panikhida he
addressed the public with the following words: “We have just performed a panikhida –
formally, but we know that he [Rodionov] is alive, that he has no need in our prayers and that
we are the ones who have a need in him”. The brief speech was concluded with a call to the
people to worship the soldier and pray to him “even though he has not been officially canonized
yet.” Through this act of explication, the priest attempted to reframe Rodionov’s
commemoration, reminding the public that despite the form it takes, it should not be understood
in the context of ethics of duty. Instead of paying the respects that are due to the dead heroes,
the believers are encouraged to address the living saint asking the solider for his help and
intercession.
Other priests resort to more creative solutions to resolve the contradiction between the form of
the rite and Rodionov’s saintly status. Thus, many of my informants have reported that one
priest from the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk, who regularly attends the yearly memorial CEU eTD Collection event, serves a liturgy right by Rodionov’s grave, using an antimins133 to replace the altar. As
I have learned from Liubov’, in 2016 that priest for the first time served a liturgy by the
133Antimins is a rectangular piece of cloth with a small pieces of martyr relic sewn into it; it plays a central role in the Eastern Orthodox liturgy service and in certain cases can function as a replacement of the altar. 195
soldier’s grave without an antimins – an act that amounts to a recognition of Rodionov’s grave
as a holy site of its own right that does not require sanctification through the mediation of other
holy objects. This rebellious act, however, proved to be more of an accident than a premeditated
political statement: an absent-minded priest had forgotten to bring the precious relic with him.
As his usual in-between way of honoring Rodionov was rendered impossible, the priest had to
choose between switching to the panikhida or proceeding with the liturgy, finally opting for
the latter. According to Liubov’, the priest later confessed to her that he was happy to have
finally achieved the consistency of words and deeds and affirm his belief in the soldier’s
sainthood by practice.
Rodionov’s memory day provides an apt occasion for the patriotic education of youth. In the
course of my two visits to the celebration in 2015 and 2016, I encountered several
groups of youngsters of mixed age and gender, who were brought to the event in an organized
manner (see Figure 6.5). The younger ones were usually students of religious Sunday schools
from different parishes across the Moscow oblast’, who came accompanied by a rector of their
local church; the older groups, which tended to be mostly male, were military academy
students, recent conscripts, or members of the military-patriotic clubs. Each round of
panikhida served by the soldier’s grave ended with a brief sermon, in the course of which a
priest would often speak of the virtuousness of military service and its significance for the
preservation of the Russian nation. After the memorial service, a large queue would form in
front of the grave with the believers wishing to worship the martyr: they would come one by CEU eTD Collection one to the wooden cross on which Rodionov’s icon is hung and kiss it; many would go down
on their knees to venerate the earth and those believing in the grave-site’s healing powers take
a handful of earth with them. Less constrained by the churchly canon, they act upon their beliefs
more freely. As they wait their turn to come closer to the grave the believers exchange personal
196
stories of help solicited via prayers to the soldier and rumors about the miracles happening at
the feast. During the memorial event in 2016 an elderly woman standing a few meters from the
little fence surrounding the grave stopped me as I was trying to make my way through the
crowd to get a closer look at the gravesite. She asked me if I heard about the miracle that just
took place right at the feast. I shook my head and she narrated to me a story of a hymn singer
who came to read an akathist134 by the grave. The singer had a poor eyesight and as he came
up to the grave, he realized that he had forgotten his glasses at home. Upon looking at
Rodionov’s photograph, the men reportedly saw the soldier smile at him, after which he found
himself to be able to clearly discern the text without the glasses and finish the rite.
After the last panikhida is served and the last priest present at the gravesite leaves, lay
believers would take over, sometimes simply standing there in silence, sometimes performing
their own rites or delivering speeches. During the commemorative event in 2016, I witnessed
a group of believers organize a reading of akathist to Rodionov from the small booklets that
were circulated earlier during the event (see Figure 6.6). When the reading was over, a Chechen
war veteran in a wheelchair came forward and asked the public for permission to speak. He
then denounced the position of the Russian government and the Patriarchy, alleging that they
were deliberately trying to downplay the significance of the soldier’s deed and create
impediments to his veneration in order to “impose tolerance” and avoid angering the Muslim
community. He claimed that through one high-ranking official from the Spiritual Council of
Muslims in Russia he heard of a former mufti who converted to Christianity upon seeing a CEU eTD Collection video of Rodionov’s execution. The video was allegedly shown to him in a madrassa among
other video footages of the killings of Russian soldiers in order to incite hatred against
134 Christian Orthodox hymn service dedicated to a saint or a holy event. 197
Figure 6.6. Lay believers reading the akathist by Rodionov’s grave. Photograph by the author, Satino-Russkoe, May 2016.
“infidels.” According to the veteran, the video, however, had an opposite effect on the mufti,
as Rodionov’s preparedness to die for Christ convinced him of the truthfulness of Orthodox
faith. The veteran concluded by praising the bravery and honesty of those few priests who
openly speak about the soldier’s sainthood and by pointing out that only through popular
(narodnye) private and public acts of veneration can Rodionov’s memory be preserved. Later,
in a private conversation, the veteran told me that Rodionov has a special power of helping
CEU eTD Collection both Christians and Muslims who fell victim to recruitment by Islamic extremist organizations.
“I heard that relatives of people who, like Varvara Karaulova,135 were recruited into Islamic
135 In 2015, Varvara Karaulova, a model student of the Moscow State University’s Philosophy Department, converted to Islam and carried out a failed attempt to reach the Islamic State in Syria to marry an ISIS fighter there (Nehezin 2016). Her case and subsequent trial in Russia were broadly publicized, opening up a big public discussion on the dangers of conversion to Islam and online radicalization. 198
State, are praying to Evgenii and that he helps to return people to Orthodox faith.” He also
mentioned hearing about the stories of Muslims converting to Christianity after Rodionov
appeared to them as “a soldier in a red cloak.” For the veteran the soldier thus represents a
guardian of not only state borders, but also of people’s souls, as he helps save those who would
otherwise be lost to the sin of “hagarism.” While this image of Rodionov as a protector against
conversions was not very present in the written hagiographic accounts of his life I have
encountered, the narratives of Muslim believers converting to Orthodoxy upon having the
soldier “miraculously appear” to them were part of the oral folklore that I heard reproduced by
several of my informants. Such accounts draw on the familiar trope of the blood of martyrs as
“the seed of Christians,” casting witnessing for Christ as a practice that not only helps to
delineate and guard the confessional identity of a community through resistance to conversion
(Krstić 2011: 18), but also helps expand the confessional community, as martyrs’ ultimate
displays of commitment can convince non-Christians in the truthfulness of the faith they
profess (Salisbury 2004). As Nomikos Vaporis (2000: 15), the author of a martyrologue
documenting the stories of Greek neo-martyrs of Ottoman era, put it, martyrdom is an “ample
proof of the worth of Orthodoxy” because so many people of different social positions were
“eager to demonstrate their loyalty to Jesus Christ by enthusiastically sacrificing their lives.”
The event in Satino-Russkoe attracts many representatives of the so-called alternative
Orthodox streams adhering to beliefs and practices not formally encouraged by the ROC:
supporters of canonization of such controversial figures as Tsar Ivan the Terrible and Grigorii CEU eTD Collection Rasputin, the members of the eccentric Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers, and different sorts
of visionaries and charismatic preachers who can be seen giving away booklets and delivering
sermons to small groups of enthusiastic and sometimes skeptical listeners. While not large in
numbers, they are particularly visible at the event and their presence rarely goes unnoticed by
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the priests, whom I have heard on several occasions publicly asking the people to stop
circulating “blasphemous” booklets or to remove Rasputin’s icons so as “not to desecrate the
holy site.” A young priest from Shuiia who came accompanying a large group of pilgrims from
his parish – mostly children and teenagers who were brought to the celebration as part of the
parish’s efforts to develop patriotic education – told me that the feast left an ambiguous
impression on him. He said that he deeply respects Rodionov’s deed and considers the soldier
a great exemplar for patriotic, spiritual, and moral education. However, he was not sure if he
would bring a new group of children next year, explaining that he was very disturbed by the
presence and circulation of “leaflets of a particular content” at the feast. “There is no graver
sin than that of schism,” he concluded. While intolerant towards schismatics, the priests are
rather lenient towards the lay believers’ uncanonical expressions of faith. On several occasions
I have witnessed believers approaching the priests at the feast asking whether the practice of
venerating Rodionov before his formal canonization is sinful. All were visibly relieved once
they were reassured that private prayers to the soldier are permissible.
Father Nikita – a young dean of the Church of God’s Ascension adjacent to the Satino-Russkoe
cemetery – is disturbed by the many “unorthodox” practices taking place just a few meters
away from his church’s porch, but has no other choice than to tolerate them, since, as he
acknowledges, he has no right or authority to prohibit anyone from visiting the cemetery.
Despite its geographical proximity, the parish of the Church of God’s Ascension does not take
any part in the organization of the celebration.136 Fr. Nikita explained to me that he had not CEU eTD Collection heard about Rodionov before 2009, when he was appointed to take over the position of the
dean of the local Church of Christ’s Ascension and that he was caught by surprise when he first
136The parish’s exclusion from Rodionov’s celebration is likely to be due to the uneasy personal relationship Liubov’ Rodionova had with the former dean of the Church, whose position was taken over by Father Nikita in 2009. 200
witnessed the memorial event. Himself a police academy graduate and a person not
unsympathetic to military culture and values, Fr. Nikita says that he respects Rodionov’s deed,
but expresses skepticism towards the soldier’s alleged sainthood:
I personally do not feel any particular reverence towards him ... Maybe this man is a saint, I do not know, I have no idea, but I have no grounds to state that he is... God knows better… I see different people who come [to venerate the grave]… This all somehow passes us [the parish] by, we are just living and trying to save our souls and till the churchly order comes will not venerate him [Rodionov].
Fr. Nikita is equally unconvinced of the Orthodox nature of the soldier’s popular veneration,
alleging that many of the people who attend the feast are ignorant of the Orthodox doctrine and
practice and pointing out that few of them ever set foot in his Church. As he was giving me a
tour around the Church building that despite the restoration effort was in a rather shattered
state, he pointed at the collapsing ceiling, stressing that it was another prove that the “so-called
pilgrims” visiting Satino-Russkoe have little to do with religion, as none of them thought to
make a donation. Nevertheless, Fr. Nikita always comes on 23 May and makes sure that the
church’s doors are open for those wishing to enter. When asked about his opinion about
Rodionov by the occasional visitors, myself included, he seems uneasy. He insists that every
person should only think about the matters that are in his or her competence and that
establishing the fact of Rodionov’s sainthood is the prerogative of the Church’s Commission
for the Canonization of Saints. He also patiently explains that “not every suffering is a suffering
for Christ,” adding that the soldier has already been glorified (proslavili) in a sense – by being
CEU eTD Collection acknowledged by the state and awarded the medal for courage, which in itself is a form of
glory. As Fr. Nikita pointed out, Rodionov’s example is not unique and there were many similar
precedents of soldiers being killed for refusing to convert during the Russo-Turkish War of
1877–1878. “I think this is a normal example of Russian warriors. Is it worthy of canonization?
I do not know…” he said, explaining that each such case should be assessed individually and
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that it is important that one can establish that a person made a conscious choice to die for Christ
and that refusal to convert was not motivated by other reasons, such as loyalty to Fatherland or
hatred towards the enemy.
The commemorative event in Satino-Russkoe crystalizes the numerous tensions inherent in
Rodionov’s cult by concentrating in one place a highly diverse set of actors who each bring
different meanings in their act of venerating the soldier. Peter Brown (1981: 38) in his seminal
study of the cult of saints in Latin Christianity, points out the central role materiality and a
saint’s connection to a particular location through his or her burial site plays in the
establishment of a saint’s cult. He describes a contested process of meaning-making in course
of which different actors, through establishing their presence and trying to control physical
access to the sacred site, seek to establish a monopoly over the interpretation of the meaning
of a saint’s life and his or her posthumous manifestations. While Liubov’ Rodionova does not
have complete control over the event, she does set its tone by keeping close contacts with
veteran organizations and inviting them to come, thus ensuring the presence of the military
element in the feast. The participation of the priests, lay believers, and other organizations is
less coordinated and mostly has a spontaneous character. As part of a public cemetery,
Rodionov’s grave is immune to monopolization by any specific group of actors, with the
cemetery’s guard ultimately being the only person with the power to restrict people’s access to
the site. At the end of the feast in 2016, I witnessed this power in action, as an elderly female
guard unceremoniously interrupted the last small group of venerators who stayed reading CEU eTD Collection prayers by the soldier’s grave after most of the other visitors had left. Grumbling at the
unwanted visitors invading her cemetery every year and leaving candles and leaflets all over
the place and generously diluting her speech with swear words she asked the bemused
venerators to leave the premises. To prevent incidents like this and insure that her son’s grave-
202
site is kept in order, Liubov, as mentioned in Chapter 2, had tried to involve the local
authorities, asking them to proclaim the grave a military burial site and assume responsibility
of its maintenance. However, her pleas have so far fallen on deaf ears, leaving the soldier’s
gave-site outside of the control of any specific group and open for the continued contestation
by different actors.
6.2. The Culture of Patriotism
The proliferation of conservative and patriotic discourses in Russia during the 2010s, discussed
at length in Chapter 4, played a significant role in consolidating Rodionov’s cult. As Maria
Engström (2014: 358) observes, the new Russian conservatism is best understood not simply
as a political shift, marked by a new set of policies, but as a “metapolitical, intellectual
movement, which acts at the junction of art, literature, philosophy, and politics.” The newly
emerged concern with the patriotic education of society was not limited to the state educational
policies, but was also reflected in the broader cultural sphere, where the demand for “authentic”
Russian content has been on the rise since the early 2000s. As Norris (2012) demonstrates in
the case of contemporary Russian cinema, a turn to the past and production of historical dramas
and war epics emerged as a domestically produced alternative to Hollywood movies. To ensure
the market success of their products Russian directors actively copied the blockbuster style and
borrowed the visual tricks from their American colleagues. However, they also made a point CEU eTD Collection of imbuing their movies with strong moral and patriotic messages, thus marking the end of the
cynical and violent “overkill culture” that dominated the Russian cinema throughout the 1990s
(Norris 2012: 4, 317).
203
While the resurgence of patriotism on Russian screens – both big and small – has been explored
at length by scholars working on the media and the political life of contemporary Russia
(Beumers 2000; Dunn 2008; Gillespie 2005; Hutchings and Rulyova 2008; Laruelle 2014;
Norris 2012; Oushakine 2013; Zvereva 2007), the amateur and small-audience cultural
practices that target local, rather than national publics – poetry nights, concerts, and drama
plays – have received considerably less attention. Yet, it was in this revitalizing cultural domain
that the patriotic and militaristic imagery truly struck a chord and found a stable platform for
dissemination. These cultural practices, even when they involve professional artists, are rarely
done for commercial purposes and are closely connected to the Soviet public culture and its
tradition of khudozhestvennaia samodeiatel’nost’ – amateur artistic activity. Local amateur
music, dance, and theater collectives that would often be organized on the basis of factories,
kolkhozes, and educational institutions were omnipresent across the Soviet Union, as Soviet
citizens were encouraged to pursue the development of their personality through both
consumption and participation in the production of art (Habeck 2011; Olson 2004). As
commentators on Soviet cultural life observe, the amateur engagement with arts bore a mass
character and played a central role in securing the cultural and ideological cohesion of the
Soviet society (Olson 2000:11; Donahoe and Habeck eds 2011; Hoffmann 2003: 33; Mally
2000). While samodeiatel’nost’ experienced a strong decline after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, with many of the local houses of culture becoming inactive (Habeck 2011: 6,8) and
worker art collectives dismissed, it never completely ceased. The tradition of samodeiatel’nost’
continues to be an integral part of pedagogical institutions – schools, summer camps, and CEU eTD Collection universities – where students are often encouraged to create their own artistic collectives and
demonstrate their versatile talents at the concerts and events organized by their institutions.
Moreover, poetry nights and thematic concerts for the broader public – some professional,
204
others amateur – are still organized at libraries, some of the still functioning houses of culture,
and newly emerged centers for spiritual enlightenment curated by the Church.
A wide array of cultural actors – patriotically-oriented poets, singers, and playwrights
interested in exploring the themes of war, heroism, and sacrifice – found inspiration in
Rodionov’s story and mobilized it for the organization of patriotic events. One such example
is the Saint-Petersburg-based creative collective “Light Up a Candle Inside You” (Zazhgi v
Sebe Svechu) that performs Orthodox and military-patriotic songs and has organized several
concerts devoted to saints, heroes, and martyrs of Russia. Established in 2014, the collective
consists of three people – song writer and sound director Sergei, his wife, singer Angelina, and
their friend Natalia who helps with the organizational matters. The first concert organized by
the collective in February 2015 was devoted to Rodionov and the group has carried out a
number of events in the soldier’s memory since. I met all three of them for an interview in July
2016 in St. Alexander Nevskii Monastery, where the Spiritual and Enlightening Center of
which they are all a part of is located. At the time, the collective was preparing to go on a big
tour called The Roads of Holy Rus’ with a concert that (among others) would feature a song
about Rodionov. They were scheduled to perform in Tver’, Sergiev-Posad, Podolsk,
Gelendzhik, Sochi, Orel, Smolensk, Vitebsk, and several Belorussian cities. They were also
planning to visit the soldier’s grave in Satino-Russkoe during the tour and give a concert
devoted to the soldier in the nearby city of Podolsk. As Angelina explained to me, all of the
group’s members knew Rodionov’s story and privately venerated him long before the CEU eTD Collection collective was created and once the idea to start organizing concerts came about they
unanimously decided that the first one should be devoted to the soldier.
205
Figure 6.7. Natalia, Angelina, and Sergei after the concert devoted to Rodionov. May 18, 2018. Source: https://vk.com/club86813218?z=photo-86813218_456239371%2Fwall-86813218_334
The 2015 concert devoted to Rodionov was held in Saint-Petersburg’s St. Alexander Nevskii
Monastery. Angelina performed her own song there called “The Feat of Evgenii Rodionov.”
She told me that she had been thinking of writing a song about Rodionov for a long time –
since she first heard about the soldier several years ago and found herself very moved by the
story. However, it was not until she started preparing the script for the concert that the music
“came to her miraculously”. Her husband wrote the words and so the song was made. The
concert hall was full, and the event proved very successful among the audience. Offers to hold
other concerts followed, many of them coming from educational institutions, and so the CEU eTD Collection collective organized several more concerts in Rodionov’s memory, this time designed
specifically for the youth.
206
One such concert, held at the Saint-Petersburg’s Marine Technical College in February 2015,
demonstrated to the collective the potential such events hold for influencing the moral values
of the younger generation. Although none of the students had previously heard about Rodionov
(no one among the 200 people audience raised their hands when Angelina asked them if they
knew who Evgenii Rodionov was), sometime after the event Angelina learnt from their teacher
that about 80 students chose the soldier’s story as a subject for their thematic term essay, “The
hero of Russia.” Later, the collective also gave a concert for students of the Saint-Petersburg
Forest Technical University. That event was devoted both to Evgenii Rodionov and to Nikolai
Leonov – an Orthodox rapper who died during the Donetsk airport siege and whose story was
discussed in Chapter 4. The group invited Leonov’s mother and his girlfriend to participate in
the event and tell the audience about him. “Such feats leave no one indifferent and we should
remember them and pass the knowledge about them from generation to generation,” Angelina
said, adding that forgetting about the heroes would mean the end of the Russian nation.
Building on the success of their events devoted to Rodionov, the collective expanded its
repertoire and started organizing concerts devoted to World War II heroes as well as the heroes
of Afghan and Chechen campaigns and the latest Russian campaign in Syria. With the
unfolding of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, the group organized several concerts aimed
at gathering humanitarian aid packages for Donbass and at collecting donations to fund
rehabilitation treatment for the Saint-Petersburg residents who sustained injuries while
participating in the military action in eastern Ukraine. They also held a separate event devoted CEU eTD Collection to “the heroes of Novorossiya,” where the Russian volunteers who fought in eastern Ukraine
were invited and honored. The vision of patriotism advanced by the collective’s events thus
has a strong militaristic dimension, as it is mostly the warring heroes – both old and
contemporary ones – that they offer to the public as moral exemplars.
207
Natalia, who works at St. Alexander Nevskii Monastery’s Spiritual Enlightenment Center and
through her work often interacts with young people, added that the issue of informing the youth
about the heroes of the Russian nation – both past and present – is an important mission because
often-time school programs do not have well developed history and patriotic education
components. Echoing Airat, the head of the Suvorovets martial arts club, Natalia spoke of the
need to show the “right” exemplars to the youth to counter the influence of Western culture
and the popularity of its “spiritual-less” heroic images spread through movies and comics.
Natalia brought up the events in Ukraine and the rise of the radical nationalism there in the
wake of the Maidan Revolution to illustrate the danger collective forgetting of one’s heroes
and national history poses:
The politics that is coming to us from the West now is trying to re-write the history [of WWII]. And now I encounter young boys and girls who do not even know who Hitler was, what happened, and how the war started and they sometimes even support the Nazis. This leads to what is happening in Ukraine right now.
Establishing direct connections between the revision of the World War II history and the rise
of nationalism in Ukraine in the wake of the 2014 Maidan revolution is common among the
Russian commentators on the conservative spectrum (Fedor 2017: 333). In this context,
patriotic and commemorative events staged in Russia are often presented as means for
defending national consciousness and the minds of young people. As discussed in Chapter 4,
patriotic and historical education emerged as a strategic area for the Russian government
following the spread of “color revolutions” across post-Soviet space in the first half of the
2000s. The Maidan revolution and the heated debates about the historical memory of WWII CEU eTD Collection that it triggered in Ukraine only further amplified this trend, creating a perception among many
Russians that the memory of the sacrifices of Soviet people in the fight against Nazi Germany
is being erased.
208
The concerts devoted to Rodionov, Natalia explained, are aimed not only at young audience
but also at older people who were not personally affected by the Chechen war and do not know
much about it. “The Chechen war went by like that – it did not touch everyone – some were
too young, some from the older generation simply did not notice it, some were only affected
tangentially,” Natalia said, explaining that in her case the Chechen campaign had a personal
affect. Natalia grew up and finished high school and then a technical school in Khot’kovo, a
small city in the Sergiev Posad district of Moscow oblast’. On March 2, 2000 twenty-two
members of the Special Police Unit (OMON) from Sergiev Posad were killed in Chechnya by
friendly fire from the Podolsk Special Police Unit and policemen from Ekaterinburg whom
they were coming to replace.137 Many of the killed were Natalia’s former classmates and
technical school colleagues. For Natalia, the event held in memory of Rodionov and other
veterans of “the local conflicts” (Chechnya and Afghanistan) are thus an occasion to also
commemorate her fallen friends. Natalia told me that after the concert she started receiving a
lot of messages on social media from the members of the Saint-Petersburg paratroopers’
community, who shared with her their stories of receiving help through prayers to Rodionov
when taking exams or participating in sports competitions.
The collective’s members told me that they decided to make their concerts in Rodionov’s
memory their “visiting card” and hold them on a yearly basis in St. Alexander Nevskii
Monastery. While the collective’s members venerate the soldier privately, their concerts and
events do not feature a display of his icons. Having discussed the issue with their spiritual CEU eTD Collection father, they decided to put up a large portrait of Rodionov on the stage instead, so as not to
violate the churchly canon. “Those who wished could still pray to Evgenii at the event,”
137 The military officials initially attempted to silence the truth about the incident and blame the deaths on an attack of Chechen militants (Schekhochikhin 2001). As the truth about the soldiers’ death emerged, it triggered a big public debate about incompetence and corruption in the higher echelons of power. 209
Angelina said, explaining that the audience members had a chance to put a lighted candle in
front of the photograph:
What is an icon? Is not it a photograph that was sanctified by the Church? In the same way we can through a photograph address him [Rodionov]. Yes, the Church does not consider him a saint, but for me he is and it is just a matter of time. He became a saint by sanctifying himself through the sacrifice that he made. I pray to him as to a saint and I think many people are doing the same. But we respect the opinion of the Church, of course.
The collective’s concerts, that are largely based on the Soviet tradition of holding cultural
events to honor heroes and notable citizens, thus come to incorporate Orthodox motifs and
practices slowly blurring the line between commemoration and veneration. At the memorial
concert that I attended on May 18, 2018 the songs and poems devoted to Rodionov alternated
with the Soviet songs about the Great Patriotic War and songs about the Afghan and Chechen
wars written by the performers. In the final part of the concert, Angelina performed her song
called Donbass that reflects on the tragedy of the “fratricidal” war in eastern Ukraine. It
represented Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus’ as one indivisible nation united by faith (Holy Rus’)
and called upon the Virgin Mary to protect Donbass. Although the presenters avoided talking
about Rodionov’s sainthood in their narration of the story and made a point of only using the
soldier’s photographs, but not the images of his icons as a visual illustration, every time
Rodionov’s picture was projected on the screen many among the audience would make a sign
of the cross. After the concert, a few audience members went up to the stand with the soldier’s
portrait located by the stage and kissed it, as if it were an icon.
For the collective’s members, Rodionov is more than just a subject of inspiration for their art. CEU eTD Collection He is also a living saint who they believe is guiding and supporting them. For Angelina the performance is thus also a way of being closer to this martyr and “feeling” his presence: During the concert we felt that it was not just another empty box-ticking event, but that Evgenii was with us and we could feel this connection to him
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because the line between the material and the spiritual worlds is very thin, we could feel that he was with us, could feel his support.138
The idea of Rodionov being present at the memorial events and co-participating in the creation
of the art devoted to him is a theme that came up several times during my interviews with the
artists who had devoted their work to the soldier. Such was the case of Vlad Malenko – a
contemporary Russian poet, actor, song-writer, and journalist – who had written a poem
devoted to Rodionov called “Bamut” and whom I met for an interview in Moscow in May
2016. Vlad made a big contribution in the dissemination of information about the soldier, as he
frequently participates in the memorial events devoted to him and often uses the cultural and
patriotic events he takes part in as an occasion to talk about Rodionov’s feat. Vlad participated
in Izborskii Club’s 2016 round-table meeting devoted to Rodionov and discussed at length in
Chapter 4 and was one of the signatories of the Club’s petition to Patriarch Kirill asking for the
revision of the decision on the soldier’s canonization. He was also part of the group that
organized the construction of a chapel devoted to Rodionov in Pereiaslavl’ that is being built
with the blessing of schiarchimandrite Ilii (Nozdrin), the spiritual father of Patriarch Kirill, and
is partially sponsored by a prominent lawyer and Orthodox public figure Evgenii Tarlo.
As Vlad explained to me during our meeting, Rodionov’s story has a very special significance
for him, not least because he had visited Chechnya during the Second Chechen campaign as a
war correspondent and personally knew many soldiers who fought there. For him, Rodionov is
both an individual exemplar of faith and a symbol of the entire generation of soldiers who
perished in Chechen campaign: CEU eTD Collection
I know that there were many stories like this – guys being beheaded, tortured, executed. There was also a slave trade that was coordinated from here, from Moscow – and that is a sad fact. And I think there is a kind of God’s providence that through Zhenia he glorifies all the soldiers, not just him. … I just know it that when we ask for Zhenia’s intersessions all of
138 From my interview with Angelina (July 2016). 211
these forgotten boys who were held captive, maimed, and killed – not just in the Chechen war, in all the wars – they rejoice and start helping us. In Vlad’s discourse, the heroic and martyrical models of commemoration peculiarly converge,
as he not only speaks of the need to acknowledge the heroism of the soldiers who fought in
Chechnya but also alludes to the possibility of all the soldiers, not just Rodionov, being “alive”
in some form and having a power to intercede in earthly affairs.
Vlad told me he has been venerating Rodionov for a long time – since the first newspaper and TV stories about the soldier’s feat started to appear in the late 1990s. To him, Rodionov is both a private guardian whose presence and help he experiences in his daily live and a personification of all things spiritual: Zhenia came into my life in 1997 and I just knew that he is somewhere near. Moreover, you don’t just know, you feel that this saint is helping you when you pray to him. It is very important. For me Zhenia is something that will stay with me forever – he is like Russian literature, like water or the need to see the sea – something very much loved, very cherished, close, and intimate.
Vlad was not optimistic about the outcome of the latest petition demanding a revision of
Rodionov’s canonization decision and said that the Church’s response will most likely be a
political one. Yet, he is convinced that the soldier’s canonization is imminent saying that
popular veneration of Rodionov is itself proof of his sainthood. He believes that only a saint
could provoke such a powerful response from the people:
Veneration, when there is no living source behind it – in other words, God providence – dies out fast. There were a lot of false heroes in the 1990s, one thought they would be remembered forever, but now nobody knows their names anymore. … This [Rodionov’s veneration] is not that of the dead but is that of the living. It is connected to the living and pure energy of the Savior. Because if it was anything else, I would have felt it. Personal
CEU eTD Collection experience is the most important… The opposition between “the dead” and “the living” that emerges from Vlad’s statement
simultaneously engages different cultural levels. On the one hand, he alludes to the imagined
ontological status of Rodionov, suggesting that only a living saint has the power to act upon
people and inspire them. On the other, he engages the more abstract dichotomy of truth vs.
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falsehood, suggesting that commemoration of “fake” heroes – those representing the false
ideals – would never last because it is “dead” – that is lacking the true moral substance behind
it. In contrast to the bureaucratized procedure of the ROC’s Synodal Commission for
Canonization that relies on investigation and verification of facts to determine someone’s
sainthood, many of my informants, like Vlad, said they just “knew” or “felt” that the soldier
was a saint. In such an epistemic paradigm “feeling” and inner knowledge are believed to be
produced not by the agents themselves but by an external source – the saint, who “reveals”
himself to the public through acting upon the hearts of individual believers. Such a view, while
seemingly at odds with the ROC’s practice, is nonetheless not incompatible with it, as in some
cases, a widespread popular veneration of a person can itself be treated by the Church as a
ground for canonization.
Vlad has a close relationship with Liubov’ Rodionova, whom he first met in 2011, when he
came to Satino-Russkoe on the 15th anniversary of the soldier’s death. He introduced himself
and she gave him her phone number in case he would want to keep in touch. Vlad told me he
was shy to call at first, unsure as to what he should say to the mother of the saint, but still did
so a year later encouraged by a monk from Valaam, his former university classmate and a close
friend. When he called, Vlad found out that Liubov’ was in hospital undergoing a rehabilitation
treatment course for the head trauma she received in Chechnya. Vlad and his friend went to the
hospital right away. Vlad showed Liubov’ the video clip he made for the patriotic song he had
written that was inspired by the soldier’s feat and featured the photographs of Rodionov’s CEU eTD Collection icons. Liubov’ liked the song and the video; they stayed in touch after that and gradually
developed a close friendship. Vlad then accompanied Liubov’ to different cities where
commemorative events for the soldier were organized, including Volgograd, Sevastopol,
Penza, and Kuznetsk. In 2015, he joined Liubov’ on her trip to Chechnya, in the course of
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which they visited the site where Rodionov was taken captive and the Bamut village where he
was executed. A small delegation of local villagers consisting of the village head, a high school
teacher, and several students accompanied them to the memorial cross put up on the site of the
execution.
Vlad told me that his friendship with Liubov’, whom he called his “second mother” means a
lot to him:
We have very personal conversations. Strange as it may be, somehow, I can talk to her more openly than I can with a priest or other people who are very close to me. She is a very easy-going person. And Zhenia is part of this relationship too. … I often say to my friends that it is a great blessing incomparable to any biblical things that we have among us Liubov’ Vasil’evna and the living Zhenia.
Like many of Rodionov’s venerators I have encountered throughout my fieldwork, Vlad kept
calling the soldier by his nickname – “Zhenia.” In the ritualistic context, saints are always
referred to by their full first name (together with either the last name or a geographical index,
like Seraphim of Sarov) and using a nickname to speak of saints is not very common in
conversations among lay believers either. Sonja Luehrmann (2016: 12) observes in her analysis
of Orthodox prayer books that referring to a person by their full first name, rather than a
nickname they are addressed by in their daily lives, is a form of maintaining the boundary
between the sacred and the profane. Thus, during Church rites lay believers are always
addressed by their full first name, both to demarcate the ritual context and to signal a person’s
belonging to the eternal community by identifying them with a saint who bears the same name.
While the church rituals of saint veneration work to establish a certain level of reverent distance CEU eTD Collection
from the divine by using verbal formulas that are separate from everyday speech, private acts
of prayer can sometimes, to the contrary, seek to undermine it in order to establish intimacy
with a saint. Maya Mayblin (2014) in her analysis of Catholic saint veneration in Brazil points
out that it is this interplay of distance and intimacy, unknowability and familiarity that plays a
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central role in the production of a saintly charisma. While as an exemplar, akin to the Soviet
heroes of the revolution and Great Patriotic War, Rodionov’s figure, as discussed in Chapter 4,
is used to produce a militant model of morality the public is encouraged to emulate, as a living
saint he also offers the believers an opportunity for an intimate personal engagement. Severine
Rey (2012) in her discussion of the veneration of St. Rafail, Nikolaos, and Irini – the neo-
martyrs of the Ottoman era whose cult formed in Greece the 1960s – describes a similar tension
between martyrs as symbols of the Church’s resistance against Ottoman rule and the popular
practices of engaging with charismatic saintly figures that entail personal, reciprocal
relationships between believers and the saints. Contrary to the official churchly representation
of these neo-martyrs as defenders of Orthodox faith, lay believers, Rey (2012:92) argues,
treated these figures as personal guardians and exemplars of saintly life, rather than martyrical
death. Popular narratives of these saints ignored the significance of martyrical categories and
focused instead on the miracles attributed to the saints and personal qualities ascribed to them,
such as kindness, generosity, and piety (Rey 2012: 29).
While the ordeal Rodionov had to go through, unimaginable to most believers, raises the soldier
to the unattainable pedestal of moral and spiritual excellence, many of the soldier’s venerators
still find his image very familiar because of his contemporaneity, young age, and humble social
background from a small village. Not only can they easily identify with the social reality
Rodionov lived in, but they can also easily imagine their own paths crossing with him. Vlad,
who admits that he cannot possibly imagine making a choice of the kind Rodionov did, told me CEU eTD Collection that it is being the soldier’s contemporary that he finds the most moving:
I often go back to this time in my mind [mid 1990s]. Zhenia was still alive, he lived nearby, just 25 km from me, I was six years younger. We could have met at some rock concert or some sport event, could have been in the same place at the same time. And I think all the time that I was his contemporary and he was mine. And this makes me relate to everything
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differently, makes me think this is how one should live – the way this man lived.
It is the idea that a common person was capable of such a feat that makes the soldier’s image
so appealing to contemporary Russian believers. Dmitrii, a poet from the artistic collective
“Theater of Poets” organized and run by Vlad, expressed a similar view about the appeal of
the soldier’s contemporaneity:
Zhenia is just a simple Russian boy. When people think about saints they usually imagine an old grey-haired man whom nobody among the living encountered in person, but he [Rodionov] is a regular kid from the neighborhood and here [at the event] we can meet people who knew him or were friends with him.
I met Dmitrii on Rodionov’s memory day in Satino-Russkoe in 2016, where he came with
Vlad. Dmitrii said he had no doubt that Rodionov is a saint and to the potential skeptics asking
for the proof of the soldier’s sainthood, he replied that no one among the presently living has
seen the proof of Jesus’s sainthood either. “This is a matter of faith,” he concluded.
Dmitrii stated that it is important to keep talking about Rodionov and keep his memory alive
and that this is something that should be coming from below, from the people. He also asserted
that it is not Rodionov but the Russian people and society who have need of these acts of
commemoration: “If we came here today it means first of all that we need this because Zhenia,
is over there, he is a saint. He does not need our presence here that much – we need this! We
need him!” For Dmitrii, like for many of Rodionov’s venerators I have encountered, the soldier
is also a symbol of hope that even in the darkest historical moments, like the 1990s, there are
still people in Russia capable of showing a moral example to others: CEU eTD Collection
We remember all the Russian heroes – Alexander Nevskii, Minin and Pozharskii, the heroes of the First and Second World Wars, but in some sense, it was easier for those heroes because they knew what they were dying for and the entire country was behind them. But here [in Chechnya] it was an awful war, war unleashed by the scumbags who came to power in the early 1990s. These boys were dying for some strange things. There was a lot of lies, betrayal, people who profiteered from the war and were eating black caviar
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while Zhenia and the boys like him were dying. It is very wrong that people remember these scumbags and not these boys – they should be the only ones to be remembered from that era.
In these two statements Dmitrii appeals to different ethical models of commemoration. First,
when talking about Rodionov’s veneration, he emphasizes that it is the people who need
Rodionov and not the other way around. Yet, when talking about “Zhenia and the boys like
him” in the context of the Chechen War, he switches to a heroic model of commemoration
based on the notion of duty, calling for the correction of the historical injustice and granting
the soldiers who fought in Chechnya the recognition they deserve.
6.3. Lessons in Courage
As discussed in Chapter 3, the patriotic turn in educational politics led to the rejuvenation of
the Soviet tradition of the so-called “lessons in courage” – history-oriented extra-curricular
events devoted to the heroic deeds of Russian people. There is no one set script for these
lessons: some are carried out in the format of a meeting and conversation with war veterans,
others are often held in the form of a memorial event that combines the narration of a specific
person’s life history together with the performance of poems and songs. Internet web-sites that
are meant to facilitate teachers’ preparation for classes, where individual teachers can share the
lesson plans they have designed with their colleagues, are flooded with templates of lessons of
courage devoted to Rodionov. Some of the lessons are dedicated to the commemoration of
CEU eTD Collection Afghan and Chechen wars and feature only a short report about Rodionov, while others are
devoted to the soldier’s story entirely. The lesson plans usually follow a similar structure, in
which students narrate Rodionov’s story from the script prepared by the teacher and distributed
to them beforehand, read war poems, and sometimes sing songs.
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In the comments to one such lesson plan designed for the ninth grade,139 the teacher defines
the goals as “cultivation of the strength of spirit, Christian courage, and faith among the youth”
and as “emotional stimulation and development of patriotic feelings among the students
through familiarization with military and Orthodox traditions.” The lesson plan features a
detailed account of Rodionov’s life and death accompanied by a Power Point presentation on
which his photographs are displayed. The narration of the soldier’s story alternates with the
student performances of the poems devoted to him and screening of short videos about him.
The presentation concludes with a short report on the posthumous veneration of Rodionov and
stories about miracles he allegedly performed. The second part of the lesson is devoted to the
discussion of the soldier’s feat with the students in the course of which the teacher asks the
following questions: “Why do you think Zhenia did not take off his cross? Was it easy for him
to do so? Did he fulfill his duty? Does Russia need people like this? What do you think should
be done so that every person is capable of a feat like this?” The discussion is followed by a
student reading of a poem about duty and heroism. In the final part of the lesson the teacher
asks the students to make together a paper model of an eternal flame monument to express the
feelings they have experienced during the lesson. The flame is compiled out of the colorful
leaves that were distributed to the students beforehand, each color meant to symbolize different
emotions – pride (red), grief (yellow), and tears (orange).
While the lessons in courage are most often organized by the school teachers, sometimes the
schools also invite external speakers – war veterans, writers, or priests – to lead the event. CEU eTD Collection Liubov’ is often invited to the schools and military institutions to talk about her son and her
personal experience in Chechnya and she frequently participates in such events. In 2011 in
139 “Urok Muzhestva ‘Evgenii Rodionov. Zhizn’, Podvig, Pamiat’.” n.d. Retrieved June 27, 2019 (https://infourok.ru/urok-muzhestva-evgeniy-rodionov-zhizn-podvig-pamyat-1493751.html). 218
Saint-Petersburg Fr. Dmitrii Vasilenkov, a staff member of the ROC’s Department of Relations
with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies (DRAFLEA) and head of the Saint-
Petersburg Eparchy’s Department for Cooperation with the Cossacks, suggested a project that
would bring together “military” priests and war veterans to organize lessons of courage in high
schools, universities, and technical schools around the city. According to the report of Saint-
Petersburg Metropole’s communications service Voda Zhivaia from December 26, 2011, the
first such lesson was held in 2011 in St. Alexander Nevskii Monastery’s Spiritual and
Enlightening Center for the wards of four Saint-Petersburg’s orphanages. 140 The lesson
featured a conversation with an Afghan war veteran who had survived captivity and a screening
of a documentary about Rodionov.
Fr. Dmitrii is closely involved in the military-patriotic educational initiatives – he coordinates
the organization of Cossack summer camps as well as forums and joint military games and
drills for the members of military-patriotic clubs from all over Russia. He is also very
outspoken about his belief in Rodionov’s sainthood. Fr. Dmitrii made a pilgrimage to the site
of the soldier’s execution near Bamut and admitted in an interview to Pravoslavnyi Sankt-
Petersburg (May 2011) that he often prays to Rodionov during his trips to the Russian military
outposts around the Caucasus he carries out as part of DRAFLEA’s missionary activities. He
also takes an active part in the organization of the yearly martial arts tournament devoted to
Rodionov’s memory and held in Saint-Petersburg’s Suvorov Military School 141 . The
tournament is organized jointly by the school, DRAFLEA, and the local branch of the veteran CEU eTD Collection organization Boevoe Bratstvo. Liubov’ Rodionova alongside with a number of Saint-
Petersburg’s high-ranking officials are invited to the event as honorary guests.
140 Retrieved July 7, 2019 (http://mitropolia.spb.ru/news/av/?id=20517&sphrase_id=63173). 141 The Suvorov Military Schools is a network of boarding schools across Russian for boys aged between fourteen and eighteen years old. Established in 1943, the schools were meant to provide young men with a secondary education with a specialization in military-related subjects. 219
Figure 6.8. The participants of the sambo tournament devoted to Rodionov. Saint-Petersburg, Suvorov School, December 2014. Source: http://mitropolia.spb.ru/news/otdeli/?id=62885
During the celebration of Rodionov’s memory day in Satino-Russkoe in May 2015, I met a
group of young friends – Vladimir, Andrei, and Maksim – who had been organizing the lessons
in courage devoted to the First Chechen Campaign and to Rodionov is Stavropol’skii Krai. A
day later I met them for an interview to discuss their impressions from the visit to Satino-
Russkoe and their educational activities. All three friends spoke of the event as a deep
emotional experience that they struggled to put into words. Andrei, who teaches music and
chess at a children’s center and writes and records his own songs in his free time, said that he
CEU eTD Collection considers Rodionov a symbol of a true Christian person. He told me that visiting the soldier’s
grave and meeting Liubov’ Rodionova in person left a strong impression that he feels will stay
with him for a long time. Maksim works as a cameraman at the Moscow-based Russian
Spiritual Theater “Glas”; he told me that one of the plays staged at the theater called “For The
Holy Rus’” features an episode devoted to Rodionov’s story. Andrei and Maksim have never 220
visited Satino-Russkoe before and were brought to the event by their friend Vladimir, who has
been venerating Rodionov for a long time and had previously visited the soldier’s grave on
several occasions.
Now in his mid-20s, Vladimir told me that he first heard about the soldier when he was sixteen.
At that time Vladimir just started turning to Orthodoxy and he said that that Rodionov’s story
played an important role in consolidating his faith. The soldier’s figure has a particularly strong
appeal to Vladimir because of his deep interest in the history of the Chechen war and its
memorialization. Several years ago, he had written a novel devoted to the First Chechen
campaign called We Are Coming Back that was published in 2011 with a print run of about 500
copies. The book was based on his own historical research and his conversations with Chechen
war veterans. Vladimir has always been drawn to the military, but having a congenital
disability, he never had a chance at making a career in the army. He chose to do a degree in
journalism instead, hoping that one day it might give him an opportunity to visit some of the
former or active conflict zones as a war correspondent. However, as his health continued to
deteriorate and he almost lost his eyesight, he had to give up the idea, as it became clear that
he would not be able to handle physically exhausting and potentially dangerous trips to the hot
spots. Vladimir eventually decided to quit his studies because he never had a genuine interest
in journalism as such, as he explained.
Andrei and Vladimir met at the literary-creative union “Kuban’” in their hometown of CEU eTD Collection Nevinnomyssk in Stavropol’skii Krai. Although Andrei first heard about Rodionov in 2004
from his mother, a devout Orthodox believer, he had only developed a greater interest in the
soldier’s figure when he became friends with Vladimir and read his book about Chechnya. In
2011, once Vladimir’s book got published, the head of the Kuban’ literary-creative union
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encouraged him to carry out a promotional campaign among young people and helped him
arrange the invitation to hold lessons in courage in the schools in Nevinnomyssk and nearby
villages based on his book. Vladimir invited Andrei to join and together they carried out six
such lessons for the high school students. The lessons featured a screening of a short
documentary about the First Chechen Campaign and a short video about Rodionov that
Vladimir compiled himself based on the visual materials available on the Internet as well as
performance of songs and poems about the war and a reading of selected excerpts from
Vladimir’s book.
Vladimir said that for him the lessons were first of all an opportunity to talk about the Chechen
war – an issue that has been captivating his imagination for a long time. Stavropol’skii krai,
where Vladimir grew up, was more affected by the war compared to the other Russian regions
due to its proximity to Chechnya. The trains carrying conscripted soldiers to the military zone
were passing through it and in the late 1990s the region became a popular destination for the
refugees – mostly ethnic Russians trying to escape Chechnya. The region also suffered heavy
casualties, as many of the young men conscripted to the army from Stavropol’skii Krai in the
mid- and late-1990s were sent directly to Chechnya. As a teenager Vladimir used to attend a
training-center preparing young men for military service. He joined it when he was twelve and
he recalls that the elder students he had met there – those who reached the conscription age –
were all subsequently deployed to Chechnya. He later had a chance to reconnect with those of
them who came back and he recalled being shocked upon seeing how much the war had CEU eTD Collection changed them. “As I was talking to the veterans, I realized that it is important to transmit the
experience of people who participated in the war to those who have not been there,” he said.
Vladimir explained that the key message he was trying to transmit to the students during the
lessons was that contrary to the dominant public perception, the Chechen war was not
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meaningless and that it helped reveal not only the worst but also the best qualities of Russian
soldiers: “Zhenia and guys like him with their example proved the fact that not everything
during that war was measured by betrayal, oil, and drugs – that there were episodes during this
war that make it worth remembering.” Echoing other Rodionov’s venerators I have talked to,
Vladimir lamented the social and moral degradation the collapse of the Soviet Union brought
about, saying that the entire country found itself in a “moral pitfall.” To him the Chechen war
and the instances of individual heroism on behalf of the soldiers it generated thus became the
major event of the 1990s:
I grew up in this country and for as long as I can remember there was very little happening in the country one could feel proud of. All that remains is the [Chechen] war, the only bright event that happened in my world – bright in the sense of being something high, something worthy of being talked about in such categories as “the meaning of life.”
I accidently met Andrei and Vladimir again a year later, in May 2016, when I came to Satino-
Russkoe for the celebration of the 20th anniversary of Rodionov’s death. Vladimir came from
Nevinnomyssk for the event, which now became for him an occasion to also visit Moscow and
meet up with his friends Andrei and Maksim, who presently live there. Curious about the
findings of my own research he asked me if I thought the soldier’s commemoration mostly
attracts “normal believers” or “all sorts of nationalists, schismatics, and Banner-Bearers.” He
explained that the veneration of Rodionov is something very personal and private for him and
that he feels upset about the fact that the soldier’s name is often being used for political
purposes or as a way of fracturing the society and the Church. He was particularly concerned CEU eTD Collection with the growing visibility of the non-canonical practices at the memorial event:
I don’t like that the name of Evgenii – a person who is undeniably holy for me – is being used for some people to create unnecessary schisms. No one is prohibited to pray to Evgenii in private – I do so, but why would they try to display his icons knowing that he has not been canonized and that making an icon of an uncanonized person is against the canon? This becomes a form of making some kind of statement or challenging [churchly authorities] and I
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don’t like it when people are trying to use his name for those kind of anarchist purposes.
He added that he believes that the canonization will only happen when the Church and the
people will be ready to accept and pronounce that the three soldiers who died together with
Rodionov are also saints. Reflecting upon his latest visit to Satino-Russkoe, Vladimir told me
that, while he enjoyed the celebration, he prefers to come to the soldier’s grave on other days,
when it is quieter there:
I like coming when no one is around – to sit by the grave, pray, leave flowers. I no longer have this feeling of tragedy connected to Evgenii – I just go there as if I was coming to him for a visit.
Vladimir thus appears to separate the public commemoration of Rodionov, which to his
disappointment is often appropriated by different political groups, and his private acts of
venerating this new martyr. While Vladimir himself is closely involved in the memorialization
of the Chechen war and believes in society’s duty to acknowledge and honor its heroes, his
description of his private acts of venerating Rodionov does not build on the discourse of duty,
but rather reflects an intimate and personal engagement with the living saint. The feeling of
peace and calmness untainted by the sense of tragedy or sadness he said his visits to the
Rodionov’s grave evoke in him contrasts strongly with the sorrow and pain he feels for the
other soldiers who fought in the Chechen campaign and whose young lives were brutally cut
short by the conflict.
6.4. Concluding Remarks
CEU eTD Collection
The popular cult of Evgenii Rodionov presents a rich tapestry of diverse practices and
discourses in which the Soviet practices of hero commemoration are closely intertwined with
the affective practices of saint veneration stemming from the Orthodox tradition. Due to
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Rodionov’s close connection to the Chechen War and his representation as a symbol of an
entire generation of Russian soldiers who perished in the conflict, the ethos of “duty to
remember” characteristic of the heroic model of commemoration remains an integral part of
the cult. To the people concerned with the history of the Chechen conflict and the fates of the
soldiers who fought there, the public commemoration of Rodionov presents an opportunity to
honor all the otherwise forgotten defenders of the motherland. At the same time, when talking
about their individual acts of worship, the soldier’s venerators tend to think of them and frame
them as a personal relationship with the saint that is based not on the sense of duty but on a
reciprocal exchange of favors and messages.
The two models of commemoration are not mutually exclusive and each entail a strong
pedagogical dimension that is being realized both through the public rituals in the course of
which the exemplary life of a hero or martyr is presented to the audience as a model to emulate
and through the private process of working on the self and cultivating the moral qualities
ascribed to the exemplar. In some cases, the two models of commemoration collude generating
new cultural forms, like the concerts organized by the “Light Up a Candle Inside You”
collective. While modeled on the Soviet tradition of patriotic concerts and memorial evenings,
the collective’s events also incorporate some elements of Orthodox worship, including the
display of icons and the reading of prayer services, effectively blurring the line between artistic
performance and ritual.
CEU eTD Collection Serguei Oushakine (2013: 274) in his ethnography of public rituals commemorating The Great
Patriotic War in contemporary Russia analyzes such performances as “an affective
management of history.” He points out the central role materiality, emotions, and sensory
experiences play in producing the feeling of connection to history among the audience during
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such events. The goal of such affective management of history, he claims, is not so much to fill
the popular signifiers like The Great Patriotic War with a specific content or historical
knowledge, but “to link remembering people together” through providing them with a shared
experience and shared symbols. Likewise, Rodionov’s memory day in Satino-Russkoe, and the
lessons in courage, and concerts devoted to the soldier aim to elicit emotional responses from
the audience and produce a sense of intimate familiarity with the soldier’s figure by narrating
his story and sometimes enabling personal contact with his mother. Such personal emotional
experience plays a central role in constructing a community of remembrance united by
concordant emotional responses to Rodionov’s figure, matching moral evaluations of his story,
and a commitment to the shared set of values they imagine the soldier to represent.
CEU eTD Collection
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7. “Evgenios o Rossos”: Saints as Transnational Mediators Between
Orthodox Churches
In 2011 a small chapel in the Monastery of St. Maria and Rafail located next to the Greek
Cypriot South-Eastern town of Xylotymbou was consecrated to Evgenii Rodionov and three
other Russian saints – St. Luke of Crimea, St. Serafim of Sarov, and St. John of Shanghai and
San Francisco.142 This dedication was yet more evidence of Rodionov’s growing popularity
outside the Russian borders and particularly in the Greek Orthodox world. Several Orthodox
churches across Cyprus display different versions of icons of St. Evgenios, as the soldier is
referred to in Greece and Cyprus, and at least four churches have included his name in their
calendar of saints and celebrate him every year on May 23. Many ecclesiastical book-stores
feature different versions of Rodionov’s hagiography published in Greece, including a special
edition designed specifically for young children (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2), while the small
laminated icons of the soldier can be purchased in many stores adjacent to the local churches
and monasteries.
In this chapter I reconstruct the micro-history of Rodionov’s cult transfer to Cyprus and
describe the forms of engagement with the soldier’s figure that I observed on the island. By
doing so, I illuminate the cultural mechanisms that enable a saint cult to take roots in a new
locale and identify the features that made a model of martyrdom represented by Rodionov
CEU eTD Collection transportable to new contexts and appealing to foreign audiences. By positioning Rodionov’s
142 St. Luke (born Valentin Voino-Iasenetskii) was a renowned 20th century surgeon and an archbishop of Simferopol and Crimea (since 1946). He was canonized by ROC in 1996 and is broadly venerated in the Orthodox world as a miracle worker (Morun 2019). Seraphim of Sarov was a prominent 19th century elder famous for his hesychastic teachings; canonized in 1903 (ibid.). St. John of Shanghai and San Francisco was a 20th century hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, famous for his asceticism and alleged powers of clairvoyance and healing. He was canonized in 1994 (ibid). 227
Figure 7.1. Book Cover “Russian Neomartyr and Soldier of Christ, Saint Evgenii Rodionov.” Photograph by the author, May 2019.
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 7.2. Book Cover “Saint Evgenii Rodionov. A Russian Soldier. For Children.” Photograph by the author, May 2019.
228
veneration in Cyprus in the context of broader process of the growing popularization of Russian
saints on the island I also trace the multiple official and unofficial ties between Russia and
Cyprus that enable the circulation of representations and discourses between the two
communities. While the soldier’s veneration on the island emerged at the initiative of Greek
Cypriot priests and believers, I maintain that the growing Russian cultural influence on the
island and interest in the Russian Orthodox tradition among Greek Cypriots it promotes is
crucial for understanding the background against which Rodionov’s veneration on the island
took root. I thus use the exploration of the Russian soldier’s veneration on the island as an
occasion to both identify connections between and compare Russian and Greek Cypriot
Orthodox devotional cultures and their relationship to the broader nationalist discourses.
The emergence of the Russian saints’ cults in Cyprus needs to be understood in reference to
the broader culture of saints’ veneration on the island that not only remains a central feature of
local religiosity, but in many ways serves as a basis of Greek Cypriot national identity. The
ideals of sacrifice and martyrdom were central to the formation of the modern Cypriot state.
During the anti-colonial struggle, Cyprus’ leader Archbishop Makarios III promoted a vision
of radical commitment to the national cause as a moral and spiritual imperative, drawing
explicit parallels between the sacrifices of young Greek Cypriots fighting against the British
with those of the Christian martyrs (Hadjipolycarpou 2015: 139). Makarios’ vision of a modern
Cypriot state was thus marked by a powerful fusion of nationalist and theological imagery, as
he emphasized the image of Cyprus as grounded in the Byzantine tradition and thus
fundamentally distinct from the West (ibid.). Within this vision the figure of a saint was put CEU eTD Collection
forth “as the integral moral model for the individual as well as for the nation” (Hadjipolycarpou
2015: 129, 142).143
143 Hadjipolycarpou (2015: 143) reports that Makarios paid little attention to the issue of retrieval of Cyprus’ classical artifacts from the Western museums and focused instead on the saints’ relics lost during the Arab raids and manuscripts with saints’ hagiographies that have been transferred to different European cities. 229
In the Greek Cypriot discourses one can often hear a reference to Cyprus as “the island of
saints” – a phrase that was popularized by Archbishop Makarios III in his 1968 eponymous
work that indexed the names, memory days, and other details for 239 saints who lived in Cyprus
between tenth and twentieth centuries.144 Instead of providing a detailed via for each saint the
index focused on emphasizing the saints’ Cypriot identity and establishing a connection
between their lives and the island’s topography, meticulously listing the names of the Cypriot
villages, chapels, and churches named after each saint (Hadjipolycarpou 2015: 143). The
saints’ connection to the island is also asserted through the stories of miracles and intersessions
that are often closely entangled with the history of Greek Cypriot national struggles. For
instance, as Aaron Hollander (2018:157, 216) demonstrates in his exploration of the cult of St.
George – one of the most widely revered saints in Cyprus – the great martyr’s representations
as a safeguard of spiritual identity and a patron of those who resist oppression, injustice, and
imperial domination are closely connected to the island’s lived history of foreign occupations.
While the practices of saint veneration in Cyprus are closely intertwined with Greek
nationalism, they are by no means reducible to it. For many Greek Cypriots living on the “island
of saints” means participating in the community of veneration that is both local and global and
that, while being invested in the local saints’ cults, also has a constant drive for expansion and
an appetite for new models of sainthood. Many Greek Cypriots I got to know in the course of
my research had an experience of participating in pilgrimages to Greece, Jerusalem, Russia,
and Romania and had active interest in discovering new saintly figures through reading freshly CEU eTD Collection published hagiographies. While the Orthodox world has historically been characterized by the
existence of a robust network, comprising a multitude of vertical and horizontal links
connecting institutions and communities and enabling transnational flow of ideas and practices,
144 Archbishop Makarios III. 1997 [1968]. Kipros: i Agia Nisos. Iera Arhiepiskopi: Nicosia. 230
through much of history such a network was also mostly confined to the clergymen and national
elites, rather than common believers (Roudometof 2014:58). With long-distance travel
becoming more accessible to the general public in the 20th century, individual believers
received an opportunity to go on pilgrimages to venerate the icons and relics in different places
as well as to discover new saintly figures celebrated in different locales. Aside from the
pedagogical aspect, Christian Orthodox devotional cultures also have a powerful affective
dimension grounded in the materiality of shrines, relics, and icons and in the emotional power
of public and private ritualistic engagements (Dubisch 1990; Green 1990; Heo 2015;
Naumescu 2017; Pop 2017; Rey 2012). These local cultures of devotion and the official
churchly structures supporting them thus create the basis for the establishment of new saint
cults, whose figures get incorporated into the local pantheon of saints.
Rodionov’s cult, as it moved from the post-Soviet to the post-colonial space, has lost much of
its political connotations. Often unfamiliar with the history and context of the Chechen conflict,
Greek Cypriots rarely find any controversial aspects in the soldier’s story. Positioned outside
of the politics of the Russian Orthodox Church, they are also undisturbed by the absence of
formal canonization and hardly view Rodionov’s veneration as an act aimed at undermining
the institutional authority of the Church. Rather, those among them who promote the soldier’s
figure view Rodionov as a contemporary exemplar of martyrdom for faith and draw on his
story for pedagogical purposes. Although Greek Cypriot society is characterized by a much
higher level of religiosity compared to Russia – at least when it comes to church attendance CEU eTD Collection and basic knowledge of the Orthodox rites – many Greek Cypriot priests view the reproduction
of religious tradition as threatened by the processes of secularization and Westernization. Much
like their Russian counterparts, they thus see a solution in the revival of the values of sacrifice
and respect for tradition as well as cultivation of commitment to one’s ethnic and cultural
231
identity and spirituality among the youth. Through examining the positions of the priests
promoting Rodionov’s veneration on the island, I will explore in the final part of the chapter
the distinct form morally conservative discourses of sacrifice and tradition take in the Greek
Cypriot context.
7.1. Russian Cultural Presence in Cyprus
The foundation for the strong economic, political, and cultural ties between Russia and Cyprus
was laid during Soviet times. Since its establishment in 1941 the Cypriot communist
Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) maintained a close relationship with the Socialist
bloc, many of its members getting special scholarships to complete their studies in the USSR
(Stergiou 2007:90). Immediately after the creation of independent Cyprus in 1960, the Soviet
Union established diplomatic relations with Nicosia and already in 1962 the first trade
agreement between the two states was signed (Delanoe 2013). By the end of the 1960s Cyprus
and the Soviet Union developed close diplomatic relations that were facilitated through active
commercial and cultural exchanges (Sakkas and Zhukova 2013). Following the establishment
of the military regime in Greece, which the Soviet leadership viewed as a threat to its interests
the region, it had been expressing active support to Archbishop Makarios III in his fight against
radical nationalists seeking reunification with Greece (Sakkas and Zhukova 2013). Although
in practice the Soviet Union never made any concerted effort to intervene on the Greek Cypriot
CEU eTD Collection side in the wake of the Turkish invasion in 1974 (Stergiou 2007), since the 1980s, it has
consistently called for the end of foreign interventions and removal of foreign troops from
232
Cyprus and demilitarization of the island. It also officially condemned the establishment of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. 145
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cyprus has become home to about 30,000 immigrants
from the post-Soviet space, most of them Russian speaking (Ryazantsev 2015). Towards the
second part of the late 1990s Cyprus with its offshore zones, low corporate tax rate, and visa-
free regime with Russia146 became a popular destination for Russian investors purchasing real
estate and opening businesses there.147 Ryazantsev (2015) reports that in the early 2010s about
21,000 Russian companies were registered in Cyprus, contributing about 3 billion USD to the
Greek Cypriot economy. Today there are up to 50,000 Russian-speakers residing in Cyprus,
mostly concentrated around the cities of Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol; in addition, a large
number148 of Russian tourists visit the island every year (Ryazantsev 2015). Russia’s growing
financial and political influence in Cyprus throughout the 2000s even drove some
commentators to describe the island as “a new Russian foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean”
(Delanoe 2013).
Since the 1990s the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) actively worked to establish cultural ties
with its Greek Cypriot sister-church, extending its presence on the island to cater for the
religious needs of the Russian-speaking diaspora. Up to ten different churches across Cyprus
145 The Soviet policy on the issue was rather volatile and conditioned by the need to uphold the economic and political ties with Turkey (Stergiou 2007). In the aftermath of the 1974 invasion the Soviet Union did not rush to
CEU eTD Collection publicly condemn Turkey, hoping that the Turkish military intervention would restore constitutional order and facilitate the return of Archbishop Makarios to power. Their position, however, changed once they realized that the Turkish troops were to remain on the island (Sakkas and Zhukova 2013). As Sakkas and Zhukova (2013: 133) point out, the Soviet critique of the occupation was often very vague and non-confrontational, “directed against unnamed imperialist forces or member-states of NATO,” but never directly implicating Turkey or the US. 146 The regime was abolished in 2003, as Cyprus was preparing to join the EU. 147 After Cyprus’ accession to the EU, the island also attracted many Russian investors via its permanent residency acquisition scheme that is granted to individuals investing the minimum sum of 300,000 EURO into the Cypriot economy and endows its recipients the freedom of movement around the EU (Delanoe 2013:86). 148 The flow of tourists from Russia grew from 113,500 visitors in 1999 to 334,000 in 2011, making Russian tourists the second largest group of visitors after UK residents (Delanoe 2013:85). 233
deliver liturgy and other services in Russian. While these churches formally belong to the
Orthodox Church of Cyprus (OCC), the services are delivered by ROC affiliated priests who
were sent to the island with a mission of providing spiritual guidance to their compatriots. In
2017 a Church devoted to Andrew the Apostle and All the Saints of Russian Land was opened
in Cyprus in the village of Episkopio located in the outskirts of Nicosia. The Republic’s
president Nicos Anastasiades and several high-ranking OCC officials attended the ceremony.
The construction was sponsored by Viacheslav Zarenkov, a Saint-Petersburg-based billionaire
and head of Etalon construction holding, known for his philanthropic activities. 149 Built
according to the architectural canons of the Russian Orthodox tradition, the church offers
liturgical services in Church Slavonic followed by a sermon either in Russian or Greek.
The growing Russian diaspora on the island, combined with the ROC’s outreach efforts,
contributed to the growth of interest in the Russian Orthodox tradition among Greek Cypriots.
In addition to the parishes designed to accommodate Russian expats, there have also been a
number of chapels dedicated to the Russian saints built at the initiative of Greek Cypriot
believers. Often such constructions are sponsored by individuals who wish to express their
gratitude to a saint from whom they believe to have received a miraculous help. For instance,
The Church of St. Matrona of Moscow located in the village of Agios Georgias in the vicinity
of Pafos was built in 2015 at the initiative of a Greek Cypriot family who believe their child to
have been healed through prayers to the saint (Gid na Kipre, n.d.).150 Other temples devoted to
the saints of Russian origin include the large church devoted to St. Serafim of Sarov in the CEU eTD Collection
149 The fund “The Creating World” run by Zarenskov has been actively supporting the initiatives aimed at the development of cultural ties between Russian and Cyprus, including the construction of Victory Park in Limassol and organization of the festival of Greco-Slavic arts and friendship “KipRus” in 2018 (Tatarov 2018). Since 2016 Zarenkov’s company Etalon Group previously registered Guernsey Island, was reregistered in Nicosia (Vasilieva 2017). 150 Retrieved June 28, 2019 (http://gidnakipre.ru/tserkov-blazhennoj-matrony-moskovskoj/). 234
village of Skuriotissa, the chapel devoted to the Optina Elders at St. George Monastery near
the village of Troulli, and a church devoted to St. Xenia of St. Petersburg151 in Limassol.
The dean of the Church of St. Serafim of Sarov that is currently being built in the village of
Skuriotissa on the outskirts of Nicosia is an icon-painter of Russian origin, Fr. Amvrosii. Before
relocating to Cyprus, he spent ten years as a monk (postrizhnik) at Pskovo-Pechersky
Monastery and then two more years at Mirozhsky Monastery in Pskov. Throughout these years
he was contracted several times to paint icons and frescoes for the Cypriot churches. He
developed close and friendly relationship with Archimandrite Symeon, the dean of St. George
monastery and a prominent in Cyprus icon-painter, who later became his spiritual father, as
well as with the Metropolitan of Morphou Neophytos and decided to stay on the island. With
the mediation of Neophytos he was offered a piece of land to start an icon-painting workshop
and build a small chapel. In 2010 the construction of a bigger, stone church on the site began.
Fr. Amvrosii told me that when a question of picking a name for the church came up, he
immediately thought of Serafim of Sarov for whom he always felt a special love. However,
when the Metropolitan asked him the question, Fr. Amvrosii, worried that Serafim was not
recognizable enough on the island, suggested to name the Church after the Holy Trinity. To his
surprise, Neophytos responded that he expected Fr. Amvrosii to pick Serafim of Sarov. This
episode made Fr. Amvrosii realize the scale of Serafim’s popularity in Cyprus:
It turns out the local people love him a lot, know, and venerate him. There are plenty of books about Serafim in Greek, many churches have his icons and even murals. During his feast a lot of people come here and later Archbishop Georgii presented us a piece of Serafim of Sarov’s relics and we decided to CEU eTD Collection construct this church.
151 A wife of a colonel, after her husband's death Xenia gave away all of her possessions to the poor and became a fool-for-Christ, spending more than four decades wandering around the streets of St. Petersburg wearing her husband’s military uniform. She was canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) in 1978 and then by ROC in 1988 (Morun 2019). 235
Fr. Amvrosii confirmed that over the past decade there has been a substantial increase in the
publishing of Greek language hagiographies of Russian saints. Yet, he believes that it is not
the proliferation of the texts, but the charisma of the saints “working even in places where
people have no chance to learn something through books” that plays a central role in the spread
of the veneration of Russian saints on the island. As an example, he told me a story narrated
to him by a Greek Cypriot woman who came to his church to venerate St. Serafim. The
woman, who works in a book story in Kykkos monastery, claimed to never have heard of
Serafim of Sarov until the saint appeared to her in her house. According to the woman, when
asked about who he was, a grey-haired elderly monk standing in her room responded in Greek:
“I am a Russian saint, Serafim of Sarov.” When the woman replied that she had never heard
of such a saint, the monk instructed her to find and read his via. “You see, the saints can
introduce themselves to people even without the mediation of the books,” Fr. Amvrosii
concluded.
Fr. Amvrosii is aware of Rodionov’s veneration on the island and maintains friendly
relationships with the priests and icon-painters venerating the soldier, whose stories I will
explore in greater detail in the following section of this chapter. When asked about what in
his opinion triggered such interest in Rodionov’s story among the Greek Cypriots, he stated
that “the martyrs in all times have always been the light for all the Christians”:
Sacrificial love of God, when a person gives up everything, including his own life for Christ, gives meaning to our faith. … Our era is rich with such people, not just in Russia, but also in Arabic countries – Egypt, Syria – plenty of people have voluntarily given up their lives for faith and Rodionov is one of CEU eTD Collection them.
Fr. Amvrosii emphasized that the absence of formal canonization of Rodionov is a secondary,
almost irrelevant question, pointing out that in the early Christian times official canonization
did not exist: it was enough for the people to see the blood of martyrs to start praying to them.
236
Fr. Amvrosii is an adherent of ecumenicalism and he believes that the Christian culture entered a period of degradation with the schism between Latin and Eastern Churches as well as with the growing separation and nationalization of the Orthodox churches: When the churches take in some nationalistic movements a spirit of schism appears and the desire to regain this original ecumenical spirit has always lived in all Christians. This spirit of universalism does not diminish in any way the national peculiarities – a Greek person remains Greek and a Slavic a Slav. There were a lot of people in the borders of Byzantine empire and they all breathed the spirit of the ecumenical Christianity. The very same ideas guide those who are trying to return to the Byzantine tradition now.
He thus sees the trend of the resurgence of interest in the Byzantine canon as well as in
hesychasm 152 – mystical tradition rooted in the monastic life of early Byzantium that
emphasized prayer and ascetic lifestyle as a central path towards experiencing God (Stöckl
2010) – across Orthodox countries as a historical opportunity for the greater integration of the
Orthodox world. A similar position is shared by the Metropolitan Neophytos, who belongs to
the so-called neo-Orthodox movement that is characterized by rejection of particularism in
favor of Orthodox ecumenicalism as well as by anti-modernism and commitment to the
purification of Orthodox tradition from the influences of Western rationalism (Argyrou 2010).
Aside from the ties between the churches, the cultural and spiritual exchange between Russia
and Cyprus is also fostered through the work of lay cultural organizations. One such example
is The Russian Orthodox Educational Center (ROEC) in Larnaca that is managed by a Russian
expat couple: Natalia and Valerii Zykovy. Natalia moved to Cyprus in the early 1990s. A
history and English teacher by education, she initially came to the island to complete an MA CEU eTD Collection degree in Pedagogy that was offered by the Cypriot branch of State College of New-Jersey.
Having grown up in a religious family, Natalia got very enthusiastic about exploring Cyprus’
152 In the 20th century the revival of the hesychasm is connected to the writings of the Russian émigré theologians Georgii Florovskii, Sergei Bulgakov, and John Meyendorff (Stöckl 2010). 237
Orthodox heritage but was disappointed to discover that the substantial Russian diaspora on
the island takes little interest in it. She decided to address the situation by volunteering to run
a Sunday school in Limassol that would familiarize Russian speaking children with Russian
history and Orthodox faith. To make up for her own lack of formal theological training she
arranged to take lessons from several local monks. Later, Natalia was approached with an offer
to teach the Basics of Orthodox Culture first at the Russian-speaking school in Limassol and
then at the Russian Embassy School in Nicosia. After several years of teaching Natalia and her
husband Valerii opened their Russian Orthodox Educational Center (ROEC) in Larnaca in
1997. The Center’s main mission is educational work among the Russian-speaking Cypriot
community, organization of inter-cultural Orthodox seminars and festivals as wells as
pilgrimages to the Cypriot monasteries.
Since their arrival in Cyprus both Natalia and Valerii have been actively involved with the
Russian diaspora: in addition to her teaching activities Natalia has written articles for Russian-
language newspapers and journals, while Valerii has coordinated the work of the Russian
editorial office of the Orthodox radio in Limassol Eparchy for 10 years. Since 2006 Valerii has
served as the chairman of the Committee organizing the days of Slavic writing and culture.
One of the dimensions of the Center’s work is memorialization of Russians who have
contributed to Cyprus studies. As a historian, Natalia is interested in the history of connections
and cultural exchange between the two countries. She studied in detail the writings of hegumen
Daniil153, a traveler from Kievan Rus’ who visited Cyprus in 1106 during his pilgrimage to CEU eTD Collection Palestine. In 2006, to commemorate the 900th anniversary of Daniil’s visit, ROEC, with the
blessing of Patriarch Aleksii, organized an Orthodox festival of Russian-Cypriot friendship
153 Daniil’s work “Zhitie I Hozhdenie Daniila, Rus’skyia Zemli igumena” is one of the oldest Russian descriptions of pilgrimage to Palestine and one of the most popular work in early East Slavic literature (Børtnes 2006). 238
“Enotita” (Unity). During the festival Natalia asked the abbot of the Stavrovuni monastery to
grant his blessing for putting up a monument for Daniil on the monastery’s territory, as the site
left a strong impression on Daniil and was mentioned in his writing. The abbot granted his
blessing and on October 31, 2009 the opening ceremony for the monument took place with the
participation of Russia’s Ambassador in Cyprus Andrei Nesterenko and episcope Mark, the
secretary of Moscow Patriarchate's Administration for Institutions Abroad. Natalia also did an
original research documenting the history of the 18th century Russian monk and explorer,
Vasilii Barskii’s154 pilgrimage to Cyprus. Having carefully studied Barskii’s travel diaries, she
personally recreated his route, identifying the sites and churches the monk had visited. The
project resulted in a book that followed Barskii’s steps and provided photos of the present state
of the churches and a commentary on their histories.
Through her work on popularizing the knowledge about the Russian explorers of Cyprus
Natalia is trying to instill in the Russian diaspora the sense of pride for their ancestors and
remind them that they are “the heirs of the great Russian civilization that has always been
characterized by humanism, great culture, and spirituality” (Zykova 2010). At the same time,
her activities also aim to demonstrate to the Greek Cypriots the good intentions of the
representatives of the Russian community towards the local population and to highlight their
contribution to the Cypriot culture. As she put it in her article devoted to the exploration of
Russian presence in Cyprus, “Unlike many others, our ancestors came to Cyprus not with a
sword, but with a pen. Not to loot and subdue, but to be amazed at the beauty of the Cypriot CEU eTD Collection land and spirituality of Greek Cypriot people, to worship the holy shrines of Orthodoxy, to
study Cyprus and immortalize its history in books” (Zykova 2010).
154 Barskii traveled extensively through Europe, Palestine, Greece, Cyprus, and Asia Minor. For more information on Barskii’s pilgrimage and his travel diaries see Grishin (2006). 239
During our conversation in 2014 Natalia emphasized the positive attitude of many Greek
Cypriots towards Russia and Russian culture. This attitude, she claimed, has been forged
throughout centuries and as such cannot be easily changed by the passing political
conjunctures. To illustrate her point, she recalled an interview she had with Archbishop
Chrysostomos II in the early 1990s:
When I just got to Cyprus I was doing a bit of Orthodox journalism and I interviewed Archbishop Chrysostomos. I asked him, if there was anything he would like to wish to the Russian readers and he suggested that they should pray for Cyprus. At the moment that sounded strange to me. I came from such a dysfunctional country. In the 1990s the country was collapsing, people were so poor, and he says, “pray for Cyprus.” I thought to myself: “one should pray for Russia” – Cyprus was a blooming country back then and he told me “We have always viewed the Russian Church as our defender and helper.” The decades of Perestroika did not have any significance for the Greek Cypriots, they are wise people, they knew that it would pass and that the Russian Orthodox Church would stay.
Chrysostomos’ view of the Russian Church alludes to the historical trope of Russia as a
defender that gained particular prominence in the Greek Orthodox world in the 18th century,
inspired by a series of Russo-Ottoman confrontations and Catherine II’s project of restoring
Byzantine empire (Nicolopoulos 1985). In the late 18th century Greece a famous prophecy
circulated in the Agathangelos collection that foretold the arrival of the “Blond Race”
(ksanthon genos) to the Balkans to liberate Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman yoke came
to be popularly associated with the Russian people (Nicolopoulos 1985: 45). Although none of
my Greek Cypriot informants ever referenced the prophecy and, when asked about it, dismissed
it as a myth, the image of Russia as a benevolent power that has a special spiritual connection
to Cyprus and Greece grounded in the shared religious tradition was common among my CEU eTD Collection interlocutors.
ROEC’s main activity is the organization of “pilgrimages” to St. Lazarus Church in Larnaca.
One of the Cyprus’ major attractions, the 9th century church is named after Lazarus of Bethany,
240
the believer whom Jesus brought back to life, according to the Gospel of John. Eastern
Orthodox tradition holds that sometime after the Resurrection of Jesus Lazarus left for Cyprus,
where he became the first Bishop of Kition (Larnaca) and spent the final days of his life. The
church is believed to have been built above Lazarus’ tomb. ROEC’s pilgrimage is held twice a
week (on Tuesdays and Saturdays) during the tourist season and consists of a short lecture on
the church’s history and architecture accompanied by a brief excurse into the history of OCC
and a visit to the church where the pilgrims who wish to pray or put up candles are offered
some private time. The Center’s web-site estimates that about 3,500 people take part in the
pilgrimage every year.
Although Natalia refers to her tours as “pilgrimages,” she admitted that they are not pilgrimages
in the conventional sense, as her center is oriented at working with a very diverse tourist
audience, most of whom come to the island for non-religious reasons. While the Center
occasionally works with the pilgrims – Orthodox people who come to Cyprus explicitly with
the purpose of visiting local monasteries and churches – the majority of the center’s clients are
regular tourists, some of them non-believers vacationing in Larnaca, who stumbled upon the
Center’s advertisement and decided to join the free tour. When Natalia first came up with the
idea of establishing the Center, among the Russians Cyprus was broadly perceived as a party
and holidays destination – an image that largely persists to the present day. Natalia recalled
that when Patriarch Aleksii II sent her a letter to grant his blessing for the establishment of the
Center, he instructed her not to be discouraged if people come there “as tourists,” as long as CEU eTD Collection “they leave as pilgrims.” Natalia thus sees her mission as that of drawing those who might be
open to it closer to the churchly life. On Saturdays the visitors are invited to come back to St.
Lazarus’ church for the evening liturgy and are also provided with the contact information of
Russian-speaking parishes on the island.
241
While visiting different monasteries with the groups of Russian pilgrims Natalia noticed a big
interest in the saints of Russian origin among Greek Cypriots, who always willingly accept the
small laminated icons pilgrims bring as a gift and often recognize the saints depicted on them.
This observation inspired Natalia to organize a transfer of several icons from Russia as a gift
to the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. By doing so she was hoping to renew the tradition of
Russian contributions (vklads) to Cypriot churches, which she claimed has been observed by
the Romanovs and Russian elites throughout 18th and 19th centuries. Before ordering the icons,
Natalia talked to several Greek Cypriot priests to find out which icons they would like to
receive. According to her, St. Matrona of Moscow, Serafim of Sarov, and Luka of Crimea were
the most popular choices alongside different versions of the Virgin Mary. As a result of this
project, Patriarch Kirill during his visit to Cyprus in June 2012 presented to the OCC a reliquary
with the relics of St. Sergii Radonezhskii, St. Serafim of Sarov, St. Filaret of Moscow, and St.
Amvrosii of Optina alongside 19 icons created by Russian icon-painters (Ria Novosti, June 11,
2012).155 For her involvement in this initiative Natalia was awarded St. Euphrosyne of Polotsk
medal by the ROC. This example highlights the central role Russian diasporic organizations
play in mediating and facilitating the cultural exchange between the two national Churches
through uncovering and memorializing Russia and Cyprus’ shared histories and identifying the
cultural themes and representations that have a potential to stir interest among Greek Cypriot
believers.
Despite the efforts of individual enthusiasts like Natalia, the majority of Russian-speaking CEU eTD Collection diaspora display little interest in the Orthodox tradition and instead organize their own cultural
155 2012. “Patriarch Peredal Kiprskoi Tserkvi Moschi Russkikh Sviatyh i 19 Ikon.” Ria Novosti, June 11. Retrieved July 7, 2019 (https://ria.ru/20120611/670778019.html). 242
events. Natalia, however, remains critical about the moral message of such initiatives:
Vestnik Kipra156 – they organize Russian-Cypriot friendship festivals. They had Dima Bilan157 perform and a race on high heels and they write that 20,000 people attended the event. I consider this a profanation, but these thousands of people came to see the race on high heels! … Some people consider this culture, I personally do not, but I don’t want to usurp the notion of culture either.
This statement points to an existing tension between the secular values and cultural repertoires
of the many representatives of the Russian diaspora on the island and the moral sensibilities of
the Orthodox believers in their mist. In my experience, however, the Greek Cypriot public
remains largely unaware of these tensions. Despite the fact that committed believers constitute
a minority of the Russian expats and tourists, the image of Russians as religiously committed
and deeply spiritual people, was very common among my Greek Cypriot informants. The
persistence of this image is conditioned both by the extensive circulation of the Russian
religious literature in the Greek Orthodox world and by the fact that the boundaries of secularity
are marked differently in Cyprus, were indulgence in secular festivities and popular culture and
religiosity are not viewed as necessarily mutually exclusive.
In the post-Soviet Russian context, religious sensibility is not opposed to the notion of secular
festivities as such. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, many Orthodox believers appreciate and
actively participate in secular practices inherited from the Soviet era, including memorial
events, various forms of amateur concerts, and sport festivals. Yet, Russian public sphere is
marked by a sharp distinction between the so-called “spiritual” (dukhovnye) forms of culture
and “lowbrow” culture that is seen as primitive, overly sensual, and conducive to vice. In CEU eTD Collection
contrast to the public culture of the late Soviet era that drew heavily on the notion of “spiritual
values” and was oriented towards a moral transformation of the subjects into better citizens
156 Cyprus-based Russian-language newspaper 157 Famous Russian pop singer. 243
(Luehrmann 2011: 165-167), most forms of pop culture that developed after the collapse of the
USSR came to be seen by conservatively minded Russians as vulgar and deprived of spiritual
content (bezdukhovnye). Based on my observations, such a distinction between spiritual and
lowbrow cultural practices was less clearly articulated in Cyprus. In contrast to the post-Soviet
Russian Orthodox tradition that is characterized by a revivalist ethos and conscious and
reflexive attempts at separating itself from the secular cultural space and delineating
appropriate forms of engaging with it, Greek Cypriot lay believers do not seem to be
particularly concerned with discerning different cultural forms based on their spiritual
properties. As Jill Dubisch (1990:128) observes, religious and recreational activities are not
treated as antithetical in Greek Orthodoxy since in a traditional village life religious holidays
tend to be the main recreational events. As popular tourist destinations Greece and Cyprus
regularly receive a large number of pilgrims-cum-vacationers, who combine their visits to
churches and monasteries with shopping, swimming, sunbathing, and degustation of local
cuisine. In contrast to the Russian word palomnichestvo that, just like the English word
“pilgrimage,” implies a special journey carried out exclusively with the goal of visiting a holy
site, the Greek word proskinima refers to the ritual acts commonly performed in the church
(lightning a candle, venerating icons) and is used to describe both a regular visit to a church
(that might as well be spontaneous or accidental) and a planned trip to a sacred site (Dubisch
1990: 119). In this context, it is hardly surprising that unlike Natalia, who felt the need to
explicate that her tours to St. Lazarus Church are not “real” pilgrimages, many Greek Cypriots
view all Russians visiting the churches and monasteries as proskinites (worshipers), regardless CEU eTD Collection of whether that was the main goal of their visit to the island.
7.2. A Russian Soldier in a Greek Cypriot Church
244
As I started collecting and documenting the material evidence of the presence Rodionov’s cult
on the island in the Fall of 2014, I soon found myself confronted with an uneasy question of
what was it really an evidence of? Does the material presence of Rodionov’s representations
among those of hundreds of other saints suggest anything at all about the soldier’s popular
veneration on the island? The responses of ecclesiastic shop keepers selling icons and
hagiographies were often frustrating, as they rarely displayed much knowledge about Rodionov
other than that he was a Russian soldier who was killed in Chechnya. Many of the parishioners
and accidental visitors of the churches, where the soldier’s icon is displayed, exhibited a similar
reaction.
Assessing the scale of Rodionov’s popularity thus proved to be a difficult task. From the very
start of my research in Cyprus, it immediately became clear to me that Rodionov is
considerably less known among Greek Cypriots compared to several other “superstar” Russian
saints broadly celebrated on the island, like for instance Serafim of Sarov, Luke of Crimea, and
Matrona of Moscow, all famed for their alleged miracles. Through casually asking every Greek
Cypriot I met in the course of my fieldwork whether they heard about the soldier, I discovered
that quite a lot of people were indeed familiar with Rodionov’s story, even if not all of them
could immediately recognize his name. Recognizability, however, does not directly translate
into popular veneration. As I will demonstrate in the remaining sections of this chapter, the
establishment of Rodionov’s cult on the island largely bears a top-down character, with local
priests and icon-painters promoting the soldier’s figure among the lay believers as a CEU eTD Collection contemporary exemplar of martyrdom. While their efforts contribute to popularization of
Rodionov’s story and to some extent to the institutionalization of his cult, whether they would
manage to turn the soldier into a popularly venerated saint in Cyprus, remains to be seen.
245
Archimandrite Symeon, the abbot of the monastery of St. Georgie in Mavrovuni is one of the
key actors in the popularization of the Russian Orthodox culture in present-day Cyprus. He
also played a crucial role in the establishment of Rodionov’s cult on the island, as it was with
his blessing that the first Greek Cypriot icon of the soldier was created. The small male
monastery of St. Georgie is located in a picturesque site about 10 kilometers from Larnaca,
near the village of Troulloi. It is devoted to one of the most widely revered Orthodox saints,
2nd century great martyr George – a Roman soldier of Greek origin who was sentenced to death
for refusing to denounce his Christian faith. The present-day monastery of St. George was
founded in 1993 by Fr. Symeon and three other monks on the territory of an ancient convent,
the first historiographic mentions of which date back to 1134 (Archimandrite Symeon 2009).
The monastery’s parish has been steadily growing over the past two decades, many believers
from Larnaca and nearby village choosing it as a destination for attending both the daily vespers
and the Divine Liturgy served on Sundays. Due to the increasing popularity of the monastery,
construction of a new, bigger church on the monastery’s territory began in the mid-2000s to
accommodate all the faithful wishing to attend the services there. The monastery is particularly
beloved among the young people, for many of whom Fr. Symeon serves as a confessor and a
spiritual father. In his short book devoted to the history of St. George’s monastery, Fr. Symeon
(2009:9) explains the appeal of the monastery to the young generations through their desire to
escape the stress and fatigue induced by “the modern way of life” and a longing for a spiritual
experience of closeness to God that a monastery can provide in an “as tangible as it can get” CEU eTD Collection form.
St. George monastery is also a popular destination among the Russian-speaking believers
residing on the island as well as Russian tourists and pilgrims. Many are directed there by the
246
Figure 7.3. Fr. Symeon in his office at St. George Monastery Source: http://www.taday.ru/text/1275812.html
ROEC with which Fr. Symeon maintains a close relationship. The Moscow Patriarchate
website (March 17, 2009) reports that in 2009 an event devoted to the 200th anniversary of the
Russian writer Nikolai Gogol’, named “Gogol’ and Optina Monastery” was held on the
territory of the monastery.158 In addition to St. George’s parish members the event featured
representatives of ROEC, Russian diplomats as well as teachers and students of the high school
run by the Russian embassy. The monastery also hosts one of the largest ecclesiastic book-
stores in Cyprus that contains an impressive collection of Greek language translations of
spiritual literature by the Russian authors as well as the hagiographies of Russian saints and
martyrs. The site thus serves as an important hub for the dissemination of the information about CEU eTD Collection Russian Orthodoxy on the island.
158 2009. “V Monastyre Sviatogo Georgiia na Kipre proshli Gogolevskie Chteniia ‘Gogol’ i Optina Pustyn’.’” Retrieved June 30, 2019 (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/588730.html). 247
Fr. Symeon was born in 1948 in the town of Xylotymbou in Larnaca district. In the early 1970s,
while studying theology in Athens he got to know two icon-painters, the brothers Lipoura
(students of the famous Greek icon-painter Fotis Kontoglou) and learned from them the
Byzantine icon-painting technique that was experiencing a revival in Greece at the time
(AMEN.GR, September 27, 2011).159 Fr. Symeon became a strong proponent of Byzantine
iconographic technique and upon his return from Athens started teaching iconography to the
young icon-painters, passing on his knowledge to about 20 students in Cyprus. For Fr. Symeon
the fight for the revival of the Byzantine technique is part of a larger struggle for the restoration
of the Orthodox tradition and its protection and purification from Western cultural influences.
As he put it (2009: 11) in his book,
The church should remain and serve conscientiously the tradition of the Orthodox faith. Whatever is foreign to this tradition should be removed gradually. We want churches that express the spirit of the Orthodox theology, that combine majesty with simplicity and modesty. We want priests who inspire people with their character and conduct. … Children expect from us inspiration, inspiration that will lead them eventually to God.
Father Symeon has a strong interest in the Russian Orthodox tradition. He has visited Russia
twice – first in the early 1990s, and then in the early 2010s. During his second trip he visited
St. Petersburg and the famous Optina Monastery near Kozelsk that emerged as a prominent
spiritual center during the 19th century, renowned for its tradition of eldership (starchestvo).
When I visited Fr. Symeon at St. George monastery in 2014, he proudly showed me his
extensive collection of Greek-language translations of Russian classical literature. “I like
CEU eTD Collection Russia very much, I like Russian mysticism, I love Russian books,” he asserted
enthusiastically. A big admirer of the Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky, Fr. Symeon was
deeply moved by his literary image of elder Zosima in The Brothers Karamazov that was
159 2011. “Igumenos Simeon: ‘I Psihi Mou Ine Strammeni Stin Anatoli!’” AMEN.GR, September 27. Retrieved July 7, 2019 (http://www.amen.gr/article/igoumenos-sumewn-i-psuxi-mou-einai-strammeni-stin-anatoli). 248
created after the reverend Amvrosii from Optina. In 2006 the basement floor of the new church
that is being constructed in St. George’s monastery was consecrated to the Holy Fathers of the
monastery of Optina. This underground church features several icons that were created by a
Moscow-based icon-painter Aleksandr Lavdanskii as well as the images that were presented to
Fr. Symeon as gifts in different years by Russian pilgrims, including the large group icon Sobor
Optinskikh Startsev made in Kaluga and sanctified in Optina Monastery.160
To Fr. Symeon the Optina elders represent the ideal of preserving tradition and spirituality in
the face of the challenges of modernity. As he (2009:8) put it in his reminiscences on the history
of St. George’s monastery, “The age in which these fathers lived, with Western influences
growing in Russia, and the way the fathers met and overcame these difficulties have a lot to
teach us today in Cyprus, where we are dealing with similar problems.” The hagiographies of
the Optina elders have strongly influenced Fr. Symeon’s understanding of monastic life and
his thinking about the relationship between the clerics and lay believers. As he put it in an
interview to the Russian TV program Pravoslavnaia Entsiklopediia (August 25, 2007),161
Cyprus recently joined Europe and we have already felt the influence of the West. Russia during the times of the Optina elders also was under the influence of the West. People from all over Cyprus visit our monastery. I would want that I myself and my monks were worthy students of the elders of Optina. The way they guided their spiritual children is very relevant today. Elder Iosif is particularly close to me. He could in 2-3 words say so much that everything became clear and understandable.
To Fr. Symeon the notion of mysticism represents the ideal of worship grounded in ritualistic
practices and evocation of emotions that elevate the spirit. He sees such an ideal as threatened CEU eTD Collection
by modernity and corrupted by the centuries of Western influences on Orthodox theology and
practice. Iconography became for Fr. Symeon a major arena for his personal struggle for the
160 The icon was delivered to Cyprus with the mediation of ROEC (Zykova 2010). 161 2007. “Nuzhen li Cheloveku Dukhovnyi Otets?” Pravoslavnaia Entsyklopediia, August 25. Retrieved June 28, 2019 (https://www.sedmitza.ru/text/411326.html). 249
purification of tradition. In 2001 Archimandrite Symeon published a book called Byzantine
Iconography and Its Theology in which he outlined his views on the meaning and significance
of the Byzantine canon in icon painting. The book was largely inspired by the desire to
rediscover the Byzantine icons and its significance in the context of the perceived rapidly
changing dynamics of worship and profanation of lifestyle. “The icons,” Symeon (2001: 11)
writes, “take us by the hand and take us back” serving as doorways into the divine world of
saints, from which the modern condition of existence alienates people. He believes that the
introduction of Western canon in icon painting and the hegemony of the naturalistic style
destroyed the liturgical function of iconography, as he views Western tradition of iconography
as lacking dogmatic and theological significance, turning icons into mere “material for the
decoration.”
The decline of the Byzantine style in the Greek Orthodox world started during the period of
Turkish rule. After the establishment of the independent Greek state in the 19th century the
Byzantine canon was almost completely replaced with the Western naturalistic technique.
According to Fr. Symeon (2001), the destruction of the Byzantine style in Mount Athos was
partially propelled by the Russian influence as the so-called Western academic icon-painting
style became hegemonic in 18th century Russia following Peter the Great’s reforms. In Cyprus
the adherence to the “old manner” of icon-painting lasted in various forms for yet another
century, but had almost completely disappeared by the beginning of the 20th century.
CEU eTD Collection In the Cypriot context, the crucial role in the return of the Byzantine canon was played by the
icon-painter Fr. Kallinikos Stavrovouniotis, who studied iconography during his time as an
apprentice and then a monk in Mount Athos. In the 1960s, after his apprenticeship with Fotis
Kontoglou – the key figure in the revival of Byzantine icon-painting in Greece – Fr. Kallinikos
250
completely abandoned the Renaissance technique and started working exclusively in the
Byzantine one, becoming a prominent figure in icon-painting in the Orthodox world. As a
result, this “rediscovery” of Byzantine canon took on a totalizing character, the Church of
Cyprus issuing a special decree that commends all the new icons ordered for the churches or
monasteries to be made in accordance with the Byzantine canon. Fr. Symeon also made a
substantial contribution to the reestablishment of the Byzantine canon through training a new
generation of icon-painters and reviving interest in the Orthodox theology of icon through his
publications.
Fr. Symeon told me that he was deeply moved by Rodionov’s story when he first read about
the soldier’s death. He felt the desire to spread the word about the young man’s faith and
spiritual strength and he started encouraging his parish and his spiritual children to celebrate
the new saint. Despite the absence of formal canonization, Rodionov is included in St. George’s
calendar of saints and a prayer service is held for him in the monastery every year on May 23.
In his office Fr. Symeon stores the original of the soldier’s icon – the first to be made in Cyprus.
It was created by Fr. Symeon’s former student, icon-painter Georgios Petrou (see Figure 7.4).
Fr. Symeon had personally met with Liubov’ Rodionova, who came to the island in 2012 to
visit the churches where her son is celebrated. Liubov’’s visit on the island was arranged with
the mediation of Archpriest Konstantin, head of aerospace sector of the Russian Orthodox
Church’s Synodal Department for Relationship with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement
Agencies and a long-standing supporter of Rodionov’s canonization. In the early 2000s Fr. CEU eTD Collection Konstantin participated in the ROC’s Synodal Commission for Canonization’s investigation
into the soldiers’ case. He gathered information on the biography of Rodionov and three other
soldiers executed together with him. In the course of his investigation Fr. Konstantin got to
know the families of all the four soldiers, including Liubov’ Rodionova and visited their graves.
251
CEU eTD Collection
Figure 7.4. Icon of Evgenii Rodionov created by Georgios Petrou in 2009. Source: http://www.saint.gr/319/texts.aspx.
252
In 2004 Fr. Konstantin met Fr. Symeon during his visit to Cyprus and told him about his work
on the spiritual education of the military and about the popular veneration of Rodionov in
Russia. As Fr. Symeon was deeply interested in the story, he arranged a public meeting during
which Fr. Konstantin narrated to the parishioners of the St. George monastery the story of
Rodionov’s feat. In 2011, when a chapel devoted to Rodionov in Xylotymbou was built, Fr.
Symeon informed father Fr. Konstantin about it and through him passed an invitation to attend
the opening ceremony to Liubov’. Although she was not interested in attending the official
ceremony, Liubov’ later traveled to Cyprus, visiting both St. George’s monastery and the
chapel in Xylotymbou.
To Fr. Symeon, Rodionov, presents an important example of faith for the contemporary youth.
As he put it,
Evgenii is loved in the Cypriot church. … Young boys look at him as exemplar – as a young boy of nineteen years who died for Christ. He was asked to take off his cross and he didn’t – the Cypriots love him very much. ... I could not bear to watch the video [of the execution]162 – it is a crime… The young always ask for stronger standards and the saints show the strongest standards.
As Fr. Symeon observed, nowadays the type of martyrdom Rodionov accepted – through a
violent death – is no longer common. However, he stressed that witnessing for Christ still
exists, albeit in a different form. Thus, the young people, who manage to preserve faith and
traditions while living in a society full of sins and temptations are also demonstrating a form
of witnessing, he asserted.
CEU eTD Collection
162 Fr. Symeon is referring to the beheading video widely circulating in the Greek-language Internet space that claims to depict Rodionov’s execution. The video is likely to be one of the numerous execution footages filmed by the Chechen fighters during the conflict, however, there is no evidence or reason to believe that the soldier depicted on the video is indeed Rodionov. 253
Geogios Petrou, the icon-painter who made the soldier’s icon for the St. George monastery,
grew up in Xylotymbou, just like Fr. Symeon. He currently lives in Larnaca, where he runs
icon-painting courses and teaches religion in a local school. When I met Georgios in 2015 he
explained that he first heard about Rodionov in 2008, when a friend emailed him a link to an
Internet page narrating the soldier’s story. After reading the story Georgios had little doubt that
Rodionov was a saint who had accepted a martyr’s death. He believes that the other soldiers
who died alongside Rodionov, equally deserve to be glorified. As he put it,
Can there be a stronger proof of his [Rodionov’s] sainthood? If you don’t believe in God, you can easily say that you reject Christ. But for a hundred days there, far away, until the very last moment he and the other soldiers persevered. We should honor all of their names – they are martyrs, I believe.
Georgios, who had also met with Liubov’ during her visit to Cyprus, told me that he believes
that Rodionov will eventually be canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church, but pointed out
that more time has to pass first. Unlike the Russian Orthodox priests, he did not see the absence
of official canonization as an impediment to the creation of icons or popular veneration of a
saint:
When the relatives of a saint still live, it is hard for the Church to declare him a saint, but Evgenios is a martyr. But the saints do not need a declaration! Martyrs – they are honored inside the Church and the people always honor the martyrs. And you will see that he [Rodionov] became a well-known martyr here. Rodionov’s story moved Georgios so much he felt inspired to create an icon of the new saint.
He made two sketches, which he showed to Fr. Symeon and once the icon was completed he
gifted it to the Archimandrite who took a strong liking to it. As Georgios explained, although CEU eTD Collection he had seen several photographs of Rodionov, he wanted to make sure his icon did not have
too many portraitist features, but was made in a “traditional Byzantine style, according to the
canon.” The military camouflage uniform, which reveals the historical context of the saint’s
life and his soldierly identity, is covered on the icon with a red mantle that symbolizes
254
martyrdom. “Wearing a red mantle represents the honor of a martyr – they gave their blood for
Christ. It says in the Apocalypses that all the martyrs will rise and will ask that Christ gives
them justice for their blood,” the icon-painter explained. Georgios completed the icon during
Holy Week, which he said helped him feel closer to the mystery of martyrdom: “This is the
most beautiful period, I think, for a Christian and for an icon-painter. In the climate of the
passions of Christ you understand what it means to be Christian – I think that helped me make
the icon of this saint.”
The design of Georgios’ icon was subsequently used to produce copies for other churches as
well as smaller size wooden icons that are being sold in several ecclesiastical shops across
Cyprus. It also has broadly circulated online, often used to illustrate Greek-language articles
about Rodionov. Georgios is not disturbed by the fact that his icon’s design is being used
without any mention of his authorship or requests for permission. To the contrary, he said he
was pleased to see that his work helps spread the word about the new saint: “I did not paint it
for myself, I painted it for him [Rodionov] to become known. I just wanted to honor him
however I can.”
Like Fr. Symeon, Georgios considers Rodionov an important exemplar for the youth and often
uses his religion classes as an occasion to inform his students about the new saint. In May,
around the date of Rodionov’s memory day, Georgios organizes a special class during which
he reads parts of the soldier’s hagiography together with the students and talks to them about CEU eTD Collection the meaning of martyrdom. As he explained, one of the messages he is trying to pass across is
that martyrdom it is not a thing of the past, but a potential choice every believer might find
himself confronted with in the contemporary world. According to Georgios, with the rise of
the Islamic State in Syria the threat of forced conversion and the issue of martyrdom became
255
even more relevant to the contemporary world, sparkling a renewed interest in the topic in the
society:
I talk to my students [about Rodionov] now – I talked to them before as well – but now, with everything that is happening with the jihadists, it is easier for them to understand what had happened to Saint Evgenios. Because among those who are killing in Syria – they are not Syrians, those who do this – they are Muslim fanatics from different countries and from Chechnya as well, as far as I know… And they do the same thing, they assault the hostages if they do not change faith and this is a witnessing for faith.
As Angie Heo (2018) shows in her compelling ethnography of Christian-Muslim mediation
in Egypt, the instances and continuously looming threat of sectarian violence from the radical
Islamists gave a renewed vigor to the theme of martyrdom within the Coptic Orthodox
community. Similarly, many Christians across the globe, horrified and shocked by the news
of the massacres of Christian hostages by IS militants in Syria and Libya, resorted to the trope
of martyrdom to make sense of the disturbing events. During 2014 and 2015 many of my
informants followed the news closely, worried that the violence produced by the escalating
conflict in nearby Syria, would spill over to the island.163
Cypriot history, Georgios pointed out, knows many martyrs, who similarly died because they
refused to denounce their faith and their values. The most recent examples, he said, are the
neo-martyrs, killed during the period of the Ottoman reign in Cyprus and the heroes who died
fighting against the British for the island’s independence and defending the island during the
Turkish invasion of 1974. In the Greek and Greek Cypriot contexts, the discourse of
martyrdom is often extended into the nationalist vocabulary, many religious and political CEU eTD Collection figures who were killed during the Ottoman era being described as ethnomartyrs
(ethnomartires) (Halikiopoulou 2011). In Cyprus, perhaps the most famous example is
163 The concerns were amplified by the fact that since September 2014 Dhekelia and Akrotiri – the British military- bases – have been actively used by the Royal Airforce to carry out airstrikes in Syria and Iraq (Odell 2015). Under the 1960 treaty of independence the United Kingdom retained control over the territories of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, that were granted the status of a British Overseas Territory in Cyprus. 256
Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus, who was executed alongside three other metropolitans in
1821 for their support of the Greek War of Independence.164 Likewise, the members of The
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) 165 , who fought for the island’s
independence from Britain and its unification with Greece in the 1950s, are often referred to
and commemorated in Cyprus as hero-martyrs. As Hollander (forthcoming) points out in his
discussion of national struggle commemoration in Cyprus, “hero-martyr” is a rather unstable
category that is sometimes applied to all dead EOKA fighters and sometimes used to refer
only to those who died in the result of refusing to surrender. The representations of EOKA
fighters’ lives and deaths, he argues, are influenced by and share the narrative structure of the
vitas of Ottoman-era neomartyrs, as they emphasize the fighters’ indifference to the threats of
torture and promises of rewards and their conscious decision to turn down multiple offers to
surrender. The commemoration of heroes in Cyprus has strong parallels with the Orthodox
practices of martyr worship, as their portraits can often be spotted in public schools, coffee
shops, football clubs, and other associations, while their personal items, including weapons,
clothes, and sometimes even hair are stored as and displayed in museums as precious relics
(Toumazis 2017).
While a martyr title, when applied in a heroic context, does not entail an allusion to sainthood
– as all Greek Cypriot priests I have interviewed were prompt to point out – it does allude to a
potential equivalence between dying for God and sacrificing for the nation. For Georgios the
line between martyrdom and heroism is a thin one. As he put it, “the heroes are almost martyrs, CEU eTD Collection almost saints.” He gave an example of Grigoris Afxentiou, an iconic Greek-Cypriot national
hero, EOKA’s second in command after Georgios Grivas, who was burnt alive on March 3,
164 Kyprianos was hanged on a tree, while Chrysanthos of Paphos, Meletios of Kition, and Lavrentios of Kyrenia were beheaded. The execution was followed by a methodic cleansing of all the leading figures of the Greek Orthodox community, that was accompanied by massive confiscations of Church property (Ioannides 2019:11). 165 For more on the representations of EOKA fighters as martyrs see Toumazis (2017). 257
1957, after he refused to surrender and leave his hideout that was surrounded by the British
forces.
He [Afxentiou] had every chance to sell out to the British, but he believed in the liberation struggle. Because freedom is the most important gift that God gave us. He stayed, although other guys told him that he will be betrayed and killed and with his example, by staying he gave courage to the next ones to not stop [fighting]. It was a martyrical death, the British burnt him alive – he knew how he will die, and he was ready. There are all elements of martyrdom, but in Orthodoxy the cause of witnessing has to be for God. The future will show… I heard that some people speak about Afxentiou [and other heroes] as not just heroes but say that they have the saintliness of martyrs. I personally believe that.
Georgios told me that Rodionov is well known and revered in Mount Athos and that during his
latest visit in 2011 he heard a story of a miracle from a monk there who claimed to have seen
a paper photocopy of the soldier’s icon streaming myrrh. Inspired by the story of Rodionov’s
martyrdom and reports about his posthumous miracles, Georgios decided to name one of his
sons Evgenios – a relatively rare name in Cyprus. As Georgios told me, when he was young,
he made a promise to name his child after St. Eugenios of Trebizond – an early Christian martyr
who was tortured and eventually beheaded in Trebizond for his profession of Christian faith.
With the passing of years, Georgios forgot about his promise, but remembered it once he came
across Rodionov’s story. When his fifth child was born in 2010, he convinced his wife to name
him Evgenios, this way honoring both saints. Georgios told me that he often visits with his son
the chapel devoted to Rodionov at St. Rafael and Marina monastery in Xylotymbou and always
attends the service for Rodionov held on May 23 at St. George’s monastery. The icon-painter
believes that prayers to Rodionov saved the life of his son, who was born prematurely and CEU eTD Collection according to the doctors did not have a high chance of surviving:
I prayed to the saint [Rodionov] together with Fr. Symeon, so that he helps us because we gave his name to the child, and a miracle happened! Our kid is doing very well and has no [health] problems … – this is my personal relationship with the saint of Russia.
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This testimony exemplifies how cults of saints perpetuate among other things through personal
relationships that believers develop with saintly figures. After being initially interested in
Rodionov’s story because of its exemplary potential, by naming his son after the soldier,
Georgios made Rodionov the patron saint of his child, who is expected to be actively present
in young Evgenios’ life as a protector. Having ascribed his son’s healing to Rodionov’s
intercession Georgios not only developed his own testimony about the miraculous powers of
the new saint, but also entered the relationship of reciprocal exchange with the soldier,
committing to continue to venerate him in gratitude for his help.
An act of naming one’s child after a new saint is also an important step in ensuring that the
veneration of that saint takes roots in a new locale. As I discovered through multiple
conversations with Greek Cypriot priests, the inclusion of a commemoration of a new saint to
a church’s calendar requires a fulfillment of several conditions: there has to be an icon of a
saint available to be placed in the center of the church during his or her memory day; a Greek-
language religious service devoted to the saint has to be published; and, in most cases, there
should be a believer wishing to sponsor the feast. Unless the commemoration of a new saint is
initiated by a priest, as was the case with Fr. Symeon, the presence of a parish member wishing
to prepare the sacrificial bread – prosfora – is central for making a celebration happen. Some
families make their own bread, others – order it from the bakeries. As the process is costly and
often time-consuming, individual believers rarely sponsor more than two or three feasts per
year. Most believers observe the celebration of the saints they were named after and some also CEU eTD Collection organize a celebration in memory of the saints whose miraculous intercession they believe to
have experienced. These customs enable a smooth reproduction of the already established saint
cults but can sometimes become an impediment for the development of a new cult. The
selection of children’s names in Cyprus is often rigidly regulated by the local custom of naming
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children after the grandparents166 and hence an exotic name might create an obstacle for the
celebration of a new saint to take roots on the island.167 Naming a child after a new saint would
thus require from the parents to either deviate from the custom, risking to offend the relatives,
or to have a fifth child, as it happened in Georgios’ case. Such an occurrence is, however, rare,
as birth rates have been steadily declining in Cyprus over the past few decades, with few
families having more than one child (Chrysostomou 2018).
7.3. The Exemplarity of Sacrifice
The female monastery of St. Rafail and Marina, where a chapel devoted to Rodionov and three
other Russian saints was opened in 2011, is located next to the town of Xylotymbou (see figure
7.5). The monastery was built in the late 1980s next to the 14th century church of St. Marina.
The monastery itself is devoted to the third century great martyr Marina and the neomartyrs of
the Ottoman period – St. Rafail, Nikolaos, and Irini of Lesbos. As Fr. Kiriakos, the monastery’s
dean, recalls in his book devoted to the history of the monastery, the idea to build a church
devoted to St. Rafail, Nikolaos, and Irini came to him during his studies in Athens, where he
first learned about the saints from an abbess of St. Efraim monastery he used to frequently
visit.168 The three martyrs are often referred to as neofani – newly revealed – as their stories
became public knowledge in 1959, when a number of Lesbos residents reported the saints
appearing to them in dreams and narrating the stories of their martyrical deaths in the hands of CEU eTD Collection
166 The first two children are usually named after the paternal grandparents and the other two after the maternal ones, although the latter part of the custom is less strictly enforced. 167 It becomes a particularly serious obstacle if the saint in question does not possess the reputation of a miracle- worker and the people are less likely to address him or her in the time of need. 168 Protopresviterou P. Kiriaku Panagiotu. 2014. Iera Moni Agion Rafail-Nikolau-Irinis kai Agias Marinas Ksilotymbou. B’ Ekdoksi Epayksimeni. Tipografia Pampos D. Tsokkos. 260
Figure 7.5. Map of Greek Cypriot Churches celebrating Evgenii Rodionov.
the Turkish raiders in 1463. The martyrs were canonized in 1970, after their alleged remains
were found in the northeastern part of Lesbos.169 The monastery in Xylotymbou became the
first church in Cyprus to celebrate these saints. In the speech Fr. Kiriakos delivered during the
opening of the Church, he drew parallels between the fates of the saints killed during the
Ottoman era and the Greek Cypriots’ current predicament under the Turkish occupation,
expressing the hope that the Church will become a “a fortress against the Turkish sacrilegious
occupation”:
The majestic church that was just erected in the curbs of Attila170, in our community of Xylotymbou is an expression of love and gratefulness of the Orthodox Greeks of Cyprus to our great benefactor St. Rafail. Since today this inauguration will be a spiritual base and a foundation of spiritual and ethnic liberation.171
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169 For an overview of the story of neo-martyrs’ discovery and veneration in Greece see Rey (2012). 170 The Turkish invasion in Cyprus was code named Operation Attila. 171 Protopresviterou P. Kiriaku Panagiotu. 2014. Iera Moni Agion Rafail-Nikolau-Irinis kai Agias Marinas Ksilotymbou. B’ Ekdoksi Epayksimeni. Tipografia Pampos D. Tsokkos, p. 29-30. 261
The chapel devoted to Rodionov and the three other Russian saints was built at the initiative of
Fr. Kiriakos. As he explained to me during my visit to the monastery in 2014, he read the
hagiographies of St. Serafim of Sarov, St. Luke, and St. John of Shanghai and San Francisco
during his school years in Athens and immediately felt great love for these saints. He was also
deeply moved by the story of Rodionov, “a kid of 19 years old who was told to take off his
cross and did not take it off because of his love for God.” As Fr. Kyriakos explained, the
national origin of the saints is of no importance to him: “I dedicated a small chapel to my four
most beloved saints. They are big saints, it does not matter if they are Russian or Greek – for
God there is no distinctions.” According to Fr. Kiriakos, of the four saints, only the name of
John remains somewhat obscure to most Greek Cypriots, as Serafim of Sarov and Luke of
Crimea are well known and revered in Cyprus for their miracles, while many Greek Cypriots
have heard of Rodionov through the Internet. In the chapel he stores a small box containing the
small pieces of relics of Serafim and Luke that were presented to the monastery by the ROC as
well as the earth from Rodionov’s grave that was delivered to him by a pilgrim from Russia.
Just like the rest of Rodionov’s venerators that I encountered in Cyprus, Fr. Kyriakos did not
assign any significance to the fact that the soldier had not been canonized. As he put it:
It does not bother me because this kid sacrificed his life, performed miracles… This [canonization] is a churchly matter, it will be resolved in its time, but he is a saint – we cannot doubt that. Evgenios could have taken his cross off and gone back home. Imagine: a kid of 19 years old, how scared he was when he saw them holding knives! But because of his love for God and his faith he did not think of taking his cross off.
CEU eTD Collection Rodionov’s story interested Fr. Kyriakos so much because the topic of martyrdom is very close
to his heart. It was for that same reason he had chosen to build a monastery devoted to the
newly found martyrs Rafail, Nikolaos, and Irini. In his discourse the idea of sacrifice for God
is often conflated with that of dying for the nation:
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Figure 7.6. The Museum of the Dead and Missing in Xylotymbou Source: https://www.facebook.com/xylomuseum/
In Orthodox church there are different categories of saints – martyrs, great martyrs, holy elders, ascetics, and from the times of the Turkish rule (tourkocratia) there are neomartyrs. These people witnessed (martirisan), which means lost their lives, for God and for the Fatherland. This means that they are heroes, hero-martyrs – they did not betray either their faith, or their fatherland. Saint Rafail, suffered a lot of tortures from the Turks so that he abandons Hellenism and becomes Turk, but the saint did not apostatize and showed endurance to horrible tortures, very horrible tortures. And because of this endurance, because of his faith in God and in his fatherland the God crowned him and made him a great martyr and gave him a lot of grace to make a lot of miracles, to help a lot of people.
Fr. Kyriakos believes that the God “allowed for these saints to be found after so many years”
CEU eTD Collection to show contemporary believers, “who have neither traditions nor faith” and who are overly
preoccupied with their own wellbeing and financial success, the right way of living in faith.
A person’s life is more than just food and money – these are not great values, this is not the purpose. The purpose is to take advantage from the years that God gave us as good as we can to achieve the final purpose – to live life in Christ’s example, so that we become one community with God. All these
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neomartyrs who endured very many tortures are very loved – when you read a hagiography of a neomartyr and see the tortures they endured you are getting filled with love for the saints. For this reason, I chose saint Rafail, because of the tortures he has endured, and all these people to whom he appeared, all these miracles he made, so many people he helped and how he helped us to build the monastery here – there was nothing here and now there is this monastery and the church.
In addition to honoring saints whose lives can inspire contemporary believers to become better
Christians, Fr. Kiriakou also actively works for the preservation of the memory of the Greek
Cypriot heroes, especially those who were born in Xylotymbou. In 2012 he organized the
creation of a museum for the eight young men from Xylotymbou who died or went missing
during the 1974 Turkish invasion. The museum collection features a photo exhibition
documenting the horrors of the invasion, the portraits of the eight fellows and some of their
personal items – military uniforms, weapons, and other paraphernalia – donated by their
families (see Figure 7.6). The museum was created with the goal to both honor and immortalize
the sacrifice of the fighters from Xylotymbou and to ensure the transmission of the historical
memory about the war to younger generations. The site is often frequented by groups of school
children from the village brought there to learn about their homeland’s history. The creation of
the museum was partially inspired by the project Fr. Kyriakos’s wife, who teaches history at a
local high school, completed years ago. Together with her students she had written and
published a book dedicated to the eight soldiers from Xylotymbou. For this project the students
did their own research, collecting information about the lives and deaths of the soldiers and
meeting up with their families to learn more about each fighter’s biography.
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Several times a year Fr. Kyriakos serves a memorial service at St. Nicholas Church located in
the harbor of Dhekelia and dedicated to the missing of the Xylotymbou community. This is not
the only Church in Cyprus to be dedicated to the victims of 1974. In 1995 Fr. Christophoros, a
priest who lost his son, Alexandros, during the invasion created the Alexandros
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Papachrisophorou Foundation and built a Church commemorating the missing (Sant Cassia
2005:156). The walls of St. Alexandros Church located outside of Nicosia are decorated with
the portraits of the dead and missing of 1974 as well as murals depicting the grief of their
relatives and their struggle to obtain information on the fate of the missing soldiers alongside
with the images of the imprisoned soldiers (ibid.).
As Paul Sant Cassia (2005) compellingly argues in his ethnography of commemoration of the
victims of the Turkish invasion, their representations are strongly informed by the Christian
Orthodox imagery. According to the UN statistics, 1,378 Greek Cypriots were killed, and more
than 1000 soldiers went missing during the 1974 Turkish invasion. Despite the fact that all of
the soldiers listed as missing are likely to have been killed, the Greek Cypriot state refuses to
recognize them as dead until their remains are found. Even four decades after the conflict, the
Greek Cypriots keep referring to this category of people as agnoumenos (“of unknown fate”),
as if they could still potentially be alive (Sant Cassia 2009:119). The agnoumenos, Sant Cassia
(2005:81) explains, present a highly ambiguous, an almost liminal category that harbors a lot
of inherent contradictions: as national martyrs (presumed dead) they symbolize the separation
of the island and atrocities of the Turks, while as missing (potentially still living) – promise a
hope of return and reunification. The representations of the agnoumenos and the practices of
their commemoration thus curiously depart from the Greek Cypriot heroic aesthetics and bear
a closer resemblance to the Christian representations of saints: the remains of the missing are
referred to as “leipsana” (a term commonly used to denote the relics of saints and martyrs (Sant CEU eTD Collection Cassia 2005: 94)), while their portraits are displayed on the walls of some Churches – an honor
no other national heroes have ever been given. According to Sant Cassia (2005), the religious
symbolism is so prominent in the representations of the missing because it is only with the
transduction of the moment of vindication of their sacrifices into the other-worldly,
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transcendental framework that a redemptive reinterpretation of the conflict and the losses it
brought to Greek Cypriots becomes possible.
Another Cypriot Church where Rodionov is celebrated as a saint is St. Dimitrios Church in the
town of Paralimni. The church’s dean, Fr. Andreas, is a spiritual student of Fr. Symeon, of
whom he learned about the soldier’s story. A family of the church’s parishioners ordered an
icon of Rodionov to be made for the church to celebrate the soldier. The icon was
commissioned by an elderly Greek Cypriot couple from Paralimni in 2012 for their son,
Evgenios. As Christos, the family head explained to me, he learned about Rodionov from an
elder (gerontas) during his visit in Mount Athos. Upon hearing that Christos’ son is named
Evgenios, the elder narrated the soldier’s story to him and encouraged the family to venerate
Rodionov. The family have been sponsoring a feast on Rodionov’s memory day at St. Dimitrios
church every year since. In the course of my research I often heard reports from my Greek
Cypriot and Russian informants, that the soldier is venerated by many monks on Mount Athos.
Home to the male self-governed monastic communities, Mount Athos is a popular pilgrimage
site for Orthodox believers from all over the world, who go there in search of blessing or
guidance from the elders.172 The elders of Mount Athos, who since the 1970s emerged as a
cornerstone of Greek Orthodox religious world, embody a special type of charisma, as they are
often believed to have prophetic abilities as well as a capacity to see inside people’s hearts
(Psaltou 2018:87). Endowed with a special spiritual authority, Mount Athos elders thus play
an important role in spreading the word about Rodionov and encouraging the soldier’s CEU eTD Collection veneration among lay believers.
172 More than one hundred thousand pilgrims visit Mount Athos annually (Sidiropoulos cited in Psaltou 2018:88). Psaltou (2018) reports that starting from late 2000s, the number of visitors from Russia has been steadily growing, with Russian pilgrims occasionally outnumbering their Greek counterparts. 266
The dean of St. Dimitrios church, Fr. Andreas was born and grew up in the UK in a Greek
Cypriot family. He used to be an accountant before he came to Cyprus to study in 1994, where
he decided to radically change his life and become a priest. Unlike Fr. Symeon, Fr. Andreas is
less optimistic about the strength of adherence to tradition among young people in Cyprus. He
is concerned that secularization and modernity lead Greek Cypriots to gradually drift away
from tradition. To counteract this tendency, he devotes a lot of efforts to the spiritual education
of young people. Several local schools bring their entire student body to take communion at St.
Dimitrios church twice a year. The church also offers Sunday school for children and catechism
courses for the young adults. Several years ago, Fr. Andreas started working on completing a
plan that was long in the making – constructing a new building for a St. Dimitrios Spiritual
Center that would host religious courses and would serve as a communal venue for the parish
members for different events, including weddings, baptism celebration and memorials.
Complaining that the building of the spiritual center had been frozen due to the lack of finances,
Fr. Andreas stated: “what we need is a rich Russian person to come and give us the money.”
“Do you know any rich Russian people?” he asked me, half-hopefully, half-jokingly. This
remark was telling of the way Russians are often perceived in Cyprus, as the island attracts a
lot of rich immigrants and tourists interested in investing in local projects and, as of lately, in
donating for religious matters.
St. Dimitrios Church once used to be a popular venue among the Russian believers residing
near Paralimni. However, since the Russian-language services started to take place at the CEU eTD Collection nearby St. Nikolas Church as well as at Agia Napa’s St. George monastery, Fr. Andreas lost
many of his Russian parishioners. Fr. Andreas explains the popularity of many Russian saints
in Cyprus through the growing availability of Greek-language hagiographies of Russian saints
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Figure 7.7. The Icon of Evgenii Rodionov created by Mihalis Hadzhimihalis for St. Dimitrios Church. Source: https://michaelhdj.wordpress.com/tag/agios-evgenios-rodionov/
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and the general active interest many Greek Cypriots believers have in the lives of saints and
the newly published hagiographies. As Fr. Andreas observed, it is mostly “the new” saints of
Russian origin who are known in Cyprus, not “the old” ones – a fact he attributed to the
publishers’ tendency to commission Greek-language translations of only newly published
Russian religious books. St. Dimitrios Church, among its holy objects, has a small relic of St.
Luke of Crimea that was presented to the church by a priest, who had authored a Greek-
language monograph about Luke and visited the parish to give a talk about the saint’s life.
When I asked Fr. Andreas about the veneration of Rodionov, he took me to the church’s
basement and showed me a large icon of the soldier that is displayed in the church on
Rodionov’s memory day but kept in the storage room for the rest of the year. The icon, made
by Greek Cypriot icon-painter Mihalis Hadzhimihail173 portrays Rodionov standing tall, with
a martyr’s red mantle placed over his military uniform (see Figure 7.7). The soldier holds a
cross in his right hand, while his left hand is casually placed on the strap supporting the
Kalashnikov hanging behind his back. Through my visit to St. Dimitrios Church in 2015, I
unintentionally contributed to further consolidation of the soldier’s cult on the island. At the
time, a part of the Church’s interior was undergoing reconstruction and Fr. Andreas was in the
process of deliberating the images of which saints he would want to be painted on the wall.
Grateful that I reminded him about Rodionov, he enthusiastically stated that he would order
his image painted on the wall – a gesture that he thought would be spiritually beneficial for the
young believers. When I revisited the church in August of 2016, a large image of the soldier CEU eTD Collection
173 Mihalis has also created the icon of Rodionov for the monastery of St. Marina and Rafail as well as another version of Rodionov’s icon for the St. Dimitrios church in Xylofagu. The later was commissioned by a Xylofagu resident, Andrea in 2013 in memory of her recently deceased father, Chrisostomos. As the St. Dimitrios church already had an icon of St. Chrisostomos, Mihalis recommended Andrea to read Rodionov’s vita. Andrea liked the soldier’s story and the fact of Rodionov’s youth and contemporaneity and accepted the suggestion to make his icon instead. 269
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Figure 7.8. The mural of Evgenii Rodionov at St. Dimitrios Church. Source: https://www.facebook.com/StDemetriosParalimni/photos/
270
was indeed painted over one of the temple’s arches (see Figure 7.8.). It was created by a Greek
icon-painter who was contracted to paint the church.
Just like Fr. Symeon and Georgios, Fr. Andreas found great pedagogical potential in the
soldier’s story, arguing that Rodionov can remind contemporary believers, who enjoy
comfortable life and the possibility to practice their faith freely, of the true meaning and value
of Orthodoxy. As he put it, “It is inspirational for young people to learn about the modern
saints. He [Rodionov] stood for his faith when it was not easy. Now it is easy, you see. And
he stood up for his beliefs and he gave his life, so it is a very good example.” According to Fr.
Andreas, familiarization with the hagiographies of saints is an effective practice for spiritual
and moral self-cultivation, as engaging with an exemplar can help believers to put in the
perspective and rethink their own lives: “The purpose is to think about our lives in comparison
to theirs [saints’]. So that we have some thought in our mind of what is going on with us.
Reading lives of saints is a very good way of improving our lives as well.” Fr. Andreas admitted
that the process of popularization of Rodionov’s veneration on the island is a slow one, as he
is not a local saint, but he was confident that with the passing of time more people will learn
about the soldier. For his part, Fr. Andreas made an effort to include Rodionov’s via into the
curriculum of the Sunday school run by the St. Dimitrios Church. He printed several, smaller
size icons of Rodionov based on the icon designed by Georgios Petrou and presented them as
gifts to the teachers of the Sunday school, instructing them to use the soldier’s story in their
classes. He lamented that Rodionov’s memory day is celebrated in late May, when most classes CEU eTD Collection are finished and hence the teachers do now have an occasion to hold a special class dedicated
to Rodionov and emphasized that he nonetheless makes efforts every year to remind his young
parishioners about the upcoming celebration.
271
Like Fr. Kyriakos, Fr. Andreas is also involved in the initiatives of commemoration for the
local heroes. St. Dimitrios Church in Paralimni serves as a venue for the memorial services
(mnimosino) held for the national heroes, including the people who died or went missing during
the 1974 Turkish invasion. At the initiative of the parish a monument commemorating the
victims of 1974 was built in 2007 on the territory adjacent to the church. According to Fr.
Andreas, it was the first collective monument for the missing to be erected in Paralimni. St.
Dimitrios Church also hosts the memorial event help for Isaak and Solomou, as their families
are the parishioners of the church. Fr. Andreas told me that sometimes he feels uneasy about
the memorial event, pointing out that “it is a bit of a political thing” and that some groups
attempt to use the deaths of the two fellows for the pursuit of their own agendas. While Fr.
Andreas embraced the Bikers’ Initiative in memory of Isaak and Solomou discussed in Chapter
4, he was critical of the disruptions some nationalist groups create at the memorial event by
shouting insults at the politicians who come to give speeches and lay the wreaths on the two
heroes’ graves.
As Vicky Karaiskou (2017) observes, institutionalized religious and social rites for the
commemoration of dead heroes play crucial role in constituting belonging through
remembering in Cyprus. The ritual commemorations that assert the continuity between the
Orthodox saints connected to the island and the heroes who sacrificed their lives for the national
cause are thus central to the process of reproduction of communal life and ethnic identities in
Cyprus. In this regard, these commemorative practices perform a function very similar to that CEU eTD Collection of the mortuary rituals detailed by Bloch and Parry (1982), which establish a direct connection
between death and a renewal of life and social order. The involvement of religious institutions
in the practice is conditioned not only by the Church’s customary obligation to provide ritual
care for the dead, but also by the individual priests’ active pursuit of communal engagement
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and leadership. For many, like Fr. Kyriakos and Fr. Andreas this pursuit translates into the
educational activities aimed at the preservation of historical memory of the island’s numerous
fallen heroes. Angie Heo (2018:37) in her exploration of the representations of martyrdom in
Egypt describes the Coptic Church as “institution of martyrs.” The ritual memory of the holy
deaths, she (2018:40) argues, not only defines the self-representation of the community, but
also harbors a strong potential for resistance through disrupting “authoritarian rituals of
overlooking violence.” Similarly, in Cyprus, the ritualistic commemoration of martyrs and
heroes, is endowed with a power to subvert the political status quo, serving as an implicit moral
reproach to those who might wish to forget the violent past in the name of a peaceful and
prosperous future.
7.4. Concluding Remarks
The conversations with the Greek Cypriot believers venerating Rodionov revealed that the
soldier’s veneration in Cyprus emerged independently of the efforts of the Russian-speaking
community. Nevertheless, the growing visibility of the Russian diaspora and interest in the
Russian Orthodox tradition that it sustains constituted an important background that made the
institutionalization of the soldier’s cult possible. Contrary to my Greek Cypriot informants’
insistence on the irrelevance of a saint’s national origins, many Greek Cypriots would often
talk about Rodionov as a “Russian saint.” Moreover, in the Greek-language discourse the
CEU eTD Collection soldier is often referred to as “Evgenios o Rossos.” Nor was it a coincidence that the chapel
devoted to Rodionov in St. Marina and Rafail monastery was also consecrated to three other
Russian saints, or that all the priests and icon-painters promoting Rodionov’s figure had a
close relationship with Fr. Symeon, a well-known Russophile. While one can speak of a
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certain acceleration of exchange of religious representations between Russia and Cyprus over
the past two decades facilitated both by the new media technologies and the increasing
mobility of people, the phenomenon of Russian saints’ veneration in Cyprus also needs to be
understood in the context of the historical tradition of circulation of relics, icons, and
hagiographies. The transnational mobility of the saint cults is sustained through multiple
channels and involves a variety of actors – from Russian mediators sponsoring a gifting of a
specific saint’s icon to the Cypriot churches and the Greek clergymen ordering Greek
language translations of Russian saints’ hagiographies and prayer services to them, and
individual believers sponsoring the creation of an icon of a saint whose via inspired them or
whose miraculous help they believe to have received.
In contrast to the other saints of Russian origin popularly celebrated in Cyprus, Rodionov does
not possess a reputation of a miracle-worker, with a consequence that his slow popularization
on the island largely bears a top-down character. The priests like Frs. Symeon, Kyriakos, and
Andreas, saw in Rodionov’s figure a compelling contemporary exemplar of faith to offer to
the young believers. The story of a soldier, who has chosen his cross over his life, in this
context becomes a mnemonic tool for reinforcing the salience of the doctrinal elements of the
Christian teaching and reminding the Orthodox practitioners that witnessing to one’s faith
through martyrdom is not a thing of the past, but a possible choice every Orthodox believer
might find himself confronted with.
CEU eTD Collection The narrative of Rodionov’s martyrdom in the hands of the Islamists also proved a good fit
with the local representations of martyrs of the ottoman era as well as the heroes who fought
against the British rule in the late 1950s and then against the Turkish army in 1974. The
popularity of the martyrical representations in the contemporary Greek Cypriot context,
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however, should not be understood through the narrow lens of the memorialization of the
island’s violent historical past. While the figures of national heroes and martyrs remain
fundamental for defining the present-day Greek Cypriot national identity, especially in the
context of the persisting occupation and division of the island, I suggest that the appeal of
sacrificial imagery in Cyprus is also connected to the broader processes of resurgence of
mysticism and sacrificial morality happening in the Orthodox world. The mystical tradition
of hesychasm, which since its golden age in the 14th century has gone through alternating
periods of decline and revival, started to powerfully resurge across the Orthodox traditions in
the second part of the 20th century (Johnson 2010: 42). This resurgence was driven both by a
search for authenticity that many located in the Byzantine tradition and by the perceived need
to counteract the growing spread of secularization, westernization, and “profanation” of
everyday life. In post-colonial Cyprus, strongly influenced by the religious processes
happening in Greece, the return to Byzantine tradition was represented as an attempt to liberate
religious life from the corrupting Western influence, while in post-Soviet Russia the revival
of mysticism was connected to the attempts to reconstruct the forms of religiosity interrupted
by the Bolshevik Revolution.174 The resurgence of Orthodoxy in Russia was accompanied by
the rediscovery of the writings of the Russian émigré philosophers and theologians – Sergei
Bulgakov, Pavel Florenskii, Nikolai Losskii, Nikolai Berdiaev – and their neo-patristic
thought (Stöckl 2007). These very writings also strongly influenced the Greek neo-Orthodox
thinkers and their critique of the “Westernized” forms of Orthodoxy (Makrides and Uffelmann
2003).175 CEU eTD Collection
174 During the 19th century contemplative religiosity emerged as a prominent current in Russia, stirring a lot of interest among lay publics in the figures of elders (starets) and prompting a boom in pilgrimages to the monasteries (Worobec 2009). 175 The neo-Orthodox ideology emerged in Greece after the collapse of the military junta in 1974 as an alternative to the bureaucratic and “protestantized” religiosity of the colonel regime (Herzfeld 2002). 275
This revival of mysticism was marked by a growing interest among the religious publics in
the figures of charismatic elders and the mystical form of religiosity they exemplify (Kormina
2013; Kormina and Shtyrkov 2014; Paert 2010; Psaltou 2018). The desire to be in contact
with the sacred through the grace of the elders secured a steady stream of pilgrims to the
monastic sites like Mount Athos in Greece and Optina Pustyn’ in Russia. The resurgence of
mystical religiosity grounded in Byzantine tradition was also accompanied by a rise of
reactionary conservatism and militarism within some segments of the Orthodox Churches.
Many Greek and Greek Cypriot clergymen as well as Mount Athos monks are known to have
ties to the far-right Golden Dawn and ELAM parties and to harbor sympathies for their
authoritarian and anti-liberal views (Bampilis 2018; Papastathis 2015; Psaltou 2018). In post-
Soviet Russia, the connection between mystical trends in Orthodoxy and right-wing ideologies
was most pronounced in the 1990s and early 2000s, exemplified by the proliferation of
fundamentalist brotherhoods as well as apocalyptic and anti-globalist groups (Knox 2005b;
Kormina 2013b; Rock 2002; Verkhovskii 2003). Rodionov became a popular figure among
these streams of Orthodoxy, not least because of his lack of official recognition by the Church,
as these groups often had tensions with the ROC and occasionally positioned themselves
outside of it altogether (Mitrofanova 2016). But more importantly, these conservative groups,
just like the Mount Athos monks, appreciated Rodionov’s military identity and the defiant
model of religiosity exemplified in his preparedness to die for the faith. The Russian and
Greek Cypriot clergymen who are less sympathetic to the radical ideas of right-wing groups
and subscribe to the official lines of the ROC and OCC, cultivate a more moderate form of CEU eTD Collection militarism through engagement in patriotic education, commemoration of national heroes, and
promotion of the ideal of self-sacrifice among their parishioners. Rodionov thus became an
appealing figure both to the reactionary and fundamentalist militant Orthodox groups seeking
to reconstitute ethnically and confessionally homogenous communities in Russia and Cyprus
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and to the more moderate clergymen using the example of martyrs and heroes to cultivate
spirituality among lay publics.
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Conclusion
In October 2018, during the 15th International Valdai Forum, when commenting on the
possibility of Russia using nuclear weapon in response to a missile attack, president Vladimir
Putin made the following statement: “The aggressor must know that retribution is inevitable,
that it will be destroyed. And we, the victims of aggression, will go to heaven as martyrs, while
they will simply die, because they will not even have time to repent” (Sputniknews October 18,
2018).176 This remark caused laughter and a round of applause from the audience, reflecting
the way the notion of martyrdom has penetrated Russian public discourse. While few among
the cheerful audience are likely to have seriously entertained the prospect of a martyrical death
by nuclear annihilation, it is clear that throughout the 2010s the themes of ultimate self-sacrifice
and righteous violence have become more central to the increasingly militaristic state ideology
in Russia. While such a radical interpretation is but one facet of what the local historical
traditions of martyr veneration stand for in contemporary Orthodox communities, it points to
the ever-present potential for militarization inherent in martyr cults.
In this dissertation, I investigated the resurgence of martyr-centered discourses and practices
in contemporary Russia and Cyprus focusing on the examples of the developing cults of
Evgenii Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou. I have argued that the proliferation of martyr-
centered discourses and practices in these two countries is closely associated with the
CEU eTD Collection resurgence of primordial visions of the nation and the emergence of moral-conservative
movements that seek to reconstitute morally homogenous communities constructed around
“traditional” values. My research showed how the cults of heroes and martyrs, and the public
176 2018. “Putin: Russia Will Use Nukes Only if Someone Launches Strike on Its Territory.” Sputniknews, October 18. Retrieved June 28, 2019 (https://sputniknews.com/russia/201810181068990429-putin-sochi-valdai-club/). 278
appetite for the radical model of self-sacrifice they represent, developed in Russia and Cyprus
in response to the social anomie and perceived erasure of traditional moral and spiritual values
that bind communities together in the wake of a rapidly changing economic, political, and
cultural organization of everyday life. While ideas about the meaning of sacrifices of Rodionov
and Isaak and Solomou have changed over time and vary across different groups, at the most
abstract level that is invariably present in their commemoration, martyrdom is represented as a
radical rejection of the ideals of individualism, materialism, and moderation associated with
secular liberal ideology (Keane 2013). Through building a community of memory around the
martyr figures, the heterogenous groups of actors involved in promoting the cults of Rodionov
and Isaak and Solomou seek to revive the ideals of self-sacrifice, patriotism, and heroism that
they feel have been sidelined in the public sphere and erased from the private everyday life.
The cults of martyrs and heroes thus emerged in post-Soviet Russia and occupied Cyprus as
platforms for the articulation and dissemination of a conservative public project centered on
commemoration of national struggles, militarized patriotism, traditional gender roles
exemplified by the heroes’ masculine figures, and mystical religiosity. I have adopted the broad
notion of moral conservatism to characterize the heterogenous group involved in the cults of
Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou to highlight the central role preoccupation with moral
disintegration of society, discursively connected to Western cultural influence, plays in
motivating their activism. The moral conservative spheres in both countries encompass a
diverse set of actors, including: ultra-nationalist groups or parties with clearly articulated CEU eTD Collection political agendas; artists, teachers, and other cultural entrepreneurs attempting to transform the
public culture; members of the clergy seeking to promote their own visions of morality and
spirituality; and, finally, young people searching for heroic models of morality and different
forms of public engagement. While these groups diverge in their readings of national histories
279
and their visions of the social effects of capitalist economy, as well as in their stances towards
religion and towards democracy and human rights discourses, they share a perception of
contemporary Russian and Greek Cypriot communities as fragmented, atomized, and lacking
a unifying moral narrative. These groups also converge in their desire to reconstitute the public
culture imbued with transcendent religious and nationalist symbols.
More than just a product or expression of the broader conservative mobilizations happening in
Russia and Cyprus, the cults of martyrs and heroes are also generative and constitutive of these
mobilizations. Both Russia (following the collapse of the Soviet Union) and Cyprus (following
EU accession) experienced the decline of state organized cultures of commemoration. This
decline was experienced by the conservative constituencies in each country as a major sign of
the collapse of communal morality, leading to the emergence of grassroot mobilizations around
new heroes and martyrs. Many of the actors involved in the organization of commemorative
events for Rodionov in Russia were strongly influenced by the Soviet, hero-centered culture
and motivated by a desire to uphold the values it promoted through organization of amateur
memorial concerts, lessons in courage, and military-patriotic events. Similarly, in Cyprus many
of the participants in the memorial events for Isaak and Solomou express nostalgia for the
culture of anti-occupational protest and commemorative events that was prominent throughout
the 1980s and 1990s and see an opportunity to revive it through this new cult.
While grounded in and influenced by the local historical representations of heroes and martyrs, CEU eTD Collection the new martyr cults and the moral models they embody also take on new features, reflecting
the recent developments of Russian and Greek Cypriot nationalisms. As Boyarin (1999: 94)
points out, martyrdom is best understood as a discursive practice that changes and develops
over time, as the understandings of what constitutes martyrdom constantly shift and expand to
280
include new, historically specific models of sacrifice. Similarly, the model exemplified by
specific figures, like Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou, are also continuously reinterpreted,
reinvented, and reframed to fit into new political contexts and to articulate current moral
preoccupations. I thus approached the conflicts and contestations over the meaning of these
figures’ sacrifices as a lens to capture the evolution of the moral imaginaries induced by the
broader structural transformation happening in Russia and Cyprus.
In the late 1990s the notion of martyrdom emerged in the conservative discourses of post-
Soviet Russia as a way of talking about the injustices of the state towards the ordinary Russians
who remained loyal to their patriotic duty despite the neglect and sometimes outright betrayal
of authorities. The trope of martyrdom in this case appeared as a metaphor for Russia’ traumatic
transition to democracy and capitalist market economy that left generations of people raised on
the Soviet ideals of dutifulness, responsibility, and selflessness behind and feeling like they
could not find a place in the new state and the value hierarchies it created. In the historical
moment, when the pursuit of economic self-interest, conspicuous consumption, and individual
autonomy emerged in the Russian public sphere as widely accepted markers of social success
(Oushakine 2000; Ries 2002), Evgenii Rodionov’s commitment to his military duty and his
faith, fascinated the minds of the Russian public who saw in the soldier’s feat a hope for the
revival of these moral principles.
In Cyprus, the deaths of Isaak and Solomou, that occurred 22 years after the Turkish invasion CEU eTD Collection and violent partition of the island, immediately became part of the historical trope of Greek
Cypriot victimhood that represented the entire nation as a martiras – witness to the inhumane
violence and suffering inflicted by the Turks (Bryant 2012). At the time, the Republic of Cyprus
was struggling to win over the sympathy of its Western allies in their fight against “barbaric”
281
Turkey and the figures of Isaak and Solomou presented as martyrs for democracy and freedom
were actively used to that end. In parallel with these representations of martyrdom emphasizing
suffering and the cruelty of the aggressors, heroic representations of the two martyrs focusing
on their strength, bravery, and courageous selflessness started to develop.
With the passing of time and the growing temporal distance from the historical contexts in
which the deaths of Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou took place, the nature of mobilizations
around these figures has changed. Once a subversive symbol of the Chechen war, evoking the
injustices of the state towards its abandoned defenders, Rodionov’s figure emerged in the 2010s
as an emblem of new Russian patriotism built around the notion of military pride, conservative
values, and Orthodox spirituality. In the meantime, the cult of Isaak and Solomou in the late
2000s was increasingly appropriated by right-wing nationalist movements that developed in
opposition to the government’s perceived lack of commitment to the cause of island’s
liberation. In the 2010s, commemoration of Rodionov and to some extent of Isaak and Solomou
became increasingly ritualized and detached from social protest against specific policies and
political issues. Instead, these new martyr figures have been increasingly employed for edifying
purposes and offered to the public as exemplars of morality. In this context, public rituals of
commemoration and veneration affirm the recognition of and commitment to the values martyr
figures stand to represent, producing in their participants a feeling of a morally homogenous
community of memory.
CEU eTD Collection For militaristically minded young men, the figures of Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou also
present tangible and contemporary masculine exemplars of morality they turn to as they engage
in their own process of ethical self-cultivation. While few of the young men inspired by their
examples intend to imitate their deadly feats, they use the martyr’s stories to reflect upon the
282
virtues a true patriot should process and commit to working on themselves to develop these
qualities. In the Russian context, the masculine model embodied by Rodionov tends to directly
associate physical strength, militaristic virtue, and spirituality. Such a model emerged at the
backbone of the increasing convergence between Orthodox and military-patriotic cultures that
has been on the rise in Russia since the collapse of the USSR. In Cyprus, Isaak and Solomou
came to represent a nationalist moral model grounded in revanchist radicalism, that came to be
particularly appealing to the generation of youth whose political subjectivities were shaped by
the culture of nationalist events and anti-occupational protest that has been in decline since the
early 2000s. To them, the commemoration of Isaak and Solomou offered an occasion to revive
the rebellious spirit of protest and fulfill their moral and national duty by publicly proclaiming
their commitment to the cause of liberation.
In post-Soviet Russia, starting from the mid-2000s, the growing public visibility of the figures
of heroes and martyrs, including Rodionov, has been facilitated by the patriotic programs of an
increasingly militarizing state; in post-colonial Cyprus the mobilization around Isaak and
Solomou has emerged at the background of continuing government disinvestment in the
military sector and the waning of militant nationalism in official state discourses (Efthymiou
2014). Despite the stark differences in the two political contexts, the militant and masculine
models of sacrifice exemplified by Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou retain a similar shape.
Both assert such qualities as: commitment to one’s national and confessional identity;
preparedness to stand by one’s ideals in the face of danger; and, finally, spiritual strength to CEU eTD Collection sacrifice one’s life for the cause. This similarity points to public interest in martyr figures in
Orthodox communities that is shaped by the local historical traditions of martyr veneration and
that persists regardless of state authorization.
283
Although the martyr-centered conservative mobilizations emerged in Russia and Cyprus in
response to locally specific political conjunctures and the decline of state-supported public
culture of commemoration, their persistence also needs to be understood in the context of the
current momentum of global conservatism marked by the powerful resurgence of nationalist
and right-wing movements around the world. This global upsurge does not have one single
underlying cause and is connected to multiple factors, including the economic devastation of
certain nations and communities by the neoliberal restructuring of global economy (Holmes
2000; Kalb and Halmai 2007; Koronaiou et al. 2015), concern over the preservation of one’s
ethnic identity and national culture triggered by mass migration from Muslim majority
countries (Petrou and Kandylis 2016; Thorleifsson 2017), and, finally, disaffection with the
secular-liberal project and widespread questioning of its moral content (Caiani et al. 2012;
Höjdestrand 2017; Luehrmann 2019; Rock 2012). In this dissertation, I focused on this later
dimension through unpacking and exploring the moral critique of modernity (real and
imagined) articulated by conservative actors.
A close look at the beliefs and ideals motivating the actors constituting the conservative spheres
in Russia and Cyprus suggests that the popular appeal of moral conservatism, while not
unrelated to economic ills and hostility towards ethnic Others, cannot be entirely reduced to
either of these factors. Rather, it is defined by an attempt to imagine a new moral community
grounded in transcendence and reconstruct a public culture marked by passion, emotionally
charged religious and nationalistic symbols, and militaristic vigor. Building on the analysis of CEU eTD Collection the Russian case, Maria Engström (2014: 358) defines the neoconservative movement as an
“affected community” where the political and the emotional are closely intertwined and the
ideal of a passionate citizen is privileged over that of a rational one. She argues (2014: 359)
that the right-wing intellectual critique of liberalism is primarily an emotional and aesthetic
284
one, with conservative discourses often portraying liberalism as “deformed, empty, devoid of
sacrifice and heroism,” and thus profoundly dull and boring. In this context, it is hardly
surprising that many of the moral conservative movements tend to imitate aesthetically (and in
some cases ideologically) either the Soviet or Nazi German public cultures, which were both
marked by emotional exaltation and militant pathos (Berezin 2018; Griffin 1991; Rolf 2013).
The rise of moral conservative movements and their radical, militant aesthetics, thus, present
yet another attempt to reenchant the world and imbue politics and culture with transcendental
morality. Commemorative events for martyrs and heroes that fuse the emotions of grief and
pride, tragedy and triumph, and boldly assert the connection between death, sacrifice, and
national rebirth, present a great occasion for just such a re-enchantment.
While the moral conservative movements can offer a compelling counter culture to the
hegemony of Western cultural forms, it is unclear whether they have a capacity to preserve
their appeal and exercise the same emotional effect once they become dominant. Present-day
Russia has witnessed an increasing institutionalization of military-patriotic culture and a
powerful resurgence of state-sponsored war memorials. Even though this culture enjoys
popular support, its increasing bureaucratization and officials’ attempts to boost participation
by coercing students and state employees to attend the events threatens to undermine the spirit
of authenticity and the enthusiasm that gives this culture its power. For instance, The Regiment
of the Immortals parade discussed in Chapter 4, despite its ongoing appeal to the public, has
been haunted in recent years by allegations of coerced participation and scandals over portraits CEU eTD Collection of veterans found left in dumpsters after parades in several cities. 177 These scandals also
occurred in the context of growing fatigue with excessive forms of Victory Day celebrations
177 Such incidents were reported in Moscow (Gogitidze 2015), Kazan’ (Regnum 2019), and Barnaul (MKRU 2019). 285
popularly labeled pobedobesie178 – a term that is meant to express an obsessive fixation on
commemoration of the events of WWII. Such sentiments are not confined to liberal critics and
include more conservatively and patriotically-minded citizens, who claim that glamorization
of the memorial event exemplified by photoshoots of small children dressed in Soviet military
uniform and the flippant “We can do it again” slogan trivialize the tragedy of millions of Soviet
citizens who gave their lives fighting fascism. Although WWII commemoration still has a very
strong mobilizing potential in Russia, it is becoming increasingly clear to the supporters of
these events and opponents alike that instead of solving Russia’s most pressing issues, the
government is trying to project the image of a strong central state through the commemoration
of past victories. Many commentators have pointed out that contemporary Russian public
culture increasingly comes to resemble that of the late Soviet Union, becoming overly
formalistic and coercive (e.g. Cassiday and Johnson 2010; Goode 2017; Pliuschev 2018).179
As it becomes more and more hegemonic, contemporary Russian conservative culture thus also
tends to become alienating for the population and risks repeating the fate of the late Soviet
culture dismissed by many of its participants as pokazukha (show) (Yurchak 2006).
In Cyprus, on the other hand, conservative public culture and memorial events still retain the
status of a counter-culture, offering a platform for expression of radical nationalist sentiments
that go against the moderate line upheld by the center-right DISY government. As the issue of
island’s division is likely to continue to structure political culture in Cyprus for years to come,
whether appropriated by the state, or preserving its grassroots nature, this culture is likely to CEU eTD Collection maintain some level of popular appeal. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that such
ritualized forms of protest deprived of any capacity to change the political status quo might
178 The term was originally coined in 2005 by archpriest Georgii Mitrofanov (Iarova 2016). 179 The same applies to the public Orthodox culture that is haunted by reports of people being coerced to participate in cross processions and other religious celebrations. 286
also go out of fashion, with young people born after 1974 having little emotional investment
in the occupied territories and no faith in the possibility of Turkish withdrawal from the island.
While different versions of moral conservatism have proven to be successful as the basis for
global counter-movements, whether and in what form these movements might manage to
transform into a compelling hegemonic culture with a lasting appeal, remains to be seen.
Another question that would merit further investigation is whether martyr-centered public
cultures can sustain their appeal in the Orthodox world. Unlike the martyr-centered public
culture that arose in the Islamic world in the 20th century in response to intractable military
conflicts and political instability which is sustained by continued violence (Allen 2006;
Edwards 2017; Volk 2010; Khosronejad 2013)180, the new martyr cults in present-day Russia
and Cyprus were generated by military conflicts that by now are either resolved or frozen.
Hence, whether these two cults will be able to stand the test of time and outlive the present-
day conservative mobilizations remains an open question. While both cults blended well with
broader conservative discourses that counter-pose the values of heroism and self-sacrifice to
the allegedly individualistic and materialistic Western culture, so far only Rodionov’s cult has
managed to transcend the boundaries of the original conflict in which it was conceived, with
Isaak and Solomou’s cult remaining confined to Greek and Greek Cypriot audiences. When it
comes to determining a cult’s mobility, the religious element that makes a new martyr figure
potentially relevant to the transnational confessional community beyond his or her compatriots
thus comes to play a central role. CEU eTD Collection
180 Similarly, the martyr culture gained a new vigor among the Coptic communities in Egypt following sectarian violence against the Christians (Heo 2015, 2018).
287
As discussed in Chapter 4, Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine and Syria, and the
military-patriotic revival that accompanied it, gave new life to Rodionov’s cult, as the soldiers’
figure was widely mobilized as a symbol of a Russian righteous holy-warrior. The fusion of
Orthodox and military identities helped Rodionov’s cult to become attached to the new
conflicts where religious identity plays a role: Russia’s military intervention in Syria has been
represented as a fight against radical Islamism, while support of Donetsk and the Luhansk
People’s Republics was justified by defense of the ethnically Russian (and Orthodox)
population of Eastern Ukraine. The fact that Rodionov allegedly died resisting conversion to
Islam also facilitated the cult’s mobility outside Russia. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, the story
of Rodionov’s martyrdom provoked interest from Greek and Greek Cypriot clerics, who
adopted it for educating young believers about the value of Orthodox faith and the relevance
of martyrdom to the lives of contemporary Christians. The question whether Rodionov’s cult
can become a platform for the mobilization of a pan-Orthodox identity would require further
investigation into the scale and nature of the soldier’s veneration in Ukraine, Serbia, and
Greece. However, as long as sectarian violence remains a steady feature of the modern world,
Rodionov’s cult, that came to represent militant Orthodoxy and resistance to Islamization, is
likely to persist in the Orthodox world, travelling to new terrains and winning over new
audiences.
As the examples of Rodionov and Isaak and Solomou suggest, different frameworks for
collective mobilization around violent death can impact the nature, scale, and longevity of CEU eTD Collection commemorative practices. Humanitarian framework that casts violent death as a crime and
violation of the right to life has the broadest possible appeal, as it makes the death of an
individual potentially relevant to an entire global community that subscribes to the notion of
human rights. Some victim figures have indeed been able to acquire world-wide fame, adopted
288
as symbols of an international struggle against violence directed at certain groups. In most
cases, however, such mobilizations tend to be short-lived, as new conflicts develop and new
stories of victimhood captivate public attention. Heroic framework, by contrast, limits the
relevance of a death to the national collective on whose behalf the sacrifice was carried out.
While heroic figures can occasionally become the object of transnational veneration, such a
fate is usually restricted to prominent political figures like Che Guevara, rather than ordinary
citizens. Yet, it is precisely through narrowing down the group that is bound with an ethical
obligation towards a hero that heroic mobilizations acquire the capacity to last longer,
compared to those directed at the global audience. By asserting the duty of every member of a
national collective to remember and honor a hero as well as by casting heroic figures as models
for emulation, such mobilizations provide a more intimate level of engagement for the cult’s
participants. Finally, the Christian-martyrical framework has the potential to produce forms of
commemoration that can not only span centuries, but also extend to new national contexts. In
contrast to sacrifice for the nation, an act of dying for God is something that has a potential to
resonate with a transnational Christian community. Just like the figures of heroes, Christian
martyrs are often adopted by members of the public as private moral exemplars after which
individuals can try to fashion their lives. Moreover, as saints believed to have the powers of
intercession, martyrs can act as private patrons for believers who seek to cultivate personal
relationships with them.
These elements of the Christian culture of martyr worship listed above are not universally CEU eTD Collection present in every martyr cult. Rather, they are best thought of as potentialities – parts of an
available cultural repertoire inherent to this religious tradition. Their activation depends on a
number of factors, such as the distinct model of martyrdom embodied by a saint and its appeal
to different publics, the presence of different patrons and actors willing to promote the cult as
289
well as the saint’s charisma, i.e. perceived capacity to perform miracles. If these features are
actualized, as was the case with Rodionov, they can secure a lasting popular veneration of a
saint transcending the boundaries of national churches. Death defined as sacrifice thus has a
potential to turn into an endless source of social life that engenders ethical commitments, forges
communities of memory, and produces new visions of social order.
CEU eTD Collection
290
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