Stephen Brooks, ed.. Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy: A Selection from the Diaries, Correspondence and Other Papers of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, January to August 1944. Army Records Society, 27. Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2008. xvi + 384 pp. $32.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7509-5123-4.
Reviewed by James V. Koch
Published on H-German (August, 2010)
Commissioned by Benita Blessing (Oregon State University)
The stated goal of Montgomery and the Battle Normandy campaign, he generally resists skewer‐ of Normandy is to "bring together the most impor‐ ing Montgomery's interpretation of events. tant Bernard Montgomery documents for the pe‐ On occasion, he lets Montgomery of the hook riod 1 January to 20 August 1944, reproduce each rather easily in his commentary in the 650 valu‐ of the chosen documents in full and arrange them able footnotes. Illustrations include British fail‐ in a straightforward chronological order" (p. x). It ures to take Caen early on and Monty's inability to is fair to say this volume achieves this goal, even close the Falaise gap in August 1944. Nevertheless, though a batch of Montgomery documents al‐ it would be unfair to conclude that this collection ready reproduced in full in other volumes was of 211 Montgomery documents is a view of Mont‐ not included here. gomery through rose-colored glasses. For exam‐ The precise selection of a much larger set of ple, although Brooks opines that "the documents available documents (the diaries, letters, and show Montgomery as a brilliant communicator," speeches of Montgomery) that appear here is the he also catalogs Montgomery's many spats with a result of culling and evaluation by Stephen wide variety of military and political fgures (p. 2). Brooks, who previously performed a similar task Six generalizations emerge from these docu‐ for Montgomery's North African papers. Brooks ments. First, Montgomery was a skillful, meticu‐ provides some evaluative commentary relating to lous, determined organizer who was very good at the documents (primarily in footnotes) and often organizing, mounting, supporting, and operating guides readers to other sources on issues of dis‐ an army, even if subsequently he was not always pute that arise. Overall, his treatment of "Monty" the optimal decision maker in combat conditions. is gentle and, in contrast to recent histories of the Second, Montgomery, when he wished to be, could be both charming and charismatic and H-Net Reviews evinced the ability to inspire confdence and in‐ defnitely above his ceiling in his present job and crease morale among his charges. Third, an ego‐ is not good enough for the job we are on" (p. 58). tist, Montgomery was confdent he possessed dis‐ Monty added that Leigh-Mallory was "a gutless tinctive, superior knowledge and understanding bugger" and summarized, "I have no use for him" of the military, how wars should be fought, and, (p. 135). Of Air Marshall Arthur Tedder, the in particular, how to defeat the Germans. He re‐ deputy commander of the entire invasion force, garded the defeat of the Germans in Normandy as Montgomery opined, "he is very weak" (p. 167). evidence of this. Fourth, Montgomery seldom Montgomery's most revealing and pungent shied away from the opportunity to criticize or comments usually appear in his personal letters, denigrate all but a few other military leaders and which often were dispatched to Alan Brooke, chief political fgures. Fifth, his scathing comments of the Imperial General Staf. For example, Mont‐ about his military colleagues of every nationality gomery told Brooke that Air Marshall Sir Arthur betray either a brimming self-confdence of Pat‐ Coningham, who was in charge of tactical air sup‐ tonesque magnitude, or a lurking inferiority com‐ port for the invasion, is "a bad man, not genuine, plex that motivated him to attempt to cut down and terribly jealous" (p. 166). General Harold numerous contemporaries. Montgomery fre‐ Alexander, who commanded the British 15th quently was unable to admit his own errors or Army Group in Italy and who had originally been shortcomings. Finally, Montgomery's diary ap‐ proposed by Eisenhower to lead all Normandy in‐ pears to have been written with an eye to postwar vasion forces, was castigated by Monty as "def‐ historical analysis. Montgomery seems to have de‐ nitely third class as a high commander. It will be liberately shaded his diary comments, and per‐ interesting to see when the P.M., and others, dis‐ haps even revised his views on matters with fu‐ cover that Alexander is no good" (p. 104). Appar‐ ture historians in mind. When "facts" did not ft ently they did not come to that realization, since his desired narrative, he often revised his story, Alexander was made a feld marshall in 1945 and and soon claimed that the new version was what elevated to a peerage in 1946. he had predicted all along. Of General Henry Crerar, the senior Canadian Montgomery's consistent criticism of nearly commander, Montgomery complained, "I fear every other military and political leader stands very much that Harry Crerar will be quite unft to out in these documents. At the top, he laid wood command any Army.... He is very prosy and to individuals such as Winston Churchill, Charles stodgy, and he is very defnitely not a comman‐ de Gaulle, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Sir Traford der" (p. 185). Crerar, averred Monty, "is a very Leigh-Mallory, Arthur Tedder, Arthur Coningham, poor soldier, and has much to learn" (p. 244). It is Bernard Law Alexander, and Henry Crerar. hardly an accident that Antony Beevor, the most Churchill is painted as an interfering pain-in-the- recent major historian of the Normandy battle, neck. General de Gaulle, admittedly a difcult fg‐ observes, "Senior Canadian ofcers detected a su‐ ure, struck Montgomery as an individual who was percilious attitude toward them."[1] Such an atti‐ "a poor fsh and gives out no inspiration" (p. 144). tude appears to have come naturally to Mont‐ Montgomery portrayed Eisenhower as a loud, gomery. though amiable individual of limited talent whose On occasions, Montgomery's arrows were "ignorance as to how to run a war is absolute and aimed at larger groups such as the British War Of‐ complete" (p. 298). fce, where Monty lamented that "there is no one Air Chief Marshall Sir Traford Leigh-Mallory, in the War Ofce who is a really good soldier" (p. air commander for the Normandy invasion, "is 94). In this vein, he decided (correctly) that he had
2 H-Net Reviews to recast the entire Normandy invasion plan after sives, though his own private orders consistently he took command of the invasion ground forces undercut that goal. Given the high level of Com‐ in January 1944. In a February 24, 1944 letter to monwealth casualties in World War I, Monty's ap‐ Admiral Louis Montbatten, Monty lamented, proach was understandable, but came at a cost to "Here in England, I found everything and every‐ his own reputation. As Beevor has noted, "Senior one was just drifting along. Rather pathetic really. American ofcers were becoming scornful of It all had to be changed" (p. 54). In an April 1 di‐ what they saw as an inexcusable caution on the ary entry, he minced no words: "The original plan British front."[2] for Overlord was wrong ... many changes had to Montgomery acknowledged in his diaries that be made quickly. But the job has been done; Over‐ Eisenhower had prodded him several times to be‐ lord is now properly 'teed up' and the plan is come more aggressive. His July 22 diary entry good" (p. 65). Monty motivated those changes by states, "Eisenhower wrote me a letter which ex‐ purging the ranks of the invasion planners he in‐ pressed concern at my stopping operations on the herited and bringing in more than a hundred of eastern fank" (p. 233). Several days later, Eisen‐ his own people. He summarized, "We found we hower came to visit: "He talked a good deal about had to recast the operational plan, the administra‐ public opinion in America and ... the feeling that tive plan, and in fact practically everything" (p. the U.S. troops were doing more than the British 133). Virtually the only fgures of consequence troops" (p. 239). who avoided Montgomery's rhetorical scythe Montgomery's response was to assert repeat‐ st were Alan Brooke and American 1 Army com‐ edly that everything was going according to his mander Omar Bradley, although the latter fell into long-standing plan. Representative is his August 4 the category of those Monty classifed as un‐ diary entry (seemingly written with future histo‐ knowledgeable, but willing to learn from the mas‐ rians in mind): "If we examine the map I used in ter. England when expounding to all General ofcers As the battle in Normandy progressed, it be‐ the development of the land battle in Normandy, came apparent that Montgomery was a risk-avert‐ it will be seen that the battle has followed almost ing commander, at least where British and Com‐ exactly the course prescribed" (p. 269). However, monwealth forces were concerned. By August 11, Monty's own maps belie this statement, for exam‐ 1944, British and Canadian forces had sustained ple, with respect to his failure to capture Caen 68,000 casualties, but the Americans 102,000. Only within the frst few days of the invasion. 18,000 German prisoners had been captured by One explanation for the slow progress of the British and Canadians by that date, but 92,000 Commonwealth forces against the Germans was by the Americans. What was Monty's reaction to Montgomery's claim that his eastern fank of Al‐ frequent charges that the Commonwealth forces lied forces frequently faced the cream of German he led were too cautious? "The bigger American armored divisions (often true). Unable to dislodge casualties are due to their lack of skill in fghting" the Germans, Monty soon began to argue that he (p. 223). He is fortunate that this comment did not had deliberately sought out this arrangement. come to light at the time; the pressure to sack him "My broad policy, once we had secured a frm might have become overwhelming. lodgment area, has always been to draw the main Montgomery's public stance in response to enemy forces into the battle on our eastern fank, criticism that he was too timid a general was to and to fght them there, so that our afairs on the promise Eisenhower repeatedly that the British western fank could proceed the easier" (p. 174). and Canadians would undertake sustained ofen‐ Thus, he fexibly adjusted his rhetoric and "his
3 H-Net Reviews plans" to refect reality. He also fred several gen‐ supply and the need for coordination, and the in‐ erals to counterattack the claim that he did not tricacies of reporting relationships. He was a ca‐ push Commonwealth forces hard enough. pable, sometimes even inspiring, speech-maker Retrospectively, however, it was the failure of and often elicited strong, iconic loyalty from his Montgomery to close the Falaise gap in early Au‐ subordinates. gust 1944 and thereby trap the great bulk of Ger‐ Even so, he was a man of great self-esteem man ground forces in Normandy that has subject‐ and pretense who as early as February 19, 1944 ed him to more criticism than any other of his wrote that "the nation is beginning to look to me Normandy decisions. German forces had under‐ to lead them to victory. The whole of England taken a high-stakes ofensive gamble in the form know me as 'Monty,' and I am recognized at once of a tank thrust to the Atlantic coast, designed to by every man, woman and child, in the land" (p. cut Allied forces in two. At least partially because 46). Perhaps this self--perception was why in of Ultra code-breaking (an advantage that Mont‐ spring 1944 he proposed a "Public Hallowing of gomery never acknowledged that he benefted the Armed Forces of the Crown" at St. Paul's from, either there or in North Africa), U.S. forces Cathedral and suggested that coronation regalia were able to repel this attack. This situation be utilized in the ceremony. Not surprisingly, this meant that German forces were overextended attempt to evoke the whif of royalty inside the se‐ and plagued by highly vulnerable fanks. With nior military hierarchy did not fy. Canadians and Poles under Monty's command Bernard Montgomery was a successful mili‐ coming from the north, and Americans under Pat‐ tary commander and his mode of operation mini‐ ton's command coming from the south, the Ger‐ mized British casualties--an argument that is mans could be cut of and devastated. nonetheless debatable. The reality is that Monty The Falaise gap eventually was closed, but not harbored few doubts; he believed his view of mili‐ before many Germans escaped to fght another tary afairs was the gospel. Consequently, he stood day. Most historians believe that Montgomery's ready to belittle anyone who did not agree with lukewarm orders, his decision to have the Ameri‐ what he perceived to be his superior analytical in‐ cans stop short of closing the gap, and his failure tellect, unless of course they acquiesced to "learn" to supply reinforcements in a timely fashion were from him. at fault. Antony Beevor concluded that this With respect to Montgomery's Normandy de‐ episode "would be disastrous for Montgomery's cision making, Beevor sums Monty up well: "The reputation and credibility"[3]. Monty fought such problem was that Montgomery, partly for reasons assessments after the war by authoring eight of morale and partly out of puerile pride, could books, four of which dealt specifcally with his not admit that any of his plans had gone war experiences. In several, he reasserted his wrong."[4] This issue dims an otherwise illustri‐ summer 1944 Normandy claim that "present oper‐ ous military career. ations are absolutely as planned" (p. 263); howev‐ Should you read the original Montgomery er, the weight of historical opinion has not come documents Stephen Brooks has provided? Yes, if down in his favor in this regard. you wish to inspect the historical basis for the The picture of Montgomery painted by these critical reviews of Monty's leadership that have documents (and especially his own letters and di‐ appeared in most recent Normandy histories. For ary entries) is one of a highly knowledgeable and most scholars, however, it will be enough to know skilled organizer of military activity. Monty un‐ that a documentary basis for such conclusions ex‐ derstood command structure, the importance of
4 H-Net Reviews ists, and on the whole, Monty has not been dealt with unfairly. Notes [1]. Antony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Nor‐ mandy (New York: Penguin Group, 2009), 185. [2]. Ibid, 264. [3] Ibid., 306. [4] Ibid, 185.
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Citation: James V. Koch. Review of Brooks, Stephen, ed. Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy: A Selection from the Diaries, Correspondence and Other Papers of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, January to August 1944. H-German, H-Net Reviews. August, 2010.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=30543
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