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Fighting As Colony? 1St Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945

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Fighting As Colony? 1St Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945 University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2014-01-20 Fighting as Colony? 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945 Leppard, Christine Leppard, C. (2014). Fighting as Colony? 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945 (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26177 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/1278 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Fighting as Colony? 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945 by Christine E. Leppard A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER, 2013 © CHRISTINE LEPPARD 2013 ABSTRACT In the summer of 1943, Canadian Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston and Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart pressured the reluctant British Chiefs of Staff to send 1st Canadian Corps to the Italian Campaign. This decision was not popular with all of Canada’s top brass. Army Commander General Andrew McNaughton argued that fighting in Italy was not in Canada’s best interest. He urged Ralston to visit Washington and insist on taking part in strategy sessions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Then the Canadians could decide their best course of action with an eye on strategy. Ralston replied that he could not do so. Canada was fighting as a junior partner in a coalition war, and had adopted a position of “contribution without representation.” This dissertation will assess the implications of the Canadian government’s disconnection from Allied strategy-making for 1st Canadian Corps in the Italian Campaign. It also examines whether Canada’s national interest— which, second to the defeat of Nazi Germany, was defined as waging a recognisable, independent war effort without imposing conscription—was advanced when fighting within the coalition of nations in Italy from 1943-1945, as manifested in the Anglo-Canadian relationship. It argues that the Canadians made decisions about 1st Canadian Corps and the Italian Campaign without ever having a clear picture of Anglo-American strategic objectives for the theatre, caused by serious problems of Allied communication for which both the British and Canadians were complicit. This led to tension and resentment in the Anglo- Canadian alliance, which had knock-on effects on the operational level. The Canadians eventually realised that their interests could only be protected by considering strategy, but it came too late for the situation to be meaningfully remedied. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation was made possible by the generous financial support provided by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council, and I gratefully acknowledge the role this assistance played in the completion of my work. I would like to thank my supervisor, David Bercuson, for his encouragement, insight, sometimes “tough love,” editing, and support. To Stephen Randall and Anne Irwin for their guidance through comps, thank you. John Ferris and Warren Elofson have been my tireless advocates, and never sent me away when I took advantage of their open door policies. They encouraged me and Abe Roof to think big. Whenever we came to them with a new scheme they responded with “how much will it cost?” and “how can I help?” and always followed through. The freedom they encouraged was critical to making my PhD program the immensely enjoyable and fruitful experience that it was, and I owe them a great debt of gratitude. In History and CMSS, Lori Somner, Nancy Pearson Mackie, Shelley Wind, Marion McSheffrey, Diane McInnes, and Brenda Oslawsky tirelessly handled all of the questions I brought to them. They provided critical support to the successful execution of my personal program, and the activities of the History Graduate Students’ Union. Dissertation writing is a long, lonely process. I was saved from my crazy, cat-lady like tendencies by the constant encouragement and camaraderie of my colleagues and friends. To Russ Benneweis, Matt Bucholtz, Juliette Gonzalez, Alex Herd, Matt Jones, Adam Lajeunesse, Monica Ramsey, and Paul Ramsey, thank you. You made this fun. Thanks to Stephanie Cousineau for showing me the way, and Dave Borys, Katherine McGowan, and Rob Thompson for their long-distance support. ii And a “thank you” alone is not enough for Abe Roof, who within minutes of grad school went from office-mate to friend and confidant. He read every word of this dissertation at least twice, but my debt of gratitude goes much deeper than editing. Abe has been a true partner who inspired and challenged me, and always made sure that I was never tilting at windmills alone. Thank you to my family. My father, Tom Leppard, inspired my love of history, edited my writing, and was always game to help me talk through issues in my research. My mother, Karen Leppard, has a quiet brilliance that I try daily to emulate. Thanks to my brother Jason Leppard, or “the way cooler and more successful Leppard” as he became known among my friends. Thank you to my grandparents Helen Leppard, and Lily and Mervin Halvorson for their boundless love and pride. Finally, to my husband, Michael Hoblak, whose sense of humour kept up my morale, support kept me grounded, and love kept me going. Without you, I would have given up long ago. iii For my Parents, Tom and Karen Leppard iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. ii Dedication .......................................................................................................................... iv Table Of Contents ................................................................................................................v List Of Figures And Illustrations ....................................................................................... vi List Of Symbols, Abbreviations And Nomenclature ........................................................ vii Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 Chapter One: The Decision to send 1st Canadian Corps to Italy, July-Sept. 1943 ............18 Chapter Two: Establishing the Anglo-Canadian Operational Relationship ......................68 Chapter Three: Re-Equipping 1st Canadian Corps, October 1943-January 1944 .............98 Chapter Four: Preparing for Battle, January-May 1944 ..................................................134 Chapter Five: The Liri Valley Offensive, May 1944 .......................................................181 Chapter Six: Re-Evaluating the Italian Campaign, May-August 1944 ............................216 Chapter Seven: Crossing the Rubicon, September-November, 1944 ..............................248 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................286 References ........................................................................................................................301 v LIST OF FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1: Sicily, 10 July-17 August 1943 ......................................................................... 87 Figure 2: The Re-organised Italian Front, May 1944 ..................................................... 186 Figure 3: Breaking the Gustav and Hitler Lines, 11-23 May 1944 ................................ 197 Figure 4: The Liri Valley Offensive, 11 May-4 June 1944 ............................................ 204 Figure 5: The Advance to Rimini, 3-22 September 1944 ............................................... 255 vi LIST OF SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS AND NOMENCLATURE AA Assistant Adjutant AAI Allied Armies in Italy AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters BGS Brigadier, General Staff CAD Canadian Armoured Division CID Canadian Infantry Division CMHQ Canadian Military Headquarters (London) CRA Commander Royal Artillery CCOS Combined Chiefs of Staff CCRA Commander, Corps Royal Artillery CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CMF Central Mediterranean Force CO Commanding Officer Comd Commander COS Chiefs of Staff COSSAC Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander DA Deputy Adjutant DCIGS Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff DO Dominions Office DHH Directorate of History and Heritage Div Division FOO Forward Observation Officer GGHG Governor General Horse Guard GOC General Officer Commanding GS General Staff GSO General Staff Officer IWM Imperial War Museum (London) LAA Light Anti-Aircraft LAC Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa) NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NDHQ National Defence Headquarters (Ottawa) NRMA National Resources Mobilization Act PIAT Projector, Infantry, Anti-tank QMG Quartermaster General RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force Recce Reconnaissance RG Record Group SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force SP Self-Propelled Tac Tactical Headquarters vii TEWT Tactical Exercise Without Troops TNA The National
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