Fighting As Colony? 1St Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945

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2014-01-20 Fighting as Colony? 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945

Leppard, Christine

Leppard, C. (2014). Fighting as Colony? 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945 (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26177 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/1278 doctoral thesis

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Fighting as Colony? 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-1945

Christine E. Leppard

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

DECEMBER, 2013

ABSTRACT

In the summer of 1943, Canadian Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston and

Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart pressured the reluctant British Chiefs of

Staff to send 1st Canadian Corps to the Italian Campaign. This decision was not popular

with all of Canada’s top brass. Army Commander General Andrew McNaughton argued

that fighting in Italy was not in Canada’s best interest. He urged Ralston to visit

Washington and insist on taking part in strategy sessions of the Combined Chiefs of

Staff. Then the Canadians could decide their best course of action with an eye on

strategy. Ralston replied that he could not do so. Canada was fighting as a junior partner

in a coalition war, and had adopted a position of “contribution without representation.”

This dissertation will assess the implications of the Canadian government’s

disconnection from Allied strategy-making for 1st Canadian Corps in the Italian

Campaign. It also examines whether Canada’s national interest— which, second to the defeat of Nazi Germany, was defined as waging a recognisable, independent war effort without imposing conscription—was advanced when fighting within the coalition of nations in Italy from 1943-1945, as manifested in the Anglo-Canadian relationship. It argues that the Canadians made decisions about 1st Canadian Corps and the Italian

Campaign without ever having a clear picture of Anglo-American strategic objectives for the theatre, caused by serious problems of Allied communication for which both the

British and Canadians were complicit. This led to tension and resentment in the Anglo-

Canadian alliance, which had knock-on effects on the operational level. The Canadians eventually realised that their interests could only be protected by considering strategy, but it came too late for the situation to be meaningfully remedied.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation was made possible by the generous financial support provided

by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council, and I gratefully acknowledge

the role this assistance played in the completion of my work.

I would like to thank my supervisor, David Bercuson, for his encouragement,

insight, sometimes “tough love,” editing, and support. To Stephen Randall and Anne

Irwin for their guidance through comps, thank you. John Ferris and Warren Elofson have been my tireless advocates, and never sent me away when I took advantage of their open door policies. They encouraged me and Abe Roof to think big. Whenever we came to them with a new scheme they responded with “how much will it cost?” and “how can I help?” and always followed through. The freedom they encouraged was critical to making my PhD program the immensely enjoyable and fruitful experience that it was, and I owe them a great debt of gratitude.

In History and CMSS, Lori Somner, Nancy Pearson Mackie, Shelley Wind,

Marion McSheffrey, Diane McInnes, and Brenda Oslawsky tirelessly handled all of the

questions I brought to them. They provided critical support to the successful execution of

my personal program, and the activities of the History Graduate Students’ Union.

Dissertation writing is a long, lonely process. I was saved from my crazy, cat-lady

like tendencies by the constant encouragement and camaraderie of my colleagues and

friends. To Russ Benneweis, Matt Bucholtz, Juliette Gonzalez, Alex Herd, Matt Jones,

Adam Lajeunesse, Monica Ramsey, and Paul Ramsey, thank you. You made this fun.

Thanks to Stephanie Cousineau for showing me the way, and Dave Borys, Katherine

McGowan, and Rob Thompson for their long-distance support.

And a “thank you” alone is not enough for Abe Roof, who within minutes of grad school went from office-mate to friend and confidant. He read every word of this

dissertation at least twice, but my debt of gratitude goes much deeper than editing. Abe

has been a true partner who inspired and challenged me, and always made sure that I was

never tilting at windmills alone.

Thank you to my family. My father, Tom Leppard, inspired my love of history,

edited my writing, and was always game to help me talk through issues in my research.

My mother, Karen Leppard, has a quiet brilliance that I try daily to emulate. Thanks to

my brother Jason Leppard, or “the way cooler and more successful Leppard” as he

became known among my friends. Thank you to my grandparents Helen Leppard, and

Lily and Mervin Halvorson for their boundless love and pride. Finally, to my husband,

Michael Hoblak, whose sense of humour kept up my morale, support kept me grounded,

and love kept me going. Without you, I would have given up long ago.

iii

For my Parents, Tom and Karen Leppard

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... i

Acknowledgements ...... ii

Dedication ...... iv

Table Of Contents ...... v

List Of Figures And Illustrations ...... vi

List Of Symbols, Abbreviations And Nomenclature ...... vii

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter One: The Decision to send 1st Canadian Corps to Italy, July-Sept. 1943 ...... 18

Chapter Two: Establishing the Anglo-Canadian Operational Relationship ...... 68

Chapter Three: Re-Equipping 1st Canadian Corps, October 1943-January 1944 ...... 98

Chapter Four: Preparing for Battle, January-May 1944 ...... 134

Chapter Five: The Liri Valley Offensive, May 1944 ...... 181

Chapter Six: Re-Evaluating the Italian Campaign, May-August 1944 ...... 216

Chapter Seven: Crossing the Rubicon, September-November, 1944 ...... 248

Conclusion ...... 286

References ...... 301

LIST OF FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Sicily, 10 July-17 August 1943 ...... 87

Figure 2: The Re-organised Italian Front, May 1944 ...... 186

Figure 3: Breaking the Gustav and Hitler Lines, 11-23 May 1944 ...... 197

Figure 4: The Liri Valley Offensive, 11 May-4 June 1944 ...... 204

Figure 5: The Advance to Rimini, 3-22 September 1944 ...... 255

LIST OF SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS AND NOMENCLATURE

AA Assistant Adjutant AAI Allied Armies in Italy AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters BGS Brigadier, General Staff CAD Canadian Armoured Division CID Canadian Infantry Division CMHQ Canadian Military Headquarters (London) CRA Commander Royal Artillery CCOS Combined Chiefs of Staff CCRA Commander, Corps Royal Artillery CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CMF Central Mediterranean Force CO Commanding Officer Comd Commander COS Chiefs of Staff COSSAC Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander DA Deputy Adjutant DCIGS Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff DO Dominions Office DHH Directorate of History and Heritage Div Division FOO Forward Observation Officer GGHG Governor General Horse Guard GOC General Officer Commanding GS General Staff GSO General Staff Officer IWM Imperial War Museum (London) LAA Light Anti-Aircraft LAC Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa) NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NDHQ National Defence Headquarters (Ottawa) NRMA National Resources Mobilization Act PIAT Projector, Infantry, Anti-tank QMG Quartermaster General RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force Recce Reconnaissance RG Record Group SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force SP Self-Propelled Tac Tactical Headquarters

vii

TEWT Tactical Exercise Without Troops TNA The National Archives (Kew) TMM The Military Museums (Calgary) VCIGS Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff WO War Office

viii

INTRODUCTION

Defining the National Interest: Canadian Army Policy from 1939-1943

In preparation for the “Quadrant” Conference held in Quebec City in August

1943, the Dominions Office wrote a memorandum for Prime Minister Winston Churchill concerning topics that might arise in his upcoming conversations with Canadian Prime

Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. “Quadrant” was strictly a bi-lateral meeting between Churchill, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Combined Chiefs of

Staff to decide military strategy for 1943 and 1944. The Canadians, however, were hosting, and Churchill was to meet unofficially with Mackenzie King and attend a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet War Committee. The Dominions Office intended to prepare him for whatever the sometimes-sycophantic, sometimes-acerbic Canadian Prime

Minister might throw at him.

The Dominions Office proceeded to outline the “functionalist” principle that guided Canadian policy makers throughout most of the war. This policy stipulated that the Canadian government would vie for input and decision-making power in areas of the war effort where the size of the Canadian contribution warranted it. It was a way of asserting Canada’s political independence, while acting as a loyal alliance partner. “The principal outstanding political issue, so far as relations with Canada are concerned,” the report opened, “is the future position of Canada in relation to world affairs.”1 The

Dominions Office drew Churchill’s attention to the fact that in “recent months, [Canada

1 “Memorandum – Relations with Canada,” 3 August, 1943, The National Archives (TNA) Dominions Office (DO) 35/1486. 1

had demonstrated] a tendency to take strong exception to the present two-power set-up under which major issues are settled between the United Kingdom and United States and the… ‘Combined Board’ machinery resting on the authority of the Prime Minister and the President.” Moreover, Canada had “been inclined both to claim a share for herself in view of her very substantial contributions to the war effort and….to claim to come forward as representing the interests of the small Allied powers.”2 The British and

Americans had done much to meet this demand. Next to the United States, Canada was the largest contributor of food to the Allied war effort.3 Canada had been admitted as a

Member of the Combined Production and Resources Board, was about to be added to the

Combined Food Board, and had a special place in the United Nations Relief and

Rehabilitation Administration.

When it came to Canada’s relationship with Allied Grand Strategy, however, the story was quite different. Far from demanding participation in the determination of strategy, Mackenzie King sought mainly public recognition for the country’s efforts. The

Dominions Office reminded Churchill of the Sicily incident of July 1943 when

Mackenzie King had pressured Churchill and Roosevelt for Canada’s name to be included explicitly among the roster of invasion forces. Mackenzie King had not wanted

Canada to be lumped generically under the moniker “Anglo-American” alliance.4 While

Mackenzie King got his way, Churchill was warned that “it is understood that there is

2 Ibid. 3 Draft Memo to External Affairs,14 July 1942, quoted in J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 298. 4 Brandey Barton, “Public Opinion and National Prestige: The Politics of Canadian Army Participation in the Invasion of Sicily, 1942-1943,” Canadian Military History 15:2 (Spring 2006): 23-34. 2

still some feeling of resentment over the handling of this matter.”5 There was more. Since

March 1943 the Royal Canadian Navy had had control over an operational theatre of war,

the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command—Canada’s one and only throughout the war

and an active demonstration of the country’s autonomy—yet Mackenzie King was

concerned that “in view of the part which the Canadian Navy were taking in the war

against submarines, special reference should be made to Canada in the monthly

statement.”6 This too was about public opinion, and not strategy; U-boats had been sinking ships in the St. Lawrence with impunity and Canadian escort groups had recently been pulled from the North Atlantic to train and re-fit. Mackenzie King had been taking flak in the Canadian press, and looked to bolster his public image.7

While it was important for Mackenzie King that Canada be seen at home and by

its Allies as independent among the coalition of nations at war with Hitler’s Germany,

that independence did not extend to having a voice in when, where, and with what

objectives the Allies—and thus Canadian troops—would fight Nazi Germany. This

dynamic would prove exceptionally important at the 1st Quebec Conference, when for

domestic and intra-army reasons, the Canadian government requested that the British

send 1st Canadian Corps headquarters and 5th Canadian Armoured Division to the

Mediterranean to join 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank

Brigade, much to the chagrin of Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Alan Brooke,

among others. This decision changed the nature of Canada’s war effort by splitting its

5 “Memorandum – Relations with Canada,” 3 August, 1943. 6 Ibid. 7 Roger Sarty, War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten U-Boat Battles on Canada’s Shores (Toronto: Penguin, 2013), 247-248. 3

army between two theatres. In the words of Canada’s Official Historian of the Second

World War, C.P. Stacey, “If the Canadian government desired to have its forces

respected as national entities, it should have kept them together, and thereby strengthened

the arm of its field commander.”8

Historians have long recognised the strategic disinclination of the Mackenzie

King government, and this has had a polarizing effect on the historiography, especially

that of the Canadian Army. Common trends are to assess either government policy or,

more often, military operations. Only rarely have the two met. This is especially apparent

when it comes to the Italian Campaign. Few Canadian historians devote concerted

attention to the Italian Campaign, preferring the more illustrious, war-winning theatre of

North-West Europe to the gruelling side-show endured by the “D-Day Dodgers.” Those

who do have sought to address how effectively the Canadians performed at the sharp end.

Originally, historical consensus was that the Canadians performed only adequately. Their

operations “erred on the side of caution, control, and the dictates of an orderly battlefield,

rather than boldness, initiative, and chance.”9 Lee Windsor has done much to draw

Canadian focus back onto the Italian theatre by arguing that the Allied strategy to keep

German divisions trapped in the Apennines and Alps was successful, and contributed to

the winning of the war. When evaluated in terms of waging attrition warfare, 1st Canadian

8 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), 197. 9 William J. McAndrew, “Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily – 1943,” Military Affairs, 51:3 (1987): 144. See also: William J. McAndrew, “Fifth Canadian Armoured Division: Introduction to Battle.” Canadian Military History 2:2 (1993): 43-55; Brereton Greenhous, “Would it Not Have Been Better to Bypass Ortona Completely…?” Canadian Defence Quarterly 18:5 (1989): 51-55. 4

Corps performed well.10 Windsor has inspired a number of important micro-studies on

different Canadian battles in Italy that support his general conclusion.11

However, focused on the operational level, Windsor—as with many of his

peers—does not assess whether it was in Canada’s best interest to fight in Italy, even if it

was good for the Allies’ as a whole. Nor does he assess how the decision to go to Italy,

and those taken by the Canadian government thereafter, influenced the Anglo-Canadian

relationship. In one of the few comprehensive campaign histories of the Canadians in

Italy, Daniel Dancocks avoids the issue by instead leaving the last word to Major-General

Maurice Pope, head of the Canadian Mission in Washington and advisor to the Prime

Minister. Pope argued simply that “it was better…to fight divided than not to fight until

victory had been practically assured.”12

There are notable exceptions to this gap in the historiography. Canada’s Official

Historian of the Second World War, C.P. Stacey, attempts to understand how Allied

politics influenced the way that the Canadian Army was used in the field.13 Recent biographies of General Officers Commanding First Canadian Army A.G.L. McNaughton

(1939-1943) and H.D.G. Crerar (1944-1945), by John Rickard and Paul Dickson, respectively, have both pointed to the ways in which Canada’s top generals sought to lead

10 Lee Windsor, “Anatomy of Victory: 1st Canadian Corps, Allied Containment Strategy and the Battle for the Gothic Line,” (PhD Dissertation, University of New Brunswick, Canada, 2006), 166. 11 William J. Pratt “1 Canadian Armoured Brigade and the Battle of Lake Trasimene, 20-28 June 1944 (MA Thesis, University of New Brunswick, Canada, 2010); Charles A. Eddy “Before they were the D-Day Dodgers: 1st Canadian Infantry Division and Operation Chesterfield” (MA Thesis: University of New Brunswick, Canada, 2009); Keith Donaldson, “Thunder in the Mountains: 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade in Italy, 1943-1944” (MA Thesis, University of Calgary, Canada, 2008); Lee Windsor, Steel Cavalry : The 8th (New Brunswick) Hussars and the Italian Campaign (Frederickton: Goose Lane Editions, New Brunswick Military Heritage Project, 2001). 12 Quoted in Daniel G. Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers: The Canadians in Italy (Toronto: McClelland&Stewart, 1991), 436. 13 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments. 5

the army while fulfilling and influencing the wishes of their political masters, and the

effect this had on their relationships with the British who throughout the war maintained

operational control over the Canadian army.14 Jack Granatstein used a similar, truncated

framework in The Generals. Several broader narratives covering Canada’s war effort in its totality, or the Canadian army’s war effort as a whole, have also touched on the role of strategy in Canada’s war and on the Anglo-Canadian dynamic.15

All of these studies have grappled, to some extent or another, with a fundamental

question: in a global war where strategy was determined by Britain and the United States,

was Canada able to balance its national interests with those of the Grand Alliance?

Canada’s ability to stand independent but cooperative within the Grand Alliance was not

determined by Canada’s actions alone. Fighting as part of a British Army, British Army

Groups, and Anglo-American theatres meant that the actions, opinions and biases of the

British especially, but Americans as well, significantly influenced how this question was answered.

Stacey argued that during the Second World War, as in the First, the “[Canadian]

Army had been the chief vehicle of the national effort and national spirit” and consequently “the story of the control of the Canadian Army overseas is a topic of national significance and even some fascination.”16 In reference to the Italian Campaign

14 John Rickard, The Politics of High Command: Lieutenant--General A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army, 1939-1943 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Paul D. Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). 15 David Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis: Canada’s Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1995); J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, Canada and the Two World Wars (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1939). 16 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 205. 6

specifically, Stacey pointed out that, “Although the lives of so many Canadian soldiers

were involved in the strategic decision to continue the offensive in Italy after we reached

the Gothic Line,” he wrote, “no Canadian authority was consulted upon it or even

informed of it.”17 This was hardly indicative of a responsible relationship among

partners. The same question has been asked of the operational level. Indeed, whether the

Anglo-Canadian relationship was a remnant of the old imperial order—“an inherent

British tendency to regard Dominion troops as colonial auxiliaries,”18 or indicative of

new respect between Allies; or if there were shades of both, is fundamental to

understanding the development of Canadian nationhood during the Second World War.19

David Bercuson suggests that,

As far as the Americans were concerned, the Canadian Army was part of larger British formations and there was no need to consult the Canadians about how their troops were to be used. The British agreed, since to agree meant that their traditional position of imperial superiority over Canada could be maintained. Canadian commanders in the field always had the option to refuse assignments of various sorts, but the people of Canada generally saw their effort as part of a great Allied venture led by the British, the Americans, and the Soviet Union.20

Douglas Delaney takes a different tact and argues that the “intrusion of Canadian

national politics” ultimately ruined the relationship between British and Canadian High

Command, as Crerar refused to be “subsumed in the British chain of command” and as

his military responsibilities grew, “so too did his political responsibilities to the Canadian

17 Ibid., 199-202. 18 Bill McAndrew, Canadians and the Italian Campaign 1943-1945 (Montreal: Art Global, 1996), 89. 19 See, for example, Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis, 167; Terry Copp, “Some Reflections on the Italian Campaign,” Keynote Address at the 2010 Military History Colloquium; J.L. Granatsein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 66. 20 Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis, 167. 7

government.”21 High Command was typified by stereotypes (sometimes accurate) and

frequently conflicting personalities, and ideas of history and national interest that often

hampered the greater Allied cause. This served to strain the Anglo-Canadian relationship,

as the commanders of Canadian formations were always serving two masters, making

their job imminently complex. On a tactical level, the staffs of the Canadian and British

armies worked well together, thanks to a common staff language learned in the pre-war

staff colleges.22

While Delaney’s conclusions—like those of Dickson and Rickard—provide important insight into the nature of the Anglo-Canadian relationship, by focusing on personalities, room remains to examine this theme in reference to the Italian Campaign

specifically, and in particular, the dynamic between Ralston, Chief of Staff Lieutenant-

General Kenneth Stuart, and Brooke, and 1st Canadian Corps and Eighth British Army.

The purpose of this dissertation is to do just that; to assess whether the Canadian government’s disconnection from Allied strategy-making influenced the way the army was used in the Italian theatre. It is also to examine to what extent Canadian national interest was advanced when fighting as a junior partner within the coalition of nations in

Italy from 1943-1945, as manifested in the Anglo-Canadian relationship.

To answer this question, it must be reiterated that in the eyes of Mackenzie King,

Canada’s national interest could best be secured if—counter intuitively—he remained at

21 Douglas E. Delaney, “When Harry Met Monty: Canadian National Politics and the Crerar-Montgomery Relationship”, in The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006): 228-229. 22 Douglas E. Delaney, “Cooperation in the Anglo-Canadian Armies, 1939-1945,” in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy, The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856-1956: Essays in Honour of David French (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 214-216. 8

arms-length from involvement in Allied strategic decision-making. To satisfy the

Canadian public he needed only to appear to be in concert with Prime Minister Churchill

and President Roosevelt, and to appease the warlords, he needed to stay out of the way.23

By 1943, Canada had raised the largest army in its history. The overseas contingent

included two corps comprising three infantry and two armoured divisions, and two

independent tank brigades. While its size was proportionally significant to the Canadian

population, it was small compared to the American and British behemoths. As Graham

and Bidwell put it, the balance of power in the grand coalition was primarily “decided by the material means at the disposal” of its members.24 Mackenzie King accepted this logic

without a fight; in fact, he did so willingly.

This was not because of a lack of resolve to beat Hitler. Mackenzie King believed

that the threat posed by Nazi Germany was existential. Malcolm McDonald, British High

Commissioner in Ottawa from April 1941 to April 1946, wrote of the Canadian Prime

Minister in his February 1942 report to the British War Cabinet that, “The sincerity with

which he holds his [religious] beliefs is the explanation why this man, who is often called

by his critics a pacifist, is passionately determined that the war shall be waged

mercilessly until Hitler and all his works have been wiped from the face of the earth. For

Hitlerism is a denial of everything in his faith.”25

Despite his fervent desire to destroy Nazism, Mackenzie King also believed that the war should be fought in a manner that pursued Canada’s national interests. In

23 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 4 August 1943, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), MG 26-J13. 24 Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Some Aspects of Command in Two World Wars (Riverside, NJ: Macmillan, 1993), 2. 25 “Canada: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,” 28 February 1942, TNA CAB/66/22/33. 9

Mackenzie King’s estimation, national unity was the country’s most vital war interest.

During the First World War, the Canadian Expeditionary Force had been bled white in

the mud of the Western Front, resulting in the 1917 conscription crisis that had torn the

country from stem to stern and banished the Conservative party from Quebec. Mackenzie

King knew that it was in the country’s best interest, and that of the Liberal Party—indeed

in his mind the two were indivisible—to avoid a repeat of that crisis. King believed that

the root cause was that Canada had been dragged into the First World War as an Imperial

powder monkey. While many English Canadians had rallied to the cause, French-

Canadians and other recently settled ethnic minorities, notably in Western Canada, were

disinclined to fight for the British, or were outraged at being conscripted into a British

war. Riots, rallies and civil disobedience split the country. During the inter-war years,

King’s policy was to avoid foreign entanglements. “Canadians did not like to feel that

they might be involved [in] European wars” Mackenzie King told Lord Curzon during

the 1923 Imperial Conference, “and if a constitutional system developed which rendered

them liable it would aggravate the problem which Canada was facing of keeping the

people from emigrating to [the United] States…”26 Canadians no longer wanted to be dragged de facto into British wars, so much so that King believed (or at least used as a convenient threat to Curzon) that they would consider moving to the United States to avoid it.

26 It had not seemed to occur to Mackenzie King that the U.S. might also join in a war. From the diary of J.W. Dafoe, who was a member of the Canadian delegation at the 1923 Imperial conference, and published for the first time in an article by Ramsay Cook, “J.W. Dafoe at the Imperial Conference, 1923,” Canadian Historical Review 41:1 (March 1960): 26. 10

The Statute of Westminster was promulgated in 1931, granting Canada control

over its own foreign policy; one of the final steps in the path from colony to nation. When

Canada entered the war in 1939, it did so as a sovereign nation with its own declaration

of war on Nazi Germany, a week after Britain’s. Mackenzie King had been true to his word that “Parliament would decide.” Illustrating this critical change, Mackenzie King wrote in his diary in April 1941 of a recent disagreement with Sir Frederick Phillips of the British Treasury over a financial matter: “Phillips had said to me that he would have to report the matter to Churchill. I had said I hoped he would. Not to think that Canada was a colony. That we were a nation administering our own affairs."27

Yet, Canada also remained a devoted member of the British Empire. There was little question that Canada would support Britain when war did come; on 10 September,

1939 the House of Commons voted nearly unanimously to go to war. Most Canadians

(English and many French) believed they were tied to Britain by sentiment and history,

and that Canada’s first line of defence was, in fact, Britain.28 When France fell in 1940,

Canada became by default Britain’s most powerful and highly industrialised ally, geared

economically, socially, politically, and militarily towards fighting the war alongside

Britain. In Mackenzie King’s view, protecting Canada’s newly minted sovereignty from

British influence, on the one hand, and supporting Britain in war, on the other, were not

mutually exclusive; in fact, the one could not exist without the other.

27 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 17 April 1941. 28 Granatstein, The Generals, 95; W.G.D. Lund, “The Royal Canadian Navy’s Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic,” in RCN in Retrospect 1910-1968 ed. James Boutilier (Canada: Hignell, 1982), 139. It helped, too, that the Army was more French-Canadian friendly in 1939 that it had been in the First World War, with a number of French-speaking regiments. 11

Throughout the remainder of the war, Mackenzie King paradoxically needed to

balance the tensions of loyalty to Britain and the desperation of the struggle to defeat

Nazism on the one hand, while protecting Canada from another conscription crisis, on the

other. Early in the war this was not difficult; King prioritized Canada’s air and naval

contribution, both considered essential by Britain and neither expected to incur the high

casualties of trench warfare, thus requiring conscription. Significant portions of the

British Commonwealth Air Training Plan were operated by and paid for by Canada. In

exchange, an agreed upon number of Canadian graduates were placed in Canadian

squadrons, a constant reminder to Canadians that the nation was pulling its weight in the

war.29 The Royal Canadian Navy grew exponentially in size to protect North Atlantic

convoys leaving from Halifax and St. John’s.30 Elsewhere, Canadian industry came out of the depression, re-tooled and expanded to produce war materiel. Agricultural production skyrocketed to feed hungry armies, and the country shipped grain and other essentials to sustain Britain, but not at charity prices; by l942, Canadians had shaken off the depression and the economy was humming. To top it all off, that year Canada gave

Britain a well-publicised gift of one billion dollars to help prevent Britain from going bankrupt, and Britain spent much of that money in Canada. In all these ways, Canada

29 “Canada is a Dominion and as such is no less entitled to a separate and autonomous Air Force than is the United Kingdom. This right she has temporarily surrendered in the interests of war efficiency, accepting the fact that unity of organization and of operational command is essential in the prosecution of total war. The recognition by Canada of this need for unity has, however, placed upon us the responsibility of maintaining and encouraging the esprit de corps of that part of the R.C.A.F. which became part of the Imperial Air Forces in the United Kingdom,” B.E. Sutton, Air Marshal, “Air Ministry Letter on ‘Canadianization’ of the R.C.A.F. Overseas, 19 Feb 1943,” quoted in Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, Appendix K. 30 See Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: the Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); Canada's Navy : the First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 12

asserted itself as an independent but committed ally in the struggle against Nazi

Germany.

This left the question of what to do with the Canadian Army. Clearly there had to be an overseas commitment of ground forces. Both the British government and Canadian populace wanted it as Canada’s most important signal of commitment to the Allied cause.

A British telegram to the Canadian government in September 1939 expressed the hope

“that Canada would exert her full national effort as in the last war, even to the extent of the eventual despatch of an expeditionary force.”31 Even before the Fall of France,

Mackenzie King admitted that Canadians wanted a corps; “the pride of the nation would

demand it.”32 Although he initially pursued a policy of “limited liability,” intending to

keep the country’s overseas contribution to one division, the fall of France in 1940

committed Mackenzie King to fighting a total war; the nation would accept nothing less.

This led to significant problems. As Dickson and Roi explain, “This crisis-driven military expansion was not reconciled to any government defence policy or coherent assessment of…what Canada’s objectives should be in the war beyond Mackenzie King’s national unity, no conscription agenda.”33 However, with the influence of Harry Crerar, in 1941

Canada committed to building a two-corps overseas army.34 Events had forced King to

expand the army and confront the conscription bogey man.

To fulfill Mackenzie King’s objectives of national unity, this army was to be

Canadian; and it had to look Canadian. The policy pursued by the Canadian government

31 Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, Appendix C. 32 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 2 April 1940. 33 Paul Dickson and Michael Roi, “Canadian Civil-Military Relations, 1939-1941: A Case Study in Strategic Dialogue,” Defence R&D Canada, July 2011, 47. 34 Ibid. 13

was one of “Canadianisation” and national command. The Canadian Army was at all

times responsible to two chains of command: an administrative branch that led to Ottawa,

and an operational branch that led to the British Chiefs of Staff. The Canadian

commander was a “national commander”—the representative of the Canadian

government in the field. At the same time, King did “all in [his] power to interfere as

little as possible and [allow] Churchill and the President complete leadership of the

war.”35 The British knew that “Canadian forces would be made available to go wherever

their services [were] most needed,” as Prime Minister King had stressed.36 Within this system, King believed he could accomplish both of his goals of protecting Canadian interests, while fighting as a loyal junior ally in the Grand Alliance.

In retrospect, by mid-1943 it appeared that the stage was set for Canada to have its cake and eat it too. The Canadian Army was intact and training for the attack on

Hitler’s “fortress Europa” in North West Europe. With the invasion imminent, the

Canadian public would soon get the ground war that it demanded, while in the meantime husbanding its manpower by not fighting in peripheral campaigns, thereby hopefully avoiding conscription. Plus, Canada’s role in the main invasion would finally prove in blood the country’s commitment to its allies while asserting the country’s independence from Britain.

Yet in the summer of 1943 the Canadian government changed course. Minister of

National Defence J.L. Ralston and Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart first

35 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 4 August 43. 36 Telegram 1630, High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 15 June 1942 in Department of Foreign Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations, ed. John F. Hilliker (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1980). Rickard also argues this point in Part I of Rickard, The Politics of Command, 80. 14

convinced Mackenzie King to send 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army

Tank Brigade to fight under Eighth British Army in Sicily to gain battle experience. More importantly, they then convinced the Prime Minister to send the 1st Canadian Corps and

5th Canadian Armoured Division to join 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Italy. This

decision left the fate of First Canadian Army headquarters hanging in the balance, and

helped usher General Andrew McNaughton out of command. McNaughton opposed the

division of the army on the grounds that doing so would sacrifice Canada’s political

aspirations and potentially damage the war effort, by ending the dream of a unified

Canadian Army fighting in North-West Europe.37 Ultimately, 1st Canadian Corps was

sent to Italy in order to gain much-needed battle experience for the untried Canadians with vague assurances of being reunited by D-Day.

This dissertation begins with the question of why the decision to send 1st

Canadian Corps to Italy was pressed by the Canadians and accepted by the British, and

whether Allied strategy influenced the decision taken by the Canadians, or whether the

decision remained purely a political and operational matter. It then examines the effects

of this decision, and proceeds to study the political-strategic-operational interface

between Canada, Britain, and the Italian Campaign starting with the arrival of 1st

Canadian Corps in Italy in November 1943, through to its battle at the Gothic Line in the

fall of 1944. It ultimately argues that the Canadians made decisions about the Canadian

Army and the Italian Theatre of Operations without ever having a clear picture of Anglo-

American strategic objectives for the theatre. Of course, these objectives evolved

37 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 207. 15

between 1943 and 1944, but this was all the more reason for Canada to be able to check

the pulse of Allied strategy. Both the British and Canadians were complicit in this

situation, which points to serious problems of allied communication, which compromised

Anglo-Canadian relations. The Canadians remained focused on their own interests, with

little regard or understanding of the potential effect of these interests on military strategy

or operations. Ironically, their ability to achieve such political objectives was hindered by

their inability to know and account for Allied military strategy in the Mediterranean. The

Canadian approach created an infinite loop from which there was no escape.

The British, conversely, tried to minimise the potential impact of these nationalist

interventions by treating 1st Canadian Corps as if it were any other corps in the British

Army, rather than a national contingent responsible to the Canadian government in

Ottawa—a position unacceptable to the Canadians. This had clear knock-on effects in the operational relationship between 1st Canadian Corps and Eighth Army in Italy, from the

re-equipment of the corps, to its use at the Hitler Line, and the political strife caused by

the attempted firing of Corps Commander E.L.M. “Tommy” Burns by Eighth Army’s

General Officer Commanding in June 1944, and then his actual firing in October.

Minister of Defence J.L. Ralston must be held largely accountable for the nature of this relationship, as he failed to appreciate the importance of strategy and its influence on the decisions he made. Ralston had championed the deployment of 1st Canadian Corps to

Italy, but too late realised that the Italian Campaign could not achieve the country’s

political or operational objectives over the long-term. His attention turned almost wholly

away from the Italian Theatre, until June 1944, when—again for national, not military,

reasons—he tried to bring 1st Canadian Corps out of Italy to re-unite the Canadian Army.

By then the die had been cast, and the corps was stuck in Italy for far longer than was politically or operationally desirable.

There is a famous picture of the First Quebec Conference of August 1943, in which Mackenzie King sits proudly between Churchill and Roosevelt. Behind them stand the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Conspicuously absent from this assemblage are any senior

Canadian officers or cabinet ministers. Yet, after the conference and lacking real-time information on the objectives for the Italian Campaign, the Canadians proceeded to pressure the British to accept a Canadian corps and armoured division in the Italian theatre. It was the defining moment for the Canadian Army, as thereafter two-fifths of

Canada’s ground force commitment to the Second World War were fated to fight in Italy as—in Churchill’s words—harvest bugs against the grain.

CHAPTER ONE

“Contribution without Representation”: The Decision to send 1st Canadian Corps to Italy, July-September 194338

“We shall never attain major league standards without major league practice,”

Maurice Pope wrote ruefully in August, 1943.39 As Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff

Mission in Washington, Pope had temporarily returned to Canada to observe the proceedings of the First Quebec Conference, “Quadrant.” For two weeks, the Mackenzie

King government hosted a bilateral conference between British Prime Minister Winston

Churchill, American President Franklin Roosevelt, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, during which significant decisions were made about the future strategy for the war.

Pope’s comments referred to a meeting between the Canadian and British Chiefs of Staff, held only out of British courtesy to their Canadian hosts. The Canadian staff arrived at the meeting without “the wit,” in Pope’s words, to bring their own secretary along, and much to his embarrassment had to rely on the British to record and share the minutes of the meeting.40 It was clumsy, and Pope knew it. Unfortunately, it was representative of the larger pattern of Anglo-Canadian relations in the spring and summer of 1943, which was approaching a critical juncture in the Canadian Army’s war effort, and of Canada’s ability to evaluate strategy. Led by the Minister of National Defence James Layton

Ralston and Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, the Canadian

38 Minister of National Defence for the Army, J.L. Ralston, explaining Canada’s relationship with Allied strategy-making to General Officer Commanding First Canadian Army, A. G.L. McNaughton, 29 July 1943, quoted in J.M. Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army, 1942-1944: Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 182,” 23 May 1946, 79. 39 Maurice Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 226. 40 Ibid. 18

government pressured the British to send 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured

Division to join 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade in the Mediterranean Theatre, where they had been fighting since July 1943. After many months of often heated debate, the British finally relented, reluctantly, to the truculent

Canadians. This decision left the fate of First Canadian Army —thereafter unbalanced and unusable with only one corps under its command—hanging in the balance. Despite the gravity of this decision, however, it was pursued vigorously by Ralston and Stuart with only partial information about Allied Grand Strategy and the strategic objectives for the Italian Campaign. The Canadians did not accurately or thoroughly assess the implications of what turned out to be a crucial decision, signifying an immaturity in the nature of Canadian decision-making. It also points to serious communication problems between Canada and Britain, for which both the Canadians and British were at fault: the

British offered at best a partial, and sometimes incorrect, picture of ongoing Allied strategic negotiations. However, even in instances when the details of Allied strategy were made available to the Canadians, Ralston and Stuart were so intent on getting the

Army into action that they either purposefully or negligently ignored the British. Canada consequently became committed to sending a corps to the Italian Theatre before Allied strategy for the Mediterranean had been determined, and their position remained fixed throughout the fall of 1943 despite British reluctance to expand the Canadian commitment in Italy beyond the 1st Division.

By the spring of 1943, First Canadian Army had grown to two corps and five divisions, but aside from the disasters at Hong Kong in 1941and Dieppe in 1942 the army

had spent its war guarding the shores of Dover, training, and carousing. After being

excluded from the North-African Campaign, the army hoped to be among the armada that

eventually crossed the channel to breach Hitler’s Atlantic Wall.41 However, the invasion

of North-West Europe was projected to take place no earlier than 1944,42 and so the 1st

Canadian Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade were sent to fight with

the Eighth Army in Operation “Husky,” the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. Sensing that

the Canadian public placed great value on the exploits of its ground forces, Prime

Minister Mackenzie King agreed to Canadian inclusion in “Husky” for reasons of politics and national prestige, not military necessity.43 When the Combined Chiefs of Staff made

the decision to continue the advance from Sicily to the Italian Mainland, the Canadian

government agreed to let 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the army tank brigade participate, rather than returning it to England to reunite the Army.44 Shortly thereafter,

the Canadian government requested that 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters and 5th

Canadian Armoured Division also be sent to the Mediterranean Theatre, leaving First

Canadian Army Headquarters unbalanced and its continued existence in question.

Why the army was divided between Italy and England in 1943 has been an important question for Canadian historians. The decision resulted in 1st Canadian Corps

fighting in Italy until February1945, meaning Canada’s two corps were united in First

Canadian Army only for the final months of the war in Europe. Some historians have

41 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 52. 42 General Turner to General McNaughton, 7 April 1943, in J.M. Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army, 1942-1944: Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 182,” 23 May 1946, 64. 43 Barton, “Public Opinion and National Prestige,” 23-34; W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 3 July 1943. 44 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 16 August 1943. 20

accepted that there was merit to pursuing participation in Italy to gain valuable fighting experience, to heal the low morale affecting the army in England, to bolster Canada’s position among its Alliance partners, and to preserve Mackenzie King’s political popularity at home. Four years into the war only one Canadian division was fighting.45

They have thus focused on the so-called conspiracy by Ralston and Chief of the Imperial

General Staff (CIGS) Field Marshall Alan Brooke to use the deployment of the corps to

Italy as a means to oust General Officer Commanding First Canadian Army Andrew

McNaughton, whom they both believed was unfit for field command.46 McNaughton had

hoped to lead the Canadian Army in toto in North-West Europe. When he argued against

the deployment of 1st Canadian Corps to Italy, Ralston forced his resignation.

McNaughton’s most recent biographer, John Rickard, disagrees with this analysis of

McNaughton’s dismissal. Instead he argues that while McNaughton believed the army should be kept united, he was not obstructionist, and agreed to send the corps to Italy as his government ordered. According to Rickard he was fired, rather, because of a personality clash with Ralston and Brooke.47

By exploring McNaughton’s dismissal in-depth, historians have identified the

political and operational reasons for sending 1st Canadian Corps to Italy in the fall of

1943. Missing from this narrative, however, is an assessment of Canadian strategy- making at this critical juncture—if indeed there was any. While Rickard shows that

45 Canada’s only other two army deployments had ended in disaster, at Hong Kong in 1941, and Dieppe in 1942. 46 See G.W.L. Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy: Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume II (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1956), 340-344; Granatstein and Morton, Canada and the Two World Wars; John Swettenham, McNaughton, Volume 2 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969); Dixon, A Thoroughly Canadian General; Rickard, The Politics of Command. 47 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 228. 21

McNaughton tried earnestly to consider strategy when advising Ralston on the potential deployment of the Canadian corps, this still leaves the question of how Canada’s other key decision makers, namely Mackenzie King, Ralston, and Stuart, thought about grand strategy or theatre strategy.48 Mackenzie King, for his part, had decided early in the war

that Canada would relinquish all grand strategic decisions to the British and American

Combined Chiefs of Staff. Canada raised the largest army in its history, yet neither

Ottawa nor the Canadian Army would have a voice in Allied grand strategy during the

Second World War. Less certain, however, is the extent to which Allied strategy

informed Canadian decisions during the war, if at all. Did the country’s politicians and

senior military leadership understand grand or theatre strategy and did it factor into their decisions regarding Canadian army deployments and operations? Did they receive

accurate information on strategy or were they required to infer and guess? The choice to

divide the Canadian Army dramatically changed the direction of the Canadian war effort,

and therefore provides a window into the nature of Canadian wartime strategic thinking,

illuminating whether at this important moment Canadian decisions were even the product

of strategic thinking.

Although regularly derided by his critics as a “tinkerer” concerned more with the

minutiae of war materiel than with training to lead an army in battle,49 First Canadian

Army Commander Andrew McNaughton ardently believed that Canada’s decisions

48 Rickard, The Politics of Command, chapter 12. 49 Referencing both McNaughton’s technical proficiency and his later firing, Sir Patrick Duff, Permanent Secretary in the Office of Works, wrote to Dominion’s Office Permanent Secretary Sir Eric Machtig in November 1943, “The Flame warfare in which [Lt. Gen Andrew McNaughton] gave [Sir Donald] Banks such ‘foresighted assistance,’ is nothing to the flame warfare that the unfortunate General is involved in here at the moment.” TNA, DO 35/1210. 22

should be anchored by a lucid consideration of Allied strategy. Only in this way could he

and the government ensure that Canada’s army was used in a manner that protected and

promoted its national interest. His endeavour to think about Canada as unique within the

Grand Alliance stemmed directly from his First World War experience as a Brigadier

General in Arthur Currie’s Canadian Corps. According to Rickard, McNaughton

identified with “Currie’s vision of a unified, semi-autonomous, and powerful Canadian

Corps fighting for achievable objectives.”50 As Army Commander, McNaughton was frustrated in his attempts to emulate Currie by the unstructured communication system whereby he met with Brooke only every few weeks to get information about the war. In the fall of 1942, he

pointed out that under the present system it was impossible for him to be kept fully informed of future operational plans and that present arrangements were that he should meet General Brooke every 2 or 3 weeks in order that he might be kept up to date and in the minds of the Chief of Staff. As a result of the present unsatisfactory position in which he found himself[,] he stated that he was unable to adequately advise the Minister of National Defence.51

This informal system left McNaughton out of the loop and consistently a step behind. He

knew it, and protested at the treatment. In mid-March 1943, rumours emerged that a contingent from First Canadian Army was to be used in a limited operation against North

West Europe. The plans were eventually cancelled, but without anyone bothering to tell

McNaughton or the Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Vincent

Massey. McNaughton told Stuart that the problem was systemic, a “fault of the system under which I have relied on C.I.G.S. [Brooke] personally to keep me sufficiently in the

50 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 20. 51 Personal Assistant to GOC-in-C First Canadian Army, Fall 1942, “Notes by Major D. C. Spry,” Ralston Papers, LAC MG 27 III B II Vol. 64. 23

picture so that we could act sensibly and with reasonable foresight.”52 At arms-length

from Allied decision making, it was difficult for McNaughton to get accurate, up to date

information, impeding his ability to adequately advise his government.

In Washington, Pope was having similar problems getting information from the

Combined Chiefs of Staff. His role was to keep Ottawa informed “as to trends in the

over-all direction of the Allied war effort,” but was finding this hard to do.53 The

Canadian Joint Staff Mission was housed in the same building as the British Mission, where Pope could read over relevant papers and speak with British and American officers so to “gradually pick up useful information” about the war.54 This too was informal, and

like McNaughton, Pope was on the outside looking in. Relying heavily on hearsay and

off-the-record conversations was hardly a methodical way for Canada to obtain

information about grand strategy.

McNaughton earnestly endeavoured to fix the system when Lieutenant-General

F.E. Morgan was made Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC)

after the “Casablanca” conference of January, 1943. Even though a Supreme Commander

had yet to be named, Morgan was to begin planning the invasion of North-West Europe.

In mid-April, Morgan informed McNaughton that the Canadian Army was to participate

in the invasion, and it should “now be trained[,] organized[,] and equipped solely with

service in North West Europe in mind.”55 McNaughton insisted that Morgan accept a

52 McNaughton to Stuart, 20 March 1943, quoted in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 61. 53 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 184. 54 Ibid. 55 Meeting between Morgan and McNaughton, 13 April 1944, in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 63. 24

Canadian liaison officer onto his staff. Major-General Guy Turner was to report matters of planning back to McNaughton.56 While helpful, this was no panacea, as Turner only had access to COSSAC, not to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

These systemic impediments were exacerbated by the fact that Allied strategy was evolving throughout most of 1943, especially that for the Mediterranean Theatre. The year had begun with a moment of bilateral clarity and agreement at the Casablanca

Conference, where a firm commitment was made by the British and Americans to extend

the war in the Mediterranean Theatre from North Africa to Sicily, while the build-up for

the cross-channel invasion continued in England in 1943, anticipating that it would be

launched in 1944.57 In the aftermath of the conference, however, the Americans began to feel that they had somehow been “duped” by their British counterparts into fighting in the

Mediterranean. In both idea and execution, the British strategic vision for the

Mediterranean had been adopted at Casablanca. The British position was that after

German defeat in North Africa, there would be significant numbers of British and

American troops whom the Allies did not have the shipping capacity to bring back to the

UK for an immediate cross-channel invasion. Either those troops could remain idle in

North Africa until such time as they could be returned, or they could continue the fight in

the Mediterranean.58 Considering the pace of operations on the Eastern Front and

pressure from Stalin to invade, continuing to fight in the Mediterranean seemed the only

course of action.

56 April, 1943, Ibid. 57 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 31. 58 Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (Yorkshire: Greenhill, 1993), 35. 25

Within the British delegation dissent had existed about whether Sicily or Sardinia

should be the Allies’ next target. Many members of the Joint Planning Staff, including

Air Chief Marshall Charles Portal and Admiral Dudley Pound, believed that Operation

“Brimstone” on Sardinia should precede or replace Operation “Husky” on Sicily. But

with Brooke’s backing, Sicily was championed as the next target for two main reasons:

when Sicily capitulated, the Germans would likely reinforce Italy, drawing divisions

from France. Plus, Sicily would provide a base from which Allied air and naval power

could be concentrated in the Mediterranean.59

The arguments forwarded by the British at Casablanca had merit, and ultimately persuaded US Chief of Staff George Marshall. He was swayed in part by British

Intelligence reports that the Luftwaffe had been depleted, and continuing the attack in

Sicily would help prevent its recovery.60 He also recognised that “the British were not going to cross the Channel in 1943, and there weren’t enough Americans to do it on their own.”61 Even so, the Americans remained convinced that the Mediterranean strategy would pilfer valuable men and materiel from the preparations for North-West Europe,

which is where the war would ultimately be won. With limited shipping capacity and the

pressure to continue the build-up in the UK for the cross-channel invasion, the decision

seemed to the Americans one that they were bullied into by perfidious Albion.

Consequently, although the Americans agreed to attack Sicily, they did not trust the

British commitment to the cross-channel invasion. The Anglo-American relationship was

59 Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders: How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alanbrooke Won the War in the West (New York: Allen Lane, 2008), 328. 60 Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 31. 61 Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 335. 26

tainted with frustration and mistrust, and another conference was subsequently planned for May.62 Between January and May, therefore, both the British and Americans

endeavoured to come up with a strategy for the Allies to pursue after the Sicilian

Campaign had been fought and won.

In the meantime, the Canadians were made aware of the Allied plan to attack

Sicily, but little else. They became determined to have a Canadian contingent participate.

Brandey Barton has evaluated the Canadian decision, concluding that Ralston was

ultimately responsible for Canadian involvement in Operation “Husky.”63 Ralston was an

old soldier. A successful lawyer and Member of Parliament for Nova Scotia when he enlisted at the outbreak of the First World War, by 1918 he had risen to the rank of

Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the 85th Infantry Battalion (Nova Scotia Highlanders).

He was known for his stout courage, discipline, and concern for his men.64 One

biographer has suggested that, “the war confirmed in him a notion of concern for and

service to others, with which Ralston had apparently been raised from an early age, and

to which he was unwilling and perhaps even unable to resist responding for the rest of his

life.”65 After the war he stayed in the military and was promoted to colonel. Then in

1926, he went back to politics in the Mackenzie King government and served as Minister

of National Defence until King’s government lost to R.B. Bennett in 1930. In 1939 he

62 Ibid., 337. 63 Barton, “Public Opinion and National Prestige,” 25. 64 Patrick Brennan, “Good Men for a Hard Job: Infantry Battalion Commanders in the Canadian Expeditionary Force,” Canadian Army Journal 9:1 (Spring 2006): 22, 24. One biographer has noted that Ralston “developed a profound empathy for the plight of the front-line soldier during World War I, he did not nurture a corresponding amenity towards war itself.” John Robinson Campbell, “James Layton Ralston and Manpower for the Canadian Army,” (MA Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 1984), 17. 65 Daniel Byers, “J.L. Ralston and the First World War: The Origins of a Life of Service,” Canadian Military History 22:1 (Winter 2013): 3. 27

joined the Cabinet again as Finance Minister, before taking over Defence after the death of Norman Rogers in 1940. Known as “the Colonel” even in civilian life, Ralston oversaw the expansion of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, which was to reach its full complement of five divisions and two tank brigades by 1 October 1943.66

However, in March 1943, Prime Minister Churchill informed Ralston that that schedule

could not be maintained. He told Ralston that because Canada was not slated to

participate in overseas operations until the cross-channel invasion, the Trans-Atlantic

shipping tonnage allocated to bringing Canadian troops to the United Kingdom to

complete the army build-up, had to be re-assigned to the United States.67

Ralston did not seem to know or care about the gravity of the shipping situation

facing the Allies, because he took the War Office decision as a disparagement of

Canada’s war effort and became determined to secure immediate operational action for

the Canadian overseas army. Somewhere, somehow he would get the army or a part

thereof into action. He proceeded to pressure Brooke to find the Canadians an operational

role.68 His resolve was bolstered by the fact that on 17 April, Turner had told

McNaughton that the cross-channel invasion was unlikely before 1944. Unless Ralston

took action, the army was likely to remain inactive for the remainder of the year 1943.69

In concert, these factors supported the conclusion that Ralston had reached a year earlier

when visiting the Canadian Army and speaking with Canadian officers, that the army

needed to get into action as soon as possible to help boost enlistment at home, bolster

66 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 56. 67 Barton, “Public Opinion and National Prestige,” 25. 68 Ibid. 69 17 April 1943, in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 64. 28

morale overseas, and ensure that the army had the fighting experience necessary to play a

key role when the invasion finally came.70 Ultimately, Ralston’s decision to send a

Canadian contingent to Sicily was not informed by the strategic plans for the campaign, but rather by pragmatic considerations of the war effort at home, concern for the British

perception of the Canadian war effort, and to ensure Canadian operational effectiveness

abroad. The simple truth for Ralston was that the Army had been built to fight, not sit in

England, and his patience had run out.

Brooke grudgingly consented. On 23 April, the Chief of the Imperial General

Staff met with McNaughton and informed him that the Chiefs of Staff had allocated room

for the Canadians to participate in the forthcoming invasion of Sicily. While Montgomery

told McNaughton that he was “delighted [the] Canadian Division will come under me for

Husky,”71 Brooke made it crystal clear to McNaughton that this arrangement was only

agreed to because of the eagerness with which Ralston had pressed his case. 1st Canadian

Infantry Division would replace the 3rd British Division, who would be “very disappointed” about it, and against the advice of Brooke’s own staff, who adamantly opposed the decision because their plans were already at an advanced stage.72

Two days later, the Canadian government officially authorized 1st Canadian

Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade to participate in Operation

“Husky.”73 Now faced with immediate and long-term operational commitments for his

army, McNaughton endeavoured to balance Ralston and Stuart’s short-term interests in

70 “English Trip Fall 1942: Canadian Army – General Notes on,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 71 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 26. 72 Discussion between McNaughton and Brooke, 23 April 1943, quoted in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 66. 73 Ibid., 67. 29

Sicily with the ongoing planning for North-West Europe. In conversation with General

Hastings Ismay of the Chiefs of Staff on 27 April, McNaughton expressed his hope that

the Canadians could be returned to the United Kingdom after “Husky,” so that First

Canadian Army would be united in time for the cross-channel invasion.74

Over the next two weeks, however, McNaughton’s goals were disrupted. The

British Chiefs of Staff were in the midst of preparing for the “Trident” conference, to be

held in Washington 12-27 May 1943. The object of the conference was to determine a

course of action after Sicily. The stakes were high. Churchill later wrote that he “was

conscious of serious divergences [between the British and Americans] beneath the

surface, which, if not adjusted, would lead to grave difficulties and feeble action during

the rest of the year.”75 Receiving only partial information at best, the Canadians were again kept out of the loop; it was an all too familiar and frustrating pattern.

In British circles, the hope to attack Sardinia had not been put to bed at

Casablanca; instead, some still hoped to launch it as a separate, British-only operation.

General Alexander Galloway, Director of Staff Duties in the War Office, told CMHQ on

6 May that Operation “Brimstone” had been revived. He thought it possible that the 3rd

Canadian Infantry Division might be employed in it.76 Upon hearing this, McNaughton

immediately wrote to Stuart, warning him that, “if this request [to send 3rd Canadian

Infantry Division to Sardinia] is made and accepted it will end the conception on which

74 Discussion between McNaughton and Ismay, 27 April 1943, in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,”67. 75 Quoted in Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 357. 76 Galloway to BGS, CMHQ, 6 May 1943, in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 76-77. 30

we have been proceeding namely that Canada’s contribution to the War could best be

through her own army.”77

An official request for Canadian participation in “Brimstone” never came, and the

operation was not launched, but the potential of having an additional Canadian formation

in the Mediterranean set Stuart’s mind that a second Canadian division and even a

Canadian corps could be sent into action post haste. Stuart did not think that keeping the

army intact for the eventual cross-channel invasion justified deferring immediate action.

He wrote McNaughton on 8 May that,

I assume you will be exploring with Troopers the possibility if request met of grouping our 2 divisions and ancillary troops in one operation under Canadian Corps HQ….our Corps HQ need battle experience as much as our divisions and while dispersion if necessary is accepted on the principle we have all along expressed there are obvious reasons for minimizing dispersion if feasible by keeping together the components selected for field force… It would appear that there is not much likelihood of the Canadian Army as a whole being employed in 1943. I cannot see that the employment of approximately 1 Corps in Africa this year would necessarily prevent the employment of the Army as a whole in 1944.78

McNaughton disagreed, and promptly wrote back that while he would propose to the

British that a Canadian corps headquarters be employed immediately if the situation allowed, he believed that the immediate employment of a corps would pose grave danger to the re-unification of First Canadian Army. The pressures on Allied shipping would limit the amount of times a corps could travel through the Mediterranean. If “a corps of

two [divisions] plus ancillaries were positioned in Africa during 1943 it is very unlikely

that they could be brought back to North West Europe for 1944. Time, space and

77 McNaughton to Stuart, 6 May 1943, Ibid., 77. 78 Stuart to McNaughton, 9 May 1943, Ibid, 77. 31

shipping would be determining factors.”79 Moreover, McNaughton assessed the move

with an eye on the Anglo-American alliance. He believed that the “real reason” the

British had agreed to send 1st Canadian Division to Sicily was not just Canadian pressure,

but their “desire to maintain number of British Divisions in [the cross-channel]

Expeditionary Force vis-à-vis U.S. and ourselves.”80

McNaughton’s assessment of the British position was re-affirmed in a

conversation with Morgan on 17 May, when he was told that unless the world shipping

situation improved so that additional divisions could be returned to the UK from North

Africa, the British Army could muster no more than six divisions in North-West Europe,

which would be but a small component of the 100 divisions he believed necessary to

attack the continent. Consequently, the loss of even one more division had already

impeded the planning for Operation Overlord. Commander-in-Chief Home Forces

General Paget informed McNaughton on 19 May that sending 1st Canadian Infantry

Division to Italy had “very much upset the balance of First [Canadian] Army.”81

By mid-May, then, McNaughton understood that shipping was a limiting and

determining factor in Allied strategy, and that the Canadian Army was an integral part of

the British plans for the North-West Europe Campaign. Equally clear, however, is that

Stuart, despite McNaughton’s warnings, was searching for a role for a second Canadian

division even before “Trident,” and with little regard either to the planning for North-

West Europe or the Mediterranean Theatre.

79 McNaughton to Stuart, 9 May, Ibid. 80 McNaughton to R.B. Gibson, liaison officer for NDHQ, 5 May 1943, quoted in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 70. 81 Paget to McNaughton, 19 May, 1943, quoted in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 71. 32

A final decision on Allied strategy for the Mediterranean was not taken at

“Trident,” however, although key decisions that would affect Canada’s fate were. During the conference in Washington, Morgan presented COSSAC’s plans for North-West

Europe, and insisted that battle hardened divisions return from the Mediterranean for participation in the cross-channel invasion. There was validity to this decision on the basis of operational effectiveness. “On this side of the water,” Morgan wrote, “our troops are ‘at peace’. On the far bank….those same troops will find themselves in the heart of the most intense battle the world has ever known. We must seek a means of palliating the intense nervous and moral shock of this rapid transition.”82 To ease that transition, the

British agreed that seven experienced divisions—three British and four American—were to be returned from North Africa beginning on 1st November 1943, to thereafter form the nucleus of the invasion of North-West Europe.83 This decision was also distinctly political. The Americans demanded such a commitment so as to prevent further delay in the cross-channel invasion in favour of the Mediterranean Theatre. The British also affirmed that the invasion of North-West Europe, thereafter called Operation “Overlord,” would take place no later than 1 May 1944. This was all part of a negotiation. As Roberts writes, “the British made the first of three binding decisions to launch a cross-Channel invasion in May 1944, and the price the Americans seem to have paid…was an Italian

Campaign.”84

82 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 71. 83 Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 360-361. 84 Ibid., 369. 33

Yet, any agreement at Trident to invade Italy was not official. A formal

commitment to attack the Italian mainland had not been made, which necessitated

another Allied conference later in the year. As such, the strategic objectives for the still-

potential Italian Campaign had not been agreed upon either. The Americans only saw

value in an Italian expedition in so far as it could affect the cross-channel invasion. A

limited campaign into the south could potentially draw off German divisions from

France, and yet still enable the removal of Allied divisions from the Mediterranean for

North-West Europe, without materially hurting the forces remaining in Italy. They

perceived of a campaign limited in its troop commitments and objectives, as a sort-of

flank support to the cross-channel invasion. The British instead wanted to fight to the

industrial Po Valley in the north, whereby Italy could be used as a launching pad into

other parts of Europe.85 Ultimately, the compromises at “Trident” set the stage for the

“Quadrant” conference held in August.

It was in the period between “Trident” and “Quadrant” that the full effects of the haphazard, ad hoc manner in which Allied strategy was formulated and communicated to the Canadians, influenced Canadian decision-making. One again the Canadians made important decisions without having all the facts. Indeed, the Canadians were left to guess at Allied strategy even as it was being formed, and to form their own plans with incomplete information. Thanks to Turner, McNaughton was aware of the agreement to bring seven divisions back from the Mediterranean by November.86 He was also led to

believe that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division would be one of the returning to divisions.

85 Ibid., 370. 86 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 71. 34

On 12 June, Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff Archibald Nye assured him that

plans had been made to include the Canadian Army in the cross-channel invasion, and

that it “should be assumed that 1 [Canadian] Div[ision] and 1 [Canadian] Army T[an]k

[Brigade] will be returned to the U.K. in the late fall of 1943.”87 McNaughton was also

informed that Paget was to command the Anglo-Canadian Army Group in Normandy.

Visiting with him on the 17th, Paget confirmed the understanding that the Canadian units

in Italy “would be included among the formations returning to the United Kingdom.”88

Even so, Allied plans remained indefinite and these assurances were never confirmed in

writing. As Major-General John Kennedy, Brooke’s Director of Military Operations—the

senior War Office planner—reminded McNaughton two days later, “what was done would depend on the development of the strategic situation” which would be revisited in

August at the Quebec Conference.89

However, Stuart’s positions was not changed by the possibility that 1st Canadian

Infantry Division could gain operational experience but still be back to the UK in time for

Overlord, nor by the fact that Allied strategy—for Italy in general nor the objectives of the campaign in particular—had yet to be confirmed. Ralston agreed with Stuart, and by

July, they were committed to pressuring the British to send a Canadian corps

headquarters and second division to the Mediterranean Theatre. The justification posited

was to gain immediate operational experience, and they were willing to accept the

inaction of the First Canadian Army headquarters in consequence. Ralston set the stage

87 Meeting between Nye and McNaughton, 12 June 1943, quoted in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 71. 88 Ibid., 72. 89 Ibid., 73. 35

with the Cabinet War Committee on 2 July. He “gave to the war committee some of the

particulars…about some of our men overseas,” which left Mackenzie King with the

impression that the army had expanded beyond the capacity of the country to sustain.90

On 10 July—the very day that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division landed in Sicily—Stuart

informed Mackenzie King that it was unlikely the invasion of North West Europe would

happen before May 1944. In light of this, Ralston told the Prime Minister that he felt that

it would be best to send more troops to the Mediterranean. He worried that the war could

be over before the Canadians got into the fight, and that this could have serious

implications on Canada’s post war stature. Mackenzie King initially resisted what seemed

to him a foolish canard, reporting that,

Public memory was short… [It was] sounder to keep the Army as intact as possible for the final blow, a very strong blow in the end. All armies are one in the life time of a war, the man that makes the strongest finish wins, where numbers are so difficult, a strong fresh small force highly organized, for the final round can destroy larger forces – forces many times their number, that is the only way this war can be won, this [and] bombing.91

Although this sounded remarkably like a sound strategic view, over the next few months Mackenzie King flip-flopped. The Canadian official historian argues that his conversion happened for two reasons: (1) it was mistakenly predicted at the time that the wastage rates in Italy would be far less than would later be incurred in North-West

Europe, and so maybe Canada could avoid conscription (King was certainly willing to

listen to anyone promising low casualty rates); and (2) that the participation of 1st

Canadian Infantry Division in Sicily had been extremely popular, and in the summer of

90 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 2 July 1943. 91 Ibid., 10 July 1943. 36

1943 the Liberal Party lost a number of bi-elections.92 As Granatstein and Morton put it,

“Ordinary Canadians felt that, without soldiers fighting, Canada was somehow out of the

war. No number of bombers or corvettes could substitute for fighting divisions.”93

Mackenzie King began to sense this.

The revised assessment in Ottawa that First Canadian Army was not inviolable

matched Brooke’s view through the latter half of July. On 10 July, Operation “Husky”

was launched, and 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade

landed on the shores of Pachino as part of Montgomery’s Eighth Army. McNaughton

travelled to the Mediterranean with the hopes of visiting the Canadians. The details of

McNaughton’s trip have been well-documented elsewhere; suffice to say that upon his arrival in North Africa, he was barred by Montgomery from visiting the Canadians in

Sicily.94 Returning to the United Kingdom on 21 July, McNaughton had a row with

Brooke that came down to the fact that they had very different perspectives on Canada’s

role within the Anglo-Canadian Alliance. Brooke warned McNaughton that having the

Canadians fight as a unified army was militarily inconvenient to the British.95 This was

heresy to McNaughton, who continued to believe that a united Canadian army should

fight in North-West Europe even if, as Rickard has shown, he was willing to agree to an

immediate operational deployment if so demanded by his political masters. Either way,

this meeting undoubtedly set the stage for Brooke’s encounter with Stuart less than a

92 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 237. 93 Granatstein and Morton, The Two World Wars, 259. 94 See Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 224-228; and Rickard, The Politics of Command, 171-186. 95 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 182. Rickard convincingly argues that while McNaughton preferred to have a untied Canadian Army fight in North-West Europe, he was willing to consent to operations in the Mediterranean. Even so, he remained protective of First Canadian Army. 37

week later. Brooke, who was frustrated with McNaughton’s acerbic treatment of his

superiors, recorded that Stuart “suggested splitting the Canadian force between Home and

Mediterranean so as to dispose of McNaughton as an Army Commander! He is right. It is

the only way to save the outfit.”96

The same day, Stuart and McNaughton met with Morgan, who, despite the

agreement at “Trident,” refused to give them a firm date for the projected attack on

North-West Europe. Instead, he said that while he still hoped it would be May of the

following year, he felt the build-up might push it to September. Morgan also told them

that the British and Americans still disagreed on future operations in the Mediterranean.97

When asked by McNaughton what the Anglo-American debate could mean for the

Canadian Army, Morgan answered that there would be an “adverse effect on Anglo-

American co-operation” if additional Canadian troops were sent to the Mediterranean. At

Stuart’s prompting, Morgan conceded that the impact might be lessened if it was done on

the basis of an exchange with British units. Whether the idea of swapping Canadian and

British units in Italy had its genesis in this meeting, or earlier, is unclear.98 Either way,

this meeting was of critical importance and would help shape Stuart’s subsequent actions.

However, had the Canadians been made aware of the Allied commitment at “Trident” to

1 May as the date for the cross-channel invasion, Morgan—who as COSSAC was

understandably considered a reliable source by the Canadians—may not have had the

subsequent effect that he did on Canadian decision-making.

96 Meeting with Stuart on 27 July 1943, in Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 1939-1945, ed. Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (Berkley and Los Angles: University of California Press, 2001), 434. 97 Rickard, Politics of Command, 189. 98 Rickard believes the idea for the “swap” may have originated with Brooke, but that the evidence is inconclusive. Ibid. 38

As it was, however, the veiled reference to the pressures on Allied shipping seem

to have eluded Stuart, who “raised the importance of Canadian divisions obtaining battle

experience; if further operations were to be conducted in the Mediterranean, the Canadian

Government felt that an additional division and a corps headquarters should be provided

from the First Canadian Army.” 99 Moreover, if the invasion was delayed until

September, it might yet be possible to have the Army re-united in time for the

offensive.100 Without the slightest hint of irony, Stuart told Morgan that “C.O.S.S.A.C.

plans seemed to be based more on political than military considerations.”101

The possibility that the cross-channel invasion would not happen until September of the following year had a vital impact on Stuart and Ralston. Ralston arrived in England on 29 July willing to accept the dissolution of the Canadian Army Headquarters in order to get into action in Italy in 1943. He was resolved to ask the British Chiefs of Staff to accept a Canadian corps into Eighth Army in Italy.102 His determination was undoubtedly

bolstered by his conversation that day with Stuart and McNaughton, during which Stuart

relayed to Ralston that the attack on France might not be launched until September 1944, and, as per his conversation with Morgan, suggested that a Canadian Corps be built up in

Italy, “by exchanging [Canadian divisions] for British, even if there was no certainty that they could be brought back.” If this were done, Stuart said, “H.Q. First [Canadian] Army as an operational command would be redundant and that it might therefore be advisable

99 Stuart and Morgan, 27 July 1943, quoted in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 78. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Ralston/Stuart/McNaughton, 29 July 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 39

to combine H.Q. First [Canadian] Army and C.M.H.Q. to administer all [Canadian]

Forces in European and African theatres.”103

Such a drastic course of action surely should have been considered with a

comprehensive understanding of Allied plans for both Italy and the timing of the cross-

channel invasion. Ralston should have gone straight to Brooke and demanded a full

briefing. Instead, he asked for the speculative assessments of 1st Canadian Corps

Commander Harry Crerar and the Senior Combatant Officer at CMHQ Price Montague,

who accompanied him to visit the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. Crerar felt that the continuance and expansion of Canadian operations in Italy was logical, because the

cross-channel invasion should wait until German defences on the continent had

deteriorated, presumably by peripheral campaigns in Italy and on the eastern front. In the

meantime, Crerar believed that the fighting spirit of his men would be buoyed by the

hope of early action. Montague was also strongly in favour of early action for a Canadian

corps. Where the two men differed was on what should be done about the army

headquarters. Crerar felt that the headquarters should be maintained “in case

Mediterranean troops return,” whereas Montague had “no definite ideas [regarding the]

feasibility or advisability of maintaining army set-up.”104 Both counselled Ralston that

getting the army into the fight was of utmost importance for the operational effectiveness

and morale of the Canadian army.

103 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 191. 104 Friday, 30 July 1943, “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean are and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 40

Buoyed by his discussion with Crerar and Montague, on 2 August, Ralston

proposed to Churchill the idea of exchanging British units with a Canadian corps and

division. Ralston told Churchill that Canada was, “Always ready to serve where [they]

could serve best in whole or in part but feel [we] have the right to make representations

regarding considerations which might affect our usefulness.”105 Churchill was blunt in his

reply. Such a proposal would influence the nature of his relationship with the Americans

and he did not want to “appear to be forgetting them by sending troops out of the U.K.

without consultation.” Even so, he was not averse to Ralston’s idea that a Canadian corps

headquarters and division replace British units that needed rest or refit after years of hard-

fighting against Rommel’s Afrika Korps.106 Oblivious to the pressures on Allied

shipping, Ralston concurred with Churchill that it could hardly be considered a breach of

his existing agreements with the Americans if the Canadians in the UK were “replaced by

bringing back divisions that had been fighting in North Africa for a year or more.”107

The following day, Ralston met with Brooke for what was the most important meeting between the two men in this period. Ralston related his conversation with

Churchill, and Brooke agreed that it might be possible to send the Canadians if done as an exchange. According to Ralston, Brooke went on to suggest that he felt that if a corps went, “it would be advisable to abandon [the] idea of [the] Canadian Army.”108 There

was little point in maintaining an army headquarters and staff to administer one corps,

105 Walk with Prime Minister, 1 August 1943, “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean are and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Brooke/Ralston/Stuart, 3 August 1943, Ibid. 41

argued Brooke. From the British point of view, “it would of course be easier for him to

have Canadians in [a] corps rather [than] one big group of one nationality.” More

importantly, he “wouldn’t feel like putting a British Corps under [McNaughton]” in

whom he had little faith.109 Ralston noted that Brooke’s opinion may have stemmed from

a sound military point of view.110 But it was also more than that, as Brooke had decided

as early as July 5—after meeting with Stuart—that the “best solution” for “eliminating”

McNaughton was to divide the army between the European and Mediterranean theatres.111 Regardless, at this point the discussion of Canadian operations were wholly

framed by Canadian national-politics and Anglo-Canadian relations, and Brooke’s not-so

veiled hope of maintaining as much operational control over Canadian and other Empire

forces as possible. Strategy would be decided at the Quebec conference without Canadian

participation. From Ralston’s and Stuart’s perspective, all that mattered was whether the

Allies intended to continue to Italy or not.

In the meantime, Ralston had met with McNaughton, who had admitted that

despite his desire to see the Canadian Army fight in North-West Europe, “the cause [of getting into action] was bigger than” his own interests.112 On 3 August, he warned

Ralston that he doubted Brooke’s true intentions for agreeing to consider sending a

Canadian corps to Italy. He believed—quite rightly, as Brooke said so explicitly—that

the CIGS was irritated by the constitutional limitations imposed by Canada, and preferred

109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 426. 112 Ralston/Stuart/McNaughton, 29 July 1943, “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean are and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 42

to split the Canadians up, which was against the country’s national interest, and would

increase Brooke’s control over the Canadian forces. McNaughton also pleaded for the

Minister of Defence to find out more about Allied strategy before any decision was made.

He advocated imposing conditions that the Canadians be fully “in the picture as to

strategy.”113 This did not happen.

Ralston failed to heed McNaughton’s advice. On 5 August, he met again with

McNaughton and Stuart. McNaughton continued to argue that it was “in [the] interests of

Canada that we maintain [the] Canadian army.”114 For McNaughton, recorded Ralston,

this was “even more important than battle experience. [He] [s]till adhered to that policy

in the light of changed conditions,” meaning the projected date for North-West Europe.

McNaughton was willing to agree, however, that he did not “regard sending the Corps to

Mediterranean as dispersion provided agreement is reached with U.K. that corps is to be returned to U.K. in time to take part in major operations based on U.K.”115 For this, the

Canadians would need to know what Allied strategic objectives for the Italian Theatre would be, and not just whether the campaign was to take place. More, this required a thorough understanding of the shipping limitations, which to this point had been addressed only by implication and speculation.

McNaughton’s logic was sound, and his recommendation that Ralston get all of the facts before determining Canada’s best course of action was reasonable, but also

113 2 August 1943, “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean are and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 114 “McNaughton/Stuart/Ralston,” 5 August 1943, “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean are and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 115 Ibid. 43

clashed with Ralston’s priorities. Consequently, by early August the potential deployment of the Canadian Army had created a schism among Canadian decision-makers. Ralston,

Stuart, and Brooke wanted to commit a Canadian corps headquarters and another division to Italy and, if necessary, dissolve First Canadian Army Headquarters in England.

Ralston, however, overlooked or ignored the fact that Brooke’s position was a direct threat to Canadian political interests; he preferred to deal with the Canadians in parts, rather than “one big nationality.” Brooke had little interest in Canadian nationalism, and wanted to use the Corps under British command, as during the Great War, and avoid dealing with a Canadian Army Commander. In the meantime, McNaughton disagreed in principal, but was willing to compromise on the deployment of Canadian units in the short term, if given assurances that they be would be returned in time for the invasion and thus that the army headquarters be maintained.

Further exacerbating the situation was that the Canadians were considering a significant change without a full understanding of Allied strategy, which had yet to be worked out. They were dealing with only partial and haphazard information.

McNaughton saw the danger, and urged Ralston and Stuart to go to Washington and insist on taking part in strategy sessions. Ralston replied that the Canadians’ existing position was one of “contribution without representation” and that it was in fact impossible to gain entrance into the decision-making circle.116 Ralston seemed blind to the reasoning that helping to make Allied decisions and using those decisions to guide his own, were two sides of the same coin.

116 29 July 1943, in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 79. 44

Nothing about the Italian Campaign was definite before the Quebec conference.

Pope took a brief trip to London in early August at the same time as Ralston. He met with

Nye at the War Office, and, having asked him about the situation in general, was told that from the British perspective, the Americans were still “sticky on the question of the

Italian front,” and it was up to Churchill to convince Roosevelt at Quebec to follow their lead. “The Italian situation was crying out for action and the opportunity could not be allowed to slip. And yet, Nye said, the Americans were still pressing for the cross- channel try where they would run up against no less than thirty German divisions at the outset.”117

As a result of the American push-back, the British were unsure whether the Italian

Campaign would be agreed to at all, let alone what the objectives for the campaign would be. Kennedy told Brooke on 30 July that if 13 to 18 German divisions chose to make a stand on the Ravenna-Pisa line, 16 Allied divisions would be needed for Italy. Brooke thought the required number was closer to 22 divisions, to account for the fact that the

Germans were closer to home and could therefore more easily reinforce their armies.

Kennedy consequently worried that “it will be extremely difficult to get the Americans to agree to an advance to the north of Italy. Marshall has always held that it would be a bottomless pit into which to fling resources and is still obsessed by the idea of invading

France.”118

Without knowing specifics, Stuart, like Nye, was confident that the British vision for the Mediterranean theatre would prevail, but McNaughton continued to caution

117 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 221-222. 118 Quoted in Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 390. 45

against formulating a Canadian plan before Allied strategy was determined. To

McNaughton, this meant more than just whether the campaign was launched, but what the strategic objectives for the campaign were to be. In a meeting on 2 August,

McNaughton warned Ralston and Stuart that if the American strategic vision to ramp down Mediterranean operations in preparation for Overlord prevailed, Canada would be committing itself to what would turn out to be garrison duty. Ralston replied that

“strategy was the very thing that was to be the subject of [the Quebec] conference and our whole reason for discussing the matter was that troops might have battle experience.”119

McNaughton reiterated his argument that Canada must desire to know whether the project was a reasonable operation of war, or if the campaign would become dormant if the Americans pulled out for France. To this Ralston’s response was ambiguous: he “said that [he] found it difficult to understand one of [McNaughton’s] wires which looked as though we should accept the British Chiefs of Staff’s judgement. [McNaughton] said he only meant that to apply to strategy and not to the tactical soundness of a particular plan.”120

Ralston and McNaughton spoke of the matter again a week later. In Ralston’s eyes, McNaughton was in a much better frame of mind; a result of his recent discussion with Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. In what was an accurate prediction but incorrect analysis of what would happen in the Mediterranean,

Dill guessed that the Germans would put 40 divisions in Northern Italy if the Russians

119 Ralston/McNaughton, 2 August 1943, “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean are and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 120 Ibid. 46

released pressure on the Eastern Front. These divisions would “suck in and destroy” any

Allied force. Consequently, he believed the Allies would decide to discontinue operations in the Mediterranean. McNaughton was satisfied that the army might remain intact but,

Ralston noted, he “did not mention again the effect on morale of a winter of idleness.”121

McNaughton tried to incorporate strategy into his advice to the Minister. Ralston, however, was focused on the effects operational experience would have on the Canadian

Army and thus cared only whether the Italian front was to take place, not what its strategic objectives would be.

In the meantime, Ralston was called home by Mackenzie King for the Quebec conference.122 It speaks volumes that the Prime Minister’s telegram was even necessary.

Ralston had hoped to spend another week in England before travelling to the

Mediterranean to visit the Canadian troops. This would have meant his absence from the

Quadrant conference. While Canada was not a formal participant in the meeting,

Mackenzie King knew the optics of Canada’s role as host would be damaged if the

Minister of National Defence was not in Quebec. Ralston’s opinion had, however, been set—if the Allies went to Italy, he wanted a Canadian corps headquarters and another division to be part of the order of battle. As Massey implied in his diary, the nuances of the strategic decisions outlined at Quebec would not change, or even inform this position.

Had a very satisfactory talk [with Ralston] about the employment of the army, its command, etc. He put me fully into the picture telling me that the only other person who knew the full story was Stuart, the C.G.S. The final decision as to the use of our forces would be arrived at at Quebec but it was quite clear that Ralston was quite prepared to

121 “With Stuart at Army HQ”, 7 August 1943, “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean are and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 122 “Ralston’s recall from England to Attend Quebec Conference,” 5 August 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 66. 47

see the Canadian forces serving where they can best be used although this would probably mean their being divided. He has no patience with the army fetish….It does not now look as if the Canadian army would take the field as an army formation.123 King’s political sense saved Ralston from himself. “The matters to be discussed at the forthcoming meetings will clearly be of the highest importance with regard to the conduct of the war in the immediate future, and will inevitably entail questions regarding the employment of Canadian forces. In these discussions I feel I should have your counsel and support as Senior Defence Minister.”124 Ralston returned to Canada days later. Before he left England, he assured McNaughton that “no decision regarding the despatch of further Canadians to the Mediterranean was possible until after the decisions of the Quebec Conference.”125 It was clear, however, that if the Allies chose to continue the operations into Italy, Ralston intended to pressure the British to accept a Canadian corps, with little regard for the strategic objectives of the campaign. Most tellingly was

Ralston’s determination to get Canadian units into battle, whether or not he was given assurances that those units could be returned in time to rejoin the Canadian Army for the cross-channel invasion.

Thus by the time of the Quebec Conference, the battle lines had been drawn.

McNaughton preferred to keep the Canadian Army intact, and was doubtful of the

Mediterranean strategy. That aside, he was willing to consent to a Canadian deployment to the Mediterranean, so long as the corps could be brought back to England in time for the invasion of North West Europe. This position was based on his knowledge of the

123 Diary entry quoted in Vincent Massey, What’s Past is Prologue: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, C.H. (Toronto: MacMillan, 1963), 382. 124 “Ralston’s recall from England to Attend Quebec Conference,” 5 August 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 66. 125 Quoted in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 80. 48

stresses on Allied shipping capacity, and the Canadian Army’s role in 21st Army Group.

Ralston, conversely, paid little mind to the strategic picture. Instead, he believed that for the purposes of Canadian military effectiveness, the corps required battle experience, even at the expense of the army headquarters. Even so, and despite evidence to the contrary, he was unwilling to admit that if a corps was sent to Italy, the Canadian Army

ipso facto could not be united in time for operations in North-West Europe, which made

the goal of “battle experience” redundant.126 As King recorded,

At one stage, near the end, McNaughton had said: ‘The die is cast’ to Ralston, and said: it is clear from the conversations you have been having, you do not care about the Canadian army. Ralston pointed to his having pressed for the army; having the forces we had; of his defence of it in Parliament, etc. Said he could not understand McNaughton speaking that way. McNaughton thought that the conversations Ralston was having with others seemed to indicate his feeling.127

Neither was wrong, but Ralston’s position was reinforced by Brooke’s and Paget’s lack

of confidence in McNaughton’s ability as a field commander. His hand was strengthened

when in August Mackenzie King agreed that having a corps in action would bolster his

flagging domestic popularity.128

Like Ralston, once Mackenzie King had decided to get the Canadians into action,

the question of where they would fight mattered little, and military considerations had

little weight on the Prime Minister’s decision. On 10 August 1943, Churchill and King

rode together from Ottawa to Quebec City, during which time Churchill spoke about the

importance of continuing up the “soft underbelly” until the necessary preparations were

made for North-West Europe. Mackenzie King accepted Churchill’s decision without

126 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 79. 127 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 10 August 1943. 128 Granatstein and Morton, The Two World Wars, 259. 49

question.129 When presented with the opportunity at key moments to voice opinions on military strategy, King opted for acquiescence. Whether this was indifference, ignorance, or sycophancy (or a combination thereof) matters less than the fact that he had no input at key moments and, worse, did not try to have a voice. Yet, “Mr. Mackenzie King had made a strong plea that all the Canadian Forces available in this country should be used on some active front. The Prime Minister [Churchill]… suggested that a definite conclusion be reached in the light of the strategic decisions yet to be taken at the

Quadrant Conference.”130 Later, Mackenzie King recorded his view of the situation:

There will remain a Canadian Army Corps in Britain. Then, when the main assault comes, instead of our men bearing the brunt of this assault, it will be divided between the British, Americans and ourselves. The British are two or three times in number to our own, and the Americans five times. Having regard to the length of time we have been in the war, and the relative size of the country, the proportion is certainly not unfair to the U.S. It will mean that, after the first assault, a somewhat similar plan will follow for the driving on immediately thereafter into Germany. This, I think, will mean a considerable saving of life of our own troops and it will also have the advantage of Canada sharing in such successes as there may be in the South as well as in the North….Our men will not suffer the slaughter that the earlier plans [to send the full Canadian Army to North-West Europe], had they been continued, would have resulted in, while so far as the winning of the war is concerned, their contribution will be just as great.131

Mackenzie King was willing to fight to the last drop of American blood. He believed that

the war would be won with or without Canadian soldiers fighting and dying, in which

case, the fewer Canadian casualties the better.

Everything hinged on the strategic discussions that took place at Quebec. Held in

the Chateau Frontenac in Quebec City, the meetings of Roosevelt, Churchill and the

Combined Chiefs of Staff took place overlooking the St. Lawrence River. The Canadians

129 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 10 August 1943. 130 117th Conclusions, Minute 2, Confidential Annex, 19th August, 1943, TNA CAB 65/39/13, W.M. (43). 131 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 21 October 1943. 50

were generous hosts, even flying in fresh oranges from New York. “We were spoiled,”

one participant remembered.132 The goodwill was short-lived, and behind closed doors

the mood was one of exasperation and mistrust. In an effort to maintain “Overlord” as the

Allied strategic priority, the Americans demanded on the conference’s opening day that the British re-commit to returning seven divisions from the Mediterranean Theatre by

November. The British complied, even though Brooke was reluctant to be hemmed in by firm commitments which could in the future limit the Allies’ ability to react to circumstances as they changed.133 In exchange, the Americans agreed to continue

operations from Sicily to the Italian mainland. Preparations for Overlord were to

continue, and the cross-channel invasion was to remain the Allies’ priority, with 1 May

1944 as the definite invasion date. Moreover, the attack was to be complemented by a

coincidental secondary invasion into southern France from Italy, code-named Operation

“Anvil.”134

Throughout the conference, the Canadians tried to gather what information they

could about the Anglo-American decisions, but without much success. Pope travelled to

Ottawa from London and made it his mission “never to be in the way but yet never out of it.”135 The results of the Canadians’ efforts were mixed, and at times misleading. Indeed,

in a meeting with Ralston and Mackenzie King on the 14th, Brooke said that he “was

inflexible in not attempting any crossing of the Channel this year or before the autumn of

132 Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 392. 133 Ibid., 401. 134 Ibid., 406. 135 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 226. 51

the next year. He was anxious to press on to Italy.”136 Based on the terms of Trident and

the agreements of the following days, this was disingenuous—it was Brooke’s opinion

only, and while he undoubtedly believed the Americans would come to see his way, it

was not what had been agreed upon at Quadrant. Instead, the British had re-affirmed their commitment to launching the cross-channel invasion by 1 May.

Moreover, on 21 August, Pope sat down with Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon

Macready, formerly an Assistant Chief of the General Staff who was the army representative on the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and with whom Pope had been friends since their pre-war Staff College days together.137 Macready “inferred that

the capitulation of Italy was at hand and that it was planned to occupy the lower half of

the Italian peninsula.” The Americans continued to press hard for Overlord, however, so

“it had been agreed that equipment such as landing craft which [Supreme Commander of

Allied Forces Headquarters in the Mediterranean Theatre, Dwight] Eisenhower and

[Commander 15th Army Group, Harold] Alexander had said they needed for the projected

operation against the Italian peninsula, was to be returned to England now, for possible

use in eight months’ time!”138 Part of this was correct; landing craft were to be the priority of the cross-channel preparations. However, the conference agreed to occupy not just the “lower half of the Peninsula”, but to advance to Florence, where they predicted the Germans would establish their main defensive line (the Gothic Line). Macready also intimated to Pope that he had heard on the “highest level” that another Canadian division

136 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 14 August 1943. 137 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 185. 138 Ibid., 227. 52

was going to be sent to the Mediterranean. This plan was news to Pope, who had not

heard a whisper about the plan, even from Stuart, whom he had met with earlier that day,

and despite the months that the Canadians had already been working towards this

outcome.139 This is further evidence that Ralston’s plans were formed without

consideration for Allied strategy, as Pope was Canada’s closest link to Washington and

the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Pope’s final report on the conference to the Cabinet War Committee wove

together the information he had managed to glean. The Americans accepted the plan to

continue to Italy with the British assurance that the invasion would “strain Germany’s

over-taxed resources and would make the contemplated cross-channel operation a matter

of practical politics.” Three British and four American divisions were still slated to be

returned to the United Kingdom from Italy. Where that would leave the Allied Forces in

Italy, Pope was unsure.

The British, however, who are determined to see to it that General Eisenhower will not be required to run the risk of finding himself short-handed, propose, with United States consent, to replace their formations by fresh divisions from home. But much requires to be done and in some British quarters the view has been expressed that the necessary preparatory work cannot possibly be completed before the 1st of September of next year. No word of this, however, has been allowed to reach American ears.140

Ultimately, the Canadians based their decisions on the misguided belief that the attack on North-West Europe would not happen before September 1944, regardless of the official promise that had been made at Trident and again at Quadrant, and that the Italian

Campaign was proceeding apace. Armed with these two pieces of information, Ralston pressed the British to send a Canadian corps to Italy. On 1 September, Churchill attended

139 Ibid. 140 Ibid., 231. 53

a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet War Committee where he was asked whether additional Canadian forces might be employed in the Mediterranean. Churchill responded that the “question had to be considered in relation to plans for operations against

Europe.” British troops were slated to return in preparation for Overlord, and an additional British division might be withdrawn, to be replaced by Canadians. “The

question would be taken up at once with the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff in

London and, if possible, arrangements made accordingly. If the movement were

acceptable a request would be presented to the Canadian government, through the usual

channels.”141 He promptly cabled the War Office to investigate the potential effects of

such a move and, upon receipt of its report, proposed to take up the question with the

United States and Canadian governments.142 To Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee

and the Chiefs of Staff, he wrote that a “strong desire was expressed that a second

Canadian Division should be despatched to the Mediterranean area as soon as possible. I

understand that C.I.G.S. [Brooke] is fully in picture as the result of his talks with General

Stuart. Pray let me know as soon as possible what can be done. We can then put our

request to the Canadian Government in the usual way.”143

Churchill received a response from London the next day, 2 September. According

to the Chiefs of Staff, the crux of the problem with what Churchill was asking was the

worldwide shortage of troop ships, and the seven divisions the Allied were to bring back

from the Mediterranean for Overlord. It would be simple to send Canadian troops to the

141 Employment of the Canadian Army Overseas, “Extracts from Minutes of Cabinet War Committee,” 31 August 1943, LAC RG 2 7C, Privy Council Office (PCO). 142 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 82. 143 Message from WS Churchill (Quebec) to Clement Attlee re sending of 1st Cdn Corps & 5th Cdn Armd Div to Italy d/31 Aug 43, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10,772. 54

Mediterranean in the empty ships going to pick up US and British divisions from North-

Africa. “This exchange would be of personnel only each taking over equipment of the

other.” 144 However, a firm commitment had been made to add seven divisions to

Overlord, not six, meaning another division would have to be shipped home to replace

the Canadian formations. The only options were to reduce the build-up for Normandy by

the personnel for one division; or find additional shipping at the expense of the Pacific

campaigns. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that either way, this decision could only

be made at the highest level between Churchill and Roosevelt.145

Nye warned McNaughton of the British reservations. It was all about shipping. If an additional Canadian division was despatched, it would mean that one less American division could be sent to the United Kingdom or South Pacific, “since all movement had to be governed by global allocation of shipping.”146 Plus, if it was decided to send

another Canadian division, Nye said that the War Office would favour the buildup of a

complete corps, with corps troops. While this was exactly what Stuart and Ralston had in

mind, Nye laid out the long-term implications. The corps would have to be considered a

“more or less a permanent commitment” to the Italian Campaign, because it was “highly

improbable that shipping would be available in time for it to return to Britain by the

target date of 1 May 1944 and unlikely for operations by 1 September,”147 although in

144 Deputy Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to Churchill, 2 September 1943, “Future Use of Canadian Forces,” TNA WO 216/163. 145 Ibid. 146 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 83. 147 Ibid. 55

this scenario, the Canadian Army might remain intact and be given British divisions to

bring it up to strength.148

The limits of Allied shipping, however, would make it difficult to get the

Canadians to the theatre in the first place. Indeed, the Chiefs of Staff wrote to Churchill

on 4 September that to send a Canadian Corps and division to Italy, more shipping would

have to be found to bring back another British unit so as to “make good the loss to

Overlord…This can only be done at the expense of some other commitment agreed at

Quadrant.” After the completion of the move of the promised seven divisions, all other

shipping was to be diverted to “Bolero,” the build-up for the cross-channel invasion.149

Still, the British did due diligence and weighed their options. Churchill bypassed

Brooke and asked Dill and Ismay to gauge the pulse of the Americans, and to recommend whether he should adopt the Chiefs of Staff recommendation to approach President

Roosevelt directly, or, instead, to “tell Mackenzie King quite frankly that the proposed move cannot be justified to the Americans on military grounds which did not exist at

Quadrant, and ask him not to press it.”150 Before answering the Prime Minister, Dill wrote to Brooke. His assessment was blunt: “If [the] Prime Minister adopts [option] (a),

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff will regard it as another subtle attempt to whittle down Overlord in order to add to our strength in the Mediterranean. With the ink scarcely dry on

Quadrant decisions, this will come particularly badly.”151 Dill recommended taking

option (b) and telling Mackenzie King that his request was unfeasible, unless Brooke

148 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 198. 149 Chiefs of Staff to Churchill, 4 September 1943, Concrete No. 731, “Future Use of Canadian Forces,” TNA WO 216/163. 150 Dill to CIGS, 6 September 1943, “Future Use of Canadian Forces,” TNA WO 216/163. 151 Ibid. 56

“cannot in fact ‘hold’ the Canadians in England for about nine months more.” Moreover,

“it would seem sound to me to include the First Canadian Division in the three British

Divisions to be brought back. This Division, with its battle experience, would do much to leaven the whole lump of the Canadian Army.”152 Considering that the 1st Division had

been sent to Sicily ostensibly to gain battle experience, Dill’s suggestion made good

sense.

Brooke was away on a few days leave, so Dill received his answer from Nye, who

advised Dill not to give Churchill the same recommendation he had given the Chiefs of

Staff. Not only was Nye “anxious if at all possible to meet the Canadian desire,” but they had “already nominated the three Divisions to be brought back and great confusion would be caused if we were now to include the 1st Canadian Division among these.” As such,

the only solution Nye saw as feasible was to leave the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in

the Mediterranean, while explaining frankly to Mackenzie King that the “shortage of

shipping precludes the dispatch of a second Canadian Division to the Mediterranean for

the moment…and when another Division is required in the Mediterranean later on we

should then send a Canadian Division.”153

In mid-September, the Canadians finally received their answer. Brooke informed

McNaughton that there was now no likelihood of a Canadian division or corps

headquarters being sent to the Mediterranean, as the target date of May 1944 was set for

the attack on North West Europe and all shipping would need to be allocated to the build-

152 Ibid. 153 Nye to Dill, 6 September 1943, “Future Use of Canadian Forces,” TNA WO 216/163. 57

up. 154 Moreover, despite the early rumours that had reached McNaughton, 1st Canadian

Infantry Division was not to be one of the three British divisions returned to the UK.155

Instead, the 50th and 51st (Highland) Divisions and 7th Armoured Division were to be

brought back, largely on the recommendation of Montgomery, who had written to Brooke

on 3 September that, “some of my chaps are getting tired. 50 Div[ision] are definitely so; so are 51 Div[ision]. Both of these splendid divisions have been fighting almost continuously for over a year, and 50 Div[ision] for much longer. I have left them both out of this party [the landings on Italy], and they are resting in Sicily; they ought to be taken home to the UK; they will be grand to have for 'Overlord.'"156 McNaughton was

undoubtedly disappointed, but Brooke promised that if the date for the cross-channel

invasion was delayed, and if the situation in the Mediterranean permitted, 1st Division

might be returned to the UK.157 It was an easy promise to make, since it was one he knew he would not necessarily have to keep.

At the moment, the situation in the Mediterranean did not permit the removal of

the Canadians. 15th Army Group had invaded the Italian mainland in September, with

Eighth Army crossing the Strait of Messina into the toe of Italy, while the Fifth U.S.

Army launched a seaborne assault on the port of Salerno. After heavy fighting, the Fifth

U.S. Army was on the verge of capturing Salerno, and the Eighth British Army had

advanced up the boot toward Potenza. The impending victory at Salerno had prompted a

154 “Employment of Canadian Army in the Mediterranean,” 14 September1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 58, 155 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 83. 156 Montgomery to Brooke, 3 September 1943, in Bernard Montgomery, Montgomery and the Eighth Army: A Selection from the Diaries, Correspondence and other Papers of Field Marshall The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, August 1942 to December 1943, ed. Stephen Brookes (London: Bodley Head for the Amery Records Society, 1991), 277. 157 “Employment of Canadian Army in the Mediterranean,” 14 September1943, Ralston Papers, Vol 58. 58

re-examination of the Allied strategic goals for the Mediterranean Theatre, including an

assessment of whether the Germans planned to defend Rome or dig-in north of the

Eternal City. Taking stock of what materiel and manpower would be allocated to the

Italian Theatre considering the forthcoming landings in North-West Europe complicated matters. Churchill again showed his enthusiasm for a continued push in the

Mediterranean Theatre, by suggesting that the Allies divert efforts from Italy to capture the Greek Island of Rhodes, which would help open up the eastern Mediterranean to

Allied air and naval traffic.158 Brooke believed the plan to be “sheer madness.”159

Instead, the Allies should stick with the strategy outlined at the Quadrant conference—to

concentrate the theatre’s limited resources on the Italian Campaign while continuing the

build-up for Overlord.160 Similarly, in a conference of the three Service Commanders-in-

Chief in the Mediterranean on 9 October, Eisenhower argued that “detachments from the

Italian command were not warranted and that we could and would do nothing about the

islands…[which] while of considerable strategic importance did not compare in military

value to success in the Italian battle.”161

Undaunted, Churchill continued to press his point, and the Americans became increasingly distrustful of British intentions for the date of Overlord. Moreover, after a

“gloomy report” from Alexander on the progress in Italy, George Marshall criticized

Alexander for not doing enough to use the weight of the resources he already had to make progress on the Italian Mainland. Secretary Stimson went so far as to accuse the British

158 G.A. Shepperd, The Italian Campaign 1943-45: A Political and Military re-assessment (New York: Praeger, 1968), 174-175. 159 David Fraser, Alanbrooke (London: Collins, 1982), 367. 160 Ibid. 161 Shepperd, The Italian Campaign, 175. 59

of playing “Dirty Baseball” in regards to the Mediterranean Theatre and their plans for

Overlord.162 In this tense atmosphere, rather than making an immediate strategic

decision, meetings of the Combined Chiefs and Big Three were planned for November in

Cairo and Tehran respectively.

With hindsight, it should have been considered good news for the Canadians that

a corps was not to be sent to Italy; the strategic objectives of the theatre were still in flux,

and in the current situation the Canadian Army was to fight in North-West Europe with a

full complement of two corps. Plus, Ralston and Stuart still had 1st Canadian Infantry

Division fighting in Italy, without running the risk of having the corps sucked into a

lengthy, attritional campaign. However, although Ralston was aware of what Brooke and

Nye had told McNaughton, rather than at this point realising that when the attack on

North-West Europe was launched Italy would become a secondary priority, and rather

than re-focusing on Canadians preparations for the cross-channel invasion, Ralston

continued to press for more Canadian units to Italy. On 15 September, he had Massey deliver a message to Churchill:

McNaughton advises that in conversation with the C.I.G.S. it appeared that now no likelihood of additional Canadian Division or Corps H.Q. being sent out on account of shipping situation. He does indicate however it is contemplated that seven divisions be returned to U.K. provided situation in Mediterranean permits…May we ask that further, and we strongly hope favourable, consideration be given to formulating arrangements which will make this [deployment of I Corps] possible. It occurs to us that shipping being used for return of troops to U.K. might be utilized on outward trip for transport of Canadians.”163

162 Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 293-294. 163 Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain, Telegram 1631, 15 September 1943, DEA/41s in Hilliker, Documents on Canadian External Relations. 60

Churchill responded that he had done his best to move a corps headquarters and division

to the Mediterranean, but this could only be done at the expense of either the building-up

for Overlord or the Pacific Theatre. “Either alternative would involve disturbing

decisions taken as recently as the Quebec Conference without any military justification

which was not valid when [the] Conference took place. Even if I felt it right to press our

friends [the Americans] in the matter I am sure they would not agree.” He did, however, assure them that “if at some future date it should become possible to despatch a second division and Corps Headquarters to the Mediterranean without interfering with operations already agreed upon, we will not hesitate to do so.”164 Stuart held so little hope that on 29

September he asked McNaughton to consider replacing Simonds as General Officer

Commanding 1st Canadian Infantry Division, so that another Canadian officer could get

battle experience.165 Prompted by Massey’s letter, however, Churchill agreed to “have another try.”166

The Canadian entreaties came at the right moment. On 7 October, Brooke

announced to the Canadians that it might be possible after all to swap a Canadian corps

for 30th British Corps headquarters and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division for the 7th

Armoured Division. 167 He would later explain to Alexander that his decision was made

primarily because the planning for Overlord included an airborne drop, which

164 Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Telegram 143, 19 September 1943, DEA/41s. 165 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 83- 84. 166 High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Telegram 2343, 30 September 1943, DEA/41s. 167 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 83- 85. 61

necessitated the return of four, rather than three, experienced British divisions from Italy

to prepare for Normandy—the 50th, 51st, 7th Armoured, and 1st Airborne Divisions, along

with 30th Corps headquarters. The planning for Overlord thus provided a military

justification—in addition to the political pressure by the Canadians—to allocate the

shipping necessary to take a Canadian division to the Mediterranean Theatre.168

McNaughton selected Harry Crerar’s 1st Canadian Corps and the 5th Canadian

Armoured Division for the operation.169 The terms of the “swap” were expanded to

include equipment; the 30th Corps and “Desert Rats” would leave their equipment in Italy

for the Canadians, and vice versa. This decision limited the number of transport ships

required for the move. On 12 October, Churchill wrote to Mackenzie King formally

requesting that 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division be sent to the

Mediterranean.170

Ralston and the Canadian government eagerly accepted Brooke’s proposal.

However, in their haste, albeit consistent with their decision-making approach of the

previous months, they never determined whether the plan to swap equipment was in fact

a feasible one—whether the 30th Corps and 7th Armoured Division had enough equipment to bring 1st Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division to meet the Canadian

establishment. Nor did Ralston question the condition of the British equipment which had

been in action for months, compared to the Canadian kit, which was new. This

168 Brooke to Alexander, 19 October 1943, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/13. 169 Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 83- 85. 170 “Employment of Canadian Army in the Mediterranean,” 7 October 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol 58. 62

information was available, had he asked for it.171 As early as August, Allied Forces

Headquarters (AFHQ) in North Africa had been sending regular reports on equipment to the War Office indicating that serious equipment deficiencies were emerging. After tough

fighting in the desert, the 7th Armoured Division had been re-equipped from the kit of the

1st Armoured Division.172 Thereafter, Eighth Army did not have the supplies to re-equip

1st Armoured Division and Montgomery concluded that the only answer was to send

more equipment from the U.K.173 “No progress in re-equipment on account [of] higher

operational requirements,” reported AFHQ.174 The 7th Armoured Division, which was to

give the Canadians its equipment, had fought through North Africa, and had been re-

fitted with the hand-me-downs of another heavily-experienced division.

Basic equipment shortages were made more difficult by the confused

administrative situation facing Eighth Army. Montgomery informed Alexander on 7

October that unless he received ten more General Transport companies, he could not

advance to Rome.175 He recorded that he had at least 500 vehicles waiting for new

engines, but no heavy repair shops had been set up in Italy yet, and so the vehicles all had

to be sent back to North Africa. This problem was compounded by the fact that 15th

Army Group General Headquarters (GHQ) was still located at Algiers with only a

171 “Employment of Canadian Army in the Mediterranean,” August-November 1943, Ibid. 172 War Material and Equipment – Tank Situation, AFHQ to WO, 5 August 1943, TNA WO 193/540. 173 Ibid. 174 War Material and Equipment – Tank Situation, AFHQ to WO,, 16 August 1943, TNA WO 193/540. 175 “Montgomery’s diary notes on a meeting with General Alexander, 7 October 1943.” Bernard Montgomery, Montgomery and the Eighth Army: A Selection from the Diaries, Correspondence and other Papers of Field Marshall The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, August 1942 to December 1943, ed. Stephen Brookes (London: Bodley Head for the Amery Records Society, 1991), 298. 63

forward base in Italy, making it slow to respond to the changing situation at the front.176

“The whole situation of the Allied Forces in Italy requires to be considered most carefully

in the light of what is possible, and what is not possible,” Montgomery implored

Alexander. “The land armies have got to capture the Rome line; they cannot do it unless

they are supplied with all their needs so that they can operate efficiently. A small

weapon, properly supplied and sustained, is better than a big weapon which is starved of

its needs.”177

Ralston did not ask for reports or assessments on the state of equipment in Italy

before approving the idea of the swap. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that when 1st Canadian Infantry Division had moved from England to Italy, the Canadian

Army pooled its ordnance supply chain with that of the British to increase efficiency and

economy of scale. This dealt with items like wireless radios and battle dress, while

vehicles and ancillary equipment were to be issued through Canadian supply channels. It

remained for the integrated supply depots to try and equip Canadian units with Canadian-

made equipment.178 Plus, 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Italy was being refitted

through Eighth Army supply chains, establishing the precedent that the British equip in

theatre Canadian forces through British supply chains. This made sense. Perhaps Ralston

trusted that the same efficiency and arrangements would be made regarding 1st Canadian

Corps. Even if that was the case, however, Ralston still agreed to the equipment swap without ensuring equipment was available in Italy, when considerable evidence existed to

176 “Montgomery’s diary notes on administration problems in Italy, 27 September 1943,” Ibid., 293. 177 “Montgomery’s diary notes on a meeting with General Alexander, 7 October 1943,” Ibid.,298-299. Emphasis in original. 178 “English Trip, July-Aug 1943: Civil Administration, Canadian Officers (#14) in CMHQ Meeting,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 65. 64

the contrary. Considering that it is necessary for strategic decision makers to work within

the confines of the possible, and that weapons procurement is a major part of the Minister

of National Defence’s role, Ralston seems in this instance to have been flirting

dangerously with incompetence.

Brooke certainly deserves criticism for the way he handled Ralston. He did not

give this information to the Canadians. Under extreme pressure from Churchill and the

Canadians, Brooke did not offer a feasibility assessment of the plan to swap the corps and

divisions.179 While Ralston was so focused on pushing his agenda he neglected to do due diligence, Brooke was pressured from all sides and did not volunteer any information on

the state of equipment in theatre. Certainly this cannot be considered a responsible

dialogue among partners, where political objectives were considered within the limits

imposed by the greater demands of the war.

This chain of events encapsulates Canada’s leaders’ seemingly confused and often

contradictory decision making. Canada, a country that forwent any chance to participate

in strategy, made an operational decision based primarily on political motives. In his zeal

to battle-harden a corps somewhere, anywhere Ralston was willing to sacrifice one of the

key tenets of Canada’s nearly four year old wartime policy—a homogenous, national

army headquarters. But leaping at the opportunity to go to Italy without first

understanding Britain’s changing wartime strategy suggests Ralston’s decision was

largely reactive and ill-informed. While fault must certainly be allocated to the British,

and Brooke in particular, for providing Canadians with limited and at times contradictory

179 See Ralston Papers Vol. 58 and 64. 65

information regarding grand strategy, as much blame must be given to Ralston. Thanks to

McNaughton and his sources in Britain, Ralston was made aware—at least in general terms—of the limits of shipping on Allied strategy, the potential role for First Canadian

Army in the cross-channel invasion, and the very real possibility that if a Canadian corps was sent to the Mediterranean it could be there indefinitely. Even Canadian reporter

Grant Dexter knew what was at stake. Hearing the rumours on 21 October, he wrote that

“Once this fifth division goes south, there will be no further allocations to the

Mediterranean. The rest of the Canadian army will take part in the cross-channel invasion. Our army, therefore, will be split in two. As far as can be seen, the split will last out the war.” 180

However, once Ralston made up his mind that operational experience was

necessary, he put little stock in either how the decision would affect Allied strategy, or how strategy would affect the decision. As a result, he had decided to split the Canadian

Army and send a corps to Italy before the Combined Chiefs of Staff had even made up their minds to invade the Italian mainland, let alone what the strategic and operational objectives of the campaign would be. Ralston cared only if the Allies would fight in Italy, without considering the purposes or length of the campaign, the shipping challenges of getting the Canadians to or from the theatre, or the equipment allocations for AFHQ.

The unfortunate culmination of this thinking was Ralston’s decision to send 1st

Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division to Italy on the basis of an equipment swap,

180 Grant Dexter, Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945, ed. Frederick W. Gibson and Barbara Robertson (Winnipeg: The Manitoba Record Society, 1994), 445.

without first determining whether equipment would be available for the Canadians once

they arrived, despite the fact that the War Office had information indicating that there

was not enough reliable equipment. Ralston charged ahead without knowing what he had

committed Canadian forces to. His single-mindedness blinded him to seeing the full

picture. That throughout this period the Minister could have demanded so little

information, when the fate of a full corps of men was at stake, is incredible. Of course

Allied strategy was in flux throughout this period, but that was all the more reason for

Ralston to be regularly informed and proceed cautiously until he had the full picture.

Only in that way, could his decisions could be grounded in detailed, up-to-date information about Allied grand strategy, about the strategic objectives of the Italian

Campaign, and about the equipment allotments provided to achieve those objectives.

Instead, Canada’s decision to send 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured

Division to Italy was based on generalities formed from rumour and often obsolete or

marginally accurate information. By November the Canadians were en route to Italy. The

army was split and the survival of First Canadian Army headquarters was in jeopardy, with no promise that the corps would be returned to England in time for the invasion of

Normandy.

CHAPTER TWO

“Practical and Effective Operational Command”: Establishing the Anglo-Canadian Operational Relationship

Leading the 1st Canadian Corps to Italy was General Officer Commanding H.D.G.

“Harry” Crerar. On 24 October 1943, four years into the war, Crerar arrived in the

Mediterranean Theatre as the first Canadian corps commander in a theatre of war since

1918. There was an historic importance to Crerar’s position. So too, did history—in both the long and short-terms—define Crerar’s political mandate, the parameters of his command, and his relationship with British Eighth Army. Indeed, Crerar served two masters: the Canadian government and Eighth Army. It was a unique position which made the British uncomfortable; even though they recognized the importance of having

Commonwealth troops in their battle order, they felt their operational flexibility was limited by having to work with an indivisible Commonwealth corps. An examination of the political, legislative, and operational contexts within which the Canadians and British were operating in 1943 demonstrates the difficulty of Crerar’s position. The Canadians could not separate their desire for immediate operational experience from the government’s political interest in seeing 1st Canadian Corps fight as a unified, indivisible corps—meaning that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 5th Canadian Armoured

Division were to remain under Crerar’s command for the duration of the campaign. The

British, meanwhile, preferred not to work with “national commanders” at the corps level.

It was a clash of politics and military expediency, derived from Canada’s historic precedent, and the lessons of the war thus far.

When 1st Canadian Corps left for Italy in the fall of 1943, the looming

consequences of the Canadian government’s strategic immaturity had yet to be realised.

Instead, the government had every reason to believe that the corps could and would

successfully fulfil their political and operational objectives for deployment. In the first

place, the legal and organisational framework for the Anglo-Canadian alliance had been

codified in the spring and summer of 1942. The framework dated back to the Boer War,

when a contingent of Canadian volunteers had been deployed to South Africa to fight

under British operational command, while still remaining responsible to the Canadian

government for administrative matters. The dual chain of command became the Canadian

way of contributing to Imperial forces, without having the country’s militiamen simply absorbed into the British Army.181 The same system was used during the Great War,

when the Canadian Corps battled through the trenches on the Western Front. As the war

stretched on and Canadian casualty figures mounted, having all four Canadian divisions

fighting together under the Canadian Corps headquarters was a visible reminder to

Canadians at home that they were fighting their own war, not Britain’s. When in 1917

Canadian Arthur Currie assumed command of the corps, he was able to use his political

leverage to protect the corps when he believed it was being misused by the British. Two

well-known examples came in 1917 and 1918, when Currie demanded concessions from

Field Marshall Douglas Haig before he was willing to fight his corps at Passchendaele.

During the German Spring Offensive in 1918, he appealed to the Canadian government to

181 Bernd Horn and Ronald G. Haycock, “The Primacy of National Command: Boer War Lessons Learned,” in The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006): 147. 69

have his divisions re-united under his command, after the panicked British Army had

stripped him of them in order to plug holes in the line during the German advance. Plus,

by maintaining a homogenous, indivisible Canadian corps with equipment provided by

the Canadian government, the corps was able to integrate lessons learned at a fast pace

with more equipment per unit than the British could muster.182 Currie had the power to

resist British pressure to reduce his brigades from four to three battalions to sustain

reinforcements, and instead broke up the 5th Canadian Infantry Division. Ultimately, the

Canadian Corps emerged from the First World War as an integral part of the British

Expeditionary Force, while asserting Canada’s independence from Britain. As Stephen

Harris has argued, “it is clear that by the end of the First World War the idea there was something approaching a distinctive Canadian way of war was widely accepted. Quite simply, guided by the twin notions that men were more valuable than shells, and that men could be trusted to know what they were about to do, General Sir Arthur Currie, his staff, and those leading his divisions, brigades and battalions, had the critical mass, the shared collective tactical experience, and the conscious self-confidence and will to do things the way they wanted and, in doing so, to do them better than most.”183 The successes and

sacrifice of the corps on the battlefield had given Prime Minister Robert Borden the clout

and confidence to demand the passage of Resolution IX from the Imperial War Council,

which recognised the Dominions as autonomous nations within an Imperial

182 See Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). 183 Stephen J. Harris, “A Canadian Way of War: 1919 to 1939.” In The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest, ed. Col. Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006), 196. 70

Commonwealth, and secured an independent seat for Canada at the Paris Peace

Conference.

In the inter-war period, the role of Canada within the Empire remained a central concern for successive Canadian governments. Two years after the Statue of Westminster

(1931) granted the Dominions formal control over their foreign policies, the Visiting

Forces Act was signed as a framework for future Anglo-Commonwealth military cooperation. At that time, McNaughton was Chief of the General Staff, and thus

Canada’s voice at the intergovernmental discussions in the UK that mapped the act. He

“emphasized that the proposed legislation should make it clear that Dominion forces were as much ‘His Majesty’s Forces’ as those of the United Kingdom.”184 The Canadian

Forces and British Forces in cooperation would be legally equal partners working

together. Ultimately, the Visiting Forces Act established the relationship by which

Canadian and British forces would work together in any future conflict. The militaries

could be designated as “serving together,” in which case they were “essentially independent of each other”; they could also be put “in combination,” where unified command would give the force commander wide powers over multiple commonwealth countries.185 When Prime Minister R.B. Bennett signed the Act in April 1933, he

believed that the commander of a combined force would be named by an Imperial War

Cabinet, in which the Canadian Government would be represented.186

184 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 211. 185 Ibid., 212. 186 J.M. Hitsman, “The Visiting Forces Act 1941-4: Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 180,” 18 September 1986, 5. 71

However, upon the outbreak of war in 1939, Mackenzie King was unwilling to

press for the influence that Borden had demanded on an Imperial decision making body

in exchange for Canadian contribution. When the Visiting Forces Act was re-assessed in

1939, the Canadians agreed only that the commander of any joint force would possess his

power of command by appointment of the King, upon the advice of both the Canadian

and British governments.187 An Anglo-Canadian conference in April, 1941, confirmed that “the Canadian government would wish to make a submission to the King in regard to

this appointment [of Commander-in-Chief], and that the validity of lower appointments

to command Armies, Corps, etc., would flow from it.”188 Sub-commanders would thus

also legally be appointees of the King.

In 1941, the fighting in the Middle East prompted South Africa to request from

the British government that their commanders be given the default authority to command

any British troops that might be added to their ranks. The tempo of ongoing operations

was threatened by the need to obtain political approval every time mixed-units were

established. On 18 December 1941, an Order-in-Council was issued by the British

Government, giving any officer from Canada, Australia, New Zealand or South Africa

the default right “to be [named] officers commanding a combined force, or any part

thereof, as the case may be,” with authority over the British troops under their command.

Complementary action was taken by the South African government, and the British asked

that Canada issue a similar order.189

187 Ibid. 188 Ibid., 5. 189 Ibid., 7-8. 72

The implications of an agreement that allowed default command to be approved

in the field would be far reaching, as it was different in law and spirit than the original

Visiting Forces Act, which J.E. Read, King’s Council to the Department of External

Affairs explained as follows: “we have been assuming that…where the Canadian Corps is designated to act in combination with the Home Army in England, we consider that the

Officer Commanding the Home Army is an Officer appointed by the King to command a combined forces.” The changed British viewpoint would thus “throw doubt upon…the

[legal] position of Canadian forces serving in places like Hong Kong, and the Near

East.”190 When the British issued their order-in-council, they effectively and unilaterally

voided previous arrangements with the Canadians, and thus the onus was on the Canadian

government to either issue reciprocal orders, or propose a new legal command

relationship.

Establishing a legal basis for operational cooperation between British and

Canadian units became more urgent in the spring of 1942. Thanks primarily to the savvy

maneuverings of then-Chief of the General Staff Harry Crerar, the Canadian contingent

in England had expanded into a two-corps Army.191 Planning for an operational role for

that army had begun—in the short-term for the raid on Dieppe, and in the long-term for the cross-channel invasion.192 The promise of an operational role for Canadian forces

within a British Expeditionary Force on the continent demanded that the command

relationship of the Visiting Forces Act be clarified.

190 Read to CMHQ, 26 December 1941, Ibid., 8-9. 191 See Paul D. Dickson, “The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of First Canadian Army, 1940-41,” in The Journal for Military History 60 (April 1996): 271-98. 192 “High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs,” Telegram 1630, 15 June 1942, W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Vol. 329. 73

The Australian experience during these months served as a warning to the

Canadian government and military as to what could happen if the legal position of

Canada’s forces was not expertly managed. Numerous problems plagued the Anglo-

Australian relationship during the Second World War, and a few of these issues caught

the attention of the Canadians.193 Indeed, McNaughton’s concerns over the legal status of

the Canadian army were “prompted by the experience of the U.K., Australian and South

African forces in Libya.”194 Australian forces were used for six months in 1941 to

garrison Tobruk, and Australian Generals Leslie Morshead and Thomas Blamey

eventually had to use the Australian government to pressure Commander-in-Chief Middle

East Command Claude Auchinleck to relieve their beleaguered forces. The political battle over the fate of the “Tobruk Rats” had come on the heels of the disastrous Greek

Campaign (April 1941), which resulted in the capture of over 5000 Australian soldiers.

GOC 1st Australian Corps Thomas Blamey was informed of the expedition only after

planning had already begun, and was not consulted on which Australian troops should be

used in the campaign, even though his charter from the Australian government stated that

his consent was necessary before any part of the Australian Imperial Force could be

detached from his command.195 To top it all off, Blamey—known for his hard-drinking

and womanising—was not considered by the British as a possible commander for the

193 The reverse was not really true. In August 1941, Australia’s Minister of the Army Mr. Spender, was “unaware of whether Canadian troops had fought in the Middle East, but he thought they had taken part in the evacuation from France.” “Army and the Air Force: Co-operation Plans,” The Age, 28 August 1941, Department of Defence Co-Ordination, "G.O.C. in C., Australia--Sir Ivan Mackay," National Archives of Australia: A 5954/69, 260/12. 194 Canmilitry to Defensor, 20 June 1942, quoted in Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 216. 195 Joan Beaumont, Australia’s War 1939-45 (St. Leonards: Allen&Unwin, 1996), 12-14. 74

combined force, despite the large number of Australian troops involved. 196 Instead,

British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson was given command. Blamey expressed his frustration with the British in March, 1941:

It is clear that, broadly speaking, the fighting is the province of the Dominion troops, while supply and Line of Communication is the main function of the British … But experience has taught me to look with misgivings on a situation where British leaders have control of considerable bodies of first class Dominion troops while Dominion commanders are excluded from all responsibility in control, planning and policy.197

Similar sentiment was espoused by members of the Australian government, who were increasingly distrustful and even virulent in their analyses of British leadership. In

April 1941, the Dominions Office reported that one member of the Australian Advisory

War Council, a bi-partisan committee that made recommendations to the Australian government on military policy, “was particularly vehement, declaring that ‘when our troops were thrown into battle in Greece they lacked almost all essential equipment’ demanding that the United Kingdom Government should be told in unambiguous language ‘that never again will Australian soldiers be allowed to fight in such unfavourable circumstances’ and declaring that the responsibility fell on Mr.

Churchill.”198 McNaughton hoped to avoid a similar situation when the Canadian Army was in action.

Having watched from afar the problems in North Africa, Australia’s vulnerability—both existentially and within the Empire—was again highlighted in the spring of 1942 when controversy broke out between Churchill and Australian Prime

196 Beaumont, Australia’s War, 13. Considerable literature has been penned on the Australian experience in Tobruk and Greece. For a general overview see Beaumont, Australia’s War, 1-26. 197 Quoted in John Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, Selected Essays (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 206. 198 Report to the War Cabinet by Cranborne, August 21, 1941, TNA CAB 66/18/21. 75

Minister John Curtin over Richard Casey. Casey had headed Australia’s first legation in

Washington until resigning when Curtin’s government took office in October 1941.

Churchill then invited Casey to act as British Minister of State in the Middle East. The

“poaching” of an Australian diplomat in conflict with the current government was deemed contemptible by Australians, not least by Curtin, who saw it as a move to outflank the Australian government.199 Mackenzie King took a rather cynical view of the entire affair, which he divulged to Malcolm McDonald in March.

Churchill really wanted to be free of Australian representation in Britain altogether. He did not like Bruce, nor Earle Page, and was rather disgusted and a bit suspicious of Menzies. By getting Casey, he would have him nominally in the Cabinet but not on his back—far enough from London to be out of the way. It might appear he had consideration for Australian troops in the Middle East.200

King was acutely sensitive about Canadian sovereignty, and was—considering the

Australian experience—understandably skeptical of the way that the dominions’ interests were addressed by the Mother Country, believing that Churchill was “apt to forget their significance altogether.”201

King was also well aware of Australia’s military vulnerability. With Churchill’s assurance of protection, Australia had prioritised the Middle East over home defence in

199 Curtin wrote to Churchill on the matter, “I told you…that we did not desire change at Washington, and if new man of equal calibre could be secured it would take time for him to establish himself, and therefore desirable that no approach be made to Casey at the present time. However you persisted…and explained that while you were in America you had discussed with Casey his desire for change and therefore had no doubt that he would welcome the proposed appointment. I took this as a plain statement that you wanted Casey, and that Casey was eager. I may add that hours prior to Casey cabling me from San Francisco his acceptance of your offer, the B.B.C announced it to Australia. I learn what my minister has done from the world at large,” Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister, no date, internal evidence requires a date between March 17 and March 20, 1942, DO 35/1009/12. 200 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 21 March 1942. 201 Ibid. 76

1940 and despatched the 6th Australian Division to North Africa.202 However, the

Japanese offensive in the Pacific at the end of 1941, and the fall of Singapore in February

1942 had shifted the balance in the Far East. King knew it: “few realize what the loss of

that great strategic centre is going to mean in the western Pacific," he wrote in

February.203 Apparently Mackenzie King considered himself one of the “few,” along

with Churchill, the British War Office, and the entire population of Australia who sensed

the importance of the loss of Singapore. On 8 April 1942, Australian Foreign Minister

H.V. Evatt arrived in Canada and attended a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee.

Evatt had been sent to London and North America to garner support for Australia’s

defence.204 His country was weak, he told King, “having sent their men abroad, their

ships, equipment, munitions, etc.; lost large number of men, fleet half gone, and not being

able to get them back.”205 King felt “deeply moved” for Evatt and Australia, and believed

truly that they were “in a desperate position.”206 He questioned the danger to Canada, and

equated Australia’s, with Canada’s, vulnerability: “Australia, vis-à-vis Canada, was about

in the same position in the Atlantic as Britain was vis-à-vis Canada; that if Australia went, the whole of the Orient would be in the hands of the Japanese, and only an ocean

202 Graham Freudenberg, Churchill and Australia (Sydney: Macmillan, 2008), 210-211. 203 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 11 February 1942. 204 Evatt also encouraged the establishment of the Pacific War Committee, the first meeting of which was held in Washington on 1 April 1942. At the urging of Evatt and Roosevelt, Mackenzie King held the second meeting held on 15 April 1942. At the meeting Mackenzie King intimated that Canada would not send troops to Australia, although it would support their bid to alter Munitions Assignment Board allocations. He confirmed this position on 28 April. Galen Perras, “‘She Should Have Thought of Herself First’: Canada and Military Aid to Australia, 1939-45,” in Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century, ed. Margaret MacMillan and Francine McKenzie (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 134-135. 205 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 8 April 1942. 206 Ibid., 8 and 9 April 1942. 77

between us and them.”207 Evatt asked King to commit Canadian troops to Australian defence but after much deliberation, the Prime Minister declined, choosing instead to learn from the Australian experience, and keep his forces in Canada to bolster the defence

of the west coast. 208

In retrospect, the irony marking this period is unmistakeable. In Mackenzie

King’s eyes, the British had endangered Australia’s territorial defence for their own benefit, and he worried that if his government was not careful, Canada could suffer a similar fate. Yet, he consistently failed to see his own complicity by his not demanding a voice in British strategy. Britain did not simply “abandon” Australia out of malice or deception, but rather made a strategic assessment about where best to allocate their scarce resources; in the British strategic hierarchy, Singapore came third after North Africa and

Russia, which was first, and receiving the bulk of Allied aircraft through Lend Lease.209

With little sympathy for or strategic appreciation of the difficult British position,

Mackenzie King reflected on his meeting with Evatt:

I do not wonder he [Evatt] and his government have felt terribly distressed at the way in which the British Government have held back some of their forces which were to have been returned to Australia though Churchill himself had offered to allow them to be returned and subsequently sought to hold them back…There is danger of everything but the heart of the Empire being destroyed. Britain may save herself but lose the Empire through having used the latter too much to preserve for her own people and not giving sufficient thought to the peoples themselves. There has been too great centralization of power in London; too great monopoly of control of strategy and all else from there. Even

207 Ibid. 208 Galen Perras concludes that Mackenzie King mishandled this situation. He sent an unqualified Victor Odlum to Australia as Canada’s ambassador, who issued “convoluted statements” to the Australians which left them convinced that Canadian aid was forthcoming when, in fact, it was not. Perras, “‘She Should Have Thought of Herself First,’” 142-143. 209 See chapter seven, Abraham Roof, “The British Empire Before Sunset: Commonwealth Economic War Mobilisation, 1939-1942” (PhD Thesis, University of Calgary, Canada, 2014). 78

in Canada with our strong assertion of our own position, we have I think taken risks greater than we should have ever permitted ourselves to do.210

King’s own dismissal of strategic considerations makes his assessment of the Australian

situation tragically ironic.211 However, the confluence of the Anglo-Australian troubles of

1941-42, the anticipation of an overseas role for the Canadian forces, and the challenge to the chain of the command initiated by the South Africans, served to emphasize the need to confirm the legalities of the chain of command in operations involving the Dominions.

Plus, in the spring of 1942, King was forced to ask Canadians to release him from his pledge not to impose conscription. With the fall of Pearl Harbor and perceived threat to the Canadian west coast, the German victories in the Soviet Union, North Atlantic and

North Africa, and the manpower pressures of the rapidly expanding Canadian military and war industries, came a demand for overseas conscription from the Conservative Party and English Canadians more generally. Reluctantly, King held a plebiscite in April asking that Canadians release him from his pledge not to enact compulsory service. Even though the plebiscite only meant King could impose “conscription if necessary,” he expected that it would be unpopular in French Canada, especially at a time when

Canadians were volunteering in record numbers.212 On 27 April 1942, English Canada

voted solidly in favour of releasing Mackenzie King from his pledge, while French

210 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 9 April 1942. 211 This is not to say that Canada should have sent troops. A July 1942 appreciation by the Canadian Chief of Staff noted that under the terms of the United Nations Agreement, The Pacific Theatre was primarily an American responsibility, limiting Canada’s contribution to coastal defence from potential raids. “An Appreciation of the Military World Situation with Particular Regard to its effect on Canada, as of 31st July, 1942,” Appreciation – Canadian Military Effort 41-42, Ralston Papers, MG 27 III B11 Vol. 37. 212 J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977), 167. Fortunately for Mackenzie King, the political damage was mitigated by Conservative Party leader Arthur Meighen’s decision to criticise the plebiscite as not going far enough, thereby keeping French-Canadians safely supporting the Liberal Party. Ibid. 79

Canada voted “non”; 72.9% of Quebec voted against. Mackenzie King was “shaken by the outcome,” write Granatstein and Hitsman. He “felt very strongly that to keep Canada united we would have to do all in our power [to keep] from reaching the point where

[the] necessity for conscription overseas would arrive.”213

Absented from all strategy making circles, Canada’s only remaining avenue for attaining some independent control over the fate of its forces in the field was through the chain of command. Consequently, in the spring and summer of 1942 the Canadian government proceeded to clarify the meanings of the two operational arrangements defined by the Visiting Forces Act: “mutual cooperation” and “unified command.” When in the UK, the Anglo-Canadian staffs and units would work together through “mutual cooperation,” meaning that Canadian and British forces were essentially independent.

However, the Canadians would “be entirely agreeable to correlate training with operational plans.”214 It was a system of voluntary cooperation for joint planning and training, whereby the Canadians chose to cooperate with British Home Forces while retaining legal authority over their own troops. In the event of an emergency such as the invasion of Britain, the Canadian commander had the legal authority under the War

Measures Act to assign its troops to fight in combination with British forces.215

Contingencies for unity of command stated that when a Canadian force was part of a British Expeditionary Force on the continent, the British Commander would hold

213 Mackenzie King diary entry, Quoted in Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 171. 214 High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Telegram 1980, 1 August 1942, W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Vol. 329, 215 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 212. 80

wide operational powers over the Canadian forces.216 In discussions between First

Canadian Army and NDHQ and their legal advisors in June 1942, it was decided that the

Commander-in-Chief of a Combined Force would be designated an appointee of the

Canadian Government.217 Plus, the senior Canadian officer in the field had the “right of

reference” to the Canadian government on any matter that appeared to conflict with the

goals and policies of the Canadian government, which could include the removal of

Canadian divisions from the Canadian Corps headquarters. 218 This had happened during

Exercise “Victor” of 1940, when the British Commander-in Chief ignored the protests of

acting Corps Commander Victor Odlum, and took two Canadian divisions from the

Canadian corps and attached them to British units.219

There were obvious implications for British operational flexibility in the nature of the Canadian instructions; most important was which issues the Canadian Commanderss could refer to the government. The Dominions Office (DO) tried to mitigate the potential operational damage of such a right, by limiting it to general assignments, thereby preserving the chain of command during ongoing operations. The DO wrote to

Mackenzie King that,

It is assumed that…approval of the Senior Canadian Combatant Officer overseas is required only for the general task assigned to the Canadian Forces and not for more detailed tasks or plans arising in the course of operations. The latter interpretation would be inconsistent with the placing of the Canadian Forces under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief British Expeditionary Force…It is therefore suggested that this point should be met by substituting for “Senior Canadian Combatant Officer” overseas in

216 Ibid. 217 McNaughton to NDHQ, 20 June 1942, in Hitsman, “The Visiting Forces Act 1941-4,” 12. 218 Ibid., 13. 219 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 215. 81

the last line of the paragraph “Senior Canadian Combatant Officer with the combined force.”220

Read was unwilling to consent to this interpretation. “It is my personal opinion,” he wrote to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson on 19 August—the morning that over 900 Canadians lives were lost at Dieppe—“that we should insist on

[the] acceptance of…Canadian control of details of tactical employment and Canadian control of training. If we give in…our concession would lead to friction between

Canadian and British Commanders and would impair the practical and effective operational command established by our proposals.”221 The Senior Combatant Officer

(SCO) needed to have the right of reference to the Canadian government on any issue, to

“merely be given powers de jure which General Currie assumed in the last war de facto.”222 The Cabinet War Committee agreed, but promised that such reference would be avoided “on issues capable of being settled between commanders in the field.”223 As

Massey articulated:

We are confident that the policy advanced by the Canadian Government of reserving to its Commanders the approval on its behalf of all tasks or plans arising in the course of operations will not prejudice the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief British Expeditionary Force. It is to be realised that the Canadian Service authorities are responsible to the Government and the people of Canada for the forces entrusted to their commands, and accordingly it is clear that a corresponding measure of authority and discretion must be accorded those so responsible.224

220 High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Telegram 1980, 1 August 1942, W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Vol. 329. 221 High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Telegram 1987, 3 August 1942, Ibid. 222 High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Telegram 2071, 14 August 1942, Ibid. 223 Extracts from Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee, 19 August 1942, LAC RG 2 7C, PCO. 224 Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1 August 1942, Telegram 1980, W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Vol. 329. 82

The government’s position on British-Canadian relations was not changed by the debacle at Dieppe, which neither the government nor Canadian high command had a hand in planning. The final decision on the Visiting Forces Act was made on 19

August.225 With little other choice, Dominions Secretary Clement Attlee accepted the

Canadian terms, and “the Canadian Government’s view that no practical difficulties will arise in the association of United Kingdom and Canadian troops against the enemy.”226

Formal Dominions Office acceptance came on 9 September. The Canadian government would protect its national interests by maintaining ultimate operational control over its forces when in a theatre of war—a necessary command and control arrangement for any sovereign power. But the country would do so while being a good ally within the British chain of command, by promising that they would not enact the right of reference afforded them unless absolutely necessary.

These legal rights were not to be taken for granted, and when Crerar was deployed to Italy in October 1943 in command of 1st Canadian Corps, it was both his right and responsibility to establish the Anglo-Canada command relationship as per the terms of the Visiting Forces Act. On 20 October, McNaughton issued a directive to

Crerar, giving him command over the employment and administration of Canadian troops in the Italian Theatre. 227 He also wrote to Alexander, and told him that Canadian formations would come under his command, and that authority would “then be vested in

[him] to place them under [the] com[man]d [of] Armies, Corps or other formations

225 Extracts from Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee, 9 September 1942. 226 High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Telegram 2202, 4 September 1942, W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Vol. 329. 227Montague, CofS, Undersecretary of State, (Attn CIGS) War Office, SW 1. Relationship to AFHQ of Canadian Troops in Italy. Crerar Papers, LAC MG 30 E 157 Vol. 3. 83

subordinate to [him] and forming part of [his] command as may be appropriate to the operational tasks contemplated, and to delegate the powers conferred on you as you may deem appropriate.” Order of Detail No. 8 placed Canadian troops ‘in combination’ with

British forces in the Mediterranean.228 1st Canadian Corps was under the command of 15th

Army Group, which put them under the operational command of Eighth Army, although

training and discipline would remain under Canadian jurisdiction.

Two weeks later, Crerar was further instructed that in his capacity as national

commander, he was to immediately administer Canadian policy in theatre. “All officers

commanding [Canadian] formations or units in the Mediterranean theatre from time to

time not serving under your direct com[an]d are hereby ordered to continue to follow

your wishes in respect to matters of [Canadian] policy and [Canadian] business,” Crerar

was told.229 As such, he informed Canadian units to keep regular and direct contact with him, “if unnecessary difficulties for me are to be avoided in my co-ordination and direction of [Canadian] policies and business.”230 Any order which seemed at variance

with Canadian policy was to be submitted to Crerar, as were promotions and

appointments including and above the rank of Major.231

The corollary was that Crerar also sought to bring all Canadian units in theatre under his command. He requested that Canadian units keep him informed generally as to the activities of the Canadian forces in Italy, “in order that progress to set up the

[Canadian] forces in the Mediterranean theatre as a Corps under my command may be

228 Directive by the Senior combatant Officer of the Canadian Military Forces Serving in the United Kingdom or The Continent of Europe, 20 October 1943, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 229 Memorandum, Main HQ 1 Cdn Corps, 16 November 1943, Crerar Papers, Vol. 1. 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid. 84

facilitated.”232 From his arrival in Italy, then, it was Crerar’s intention was to administer and command a Canadian corps comprised of two Canadian divisions. His challenges were unmistakable: as Canadian national commander in the Mediterranean Theatre he was to protect Canadian political interests in the field; and yet, those political interests were primarily to establish and maintain the authority of the national commander in the field.

Crerar’s second major objective was to lead the 1st Canadian Corps into action as soon as possible. This was Ralston’s major interest as well. He had articulated as much to

Mackenzie King, Brooke, and McNaughton on more than one occasion, saying that his goals were to get, “a. Corps HQ experience; b. Battle experience for troops; c. [improve] morale of Canadian Army generally and troops overseas particularly; d. [improve] public morale as well.”233

Crerar too craved battle experience. He had been advocating getting battle experience from at least 1942 onward and for a short period indicated he would take a temporary demotion to command a division in battle.234 While Crerar had been kept at arms-length from the discussions between Ralston, Stuart and McNaughton about getting

1st Canadian Corps to Italy, it had not prevented him from voicing an opinion about his urgent need for battle experience. By mid-September Crerar had taken to petitioning his

British superiors directly. Meeting with Brooke on the 15th, he chastised the CIGS for not

232 Ibid. 233 Ralston/Stuart/McNaughton Thursday, 29 July 1943, “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean area and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” Ralston Papers, LAC MG 27 III B II Vol. 64. Ralston told this to Brooke, and later to Churchill in a private meeting on 1 August. The Prime Minister had “sympathized with our reasons for more active participation.” Ibid. “Walk With Prime Minister” Sunday, 1 August 1943. 234 Paul Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 211. 85

allowing the Canadians to be “sufficiently in the limelight”, making Brooke “quite

angry.”235 Two days later, Crerar recommended to McNaughton that, as a matter of

policy, arrangements should be made for himself and a selection of officers to gain field

knowledge and experience with Eighth Army, because it was likely “if the sequence of

events follows a normal course” that his corps headquarters would “be engaged in

operational responsibilities before HQ Canadian Army” and therefore “steps for our

practical education should now be taken.”236 He expressed the same sentiment to

Montgomery, writing that he had,

several times put it to Andy that I should have personal experience. I believe that I could run a good show in modern battle but I would like to test out these beliefs by practical experience. In fairness to those whom I might command in battle, it seems to me an essential personal preparation. However, there always seem to be some reason why this ambition cannot be fulfilled.237

His eagerness was not without cause. He had not been in action since his time as artillery

officer in the First World War, let alone commanded a higher formation in the Second.

Taken together, Crerar’s objectives were to establish his corps headquarters, and

eventually group all Canadian units in theatre under his command; 238 then he was to get it into action, all the while maintaining effective communication and relations with his

British superiors and counterparts, and asserting his authority and responsibility to the

Canadian government as the nation’s ranking officer in theatre.

235Brooke’s diary entry for 15 September 1943, Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 453. 236 Crerar to McNaughton, 17 September 1943, “Miscellaneous Corresp Command 1 Cdn Army/Comm 1 Cdn Corps April 42-Sep 43,” Crerar Papers, Vol. 2. 237 “Corresp-Gen HDG Crerar and F.M. Montgomery, d/3 Feb 1942/14 July 1945,” 20 September 1943. LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,651. 238 Administration and Organization Period Nov 43-Feb 44. Channels of Communication CFM, “Administrative Memorandum Number 79,” 28 November 1943, Crerar Papers, Vol. 1. 86

The experiences of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Sicily seemed to indicate that on the divisional level the system worked, and that these objectives were attainable.

The “Old Red Patch” had fit fairly seamlessly into Eighth Army. They bought into the so- called “Montgomery Method,” in which he relied on the division as the operational backbone. “Divisions must fight as divisions and under their own commanders with clear-cut tasks and definite objectives,” wrote Montgomery, “only in this way will full value be got from the great fighting power of a Division, and only in this way will concentration of effort and co-operation of all arms be really effective.”239

240 Figure 1: Sicily, 10 July-17 August 1943

239 Training Memorandum No. 1, 30 August 1942, quoted in David French, Raising Churchill’s Armies: The British Army and the War against Germany 1939-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 255. 240 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, Map I, insert p. 65. 87

General Officer Commanding 1st Canadian Infantry Division Guy Simonds was one of Montgomery’s protégés, and he and his brigade commanders fought the “Monty method” in Sicily, with calculated staff plans and an artillery-based attack doctrine.241 In

the first two weeks of the Sicilian Campaign, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division advanced

on the left flank of the Eighth Army, chasing German fighting retreats while the main

battle was fought on the Catania plain. By 22 July, Montgomery realised that the

Germans intended to hold a defensive position around Mount Etna while they organised a

retreat to the mainland. As the Catania advance was stunted, Montgomery switched the

axis of advance to 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s front, and augmented the division

with the 231 (Malta) Brigade. An attack on the mountain-top town of Agira was the

Canadians’ first assault on a dug-in German defensive position, and Simonds’ plan was right out of the Montgomery playbook. The division fought a multi-phased attack that was orchestrated by artillery-barrages and air support, through the German defensive lines in-depth, “Lion,” “Tiger,” and “Grizzly.”

From the view of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, the operation fell short of its objectives, especially in its first phase. The artillery barrage proved ineffective, and the

air support was late, meaning most of the heavy lifting was left to the infantry, who

suffered from communications breakdowns. Altogether, this resulted in delays and heavy

casualties, leading historian Bill McAndrew to conclude that the Anglo-Canadian attack

doctrine limited manoeuvre and flexibility, and immobilized the attack through a failure

241 Under Montgomery’s South Eastern command in England, the Canadians had become well-versed in his attack doctrine. See John English, The Canadians in Normandy: A Study of Failure in High Command , (New York: Praeger, 1991). 88

in communications.242 Yet, the ultimate success of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade in

capturing their objectives suggested otherwise to Simonds. Two infantry companies

supported by armour advanced on “Tiger,” directed by the tactical HQ of brigade

commander Bert Hoffmeister—an innovation of the desert campaign that had become a

standard by El Alamein to help enable quick command decisions and enable

communications.243 When the advance stalled, the Canadians waited for support, but,

showing commendable innovation, they skillfully manoeuvred around the German

defences. While following a calculated plan, the Canadians still reacted swiftly to the

Germans, and Hoffmeister, from his Tac HQ, was able to make quick decisions to push

the advance forward. In the end, as Doug Delaney concludes, the “assault on Agira was a

2 CIB triumph.”244 The commanders of 1st Canadian Infantry Division had been trained

in, and knew how to fight, a doctrine stressing calculated planning and heavy artillery, as

well as when to take the initiative.

Not only did Montgomery allow the Canadians to gain the battlefield experience they craved, he also allowed them the time to train and absorb the lessons learned. He wrote Crerar in late July that although the Canadians “were a bit soft when they landed here [Sicily] and had too many fat officers and men… I decided to give them two days rest in reserve. That did them good; I then put them in the lead on the left flank and they have never looked back since.”245 The gruelling attack on Agira proved costly, incurring

242 William J. McAndrew, “Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily – 1943,” Military Affairs, 51:3 (1987): 144. 243 French, Raising Churchill’s Armies, 249. 244 Douglas Delaney, The Soldiers’ General: Bert Hoffmeister at War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 65. 245 “Corresp – Gen HDG Crerar and F.M. Montgomery, d/3 Feb 1942/14 Jul 1945,” 23 July 1943. 89

438 casualties,246 and although the division fought a few other important engagements,

by mid-August it was worn out and pulled out of the line for rest and re-fit.247

As lessons were absorbed by 1st Canadian Infantry Division, they were also

transmitted to the army in England in extracts from the war diaries and operational

reports sent by the 1st Canadian Infantry Division historical officer, Gus Sesia to Colonel

Stacey, Historical Officer, CMHQ. Stacey synthesized and circulated Sesia’s communiqués to the formations still training in England. These “Extracts” were not official training memoranda, but were intended to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of army doctrine, such that it could be taught most effectively or adapted as necessary. It was left up to individual commanders to decide how much stock to put into these reports, and they were sought after.248

In other ways, too, Eighth Army’s set-piece attack doctrine was crucial to the

Canadian war effort, as it was the British. As Delaney argues, “whereas full mobilisation

had exhausted British human resources and made manpower-conservation a principle of

British doctrine, the spectre of conscription did the same for the Canadians.”249 When the

British manpower crunch started to be felt in 1940, Churchill’s answer was to economise

the “tail” of their divisions. “The establishment of an infantry division was 15,500 men,

yet only 6,740 of them were front line infantrymen. In Churchill’s opinion there was too

much ‘fluff and flummery behind the fighting troops’”250 It also meant that the British

246 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 134. 247 “Points Raised at Study Group by OFFRS of 14 CTR and ANSWERS by Officers of 12 CTR,” 17 August 1943, Three Rivers Regiment War Diary, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 18,205. 248 C.P. Stacey, A Date with History: Memoirs of a Canadian Historian (Ottawa: Deneau, 1983), 127. 249 Delaney, “Cooperation in the Anglo-Canadian Armies,” 216. 250 French, Raising Churchill’s Armies, 186-187. 90

Armies would try and minimise infantry casualties by employing heavy pre-assault artillery barrages. Montgomery had realised this in December 1942, writing that in all of his operations, “I have to be very careful about losses, as there are not the officers and men in the depots in Egypt to replace them.”251 He would compensate with shell-fire.

This doctrine was one Canada had employed in the First World War, and although by

1943 the Canadians had yet to feel the full effect of the manpower crunch as they would in 1944, Bill 80—which would send NRMA servicemen to fight overseas—had yet to be passed, meaning the same desire to minimise casualties to avoid conscription was an important operational imperative for Canada’s senior officers.252 On the battlefield, it was

essential to preserve manpower by shooting the infantry onto their objective in set-piece

attacks. The artillery was the pre-eminent unit in the Anglo-Canadian attack doctrine, and

the axiom of “waste shells not lives” still applied.

Over the course of the campaign, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division had grown

proud to be part of the Eighth Army. Major-General M.P. Bogert remembered that the men “got on well with the Brits in Italy. Monty didn’t care what the officers thought but he would get the troops together… he’d say ‘We’re going into battle and we’re going to win because you know I wouldn’t put you into a battle that we couldn’t win.”253 The message resonated with the green division. Bruce Matthews recalled that in Sicily, British units offered prompt and professional help to the AGRA and armour.254 In turn, the 1st

Canadian Infantry Division was accepted as an organic part of the storied Eighth Army,

251 Ibid., 244. 252 Delaney, “Cooperation in the Anglo-Canadian Armies,” 216. 253 Interview with MGen M.P. Bogert, 8 September 1991, DHH, Granatstein Papers. 254 Interview with Gen. A. Bruce Mattews, 10 June 1991, Ibid.. 91

and was proud of it. When CBC Correspondent Peter Stursberg asked Simonds whether it

was “the Canadian push…which cracked the German defences…?” Simonds answered

that, “no, it is a great exaggeration to say that. The victory in front of Etna was an Eighth

Army victory. The First Canadian Division contributed to it in that it effectively carried

out its allotted task….but all this would have been ineffective except as part of a

concerted effort by a number of divisions”.255

On the home front, the country applauded the long-awaited contribution of the 1st

Canadian Division to Allied operations. “For the first time Canadians feel that their army is really in the war, and they are proud that it should be so” wrote one newspaper article shortly after the campaign began.256

All told, the Sicilian experiment had worked; the participation of the division in

the Mediterranean had bolstered the Canadian war effort, while Eighth Army doctrine

attempted to protect Canadian vulnerabilities: manpower and conscription. On the

battlefield the division had seemed to excel after a few initial missteps; it had achieved

the battle experience Ralston craved, and proved itself—and the Canadians’ worth—to the British, and Montgomery in particular, in doing so. When 1st Canadian Corps arrived

in Italy, it did so in the wake of a successful experiment.

However, the British experiences over the previous four years had also offered

lessons on how to cooperate with Dominion armies in the field. In dealing with the

Australians especially, the British had learned lessons the hard way. From the beginning,

command flexibility over Commonwealth forces was a key issue. Air Chief Marshall

255 “CBC Interview: Peter Stursburg and Guy Simonds from Sicily,” LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,726. 256 “Canada’s Pride Soars Again,” New York Times 11 July 1943. 92

Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander in Chief Far East, wrote to the War Office in

August 1941 when discussing the defensibility of Singapore, that “an A.I.F. Brigade lacks some flexibility if earmarked as a command reserve. In emergency it can of course be used anywhere not (repeat not) necessarily under its own divisional commander. But precautionary moves such as to a central or more northerly position and placing it under a

British Divisional Commander might always have political implications.”257 Brooke-

Popham hoped to mitigate some of the dangers of using untested commonwealth divisions, while increasing operational effectiveness by using Australian brigades in

British divisions, consciously overlooking the political ramifications. These attitudes seemed justified during the fall of Singapore, when morale and discipline were so low in the panicked Australian units that one civilian described the Australian troops as “roving brigands” who “roamed the streets in drunken bands looting any houses left unlocked” and “terrifying” the natives.258

The situation grew worse in North Africa, before finally getting better. After the debacle in France in 1940, the Bartholomew Committee concluded that fighting on a multi-division front over hundreds of miles was a problem that could only be overcome by giving more local authority to brigade and battalion commanders. 259 This applied especially to all-arms cooperation. In the desert, commanders suggested moving beyond the traditional, rigid, centralized command system to solve the German problem. Brigade groups were seen as a potential answer, as fighting with a decentralised command

257 CinC Far East to the War Office, 20, August 1941, TNA, WO 193/865. 258 Evidence as to Behaviour of Australian Troops in Malaya, May 29, 1942, TNA DO 35/1010/3. 259 See John Ferris, “The British Army: Signals and Security in the desert campaign, 1940-1942” in Intelligence and Strategy, Selected Essays, 207; and French, Raising Churchill’s Armies, 189-192. 93

structure gave the attackers flexibility. Auckinleck explained his doctrine to his commanders as follows:

An essential part of [my] method of defence is the close control and co-ordination of the action of battle groups by divisional commanders who must make their presence felt on the battlefield. It is their duty to supply the driving power...The Corps Commanders must be in the closest possible touch so as to ensure that if one Corps or part of it has to give ground the other is immediately able to take advantage of the situation by rapidly and boldly attacking the enemy in the flank.260

However, this new attack style brought Auckinleck into conflict with his Dominion generals who wished to maintain centralised, national control over their forces. “‘Old

Blamey’ and the Australian Government,” Auckinleck later wrote, “derived their ideas from the first war and western front in France. They were quite inapplicable to modern mobile war in the desert, where flexibility in the use of formations in the desert was essential. The use of a ‘fixed’ corps would have been wasteful and impracticable.”261

As John Ferris concluded, the “debate was doctrinal and political.”262

Montgomery’s rise to command the Eighth Army in part made this issue moot.

Battle groups were no longer to be de rigour. Instead, traditional divisional operational formations would lead Eighth Army through Second El Alamein. The weaknesses of the battle group have been outlined by John Ferris:

Within the British system, combined arms could best be done by a corps; the prospect was crippled by the lack of trained personnel, and by the failure to recognize the significance of this level of command or of that function. Given this military organization, a decentralized system of command could succeed only if British field and staff officers were better than their enemies, able to substitute superior expertise for inferior organization. They were not and the price was high—the loss of all the potential advantages of the British style of war. … Without centralized control, artillery could

260 Quoted in Corelli Barnett, The Desert Generals (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 190. 261 Ferris, “Signals and Security in the desert campaign,” 208. 262 Ibid. 94

never be massed, especially since the machine naturally divided guns to protect brigade groups and Jock columns against tanks.263

Montgomery realised these weaknesses, and when he replaced Auckinleck he re-imposed

the traditional British army-corps-division command structure, insisting that “divisions would fight as divisions.”264

Yet, this came with secondary implications for their relationship with

Commonwealth divisions, as indivisible corps’ still proved limiting to operations.

Commonwealth divisions were not only welcome, but encouraged. The Australians had

improved after Singapore, and proved reliable in North Africa. The New Zealanders even

more so, especially under the command of the very capable General Bernard Freyberg.

Yet, as Ferris has articulated, the role of the corps in British doctrine necessitated

flexibility—the flexibility to augment corps-attacks with divisions from other corps, just

as the 231 (Malta) brigade had been added to 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s battle roll

for Agira. British operational doctrine was based on a flexible corps system—if

Commonwealth divisions could not be removed from under the command of their corps

commander they were less valuable. The arrival of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy—an

inexperienced corps headquarters determined to retain its divisions—would compromise

the system’s tactical flexibility.

From a political perspective, however, accepting a Canadian corps in Italy made good sense. Replacing a Canadian corps for a British corps in the cross-channel invasion

263 Ibid., 211-212. 264 Quoted in Barnett, The Desert Generals, 300. 95

would help with the ratio of British to American divisions in Normandy. 265 The best case

scenario was that the British and Canadian High Command would have the opportunity

to smooth out the rough edges of cooperation in the Italian Theatre, before the invasion of

Normandy. 266 While the British did not appreciate the intrusion of a Canadian corps in

their army structure from an operational perspective, as its presence and national mandate

potentially restricted the fluidity of the division-based operational doctrine, the limits on

British manpower and war production meant they had to play ball with their largest and oldest dominion.267 They needed the Commonwealth forces, even if it meant having a

semi-autonomous Canadian formation within the British command structure.

When Crerar arrived in Italy in November 1943 he had his work cut out for him.

As per the Visiting Forces Act, the Canadians were to be brought under his command,

with the hope of immediate operational experience for a homogenous Canadian Corps.

The respective approaches of both the British and the Canadians to these objectives

stemmed largely from their prior experiences. While the Canadians had on a political

level learned to protect their national status, so the British had learned to promote

operational fluidity by wanting to work only with Commonwealth divisions as the largest

practical formation. As such, Crerar’s objectives were uncomfortably incompatible; he

was hardly well positioned to maintain positive allied relations when his military purpose

265 McNaughton to R.B. Gibson, liaison officer for NDHQ, 5 May 1943, quoted in Hitsman, “The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army: CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 182,” 70. 266 “Diaries and Notes for Overseas Trips 1943 (Mediterranean are and U.K.), 1943 – Evolution of McNaughton Attitude re Participation on Corps Basis,” with Brooke, 3 August, Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 267 Recruits were so limited by 1942 that the British Army had begun to disband formations. In mid-1942, four divisions were disbanded in the UK. French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 243-244. 96

in theatre had little to do with the operations in that theatre and his political purpose was

to be overtly Canadian. They were also exacerbated by the fact that the Canadian corps was serving “in combination” with a British army that had learned in Singapore and in

North Africa about the problems of working with Dominion commanders. Examination of the contexts—political and operational—within which the Canadians and British were operating in 1943 demonstrates that there were two competing paradigms at work. On the

Canadian side, the need for tactical and operational experience could not be separated from a desire to ensure that 1st Canadian Corps went into action controlling both

Canadian divisions (1st Infantry and 5th Armoured Divisions). The British, meanwhile,

needed Commonwealth troops and were proud that Eighth Army was multi-national, but preferred to avoid working with their “national commanders” at the corps level, which they believed (correctly) limited the flexibility of the Army’s attack doctrine. It was facing these opposing paradigms that Crerar sought to establish his corps in Italy. While the Sicilian Campaign had shown that the British and Canadians could work together at the divisional level, the arrival of 1st Canadian Corps changed the Anglo-Canadian

dynamic. Whether the system could adapt would depend largely on how Crerar was able

to navigate his first months in theatre.

CHAPTER THREE

In(to) Short Supply: Equipping 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division for Battle, October 1943-January 1944

The code name for the movement of 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian

Armoured Division to the Mediterranean Theatre was Operation “Timberwolf.”268

Planning for “Timberwolf” took place in the strictest secrecy starting on 8 October, and by the 12th—the same day that Mackenzie King accepted the official British request to

expand the Canadian contribution to the Italian Campaign269—CMHQ had developed an ambitious plan for the transportation of the Canadians to the Mediterranean.270 It called

for four convoys to move the Canadians between October and January.271 As part of the

agreement fashioned by Ralston and Brooke in the preceding months, the Canadians were

to proceed to Italy on the basis of an equipment swap with 30th British Corps and 7th

British Armoured Division. To minimize the number of transport ships, the Canadians

would take only their personal kit and select armaments. Once in Italy, Harold

Alexander’s 15th Army Group would re-equip the division and corps. However,

significant materiel shortages already plagued 15th Army Group, and Alexander made the

equipping of 1st Canadian Corps a low priority, choosing instead to send available

equipment to active troops. The Canadians were ignorant of this equipment issue until

268 The name “Timberwolf” was consistent with the practice of assigning dog names to operations to the theatre , like “Husky”, the attack on Sicily. At the end of November it was viewed as a security threat, and thereafter code names were chosen at random. SECURITY INSTRS Ex. “Timberwolf” 13 Oct – 5 Dec 43, “Memorandum: Code Names for Troops Movements by Major Walter, GSO2 (M.I.),” 30 November 1943, DHH 312.026 (D3). 269 Mackenzie King officially accepted the British request on 12 October; Special Instruction No.1, which detailed the move, was issued the very same day. CMHQ Special Instruction No. 1, 12 October 1943, DHH 140.009 (D5). 270 SECURITY INSTRS Ex. “Timberwolf” 13 Oct – 5 Dec 43, DHH 312.026 (D3). 271 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 345. 98

they were already en route to the theatre. Dealt a bad hand by their political masters, it

was left to Crerar and 15th Army Group to equip Canadian units so that Crerar could

fulfill his objectives of getting immediate operational experience, but without interrupting

ongoing operations. Re-equipping 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured

Division was the first test of the Anglo-Canadian alliance in Italy.

A meeting of senior Canadian Army officers that included McNaughton, Senior

Combatant Officer at CMHQ Price Montague, and Deputy Adjutant General A.W.

Beament, was held in London on 8 October 1943, at which Operation “Timberwolf” was

outlined. In short order, they decided that a convoy carrying 25,000 Canadian troops to

the Mediterranean would depart England on or about 25 October. Priority despatch was

given to Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps and Corps Troops, followed by a 500-bed

hospital, a 1,200-bed hospital, 5th Canadian Armoured Division Headquarters, 11th

Canadian Infantry Brigade, and one month’s cache of reinforcements.272 Crerar and a

handful of his senior staff officers were to await them in Italy. The remaining units were

to ship out in November and December, with a final convoy in January for any remaining

troops. Canadian senior officers planned the move on the basis of the Ralston-Brooke agreement, confirming that Canadian troops would take with them only their personal weapons and equipment, and Bren guns and 2” mortars. On arrival, they would receive

British heavy equipment and vehicles, including armoured and specialised vehicles, to

272 L.A. Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf’: The Movement of 1 Cdn Corps to the Mediterranean, 1943: Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 170,” 10 February 1947. 99

bring them up to war establishment. 273 Most of this equipment was to come from 30th

Corps and 7th Armoured Division, which were to hand over their vehicles, small-arms,

etc., to the Canadians in a so-called “Barracks Swap.” Allied Forces Headquarters

(AFHQ) would thereafter assume the responsibility for filling any remaining equipment shortages from in-theatre stocks.274

The only exception was to be the tanks for 5th Canadian Armoured Division.275

Back in August, McNaughton had insisted that the Canadian made Ram Tank be replaced

by the more powerful Sherman. The Sherman had a 75mm gun, a larger turret and would

standardize Canadian armoured units with their British counterparts.276 In the meeting at

CMHQ in October, McNaughton insisted that 5th Armoured Division be provided with mint M4 Shermans, rather than with 7th Armoured Division’s worn-out M2s,277 of which

War Officer records indicated there were 157 of as of 2 October.278 However, under the

terms of the Ralston-Brooke agreement, providing the 5th Canadian Armoured Division

with Shermans remained the responsibility of 15th Army Group. Thus from the

Canadians’ perspective, Operation “Timberwolf” consisted of two components: the movement of the corps and division troops to Italy and the takeover of equipment from

273 “Minutes of Meeting held in the War Office at 1800 hrs, Saturday 9 Oct 43, to discuss the move of a Canadian Armoured Division and Corps Troops to the Mediterranean,” Equipment Policy – Cdn Troops in Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 274 9 October, 1943, CMHQ to MND 9 Nov 43, Equipment Policy – Cdn Troops in Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, Appendix A, “Resume of decisions affecting policy and supply of equipment over period 8 Oct 43 to 8 Nov 43”. Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 275 Ibid. 276 “Tank-Disbandment of Surplus Army Tank Regiments (No.5) – CMHQ Meeting,” Record of a Meeting held in the Office of the Minister of National Defence at CMHQ on 4 Aug 43, Ralston Papers, Vol. 66. 277 Windsor, Steel Cavalry, 60. 278 War Material and Equipment – Tank Situation, TNA WO 193/540. 100

30th Corps and 7th Armoured, less personal weapons and 2” mortars; and the provision of

Sherman tanks from 15th Army Group for 5th Canadian Armoured Division.

In a meeting at the War Office on 9 October, the Canadians and British confirmed the details of the swap. Canadian formations would move to Italy without their armoured or transport vehicles. After re-assessing the available equipment, however, the Canadians agreed to take with them certain specialized vehicles required to meet their war establishment where it differed from British establishment. The British, in turn, formally accepted responsibility for re-equipping all Canadian units in Italy.279 The equipment left by the Canadians in England would be taken over by the British units returning to the UK in preparation for Overlord.280

In England, the planning for the Canadian deployment went smoothly. So smoothly, in fact, that the terms of Operation “Timberwolf” were set out and agreed to before Generals Alexander or Eisenhower in the Mediterranean knew that they were to be gaining a corps. This fact confirms that the deployment of 1st Canadian Corps had a political—not military—genesis. When they found out, they were both unequivocal about not wanting the Canadians. There were strategic, operational and political reasons for their positions. In September, the US Fifth Army had launched a seaborne assault at the port of Salerno south of Naples, prompting the Germans to increase their fighting strength in Italy from 14 to 25 divisions, drawing reinforcements from Russia and North-

West Europe.281 The fighting was difficult and casualties were high. Eighth Army

279 “Resume of decisions affecting policy and supply of equipment over period 8 Oct 43 to 8 Nov 43,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 280 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf’”, 3. 281 Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 410. 101

advanced up the “toe” of Italy to support the Fifth Army breakout from the beachhead. In the rugged terrain and narrow valleys of the Apennine Mountains through which Eighth

Army advanced, there was little room to manoeuvre armour, making infantry and artillery the keys to success. As one Canadian regimental war diary later reported sardonically,

“Contrary to what might have been expected from the map, the country proved to be extremely close and much of the time squadrons were moving in line ahead.”282 With the

Apennine Mountain Range forming the spine of the country and the Alps in the North,

Italy was an alternating combination of steep mountain walls and lush valleys with rivers, streams and gorges. It was not traditional “tank country”, and there were limited opportunities for concentrated armoured assaults.

Moreover, despite the stiff German resistance at Salerno, Alexander did not yet know that as of October, Hitler had ordered his Commander-in-Chief South, Field-

Marshal Albert Kesselring, to stand and fight south of Rome. The Allies predicted—as

Kesselring himself had originally planned—that the main German defence of Italy would come in the more open, tank-friendly terrain of the Po Valley in the north. After

Mussolini was ousted in July and the Italians had signed an armistice with the Allies in

September, Kesselring had considered whether to reinforce his garrisons in the industrial north, where the Communist insurgents in particular posed a threat; or whether to guard his flanks against amphibious assaults. Hitler made the decision for him, by ordering him to create a fortified defensive line stretching from Gaeta to Ortona and hinged at Monte

282 Lord Strathcona’s Horse Regiment, War Diary, 24 May 1944, Lord Strathcona’s Horse Archives, The Military Museums. 102

Cassino, which effectively blocked the road to Rome.283 Alexander was not yet aware of

the German defensive strategy, or the tough fighting that would face the Allies

particularly at Monte Cassino in the New Year. For these reasons, Alexander wrote on 13

October that, “I do not think we require more armour in Italy before we reach the Valley

of the Po,” and he “would have preferred an Infantry Division.”284

Like Alexander, Eisenhower worried that there would be an “excess of armour in

the theatre” with the arrival of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division.285 He was also

concerned about the formation of a Canadian corps headquarters, and implored London

to cancel the deployment of non-essential corps troops. His reasons were operational, and demonstrated a firm grasp of the political and logistical problems that would accompany the Canadian corps:

(A) our own experienced corps of which we have sufficient are better than Canadian Corps. (B) We cannot [repeat] not guarantee to keep divisions in definite corps because they have to be withdrawn periodically for refit and replaced by other divisions. Elasticity in this respect is important. (C) The equipping of these Canadian units which are not [repeat] not essential to our operations will seriously delay the equipping of ours.286

Alexander was direct with Brooke on 16 October,

The proposed move of the Canadian Armoured Division has come as a complete surprise to me. We already have as much armour in the Mediterranean as we can usefully employ in Italy. I should have preferred another Canadian Infantry Division.287

In addition, 7th Armoured Division’s equipment was in poor shape. After the North

African Campaign, the 7th Armoured Division’s equipment was brought back up to

283 Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943-1945, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986), 104. 284 Cipher from General Alexander to AFHQ General Whiteley, [circa 13 October 1943], LAC RG 24 Vol 10,497. 285 General Whitely to General Alexander, 15 October 1943, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/55. 286 Ibid. 287 Cipher for CIGS from General Alexander, 16 October 1943, LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,497. 103

strength for Sicily by cannibalizing the 1st Armoured Division, which was another well-

seasoned division. Having subsequently been left out of Sicily, the 1st Armoured Division

had now been slated to relieve the 7th Armoured Division.288 Canadian High Command

had no knowledge of these arrangements, and had proceeded on the assurance from

Brooke that equipment from the 7th Armoured Division would be made available.

Eisenhower was consequently forced to cancel 1st Armoured Division’s relief of 7th

Armoured.289 Regardless, Alexander pointedly wrote to the CIGS, “I do not want another

Corps Headquarters at this stage. I shall be grateful if I can be consulted in future before

matters of such importance are agreed upon. These decisions upset my order of battle

which in turn affect my plans for battle.”290

Even so, Alexander realised that “Timberwolf” was already in motion, and

admitted that he “shall need this HQ in view of our total build-up of Div[ision]s.”291 The

terms of the Trident and Quadrant conferences still stood, and seven divisions were to be

returned to the UK by the first week in November, including the 50th and 51st British

Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Airborne Division. In the meantime, the victory at Salerno

and surrender of the Italian Government had led to another confrontation between the

British and Americans over Mediterranean strategy. Brooke hoped to exploit the victory

at Salerno by keeping up the operational tempo in Italy. Churchill instead wanted even

more troops and Allied landing craft committed to the Mediterranean, so that the theatre

288 Ibid. 289 Eisenhower to 15th Army Group, 14 October 1943, Timberwolf - Plans Msgs d/20 Oct/23 Nov 43, LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,403. 290 Cipher for CIGS from General Alexander, 16 October 1943, LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,497. 291 General Alexander to General Whitely, 16 October 1943, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/55.

104

could be expanded with an attack on the Balkans. Ever distrustful of Churchill’s

Mediterranean strategy, and wary of further delays for the date of the cross-channel invasion, Marshall remained adamant that the terms of Quadrant be upheld. The

Canadians had an inkling of what was going on. Remarkably unsympathetic with the

American view, Hume Wrong, Canadian Assistant Undersecretary of State for External

Affairs summed up the state of affairs to Vincent Massey:

They [the Americans] like to pursue an agreed scheme even if conditions have changed so as to open up unexpected alternatives. At Quebec they secured agreement that the Italian campaign should have the status of an important sideshow and should not be permitted to modify the earlier plans for a direct attack on western Europe to take place as soon as possible in 1944. It was agreed that Italy should be cleared of the enemy at least as far as the line of the Arno (you must hate as much as I do the thought of the Arno being a front line) and if conditions were favourable as far as the Alps. The commitment, however, is to be severely limited in the number of divisions employed and battle trained troops are to return from the theatre to the United Kingdom to participate in the main attack.292

While the strategic situation in Italy had re-opened negotiations, Alexander worried about

how the loss of seven divisions would affect his operational tempo, and saw the

Canadians as helping soften the blow. However, he also believed non-operational troops were of limited use and, as such, he was “anxious that this [Canadian] HQ and non- div[isional] troops should not be equipped at the expense of formations and units already earmarked for Italy.”293 Units already on the mainland needed vehicles, and in his

opinion, “any refusal would lead us into political difficulties.”294 Not to mention

operational challenges, too.

292 Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain, 25 October 1943, DEA/88s in Department of Foreign Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations. 293 Alexander to General Whitely, 16 October 1943, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/55. 294 Ibid. 105

Of course, the operational needs of the Italian Campaign had little to do with the

original decision to send the Canadians to Italy, of which Brooke informed Alexander on

19 October. The 7th Armoured Division was originally slated to be among the British

divisions returning to the UK, but as planning developed, Brooke had had to substitute

them for the 1st Airborne Division. However, he still wanted another experienced

armoured division for Overlord, and, facing pressure from the Canadians to get another

division operational, an exchange with the Canadians “became necessary.” Brooke tried

to justify his decision to Alexander by saying that the Canadians then “naturally” pushed

for the corps headquarters to command their two divisions. “I went into all the pros and

cons very carefully, and this seemed to me the best way of dealing with a very

complicated problem about which it has not been possible to consult you in view of

necessity for high level political consideration first.”295

This was hardly comforting for Alexander, who was already facing dire equipment shortages. He had no reserves to equip the Canadians with, as all available

equipment in the theatre was earmarked for combat units. AFHQ warned the War Office

on 16 October that the equipment and vehicles of British units returning to the UK had

already been taken by units in Italy to meet immediate operational requirements. They

were especially short of “B” vehicles—the classification for transport vehicles, light

armoured cars, armoured and half-track trucks, among others—and they estimated that

with the arrival of their Canadians their present deficiencies would increase by at least

295 Brooke to Alexander, 19 October 1943, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/13. 106

2500 vehicles.296 Eisenhower confirmed the report, writing to the War Office that the,

“majority of equipment and vehicles of units returning to United Kingdom [was] absorbed by Units required for immediate tasks.” The problem was inevitable, “owing to shortage of equipment and vehicles [in] this theatre and urgent operational necessity to attain most rapid build-up possible” for ongoing operations.297 Eisenhower wrote a lengthy letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 October stating in full the problems with the arrangements, both for the Canadians and the Eighth Army.

First, the equipment being released in Sicily by 30 Corps and 50 and 51 British Divisions is already heavily depleted and almost fully mortgaged as reserves for the British forces now engaged on the mainland who are already drawing upon this supply almost as fast as it can be moved up to them. We already import equipment as fast as port capacity will allow and this equipment is earmarked for formations already in the theatre. Even on the existing programme we have a back log which is likely to take many weeks to clear. The additional commitment for re-equipment of Canadians can not [sic] therefore be met by additional shipments which would remain in ports undischarged. Second, a large proportion of the non-divisional troops will have to be disembarked in North Africa for administrative reasons, and will necessarily have to take a low priority in the long list of units to be transported overseas to Italy, since these priorities must be determined strictly on an operational basis… Third, the equipment of 7 Armd Div does not correspond with that of Canadian Armoured Divisions and a period of training will be essential to accustom the Canadians to these new types. This applies particularly to wireless equipment.298

Eisenhower warned the Joint Chiefs that “necessarily there will be a considerable delay in equipping the Canadians and bringing them into action.”299

Ultimately, the strategic confusion of October 1943 influenced how Eisenhower and Alexander reacted to the news of the impending arrival of a Canadian corps and

296 “Resume of decisions affecting policy and supply of equipment over period 8 Oct 43 to 8 Nov 43,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 297 AFHQ to WO, 17 Oct 43, “Resume of decisions affecting policy and supply of equipment over period 8 Oct 43 to 8 Nov 43,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 298 Eisenhower to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 October 1943, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/13. 299 Ibid. 107

armoured division. Although the Allied scale-back of divisions meant that another division could be valuable, for the purposes of operational effectiveness, the Allies needed infantry, not armour. Even worse was an armoured division without armour. In a theatre already dealing with equipment shortages, equipping the Canadians, and especially their Corps Troops, would not be 15th Army Group’s first priority, which—as

Eisenhower predicted—would anger the Canadians who wanted to get immediate

experience with a two-division corps. There were strategic, operational, and political

realities at work that would make the equipment and employment of both 5th Canadian

Armoured Division and 1st Canadian Corps a low priority. This was clearly understood

by Alexander and Eisenhower and relayed to Brooke, the War Office, and the Joint

Chiefs. Ironically re-iterating that manifold factors working against the Canadians, on 21

October—mere days after Alexander had argued that the Canadians were a bad choice to send to Italy—he submitted a report to the CIGS arguing that if the allied objective of pinning down German divisions in Italy was to be achieved, he needed to maintain

pressure through frontal and amphibious attacks, which would require more troops and

landing craft than they currently had in theatre!300 It was evidence of the difficulties the

Canadians faced: Alexander needed more men, but did not want the un-tested Canadians,

yet offered no solutions to bridge the gap.

In a serious breakdown of Anglo-Canadian communications, the grim outlook for

the Canadians conveyed to England by Alexander and Eisenhower, was not passed on to

the Canadians. McNaughton reported to Stuart on 21 October that the DCIGS had

300 Fraser, Alanbrooke, 369. 108

assured him that “the [equipment] situation is not as bad as anticipated” and that

“necessary equipment will be sent out from England.”301 Whether this disconnection was

by design, accident, or negligence is unclear. Regardless, the Canadians were en route to

the Mediterranean with no idea that they were unwanted or unwelcome by 15th Army

Group.

Thus on the eve of the Canadian arrival in Italy, the situation was far from

satisfactory. From an operational perspective the Canadians were redundant, and

Eisenhower was well aware that the limitations imposed by the conditions in the theatre

would make it difficult for the Canadians to achieve their political objectives for 1st

Canadian Corps. As of 16 October, Montgomery had never heard of Operation

“Timberwolf,”302 and Alexander worried about equipment and even port facilities.303 Yet

McNaughton and Canadian army staff officers had put in place a four-stage plan that

would get the Canadians to Italy by the end of year, on the promise that the British would

equip their corps in theatre to help them see early action. The “fog of war” has many

manifestations, and it is clear that a fog of bad planning and poor communication had

descended on the Italian Theatre.

On 24 October, Crerar and some of his senior staff arrived in Algiers in advance

of the Corps in order to prepare for its arrival. Many of the administrative tasks for

establishing a corps headquarters were already being addressed by Canadian Section

GHQ 1st Echelon, 15th Army Group. It had been set up in the Mediterranean in July to

301 Bennett, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,’” 7-8. 302 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 341. 303 Alexander for General Whiteley, 13 October 1943, “Timberwolf” Telegrams from Gen. Alexander to AFHQ & CIGS re arrival of 5 Cdn Armd Div in Italy on Ex “Timberwolf” d/14/16 Oct 43, LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,497. 109

administer 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade and act

as the Canadian section of the AFHQ. Its role was to advise British staff officers in any

differences between Canadian and British practices, and to liaise between Canadian

service authorities in the U.K. and the British C-in-C. To do this, the Officer in Charge of

Canadian Section GHQ 1st Echelon, Lieutenant-Colonel D.K. Tow, was given direct access to the C-in-C so that he could represent the views of Canadians authorities in

England, or officers in the field on the matters of Canadian policy.304 Canadian Section

GHQ 1st Echelon also administered the Canadian Base Reinforcement Unit, the 5th

Canadian Field Hospital, and Courts Martial. 1st Echelon existed in two sections—one

attached to AFHQ in Algiers, and a forward echelon attached to 15th Armoured Group in

Bari, and later with British General Robertson’s Administrative HQ (AAI) in Naples.

From July through October, Lieutenant-Colonel Tow and his section had moved the Canadian hospital from a malarial area of North Africa to a swamp-free section on the coast; they had established the Canadian Base Reinforcement Unit (CBRU) and worked out a system for noting and transferring British soldiers admitted to Canadian hospitals, and vice versa. On 14 October, Tow, who was replaced by Brigadier A. W. Beament just a few days later, was instructed to begin preparing for the expansion of these facilities, in anticipation of the arrival of 1st Corps and supporting units.305 Tow communicated with

Simonds of 1st Canadian Division and Brigadier Wyman of the 1st Canadian Army Tank

Brigade, about the changes underway and how they would be affected. Simonds was to

move from 1st Canadian Infantry Division to take command of 5th Canadian Armoured

304 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,’” 11. 305 Canadian Section GHQ 1 Echelon, War Diary, June-December 1943, LAC RG 24 Vol. 13.570. 110

Division, so as to get the requisite experience with armour to prepare him for corps

command. Tow also prepared for the movement of Canadian troops from Sicily to Italy.

By the time of Crerar’s arrival, much of the important groundwork for maintaining an

independently administered Canadian contingent had been put into motion by 1st

Echelon, but the pressing issue of equipment remained to be settled.306

On 25 October, a conference was held at AFHQ in Algiers between British and

Canadian staffs to discuss the Canadian corps’ impending arrival. Only spotty

information exists regarding what was discussed at this conference that “apparently

brought disclosures somewhat embarrassing to all parties concerned.”307 The meeting did

not start smoothly, with annoyance and recrimination on both sides. Brigadier Lister, the

Canadian Deputy Adjutant and Quarter-Master General (DA&QMG), reported that it was at this meeting that “it was first intimated by [Chief Administrative Officer at 15 Army

Group] Lt-Gen Sir Humphrey Gale…that there was no eqpt [equipment] available in the

theatre.” 308 Brigadier Lister later told the 1st Canadian Corps’ historian that,

the announcement was received with astonishment and consternation by those who heard it, and on his part by extreme annoyance. When Lt-Gen Gale invited the Corps [Commanders’] comments on this amazing situation, the GOC tactfully observed that this was a matter for his DA&QMG, and asked for Brig[adier] Lister’s view. Being somewhat angry, the DA&QMG demanded to know that if such was the situation, why 1 [Canadian] Corps had been brought out [from] the UK, where it had been equipped as the result of four years unremitting effort, to face a situation where the whole process would have to be gone through again. Lt-Gen Gale replied that 1 [Canadian] Corps had not been asked for by those in the theatre and the situation was not of their creating. It only remained for both parties to make the most of a bad job.309

306 Ibid. 307 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,’” 13. 308 No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, War Diary, 1 March 1944, LAC RG 24 Vol. 17,505. 309 Ibid. 111

Lt-Colonel W. Roaf, AQMG, took over the re-equipment issue when Lister was subsequently sidelined by illness, and his report on the 25 October meeting was in the same vein. He remarked on the incredulity with which he and members of his staff had been greeted when they announced to their British counter-parts that the corps and divisions were arriving without equipment.310 Crerar noted that,

It became immediately apparent that [there was] no practical basis for the re- equipment of [Canadian] Corps [Troops]… Demands of 15 Army Group had already resulted in the disappearance of a considerable portion of equipment which 30 Corps had taken to Sicily…311

Further confirming that the Canadian Corps had been deployed without regard for military operations in Italy, “General Gale indicated that [the] War Office had been informed of the equipment situation by AFHQ although I [Crerar] gathered that this had been done only a few days before our arrival and after decision to despatch had been taken.” 312

There had been little concern among Canadian and British decisions makers in London about the realities on the ground, leaving it to 15th Army Group and 1st Canadian Corps officers to hastily remedy the situation. To their credit, both sides quickly accepted that they had been dealt a bad hand, and had no other option than to address the situation. By the end of the meeting a general plan for equipping the corps had been put in place. “The fact that they were actually coming, without other equipment than their personal kit and weapons, was accepted and the conference did outline the plan for re-mobilization of both

310 Ibid., 12 February 1944. 311 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,’” 13. 312 Crerar War Diary, 25 October 43, quoted in Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,’” 13. 112

formations [1st Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division],” wrote Roaf.313 The

only workable solution was suggested by Gale, who argued that the shortages in

the theatre made it absolutely necessary for additional equipment to be sent from

England, regardless of shipping limitations. He proposed that 15 ships in the

December maintenance convoy bring equipment from England, and in the

meantime, 15th Army Group would try to meet the rest of the Canadian

requirements.314 Gale outlined his solution to Alexander on 28 October:

In order that we may not have the Canadians on our hands for an indefinite period, thus creating not only a serious military problem but also an acute political one, I am endeavouring to arrange with the War Office special shipments of equipment for the Canadians without in any way interfering with our present equipment programme. I am trying to do this by reducing our shipments to North Africa of such things as coal, engineer stores and supplies and other normal maintenance cargo. The effect of this is that we shall eat into our reserves for some three or four weeks and as these are adequate I see no serious risk in this procedure. It will I hope enable a considerable number of vehicles and a reasonable amount of essential equipment to reach the Canadians during December.315

AFHQ formally submitted Gale’s proposal to the War Office, and asked that the

necessary shipping be made available to transport those vehicles.316 With 1st Corps en

route, the War Office had little choice but to agree. Lt.-Col. Stares of the War Office, on

behalf of the Deputy CIGS Lt.-Gen Sir Ronald Weeks, approached N.E. Rodger, B.G.S at

CMHQ, about the issue on 29 October. He inquired as to whether the Canadians would

be willing to provide the equipment required for 1st Corps from their own stores. This

was to be on a reciprocal basis, as the British would then find the corresponding vehicles

313 Report prepared by Roaf in March, 1944, quoted in Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,” 13. 314 Ibid. 315 Gale to Alexander, 28 October 1943, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 316AFHQ to WO, 27 October 1943, “Resume of decisions affecting policy and supply of equipment over period 8 oct 43 to 8 nov 43,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 113

for their units returning to the UK.317 Rodger agreed that this was “in the best interests of

1 [Canadian] Corps…forthwith, especially as our ultimate net requirement of [Canadian]

vehicles would be the same whichever arrangement was made.” 318 That afternoon,

Rodger had a report drawn up on how many vehicles the Canadians required. The results

were as follows:

Table 1: 1st Canadian Corps’ Equipment Deficiencies, October 1943

Unit Vehicle Deficiency 5th Canadian Armoured Division 2311 Increment to 1st Canadian Infantry Division 192 Increment to 5th Canadian Armoured Division 329 1st Canadian Corps Troops 1893 Army Troops 804 GHQ and Line of Communication Troops 79 Total 5608 Total Excluding 5th Canadian Armoured Division 3297319

Excluding the needs of 5th Canadian Armoured Division, the Canadians would be

short 3350 vehicles, which meant mainly transport vehicles and some light armoured

cars, as required by Corps Troops.320 The War Office cleared with AFHQ the priority

despatch of these vehicles.321 Three things are notable in the nature of this decision. First, the deficiencies of 5th Canadian Armoured Division were well understood, yet, secondly,

the decision was made only to send vehicles based on 1st Corps’ shortfalls. As Rodger

articulated in his report: “AFHQ has asked War Office to ship some 3300 [vehicles] for

317 “Memorandum for File by BGS, CMHQ, 29 Oct 43,” Equipment Policy – Cdn Troops in Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, Folio 11, Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 318 Ibid. 319 Ibid. 320 Ibid. 321 Ibid. 114

Timberwolf excl[uding] 5 Div[ision] which will be looked after by theatre resources i.e. 7

Div[ision] hand-over.”322 Lastly, the intention of these vehicles was expressly stated as to

equip Canadian units other than the 5th Division.

In the following days, the Canadians in England worked out the amendment to

“Timberwolf” on their end. The necessary vehicles were to be drawn from existing resources at the Base Ordnance Depot in the UK, although some had to be recalled from field units. The vehicles included 3-tonne lorries, especially medical and dental lorries, and tractors for medium and heavy artillery. All of the vehicles were to be complete with vehicle equipment and technical stores.323 By 2 November, the War Office and CMHQ,

working with Brigadier Beament in Italy, had organised the deployment of vehicles in the

December convoy.

On the whole, the first stage of getting the Canadian Corps to Italy, while

encountering plenty of friction, actually demonstrated the capacity for cooperation among

Canadian and British staff officers when handed a difficult situation by their political and

military masters. A clear plan based on compromise was worked out to make up the

corps’ equipment deficiencies. Pragmatism and the overall Allied interest won out over

lesser concerns and rivalries, although the resentment caused by the unpleasant surprise

left a mark. 15th Army Staff officers were already under pressure to find adequate

transport for Montgomery’s army as it pushed northward toward the Winter Line. The

speed at which they could equip Canadian Corps Troops and a full division would be

322 Ibid. 323 Montague to HQ, First Cdn Army (DA&QMG), 30 October 1943, “Ex. ‘Timberwolf’ Gen docs re – Oct 43/Jan 44,” LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,728. 115

limited by operational requirements. The Canadians were “unwelcome, the real necessity being for the general reinforcement of existing commitments, but not for the bringing in of another higher [formation].”324 On the other hand, the Canadians could not become part of those operations until suitably equipped. Roaf concluded that lest the Canadians get trapped in a stagnant role, “we would have to force the pace to obtain equipment and prepare both formations for operations as soon as possible.”325 The Canadians would have to remain vigilant over the British staff, which reluctantly had to equip a corps that they had never asked for and did not need or want. It remained for 15th Army Group to bring 5th Canadian Armoured Division to establishment based on theatre resources, and to get the Canadian Corps into action. It would be a long and difficult process.

When Crerar met with Montgomery in the last days of October he received a very cool reception. Montgomery had promised Alexander that he was going to tell Crerar,

“that I cannot accept a [Canadian] Corps H.Q. in my Army at present and that the Corps

H.Q. and Corps Troops must assemble in North Africa or Sicily and wait there until shipping and maintenance situation allow of their being brought over. 5 [Canadian

Armoured Division] can release 7 [Armoured Division] in due course, but will be quite unable to operate as a division for some months.”326 However, Montgomery was not nearly as acerbic at the meeting as his note to Alexander presaged. Crerar recorded that

Montgomery “forecast a regrouping of his forces early in the new year which will probably require the addition of another Corps Headquarters…1 [Canadian] Corps would

324 No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, War Diary, 4 February 1944. 325 Ibid. 326 Letter from Montgomery to Alexander, 28 October 1943, quoted in Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,” 16. 116

prospectively fit into this picture.”327 Until such time, it remained for Crerar to continue to ready his corps and division, and to not let Montgomery forget about his Corps waiting in the wings.

Crerar met with Alexander on 1 November, and received similarly bland, half- hearted assurances that his corps would, eventually, be brought into action. Alexander

“indicated his intention of moving 1 [Canadian Corps] and also 10 Corps to Eighth Army area within the next few weeks. He described his difficulties owing to [the] reduction in

Mediterranean theatre of landing craft and landing ships. [But he] showed himself in complete sympathy with [the] desire of [the] Canadian Government to bring all Canadian forces in this area under command H.Q. 1 [Canadian] Corps at [the] earliest possible date.”328 From North Africa, Crerar returned to Taormina, Sicily, where his HQ would stay until they could be moved to the mainland, to prepare for the arrival of his troops.

While Crerar received platitudes from Alexander and Montgomery in Italy, the disconnection between the realities of the Mediterranean theatre and Anglo-Canadian negotiations in London continued unabated. On 6 November, well before most of the corps had arrived in Italy, Ralston—who was visiting the UK—asked Brooke without a hint of shame “about the re-collection into one [Canadian] army of all our divisions.”329

Having the wherewithal not to laugh at the Canadian Minister of National Defence,

Brooke answered diplomatically that it “would be a possibility but that it depended on developments of presently planned operations.”330 Then, even more unbelievably

327 Crerar War Diary, 28-29 October 1943, Ibid. 328 Crerar War Diary, 1 November 1943, Ibid. 329 Meeting with Brooke, 6 November 1943, Ralston Papers , Vol. 64, 330 Ibid. 117

considering the equipment fiasco and resentment already typifying the Anglo-Canadian

relationship in Italy, Brooke asked Ralston whether the Canadians would consider

sending yet another division to the Mediterranean Theatre.331

As had happened before the Trident and Quadrant conferences, the Canadians

once again fell victim to British preparations for an upcoming meeting of the Combined

Chiefs, to be held in mid-November 1943. In the weeks before the conference, Brooke

was despondent about progress in the Mediterranean and future strategy. The Allied

advance had slowed, and Brooke blamed Marshall’s “insistence to abandon the

Mediterranean operations for the very problematical cross Channel operations.”332

Brooke was so angry that despite his earlier hesitations about Churchill’s Mediterranean

strategy, he now wrote that if not for American obstruction, “[w]e should have been in a

position to force the Dardanelles by the capture of Crete and Rhodes, we should have the

whole Balkans ablaze by now, and the war might have been finished in 1943!!”333 It is

likely that these ideas and resentments underlay his dealings with Ralston in early

November. Indeed, Brooke said that it was doubtful the 1st Canadian Corps could be

returned to England before the invasion of North-West Europe, regardless of Ralston’s

lukewarm request that this should happen. Without missing a beat, Ralston responded

that a corps in Italy and another in an army on the Western front identified as a Canadian

army “struck [him] as a good idea.”334 Brooke went on to ask what Ralston’s reaction would be if the British requested that another Canadian infantry division be sent to Italy,

331 Ibid. 332 Quoted in Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 422. 333 Ibid., 425. 334 Meeting with Brooke, 6 November 1943, Ralston Papers , Vol. 64. 118

reassuring him that the request might never come—and it never did. After conferring

with Stuart, Ralston said that it would be considered favourably.335

Why Ralston would react favourably to such a scheme that could have been the death knell of First Canadian Army, and in light of the equipment difficulties already plaguing 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy, is difficult to understand, albeit consistent with his earlier actions in August. Perhaps the easy answer was that Ralston simply wanted to mend fences with the CIGS. A day earlier, Ralston had found out, apparently for the first time, that there had been resentment in British circles over the deployment of 1st Canadian Corps to Italy. This was news to Ralston,

who seemed blissfully unaware of the reverberations of his political pressure on Brooke.

He asked McNaughton, who,

said [the deployment of 1st Corps had been] against [the] wishes of CIGS, COSSAC and Paget. I took him up and asked if he was sure of this. I said CIGS was certainly favourable at our interviews with him in August and at Quebec. Stuart said COSSAC (Morgan) was strongly in favour when he (Stuart) and McNaughton talked with him on Stuart’s trip in July. McNaughton said well he (McNaughton) certainly got the impression from them that they were unfavourable.336

Or perhaps it stemmed from the fact that “The Hun,” Brooke told Ralston,

“appeared to be settling down or trying to hold a line south of Rome for the winter.”337

Ralston valued immediate operational experience over the eventual fielding of a

Canadian Army, and maybe this limited insight into Allied strategy that the Germans

were preparing to stand and fight in Italy, led Ralston to believe that another Canadian

division in Italy was a good idea. Whatever the reason, Ralston told the CIGS that he was

335 Ibid. 336 5 November 1943, Ibid. 337 Ralston with Brooke, London, 6 November 1943, “Overseas Trips 1943,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 119

amenable to sending another Canadian division to Italy. His acquiescence was given

without obtaining more information on Allied strategy, and without considering the

ongoing equipment problems already plaguing the corps and armoured division, even

though they had yet to arrive in theatre. Fortunately, the request never came.

Meanwhile, the Canadians’ equipment challenges in Italy got even worse. The

Santa Elena, which was carrying Canadian hospital and line of communication troops

and equipment, was sunk by German torpedo bombers in the Mediterranean Sea on 5

November. Fortunately there was no loss of life, but the equipment situation was now exacerbated by the need to replace that lost. By 13 November, Crerar wrote to

Montgomery that his corps troops had arrived and were “now engaged in cleaning up

themselves and their quarters and in sorting themselves and their belongings after the

three weeks spent in getting here.”338 He was also expecting the arrival of Colonel

MacDonald, who was the Canadian Liaison Officer at A.F.H.Q. and was to provide

Crerar with “all available information concerning the re-equipment of HQ 1 [Canadian]

Corps and [Canadian] Corps Troops. After he arrives, I [Crerar] should learn what the plan and the programme is to be. At present, I am extremely ignorant as to higher intentions.”339

The outlook was worse than imagined. MacDonald had spoken to Brigadier

Fernyhough, Brigadier Q(AE) at AFHQ, who had given him “the definite impression that

the equipment situation in the Mediterranean was quite satisfactory.”340 But that was not

338 “Corresp – Gen HDG Crerar and F.M. Montgomery,” 13 November 1943, LAC RG 24 Vol, 10,651. 339 Ibid. 340 “Memo re ‘Equipment-1 Cdn Corps 1943’ Col. CP Stacey d/19 Jul 47 & paper entitled ‘Controlled Stores’” Memo by C.P. Stacey, 19 Jul 47, LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,431. 120

accurate. While at AFHQ in Fernyhough’s absence, MacDonald had been handed a damning memo by the officer in charge. “The paper is a concise statement of the general

British equipment situation in the Mediterranean at this time,” it read.341 The only items

in good supply were the 6 pounder and 17 pounder anti-tank guns, No. 27 Artillery

trailers, 7.92 mm Besa machine-guns, and 40 mm towed Bofors. “The [position]

regarding other major equipment is that our stocks are only just sufficient to meet

existing commitments.”

Small arms, particularly Brens, TSMGs [Thompson Sub-Machine Guns] and Pistols Rev .38 are, at the moment, at a low level. PIATS [Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank] are insufficient to meet our requirements…to supply Div[ision] and Corps troops (other than infantry), but in any case the [ammunition] situation of PIATs will not permit a greater distribution at present.342

In contrast to the official line offered by Fernyhough, the British supply situation was

bleak. At the bottom of the resupply list, the Canadians would be forced to wait.

5th Canadian Armoured Division began arriving in early November. Unlike 1st

Corps troops which went to Sicily, they disembarked on the Italian mainland, and were to

be stationed for training near Altamura. According to the CMHQ report written shortly

after the war, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division faced three main problems upon their

arrival. First, there were official differences between the war establishment of the

Canadian division, and that of the British. Secondly, to keep at strength the 7th Armoured

Division had made unofficial substitutions and improvements in their own

establishments, inspiring one Canadian diarist to write that, “the ‘Desert Rats’ have a

W.E. of their own….they have been in a position [presumably, battle] to demand exactly

341 Ibid. 342 Ibid. 121

what they want in both personnel and vehicles and considerable difficulty is being

experienced in the takeover.”343 Thirdly, the establishments sent to 15th Army Group

were not the most up to date, and did not account for additions authorized before

departure from England. This related particularly to 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s

signals.344 Adding to these problems was that it became quickly clear that the equipment

they did get from 7th Armoured was in ropey condition and, even if battle-worthy, was outdated, like, for example, the 4x2 trucks. On the overland transfer to Altamura frequent vehicle breakdowns caused delays.345 A quarterly inspection of all 6-pounders received

by the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade found that “by any reasonable engineering

standard” over 60% of their gun carriers were unserviceable.346

In the face of these many shortages, Simonds was asked by 15th Army Group

whether he wanted to save time by taking over the M2 Shermans of the Desert Rats,

rather than awaiting the new M4 Shermans that McNaughon had insisted on. The 7th

Armoured Division’s tanks used diesel engines and were likely in poor shape, so

Simonds chose to wait until new the new tanks with Chrysler, gasoline engines could be brought over from North Africa. “If we took the Diesels – they are no longer being made

– replacements are not available and we would be very soon reduced to a mixture of the two types,” Simonds explained to Crerar.347 The new Chryslers would be easier to repair

and resupply. Simonds was promised the delivery of the M4s by the first week of

December but was later told the shipments would not arrive before late December or

343 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,’” 21. 344 Ibid. 345 Ibid. 346 Ibid., 23. 347 Letter Simonds to Crerar, 15 November 1943, quoted in Wrinch,“Operation ‘Timberwolf:,” 26. 122

early January.348 Indeed, Lister told 1st Canadian Corps HQ that AFHQ was trying to find shipping for the 5th Division’s tanks, and that they hoped to have 230 tanks to Bari or

Brindisi by 31 December, with the remainder brought forward in January.349 However, the plan to deliver 50 tanks a week suffered inevitable delay. 37 tanks arrived on 9

December, but after being overhauled by a British Tank Maintenance Group, the first delivery would not reach Simonds’ division until 19 December.350

It was in the midst of this fiasco that Ralston decided it was necessary to go to

Italy. He was now fully aware of the depth of equipment problems, and told the Prime

Minister that “no member of the government has yet visited our troops on active front…Conditions regarding provision and maintenance of equipment and personnel are to the fore and I am satisfied that examination on the ground will be a great aid to me in coming to future decisions.”351 On 22 November, the Minister of National Defence

arrived in Italy to do his best to help sort out the equipment crisis and get the corps into

action. He did not succeed, and in certain ways made matters worse.

Upon his arrival, Ralston met with Montgomery and pressured him to find an

operational role for the Canadians as soon as they were all in theatre. Montgomery, in

typical fashion, offered the Canadian minister his take on all matters Canadian, as well as

on Eighth Army. He repeated his complaint that he did not want armoured units, and

expressed reservations about Crerar as a field commander. Undoubtedly at Ralston’s

348 Ibid. 349 A&Q Branch, 1st Canadian Corps, War Diary, 27 November 1943, quoted in Wrinch,“Operation ‘Timberwolf:,” 26 350 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,” 26. 351 While referring directly to the equipment crisis, Ralston’s rationale also hinted at his growing concerns over conscription. 11 November 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 59, 123

urging, he did, however, agree to put the corps headquarters into the line, and get them

several battles, “even three or four,” as soon as he could. He would “try out Crerar,” he

promised, and then let Ralston know how he rated.352

On the 27th, Ralston and Crerar went together to see the 15th Army Group Chief of

Staff, General Richardson, and Crerar pressed him to hurry.353 The same theme played

with General Alexander, whom Ralston met with that evening. Now fully aware of the

resentment caused among British politicians and High Command over the deployment of

the Canadians, Ralston did his best to calm the waters. He explained that after three years

of having no opportunity to fight, when the chance presented itself in the Mediterranean

the Canadians’ capitalised upon it. He had had no idea that Alexander had not been

consulted about the plan to swap Canadian and British units. Ralston recorded that

Alexander “was quite unconcerned in accepting my explanation”.354 He said only that he should have been “asked what type of formation he wanted. He said they [the armoured division] would be useful of course, but not as quickly as an Infantry Div[ision] would be.”355

Ralston reminded him that the 5th Canadian Armoured Division consisted of an

infantry brigade, “which was well trained and that the armour was only 1 [Brigade] and

that already our Army Tank [Brigade] had been most useful and adaptable. He agreed

and it came down to this, that he would rather have had an Infantry Division but he would

make good use of the Armoured one.” Ralston then asked Alexander about the prospects

352 Ralston with Montgomery in Italy, 22 November 1943, “Overseas Trips 1943,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 353 Ralston with General Richardson, Chief of Staff 15 Army Group, Bari, 27 November 1943, Ibid. 354 Ralston with Alexander, Bari, 27 November 1943, Ibid. 355 Ibid. 124

for the corps being “teed up” for action. To which Alexander disingenuously replied that

“there would be no delay,” and that “he would do everything possible to get Crerar going

as soon as possible.” Richardson then joined the meeting, and Alexander asked him how

long it would be before the Canadian Corps could be at the front. Richardson predicted it

would not be until mid-January. “Gen[eral] Alexander told him to try and [do] better that

so that Crerar could get battle experience as he might be needed for something even

bigger and Gen[eral] Richardson said he would do all he could.”356 Ralston tried to use

his political leverage to nudge Alexander and Richardson into finding an operational role

for the Canadians. While Alexander was the embodiment of the traditional, diplomatic

British officer, he must have resented this political intrusion into his theatre, especially

after he had explicitly warned London that this very situation would arise.

Ralston next visited Simonds at 5th Canadian Armoured Division, where he saw some of the transport vehicles that the division had to work with, many of which had been cannibalised from other vehicles. It was there that Ralston stoked a fire that had been burning between 1st Corps HQ and 5th Canadian Armoured Division. Lt-Col. Roaf informed Ralston that in trying to work out its own equipment difficulties, 5th Canadian

Armoured Division had requested that it receive some of the new equipment that would

be arriving in the December convoy for 1st Corps Troops. Despite these “repeated pitiful

appeals,” Crerar decided to adhere to the original policy and allot all of the equipment to

1st Canadian Corps HQ. Meeting with MacDonald on 5 December, Ralston was told that

the 5th Canadian Armoured Division was still short 72 25-pounders, 96 anti-tank guns,

356 Ibid. 125

and 80-90 PIATS. There were only 12, 18 and 51 remaining in Italy, respectively. Of the

meeting he recorded that “Fernyhough, representing Gale, has sent a wire to Flambo, the

Naples Echelon of AFHQ to give 20-25% now in Sicily to Canadians subject to withdrawal if in future may be needed for operational necessities…[The] difficulty is that

Flambo may not be inclined to follow instructions…there has been some indication that

Flambo is (instead of meeting Canadian requirements for equipment…) inclined to hand over any equipment to 15 Army [Group] which is piling up stock.” 357 This certainly did

not bode well for Simonds, whose shortages still had to be found from British sources in

Italy. The only alternative was for Crerar to give Simonds some of the Corps’ equipment,

and Ralston promised Simonds that his division would indeed get some of the equipment

coming from England.358

Simonds did not take this assurance seriously. He wrote to Beament on 5

December that he knew the equipment from England was for Corps Troops and that he would have to rely on 15th Army Group.359 He was not hopeful about the quality of equipment he would get from the British, thinking that “if we are to get new or well- conditioned transport of the type with which the Canadian formations have been equipped up to now, then only intervention on a high level will produce the desired result.”360 Ralston seemed to be thinking the same, as in the meantime he instructed Gale

and MacDonald to come up with a more accurate assessment of the equipment still

needed by 5th Canadian Armoured Division, “to avoid [the] assumption that the take over

357 5 December 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 358 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,’” 24. 359 Ibid. 360 Simonds to Beament, 5 December 1943, Wrinch, “Operation Timberwolf,” 24. 126

from the other division has furnished what is wanted.”361 He also appealed directly to the

War Office, who referred his appeals back to 15th Army Group.362 If all of his appeals

proved fruitless, he promised that he would revisit the problem if the division had not

been properly equipped by January. The simple fact was that there was no guarantee that

the 5th Division would get equipment in the foreseeable future.

Despite Ralston’s intervention, considerable confusion remained through the end

of November and early December, with Simonds, Crerar, Ralston and Beament all

fruitlessly trying to draw equipment from the British. Crerar continued to reject the idea

of handing some of his Corps Troops’ equipment over to the 5th Canadian Armoured

Division. He insisted that the Armoured Division equipment issue be left with AFHQ,

until

it is impossible for A.F.H.Q. to produce for Simonds the “A” and “B” vehicles, weapons, etc., which I was assured could be made available. There is danger in switching M.T. [Motor Transport] from Corps troops to 5 [Canadian] Arm[oure]d Div[ision] because the result may well be that a reason can thus be found to delay the formation of 1 [Canadian] Corps owing to the non-equipment of one or more Corps troops units which Army or Army Group may then say are essential to that purpose.363

It was politics mixed with pragmatism; Alexander had made it abundantly clear that the corps headquarters was of even less value to Eighth Army than the armoured division,

and Crerar was playing it safe. However, he was also protective of his position as Senior

Canadian Officer in the field, and his position relative to Eighth Army and 15th Army

Group. In the confusion of the period, numerous conferences were held and appeals

361 Ralston to Crerar, 5 December 1943, “Overseas Trip, Nov-Dec 1943, Mediterranean-General,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 60. 362 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,” 24. 363 Crerar to Simonds, 9 December 1943, quoted in Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,” 25. 127

made—like that of Ralston direct to the War Office. This prompted Crerar to demand to

Beament on 11 December that the “equipment of 5 [Canadian] Arm[oure]d Div[ision]

should not result in confusing recommendations by several individuals going to AFHQ,

CMHQ, and the War Office. This re-equipment issue is very big ‘Canadian business’.

Any recommendations to these higher headquarters must be co-ordinated by me and put

forward over my signature or with my authority.”364

Crerar’s decision to keep the equipment from England for 1st Canadian Corps certainly served to drag out the 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s problems. However, the events of January 1944 demonstrated that his instincts were likely right. Eighth

Army’s first priority was equipping units with an immediate operational role. Indeed, when an operational role was found for units of 5th Canadian Armoured Division, they

would be equipped; on the other hand, despite the fact that 1st Corps was equipped, and despite the pressure exerted by Ralston, Crerar, and in January by Brooke, a spot in the line could not be found for it until February, nor a significant operational role until May, at which point Crerar had already returned to the U.K.

By the New Year, the campaign in Italy had been energized with renewed purpose. Although the attack on the “Winter Line” and Ortona had petered out by

January, plans for a new offensive had developed. In the fall, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff

Walter Bedell Smith had been preparing a study about the potential to attack the South of

France in an operation later codenamed “Anvil.” He argued that the operation could only be mounted if the Allies reached the Pisa-Rimini line. From a military standpoint, Bedell

364 Letter Crerar to Beament, 11 December 1943, quoted in Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,’” 26.

128

Smith, Montgomery and Brooke were all against Anvil, while Marshall saw value in a

pincer move on France. As a result, Anvil became a bargaining chip, “as Anvil depended on the progress being made on the Italian mainland, the [Combined Chiefs of Staff] would have to provide adequate shipping for the latter if it wanted the former.” 365 Anvil could serve the Italian front by forcing the Combined Chiefs to keep more landing craft in the Mediterranean.366 Back in North Africa after the Tehran conference, Churchill

came up with a plan to take advantage of the situation. He suggested an amphibious

assault on Anzio, if the necessary landing craft could be kept in the theatre until 5

February. President Roosevelt agreed. Mark Clark’s 5th Army would attack at Anzio,

while Leese’s army kept up the pressure on the Adriatic coast.

It was in this operation that the 5th Division’s 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade

would get its first crack at battle. For the attack, the brigade was attached to Major-

General Chris Vokes’ 1st Canadian Infantry Division, which was under the command of

5th British Corps. They would attack the high ground east of the River Arielli.367

Renewed operations had increased the value of the new Canadian units in the theatre.

Operational imperatives, in turn, led Eighth Army to find necessary equipment to get the

Canadians up to establishment. Indeed, even though the 5th Canadian Armoured Division was not yet fully equipped with either tanks or transport, once the 11th Canadian Infantry

Brigade was given an operational role “the best of the vehicles on hand” were transferred

to them, with a “sudden increase in generosity by British Ordnance Depots in the matter

365 Graham and Bidwell, Tug of War, 129. 366 Ibid. 367 Eighth Army Conference, 12 January 1943, Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 366. 129

of spare parts which had in the past been very difficult to obtain.”368 5th Canadian

Armoured Division was also asked to supply an armoured regiment and motor battalion

as soon as possible. To ready it, vehicles and equipment were married up from other

units. Trucks, carriers and other “B” vehicles were promised in time for the regiment’s

move.369 The Governor General’s Horse Guards had received 30 Shermans in January, but were forced to give them up to the Lord Strathcona’s Horse, when the latter was sent to join the Canadians on the Arielli.370

With the arrival of the equipment from England for 1st Corps Troops in

January,371 the eventual arrival of supplies from North Africa in the ports of Bari and

Brindisi, and with the increase in equipment found for the 5th Canadian Armoured

Division for the Arielli, the Canadian Corps reached a state of equipment that finally

satisfied Crerar, at least enough that he was willing to address the problems with the

corps’ historian in mid-February.

HQ Corps and Corps t[roo]ps were now about 80% equipped, better equipped, in fact than [most] any of the British [formations] in Italy…A similar comparison could be made between the present position of 5 [Canadian] Arm[oure]d Div[ision] and 8 Indian Div[ision], a comparison which again was in favour of the [Canadians]. The problem of [equipment] under the actual conditions existing in the theatre was not one of rule but of availability, and while f[ro]m one point of view, it might have been tempting to press for 100% of what was due and to insist, as the Corps Com[mander] put it, upon receiving the full 16 ozs to the lb, yet to get even 14 ozs under the circumstances must be considered as very satisfactory. Such a result had not been achieved without persistence and continuous exertion, but now that so much had been received, to insist upon full measure would be merely to give grounds for a charge that the [Canadian] interest and not the winning of the war was the main object in view.372

368 Wrinch, “Operation ‘Timberwolf,” 27. 369 Ibid. 370 John Morteinson with Scott Duncan, Second to None: The Governor General’s Horse Guards (Toronto: Robin Brass, 2002), 189. 371 1st Canadian Corps HQ GS, War Diary, “Rail Move – HQ 1 Canadian Corps, Sunday – 9 Jan 43,” LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,685. 372 No. 1Canadian Field Historical Section, War Diary, 13 February 1944. 130

Ralston was interviewed by the CBC during his stopover in Campobasso in

November, during which he was asked about the proportion of Canadian equipment

being used by Canadian troops. Ralston was evasive, reporting that “sometimes we have

to use English bully beef and sometimes they get ours.” But “in all sections of the Eighth

Army you can see Canadian made equipment.”373 Of course, with the nature of the

equipment arrangement, Ralston had no straight answer to offer the Canadian press.

Some of the transport vehicles were Canadian-made sent from England, but the bulk was

British, supplied by 15th Army Group, and in poor condition.

From mid-October 1943 to January 1944, the Anglo-Canadian alliance in Italy

struggled to get the Canadians equipped so that they could get into battle, in fulfillment of

the country’s political objectives. This situation was particularly aggravating for all

concerned, as the new situation presented all at once the myriad challenges which had

hitherto appeared separately: the political issues being discussed by Ralston and Brooke;

the strategic and operational challenges of the Combined Chiefs, Alexander and

Montgomery; and logistical problems facing Crerar and his corps. In this difficult period,

Canada and Britain were unable to strike a balance between Canada’s political interests—

mired as they were in domestic politics and nationalism—and Allied military interests.

Ralston and Brooke’s agreement without consultation with the Italian theatre put the

staffs of 15th Army Group, Eighth Army, and 1st Canadian Corps in Italy in a bad spot

from day one, on one side to get the Canadians equipped; and on the other to deal with

373 “Overseas Trip, Nov-Dec 1943: Press and Radio – Campobasso-Algins-London,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 60. 131

theatre wide shortages in transport equipment which meant giving priority to combat units.

Throughout the period, 15th Army Group and Eighth Army had little choice but to prioritize equipping fighting units before 1st Canadian Corps headquarters and 5th

Canadian Armoured Division. The best they could offer were empty promises to appease

Crerar and Canadian politicians. The Canadians feared that they would be caught in a cycle of not being battle ready due to equipment shortages and thus being left out of the fight, and so consistently pressured the British to get them into battle. The opposing viewpoints of the Canadians and British led to deep-seated mistrust and resentment.

Canadian pressure had little impact until the direction of the campaign became clearer in the New Year. An operational role for part of the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade was found in the Ortona Salient in January and equipment for these operational units was promptly delivered. This was the pattern. When Canadians got an operational role, the

British provided the equipment. Indeed, the rest of the division was equipped by March, in time to prepare for the spring attack on the Gustav and Hitler Lines, of which the

Canadians would play an important part.

That no Canadians anywhere—not in Ottawa, England, or Italy—were privy to the theatre-wide decisions being made at the strategic level, was a reflexive recreation of the traditional colonial relationship; the Canadian government remained indifferent to

Allied strategy and focused on their political objectives, leaving it to the British to make decisions about how the Canadians would be used. The Canadians’ persistent pestering of the British to fix a situation that Canadian politicians had in part created, as well as

Britain’s seemingly automatic reluctance to deal with an autonomous commonwealth

132

corps, exacerbated the situation. Operational necessity took precedence, and thereafter the political; in this way, the operational and logistical needs of the Canadians were addressed.

There was little else that the Canadians could do about it. Having prioritized their political objectives without due diligence into whether their aims were in fact feasible,

Ralston had put the Corps into an untenable position. Sending them without equipment to a theatre already short of equipment, without the express consent of theatre commanders, put the Canadians on faulty footing from day one. Crerar and his staff paid the price.

133

CHAPTER FOUR

Holding “the baby”: Preparing 1st Canadian Corps for Battle, January-May 1944

In the early months of 1944, 1st Canadian Corps was not yet in the fight and bided

its time honing its skills with training and planning exercises. Even so, it was an

important period in developing of the relationship between 1st Canadian Corps and Eighth

Army. Indeed, the period of January to May, 1944 can be considered another episode in

Canada’s ongoing struggle to balance its need to act as a loyal ally, on the one hand,

while simultaneously—and sometimes contradictorily—asserting its sovereignty. In this

case, neither Canadians nor British encouraged the Corps Commanders Crerar and then

Burns to consider Canadian national interest when planning for pending operations and

1st Canadian Corps focused its efforts on becoming an integrated piece of the Eighth

Army.

Ralston’s trip to Italy at the end of 1943 gave the Minister a basic understanding

of the Mediterranean strategy. Alexander had told him “that Mediterranean operations

should go right through with full weight and that there should be no ‘damping down’ or

pauses beyond what the weather enforces. This is the only front on which British and

U.S. forces are fighting the Germans and the pressure should not be relaxed by drawing

off material or men for some future operation elsewhere, the success of which (if it ever

comes off) would be promoted by full scale operations here.”374

374 Ralston with Alexander, Bari, 27 November 1943, “Overseas Trips 1943,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 134

Eisenhower gave a similar appraisal to Ralston, who reported of their meeting on

6 December:

The strategy was to go to a good line some distance north of Rome and then to the valley of the Po, depending on what limits were put on operations in this theatre. I asked if he could sell that idea. He wasn’t very sure that he could in view of the political considerations and Stalin’s urge for a second front across the channel. He said the Russians were not impressed with the Po Valley idea, but he was. The Russians claimed that the Hun could hold on the pass at a small commitment for troops, leaving the remainder free for operations against them. But he thought the Hun would have to maintain reserves in strength because it was too near to his guts to take any chances. It also opened possibilities three ways (a) France, (b) the Brenner to Germany, (c) the Balkans. They were all too close to them to be comfortable. In addition it meant close air bases to hammer southern Germany (Montgomery had stressed this).375

Without knowing the full story of the Anglo-American debate over the fate of the campaign, or the political implications of Anvil, Ralston had at least a broad overview of

what the Theatre Commanders expected. The implications for the Canadians were

obvious. Brooke had made it clear that it would be difficult (if not impossible) to return

Canadian units to the UK in time for the cross-channel invasion,376 and given his

meetings with Alexander and Eisenhower, Ralston realised that the projections for a long

campaign in the Mediterranean included the Canadians.

Ralston still hoped that the corps and Crerar in particular could see action as soon

as possible, and Leese thought he might be able to put the Canadian Corps into the line in

February.377 Leese wrote to Alexander on 2 January that in “view of [the] forward state

of concentration [of the Canadian] corps and necessity for battle experience” the “Corps

together with Corps [Troops] be placed under command forthwith.”378 However,

375 Ralston with Eisenhower, Algiers, 6 December 1943, Ibid. 376 6 November 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 64. 377 Leese to Alexander, 2 January 1944, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/55. 378 Ibid. 135

Alexander, Leese, and even Crerar continued to tell London that the Canadian Corps’

utility was limited because of their armour-heavy formation. Alexander wrote to Brooke that the corps was “weak and unbalanced,” and asked that another infantry division be sent to bolster it.379 Despite the problems he was having getting into action, but perhaps

thinking that another infantry division would help him secure operational experience,

Crerar too supported the deployment of another Canadian infantry division to the

theatre.380 To do so would have placed three-fifths of the Canadian Army in Europe in the Italian theatre, and likely have meant the death knell of First Canadian Army.

The fulfillment of this request was impossible from the perspective of First

Canadian Army and 2nd Canadian Corps, and from that of Allied shipping limitations.

Nevertheless, pressure continued from CMHQ to find Crerar an active role immediately.

At the end of December, McNaughton had given up his command of First Canadian

Army, publically citing reasons of illness, but privately because Brooke and Ralston, in particular, had lost faith in his ability to command.381 Ken Stuart took over the post of acting-army commander, but Crerar was to be returned from Italy to take over First

Canadian Army. In the discussions about replacing McNaughton, Brooke, Ralston,

Montgomery, and even Mackenzie King, agreed that Crerar was the only logical successor.382 But Crerar was still untested in battle, and Ralston and Brooke hoped that

he would gain meaningful operational experience before returning to England. The CIGS

implored Alexander on 4 January that “it is essential that Crerar should gain maximum

379 Alexander to Brooke, January 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 380 Leese to Alexander, 2 January 1944, Ibid. 381 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 216. 382 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 221. 136

possible battle experience in next two months. Can you therefore arrange that Canadian

Corps HQ takes over a sector at earliest possible date?”383

Operational necessity prevented Alexander and Leese from immediately complying. Leese needed some Canadian units to assist other active headquarters. On 7

January, word came down that several units were to be sent to the Tyrrhenian coast, and the Canadian GSO 2 was already en route to Naples to get details.384 1600 gunners of the

11th Field, 2nd Medium, 1st LAA and 7th Anti-tank regiments Royal Canadian Artillery

were sent to Salerno to work in a transit camp for the despatch of forces for the Anzio assault.385 Then two days later, the Royal Canadian Dragoons and elements from artillery

units were moved to Brindisi and Bari to manage the movement of refugees.386

Just as Eisenhower had predicted, Crerar was not pleased at having some of his

units stripped from him, and wrote to Alexander on 15 January that while he was

sympathetic to the challenges inherent with managing a “heterogeneous, as opposed to a

homogenous, military command,” Crerar’s “responsibility to my own Government

compels me to tell you that this combination of what appears to be a comparatively slow

re-equipment and the recent large-scale employment of trained combatant [Canadian]

Troops on [Line of Communication] guard duties threatens to produce very undesirable

reactions among the Canadian forces in this theatre and, indeed, among Canadians

generally.”387 Alexander paid lip service to Crerar’s veiled threat of political interference, but avoided direct reference to Crerar’s national concerns by warning against the

383 Brooke to Alexander, 4 January 1944, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/55. 384 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch, War Diary, 7 January 1944, LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,796. 385 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 363. 386 Ibid. 387 Ibid. 137

“tendency among some troops to consider themselves incapable of doing their job unless

they are absolutely complete in all items of transport and equipment.”388 Moreover, he

continued obsequiously that it was “in no sense derogatory to ask fighting troops to carry

out such duties when for any reason they cannot be employed on the battle front.”389 Still

waiting for equipment, Crerar could hardly have been pleased with Alexander’s response, but everyone had to do their part, and no one was above doing vital war work when not actively employed on the front.390

Alexander knew that Crerar was slated to leave Italy shortly to take command of

First Canadian Army, and that he would therefore need a replacement at 1st Corps. He asked Leese on 12 January to consider whether E.L.M Burns—who was in line to replace

Simonds as Officer Commanding 5th Canadian Armoured Division—would be

acceptable.391 Since 1942, “Tommy” Burns had managed to resurrect a career that

derailed in July 1941, when Allied censors intercepted his letters to his mistress in

Montreal that criticized the Allied direction of the war and key figures in the Canadian

and British command. Burns managed to avoid a court martial, but McNaughton demoted

him from Brigadier General Staff of the Canadian Corps to a colonel administering an

armoured corps in Ontario.392 Over the next three years, the traits that had pushed Burns

up the chain of command the first time did so again—namely his intelligence and

388 Ibid. 389 Ibid., 363. 390 Ibid. Alexander sent Crerar a note written by the Commander of 1st British Division which had participated in the Anzio landings. “The Canadian units who ran the Assembly Areas did a marvelous job and gave the troops that send off which is so valuable.” Alexander added, “If you had any doubts as to the importance of the work which was assigned these units, your doubts will, I think, be completely removed by the results.” 391 Alexander to Leese, 12 January 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 392 Douglas E. Delaney, Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-1945, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 72-73. 138

administrative talent, if not his dour personality. After five months at Camp Borden, he

was promoted to Brigadier in command of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade, and after

a period of re-organisation, led it to England in 1942. In the spring of 1943, Burns was

promoted to Major-General, GOC 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which he helped to rebuild after Dieppe with a “sensible training program.”393 As a commander Burns lacked

force of character; he “possessed neither the charisma to inspire nor the ruthlessness to

instill fear.”394 But Crerar recommended him as a future corps commander in November

1943, and Burns was sent to Italy in 1944 to get experience as a divisional commander.

He took over command of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division from Simonds in on 23

January 1944.

Already under pressure to find an operational role for the Canadian Corps, Leese

was unhappy about having to put up with a revolving door of inexperienced commanders,

which he bluntly wrote to Alexander:

Consider efficiency of Canadian Corp must suffer from WO proposal whereby for [the] next four months I shall have in succession two Corps Commanders with little or no battle experience at very moment when Canadian Corps is learning. I suggest that Simmonds [sic] now takes over Canadian Corps here for two months. He has battle experience and can teach Burns whilst latter commands Canadian Armd Div. At end two months Simmonds [sic] or Burns to return UK to command Canadian Corps there. Crerar to understudy me at Army and also Com[man]d 13 Corps in order to gain experience for future employment. Consider War Office proposal and constant changes with General inexperienced in command do not take into account vital factor that Eighth Army is now in contact with the enemy.395

His suggestion was a good one, although it assumed that the Canadian and British

decision-makers cared more about the effect of their decisions on operations in Italy than

393 Ibid., 79. 394 Ibid. 395 Leese to Alexander, 13 January 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 139

preparing First Canadian Army for war in North-West Europe. Leese wrote at length on the matter to his wife later in the week.

I am having a big bother with Canadian Commanders. Harry Crerar is here, and of course knows nothing of military matters …But is presumably the Commander designate of the Canadian Army in England. The only really good commander tried out in battle is Guy Simmons[sic]. I hope very much to keep him here but there is a big push to get him home. It is a worry here as you must have longer experienced commanders especially if the troops are inexperienced in battle. Otherwise casualties are so unnecessarily heavy. I suppose one thinks too much about casualties. It is one of the big differences between us and the American Generals. They are very ruthless, which I suppose is right. I can be very definitely in a big break in or break through. But at other times one thinks all on about it. I have since heard that the CIGS has ruled that Guy Simmons[sic] is to go home, so I have to teach Crerar for a time and then change again to another totally inexperienced commander. Like everything else it will pan out allright, but one has been pretty completely let in by O [Montgomery], who shelved the necessity to teach Crerar and now runs in behind the shield of the CIGS and refuses to take him as Army Com[mander] till I’ve held the baby.396

Alexander relayed Leese’s advice to Brooke, who did not have the luxury of considering only the operational effectiveness of 1st Canadian Corps. As he elucidated to

Alexander on 17 January 1944, military operations in Italy had nothing to do with his request. “The Canadian Army and Canadian Corps at home have been inadequately commanded for a long period owing to circumstances beyond my control,” he wrote. “It is essential that a battle trained Commander for the Corps at home should be provided at once in the shape of Simmonds [sic] while Crerar must be given battle experience at the earliest possible date. I am very anxious that Crerar should exercise executive command and not merely understudy other Commanders.”397 This likely reinforced Alexander’s frustration with having to deal with the Canadian Corps.

396 Leese to his wife, 17 January 1944, Imperial War Museum (IWM), Oliver Leese Papers. 397 Brooke to Alexander, 17 January 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 140

The relations between Brooke, Alexander, Leese and Crerar in the early weeks of

1944 were thus typified by tension. Saddled with an inexperienced corps headquarters,

Alexander and Leese were being pressured by Brooke and Crerar to find a role for the

Canadians, for reasons that had nothing to do with the ongoing operations in or strategic

objectives for Italy. They instead endeavoured to use the Canadians as they would any

other corps, by detaching units as needed for immediate purposes, only to be met with political pressure from the Canadians’ national commander, which thereby reinforced resentment.

The first time elements of 5th Canadian Armoured Division saw battle was in mid-

January, when the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade was sent to the Arielli sector. In

December, Simonds had informed Crerar that of his two brigades, 11th Canadian Infantry

Brigade’s training had progressed the furthest, and the unit was ready for frontline

experience if equipment could be found for it.398 In January, 11th Brigade joined the 1st

Canadian Infantry Division, and took over a sector from the 3rd Canadian Infantry

Brigade.399 As part of an Eighth Army effort to assist the troops landing at Anzio, 11th

Canadian Infantry Brigade launched its first attack near the Arielli on 17 January 1944.400

Meanwhile, Simonds worked out the movement for the rest of the division. On 9

January, one armoured regiment of 5th Canadian Armoured Division was ordered to move

north for operational duties on 14 January.401 On the 11th, Lieutenant L.A. Hales, the

398 Stafford Johnston, The Fighting Perths (Stratford: Perth’s Regiment Veterans’ Association, 1964), 61. 399 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch, War Diary, 22 January 1944. 400 The Canadians lost eight officers and 177 other thanks. The Perths were hit especially hard, losing three officers and 44 men killed, 62 wounded, and one officer and 27 men captured. Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 370. 401 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch, War Diary, 9 January 1944. 141

Liaison Officer, returned from Eighth Army with more details as to the future of the

division. The tanks of 2nd Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Lord Strathcona’s Horse,

Royal Canadians) were to move by rail toward the front lines on the morning of 13

January. Simonds spent two days visiting Eighth Army Main HQ and Eighth Army Tac

HQ, as well as HQ 13th Corps to discuss the employment and equipment of his corps.

Upon returning to divisional HQ, orders were issued for the move of the Strathcona’s and

Westminster Regiment to forward areas.402 The rest of the division was to be grouped in

forward areas by 15 February.403 In the meantime, General Officer Commanding 13th

Corps Miles Dempsey suggested that 5th Canadian Armoured Division should eventually

take over a front line sector from the Indian division for about a week. He passed this

plan on to his replacement Sidney Kirkman, who passed it on to Leese. The Army

Commander’s view was straightforward. “Leese said it would depend on developments on the front, which he discussed briefly, and said that he thought the div[ision] should be concentrated for collective [training] at an early date, in order that it could learn methods appropriate to the probable future op[eration]s, as determined by Eighth Army experience.”404 Troop movements would be determined by operational, not national,

imperatives.

1st Canadian Corps also worked on securing a role at the front. On 23 January a conference was held concerning the takeover of the front on the Adriatic from 5th Corps.

It was decided that as soon as 1st Corps took over the line, 5th Canadian Armoured

402 Ibid., 15 January 1944. 403 Ibid., 16 January 1944. 404 Ibid., 21 January 1944. 142

Division would come under its command, and that neither 5th Canadian Armoured

Division nor 1st Canadian Infantry Division would need to alter their present position in

respect of the corps HQ.405 On 24 January, 1st Corps was issued a movement order to take over from 5th Corps.406

The same day, only one day after he had taken over the division from Simonds,

Burns met with Kirkman about the division’s impending move. Kirkman revised the

plans, believing that it was not sensible for 5th Canadian Armoured Division to take over

the line from the 8th Indian Division, “in view of the fact that the Germans might be

forced to retire by the offensive on the west coast (Anzio), in which case 8 Ind[ian]

Div[ision] would have to follow up and it would be awkward if an [armoured] div[ision]

was holding the line.”407 He did think that the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade and other

troops should remain in the line for about 10 days, and Brigadier George Kitching was

told that his 11th Brigade should be ready to carry out a series of minor operations in conjunction with 4th Indian Division to help release pressure on Anzio.408 The next day,

Burns saw Major General Francis Tuker, commanding officer of the Indian Division, and

discussed the possibility of 5th Canadian Armoured Division taking over a portion of the

line, and the projected minor operations of 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade. General

Tuker said that if he were to carry out his attack on Orsogna, minor operations would be

necessary. “He suggested that as an alternative to the 11 C[anadian] I[infantry] B[rigade]

carrying them under his [command], 5 [Canadian Armoured Division] should take over

405 1st Canadian Corps G Branch, War Diary, 23 January 1944, LAC RG 24 C 17 Vol. 13,685. 406 Ibid., 24 January 1944. 407 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch, War Diary, 24 January 1944. 408 Ibid. 143

the line and carry them out.” It would, however, be difficult to find room for the

armoured division’s HQ in the area.409 Later, Kirkman told Burns that “the future

disposition of 5 [Canadian] Arm[oure]d Div[ision] would be dependent on the

development of [operations] on the Rome side, and there could be no certainty about it

for two or three days. He was putting [forward] to GOC-in-C Eighth Army certain

proposed lines of [training] for 5 [Canadian Armoured Division], and would have definite

directions before long.”410

All this amounted to the fact that when 1st Canadian Corps finally took over a

section of the line on the night of 31 January – 1 February, it was in command of 8th

Indian Division and the 2nd Indian Para Brigade covering the Ortona-Orsogna Highway.

11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the Westminster Regiment and some other units were to

remain under the Indian Division for a while longer, depending on “operations to be

undertaken.”411 The size of the front, disposition of Canadian troops, and operations in

the west meant that the collection of Canadian units under Crerar was not one of Eighth

Army’s primary concerns. Crerar, for his part, continued to press to include the 5th

Canadian Armoured Division and 1st Canadian Infantry Division under his command, and

in the first week of February 4th Indian Division was moved to 5th Army, and on the 8-9

February 5th Armoured Division replaced 8th Indian.412

Regardless of Crerar’s entreaties championing Canada’s desire for early

deployment of a unified corps, operational necessity dictated how and where the

409 Ibid. 410 Ibid. 411 Ibid., 29 January 1944. 412 Ibid., 8-9 February 1944. 144

Canadians were used, how quickly the corps was unified, and what sector of the line it was given. This is not to say that the Canadians did not receive special consideration.

Indeed, in order to get the Canadians together, special transfers had to be worked out by

Burns, Kirkman, and Major-General Russell, commanding officer of the 8th Indian

Division. 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade had to relieve 19th Indian Brigade, which in turn

relieved 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, which then were to relieve 3rd Canadian Infantry

Brigade; “after a long and strenuous tour…the 8 Ind[ian] Div[ision] were much averse to putting them into the line again to relieve our [brigade].”413 By so doing, on 9 February

Burns’ 5th Canadian Armoured Division took over the line from the 8th Indian Division—

effectively swapping front-line positions so that the Canadian division could be under the

command of 1st Canadian Corps at the front. The same day, 5th Canadian Armoured

Brigade passed to 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s command. On 9 February, “the

div[ision] was therefore brought together once more and with effect…1 [Canadian] Corps

was functioning as a complete [Canadian] Corps with both 1 [Canadian] Div[ision] and 5

[Canadian] Arm[oure]d Div[ision] in the line.”414 Crerar took the credit for this, writing

that, “the coming into action of 1 [Canadian] Corps with the 2 Div[isions] under

com[man]d had only been the outcome of repeated representations: in this regard,

ref[erence] had been made to the political implications involved and to the ultimate

appeal to political authority.”415 However, it was on a sector of the line concerned with

raiding, as opposed to large-scale offensives. While substantial effort had been taken to

413 Ibid., 6 February 1944. 414 Ibid., 9 February 1944. 415 No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, War Diary, 13 February 1944. 145

unify the Canadian corps, the Canadians’ particular interests were a minor consideration compared to the broader operational interests of Eighth Army.

The news that 1st Canadian Corps was finally active at the front had an effect on

Ralston in Ottawa and CMHQ in London. It was a big achievement, and came at great pains to all involved, yet it did not result in the immediate operational experience needed to groom Crerar for command of First Canadian Army. As the Italian Theatre had only ever mattered to Ralston in what it could offer to the army, Canadian politics, or the cross-channel invasion, Ralston’s attention began turning almost exclusively toward the planning for Normandy.

When Stuart was chosen as acting commander of First Canadian Army at the end of December upon the removal of McNaughton, concern percolated in Canada over the timing of the change in command. Major-General John C. Murchie, Canadian Vice Chief of the General Staff, wrote to Stuart from Ottawa in early February that it was “possible that questions may be raised in [the H]ouse [of Commons] regarding [the] system which has been adopted to maintain continuity of planning [for North-West Europe] since

McNaughton vacated the appointment of army command.”416

Meanwhile, Ralston’s faith in Stuart’s ability to juggle his military and political responsibilities had been shaken. Back in November, Crerar had told Ralston who he believed should be slated for promotion if and when he took over command of First

Canadian Army. He thought Simonds should be promoted to GOC 1st Canadian Corps,

Burns to 5th Canadian Armoured Division, and Brigadier Charles Foulkes to 2nd Canadian

416 Stuart to Murchie, 6 February 1944, “Army. Canadian Participation and Planning. Jan.-July 1944,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 38. 146

Infantry Division. In a later stage, he advocated that Burns be given command of 2nd

Canadian Corps, and at such time a commander for 5th Canadian Armoured Division be

decided upon in consultation with Simonds and Burns.417 Ralston agreed with these

suggestions, apparently with little regard to any of the mitigating factors, including

Crerar’s tense relationship with Simonds,418 Burns’ inexperience, or Montgomery’s

esteem for Simonds and preference for him in North-West Europe. However, when the

urgent need arose to replace the hospitalized Lieutenant-General Samson at 2nd Corps,

Simonds was brought back from Italy to replace him. Ralston was left out of the loop

about the move. He angrily wrote to Stuart that, “[in] matters on these high levels where

questions are bound to be a mixture of policy and military considerations, [I would like

it] if we could have an exchange of views and comments before the matter becomes ‘set’

in a definitive recommendation.”419

Rounding out Ralston’s troubles in early 1944 was Canada’s failure to earn a

meaningful voice in the strategic planning process in London. Massey later recalled that

“our concern with our exclusion from the making of strategic decisions was great to the point of being obsessive.”420 McNaughton had previously had his long-time friend and

Liaison Officer Major-General Guy Turner at COSSAC,421 but Ralston did not “believe

that he did anything more than simply carry back to McNaughton what was going on and

417 Memo Crerar to Ralston, 29 November 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 59. 418 See Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 228; and Dominick Graham, The Price of Command: A Biography of General Guy Simonds (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 110-112. 419 Ralston to Stuart, 15 January 1944, “Army. Canadian Participation and Planning. Jan.-July 1944,” Ralston Papers Vol. 38. 420 Massey, What’s Past is Prologue, 351. 421 Rickard, The Politics of Command, 90. 147

I question whether his position there was regarded as one of right.”422 In February, the

Canadian government led by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman

Robertson attempted to establish a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London that would act as the Canadian political representation in military planning in London, but the results proved underwhelming.423 The Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about the ramifications of having a political body in a position to “interfere with the military command relationship existing between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme

Commanders who operated on their orders.”424 While the Canadian Joint Staff Mission met a handful of times with the British Chiefs of Staff, it “never attempted to carry out its second task–liaison with the Supreme Allied Commanders.”425 Cracking the strategic glass-ceiling eluded the Canadians.

Ralston’s trio of concerns in early 1944—questions from the House of Commons about the consistency of army planning for Normandy; the struggle of the Canadian Joint

Staff Mission to gain a meaningful role in Allied planning; and his annoyance with

Stuart’s attention to military above political matters—led to an illuminating and memorable exchange with Stuart in February. Responding to the letter from Murchie expressing concern about planning continuity,426 Stuart wrote to Ottawa on 8 February that the change in army commanders had not affected invasion planning and preparation

422 Ralston to Stuart, 13 February 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 38. 423 Stacey covers this topic thoroughly. See Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 189-198. 424 Ibid., 192. 425 Ibid., 194. 426 Stuart to Murchie, 6 February 1944, “Army. Canadian Participation and Planning. Jan.-July 1944,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 38. 148

“in [the] slightest degree.”427 As a “follow up rather than leading army” into France,

Canadian Army planning would not start for another six weeks.428 Stuart continued that he was to set up his headquarters in London, rather than going back to the army. “My reasons are that by so doing I am closer to Simonds and Montgomery. Also most of my work at the present time is at CMHQ.”429 In a following letter, however, Ralston urged

Stuart to become more actively involved in Allied planning.

I and others have been thinking that it would be a very much better working arrangement if there could be established a procedure whereby Canada would be ‘in on’ the planning at a high level. Then our Commander would know well ahead what is in mind as to the tactical disposition of our troops and would be prepared to be in a position to offer his opinion early and not be faced with a completed plan to which he had not been a party, and with the heavy responsibility of having to question, or in the ultimate analysis reject, that plan so far as it affects Canada. This would involve, (a) irritation and misunderstanding, (b) complete revamping of plans or (c) the withdrawal of Canada’s participation at a time, so late as perhaps to prejudice and possibly endanger the whole operation.430

“Canada,” he continued, “constitutionally is just as sovereign in respect to her own forces as is the United States. On the second point [that if Canada is included other Dominions will demand to be], as a matter of fact there are no other Dominions interested and that situation therefore does not arise.”431 He was encouraging Stuart to act assertively as the

Canadian national commander to protect the country’s interests, by forcing his way into

Allied planning circles.

Yet, Ralston assured Stuart that he was not talking about getting a voice for

Canada in the strategic direction of the war, but, rather the “tactical dispositions to carry

427 Stuart to Murchie, 9 February 1944, Ibid. 428 Ibid. 429 Letter Stuart to Murchie and Ralston, 8 February 1944. Stuart Papers, LAC MG 30 E 520 Vol. 1. 430 Min of Nat’l Def to Chief of Staff, CMHQ, London, 13 Feb 44, WLMK Vol. 371 in John F. Hilliker, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 10 1944-1945 (Department of External Affairs, 1987). 431 Ibid. 149

out that strategy.” 432 When it came to the Italian campaign, Ralston had not grasped that

Canada’s operations and their influence on national interest had to be evaluated in consideration of the Allies’ strategic purpose; he did, however, make the link when trying to plan for Normandy.

I know that General Montgomery in Italy gave special consideration to New Zealand. He treated General Freyberg as a Corps Commander and Freyberg had direct access to Montgomery and didn’t have to go through the Corps, even though Freyberg had what was in effect only a large division, not a corps. I mention this to indicate that when the question is raised in the proper way, those in authority are ready to accede to produce a working relationship.433

That Freyberg was a trusted, proven officer and war hero embraced by the British as one of their own, seems not to have informed Ralston’s request. Stuart knew that Ralston was

asking the impossible, and he wrote the minister at length.

I think perhaps we are finding it a bit difficult to understand one another because of our different conception of how planning is actually carried out. In respect to OVERLORD, the key or basic Army plan is prepared by Montgomery in close association with his opposite number in Air Force and Navy. Eisenhower coordinates the three service plans and approves them. They are finally approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff. Montgomery then sees his army commanders and indicates to each the task of 21 Army Group as a whole and the task of each Army. He indicates the formations and units and administrative establishments allotted to 21 Army Group and to each Army and the general support each will receive from the other two services. Each Army Commander then begins his own planning in conjunction with the commanders of the Air Force and Navy who are going to work with and support him during the operation. As a result of his tactical and administrative planning, each Army Commander makes a plan that in his opinion will work and will assure a successful accomplishment of the task assigned to his Army. In the process, the Army commander and his planners on their respective levels will have constant contact with the Commander and staff of 21 Army Group. These contacts will result in many changes of major and minor degree which become apparent as detailed planning progresses. 434

432 Ibid. 433 Ibid. 434 Stuart to Ralston, 24 February, 1944, WLMK Vol. 371, in Hilliker, Documents on Canadian External Relations. 150

Even as Acting-Army Commander, Stuart could not nose his way into strategic and

operational discussions until his army was given its orders by Montgomery’s 21st Army

Group. It was how the chain of command worked, and Stuart was not part of

Montgomery’s inner-circle, as Freyberg was. Moreover, Stuart believed that there was

plenty of opportunity to evaluate the viability of any plan involving First Canadian Army.

From a political perspective, however, Stuart seemed to be missing Ralston’s point—

Canadian operations could only be effectively evaluated, and the national interest

preserved, promoted and extended, if Canadians understood the high-level picture that

Allied planners had locked them out of. Of course, Ralston seemed to be missing Stuart’s

implication that Canada’s relationship with Allied strategy had to be a political concern

pursued at the highest levels, and that it would take his, or Mackenzie King’s,

intervention to change the status quo.

The discussion on planning between Ralston and Stuart is relevant to the

experience of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy in a number of ways. Ralston’s focus had turned

almost totally to the planning for North-West Europe. As, in McNaughton’s words,

“north west Europe is clearly to become the major theatre for operations,”435 the planning

for that theatre became paramount. Italy, as such, mattered only in what it could offer

to—or not take away from—North-West Europe. Ralston had written to Mackenzie King

from Italy on 1 December that he, “by end of leave would know (A) whether successor

available for which I would expect to recommend Crerar after satisfactory battle

experience or (B) whether organization had changed because of new dispositions and

435 McNaughton to Ralston, 25 December 1943, “Correspondence with Ralston,” Mackenzie King Papers. 151

operational conditions so as to warrant reconsideration of Army set up.”436 By January,

Crerar’s chance of gaining meaningful combat leadership experience in Italy was slim. In

February, the corps had taken over a section of the front in the east. However, with

ongoing operations in the western sector—the theatre’s major focus—the corps’ role was

limited. With planning decentralized to the division and brigade levels, this was not the

operational experience Crerar and Ralston had longed for.

Plus, Canadian political interest in military operations had moved decidedly away

from the Italian Theatre. In the light of the planning for North-West Europe, Ralston saw

that in order for the military to best preserve the country’s national interest on the

operational level, it needed to understand the objectives of the Allied Armies on the

operational and strategic levels. This was a fundamental difference from both his own

behaviour in making the decision to send 1st Corps to Italy, and the message that he sent

to commanders in Italy, where the operational experience of Crerar in command of a

united Canadian corps was the end itself. When Crerar returned to the UK to take over

Army command in March, and with the 1st Corps slated to stay in Italy for an indefinite

period, Ralston’s disinterest in Italy grew even more pronounced, save for one issue.

Ralston was increasingly concerned over the issue of Canadian manpower. While the country had survived its first conscription crisis in 1942, the issue was far from settled. On a philosophical level the commanders of the democratic, volunteer Canadian

Army knew that preserving manpower was critical to their leadership. Burns, who was a proponent of conscription—having written in a pre-war essay that democratic,

436 Ralston to Mackenzie King, 1 December 1943, “Overseas Trips 1943, Ralston Papers, Vol. 59.

152

responsible and strategic preparation trumped the arguments favouring volunteerism437—

also wrote in his memoirs, “if a general uses up his capital in able-bodied soldiery before

he has defeated his enemy, then he is defeated himself.”438 The manpower issue was not

simply philosophical or doctrinal. In the plebiscite of 27 April 1942, Mackenzie King had

been released from his pledge not to enact conscription, but he had yet to implement

compulsory service, intending to do so only if victory depended on it. The hope that

fewer casualties would be incurred in Italy than in France had in part convinced

Mackenzie King to follow Ralston’s Mediterranean plan. However, the defence minister

was starting to be concerned about enlistment rates and the availability of infantry

reinforcements, and said so to some of the Canadian officers he visited in the field.

Kitching remembered that Ralston told him and Simonds that “when our five divisions

were all in action and the losses of infantry equalled the casualties forecast in the existing

wastage rates he would find it difficult to maintain the fighting strength of units.”439

Ralston also told Kitching and Simonds that on his return to Canada he intended to

recommend conscription, and would increase the allotment of infantry positions at

recruiting stations. The heavy casualties incurred by the 1st Canadian Infantry Division at

Ortona gave credence to his argument.440

437 In the same article, authored by Burns under his pen-name Arlington B. Conway, pre-empted what would eventually be Mackenzie King’s strategy. “Perhaps part of the opposition to compulsory military service in peace time…could be eliminated by including in the law a provision that no person could be obliged to serve except in North America. It would require further legislation after the outbreak of war to reverse this proviso.” A.B. Conway, “Compulsory Military Service for Canada,” 6, Burns Papers, Burns, LAC MG 31 G 6 Vol. 6, 438 General E.L.M. Burns, General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1970), 22. 439 George Kitching, Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs of Major-General George Kitching (St. Catharines, Vanwell, 1992), 166. 440 Ibid. 153

Ralston did not ask the Cabinet to introduce conscription in 1943, but enlistments

continued to decline in the New Year. A Canadian Army Programme Report published in

February conveyed that the daily average for enlistments for the week of 18 February had

dropped by ten people as compared with the previous week and by over thirty people

since the week of 31 January.441 Not an anomaly, these were part of a longer trend.442

Concomitantly, the Canadians had started to recognise that there had been a “snowball”

effect of expanding the Canadian forces in Italy. A series of requests had been put in by

Canadian Section 1st Echelon, GHQ that incrementally increased the Canadian establishment in Italy, and, consequently, the number of reinforcements required. For example, another hospital was requested and deployed with equipment on the January

1944 convoy.443 Montague had messaged Crerar in mid-December 1943 to try to stop this

manpower creep, saying that he “realize[d] many of these [requests were] of small

dimension but [the] accumulative effect [was] now achieving serious proportions… since base installations originally approved and set up in theatre total personnel involved in new demands amount to 228 officers and 1,342 other ranks of which more than 60% are apparently required for base and L[ine] of C[ommunication] details for which British are responsible….You will agree approved policy and imposed manpower ceiling does not allow large buildup for base and L. of C. installations and that with small contingency reserve of manpower available we cannot approve additions without corresponding reductions elsewhere.”444 Montague pointed out diplomatically that the situation was

441, Progress Report – Canadian Army Programme 13 Feb – 19 Feb 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 81. 442 E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army: 1939-1945 (Toronto : Clarke, Irwin, 1956), Graph C. 443 Wrinch, “Operation Timberwolf,” 36. 444 Montague to Crerar, 18 December 1943, quoted in Wrinch, “Operation Timberwolf,”38. 154

complicated by the need to provide manpower for two theatres, and that the needs of both

“must be carefully weighed in balance before granting approval even in principal to many

recommendations received.”445

Montague was being coy, however. As one historian aptly put it, “In general,

there existed a conflict between the demands of the Canadian military authorities in Italy,

who wished to keep a large reserve of reinforcements both to meet casualties and to

supply the need for specialists, and the problems of the administration in the United

Kingdom, who had to face both the dwindling or restricted supply of men from Canada

and the prospective calls of 21 Army Group when Operation ‘Overlord’ should finally be

launched.”446

In fact, Ralston and CMHQ had by the New Year accepted that North West

Europe was the priority in manpower allotments. A message from CMHQ on 4 February

read that “we must on no account prejudice composition of Cdn component of 21 Army

Group…Proposal is to establish for each theatre a sub-ceiling based on summation of

W.E.s of authorized units plus approved rfts [reinforcements] which for C.M.F. [Central

Mediterranean Force] is placed currently at two months holdings. Within this limit comd

will be given [the] liberty to utilize personnel in accordance with his appreciation of

operational factors availability and nature of service to be added.”447 In theory this was

acceptable to the Canadians in Italy, but Beament worked to negotiate the ceiling.448

However, CMHQ remained concerned about casualties, and the number of

445 Ibid. 446 Wrinch, “Operation Timberwolf,”41. 447 Canmilitry to FLAMBO for Candex, 4 Feb 1944, in Wrinch, “Operation Timberwolf,” 45. 448 Beament to Stuart 23 February 1944, Ibid., 46. 155

reinforcements available for north-west Europe. Finally, on 19 February, CMHQ informed Beament that,

In future we will review [your] situation monthly on receipt forecast of your bid and will take into consideration your actual casualties and forecast of your activity and availability of reinforcements considering other theatre and other pertinent factors. For reasons stated above and in view operational priority this theatre [North West Europe] consider you must operate with one month’s holdings at intense rate from end of March. This will enable you to reinforce efficiently until end April if intense period activity extended and will provide opportunity to review in March…You will bear in mind that rate of return of casualties will accelerate.449

Beament and Crerar both lobbied against CMHQ’s position, saying that the lag in

delivering reinforcements to Italy necessitated that more be maintained on hand. Their

efforts were futile, however, and on 13 March a ceiling of 61,483 all ranks and 5,175 as

one month’s reinforcements, was granted to the Mediterranean Theatre.450 Burns, who

had by this point taken over command of 1st Corps, protested but CMHQ said the

decision was final. They promised Burns that transport time would be factored in, and so

too recoverable casualties and operational tempo, and that with recoverable casualties the

actual reinforcements available to him would be closer to two months’ worth. However,

he was to appreciate that “operational priority [was] now accorded [to the] European

theatre and arrivals from Canada at fixed monthly rate this policy may require

modification from time to time.”451

Reductions and shortages in equipment and most importantly ordnance magnified

the potential manpower shortages. Facing a shortage of artillery shells in the spring,

Alexander wrote to Brooke on 22 March 1944, that “artillery has proved a battle winning

449 Canmilitry to Flambo for CANDEX, 19 Feb 1944, Ibid., 46-47. 450 Ibid., 47. 451 Canmilitry to Flambo for Candex, 30 Mar 1944, Ibid., 48. 156

factor in this war—and now it appears that we must give it up and sacrifice men’s lives

(which we haven’t got) to do this job. I think it’s dreadful.”452

Taken together, the dual instructions issued by Ralston to get into battle and to fight with a minimum of casualties, the growing disinterest of the Canadian government in the Italian campaign, and the priority given by the British to operational necessity over the Canadian corps’ political desire to be united, made it the primary task of the corps during the winter of 1943-1944 of prepare to fight a set-piece battle in Eighth Army style.

In this period, 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division underwent a rigorous process of training in Eighth Army operational doctrine. There was regular and fruitful cooperation between 1st Canadian Corps, 5th Canadian Armoured Division, and

Eighth Army, validating Brooke’s later remark that it was the role of the Eighth Army to stomach Canadian nationalism, and simply go about training them to fight as best they could. 453 Indeed, from the time that 1st Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division arrived in Italy, a close training relationship developed with Eighth Army. This process was not seamless. No army anywhere wants to absorb a corps HQ and division of green troops. The British might have held on to the baggage from North Africa, when former

Eighth Army GOC Wavell said that, “‘it is not always easy to persuade Dominion troops of the need of long training and they appear to want preferential treatment in matters of equipment.’ Auckinleck shared his opinion that Australian, South African, and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand units, ‘are apt to think that once they have been in battle, they have

452 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 244. 453 Brooke to Alexander, 22 July 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 157

little to learn and are on the whole deeply suspicious of any attempt by us to teach them.’”454 And the Canadian corps had not been in battle.

GOC 1st Canadian Division Chris Vokes was equally wary of joining the new corps, and in his ever-colourful style reflected that he had felt as if he “was in the position of a boy whose loving mother had just died and who is then put under the control of a cold-hearted and ignorant stepmother. I didn’t like it.”455 The distrust and stereotype went both ways, and Burns would write that, “[it] was not only the British higher command and staffs which had little enthusiasm for the coming of the 1st Canadian Corps. There was a certain disposition to assume that the history of modern warfare had begun on July

10, 1943 [the Sicily landing], and that only the lessons which had been learned after that date had any relevance to the way the war in Italy ought to be fought.”456

But despite this animosity, the corps did learn. In December, the corps began rotating various groups of officers and other ranks through a two week stint with Eighth

Army.457 The training was worthwhile and immensely practical. Captain P.M. Peterson, the 2nd in Command of the Canadian General Troop Transport Company, 1 Canadian

Corps Transport Platoon, recorded that “For 15 days I studied his [Major Tuker, 73

General Troop Transport Coy, 13th Corps] methods and accompanied him on visits to all

13 Corps installations… the chief lessons learned emphasized the necessity of

454 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 235. 455 Chris Vokes, My Story (Ottawa: Gallery Books, 1985), 152. 456 Burns, General Mud, 133. 457 “Attachments” 1 December 1943, 1st Canadian Corps War Diary. 158

maintenance, health, specialization, elimination of paper, smoothness and speed of

operation. These points have now been implemented in 44 Coy.”458

1st Corps’ Commander Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA) E. Plow spent three days

with the CCRA 13th Corps at the Tactical HQ at the end of November, where he “had a good opportunity to discuss art[iller]y problems on a corps level.”459 Among some of the

battle-learned tips was the critical importance of having well-placed Observation Posts to

direct artillery. Additionally, the standard counter-battery drill practiced by 13th Corps was influential with the Canadian CCRA: lay down a few minutes of heavy fire on enemy Forward Defensive Lines to make him stand to his guns. This was to be followed by the main counter-battery effort on all known hostile batteries for about half an hour until just before H-Hour; and finally, during the attack, by suppressing fire on each hostile battery from one or two medium regiments. Unfortunately this system left estimates on ammunition “rather vague. And it would appear that they are generally arrived at by asking ‘Q’ what they can get up in the time available and then ‘outing the cloth’ accordingly.” 5th Corps believed that you could not use more than 400 rounds per

gun per day.460 These lessons were not lost on the Canadians.

Some of the other Canadian attachments found the specific details of battle less

useful than the experience of visiting the units in general. For example, troopers from the

1st Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (Royal Canadian Dragoons) were attached to

Eighth Army from 16 November to 20 December 1943, and concluded that,

458 War Diary Extracts, Mediterranean Theatre, LAC RG 24 Vol. 12,602. 459 “Extracts from Report of CCRA, 1 Cdn Corps, on visit to Italy, 21 Nov 45 [sic 1943],” War Diary Extracts, Mediterranean Theatre. 460 Ibid. 159

while no new principles, other than those already expressed in training directives and pamphlets were observed, a very real benefit did accrue from the attachment in the form of pre battle inoculation and experience. The many simple and practical expedients in common use to improve living (aka field craft), working and fighting conditions made a deep impression on all personnel attached” which they intended to translate into common doctrine to save the “time and trouble… during the process of getting these ‘green’ troops into battle.461

Taken together, the reports from units attached to Eighth Army suggest they yielded

positive practical results. Seeing experienced units in action brought realism to the

Canadians’ training, and offered key lessons learned on how better to implement survival

in the field and how to take the objective and minimise losses. In this way, there was a

high degree of cordial learning in the officer-attachments from 1st Corps to Eighth Army in the winter of 1943-1944, as British officers endeavoured to impart their experience and

tactical lessons on their Canadian counter-parts.

Canadian units also attended training schools run by other units in Eighth Army.

These included the Allied School of Infantry, a two-week course for company

commanders, junior leaders, and signals, to train in practical leadership schools, battle

drills, and wireless. A Royal Artillery Corps training school focused on the technical

training of instructors. Special courses were held for intelligence officers at the battalion,

brigade and division level, for two or four weeks. A school of artillery, and military

engineering was also organised and attended by Canadians.462 In March, 120 officers and

NCOs from the 1st Canadian Infantry Division attended the “The Snow Warfare School,”

where they were trained to instruct their soldiers on how to survive mountain weather

461 “1 Cdn Armd Car Regt (RCD) Report on Attachment of RCD Personnel to Eighth Army, 16 Nov 20 Dec 1943,” Ibid. 462 Appendix A, 1st Canadian Corps G Branch, War Diary, November 1943. 160

conditions, and move in small parties on steep rocks or through rough country.463 Other

units were sent to river crossing schools.464 The list went on. The 4th Anti-Tank

Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, attended the School of Artillery to fire M10s (tank

destroyers), and others visited the Eighth Army School of Camouflage.465 A mechanical

school taught select regimental officers the essentials of vehicle management.466 Since

some of the personnel “had driven in England (some of them nowhere else) for over three

years, [they] had considerable difficulty in making them familiar with and used to driving

on the right hand side of the road.”467

As the Canadians began coordinating their own training school exercises, it

became common for army and 13th Corps officers to observe them. On Valentine’s Day,

the corps held an indoor discussion and demonstration on fire support. In attendance were

Leese, his Chief of Staff, the corps commander and staff officers from 13th Corps, and the

1st Corps staff officers. Tangible lessons were learned by Canadian officers and taken

back to their own units, thanks to the professional cordiality exhibited between the

Canadian and British officers, who, thanks to the pre-war integration of staff training, spoke the same staff language.468 The demo was deemed to be of “great value” and

“provided considerable discussion.”469 Major-General Allfrey, GOC 5th Corps, visited the

Assault School to watch the Irish Regiment train, and to investigate the possibility of

463 1st Canadian Corps G Branch, War Diary, November 1943. 464 Ibid., 27 March 1944. 465 5 Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch, War Diary, 4 April 1944. 466 Ibid. 467 “Extracts from account by Major N. Cooper, RCMP, aPM, 1 Cdn Div. Given 2nd October 1943,” War Diary Extracts, Mediterranean Theatre. 468 Delaney, “Cooperation in the Anglo-Canadian Armies, 1939-1945,” 214. 469 1st Canadian Corps G Branch, War Diary, 14 February 1944. 161

making similar training arrangements for his own corps.470 Another discussion was to be

hosted by 13th Corps just ten days later. At the end of March, exercise “Desmond” was

attended by GOC 5th Canadian Armoured Division Bert Hoffmeister, Leese, American

tank officers from Fifth Army, the CRA, Brigadier Sparling, and members of 5 CAD HQ

staff.471

Another way in which 1st Canadian Corps became integrated into Eighth Army

was through the establishment of liaison officers. Liaison officers were an important

piece of how Montgomery commanded, as David French has written:

As an Army Group commander he [Montgomery] could keep in close personal contact with his army and corps commanders. But he could not hope personally to visit each of his divisional commanders regularly, and so he employed a team of specially trained liaison officers to monitor their work. They visited divisional HQs in the afternoon when the commander was making his plans for the next day. They interviewed him, and he briefed them about his intentions. When Montgomery debriefed them in the evening, the liaison officers could tell him about not only each divisional commander’s plans, but also his state of mind. If Montgomery was disturbed by anything they told him, he quickly contacted the relevant army or corps commander.472 By January, Montgomery had returned to England to prepare for Operation Overlord, but

the system of using liaison officers to coordinate between headquarters remained an

integral part of Eighth Army—not only between 1st Corps and 13th Corps and Eighth

Army headquarters, but also between division headquarters and 1st Corps. These officers facilitated the easy communications between Canadian and British units in the field. For example, in early January, Lord Tweedsmuir, the Canadian Liaison Officer at Eighth

Army, visited 5th Canadian Armoured Division to discuss with the division commander,

470 Ibid., 20 March 1944. 471 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch, War Diary, 31 March 1944. 472 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 253. 162

GSO 1, and AA&QMG training and supply matters for HQ Eighth Army.473 Then in the

February move of 1st Corps to take over 5th Corps’ front, and the transfer of 5th Canadian

Armoured Division and 8th Indian Division, liaison officers were instrumental. Captain

B.J. Finestone, the liaison officer for 5th Canadian Armoured Division HQ, worked with

the GSO 2 (SD) at Eighth Army to make the necessary arrangements for the move of 5th

Canadian Armoured Division from Altamura to the front.474 He also made arrangements

with the Tank Replacement Centre to try and get tanks for the training of Canadian

reinforcements.475 Liaison officers also visited units on behalf of their HQ. For example

in the nights preceding the move of 5th Canadian Armoured Division, Finestone spent

three nights with the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, and Lt. Hales did the same with the

Westminster Regiment.476 Liaison officers were also used to transfer written messages

between headquarters, and at times accompanied their Commanding officer on unit

visits.477 In all of these different roles—liaising on matters of training, equipment, and

unit movements—the Liaison Officers had a key role in the cooperation and effectiveness

of Eighth Army. It was as such especially important that they earned the trust of the

headquarters with which they were attached. Lord Tweedsmuir used to mess with Leese

in his small Nissen hut throughout the winter of 1943-1944, and appears to have become

a trusted member of the army commander’s HQ.478 Although the battles of Italy relied on

modern wireless communications to provide fast information for real-time decisions, the

473 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch, War Diary, 6 January 1944. 474 Ibid., 27 January 1944. 475 Ibid., 30 January 1944. 476 Ibid., 3 February 1944. 477 Ibid., 22 January 1944. On 3 February Tweedsmuir accompanied Leese to the HQ of 5th Canadian Armoured Division. 478 Oliver Leese, “Tac Headquarters, 8th Army, ” Leese Papers. 163

importance of having trusted officers who could liaise between units was critical to the cooperation and coordination of units both within the army and corps, and between them.

Through these mechanisms, 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured

Division adopted Eighth Army culture—both through the personal contacts with their counter-parts, through training exercises and with the valued assistance of liaison officers. 1st Corps became familiar with the Eighth Army way of war, and the lessons they had adapted in the Italian Campaign. They wisely incorporated these lessons in their own training syllabi.

A circular report on operations outlined 15th Army Group’s doctrinal strengths and weaknesses.

Our tactical methods are thorough and methodical but slow and cumbersome. In consequence our troops fight well in defence and our set-piece attacks are usually successful, but it is not unfair to say that through lack of enterprise in exploitation we seldom reap the full benefit of them. We are too flank-conscious, we over-insure administratively, we are by nature too apprehensive of failure and our training makes us more so.479

1st Canadian Corps set out to address both concerns by learning how to stage a corps assault against a defensive line in-depth, and by determining how to insert mobility onto the battlefield to maintain pressure during the breakthrough and pursuit stage of a battle.

To do this, the corps and divisions had to learn to fully integrate artillery into their operational plans, adapting to the capabilities of the Desert Air Force in support of ground operations. Plus, it was considered the role of armoured units, and particularly an armoured division, to spearhead the breakout and lead the pursuit. The limits of the terrain meant that tank-infantry cooperation on a small-unit basis was instrumental to

479 Quoted in French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 273. 164

tactical and operational success. It was realised that improving tank-infantry cooperation

was essential to improve the army’s ability to exploit the breakthrough of enemy lines.

Eighth Army’s September 1943 “Army Training Instruction Number Two: The

Co-operation of Infantry and Tanks” offered guidelines for the Canadian training

programme. The document stressed the importance of calculated, artillery-based phased-

operations including: (1) “the initial penetration”, (2) “The assault against enemy

positions farther to the rear” and (3) “the more fluid warfare that will follow only when

the enemy defences have been to a large extent disintegrated.”480 For the fluid operational third phase, Eighth Army specified that “it will usually be found advisable to employ one arm, either the tanks or the infantry, to carry out the assault, while the other provides the support in “feature to feature” or an “objective to objective” advance.”481

In keeping with its de-centralized command structure, the training pamphlet outlined broad tactical procedures. Subordinate units were to have “a common doctrine acceptable to and understood by both arms, on which training is based.”482 The

importance of infantry-tank cooperation was highlighted. Considering tank and infantry

units as “complementary,” the Eighth Army outlined two attack scenarios. When infantry

led, “tanks must arrive in the vicinity of the objective as soon as they can, in order that

they may be able to deal with any counter attack…while the infantry and anti-tank

artillery are engaged in consolidating.” When tanks were first over the start line, “the

sooner the infantry arrive on the objective the better” as they hastened the tempo of the

480 “Army Training Instruction No. 2: The Co-operation of Infantry and Tanks 1943,” Three Rivers Regiment War Diary, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 18,205. 481 Ibid. 482 Ibid. 165

advance. In all operations, adequate artillery was to be made available by the FOO, and special mine-lifting parties were to be on hand.483 The most important dictum was the

“inviolable rule that tanks and infantry working together must possess the fullest

knowledge of the methods of their partner in arms.”484 Inculcating Montgomery’s axiom

was the responsibility of the corps and divisions.

This operational doctrine was one to which Simonds wholly subscribed. While

he was still in command of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, he issued a training instruction

that emphasized three main stages to an assault; the first stage would begin with an air

and artillery bombardment, followed by infantry and engineers to clear minefields and

antitank ditches. A wave of tanks would then assault en masse to “break through” the

line. “An attack is based on fire and movement and timings are co-ordinated to control

these factors.”485 In the second phase tanks and infantry would work together to reduce

pockets of resistance. Phase three was comprised of a combined-arms echelon to exploit

success and maintain pressure on the retreating Germans, to prevent them from either

digging in or launching counterattacks.486 This phase was to be spearheaded by an

armoured division, which was designed specifically to facilitate all-arms coordination. In all phases limited objectives were to be consolidated because, as Simonds wrote, “The success of the offensive battle hinges on the defeat of the German counter-attacks.” More

importantly, “[t]he defeat of these counter-attacks must form part of the original plan of attack which must include arrangements for artillery support and the forward moves of

483 Ibid. 484 Ibid. 485 “1 Cdn Div Training Instruction No. 17,” 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 5 August 1942, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,725. 486 English. Failure in High Command, 113. 166

infantry supporting weapons – including tanks – on the objective.”487 This analysis

indicated a clear understanding of German defensive tactics, which hinged on retaking

lost ground quickly by launching concentred and concerted counterattacks before the

enemy had the time to consolidate their gains.

Experiences in Sicily, especially against the crack German defences at Agira,

had proven the value of this doctrine, and when 1st Canadian Corps arrived in Italy, 1st

Canadian Infantry Division was already training using this doctrine. The golden rule, one

brigade commander made clear, was that tanks should never go ahead of the infantry:

During action the procedure is as follows if the tanks are leading: The tanks bump opposition. All the fire from the enemy position is directed against the tanks and the area behind where the Infantry would be. Appalled by the fire, the infantry will go to ground and are no more use during the action…If the tanks are kept well back of the Infantry and give direct fire support when the Infantry are nearing their objective or meeting opposition the Infantry will go to ground but for their own protection will engage the enemy. The tanks can then determine, either by hand signals from the Infantry or verbal messages, where the opposition is coming from and can engage it from the best position.488

Throughout December, 1st Canadian Infantry Division fought for its life in

Ortona, in a battle that was essentially an infantry battle supported by direct and indirect

shell-fire when and where possible. The battle would become the test-case both during and after for how to assault a defended city. In the meantime, 1st Canadian Corps and 5th

Canadian Armoured Division began to undergo their own processes of learning the

operational and tactical lessons implemented by Eighth Army in Italy. When Guy

Simonds took command of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, he insisted on the

487 Quoted in Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 273. 488 “Points Raise at Study Group by OFFRS of 14 CTR and ANSWERS by Officers of 12 CTR,” 17 August 1943, Three Rivers Regiment War Diary. 167

adoption of these lessons. For example, he was satisfied with the Perth Regiment’s performance in a six-day exercise applying lessons learned from battle experiences of the

1st Canadian Infantry Division in September.489 With other units he was less pleased. In

January, Simonds held a senior officer’s study period where each arm and service was

required to make a presentation explaining their organization, roles and tactics. The

Governor General’s Horse Guard briefed the attendees on the role of the reconnaissance

regiment in battle, and how the unit should be used as an advanced guard. “At the end,”

writes the regimental historian, “General Simonds rather took the wind out of their sails

by announcing that he was not at all satisfied with the Regiment’s organization. He also

made it plain that he thought tanks had a very limited role in the mountainous Italian

terrain, and that the armoured regiments and infantry battalions of the division were

probably quite capable of performing whatever reconnaissance was needed [because of

the closed nature of the terrain].”490 Demoralizing, certainly, but the regiment left with a

better idea of the nature of warfare in Italy, and in the months following the War

Establishment of the recce regiment was updated, as equipment became available,

allowing it to adopt a more flexible structure better suited to the role it would play in the

rugged Italian mountains and valleys. In particular, a “Regimental Assault Troop” was

formed of wheeled armour vehicles and an infantry reconnaissance unit, which would

give added strength and flexibility to the regiment.491 In this new formation, the regiment

489 Johnston, The Fighting Perths, 61. 490 Morteinson, Second to None: The Governor General’s Horse Guards, 189. 491 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch War Diary, 26 January 1944. The adjustment of the GGHG War establishment only happened slowly, as equipment became available. On 29 January the regiment was told that the status quo WE would be used, including five troops each of 2 Shermans and 2 Stuart tanks per 168

determined that the best fighting formation was to have light tanks move in front, with

heavier Shermans providing fire support in the rear, with the troop leader in a Sherman

from which he could direct squadron movement.492

Tactical flexibility to support operational doctrine was also emphasized by 5th

Canadian Armoured Division during training exercise Operation “Asper” from 12-15

January 1944. In support of a seaborne landing 5th Canadian Armoured Division was

tasked to relieve pressure on the bridgehead by securing the Bari-Potenza-Salerno road.

To do so, the armoured division, with two batteries of anti-tank guns, one section of Light

Field Ambulance, three engineer reconnaissance parties, and FOOs, advanced up the

coast only to find the bridges blown over the River Sinni and the approaches covered by

anti-tank guns and machine guns. They needed to cross the river and continue the

advance. To do so, the motor battalion was to patrol forward for enemy positions, while

the engineer recce found suitable crossing points. The field regiments supported the

crossing, and the light anti-aircraft regiment was deployed covering the advance and

coastal road.493 All-arms cooperation on a small-unit level was emphasized. Certainly

realistic training was hampered by the equipment problems still facing 5th Canadian

Armoured Division. The Governor General’s Horse Guard’s regimental historian

complained that “without tanks or carriers there was not much armoured recce training

that could be done, so the unit spent most of January doing a variety of elementary

training which while no doubt useful was more than anything intended to keep the men

squadron. Later, if available, they would substitute in Daimler and White Scout Cars, as per the revised WE. Approval for the modification of the GGHG WE was given on 2 February. 492 Morteinson, Second to None, 189-190. 493 “Exercise ‘Asper’ 12-15 January 1944,” 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch War Diary. 169

busy.”494 Even so, physical exercise and “bayonet practice” were still supplemented with

the practice of essential map-reading skills, judging distances and setting up Ops, in

addition to lectures by engineers, the directing of artillery fire, etc.

Simonds continued to run Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT) that

emphasized the necessity of all-arms cooperation and flexibility to gain the objective and minimize casualties. Simonds, like Montgomery, was unwilling to suffer those who disagreed with his operational and tactical considerations. In one TEWT, Brigadier

Bradbrooke, in command of the 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade, led his brigade to the

objective and was eager to maintain the advantage and push ahead. Simonds, however,

instructed him that the armour should bite and hold, and wait for artillery to catch up

before advancing further. As Kitching recorded, “Brad disagreed strongly with this policy

and went on to commit hari-kari by asking, ‘Why should I wait for another twenty-four

guns when I’ve got over 150 of them in my tanks. I don’t need the artillery to shoot me

on to anything and I can get there quite well by myself.’”495 To Simonds this was “heresy

of the worst kind.”496 While Kitching attributed this to Simonds’ history as a gunner—

and certainly there was truth to this—it also stemmed from Simonds’ experiences in Italy,

where all-arms coordination was essential to over-coming the stiff pockets of German

resistance or their determined withdrawals in the tight Italian country-side, while

minimizing casualties.

494 Morteinson, Second to None, 189. 495 Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 168. 496 Ibid. 170

The importance of the lessons Simonds had been emphasizing were apparent

after the disastrous first crack at battle by 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Arielli

operation of January, 1944. The original intent was for 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade to

remain in a quiet sector, and on 13 January the 11th Brigade took over the front line from

3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. Leese ordered 5th Corps to use 1st Canadian Infantry

Division, supported by 11th Brigade, to obtain the high ground east of the Arielli River.

He specified that heavy casualties were “not to be incurred.” Indeed, “if the Corps

Commander decided that this cannot be done without incurring heavy casualties the matter is to be referred to the Army Commander.”497 After the war, both Kitching and

Burns wrote about their disappointment with Leese and the Corps Commander for the

battle that would turn into a disaster for 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Burns wrote that,

It is generally recognized that it is much to be desired that when a new formation is being ‘broken in’ to actual fighting, and especially for its first offensive operation, it should be given a task – such as a large raid against weak enemy forces – in which its chances of success are good. If the first offensive action goes well, it will give officers and men confidence in undertaking more difficult operations later. If, on the contrary, it meets with a more or less severe check and does not accomplish the task set for it, the effect on morale is the opposite, and it often takes some time for the formation to get over this and reach its full effectiveness. 498

Instead, Kitching’s brigade—which he later acknowledged was far from ready—was to

take the lead against the vaunted German 1st Parachute Division. While given heavy

artillery and armoured support, the barrage ran ahead of the infantry, and the Three

Rivers Tanks were slow over the river and could not keep up. Some of the Perth

Regiment broke and ran. “‘It was a fiasco,’ wrote Private Fred Cederbert of the Cape

497 Burns, General Mud, 125. 498 Ibid. 171

Breton Highlanders, made even worse when the Irish Regiment, mistaking retreating

Canadians for the enemy, shot some of the Highlanders.”499 The infantry could not keep

up with the barrage, and lost contact with their tanks. Kitching was especially angry with

the Three Rivers Regiment.

To us, at the time, our biggest disappointment was the lack of vital close support from the tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment in the early stages of the Perth attack. I had built up the name of that particular armoured regiment because of its actions in Sicily and at Termoli and there is no doubt that our battalions expected their special close support since they were the veterans and we were the novices… The degree of co-operation between infantry and tanks, particularly in an armoured division, is frequently the measure of success or failure. My brigade had not been able to train with tanks during December because there were no tanks available for the armoured regiments and, of course, we had had little opportunity to train with the Three Rivers Regiment before going into action alongside them. So the need for much closer co-operation between armour and infantry was the first of our lessons.500

News of the disaster went public, which Leese complained about to his wife.

How it all was allowed to go out, I cannot incline. It is all being investigated. It is maddening most this d--- Press is in a position to do this kind of thing. It was a swell attack to the high ground this side of the Arielli …. I gave it some 300 guns and a lot of air support. The troops were inexperienced, and it was a poor show. Luckily we got away with very few casualties and the troops learned some battle experience.501

Leese blamed Major-General Allfrey, GOC 5th Corps, “a charming man, but an old woman.”502 For the moment, the battered 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade had to remain in the line. Eventually, Kirkman and Simonds hoped that 5th Canadian Armoured Division

499 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 245. 500 Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 173-174. 501 Oliver Leese to his wife, 19 January 1944, Leese Papers. 502 Ibid. 172

would take over command of 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade while it was still in the line,

but in the meantime the brigade was under the command of the 4th Indian Division.503

11th Brigade’s failure put renewed emphasis on the operational and tactical

necessity of carefully orchestrated all arms coordination in phased attacks, notably

between tanks and infantry at the tactical level. Crerar had re-printed the “Notes” written

by Montgomery in 1941 which focused on the importance of “tactical efficiency of sub-

units,”504 and all-arms cooperation. “The concentrated fire of artillery and mortars is a

battle-winning factor of the first importance. By means of it the enemy troops can be

shaken and their morale lowered. Artillery control should be centralised in the highest

commander who is able effectively to exercise that control.” Fluid communications were

therefore crucial.505

Montgomery also emphasized the importance of armoured attacks. “Armoured

forces should be used in order to create opportunities for the employment of ordinary

Divisions; these latter can then take advantage of the disorganisation produced by the

tanks and operate freely in their support – thus completing the victory.” “Alternatively,

unarmoured formations and units must avoid being caught in the open or on the move by

armoured formations. If this danger exists it will be necessary for the unarmoured

formation to throw itself quickly into an Anti-Panzer position, in which all troops occupy anti-tank localities.”506

503 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch War Diary, 22 January 1944. 504 “Some Lessons Learnt during the First Two Years of War,” Training Instruction, LAC RG 24, Vol. 9804. 505 Ibid. 506 Ibid. 173

Crerar worked to put these principles into practice. In a general way, Crerar

emphasized that all units must know their task. “Back in Canada three and four years

earlier,” recorded the Perths,” the destination of moves had been shrouded in secrecy;

when the Regiment was in England, there were still precautions against letting all ranks

know where a move might take them. At Altamura, Lt.-Col. Rutherford spoke plainly and

openly to all ranks, in confidence that every Perth would remain tight-lipped, after being

handed information that enemy agents would be eager to acquire.”507 This was notably

consistent with Montgomery’s style of man-management.508 The importance of having

officers as close to contact as possible, to maintain effective command justified the

employment of a Tac HQ during operations. “The Commander with his essential

operational and Staff Officers and wireless should go forward and if necessary, while the

situation is fluid, remain forward until the situation stabilizes and then move the balance

of his headquarters.” In March, 1st Corps would rehearse the move of their Tac HQ.509

The coordination of artillery and air support was emphasized at corps

headquarters. At a 1st Corps study period in February, they focused on the use of artillery

during a break-in battle, the likes of which they would fight in the Liri Valley. Particular lessons included the need for counter-battery to be carried out for twenty to thirty minutes before zero hour, to neutralize heavy batteries for up to an hour. Then all available artillery could be concentrated for a support role. 13th Corps, meanwhile, maintained that

effective artillery could only be achieved through the knowledge of enemy dispositions in

507 Johnston, The Fighting Perths, 62. 508 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 244. 509 1st Canadian Corps G Branch War Diary, 29 March 1944. 174

“considerable detail,” which would allow heavy artillery concentrations to more likely

neutralize mortars—“the chief menace”—and small arms fire in forward areas. A number

of general lessons were summed up by the army commander: (1) infantry and or tanks

must keep up with self-propelled artillery fire; (2) infantry and tanks must be ready to

work their own way through gaps in the enemy defences; (3) they must attack on the

widest front commensurate with available resources of fire support; (4) the ground over

which the attack is to take place must be neutralized by fire including counter-battery; (5)

adequate arrangements must be made for mopping up; (6) tanks and anti-tank guns must

be forward in time; (7) effective counter-battery and counter mortar plans are imperative;

and (8) artillery plans must be flexible so that heavy cones may be put down where

required. “All and NOT merely SOME of the foregoing are essential to success.”510

Further instructions on coordinating with air support were issued in late February.511

While 1st Corps focused on the employment of effective artillery and air support

for break-in battles in February, 5th Canadian Armoured Division held a sector of the

front. In addition to the very real importance of familiarization with front-line conditions,

the division continued to study infantry-tank tactics; Burns and some of his key officers attended the 13th Corps Study conference discussing “T[an]k s[up]p[ort] of Inf[antry] in

the Deliberate attack and in the break through.”512

Still recovering from the vicious fighting at Ortona, 1st Canadian Infantry

Division also took to learning the lessons of recent engagements. On 28 February 1944,

510 Emphasis in original. Ibid., February 1944. 511 “The ‘ROVER’ Tentacle,” Appendix B,” Ibid. 512 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch War Diary, 26 February 1944. 175

the division organized “Unit Study Periods” scheduled for early March. Two

representatives from each infantry battalion, the Royal Canadian Artillery, Engineers, 2nd

Canadian Armoured regiment and Medical units were invited to be present “so that all

may benefit from other arms represented.” Their topics included: “time spent in

preparation,” “joint planning between infantry, tanks and artillery,” and “the employment

of tanks and infantry in break-in-battle.”513 Encouraging frank discussion between

battalion commanders who had and could be working together in combined-arms

operations was an important component of the learning curve paradigm instituted by

Canadian High Command.

Ultimately, the training of 1st Corps, 1st Canadian Infantry Division, and 5th

Canadian Armoured Division in the winter of 1943-1944 under Crerar’s leadership

reflected the operational experience in Italy up to that point, of both 1st Division and the

Eighth Army. The corps rehearsed the preparation and organisation of a break-in and break-out battle, emphasizing strict coordination, the use of artillery and airpower to protect the advancing infantry and minimize casualties, while maintaining a high degree of control through the use of a Tac HQ and wireless communications. Slated to operate on a limited front, the divisions learned to exploit whatever mobility and flexibility were possible within the corps’ umbrella, emphasizing coordination between infantry and tanks, supported by artillery and engineers, on the battalion and squadron-company levels. In this way, the limitations imposed on operations by the Italian landscape could be dealt with in a manner that allowed small units to respond quickly and as needed to

513 1st Canadian Infantry Division War Diary, 28 February 1944, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,727. 176

German defences. Plus, this method of fighting allowed, at least in theory, for infantry

casualties to be minimized through the “protection” of artillery and air support, and direct

fire by tank and mortars.

Of course, the active attention to learning in Italy did not mean that 1st Canadian

Corps was easily accepted into the Eighth Army’s inner circle. According to Vokes,

Crerar embarrassed himself during a discussion at Eighth Army when he “called for the

use of Great War tactics to combat the conditions.”514 He was met with awkward silence.

Dickson concludes that this scenario revealed more about the misconceptions about the

final years of the Great War than Crerar’s own tactical sense.515 It also highlights the

mistrust between Eighth Army commanders and the untested Canadian.

Moreover, accounts from Eighth Army and 1st Canadian Infantry Division—who

considered themselves wholly a part of the Eighth Army fold—as well as accounts by 1st

Canadian Corps, indicate that a serious cultural divide still existed during Crerar’s time as

corps commander. The Canadians were too proper. Leese described his Tac HQ as living

an “informal life” which he “found restful.”516 He felt that in this relaxed environment

Senior Officers “found it easier to discuss their affairs with me in this manner than in a formal mess.”517 Even their dress was casual, wearing “shorts and a shirt in the summer,

and corduroy trousers and a jersey in the winter.”518

Crerar, on the other hand, imposed a stiff degree of formality throughout his

corps. In his lengthy report to the staff of 1st Canadian Corps outlining his philosophy of

514 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 234. 515 Ibid. 516 Oliver Leese, “Tac Headquarters, 8th Army,” 8, Leese Papers. 517 Ibid. 518 Ibid. 177

command and expectations for their performance, he impressed upon his officers to set an

example that would “mold the human material under him, and around him, into the

disciplined, determined, reliant and self-respecting soldier who knows his job, looks his

part and is proud of those facts.”519 Standards in dress were to be maintained, cleanliness

emphasized, and orders to be exchanged on paper. This rigid discipline imposed by a

green headquarters about to lead them into battle was hardly welcomed by 1st Canadian

Infantry Division, a “battle-tested formation that had adopted the Eighth Army’s casual but efficient way and resented what it saw as parade-square make-believe in an operational theatre.”520 Some of Crerar’s obsessions seemed childish and unnecessary.

Vokes recalled that Crerar ordered soldiers to remove the nick names painted on vehicles,

which hurt morale.521

Of course, this was not a one way street. One Canadian officer remembered Leese

as “one of the great assholes of all time.” He was mocked by the Canadians, who

considered themselves rugged and hearty from the great Canadian tundra, when on a cold

day while visiting the GGHG he ordered for his “woollies. “He was a joke to the

[Canadians].522

Rather ironically, David French argues that one of the reasons that Eighth Army

developed a relaxed approach to command was the inclusion of Commonwealth divisions

in its ranks. While Montgomery attempted to reduce the latitude of subordinates to

interpret orders through the training and standardization of his operational doctrine, “The

519 “The Responsibilities of the Comd, the Staff and the Services HQ 1 Canadian Corps,” 1st Canadian Corps G Branch War Diary. December 1943. 520 Granatstein, The Generals, 107. 521 Vokes, My Story, 143. 522 Granatstein Interview with John W.H. Bassett, 20 May 1991, Granatstein Papers, DHH. 178

fact that their forces contained large allied contingents made it politically necessary for

them to adopt a more relaxed policy towards those of their subordinates who were also

allied or Dominion commanders responsible to their own governments.”523 The

notoriously rowdy Australians had set precedents that, ironically, paved the way for

Crerar’s attention to parade-square discipline to go unopposed by the British, who could

hardly have enjoyed watching the effect on morale, especially in the respected 1st

Canadian Infantry Division.

Canadian historians have given significant attention to the different culture in 1st

Canadian Corps in Italy, and with good reason. The Canadians maintained the parade-

square discipline that they had practiced for the previous four years, which was at odds

with the casual efficiency of Eighth Army.524 This apparent over-compensation for

battlefield inexperience was noted derisively by the British and even 1st Canadian

Infantry Division—reinforcing the fact that 1st Canadian Corps was not yet a proven asset

to Eighth Army.

When addressing 1st Canadian Corps’ period of training during the winter of

1943-1944 under Crerar’s direction, the salient point is the way the dual-objectives issued by Ralston affected the Anglo-Canadian relationship on the ground. Ralston’s attention turned nearly completely to the planning for North-West Europe, and he had virtually

washed his hands of the Italian campaign except for festering manpower concerns.

Consequently, Ralston failed to develop the next phase of Canada’s political and strategic

523 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 253. 524 Granatstein, The Generals, 106-107. 179

objectives for the future of the Italian Campaign. Yet, operationally and tactically,

Ralston believed that obtaining battle experience with minimal casualties was both possible and obtainable. And it was certainly possible in most circumstances, but an experienced field commander would have doubted the practicality of being able to dip one’s toe into the waters of battle without the risk of falling in. Thus, the Canadian Corps focused on absorbing through training the lessons Eighth Army had learned in four years of fighting, emphasizing, in particular, coordinated artillery plans and all-arms cooperation in order to protect the infantry from senseless casualties. It was the best thing it could have done. Meanwhile, Eighth Army worked to treat 1st Canadian Corps as any

other corps within Eighth Army, detaching Canadian units from 1st Corps HQ when

necessary, and letting the operational situation determine when and where the corps could

be used. While resentment lingered against the Canadians among Brooke, Alexander, and

Leese, that resentment re-emphasized the need for 1st Canadian Corps to focus on

operational and tactical effectiveness as an integral part of the British Eighth Army.

Overall, this training programme was a success, fostering a nascent sense of esprit de

corps between Canadian troops and Eighth Army, while undoubtedly saving many

Canadian lives from the cold Darwinian learning curve experienced by all green troops.

180

CHAPTER FIVE

“The Road to Rome and Home. Why Stop?”525 The Liri Valley Offensive, May 1944

Crerar returned to the United Kingdom to take command of First Canadian Army in March, 1944. On the 3rd, he handed over command of 1st Canadian Corps to E.L.M.

“Tommy” Burns, who would lead the corps in its first major offensive in the Liri Valley in May, 1944. Before the battle, General Leese visited the Canadians in order to rally the troops for their first full scale battle. In his staid, academic style, Burns recorded that

“these brief speeches appeared to make a good impression: the general theme was that the

Eighth Army, together with the Fifth, was about to deliver a terrific blow against the enemy, and if we did our utmost we could expect to drive him out of Italy.”526 Leese’s predictions were over-stated for effect, but they were also misleading about the facts.

While Churchill, especially, wanted the Allies to capture Rome and push the enemy into

Northern Italy, it was no longer their main strategic objective. Rather, it was to attrit the

Germans in the shadow of Monte Cassino and in so doing, force them to draw in reserves from other theatres, thereby taking pressure off the Soviets in the east and reducing the number of divisions the invasion forces would encounter in France. A new offensive was planned for spring, in which a homogenous 1st Canadian Corps would play an important role. Held in reserve for the opening attack on the Gustav Line, the corps was to smash through the Hitler Line and lead an armoured break-out, chewing up the German forces,

525 Traffic sign on Highway 6 in the Liri Valley near Frosinone. No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section War Diary, 1 March 1944. 526 Burns, General Mud, 142. 181

and, while doing so, opening the road to Rome. It was the corps’ first battle and therefore the first meaningful test of the Anglo-Canadian command relationship in Italy.

After February 1944, the strategic indecision plaguing the Italian Campaign began to subside (at least temporarily). The winter attacks on the German defences in the

Gustav Line at Monte Cassino had been driven back by Kesselring’s stalwart defences, and the Allies were still stuck in the Anzio bridgehead. London was disappointed by the slow progress. “No doubt the difficulties were great,” Kennedy wrote to Leese during the

Second Battle for Cassino, “but at this distance it seems hard to understand why the

Germans were given so much time to bring up reinforcements and adjust their dispositions before a heavy blow could be struck.”527 A month later during the Third

Battle for Cassino he was singing the same tune: “The Cassino battle does not seem to be moving very fast at the moment. It is indeed a tough problem and the Bosche is certainly hanging on very obstinately.”528

The Germans were certainly “hanging on” and Alexander had finally realised as much. Kesselring intended to have his armies stand and fight south of Rome, as per

Hitler’s instruction to him in October.529 His Special Order read to all ranks on 24

January stated that, “The Gustav Line must be held at all costs for the sake of the political

527 Kennedy to Leese, 1 February 1944, Leese Papers. 528 Kennedy to Leese, 17 March 1944, Ibid. 529 Graham and Bidwell, Tug of War, 104. 182

consequences which would follow a completely successful advance. The Fuhrer expects

the bitterest struggle for every yard.”530

Alexander and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General A.F. Harding, sought to capitalise on Hitler’s obsession with holding ground, and use the German defensive strategy to achieve a strategic victory. In an “Appreciation” circulated to all the top brass—Supreme Allied Commander Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet Sir John Cunningham, Commander of the Mediterranean Allied

Tactical Air Force Major General John Cannon, and Generals Leese and Clark—on 22

February, Alexander outlined his objective as “to force the enemy to commit the

maximum number of divisions to operations in Italy at the time Overlord is launched.”531

The attack would begin approximately 15-21 days before the Normandy landings.532 In

the Cassino sector, which two offensives had still failed to capture, his aims were bold.

“The most effective way of making the enemy draw on other theatres for troops for

employment in Italy is…to destroy enemy formations in Italy to such an extent that they

must be replaced from elsewhere to avoid a rout. Tactical plans should therefore be

designed to bring about situations in which enemy formations can be destroyed or so

reduced in strength as to be non-effective, rather than for the primary purpose of gaining

ground.”533 Every unit was still to have tactical objectives, and Rome remained an

530 Quoted in E.A. Haines, “Canadian Operations in the Liri Valley, May-June 1944: Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 179,” 2. 531 Quoted in Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East IV: Victory in the Mediterranean, Part 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1984), 5. 532 “A.C.M.F. Appreciation No. 1, 22 Feb 44,” Major-General G.P. Walsh Papers, IWM 73/7/1 Box 2, Italy & Burma. 533 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East IV: Victory in the Mediterranean, Part 1, 6. 183

alluring political objective, but the main objective of the spring offensive was to bleed the

Germans white.

To achieve such ambitious goals, the attack had to come at the Germans’

schwerpunkt with a local superiority of three to one in infantry. This meant the Liri

Valley again, where the relatively open plain would also allow the Allies to maximise the

benefit from their superiority in armour and artillery. Alexander and Harding anticipated

that they would need, “Two corps each of three infantry divisions and one armoured brigade, and each operating on a one divisional front, [which] should be sufficient to ensure penetration on a wide enough front and to the depth necessary for exploitation by two other corps each of two infantry and one armoured divisions.”534 In the warm dry

spring using rested troops, the Allies hoped to achieve enough local superiority to crack the German defences in the Liri Valley. This would lure Kesselring’s reserves into the fray where they would be encircled and destroyed in a pincer of Fifth US and Eighth

British Armies.535

Alexander began planning for a new, stronger, spring offensive, even as the

second and third battles for Cassino were being fought in February and March. First he

regrouped his armies. All British units except for those stuck in the Anzio bridgehead,

along with the Indian, Dominion and Polish Divisions, were to be brought under Eighth

Army. All American and French divisions were grouped under the Fifth Army. Plus, the

army boundary would shift west. Eighth Army would move into the Liri Valley to face

Monte Cassino, while the Fifth Army controlled the Aurunci mountains, coastal sector,

534 Ibid. 535 Eddy, “1st Canadian Infantry Diversion and Operation CHESTERFIELD,” 34. 184

and Anzio bridgehead. This shift was planned for March, while a concurrent attack by the

New Zealanders kept the Germans focused on Monte Cassino.

Alexander’s logic in his planning was straightforward,

Apart from reasons of terrain and to distribute control and responsibilities more evenly between the two Armies[,] I am regrouping to give the stronger Army HQ [Eighth Army] the task of staging and conducting our main thrust up the Liri [V]alley which is the only suitable ground in which we can deploy our great superiority in tanks and artillery when [the] ground firms up sufficiently for their employment.”536

Eighth Army was to lead the coordinated offensive on the Gustav Line, by

approaching “the Gustav-Hitler-Monastery heights positions as a whole.”537 Leese’s

army was lined up north to south fronting the German defences. The 10th Corps held the

northern shoulder of Cassino, while the Polish Corps fronted Cassino, and would launch

the main attack to capture the Montecassino Abbey, which dominated the entire valley.

13th Corps was moved to the southernmost flank of Eighth Army’s front, poised to break

over the Gustav Line and advance into the Liri Valley. Together, 13th British and the

Polish Corps would break the Gustav Line, secure the Abbey, and cross the Rapido and

Garigliano Rivers. 1st Canadian Corps would be in reserve, slated to push through 13th

Corps and break through the Hitler Line in the Liri Valley. This would be followed by an armoured breakout into the valley beyond, which would open the road to Rome.538 As

Leese’s army drove north, Alexander’s plan was for the U.S. Fifth Army to finally break

out of the Anzio bridgehead, while the Corps Expéditionnare Français (CEF) advanced

through Aurunci Mountains on the southern flank of the Liri Valley, and the 2nd US

536 Alexander to Brooke MA 1125, [Estimated] 1 March 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/14. 537 Graham and Bidwell, Tug of War, 255. 538 Ibid., 255-256. 185

Corps moved up the Tyrrhenian coast. With Clark’s army advancing east toward

Valmontone, the objective was to cut off and destroy the bulk of Albert Kesselring’s

armies in Italy. “If this flank is successful and gets as far as Valmontone,” said

Alexander, “it may well be decisive and lead to the destruction of all the German forces

between the bridgehead and the main battle front.”539

540 Figure 2: The Re-organised Italian Front, May 1944

For the first time since it had arrived in theatre, the spring offensive in the Liri

Valley provided an operational purpose for 1st Canadian Corps in Italy. Indeed, having previously protested that Eighth Army needed infantry, not armour, the defences of the

Gustav and Hitler Lines, coupled with the strategic objective of decimating the German

539 Notes by General Alexander for Army Commanders Conference, 2 April 1944, quoted in Haines, “Canadian Operations in the Liri Valley,” 13. 540 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, Map 19 insert p. 524. 186

defenders, instead emphasized the very need for armour. When Alexander wrote his

appreciation in February, he had three armoured divisions, one of which was the 5th

Canadian Armoured Division.541 Alexander repeated the importance of armour to

Churchill on 20 March, after the Prime Minister questioned why the Liri Valley was the

only place that AAI kept “butting at.”542

Along the whole of the main battle front from the Adriatic to the South coast there is only the Liri Valley leading direct to Rome which is suitable terrain for the deployment of our superiority in artillery and armour. The main highway known as route six is the only road except cart tracks which leads from the mountains where we are into the Liri Valley over the Rapido River and this exit into the plain is blocked and dominated by Monte Cassino on which stands the Monastery.543

The re-grouping of formations had started in early March. 1st Canadian Corps

handed over its sector on the Adriatic to 5th Corps, and moved into reserve near Termoli.

5th Canadian Armoured Division also moved out of the line toward Lucera, and was re-

joined by the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade a week later. For the moment, 1st Canadian

Infantry Division remained in the line, but it too would move inland in time to prepare for

the spring offensive.

The new-found operational relevance ramped up training. Burns turned to the

experienced officers in his command, and on 21 March 1944, 1st Canadian Division was

asked to supply 10 officers and 54 NCOs to 1st Canadian Corps to help “improve the standard of training” by discussing lessons learned and training practices. The attendees were then to return to their respective units and share the lessons, and in this way the

541 Malony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, 6. 542 Churchill to Alexander, 20 March 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/15. 543 Alexander to Churchill, 20 March 1944, Ibid. 187

trickle down learning would improve the training throughout the corps.544 On 28 March

1944, in “Training Instruction No. 3: Drill for Tank and Infantry Cooperation –

[Squadron] and [Company] Basis”, 1st Canadian Corps instructed a “common basis

between [squadron] and [company] commands” was to be found and “a plan must be

evolved which will include all the necessary details” for all-arms coordination.545 A

major training exercise was staged at Lucera, where 1st Division worked with the British

25th Tank Brigade, which had been attached to 1st Canadian Corps in anticipation of the spring offensive on the Hitler Line. The focus was infantry-tank coordination on the

squadron-battalion levels.546 The five foci of training were stipulated as:

(a) Attack by [tanks] and [infantry] (b) Action on the objective with [tanks] in the anti-tank role and in the counter- attack role. (c) Passage of minefields. (d) Co-operation with [Anti-tank] guns including towing. (e) The Churchill tank to all and maintenance problems to [officers].547

On 26 March, 1st Canadian Corps issued a possible sequence of events for a

deliberate corps attack, sketching out what would happen in the 8-10 days before D-Day,

then 5-7 days, and finally on each of the 4 days before the attack. Throughout the entire

period, deliberate movements, facilitated by a knowledge of enemy dispositions, would

help artillery, engineers and air support do their preparatory work. Communication

between senior officers would ensure that the plans were followed and, when necessary,

544 1st Canadian Infantry Division War Diary, 21 March 1944. 545 Ibid., April 1944. 546 Co-operative Trg with 1 Cdn Inf Div,” Ibid., 30 April 1944. 547 “Tactical Training with Tanks,” Carleton and York Regiment War Diary, May 1944, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 15,050. 188

adapted, leading to the final conference with all staff officers down to grade II and commands down to regimental and battalion or equivalent, as far as possible.548

In April, 5th Canadian Armoured Division conducted two “battle drills”:

“Sluggem” and “Thruster.” Bert Hoffmeister had assumed command of the division upon

Burns’ promotion to corps. During “Sluggem,” Hoffmeister organized a TEWT in which rifle company and tank squadron officers worked together in syndicates to plan attacks, which were then executed in dry runs. The purpose of “Sluggem,” according to Delaney, was “to develop sound procedures for infantry-tank cooperation, which meant working on methods for communication, command and control, target indication, and battle procedure.”549 Battalions rehearsed netting armour wireless sets to infantry.550 “Thruster” was a live-fire division rehearsal of the skills and concepts developed in Sluggem.

Hoffmeister grouped infantry and tank regiments together in what were foreseeable organizational possibilities, ensuring that his troops were familiar with broad methods of cooperation that could then be applied in whichever organization he envisioned.551

Creating command and operational flexibility was key, and this required training and familiarity between the different combat arms.

The Canadians’ operational relevance and coordinated training scheme, along with the absence of political meddling from London and Ottawa, not surprisingly corresponded with a noticeable improvement in Leese’s opinion of the Canadians and

Burns. On 6 April, Leese visited the Canadian Corps headquarters, where he and Burns

548 “Preparations for Orders for a Deliberate Corps Attack. Possible Sequence of Events,”1st Canadian Corps G Branch War Diary, 26 March 1944. 549 Delaney. The Soldiers’ General, 127. 550 “1 Cdn Corps Training Instruction No. 3,” 1st Canadian Corps War Diary, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,687. 551 Delaney. The Soldiers’ General, 127. 189

discussed Eighth Army’s plan for the Liri, as well as those on adjacent fronts. Leese told

Burns that he intended to bring the Canadian corps together in preparation for the

offensive, although in the short term it meant some regrouping and a dispersion of

subordinate formations from Burns’ command.552 With his eye fixed on preparing for the

corps-attack, Burns rightly did not object. Later that week Burns attended a Corps

Commanders’ conference at Eighth Army to learn more about the plan. He also presented

some of the detailed staff studies he planned for Operation “Honker.” Burns then spent

the rest of the week travelling between Canadian units discussing their plans for future

operations.553 Leese was pleased, and wrote to John Kennedy in London on 16 April that

“The Canadians under Burns are developing into a very fine Corps. He is an excellent

Commander and will, I feel sure, do well in battle. Hochmeister [sic] is turning out [to

be] a very good Armoured Divisional Commander. I am very pleased with the Corps

generally. I liked Crerar very much as a man, but I am sure that Burns is a better soldier.

He also gets on better with the Divisional Generals.”554 The 5th Canadian Armoured

Brigade, he believed, now had a good brigade commander in J.D.B. Smith, concluding

that “[t]hey are inexperienced but keen to learn.”555 Kennedy was delighted with the progress of the planning, and with the spirit of cooperation in Eighth Army, writing to

Leese that, “What you say about the camaraderie developing among your many nationalities is good hearing. The possible repercussions of such a wide selection of races are not forgotten here and you must be very pleased to see so good a result from your

552 Lt.-Gen E.L.M. Burns Personal War Diary , 6 April 1944, LAC RG 24 Vol. 17,507. 553 Ibid., 11-14 April, 1944. 554 Leese to Kennedy, 16 April 1944, Leese Papers. 555 Ibid. 190

regrouping.”556 After a long and arduous process the Canadians had earned a modicum of

British respect, but the proof would be in the pudding: combat.

The planning for the Corps’ assault against the Hitler Line proceeded smoothly throughout the month of April. Leese and Burns continued to work closely together.

Before the battle opened on 16 May, Burns met with the Army Commander or his Chief

of Staff at least twelve times, and he coordinated with Major-General Kirkman of 13th

Corps for the planned leapfrog of Kirkman’s divisions by the Canadians, once the Gustav

Line had been pierced.557 Burns was meticulous, and this was reflected in his planning

process. His Aide de Camp remembered him taking frequent flights to reconnoitre the

battlefield, and crawling up a mountain so that he could see the valley in detail for

himself.558 He then took that reconnaissance and translated it into detailed operational

plans.

Burns was given two scenarios to prepare for. If all went well in 13th Corps’

sector, 1st Canadian Corps was to pass through it into the Liri Valley via Highway 6—the

only major road in the valley—as the general axis toward Ceprano and Rome. If, however, 13th Corps met heavy opposition, 1st Corps was to attack and break through the

Hitler Line in conjunction with 13th Corps.559 Burns only expected the first option to be

implemented if the Germans were on the verge of withdrawing, in which case the

armoured division would lead the advance. Alternatively, and more likely, the corps

would have to breach the Hitler Line alongside 13th Corps. The plan for this alternative

556 Kennedy to Leese, 28 April 1944, Ibid. 557 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 83. 558 Granatstein interview with J. Douglas Crashley, 14 May 1991, Granatstein Papers. 559 “Planning Notes, Operation ‘Honker’ – Skeleton Appreciation by GOC 1 Cdn Corps,” Burns Personal War Diary, 11 April 1944. 191

called for five phases: first, the advance to contact with the Hitler Line; second, the break

through; third, the advance from the Hitler Line to seize bridgeheads over the Melfa

River (the breakout phase); fourth, the advance from Melfa to the Arce-Ceprano line; and

lastly, the exploitation to Frosinone and beyond.560 The 1st Canadian Infantry Division

would pierce the Hitler Line, supported by tanks of the 25th Army Tank Brigade, and then

the 5th Canadian Armoured Division would break out toward the Melfa River.

Parts of Burns’ preparations were wanting, as Delaney has outlined in detail.561

For example, traffic control would be important in a narrow valley with only one

highway. While there was “some informal discussion of” the possibility of having one

corps control all traffic movements, there was no formal action.562 Burns did not follow

up. He also alienated some of his subordinates, micro-managing battle preparations and

failing to hold officers accountable when they underperformed. The Corps Commander

developed a reputation for finding fault but never firing anyone, even when warranted,

“reinforcing the perception that he was weak-willed.”563

He did, however, remind his brigadiers about the importance of conserving manpower once the Canadians’ got into action. The issue of reinforcements was indeed an important one, and it was the task of each commander to try and limit those casualties.

Burns warned his officers that, “if cas[ualties] occur at the assumed rate, we shall be completely out of [reinforcements] by the middle of Jul[y]” and “no further

[reinforcements] to speak of can be expected before [the return of the men currently in

560 Ibid. 561 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 81. 562 Ibid., 83. 563 Ibid., 84. 192

hospital], due to priorities in the other theatres.”564 The nature of the battle and terms of

victory were explained bluntly in a section titled “The War of Attrition.” “If we destroy

the bulk of the trained German power in this theatre, while keeping up our own effective

org[anisation] and our str[ength] in the ranks, we shall gain the victory we want,” he

explained. “The vital factor might be termed the conservation of trained soldiers. This is particularly important in the inf[antry] and arm[oure]d corps, which are the assaulting arms, and on which the brunt of battle cas[ualties] must fall.” His focus thereafter was not on minimizing combat casualties, as “obviously in battle it is every com[ander]’s object to avoid cas[ualties] to his own t[roo]ps and cause the maximum to the enemy,” so instead he focused on minimising avoidable disease and dealing with exhaustion cases.565

From Burns’ perspective, he was poised to lead the 1st Canadian Corps into

action, as part of a coordinated Eighth Army offensive. While the political pressure to get

into action had long since eased, the attack on the Liri would still mark the first major

offensive of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, and he had planned and

prepared for the battle in a way that had begun to earn him and his corps the respect of

Eighth Army. In doing so, he had done his best to integrate the political and operational

objectives assigned to him. He would not get all Canadian units in the theatre under his

command, however. 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade566 was held in high esteem in Eighth

Army, and would not be reserved solely for the Canadian Corps. Indeed, the brigade

supported the 8th Indian Army in their attack over the Gustav Line. In the follow up, two

564 “Notes for Talk to Brigs on Necessity For Economy of Manpower,” 11 May 1944, Burns’ Personal War Diary. 565 Ibid. 566 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade had been re-designated 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade. 193

regiments were used in support of the 78th Division, while the Three Rivers Regiment

provided support for Vokes’ 1st Canadian Infantry Division along with the 25th Army

Tank Brigade.567 Even so, the Corps historian wrote as the battle was happening that,

“there was a special and historic importance att[ached] to this momentous occasion. The

reputation of [Canadian] arms and the hopes and expectations of the people of Canada

and of the Commonwealth as a whole, and those of the United Nations, hung upon the

outcome of this first h[eav]y blow struck by [Canadian] t[roo]ps fighting together as a

Corps.”568

The multi-army, multi-corps, multi-national assault on the Gustav Line opened on

11 May. Churchill wished the Allied Armies in Italy well: “All our immediate hopes are

with you in what I trust and believe will be a decisive battle fought to a finish and having

for its object the destruction….of the Armed Forces of the enemy south of Rome.”569 On

the coast, U.S. 2nd Corps fought over a series of reverse slopes through a range of hills

paralleling the Gari River, and faced the 71st Light Infantry and 94th German Infantry

Divisions. By dawn, the corps had advanced towards the town of Santa Maria, and

pushed on toward the Petrella escarpment. In the Aurunci Mountains, General Alphonse

Juin led his Corps Expéditionnare Français toward the high points of Monte Majo and

Monte Fuci. Although initially halted, the French units regrouped and captured Monte

Majo, and on the left flank the 1st Motorized Infantry Division captured San Apollinare and San Giogrio along the banks of the Liri. The capture of these positions forced

567 Bidwell and Graham, Tug of War, 289. 568 No. 1 Canadian Field Historical Section, War Diary, 23 May 1944. 569 Churchill to Alexander, May 1944, Alexander Papers, TNA WO 214/15. 194

Kesselring to commit his mobile reserves, the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, to try and

halt the French advance.570

In the meantime, the Poles had attacked the Abbey, but their first move on 13

May was halted by the Germans. 4th British Infantry Division had similarly bad luck,

when their attack around the town of Cassino stalled as the sappers working to bridge the

river were driven to ground before their work was completed. After several days of heavy fighting with few gains, 13th Corps decided to commit the 78th Division into the

bridgehead to renew the attack on the Gustav Line in conjunction with the Poles’ next

attack on the monastery. Only the 8th Indian Division supported by the 1st Canadian

Armoured Brigade managed to cross the Gari River in front of Sant’ Angelo.

Although the Allied gains had prompted Kesselring to commit some of his reserves to the preservation of the Gustav Line, he still believed that a major amphibious assault was yet to come. The three failed attempts at Cassino and the previous landings at

Salerno and Anzio had convinced Kesselring that the main allied effort would be on the coast. “Alexander could [not] be satisfied for much longer with the slow and costly way the Allied front was edging forward,” he later wrote. “Sooner or later he must surely end it by a landing,” which made Kesselring wary of committing his forces to the Eighth

Army front.571 “The [enemy] corps expects an expansion of the battle through a landing

operation,” an Allied assessment of German intentions said. “It is believed the enemy

will carry out such an operation once be believes that the coastal forces have been moved

570 Eddy, “1st Canadian Infantry Division and Operation Chesterfield,” 65. 571 Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier’s Record (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970. First print 1953), 231. 195

to the focal points of the land front.”572 This was to the Allies’ advantage. As Leese

wrote, “They’ve [the Germans] been a bit sticky today, but each day we get on farther

and the Boches is getting very stretched and knocked about.”573

On 14 May, Burns was informed that the 8th Indian Division had captured

Pignataro, and that Leese had decided to commit the Canadians to battle on the left flank

of 13th Corps.574 As Bidwell and Graham wrote, “[Leese] had one faculty essential if a

commander has to be something better than un bon chef ordinaire: flair, or what the

Germans call a ‘fingertip-feeling’. When he decided to insert the Canadian Corps into the battle his timing was perfect.”575 The German LI Mountain Corps had begun a fighting

retreat to the Hitler Line. To the Canadians’ advantage, their location was not discovered by German intelligence until the eve of battle. Duped by Allied deception efforts, the

Germans believed that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was somewhere near Salerno.

The 5th Canadian Armoured Division was thought to be in reserve under the Polish

Corps.576 This advantage would go only so far, however. Still fearing an amphibious

attack, and still in control of the Cassino ridge-line, the Germans felt they could contain the Allied advance by fighting a stiff retreat to their Hitler Line defence. As such, from

15 May on, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was committed to fighting the Germans in

front of the Hitler Line, rather than in it.

572 Capt. Steiger “Report No. 20, Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters. The Italian Campaign (4 Jan 44-4 Jun 44). Information from German Military Documents regarding Allied Operations in general and Canadian Operations in Particular,” 19 July 1948, AQHQ Rpt D 20, DHH. 573 Leese to his wife, 17 May 1944, Leese Papers. 574 Burns’ Personal War Diary, 14 May 1944. 575 Graham and Bidwell, Tug of War, 282. 576 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 393. 196

577 Figure 3: Breaking the Gustav and Hitler Lines, 11-23 May 1944

These were days of hard fighting for 1st Canadian Infantry Division, which faced determined German defenders as well as concentrated enemy artillery and mortar fire.

“On this congested battlefield there was no safety anywhere,” recounts the Royal

Canadian Regiment regimental historian.578 While one Canadian historian compliments the leading 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade for their “excellent battalion level fire and movement” against a stalwart German fighting retreating,579 at the time Leese was unimpressed, and urged Burns to get them moving. Burns relayed the message to Vokes that the army commander was “disappointed that no greater progress was made in the

577 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, Map 13, insert page 424. 578 G.R. Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, Vol. Two 1933-1966 (London: London Printing & Lithographing, 1967), 136. 579 Eddy, “1st Canadian Infantry Division and Operation Chesterfield,” 81. 197

face of quite light opposition and is very urgent that a determined advance should be

made tomorrow.”580 This was especially in comparison to “Kirkie and his people,” who

“have done magnificently.”581 Still, Leese “only wish[ed] we could get on quicker, but

the country is close and difficult, and the Boches fights very well.”582 Burns urged Vokes

to “send [his] b[riga]des f[or]w[ar]d with great determination.”583

On the 19th, which Leese wrote was a “disappointing day,”584 the army

commander called Burns to his Tac HQ, where he informed the Canadian commander

that “in view of the breakthrough to the Hitler line by the DERBY YOE south of Aquino,

13 Corps would try to exploit the breach.”585 The 78th Division had launched an attack to

secure Highway 6 and join up with the Polish Corps, and their carriers and support tanks

had managed to get into the highway area.586 With this progress in mind, and despite the

heavy casualties that 13th Corps had suffered in two of its three divisions, Leese decided to split the 4-mile wide Liri Valley with only one major highway between two corps, and send 1st Canadian and 13th Corps into the Liri. This plan would impose real and serious

constraints on the Canadian advance—already derided for its slow pace. The open “tank

country” of the Liri was far more difficult when viewed from this ground. As

Commanding Officer of the Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians), Philip Griffin

wrote, “Fire and movement was difficult as squadrons ofttimes moved… through sunken

580 Burns to Vokes, Burns’ Personal War Diary, 16 May 1944. 581 Leese to his wife, 17 May, Leese Papers. 582 Ibid. 583 Burns to Vokes, Burns’ Personal War Diary, 16 May 1944. 584 Leese to his wife, 19 May 1944, Leese Papers. 585 Burns’ Personal War Diary, 18 May 1944. 586 “Operation Instruction No. 9,” 1st Canadian Corps GS Branch War Diary, 17 May 1944. 198

roads and cross traffic creeks.”587 Lieutenant Perkins, commander of the Strathcona’s reconnaissance squadron, later wrote that the roads had been reduced to mud by the heavy rainfall, making the forward movement of tanks very difficult.588 Engineers would have to play a prominent role overcoming these obstacles, while infantry support lessened the vulnerability of tanks as they traversed this difficult terrain.589 The realities of the ground did not, however, encourage Burns to disagree with the Army Commander; instead he visited Kirkman, and they consulted on the corps boundary, which would be between the Forme D’Aquino and the Melfa River.590 Burns then spent part of the 20th coordinating with Leese and Kirkman.591 As they did so, 13th Corps continued to press forward in contact with the northern section of the Hitler Line, to protect their right flank from the high ground North of Highway 6, the town of Aquino. The 8th Indian Division was brought back into the forward area, with this objective in mind.592

No one noticed that they had made a serious operational mistake, which should have been realised at the time. Two corps each operating on a one-division front, with the same enemy strongpoints harassing both, and sharing the same road network, added a level of bureaucracy and staff work that would have taken the closest coordination and near-perfect conditions to overcome. Despite the numerous corps conferences and corps- army conferences that had taken place in anticipation of the offensive and as the battle

587 Colonel P.G. Griffin, “Italian Interlude (Fourth installment of the Author’s experiences in the Italian campaign),” 3, The Lord Strathcona’s Horse Regiment Archives, The Military Museums (TMM), P. Griffin Records/Pers. File (Biography). 588 Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers, 264. 589 Lt. E.J. Perkins, “Account of Action,” 6-7, The Lord Strathcona’s Horse Archives, TMM, E. Perkins Records/Pers. File (Articles). 590 Burns Personal War Diary, 18 May 1944. 591 Ibid. 20 May 1944. 592 “Operation Instruction No. 10,” Ibid., 20 May 1944. 199

raged, coordination was not seamless. Delaney places the blame squarely on Leese’s shoulders, “The fact that 13th Corps and 1st Canadian Corps each had different code

names for major routes [“Heart” for the Canadians and “Spade” for the British] indicates

clearly that the army headquarters had failed to manage route control.593

The controversial decision has prompted much speculation in the literature as to

Leese’s real motives for doubling up in the Liri, rather than simply putting the 78th

Division under Burns. Terry Copp blames prejudice, writing that “Leese, who in common

with other senior British officers had opposed the creation of 1st Cdn. Corps, was not

willing to allow Burns and his staff the opportunity to direct the battle.”594 There is

certainly credence to this conclusion. Despite Leese’s apparent pre-battle confidence in

Burns, he was always acutely aware of the fact that this was Burns’ first battle. As the

battle progressed, Leese wrote that although the Canadian Corps HQ was “settling

down…it takes time to get these things going.”595 At times, he micromanaged Burns.596

However, it is also important to consider that other operational considerations

may have weighed on Leese’s decision. Alexander’s original appreciation had called for

a two corps attack, and the plan was also known to Kennedy and Brooke in London.597

Plus, in the months prior to the Liri offensive, the 78th Division had been rebuilt from the

ground up. The division had been badly mauled by the battle on the Sangro in 1943, and

593 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 85. 594 Terry Copp, “Advancing on the Hilter Line: Army, Part 74,” Legion Magasine, 2008. 595 Leese to his wife, 20 May 1944, Leese Papers. 596 On the 20th, Burns told Vokes that Leese wanted him to use two brigades up, with three or four battalions in the line. This should have been Burns’ job, but, as Delaney has pointed out, Burns did not have the force of personality to make demands from his division commanders. Memo to Vokes from Burns, Burns’ Personal War Diary, 20 May 1944; Delaney, Corps Commanders, 84. 597 Kennedy to Leese, 28 April, Leese Papers. 200

afterward they had had 350 desertions in two weeks. In mid-April, the division still

remained “unbalanced.”598 Its division commander Charles Keightley—“A Corps

Commander of the future” in Leese’s mind—had done much to raise the spirit of the

division, “but like all Divisions who have been driven a little beyond bursting point, they

are taking time to recover.”599 To facilitate that recovery, Leese put the division under

Sidney Kirkman, General Officer Commanding 13th Corps. Kirkman was an artilleryman,

First World War veteran, and inter-war regular with Camberley credentials, who coordinated the fire plan at El Alamein and commanded the 50th (Northumbrian) Division

in Sicily. He was a “rather dry, strong-minded highly capable officer from Montgomery’s

stable.” 600 Like Montgomery, he expected success because he demanded it. Kirkman had

the requisite experience to earn Leese’s trust, and the power of personality to demand

it.601 Leese believed Kirkman to be “first-class” and for the Gustav Line he was “teeing

up a very difficult operation with his usual calmness, efficiency and thoroughness.”602

His conferences “created a very excellent impression and he is liked and respected by

all.”603 Kirkman realised the 78th Division was fatigued, and as such planned to use them

as his support division in the Liri operations. Since 13th Corps also participated in the

attack on the Gustav Line, this meant that operating as a follow-up division, 78th entered

the line alongside the Canadian Corps. To have taken an exhausted division from a Corps

Commander who had done yeoman work to improve their morale, and put it under the

598 Leese to Kennedy, 19 April 1944, Leese Papers. 599 Ibid. 600 Bidwell and Graham, Tug of War, 272. 601 Ibid. 602 Leese to Kennedy, 19 April 1944, Leese Papers. 603 Ibid. 201

command of the green Canadian Corps—if Leese had even considered it—might have done irreparable damage to an otherwise proven division. From the perspective of the operational effectiveness of 78th Division, and the full operational load given to 13th

Corps, the decision was in fact a reasoned one.

Of course, neither could Canadian divisions be transferred from 1st Canadian

Corps to 13th Corps. Had Leese attempted to do so, it would likely have encouraged

Burns—who otherwise was focused on his operational, rather than political responsibility—to seek political inference from the Canadian government, as it would have gone directly against their objective of having an indivisible Canadian Corps fight in the field. Ultimately then, Leese’s decision to push two corps up the narrow Liri

Valley can be attributed to a combination of experience and politics. For reasons of

Canadian sovereignty, the army commander could not strip divisions from Burns, but neither could he entrust a worn-out division to the inexperienced dominion corps with its untried commander. Instead, Leese centralized his forces under army command.

Regardless of the reasons and factors for his decision Leese added an administrative and logistical burden to the two corps moving up the Liri Valley, which would contribute to the delays and traffic problems that impeded the Canadians’ advance

On the Canadian front, 1st Canadian Infantry Division had battled its way to the foot of the Hitler Line by the 19th. Vokes decided to forego the initial plans for the operation—a set-piece division assault with two brigades up—in favour of gate-crashing the town of Pontecorvo. His decision was based on up-to-date intelligence, and Vokes hoped to avoid the costlier effects of a full-steam break-in battle. By 20 May, the French had pushed through the Hitler Line in the Aurunci mountains, and the Germans appeared

202

to be withdrawing as fast as the French were advancing. Convinced of the Germans’ imminent withdrawal, Vokes believed he could take advantage of the situation. It was a sensible approach to try and knock the defences loose and then pursue with the hope of turning a retreat into a rout. He ordered a frontal attack on Pontecorvo by 1st Canadian

Infantry Brigade supported by divisional artillery commanded by Brigadier William

Ziegler. This plan was set in motion despite the fact that Vokes’ original plans for

Operation “Chesterfield,” with two brigades up, had seemed too weak to the army commander, who had suggested it be revised as a three-brigade attack.604 Unfortunately when the battle commenced, Vokes’ artillery was caught in a traffic jam and 1st Canadian

Infantry Brigade crossed into a German killing zone without the necessary artillery support.605

After 1st Brigade’s setback, Leese insisted that the original plans for Operation

“Chesterfield” be reinstated on 23 May. This was an auspicious date. Alexander had ordered that the breakout from the Anzio beachhead be coordinated with the Corps’ breakthrough of the Hitler Line, to trap the Germans in an Allied pincer.606

604 Eddy, “1st Canadian Infantry Division and Operation Chesterfield,” 116. 605 Ibid., 123-133. 606 Bidwell and Graham, Tug of War, 293. 203

607 Figure 4: The Liri Valley Offensive, 11 May-4 June 1944

1st Canadian Corps’ Intelligence had informed its divisions that the 29th Panzer

Grenadier Regiment, one of only two German mobile reserves left in Italy, had been committed against the Fifth U.S. Army. 5th Canadian Armoured Division optimistically

said that, “Great hopes exist of trapping all these German divisions between the Adolph

Hitler Line and Rome.”608 However, it was in this attack that the knock-on effects of

Leese’s decision were now felt. The advance of two corps through the narrow defile of

the Liri Valley impeded the progress of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, and especially hurt the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade. Given little time to reconnoitre their front or

607 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, Map 18, insert p. 524 608 5th Canadian Armoured Division GS Branch War Diary, 23 May 1944. 204

marry up with their supporting armour from the 25th Army Tank Brigade, the western

Canadian brigade suffered the full effects of concentrated, well-sited German fire coming

from the German strongpoint at Aquino, which was located in 13th Corps’ sector. The

PPCLI, for example, lost all but 77 men in their attack at the Forme d’Aquino, a gully

featuring defiladed enemy machine guns. Communications broke down, and the tanks of

the 25th Army Tank Brigade were held back by a minefield and anti-tank fire from the

other side of the Forme—across the 13th Corps’ boundary—knocking out 41 of 58 tanks.609

78th Division had launched a concurrent, “feint” attack in front of Aquino to try and divert fire away from the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, while 1st Canadian Corps

artillery supported by air formations were employed in the Canadian sector, along with

tank and field artillery to locate and neutralize enemy gun positions.610 13th Corps was

“NOT to attack the Hitler Line but [was] to deceive the enemy into thinking [the] main

attack [would] be directed along Highway 6. After the Hitler Line has been breached the

adv[ance] will be resumed on a two corps front with right 13 Corps and left 1 [Canadian]

Corps.”611 The attack was only slated to last an hour, which was believed to be enough

time to relieve pressure on the advancing Canadians.612 However this hour-long feint was

not conducted in enough strength to help the Canadian advance. Indeed, the main artillery

raining on the Canadian position from the town of Aquino was in the British sector,

meaning that Burns could not properly direct enough concentrated artillery fire onto

609 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 92. 610 “Operation Instruction No. 10,” 1st Canadian Corps GS Branch War Diary, 20 May 1944. 611 “Operation Order No. 1,” Ibid., 22 May 1944. 612 Eddy, “1st Canadian Infantry Division and Operation Chesterfield,” 157. 205

Aquino to prevent the German defences from pinning down 2nd Canadian Infantry

Brigade. The 78th Division’s feint, intended to draw fire from Aquino, was too weak to

compensate for the boundary problem, and they were not slated to launch a larger assault

until success was achieved in the Canadian sector.613

As the battle got underway, Burns quickly realised the essential problem and told

his CCRA Brigadier E. Plow to neutralize the Aquino area. Plow passed the task to

Ziegler, who—knowing only the map grid square and no specific targets, requested that

Eighth Army fire a “William” target, with all of Eighth Army guns ranged on the town of

Aquino. Kirkman consented to “an army artillery shoot on a position [in his sector] from which the German defenders were killing Canadians and their supporting tank troops.”614

It was an attempt to minimize the problem of the boundary issue and neutralise the

German strongpoint. However it came too late; great damage was inflicted on Vokes’

division while the ‘William’ was prepared and fired, slowing the speed of their advance.

As Delaney says, “Clearly, the boundary was a huge part of the problem.”615

In the midst of the offensive, Burns did not re-direct this obvious planning flaw to

the army commander, and request—or even demand—that the border be re-drawn. Burns

never qualified his inaction, but Delaney argues that “he was new to the Eighth Army

‘club,’ and he was well aware that neither Leese nor Alexander wanted a Canadian corps

headquarters.”616 His inexperience was what locked him out of the club, and to challenge

the army commander in his first battle would not have won him any friends. However, to

613 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 94. 614 Ibid. 615 Ibid. 616 Ibid., 95. 206

suffer unnecessary casualties because of a faulty plan at the army level should have demanded his immediate attention both as corps commander, and as Canadian national commander.

Despite the set-back of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Canadian Infantry Division was able to crack the Hitler Line. On 24 May, 5th Canadian Armoured Division was poised to exploit the breakthrough with a forceful thrust beyond the Melfa River to pursue and destroy the retreating Germans.617 Hoffmeister did not have a lot of space to work with when organizing his attack. The hole that Vokes’ brigade punched through the line was not big enough to move a brigade through. Hoffmeister recalled that, “I was in Chris Vokes’ headquarters right up to the time we moved off and I’ll never forget the moment when

Chris turned to me and said, ‘Bert this is the best we can do, there is not much of a hole, good luck to you.”618

Hoffmeister organised three mobile brigade groups to try and exploit the breakthrough to the Melfa River. Based on their experiences and training, these brigade groups were designed to integrate infantry and armour in a way that could maintain pressure on the retreating Germans, while supported by artillery. The 5th Canadian

Armoured Divisions’ success was mixed. While they made it to the Melfa, tank-infantry cooperation broke down. In some cases, the strength of the German defence drove the infantry to ground; in other cases, the mud-soaked secondary roads that the Canadians

617 Delaney. The Soldiers’ General, 136. 618 Ibid., 137. 207

were forced to traverse bogged down the tanks.619 In either case, progress was slower

than anticipated. Plus, the Germans continued to put up frantic resistance, because, as one

Canadian diarist put it, they faced “the prospect of a walk over the mountains, should

they wish to break off the fight and rejoin the main body.”620 The Lieutenant-Colonel of the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards later wrote that,

No one knows anything for certain and it is the unexpected which generally happens. Supply trucks join a column and find that they are in an enemy convoy. Infantrymen form up for the attack and discover that the objective is held by their own troops. Medical orderlies, on their way to the rear with wounded, pass through strongly held enemy positions and wave greetings, thinking that they are in their own reserve areas. Men are captured and in ten minutes accept the surrender of their captors. And above all fear, exhaustion, and lack of information rises over an insistent demand for speed, speed and more speed – deep into the rear of the enemy, to strike at his supplies, spread confusion wider and wider, turn his retreat into a rout and prevent him from forming another line.”621

The Germans used the ground to maximum effect with its natural funnels that made it easy for small numbers to hold up the Canadian advance. German snipers and infantry units combed the orchards, and the main roadways to the Melfa were festooned with mines.622

5th Canadian Armoured Division sent only fragmentary information back to

Burns’ headquarters about their progress, prompting Brigadier General Staff G.A.

McCarter to write on 25 May that, “It is a hopeless task to try and get any information out of HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div. They are behaving like complete amateurs. We have to badger

619 Christine E. Leppard, “Task Forces: Making Canadian Amour Operationally Effective in Italy, 1943- 1944,” in New Perspectives on Canada in the Section World War: Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, No. 6 (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2012), 117-120. 620 “78 Div Intelligence Summary No. 177,” 24 May 1944, Three Rivers Regiment War Diary, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 18,207. 621 Quoted in Mark Zuehlke. The Liri Valley: Canada’s World War II Breakthrough to Rome (Vancouver, BC: Stoddart, 2001), 336. 622 The Citation for P. Griffins DSO, Lord Strathcona’s Horse Regiment Archives, TMM, Griffin Records/Pers. File (Biography). 208

them continually about sending back information and even that seldom produces

results.”623 While Burns’ struggled to get information from Hoffmeister about the disposition of his forces, Leese in the meantime decided to continue the advance on 13th

Corps front, and to do so in a way that further impeded the Canadians’ progress. On 24

May, he met with Kirkman, Burns, and the commander of the 6th British Armoured

Division, Major-General Vyvyan Evelegh, and requested that 5th Canadian Armoured

Division clear out of the Canadian Corps main artery, so that the Evelegh’s division

could be brought forward to mop up the Castrocielo and Rocasecca area on the

Canadians’ right flank.624 Copp argues that Leese’s decision to cause chaos in the

Canadians’ rear in order to push forward 6th Armoured was anchored in his desire to beat

the Americans to Rome; that he had set out from the start to move as quickly as

possible.625 Indeed, by 25 May Lucian Truscott’s 6th U.S. Corps opened the road to

Valmontone, but Clark ordered him to instead turn north and attack the Alban Hills

surrounding Rome. In doing so, Clark had sacrificed the strategic objective of the

campaign to pincer and surround the Germans, in favour of the more glamorous objective

of capturing Rome, making it the first Axis capital to be liberated.

If this was Leese’s main objective, he did not let on. Writing to the War Office on

the 26th, he spoke only of immediate operational factors. He wrote of the muddy tracks

and difficulty of moving forward, and that the Army had had great difficulty getting over

the Hitler Line and Melfa River both on 1st Canadian and 13th Corps fronts. “The

623 Quoted in Delaney, Corps Commanders, 98. 624 Burns’ Personal War Diary, 24 May 44. 625 Terry Copp, “Clash Among Generals: Army, Part 77,” Legion Magazine, July 2008. 209

Canadian Corps were a bit rusty at first in their staff work, inter-communication and traffic control. They realise their difficulties and are improving daily; and today, I am glad to say, both Corps are well across the Melfa and are driving on towards Arce on the right, and Ceprano on the left.” 626 As this two-corps attack formation had successfully

over-run the difficult position at the Forme d’Aquino, Leese decided to stick with it. “The

general Army plan is to continue with the 13th Corps on the right direct on Genazzano, and the Canadian Corps on the left directed toward Valmontone.”627 Even if Leese had been blinded by the bright lights of the Eternal City in competition with Clark, he was also certainly reacting to the Canadians’ progress, and hoped to mitigate the problem of

1st Corps with the punchy British armoured division, without realising that, at root, his unwillingness to trust Burns with the entire frontage was contributing to the traffic problems. He summed up the Army’s progress to date, on 26 May.

Kirkie has again commanded his Corps well. Burns is learning and will, I think, be good. It has been a testing time for the Canadian Corps as it has been their first mobile action. Their chief difficulties, as I have said, are staff work, inter-communication and traffic control. They are keen and will learn a great deal from this battle. Their Armoured Division did an excellent small operation in the Melfa area and showed great dash. Hoffmeister, their General, is always in the forefront of the battle – so much so that he seldom remembers about his staff duties and movement technique, and his inter- communication to the rear. But he has that inestimable asset, the will to get on at all costs. 78th Div., is as usual, excellent under Charles Keightley. Vyvian Evelegh is getting on well with 6th Armoured Div. They have only just been reconcentrated as a division and it is difficult as yet to give any opinion of them. They appear to be a magnificent division with a very decided will to get to the other end. 8th Indian Div. is, as usual, moving forward slowly but surely. 25th Army Tank Bde has fought very well. We have had certain losses in Churchill tanks, mainly I think owing to inexperience in battle. All armoured replacements have been made up, both in personnel and in tanks of all natures. Ivor-Moore, as my Brigadier A.F.V., runs a very good show.628

626 Leese to Kennedy, 26 May 1944, Leese Papers. 627 Ibid. 628 Leese to Kennedy, 26 May 1944, Leese Papers. 210

Regardless of Leese’s real motivation for moving the 6th Armoured through the

5th Canadian Armoured Divisions line of attack, the decision was devastating for

Hoffmeister, who was currently working on bringing forward a supporting infantry

brigade to help his forward units secure their position on the Melfa. Instead, Hoffmeister

had to clear the route as soon as possible. He believed it could be done by 1430 on 24

May, but it proved difficult to find areas where the vehicles could be stored off the road.

Plus, the sappers sent to clear the highway of mines had been driven to ground by sniper fire from Aquino on the 13th Corps’ front, which had not been cleared by the British artillery barrage.629 It was only around 2100 hours that 6th British Armoured Division was

cleared to advance. The obvious effect was to slow-down the assault of the 5th Canadian

Armoured Division. An attack by the Irish Regiment on 25 May had to be delayed

because the artillery was stuck in traffic, as was the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, which was to attack toward Ceprano on 26 May. Ultimately the Canadians failed to take advantage of the depleted strengths of the German 51st Mountain Corps, whose units had

been mauled in the Hitler Line.630 Leese’s tired paternalism over the Canadians’

performance was expressed to his wife on 28 May: “I went to see Burns in the morning,

and I had long talk with him. Except for our old friends of Sicily [1st Canadian Infantry

Division], his chaps are very green, but they are learning. However, it is a hard job to put

them on the right lines. We get on very well and I hope all will be well.”631 The 5th

629 Burns’ Personal War Diary, 24 May 1944. 630 The 90th Panzer Grenedier Division had been reduced to the 300 troops of the 200th Gren Reg’t and 100 men of the 361st Granadier Regiment. The 1st Para had field less than 1000 fighting troops. Delaney, Corps Commanders, 99. 631 Leese to his wife, 28 May 1944, Leese Papers 211

Canadian Armoured Division had been slow to establish a crossing over the Liri River,

but were “at last, getting tanks over” it.632

The biggest problem had been traffic congestion. Burns recorded that “bad roads

and stream crossings, congestion and unexplained delays occurred” preventing 5th

Canadian Armoured Division from clearing the point where 6th Armoured Division was

to come in, until far later than hoped.633 In the “Report on Factors which slowed up the

Eighth Army in the Liri Valley,” written after the fact by Canadian Eighth Army Liaison

Officer Lord Tweedsmuir, it was suggested that two corps on a small front brought

inevitable problems and that Burns, in his first corps battle, had not handled them well.634

The failure of staff work to stop unnecessary traffic caused suffocating grid lock, and

thereby prevented the Canadians from remaining hard on the attack. Certainly Leese’s

unfortunate, if partially explainable, decision to use 13th Corps and 6th British Armoured

Division also contributed to the chaos.

The Canadian advance continued until 31st May, when, after the capture of

Frosinone they were replaced in the line by the 6th South African Armoured Division.

Throughout the battle Leese and Burns each made mistakes: Leese remained wary of

Burns’ green corps, and he made decisions that, in turn, opened the Canadian flank to

German fire from outside of their sector, and caused traffic problems that prevented the

timely movement of infantry and artillery support. Burns, at key moments, did not

challenge the army commander. Delaney was right to conclude that, “if Burns deserved a

632 Ibid. 633 Burns’ Personal War Diary, 24 May 1944. 634 “Report on Factors which slowed up the Eighth Army in the Liri Valley from D Day to the capture of Anagni,” Liri Valley, LAC RG 24 Vol. 10, 753.

212

dressing-down for anything, it was for not playing his hand as a national commander and

telling Leese that he had no intention of executing such a foolish plan.”635

The cost of the battle to the Canadians had been high. Between 15 May and 4

June, 1st Canadian Corps incurred 3,368 casualties: 789 killed, 2463 wounded, and 116

captured. They exacted a heavy toll on the Germans in return, though, capturing more

than 1400 prisoners, and killing and wounding “an unknown, but certainly large,

number.”636

At the attack on the Hitler Line, 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters was still inexperienced, which slowed the breakout. Yet, Leese’s concern about such inexperience served to exacerbate the problem. Aside from the tough German defences, the main challenges facing the Canadian Corps were largely created by Leese. His objective was to both break-through the Hitler Line so that the Allied armies could advance on Rome, and to do so in a way that bled the German armies white. In the Canadian case, faced with the problems of reinforcements, they were to do this with a minimum of casualties. However, when Leese decided to attack the Hitler Line with two corps’, he stole from Burns the flexibility to effectively deal with German defences in a manner that both sucked in their reserves and minimized Canadian casualties. His decision to put Aquino, the site of

German artillery ranged on the Canadian advance, into 13th Corps sector, meant that 1st

Canadian Infantry Division took extremely heavy casualties before the site could be

neutralized by artillery. Moreover, the presence of two corps in a 4-mile wide valley with

635 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 100. 636 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 452. 213

only one major highway produced gridlock. Later, the difficulties of 5th Canadian

Armoured Division at the Melfa and beyond, and their communication breakdowns, furthered strained the corps’ progress.

The Canadians’ slow progress, coupled with the break through on the Anzio front, likely led Leese to hedge his bets and push 13th Corps forward, which served to make it

even more difficult for 1st Corps to advance. Ultimately, while the pre-battle training paid

dividends on the battalion level, Eighth Army demonstrated an inability to coordinate a

fluid two-corps battle. More to the point, Leese was unable to do so because he was not

clear in his own mind how best to get the job done, and had a limited appreciation of the

problems he created by jamming two corps into a narrow valley. This was heavily rooted

in his wariness about Burns’ inexperience as a corps commander.

Burns, who at no point confronted the army commander about these decisions,

failed to act like the national commander he was or the capable corps commander he

hoped to be. It would have taken great guts to stand up to the experienced Leese and

Kirkman, but Burns was tasked with protecting Canadian interests and minimizing

casualties on the tactical level. Ultimately, the tense, distrustful nature of the Anglo-

Canadian relationship which had developed in the months before the battle, especially

Leese’s concern about having a green, indivisible corps in his army, had real-time effects

on operations. The problem was cyclic: while Leese’s uneasiness about Burns’

contributed, along with operational factors, to decisions he made at the Liri, Burns’

performance—limited in part by Leese’s decisions—in turn reiterated to Leese his

concerns about Burns, and thus influenced his next operational decisions. Politics, human

214

weakness, and operational effectiveness were at play. In the end, the Canadian Corps had only mixed success at the Liri Valley.

215

CHAPTER SIX

“As soon as military considerations permit… [The Corps] should be grouped under unified Canadian command”: Re-evaluating the Italian Campaign, May-August 1944

As the Allied Armies in Italy were advancing toward Rome, Ralston was in Nova

Scotia with his constituents. He formally opened a Canadian Women’s Army Corps barracks in Halifax on 3 June, and thanked their members for taking up men’s jobs, releasing “thousands of men for active service.” More would be needed. “I do not hold with the view of some that the war is nearly over,” he remarked, “Hitler is not licked yet.”637 The Normandy Invasion three days later did little to ease Ralston’s anxiety, as the

Canadian reinforcement situation—divided as it was between two theatres—was finally

to be tested. In the meantime, the Canadian government and High Command had begun

to seriously question the manner in which the Canadian Army would fight the rest of the

war, especially in relation to its British Allies. This forced the Canadians to confront the

question of whether having 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, rather than re-united with First

Canadian Army in France, was in the country’s best interest. However, plagued by a critical inability to communicate political and operational interests in a meaningful way both within the Canadian Army and between British and Canadian allies, and by their lack of knowledge of Allied strategy in the Mediterranean Theatre, the months of June to

August were harrowing for Canada’s leadership, which added further stress to the already frayed Anglo-Canadian military relationship.

637 Article in the Halifax Chronicle, 5 June 1944, “Maritime Trip – Min. Nat. Def. – June 1944,” Ralston Papers, Vol.62. 216

The catalyst for the Canadian government’s and High Command’s renewed

interest in the Italian Campaign was, hardly surprisingly, the preparations for North-West

Europe. Through March and April, Crerar and Stuart had come to believe that General

Montgomery was failing to treat Crerar like a national commander, instead behaving as

though he was simply another army commander. At times, Crerar’s political and national

authority had been ignored by the Allied High Command.638 On 1 May, Lieutenant-

General Ken Stuart, Chief of Staff at CMHQ, wrote to Ralston outlining what he believed

needed to be done. He argued that with the invasion of Normandy impending, it was

necessary for official instructions to be issued by the Canadian Government to its army

commander, General Crerar. Stuart had already discussed the issue with Crerar, and

together they had decided that some considerations should be codified as explicit

Canadian policy for its army commander. Some of these applied to 1st Canadian Corps.

“The first being that except in cases of emergency the government would like Canadian

formations to work together under First [Canadian] Army. Second being that when an

armistice with Germany has been signed that the [Canadian] formations in western and southern Europe should be united under First [Canadian] Army.”639According to

Dickson, “The most contentious point was the difficulty of ensuring that Canadian commanders were informed of operations without prejudicing operational secrecy, but still in time to exercise their right to withdrawal Canadians if they felt it necessary.”640

638 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 249-250. 639 Stuart to Ralston, 1 May 1944, Canadian Participation Planning, Jan – July 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 38. 640 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 249-250. 217

For the next few weeks, the Canadians debated and negotiated the content of the

“Instructions” to Crerar.

These discussions led to questions about the fate of 1st Canadian Corps, and whether it was in Canada’s best interest for it to remain in Italy for the duration. On 3

May—two weeks before 1st Canadian Corps entered battle in the Liri Valley—Ralston

suggested to the Cabinet War Committee that Crerar’s instructions, “make reference to

the desirability of Canadian formations in Western and Southern Europe being united

under the Army and that this should not be restricted to the post-armistice period.”641

Rather than waiting for the end of the war, 1st Canadian Corps should rejoin First

Canadian Army whenever possible.

In the meantime, Crerar quite sensibly informed Stuart that he thought it best that

Burns should refer to him—Stuart—on any “matter of the moment” that affected the

interests of the Canadian Government. Only if the issue was something of interest to the

Canadian Army as a whole, would Crerar expect to be consulted “before consideration is

given to it by the Government of Canada.” 642 This meant Burns would mimic Crerar’s

political role in his own corps, referring to Stuart at CMHQ in cases of emergency, until

such time as the corps was re-grouped with First Canadian Army.

Stuart’s opinion that 1st Canadian Corps should rejoin the army as soon as

militarily convenient hardened over the following weeks, likely in response to

Montgomery’s ongoing recalcitrance in respecting Crerar’s special position as national

641 “May 3, 1944, Participation of Canadian forces (Army) in Western European operations,” War Committee Minutes – Extracts from on Variety of Subjects, 1940-45. Ralston Papers, Vol. 58 642 Crerar to Stuart, 15 May 1944, Crerar Papers Vol. 3. 218

commander.643 Montgomery was adamant that operational necessities would over-ride political considerations, meaning that if need be, the Canadian Army could be divided and its parts used separately. He even assumed that Mackenzie King tacitly agreed when they met in England on 18 May.644 Mackenzie King recalled that during his conversation with General Montgomery they had both—in King’s mind—agreed that Canadian

political interests would not interfere with military operations, nor would any

considerations other than military interfere with the Canadian policy in the matter of

having Canadian forces serve together.645 However, Stuart and Crerar worried that if this

sentiment went unchecked, it could ultimately undermine Crerar’s authority. Crerar felt

that as he was the only non-British or American army commander in the Allied Army, it

was for him to decide if military operations were in the best interests of his Canadian

Army. Stuart wrote to Brooke on the 18th that while he was “not anxious to tie any strings to Canadian Formations cooperating with those of the U.K. or U.S. There is one string, however, that we must insist upon and that is the right of reference to the Canadian

Government of our senior Commander in any theatre.”646

Stuart probably sensed that having a re-unified, two corps Canadian Army would

help strengthen Crerar’s position as Canadian National Commander. Draft instructions

arrived on Ralston’s desk the very next day, even as 1st Canadian Infantry Division was

643 Crerar would come to believe the same, as his relationship with Montgomery deteriorated through the summer of 1944. He wrote to Stuart on 5 September urging him to reunite 1st Canadian Corps with First Canadian Army. Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 335. 644 Ibid., 252. 645 “May 3, 1944, Participation of Canadian forces (Army) in Western European operations,” War Committee Minutes – Extracts from on Variety of Subjects, 1940-45. Ralston Papers, Vol. 58. 646 Stuart to Brooke, 18 May 1944, High Level corps collected by Lt Gen Stuart on constitutional relationship of Com 1st Cdn Army, 1944, DHH 312.009 (D59). 219

trying to breach the Hitler Line. It stated that the military purpose of having 1st Canadian

Corps in Italy was now over.

At the request of the Government of Canada certain formations of the First Canadian Army were despatched to the Mediterranean theatre with the objects at that time of increasing effectiveness of the Canadian participation in the war and obtaining battle experience. Now that those objects have been gained the Government of Canada regards it as highly desirable both from a national point of view and from the point of view of making in the present circumstances the most effective contribution and because of administrative advantages that, as soon as military consideration permit, such formations now serving in the Mediterrean [sic] theatre as well as field formation and units elsewhere, should be grouped under unified Canadian command.”647

Ralston hinted, at least, at a military justification for such thinking in the Cabinet discussion on 24 May, during which the Instructions to the Army Commander were discussed and finally approved. Mackenzie King told the cabinet about his meeting with

Montgomery and the agreement that military necessity would trump Canadian politics.

The sensibility of this argument, especially coming from the typically disinterested

Mackenzie King, is notable.648 However, Ralston replied that he did not differentiate between Canada’s national interests and Allied military interests: “it should not be forgotten that since in our view Canadians fought better together, the concentration of

Canadian formations was also a ‘military’ consideration.”649

In the final Instructions agreed to by the Cabinet that same day, Crerar’s and

Stuart’s main concerns were addressed. Crerar, in his capacity as national commander,

needed an opportunity to evaluate all operations, so that, if necessary, he could refer to

647 Emphasis added. Canadian Participation Planning, Jan – July 1944. Orders to Army Commander, 19 May 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 38. 648 As Dickson writes, this was out of character for Mackenzie King, who had every reason to prefer Crerar’s “broad national and political outlook on the army.” Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 252. 649 “May 24, 1944, Instructions to Army Commander,” War Committee Minutes – Extracts from on Variety of Subjects, 1940-45, Ralston Papers, Vol.58. 220

the Canadian government or pull the Canadians out of operations he deemed unsuitable.

In deciding whether to exercise that right, Crerar was to consider:

A) Whether in your opinion the orders and instructions issued to you by the Commander Combined Force represent in the circumstances a task for the Canadian Forces which is a practicable operation of war B) Whether in your opinion such task with the resources available is capable of being carried out with reasonable prospects of success. C) Whether in your opinion such orders instructions or task are at variance with the policy of the Canadian government D) Your appraisal of the extent of prospective losses to the Canadian Force in relation to the importance of the results prospectively to be achieved E) The effect of such withdrawal in preventing the success of the operation as a whole F) All other factors which you may consider relevant.650

In short, as national commander Crerar was to do his best to protect Canada’s vulnerabilities, namely Canadian manpower and sovereignty. The tone of the passage that referred to the fate of 1st Canadian Corps was tempered, however. It became, instead:

Now that these objects have been gained the Government of Canada regards it as highly desirable that, as soon as military considerations permit, such formations now serving in the Mediterranean theatre as well as field formation and units elsewhere, should be grouped under unified Canadian command.’”651

Reference to the administrative advantages of re-uniting the army had been removed. Even so, Ralston agreed with the sentiment in the original version, as there were real advantages to bringing the 1st Canadian Corps back to England. The reinforcement system that had been set up in the winter was keeping two months’ reserves in Italy during quiet periods, but only one month in heavy fighting. In January, the Army had calculated that 48,000 reinforcements or 4,000 per month in the calendar year of 1944 would meet the army’s needs.652 Before the high casualty rates of

650 Emphasis added. Murchie to Stuart on the Instructions to Crerar, May 1944, Crerar Papers Vol. 3. 651 MG 27 III B11 Vol. 38 Ralston Fonds, Ralston to Brigadier Gibson, 24 May 1944. 652 “Canadian Participation Planning, Jan – July 1944,” Stuart Papers Vol. 1. 221

Normandy were felt, hopes were high that the numbers calculated and system devised would hold up, and the Canadian Army would have adequate reinforcements for both theatres. On 2 June, Stuart wrote to Murchie, who as of May had replaced Stuart as the

Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa, that, “with our present reserves and a continuation of present flow from Canada, I am confident that we can meet demands during [the] next four months giving priority of course to 21 Army Group over AAI.” 653

However, Stuart also informed Murchie that the forecasts for the Western

European theatre for the first half of 1945 were received from the War Office. While tentative, they were based on the very likely possibility that the war would last into 1945.

For the moment, the forecast did not call for immediate action, as “the next three or four months…will indicate whether or not the war with Germany will continue to 1945.” In the meantime the Canadian Army had enough reinforcements in both theatres, but Stuart thought that steps should be taken to divert men from static units into the reinforcement stream.654 In Italy, Brigadier Weeks, Officer Commanding Canadian Section GHQ 1st

Echelon, had already ordered that in the future all reinforcements for GHQ and Line of

Communication Troops be drawn from a pool of men reallocated by the Standing

Medical Board. Healthy men would go to the front.655

For now the system was holding up, but Stuart suggested a preliminary analysis of the situation at the end of June, once the success (or not) of the Normandy invasion was known.656 Of course, North West Europe had to be the priority for reinforcements and, as

653 Stuart to Murchie, 2 June 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 58. 654 Ibid. 655 Canadian Section GHQ 1 Echelon, War Diary, 23 May 1944. 656 Stuart to Murchie, 2 June 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 58. 222

Stuart would later write, the “provision of trained reinforcements [was] complicated by

[the] division [of the army] between 2 theatres. This restricted [the] use of approximately

1/3 of reinforcements to [the] Italian theatre alone. Transportation to Italy made desirable endeavour always to maintain 2 months’ reserve there. This reserve [was] therefore not available to draw on to meet more pressing needs in Normandy during [a] period [of] high casualties of Infantry there from June onwards.”657 Having 1st Canadian Corps transferred out of Italy to join First Canadian Army would alleviate some of the stress on this system.

In the meantime, Crerar and Stuart continued to have problems with Montgomery.

Montgomery believed that his opinion was supported by Mackenzie King, and told Stuart that he was not willing to agree that Crerar had any operational responsibility for

Canadian troops serving temporarily in another army, essentially refuting that he was the national commander for all Canadians in 21st Army Group.658 Stuart worried that if he and Crerar continued to press the point, “Mongtomery and the CIGS may lose confidence in our judgment. We could be accused, with some superficial justification, of being a bit

‘bloody minded’ and more constitutionally minded than our political masters.”659 Yet,

Montgomery still remained unwilling to consult Crerar about operational planning in any capacity above and beyond that which he gave to his other army commanders.660

Considering the dual goal of national recognition and the Canadians’ perpetual fear of heavy casualties, Montgomery’s brush-off could hardly be abided. Stuart tempered his

657 No date, Stuart Papers Vol. 1. 658 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 253. 659 Stuart to Crerar, 29 May 1944, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 660 Stuart to Brooke, 16 June 1944, “High Level corps collected by Lt Gen Stuart on constitutional relationship of Com 1st Cdn Army, 1944.” 223

opinions, but still wrote to Brooke asserting the Canadians’ position in two letters of 16

and 17 June. He told Brooke that while Montgomery’s views were in direct contradiction

of the terms of the Visiting Forces Act, “Crerar does not expect to be consulted more than

any other Army Command as regards to operational plans, but the Canadian Government

does expect Crerar to be consulted prior to any regrouping of Canadian Formations which

would result in their detachment from Canadian Command. In practice, no issue should

ever arise because Crerar will have an opportunity to discuss any particular Canadian

issues during which Montgomery describes as ‘normal consultation.’” 661 Stuart was

referring specifically to the employment of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd

Canadian Armed Brigade under the command of Second British Army, but the sentiment was more widely applicable: “only the urgent requirements of military operations should

justify the continuance of detachment of such forces and the resultant loss of the obvious

practical advantages resulting from unified Canadian control and administration.”662

Stuart also said that the Canadian government no longer saw any value to having 1st

Canadian Corps continue in Italy. The Canadians had battle experience, and “formations

now serving in the Mediterranean theatre, as well as field formations elsewhere, should

be grouped under unified Canadian command [in North West Europe].”663

From Brooke’s perspective, the Crerar-Montgomery issue appeared one of

window dressing that could be ameliorated with smooth reassurances. He agreed with the

661 Ibid. 662 Original emphasis. Stuart to Brooke, 17 June 1944, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 663 Ibid. 224

Canadians that Montgomery’s view on Canadian command was unacceptable,664 and

thanked Stuart for his “practical outlook.” He also assured him that “no difficulties

should arise, but should you feel that at any time there was a danger of a

misunderstanding please let me know at once.”665

The recall of 1st Canadian Corps from Italy was less straight forward, however, as

once again the Canadian government was considering the Italian Campaign only in light

of what it could offer to, or was detracting from, their national interests, in this case the administration of reinforcements and Crerar’s position in 21st Army Group. They neither

considered ongoing military operations in the Italian Theatre, nor were they any more

than partly aware of Allied strategy. Stuart had confided to Ralston after the Dominion

Prime Minister’s conference in London in early May that the Canadians had been closely

“kept in the picture, certainly so far as the army was concerned,”666 but this proved an

exaggeration. They had been kept informed only of ongoing operations. Mackenzie King

knew that as of mid-May, it was too soon to tell whether any progress had been made on

the Italian front, but that “the enemy is being kept busy there. If our armies get through

one or two of the great ravines, then all will be well further North. There will be very

heavy losses meanwhile.”667 They were not kept informed of the debate within the

Anglo-American Alliance as to what the next step in Italy was going to be.

664 Crerar to Stuart, 10 June 1944, “High Level corsp collected by Lt Gen Stuart on constitutional relationship of Com 1st Cdn Army, 1944.” 665 Brooke to Stuart, 17 June 1944, Ibid. 666 Stuart to Ralston, 13 May 1944, “Stuart Corresp File – Personal – rec’d from Gen Foulkes 3 Jan ?,” DHH 312.009 (D52). 667 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, War Diary, 13 May 1944. 225

Indeed, even as the Canadian government was deciding that 1st Canadian Corps should be re-united in First Canadian Army, the Anglo-American Alliance was once again arguing over the fate of Operation “Anvil,” the proposed attack on Southern France from Italy. On 22 May, General Maitland Wilson warned Alexander that he hoped to re- launch the invasion of Southern France by mid-September at the latest. If and when this happened, it would mean the removal of seven American and French mountain divisions from the Italian Theatre and AAI would no longer be the main priority for manpower and materiel in the Mediterranean Theatre, as they had been during the spring offensive in the

Liri Valley. As Alexander waited for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he complained that, “This uncertainty was a very great handicap to our planning, and its psychological effect on the troops expecting to be withdrawn, especially the French, was undoubtedly serious.”668 He wrote as much to Brooke,

I am seriously perturbed at the probability that my present successful operations are going to be hamstrung again. I am being pressed to release an American Corps HQ for planning other operations and I foresee quite clearly that in a short time I shall be told to release some of my American and French formations. It is my duty to point out that if this happens then the extremely attractive and promising plan outlined in my appreciation will not be practicable. It seems to me that it would be criminal to throw away such a wonderful opportunity of bringing off a really great coup.669

Finally on 14 June, the Combined Chiefs notified Wilson that they approved an amphibious operation on the scale of Operation Anvil, later renamed “Dragoon.” The implications for Alexander were obvious:

Whatever value the invasion of Southern France may have had as a contribution to operations in North-western Europe, its effect on the Italian campaign was disastrous. The Allied Armies in full pursuit of a beaten enemy were called off

668 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 463. 669 Alexander to Brooke, 8 June 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/15. 226

from the chase, Kesselring was given a breathing space to reorganize his scattered forces and I was left with insufficient strength to break through the barrier of the Apennines.”670

The ramifications for 1st Canadian Corps would be serious, as the raison d’être for the

Italian Theatre had not changed. AAI would continue to exert maximum pressure onto

Kesselring’s troops in order to engage every possible German and “force the enemy to draw to the maximum on his reserves.”671 They would just have to do so with seven

fewer divisions. For the Eighth Army already fighting on a shoestring, the demands on

manpower were about to become critical.672 Because the Allies did not possess numerical

superiority, casualties would tend to be higher.

Despite the CCOS decision, the debate over Anvil continued into June. In a

meeting with the Combined Chiefs on the 23rd, Eisenhower encouraged them to make

Anvil a strong invasion. “‘France is the decisive theatre,’ he told the Combined Chiefs of

Staff, saying that they ‘took this decision long ago. In my view the resources of Great

Britain and the United States will not allow us to maintain two major theatres in the

European War, each with decisive missions.’”673 Brooke, conversely, was now hoping to

renege on Anvil altogether. Through Ultra, he was aware that Hitler intended to defend

the Italian peninsula, and that AAI would likely, and hopefully, come up against (and

thereby contain) a large German force. The British had written to the Americans on 21

June asking to end the invasion of Southern France altogether, but the Americans would

not budge. They told the British that their “proposal to abandon Anvil and commit

670 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 465. 671 Alexander to Brooke, June 1944, Alexander Papers ,WO 214/15. 672 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 465. 673 Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 495. 227

everything to Italy is unacceptable."674 On 26 June, Maitland Wilson said that it was now

time to start the removal of the French Mountain Divisions from Italy in preparation for

Anvil, to meet the target attack date of 15 August.675

All of this added up to the fact that military conditions would not allow the return

of 1st Canadian Corps from Italy. The theatre was losing Allied divisions to Southern

France, and yet the British, including Brooke and Alexander, wanted to continue their

war of attrition toward the Gothic Line. Having relinquished all strategic say over the fate of the Corps, Ralston was in no position to complain. The fate of the Canadians rested wholly on Brooke’s willingness to prioritize the Canadians’ agenda. Not surprisingly,

Stuart’s letter of 14 June did not garner the immediate response he had hoped for about bringing 1st Canadian Corps out of Italy. Blessed with a politician’s immunity to shame,

however, Ralston persisted, writing to Stuart on 25 June about the rising casualty

numbers in Normandy, and his desire to bring 1st Canadian Corps out of Italy. Plus he

had heard rumours that American troops were to be leaving the Italian theatre. However,

his misguided hope that this heralded an opportunity for the Canadians to leave, too,

indicated just how divorced he was from strategic planning:

[T]he moving of some of the U.S. Divisions from Italy to the Western front, I am wondering whether there is anything on the cards regarding our own boys. Brooke said to me that he didn’t think there was much prospect of their rejoining the Army except through Southern France. Noting the let-up on the Italian front and the marked reduction in the number of our divisions in the line, it may be that the situation has altered. I shall be interested to hear of any impressions you have gained in this respect.”676

674 Ibid. 675 Ibid. 676 Ralston to Stuart, 25 June 1944, Stuart Corresp File – Personal – rec’d from Gen Foulkes 3 Jan ?,. DHH 312.009 (D52). It is notable that the Cabinet War Committee was only officially warned about the now re- branded Operation “Dragoon” on 23 July. That day, King recorded that, “Chiefs of Staff gather from other sources likely to be a movement against Europe from the South of France, some troops probably leaving 228

Stuart took the idea to heart. He was slated to fly to Italy, and told Crerar that he

planned to discuss with Leese and Burns the “situation with regard to the joining up of 1

[Canadian] Corps with First [Canadian] Army.”677 However, a message from Brooke on

the same day killed the idea entirely. Brooke firmly told Stuart that there was no

immediate possibility of moving the 1st Canadian Corps to join First Canadian Army

Headquarters.678 The Canadian request had never been passed to Alexander for a strategic

assessment of the limits of the Mediterranean theatre, meaning that either the matter was

discussed only at the highest political levels, or that it never got off Brooke’s desk—most likely the latter, because Brooke still faced Allied shipping limitations, and with the loss of divisions to “Anvil,” Alexander could not possibly give up more units and maintain his strategy of continuing the war of attrition and containment into Northern Italy. There was no way that the entire 1st Canadian Corps could have been removed from the Italian

Campaign at that moment; it would have taken a show of Canadian political will to stand up to the British and demand the return of the corps, which neither Mackenzie King or

Ralston were prepared to do.

Meanwhile, Stuart was en route to Italy to deal with another challenge to

Canadian operational control over its forces in the field. In the immediate aftermath of the Liri Valley Campaign it was apparent to both Burns and Leese that changes needed to be made in 1st Canadian Corps. On 5 June, Leese had expressed his dissatisfaction with

Italy, ships going from other places into the Mediterranean. It looks as if on Wednesday next, Germany will find herself in a great circle of fire,” Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 23 July 194. 677 Stuart to Crerar, 3 July 1944, “GOC-in-C file 5-0-3 Vols I & II – Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44,” Crerar Papers Vol. 3. 678 Ibid. 229

1st Corps headquarters to Burns, and insisted that some heads roll, Brigadier General

Staff G.A. McCarter’s first among them, along with Burns’ Chief engineer who could be

blamed in part for the poor staff work that had impeded the Canadians’ advance in the

Liri Valley. At this point, Leese seemed satisfied that Burns should keep his post. The

corps commander later wrote that his understanding, “perhaps naïve, was that General

Leese was prepared to have me carry on.”679 Shortly after their meeting, McCarter had been removed and the corps was on its way to pinpointing and correcting the problems encountered during the battle.

As the month wore on, however, serious criticism about Leese’s handling of the battle began to emerge. As Delaney writes, “Leese had badly fumbled the pursuit battle.

That was what all the after-action reports implied. Even an Eighth Army inquiry that

Leese had ordered to determine why the pursuit had slowed down so badly said as much:

‘Movement of formations across the inter-Corps boundary lost nearly a day in each case.’”680 When criticisms of Leese’s performance emerged, Leese took to deflecting the

blame onto Burns. As early as 6 June, Leese wrote to his wife that Burns had come to see

him and he “read him the Riot act about the staff work and control of the Canadian

Corps. I hope very much he can improve it. He is, though, a man of no personality and

little power of command, but I don’t see at the moment who else they have got.”681 Leese

was apparently trying to cool the pressure on him by re-focusing attention on Burns’

shortcomings during the Liri battle.

679 Burns, General Mud, 163. 680 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 105. 681 Leese to his wife, 6 June 1944, Leese Papers. 230

By July, Leese’s hesitations had developed into a full-fledged call for Burns’ removal, even though the Canadians had commenced a rigorous process of absorbing the lessons learned from the Liri—a process similar to the one that had so pleased Leese before the battle had taken place. He expressed his concerns to Alexander, who readily agreed and, indeed, expanded upon Leese’s view when he wrote to Brooke that Burns had demonstrated a “lack of tactical sense and power of command,” and requested that he be replaced immediately with a qualified Canadian. If none were available, which he did not think there were, Alexander suggested that the corps be disbanded and its divisions be assigned to British formations. 682 His preferred choice was still Simonds, who was in

Normandy, and if he could not be made available, which clearly he could not, the corps

should be broken up.683 Complaints against Burns offered the best opportunity possible to

rid Eighth Army of the problem of having an indivisible national corps among its ranks—

which was at least part of the root problem at the Liri—not to mention a corps that

Alexander had not wanted in the first place.

The implications of what Leese and Alexander requested were obvious to Brooke.

Dissolving 1st Canadian Corps headquarters and putting Canadian troops under British

authority would go directly against one of Canada’s main war aims of a recognizable war

effort, even if it were more militarily convenient for Leese. Moreover, removing a senior

Canadian officer could only be done by the Canadian High Command. As such, before any such step was taken, due diligence would have to be approved by Brooke and the

682 Stuart to Leese, “Message to CIGS Concerning Comd 1 Cdn Corps from Tac HQ First Cdn Army,” 2 July 1944, GOC-in-C file 5-0-3 Vols I & II – Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 683 Alexander to Brooke, 29 June 1944, Ibid. 231

Canadians. It was a sensitive situation. Increasing the fighting efficiency of the corps by

removing a GOC who had lost the faith of his superior, yet avoiding a public relations

fiasco, was a minefield of political, constitutional, as well as operational considerations.

Brooke understood this and proceeded cautiously.

Plus, Alexander and Leese had a recent track record of submitting potentially politically damaging requests to the CIGS. In February, Alexander had requested that the commander of U.S. 6th Corps General John P. Lucas be fired, and that if another

“thruster” like Patton was not available, a British commander should be put in command

of the American corps at Anzio.684 Not Eisenhower, Churchill, or Brooke, would comply

with this request to put a British officer in command of an American Corps.685 Leese also

called GOC 5th Corps Charles Allfrey’s competence into question, but again, Brooke

could not consent to his removal “without a full and complete report showing exactly in

what respects he has failed.”686 For senior officers to be removed from the field of battle, especially at the request of a senior commander of different nationality, tangible evidence of incompetence had to be gathered; and even that might not be enough reason to remove

the officer in question.

Brooke passed word of Leese’s request through the proper channels to First

Canadian Army. Crerar’s reaction was immediate, and angry. He did not:

doubt the honesty of the views held by Generals Alexander and Leese. Neither do I doubt, however, that such views are importantly influenced by two factors. The first is ingrained in most Englishmen and is, at times, a source of great strength, as well as being a weakness on other occasions. I refer to the Englishman’s traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman. The second

684 No date, Estimated 15 February 1944, Alexander to Brooke, Alexander Papers, WO 214/14. 685 Brooke to Alexander, 16 February 1944, Ibid. 686 Brooke to Alexander, 18 February 1944, Ibid. 232

is the “military inconvenience” if nothing less, of restrictions on the complete interchangeability of formations, units, etc., under a higher Com[an]d. 687

On the suggestion of dissolving the Corps headquarters Crerar was unequivocal:

It would be wise, at the outset, to indicate that the dissolution of 1 [Canadian] Corps is not a prospect even worth discussing. The ambition and aim of the Canadian Government…[is] to bring Canadian formations and units increasingly together, under Canadian Com[man]d, and to build up larger “all Canadian” formations. Indeed, if shipping and operational conditions permitted it would, I believe, be very satisfactory to 1 [Canadian] Corps, to First [Canadian] Army and to Canada as a whole, if 1 [Canadian] Corps was now withdrawn from being “in combination with” AAI, and joined up with First [Canadian] Army in AEF.688

The best option for the Canadian government and Canadian Army was to re-unite the

First Canadian Army in France. It was not to carve up the corps to be used piecemeal in a

British army.

Having had his own encounters with Leese, Crerar also sensed that Leese’s challenge to Burns could have been motivated by a desire to cover up his own errors.

Crerar wondered: “were these difficulties [faced by 1st Canadian Corps] due to

inadequacy on Burns’ part, or were they inherent in the operation which Burns was

ordered by Leese to carry out?”689

The issue could not be solved from London, and it certainly had to be settled by

the Canadians. Crerar suggested that Stuart proceed to Italy to sort out the issue in his

place. He hoped that Stuart would find Leese’s suggestion too drastic a step considering

it had been Burns’ first battle. It would be best if “Alexander and Leese [were to] temper

their views in regard to Burns.” However, Crerar did assure Stuart and especially Brooke

687 Stuart to Leese, “Message to CIGS Concerning Comd 1 Cdn Corps from Ta HQ First Cdn Army,” 2 July 1944, GOC-in-C file 5-0-3 Vols I & II – Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44, Crerar Papers Vol. 3. 688 Ibid. 689 Ibid. 233

that if Burns was found wanting, he would be replaced.690 Operational effectiveness

would be given priority over politics, so long as the Canadians had time to conduct their

own investigation.

Leese, for his part, was confident that Stuart would decide in his favour. “We

shall, I trust, settle the Burns problem satisfactorily. I shall be glad to be rid of him, if I

can arrange it. It is so vital to have efficient Corps Commanders,” he wrote to his wife on

9 July.691 He was so confident that he brazenly wrote to Stuart the same day, praising the

Canadians, and even Burns, for their performance. “I trust that the achievement of the

Canadian Corps, under command of General Burns, in breaking the Adolf Hitler Line is

by now fully appreciated by the people of Canada,” he began, before detailing their

commendable exploits.692

Stuart was unfazed by Leese’s letter, and was determined to come to a fair

solution based on the facts. In his first visit with Leese upon his arrival in Italy, the Army

commander gave him a complete background into what he believed had gone wrong in 1st

Canadian Corps during the Liri offensive. Ultimately the corps had failed to exploit its

initial success, and this could, he felt, be attributed primarily to five weaknesses:

(a) Lack of effective control of his Div[ision] Com[an]d[er]s by the Corps Com[man]d[er] (b) Improper working of the “G” staff (c) Poor organization of traffic control (d) Lack of vision and drive on the part of the Chief Engineer 1 [Canadian] Corps.

690 Crerar to Stuart, 2 July 1944, GOC-in-C file 5-0-3 Vols I & II – Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 691 Leese letter to his wife, 9 July 1944, Leese Papers. 692 Leese to Stuart, 9 July 1944, Stuart Papers Vol. 1; Leese to Stuart, 10 July 1944, Ibid. 234

(e) Poor command and staff arrangements by HQ 5 [Canadian Armoured Division].693

Leese believed that the only issue left to be addressed was that of the corps commander.

For this problem, there was no gentle fix, only outright dismissal. Burns lacked the “type

of personality” required in a corps commander, the power of command, a tactical sense,

and—the last straw—Leese felt that Burns’ divisional commanders had lost confidence in

him. Leese reiterated to Stuart that Burns should be replaced by the best Canadian

available, and if there was none suitable, by a British officer. He felt that Major-General

Charles Keightley would fit the bill.694

Stuart assured Leese that even if Burns was found unfit to continue in his post,

under no circumstance would he be replaced by a British officer.695 It was the Canadians’

line in the sand. Operational and nationalist considerations could not be divorced when it

came to the removal of a high-profile officer. Stuart promised he would see Leese again

after he had visited Canadian headquarters and conducted his investigation.

His next stop was to see Burns. The Corps commander admitted quite readily that

he and his staff had made mistakes during the battle. But, quite rightly, he also said that

some mistakes were to be expected in the corps’ first operation. He also explained that

Leese’s initial post battle criticisms had been taken to heart and addressed, and that he had no cause to believe that his division commanders had lost confidence in him.696

693 “Notes By Lt-Gen K. Stuart Regarding His Trip To Italy,” GOC-in-C file 5-0-3 Vols I & II – Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 694 Ibid. 695 Ibid. 696 Ibid. 235

Stuart told Burns that he was going to investigate Leese’s allegations, and that in

the meantime “Tommy” should make three immediate changes. First, he was to keep

away from detail and think only about broader essential matters. The general with an

instinct for excruciating scientific detail needed to see the forest, and leave the trees.

Secondly, he was to assert himself more, and thirdly, to “express his personality more

than he had in the past.” He could do this if he would loosen up and “get rid of his poker

face and be the good fellow his close friends knew him to be.”697

Next, Stuart spoke with Vokes, Hoffmeister, Lister and Smith, who all said the

same thing. Tactically Burns had been sound and he had been reasonable in his dealings with his divisions. Mistakes had indeed been made, but they were the sort that could be improved upon before the next battle. They did complain of Burns’ taciturn personality.

His dour disposition hardly inspired confidence.698 However, “whatever the source,

Stuart found no evidence of any crumbling confidence on the part of Burns’s

subordinates.”699 Stuart’s conclusion was unambiguous: “As a result of meeting these

officers and talking with them I was more than ever convinced that there was nothing

wrong with the [Canadian] Corps and that they would give an excellent account of

themselves in any future operations. They were, I felt, a very happy family.”700 He went

back to Army Group headquarters with a clear conscience, comfortable in his decision to

recommend that Burns be given another crack at battle.

697 Ibid. 698 Ibid. 699 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 106. 700 “Notes By Lt-Gen K. Stuart Regarding His Trip To Italy,” GOC-in-C file 5-0-3 Vols I & II – Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 236

Stuart met with Alexander in Rome. Alexander supported Leese’s argument that

Burns lacked the personality to be an effective corps commander, but he would support

Stuart’s decision. Of course, Alexander had no other choice; this was a Canadian

decision. “I pointed out,” wrote Stuart,” that something had happened since the operation

to make General Leese change his mind. I explained what General Leese had said to

Burns shortly after the conclusion of the Canadian part in the operations. I said that in my

judgment Burns should be given another trial.”701 Based on the information that he had been given, Stuart was correct in his assessment. While Burns had made mistakes, it was apparent that Leese’s opinion had changed; while not a crime in itself, especially as assessments of the campaign were calibrated in the aftermath period, it seemed possible to Stuart that Leese was deflecting criticism of his own less than stellar performance.

On the 14th of July Stuart met Leese in his Tactical HQ. Stuart summarized his

discussions with Canadian officers, as well as those with Alexander. Leese lost his

temper, and accused Stuart “of criticising many [of] the decisions he had made in respect

to the Canadian Corps and even went so far as to suggest that I [Stuart] was trying to

command the Eighth Army. I was very glad of the outburst because it was very easy to

refute in turn every statement he had made. Also he was obviously rather ashamed of his

outburst, which made the remainder of the conversation much more useful. I cannot say

that he accepted the decision in good part, but he accepted it because he felt there was no

other alternative.”702 Even so, Leese wanted to make sure his position was on record. In a

strongly worded letter written to Stuart after he had left the theatre, Leese again

701 Ibid. 702 Ibid. 237

articulated his desire for Burns to be replaced, if necessary with a British officer,

although at this point he no longer suggested dissolving the corps and absorbing the

Canadian divisions into a British corps. He conceded, however, that he was

left with no alternative except to carry on with Burns, in whom I have no confidence. It is, of course, you and your Government alone who can appoint the Commander of a Canadian Corps, yet your decision cannot relieve me of the ultimate responsibility for the lives of Canadian troops serving with this Army. Therefore I am obliged to make clear beyond doubt my view of their present Commander, and hence the responsibility which now falls on those who decide this question. 703

Leese believed that Stuart’s decision had been made by Canadian politicians, without

duly considering the Canadian Corps’ operational effectiveness being commanded by a

second rate officer. While he was wrong in this case, his run-ins with the Canadians since

taking over Corps Command in January must in part explain his prejudice. It left him in a

bad way. “It makes my Army inflexible,” he told Stuart, “…I shall not be able to employ

Burns on any task which I consider beyond him. This is a further serious handicap, as

through my lack of faith in their Commander, I may be prevented from employing my

best troops on the most critical task. As I promised, everything in my power will be done

so that the great prestige of Canadian troops may not be prejudiced.” 704 1st Canadian

Infantry Division was well-respected in Eighth Army, but Stuart had also warned Leese against stripping the division from 1st Corps to use in another corps, using the excuse of

“the effect on morale.” 705 To boost Canadian morale after their mixed performance in the

Liri, Stuart had recommended using the Canadian Corps as quickly as possible (giving

703 Leese to Stuart, 14 July 1944, GOC-in-C file 5-0-3 Vols I & II – Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 704 Ibid. 705 Ibid. 238

some credence to Leese’s argument that Stuart was trying to run his army for him), but this Leese could not do, nor, as he had made abundantly clear, did he want to. 706 It was a

vicious circle.

Stuart’s response to Leese was equally blunt:

I do not think the basis of your letter is a sound premise to argue from. The correct premise, I suggest to you, is not that Burns will continue indefinitely in command of 1 [Canadian] Corps, but that he will be given another opportunity to prove his worth. If future events prove that you were right and I was wrong then I shall be the first to admit my mistake and will initiate action to have Burns removed from his command forthwith. If, on the other hand, future event[s] prove that I am right and you are wrong then I know that you will be quite ready to admit your error.”707

Stuart also wrote to Crerar, confirming that no change in command was to take place at

that time.708

By 3 August Stuart was in Ottawa to report to the Cabinet War Committee. His assessment of all that transpired was surprisingly bland but blunt. “Upon personal investigation on spot and discussions with highest British and Canadian officers, Stuart

came to [the] conclusion [that] Leese’s lack of confidence [was] not justified.

Accordingly [he] decided that [the] present officer should remain in command and be given further opportunity of proving his competence. General Wilson, and later,

C.I.G.S., had been fully appraised of facts and were in complete agreement with this decision.”709 In the case of Leese versus Burns, the (Canadian) jury had sided with the

(Canadian) corps commander.

706 Ibid. 707 Stuart to Leese, 21 July 1944, Ibid. 708 Stuart to Crerar, 27 July 1944, Ibid. 709 Report of Chiefs of Staff, CMHQ, 3 August 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 58. 239

Stuart was correct in his refusal to sack Burns in July of 1944. The corps

commander had not received a fair shake. While the Liri battle had been far from perfect,

Leese had—either consciously or otherwise—attempted to make the Burns’ the scapegoat and deflect attention from his own decisions. Perhaps the immense pressure was getting to him. In July, Brooke was increasingly concerned about Leese’s performance. The general gave him “the impression of stickiness and lack of thrust,” he told Alexander.

“Both the 5th Army and even the Poles seemed to have shown greater enterprise and to

have left the 8th Army behind. I have kept these feelings to myself, but have heard a great

deal of similar criticism which I have found hard to contradict. He is not a thruster and I

feel that he requires the application of considerable stimulus from behind. I do hope

therefore that you will apply some such stimulus.”710 Even so, Brooke knew how frustrating the Canadians were to deal with, and told Alexander as much.

In the last war Bing was replaced by Currie in Command of the Canadian Corps in spite of the fact that we had few better Corps Commanders than Bing, and that Currie was hardly fit to command a Corps. The Political and National feeling is so strong that it is quite useless going against it. The Canadian Government and the Canadian Army insisted in finding their own formation Commanders, and it is up to us to train them and make the best of them. I feel however that Oliver does not fully realize his responsibility as regards training Corps Commanders. I consider that he should now do his level best to make a Commander of Burns, and from what I hear from many sides I am not convinced that this is impossible. Meanwhile he must assist the Canadian Corps to try on good younger Commanders, amongst that material they must exist, and should come forward out of the fighting. 711

In his thorough account of this period, Delaney shows that Burns’ headquarters

had made terrible mistakes during the battle. His staff officers failed to control traffic

problems, Burns had micro-managed his officers, and he was pathologically unable to

710 Brooke to Alexander, 22 July 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 711 Ibid. 240

motivate his divisional commanders when they needed it most. After the battle, Burns did not have the fortitude to get rid of officers who had failed. For example, Delaney asks whether Burns should have had to be prompted to fire McCarter, his old chum. Probably not.712 He simply lacked the personality to lead a corps. And yet, it was none of these

problems that had brought this issue to bear. As criticism focused on Leese’s own

handling of the battle, he passed the buck on to the Burns. The Canadian commander’s

mistakes, coupled with his inexperience, and the built-up resentment between Alexander,

Leese, and the Canadians in the previous months, made Burns a natural target. Burns

deserved the opportunity to fix the mistakes his corps had made before being removed

from command.

The entire situation seemed to prove to the Canadians that they needed to

carefully guard their control over their own forces, for fear of unfair treatment by the

British who seemed to have little respect for Canada’s political or national interests and

status. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Canadians’ failed attempt to reunite 1st Canadian

Corps with First Canadian Army, and the Leese/Burns incident, Ralston eventually

recognised the damage that his absence from strategic discussions on Allied strategy was

having on Canada’s ability to prosecute its war effort to maximum effect—for both

Canada and its Allies. Therefore, as Ralston and Stuart dealt with Brooke and

Montgomery in England and Normandy, they also took serious steps to give CMHQ a

more direct line to the decisions being taken about the Italian Theatre. At a minimum, they wanted to remain abreast of Allied planning and what it might mean for the

712 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 102. 241

Canadians. Their solution was to establish a more informed system of liaison between

CMHQ and the headquarters of AAI. The idea had first been introduced back in April as

a way to get inside both SHAEF and AAI. Stuart had asked Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff,

General Bedell Smith, if he could use a Canadian Brigadier in the operational and

planning side of his staff, responsible to himself and Eisenhower. He made similar

arrangements with Wilson’s headquarters in Italy.713

It was not until 13 July that CMHQ sent Brigadier Bradbrooke back to AFHQ in

Italy, to assume the appointment of Canadian Liaison Officer. 714 Bradbrooke had been

fired from his command of 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade by Simonds in February after

a disagreement on the appropriate method of tank-artillery cooperation. He was thus a

senior officer in need of a placement and with knowledge of the campaign, so

Bradbrooke was named for the job of Canadian liaison officer at AFHQ. He left England

on 18 July and arrived at AFHQ on 21 July, where Bradbrooke was to concern himself

with Allied “policy and administration, but not with operations.”715

In Italy, Bradbrooke suffered a lengthy illness and spent considerable time in

hospital. Even when active though, he did not provide the insight into AFHQ planning

that Stuart had hoped for. His job description was not widely understood, and

consequently the doors at 1st Canadian Corps and AFHQ were kept shut. His first report

to the Canadian government was not issued until 1 September 1944, and it merely

summarised the problems that he faced. Even Burns seemed to view Bradbrooke as a

713 25 April 1944, Canadian Participation Planning, Jan – July 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 38. 714 CMHQ to Bradbrooke, 13 July 1944, No. 1 Canadian Liaison Detachment, Allied Force H.Q, LAC, RG 24 Vol. 13,581, File 5958. 715 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 197. 242

sort-of political spy, describing him as the “rep[resentative] of Chief of Staff CMHQ at

AFHQ.”716 Although Bradbrooke had been cleared for access to classified information,

Burns refused to tell Bradbrooke about operations, stating that he, Burns, “had no authority to disclose to me [Bradbrooke] any details of impending operations, and said that the ‘secrecy’ at that date was confined to a very high level.” 717 Bradbrooke was therefore unable to provide CMHQ with “much information of real interest.” 718

Bradbrooke did not expect to get anything from AFHQ, either. “I cannot but feel that I should not be called on very often,” he reported back. “There are few Canadian ‘A’

Matters, that are not dealt with by Brig Weeks [1st Echelon, GHQ] and his department. So

I feel ‘out of the pictures’ here without some written term of reference from you

[CMHQ].” He continued:

I hope eventually to be empowered to visit the various [Headquarters] of AAI, Armies, and Corps so that I can keep constantly in touch with how the [Canadian] Corps fits into the picture as a whole. There is of course, the ever present fear that I might be regarded as a sort of Canadian ‘spy’, but I have no doubt I can surmount that difficulty. I have already offered to do anything for anybody regardless of any Canadian flavour and propose to submit a copy of all my reports to you to any branch concerned.”719

Bradbrooke was not welcomed by either Burns’ headquarters nor AAI Headquarters, which limited the value of the information that could he provide to CMHQ. He was a lame-duck to say the least, a fact that Stacey identified, concluding that Bradbrooke was sent to Italy “simply to provide a place for a senior officer for whom there was no other

716 Lt.-Gen E.L.M. Burns Personal War Diary , 27 July 1944. 717 “First Periodic Report from Brigadier G.R. Bradbrooke, M.C., Cdn Liaison Section,” 1 September 1944, No. 1 Canadian Liaison Detachment. 718 Ibid. 719 Ibid. 243

employment overseas.”720 However when considered in the context of the Anglo-

Canadian disagreements in the spring and summer of 1944, sending Bradbrooke could

have been a desperate act to gain insight into Allied planning, but which was ultimately

fruitless. The Canadian government still had no eyes and ears in British planning.

Burns, for his part, was emboldened by his confrontation with Leese over his performance in the Liri. While he had been an amenable ally before the battle, endeavouring to fit his corps into Eighth Army as best he could and not interfering in operational planning by playing the sovereignty card, the problems of June and July encouraged him to be more assertive of Canadian interests. Leese had not taken kindly to being put in his place by Stuart, and almost immediately moved 1st Canadian Infantry

Division out of 1st Canadian Corps. Stating reasons of operational necessity, he attached

the division to 10th British Corps. Making matters worse, in the upcoming operation, the

Canadian corps headquarters was slated to be held in reserve; “it would not be the 1st

Canadian Corps that would be holding the front; it would be the headquarters of the

Canadian Corps commanding an assortment of formations which at the time were not

judged fit for offensive operations.”721 Leese made good on his threat to Stuart; the

Canadian Corps was of no value to him with a commander that he could not trust, and so

he would not use it, even though further battle experience was exactly what Stuart had

requested. Burns, to his credit, stood up to the army commander. On 1st and 2nd August

respectively, Burns went to Leese and Alexander about the situation, and demanded that

the division be returned as soon as operational limitations allowed. Delaney argues that

720 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 197. 721 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 109. 244

this was a milestone for Burns “confronting his superiors in the chain of command.”722

They both relented, “and [Alexander] said that after the present operational requirement for the separate use of 1 Cdn Inf Div was over, he hoped that regrouping would be effected.”723 Burns’ victory was pyrrhic, as the plans for the next phase of the advance

had also changed and they now included an operational role for the Canadian Corps.

Fortunately, from the Canadians’ perspective, the Anglo-Canadian disagreements

over the role of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, and regarding the Canadian right to command

were ameliorated by the fact that after his trip to Italy, Stuart was relatively sure that the

reinforcement situation was in good order. Canadian units were up to strength, and a two-

months’ supply of men at intense rates was available, the situation having improved “as

result of whole corps being held in reserve for period about two months.”724

In his meeting with the Cabinet War Committee on 3 August, Stuart also

discussed the manpower ceiling, organisational powers, and changes to reinforcement

training in the UK.725 Stuart’s news was good. He informed the Cabinet War Committee

that the morale of the Canadian forces abroad was high, and that despite the year of

fighting in Italy and two months in France, the reinforcement situation was satisfactory.

“There were reinforcement personnel available for 2 months at intensive battle casualty rate. This favourable situation resulted from unexpectedly low casualties to date and maintenance of flow of reinforcements from Canada. The only factor which was causing anxiety was shortage of reinforcement personnel for French Canadian units. It was hoped

722 Ibid. 723 Burns’ Personal War Diary, 1 August 1944. 724 Stuart to Crerar, 27 July 1944, Crerar Papers, Vol. 3. 725 Murchie to Stuart, July 1944, Canadian Military HDQRS, Personal File of Lt. Gen Stuart 1943-1944 Stuart Papers, Vol. 1. 245

measures now in hand would permit these fine units to be maintained.”726 This was the

case, even though Ralston submitted a proposal in the same meeting for the manpower

ceiling be raised slightly to meet “additional commitments already approved outside the

ceiling,” including 569 men to bring the new 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade up to strength.727 The additions could be met from the overseas pool, which was “adequate to

meet demands without any change in projected supply of manpower from Canada.”728

Altogether then, the Anglo-Canadian relationship from May to August was

another example of the separate interests on which the Canadians and British remained

focused and the animosity it engendered, fostered by a failure to communicate real

interests in real time. In drafting Instructions to Crerar on the eve of the Normandy

Campaign, and in the face of his ongoing conflict with Montgomery, the Canadians had

realised that having 1st Canadian Corps in Italy was no longer in the interests of the

nation or Army. However, this conclusion was determined without reference to or

knowledge of Allied strategy making, which was currently in the midst of a great debate

over Operation “Anvil,” the attack on Southern France. Instead, the Canadian position

had been influenced by Stuart’s desire to strengthen Crerar’s position in 21st Army

Group, and his and Ralston’s concern over the administrative and manpower challenges

created by having to reinforce two corps in separate theatres. Brooke could not remove an

entire corps from the Italian Theatre. Then, Montgomery’s threats to ignore Crerar’s

726 “Report of Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., Aug 3, 1944,” War Committee Minutes – Extracts from on Variety of Subjects, 1940-45, Ralston Papers Vol. 58. 727 “August 3, 1944, Army overseas; organization and manpower,” Ibid. 728 Ibid. 246

position as national commander were made all the more real by Alexander and Leese’s

attempt to fire Burns—a proposal based more on politics and inconvenience than inconvertible evidence of Burns’ incompetence. It was a tangled web of the Canadian determination to exert its sovereignty without knowing the big picture, and the British refusal to treat the Canadians as an equal partner. In the end, this inspired the Canadians

to try and assert their interests in Italy more forcefully than they had been since January.

Bradbrooke was sent to Italy to try and gain more information about Allied activities, and

Burns confronted Leese and Alexander as a national commander over the operational use of Canada’s forces. After the intervention of the Canadian government to save his job, he was already disliked by the army commander, and then had the gumption to press the point that the removal of Canadian divisions from his command was against the national interest, serving to exacerbate the problem. The key problem was one of communication; the tense nature of the alliance on all levels left no way for a productive exchange of interests to be submitted and received—the Canadians remained focused on their political interests, while the British tried to fight the war, ignoring the established fact that Canada was a sovereign nation and First Canadian Army was an expression of that sovereignty.

They were tired of being reminded by the Canadians that they could not be deployed without consulting the Canadian GOC. Ultimately before the many issues plaguing the

Anglo-Canadian relationship in the summer of 1944 could be solved, the Canadian Corps was committed to Operation “Olive,” the attack on the Gothic Line.

247

CHAPTER SEVEN

Crossing the Rubicone [sic]: September-November, 1944

During the attack on the Gothic Line in September 1944, Burns and his 1st

Canadian Corps finally proved themselves and were admitted to the Eighth Army “club.”

They pushed further and faster than the adjacent Allied divisions, defeated crack German units, and suffered heavy casualties in the process. Attempting to exploit the Canadians’ efforts, the bulk of Eighth Army’s resources were passed under Burns’ command. It was an auspicious moment for the Canadian general. Yet within a month, Burns had been replaced. In Canada, the second Quebec Conference of September 1944 confirmed the strategic aims of the campaign. Too late, Mackenzie King realised what his disinterest in the strategy of the Italian Campaign and in the army more generally portended: conscription. As thousands of Canadians were killed or maimed in the pursuit of strategic objectives with which their government had taken no interest, Mackenzie King finally faced the error in his ways. That the would-be victory in Italy was an afterthought was the lamentable, if inevitable, conclusion for Canada’s D-Day Dodgers.

As the summer of 1944 drew to a close, Alexander finalized his plans for the

Allied advance into northern Italy. The Gothic Line loomed. The terrain alone was difficult, and the Germans made good use of it. The regimental history of the 48th Royal

Tank Battalion of the 21st Tank Brigade describes the terrain as follows:

The Apennines fall away at right angles to the sea and there is hardly any coastal plain; thus an advancing army is faced with a series of steep, razor-backed ridges across its front, with a river between each pair. The country is ideal for defence and particularly suited to the German delaying tactics; with a minimum number of defending troops he could hold up the Allies until they were forced to deploy 248

at least a brigade, with tank and artillery support, to dislodge him, whereupon he withdrew to the next ridge and the sequence started again.729

German construction of the Gothic Line began in earnest in the autumn of 1943,

but stalled as the Germans became embroiled in the quagmire at Monte Cassino. By the

time the Allies had clawed their way to the foot of the Gothic Line it remained

unfinished. Nevertheless, the two-month delay between the capture of Rome and the

Allied offensive had given the Germans and their Italian conscripts enough time to turn

the Gothic Line into a veritable fortress. It was comprised of four separate defensive

lines. The “Red Line” would slow the Allied advance and guard the main German

position, “Green Line I,” which was situated in the heights north of the Foglia River. It

was supported in depth by “Green Line II” and the “Pisa-Rimini Line.” With bunkers and

gun positions carefully sited on cliff-sides and installations in the valleys below, the

Germans created a killing zone with 2,375 machine-guns, 479 anti-tank, mortar and assault guns, 3,604 shelters, 16,006 riflemen posts, 72,517 Teller mines, and 23,172 anti- personnel mines, along with 117,370 metres of wire, and 8,944 metres of anti-tank ditches. It also had four hull-down Panther tank positions, with another 18 still under construction, and 18 smaller tank gun turret posts.730

Alexander’s original plan was to proceed “undeterred” by the loss of divisions to

France, and attack north by the shortest route between Florence and Bologna using both

Fifth and Eighth Armies. The Germans were thus “encouraged” to think that significant

forces were being amassed behind the front-line Polish troops in preparation for an

729 Peter Gudgin, With Churchills to War: 48th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment at War 1939-56 (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1996), 119. 730 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 497. 249

attack. Heavy traffic, signals detachments, and reconnaissance parties gave the Germans the distinct impression that a troop build-up was underway, presaging an attack. German intelligence knew that 1st Canadian Corps was gathering on the Eastern flank of Eighth

Army’s position, which helped fool Commander of the German Tenth Army, General

Heinrich von Vietinghoff, into expecting an attack on the Green Line. The coast offered terrain most suitable for a set-piece attack.731

Leese proposed fundamental changes to the assault after assessing Alexander’s plans.732 He believed that the mountainous terrain and German defences in-depth would prove difficult for the armour-clad Eighth Army to penetrate. Losing the skilled French mountain troops to Operation “Dragoon” was a serious blow to AAI, limiting their operational flexibility in the mountains. Leese suggested that the centre line of the advance be up the Adriatic coast, where his army could use its tanks, artillery and aircraft in a coordinated set-piece assault through the more open terrain. Alexander conceded that the original plan was risky. “It was anything but certain that our heavy blow in the mountains of the centre [of Italy] would take us through to our objective and if the first attack there fell short of expectations the advantage would be all with the defenders.”733

He consented to Leese’s revision.

The new plan required a larger role for 1st Canadian Corps. On the right coastal flank, the Poles were to outflank Pesaro and seize the high ground. They would then move into reserve. On the centre line, the Canadian Corps would capture the high ground

731 Ibid., 460. 732 Ibid., 491-492. 733 Ibid., 492. 250

west of Pesaro, and then relieve the Poles, moving up the coast toward Rimini. On the

left, Keightley’s 5th Corps would advance towards Bologna and Ferrara. This left the 10th

Corps to send a single division up the mountainous central region of the country. When

Eighth Corps had drawn in German reserves, the Fifth Army with 13th Corps attached would attack from Florence to Bologna.734

In the words of Delaney, Leese’s plan “left much to be desired.”735 It was similar

to the problematical plan used in the Liri Valley in May, in which the British Corps was

allotted the bulk of Eighth Army divisions, despite the central role played by the

Canadians. The British 1st Armoured Division had only recently moved to Italy after a

lengthy period of rest in North Africa, and joined Keightley’s 5th Corps, even though they

were slated to operate not on the open plain, but in the foothills with less room to

manoeuvre. Plus, Keightley had four infantry divisions and two armoured brigades.

Burns was to attack through open terrain with only his own two divisions and the 21st

Army Tank Brigade, which was attached to the Canadians in July. Delaney concludes

that Leese did not have “enough faith in Burns to place either British or Indian divisions

under Canadian command,” but it was a mistake to place his heaviest corps to the

mountainous sector, rather than rolling coastal sector where tanks could have been most

effectively deployed.736

Fortunately, during the months in reserve after the Liri Valley, Burns had set out

to address the problems that had slowed the breakout from the Hitler Line. A new system

734 Ibid., 494. 735 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 110. 736 Ibid., 110. 251

of traffic control was devised.737 Lessons learned reports led to training exercises emphasising better infantry-tank cooperation.738 Plus the structural problems in the 5th

Canadian Armoured Division were addressed. Recent fighting had illustrated to Leese that the armoured divisions needed more infantry, as “the armoured division with one infantry brigade is no good in this type of fighting.”739 He reorganised the 6th British

Armoured and 6th South African Divisions to have one armoured and two infantry brigades and suggested to Burns that the Canadians do the same. Burns agreed and cabled a request to CMHQ. Around the time, Alexander wrote to Brooke. “Recent experience out here has shown the great value of an additional infantry brigade with an armoured division and Burns has cabled the Canadian Chief of Staff asking for another infantry brigade for 5 Canadian Armoured Div[ision]. I should be very grateful if you would give this request your strongest support.”740 The initial request was denied by the War Office and NDHQ, as there no support in London or Ottawa for “diversions from Overlord.”741

Leese suggested to Burns that he find an in-theatre solution by re-purposing a few units into an infantry brigade.

Burns agreed and came up with a plan that he presented to Stuart when he was in

Italy in July. He intended to convert the Westminster Regiment (Motorized), 4 Canadian

Reconnaissance Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) and 1 Light Anti-

737 Ibid., 108. 738 Ibid., 103. 739 Leese to Kennedy, quoted in Delaney, Corps Commanders, 108. 740 Alexander to Brooke, No Date, June 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/15. 741 Quoted in Delaney, Corps Commanders, 108. 252

Aircraft Regiment, RCA, into the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade.742 Stuart forwarded the

request to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, but was warned by Murchie that

because of the probability that more infantry casualties would result from the proposed

scheme, the answer was likely to be “no” unless he could give an assurance that it was an

operational requirement.743 Having spoken with Burns, Stuart decided that it was indeed

an operational necessity, and gave the corps commander permission to create the 12th

Canadian Infantry Brigade. In his 3 August meeting with the Prime Minister and Cabinet

War Committee, Stuart presented a request for additional men for use in Italy, but stressed that this decision would not lead him later to press for any more men.744

Mackenzie King recalled that Stuart promised “the war would likely be over before any

further numbers would be required beyond those already available.”745 Later, the Prime

Minister would report that Stuart had given him a “definite assurance…that it [the 12th

Brigade] would not mean any additional tax on manpower. That is, they were sure of

having all the reinforcements that were needed.”746

When Operation “Olive” began on 25 August, Burns’ and his corps’ hard work

paid off. In the first days of the assault, the 1st Canadian Corps executed a set-piece attack that broke through the Red Line. The 11th Infantry Brigade cracked the outer perimeter,

742 A second suggestion which was rejected was to transfer an infantry brigade from 1st Canadian Armoured Division to 5th Canadian Armoured Division, converting a reconnaissance regiments into motor battalion for 1 CID, and the permanent attachment of 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade to 1st Canadian Infantry Division. L.A. Wrinch, “Canadian Operations in Italy, 4 Jun 44 – 23 Feb 45: Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 143,” 2. 743 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 480. 744 Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, Volume XVI, July-December 1944, August 3, 1944, LAC RG 2, 7c, Vol. 16. 745 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 3 August 1944. 746 Ibid., 19 October 1944. 253

and Hoffmeister took the initiative to exploit the early breakthrough. However, as

Delaney reports,

Leese’s earlier decision to place the pursuit force with 5th Corps in the mountains precluded the full exploitation of the opportunity that Burns and his troops had created. The Gothic Line was much deeper than the Hitler Line, and by the time the Canadians had fought through to Tomba di Pesaro and Monteluro on 1 September, they were all but spent. They had very little with which to pursue the enemy or cut off the remnants of the 1st Parachute Division, now withdrawing in front of the 2nd Polish corps along the coast.747

The pursuit force organised by Burns was effective, but not strong enough. By 2

September, the 5th Canadians Armoured Division had been stopped by an entrenched

German defence of Coriano Ridge. Leese finally added divisions to Burns’ arsenal; the

4th British and 2nd New Zealand Divisions, and the Greek Mountain Brigade were added to 1st Canadian Corps so that Burns could break past the Rimini Line. Delaney argues that

this was a demonstration that Leese had overcome his attitude to Burns.748 Burns

believed the same, later writing that he felt “the generals had decided that I could handle

my command and that confidence had replaced the doubts which had formerly

existed.”749

747 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 117. 748 Ibid., 118. 749 Burns, General Mud, 188-189. 254

750 Figure 5: The Advance to Rimini, 3-22 September 1944 This should have been the high point of the Italian Campaign for the Canadians.

The 1st Canadian Corps had fought a combined corps attack and made such gains that it

was now moving up the centre-line of Eighth Army’s front with British, New Zealand, and Greek forces added to its battle roll. By all appearances, in this moment the corps had

achieved its original political and operational objectives of helping to defeat Nazism as a

unified Canadian corps fighting cooperatively under British operational command.751

As the Canadian corps battled through the Gothic Line, President Roosevelt and

Prime Minister Churchill met once again on the banks of the St. Lawrence River. On 12

September, the second Quebec Conference, “Octagon,” opened in Quebec City. Now

serving as Military Advisor to the Prime Minister and Military Secretary to the Cabinet

750 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, Map 20, insert p. 560. 751 See Chapters one and two for greater insight into the objectives for 1st Corps in the campaign. 255

War Committee, Maurice Pope reflected that when meeting once again with his British

and American friends, it felt “as if the Conference of 1943 had merely been adjourned for

a few weeks,”752 but the changed situation of the war had infused “a note of confidence

into the Conference which was lacking in 1943.”753 Octagon was mainly concerned with

post-war planning.754

When it came to the future strategy of the Italian Campaign, Octagon was an

instance of Anglo-American harmony. Both parties lauded the pace of AAI’s ongoing

advance. Brooke wrote, “we [the British Chiefs of Staff] found ourselves in complete

agreement with American Chiefs of Staff. They were prepared to leave American

divisions in Italy till Alex[ander] had finished his offensive.”755

As with the first Quebec Conference, the Canadians were not participants in

Octagon but merely hosts to the British and American delegations. On the 14th, the

British Chiefs of Staff attended a Canadian Cabinet War Committee meeting, which in

Brooke’s eyes was “more of a politeness than anything else.”756 In this moment of

Anglo-American harmony on the Italian Campaign, Churchill was fairly candid when

asked by Mackenzie King about the future operations in the Mediterranean which might

involve 1st Canadian Corps. Churchill, “[e]xpected these operations would continue to be arduous for some time to come. Future strategy in [the] Med[iterranean] would have to be determined according to [the] progress of events and it was hoped [the Canadian] Corps

752 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 241. 753 Ibid., 243. 754 Ibid., 244. 755 Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 1939-1945, 591. 756 Ibid., 593. 256

would continue with Allied forces there until job done.”757 This was a basic but honest take on Allied plans, and Mackenzie King tacitly consented to them.758 Churchill also assured Mackenzie King that Canada would need only to play a minor role in the Pacific

Theatre once Hitler had been beaten, which Churchill expected to happen by the end of the year.759 With Churchill’s forecast of an early end to the war, likely coupled with

King’s sycophancy of Churchill, neither the Prime Minister nor Ralston pressed to have the 1st Canadian Corps returned to North-West Europe, marking a temporary hiatus in the campaign to re-unite the Canadian Army.

As the conference drew to a close, Stuart received notes from the theatre confirming what a good job the Canadians were doing in the Gothic Line, and about how instrumental they were to the success of the operation and overall strategy. “Canadian troops have carried out the main thrust and they have fought magnificently,” Leese wrote.

“I have entrusted to General Burns the 4th British and the New Zealand Divisions, and his

Corps will continue to have the leading role for the present. I am glad to say that General

Alexander himself yesterday gave General Burns the ribbon of his well-earned D.S.O.”760

By mid-September, then, the Canadian Government knew that the Canadians in

Italy were engaged in tough fighting and were performing well, and that there would be more to come before the Italian Campaign was over. King could not claim ignorance of the Allies’ Mediterranean Strategy, as the broad strokes had been outlined in his

757 “Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, Volume XVI, July-December 1944,” 14 September 1944. 758 Quebec Conference – Central Mediterranean Operations, September 14, 1944, “War Committee Minutes – Extracts from on Variety of Subjects, 1940-45,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 58. 759 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 14 September 1944. 760 Leese to Stuart, 15 September 1944. Stuart Papers, Vol. 1. Letters of a similar tone were received from Alexander and Burns. 257

discussion with Churchill, nor did he press the point about having their corps joined with

First Canadian Army. Nevertheless, the Canadian government was about to be confronted

with the folly of its year-long inattention to the strategy of the Italian Campaign.

On 18 September, Toronto Maple Leafs owner and Canadian Army Major Conn

Smythe publically reported that Canadian reinforcements in Europe were poorly trained,

and that “large numbers of unnecessary casualties result from this greenness.”761 Smythe

was a First World War veteran who had raised an artillery unit that went to France in

1944. Badly wounded, he returned to Canada in September with a scathing opinion of the

Canadian reinforcement system.

A “routine denial” was issued by the Department of National Defence,762 but five

days after Smythe’s comments, Ralston left Ottawa for Italy. The purpose of his visit was

hardly a secret; he was there to find out about the reinforcement situation. Colonel

“Ding” Calder of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade later recalled that he “arranged for

him [Ralston] to see soldiers and knew what they’d say. Ralston asked leading questions

and was open about what he wanted to find out.”763 His first stop was to the No. 15

Canadian General Hospital near Caserta. It was quickly apparent that the infantry was

stretched thin. Ralston was informed that 1st Canadian Corps was in the process of re-

mustering 500 ordnance specialists into infantry, but the training would take four to six

weeks. Corps casualties were averaging 110 men per day, and in the previous month of

intense fighting, it was hemorrhaging on average 380 casualties daily. Even with the 500

761 Quoted in Granatstein, Canada’s War, 339. 762 Ibid., 340. 763 Granatstein interview with Col. J. Allan (“Ding”) Calder, Montreal, 4 May 1992, Granatstein Interviews. 258

re-mustered men added to those recuperating in Canadian hospitals and those at the

reinforcement station in Avellino, “One month or less will finish the [reinforcements]

even if we use specialists. 12% per month of the personnel in hospital come back. This

was stated to be an average.”764 The reinforcement situation was much worse for officers

as casualties had been heavy.765 Moreover, morphing specialists into riflemen was no

easy task and raised questions about the fighting quality of those who had been re-

trained, “because they had [previously] been employed as cooks etc.”766 Brigadier

Weeks, Officer Commanding Canadian Section 1st Echelon, AAI, echoed this report,

explaining to Ralston that “in his opinion if 1 [Canadian] Corps continued to be actively

engaged in operations that by approximately 10 Oct[ober 19]44 all general duty infantry reinforcements would have been committed and there would be no reserve. This would result in the infantry units of 1 [Canadian] Corps being required to fight slightly below

W[ar] E[stablishment].”767 Ralston’s final report clarified:

there was a constant return of fit trained reinforcements from the [Canadian] Convalescent Depot and the forward medical installations. This flow averaged between 60-100 all ranks per day. The actual battle casualties during intense fighting (killed, wounded and missing) amounted to 250-300 daily. In addition, experience has shown that the sick and injured equal in numbers the actual battle casualties, i.e. killed, wounded and missing. It follows that to keep the units of 1 [Canadian] Corps up to strength during intense fighting, somewhere in the vicinity of 500-600 reinforcements are required daily.”768

Moreover, there seemed to be something to Smythe’s comments. The Regimental

Sergeant Major of the 48th Highlanders told Ralston that in a recent intake of 72 men only

764 “Dyde, Col. H.A., Diary (Sept. 23 – Oct 1944),” 27 September 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 62. 765 Ibid. 766 Ibid. 767 “General Observations on the Visit to Italy of Col the Hon J.L. Ralston – Minister of National Defence,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 62. 768 Ibid. 259

seven were found to be fully trained.769 In future discussions with Weeks and Brigadier

Haldenby, Commander No. 1 Base Reinforcement Group, they agreed that in the future

all reinforcements would go forward to field units only after Haldenby was “personally

satisfied that they were fully trained in every respect.”770 This bluster was simply window dressing to a much deeper problem.

For the remainder of his trip, Ralston visited individual Canadian units, gathering troops into small groups to get their supposedly uncensored opinions, and to answer their questions. The troops asked Ralston “about Burma, the army of occupation, rehabilitation matters, the difficulties in the cigarette plan, Canadian beer, [and] the Zombies.”771 Their

answers to his questions left an indelible print. The shortage of reinforcements was felt

most acutely by soldiers who had been in the Mediterranean since Operation “Husky”

and in the UK before that, without receiving long-term leave.772 This was made all the

worse by the fact that the men of the NRMA were still in Canada. Many worried whether

the “Zombies were going to be demobilized to good jobs before overseas men.”773

There could be no in-theatre solution to alleviate the pressures on the corps, Leese

advised Ralston during their conversation of 29 September.

With respect to operations, Gen[eral] Leese stated that the object of the Eighth Army was to contain in Italy as many Germans as possible and at the same time kill or destroy the enemy opposing him. He stated that the enemy opposite the Eighth Army front was strong in men and material, if not greater in strength than the Eighth Army. His experience in Italy to date convinced him that unless a commander had a superiority of at least 3-1 it was not economical to attack. He stated that the Germans opposite the Eighth Army were fighting extremely well,

769 Ibid. 770 Ibid. 771 “Dyde, Col. H.A., Diary (Sept. 23 – Oct 1944),” 27 September 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 62. 772 “General Observations on the Visit to Italy of Col the Hon J.L. Ralston – Minister of National Defence, Ralston Papers, Vol. 62. 773 “Dyde, Col. H.A., Diary (Sept. 23 – Oct 1944),” 27 September 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 62. 260

that their morale was high and he anticipated that there would be serious fighting ahead before the Eighth Army made an appreciable advance. Having in mind the reinforcement situation, Brig[adier] Weeks asked Gen[eral] Leese whether his future plans envisaged using 1 [Canadian] Div[ision] to attack in the near future and in reply Gen Leese stated “yes” that he proposed to commit the 1 [Canadian] Div[ision] to an attack within the next few days. He stated that an operation was being prepared that involved an attack within the next 48 hours by the 5 [Canadian] Arm[oure]d Div[ision] but this attack may have to be delayed because of the rainy weather.774

Notably, Ralston also asked Leese if he intended to bring the 1st Canadian

Armoured Brigade under the command of 1st Canadian Corps. Leese tellingly replied that he preferred to mix up the Dominion and British troops, for “it tended to break down selfish nationalistic points of view and in practice both Canadian and British formations rather liked to be under command of each other rather than be kept as a complete national army.” This was hardly a coded message to Canada’s Minister of Defence; despite

Ralston’s concern for Canadian manpower, Leese would continue to fight the Canadians the same as any other unit under his command. Plus, Leese had had his fill of Canadian political interference. He went on to say that, “if the Canadian authorities felt very strongly on the matter that he would of course bow to their wishes but he strongly recommended against an inflexible arrangement which limited his hand from a tactical point of view.”775 Ralston did not exert strong political pressure to get his way, and in this case was right not do so—adding further political pressure onto the corps would have unnecessarily strained the Anglo-Canadian relationship in Italy.

Ralston was guarded during his press conference at the conclusion of his trip. “I discussed the system of training, and to me it appeared to be good training,” he said.

774 “General Observations on the Visit to Italy of Col the Hon J.L. Ralston – Minister of National Defence, Ralston Papers, Vol. 62. 775 Ibid. 261

While there had been some individual cases in which men had not been trained to the standard, such was to be expected. Steps had already been taken to address the issue.

“You must remember I am speaking now as an old soldier,” he told them. “I know that every Commanding Officer has a tendency to feel that no training his men gets is quite as good as that received in his own unit, and that is true, I think, of any training system as well. All the way up the line instructors at each stage are apt to feel, quite naturally, that they could have done a better job than was done in the places the men came from last, and I am investigating this matter of training thoroughly and I shall see to it that changes are made that are necessary.”776

No one was exactly sure what was going to happen in Italy either, and were unable to predict how many casualties would be incurred. Weeks, for one, believed that by lowering the war establishment of each battalion the army would fix the problem. He wrote to Stuart just after Ralston’s visit that,

From the military point of view, I am not unduly concerned regarding the reinforcement situation in this theatre. Gen Burns naturally feels that his future operational plans may be adversely affected by the fact that now, or within a few days, some of the infantry units may have to fight slightly under their War Establishment. The British are in very much the same position and have had to reduce their infantry battalions to a 3 company basis. They have always fought their infantry some 10% or 15% below W[ar] E[stablishment].777

Moreover, despite Leese having clearly informed Ralston—similar to what Churchill had told Mackenzie King—Weeks’ “own guess is that the Italian front will become a quiet sector with an active defence… If we accept this line of reasoning, then I feel that 1

Press and Radio Conference, Fall 1944, Ralston Papers, Vol. 63. 777 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 441. 262

[Canadian] Corps will not have many casualties and our reinforcement situation will tend

to improve. Gen[eral] Burns is not so optimistic…”778

Ralston travelled from Italy to North-West Europe where he continued the same

line of inquiry with First Canadian Army. Meanwhile in Ottawa, Ontario Premier George

Drew had just returned from his own trip overseas, and saw right through Ralston’s CBC

broadcast. “Mr. King knows the terrible need for reinforcements in France and Italy…

Ralston didn’t need to go to Italy to find it out.”779 Sadly for the Minister, he was likely

inclined to agree with the Ontario Premier. Drew lambasted government policy. He was

scornful that there was a shortage of reinforcements at the front “while 80,000 men

wearing the same uniform are kept here in Canada in the sixth year of war, performing no

real military duty of any kind.”780 Drew’s scathing personal attack on Ralston as “the

man who bears the heaviest load of guilt for this shameful situation,” must have hit close

to home.781

Public pressure mounted for Ralston to respond to Smythe and Drew. The defence

minister steeled his courage, believing now that there was only one option. In a letter to

Mackenzie King before his departure for Ottawa, Ralston regrettably informed the Prime

Minister that in light of the conditions he had seen, he would have to propose drastic actions upon his return.782 In the infantry, “we had more casualties than had been

forecast.”783 Mackenzie King knew that his long feared day of reckoning over

778 Ibid., 442. 779 “Overseas Trip Sept-Oct 1944 – Smythe, Major Connie,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 62. 780 Granatstein, Canada’s War, 340. 781 “Overseas Trip Sept-Oct 1944 – Smythe, Major Connie,” Ralston Papers, Vol. 62. 782 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 442. 783 Quoted in Granatstein, Canada’s War, 341. 263

conscription had finally arrived: “This is going to be a trying experience for me. Indeed,

Ralston has been a thorn in my flesh right along. However, I have stood firm before and

shall do so again.”784

Ralston and Stuart returned to Ottawa together on 18 October and Ralston met

with the Prime Minister that same day. The situation had changed dramatically since

early August, Ralston reported, and he now felt the time had come to enact Bill 80 and

deploy NRMA servicemen overseas. There was little hope that the war would be over in

1944, and SHAEF predicted that it would extend into the spring. Moreover, fighting had

been more intense than expected, and consequently the reinforcement situation was

strained in both Italy and North-West Europe.785 “He then went on to say that he thought

some of the men felt keenly about a standing army in Canada doing nothing while they

were so short of reinforcements; that their morale for fighting would be increased if the

reinforcements were larger.”786 Mackenzie King stood steadfastly against conscription

unless it was needed for victory in war, and he did not trust that Ralston felt the same. “It seemed to me that his statements were largely general and based entirely on what the army wished to keep itself up to full strength…”787 King’s feeling was quite the opposite;

“It was clear the Allies did not need to look to us to win the war. That I personally felt

that if it was the saving of lives that had to be considered it would be much better to have

the war last a little longer and Germany brought to her knees in that way than to sacrifice

784 Ibid. 785 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 18 October 1944. 786 Ibid. 787 Ibid. 264

more lives through haste.”788 While it is unclear how in King’s estimation lives could be

saved by having the war drag on longer with troops fighting at reduced strength—a

formula for heavy losses—it is apparent that during this meeting with Ralston,

Mackenzie King had an inkling for perhaps the first time that the fate of 1st Corps in Italy

and the Italian Campaign in general could, in the end, undermine his five year war policy

of keeping the country united in a voluntary war effort.

He first linked the threat of conscription with the creation of 12th Infantry

Brigade. “I then asked him [Ralston] if he had not been told at War Committee, when we

received the request for additional men for another brigade in Italy, that this would not

mean any more difficulty in raising the required numbers without conscription. Ralston

gave some explanation about the nature of the brigade but I could not follow him.”789

Ralston also “intercepted at one point a sort of defense at having separated the army; also

as to sending part of it to Italy, saying we had done honour to our country in giving it a

place in world affairs by doing this or some such expression.”790 Righteously ignorant of

his own complicity in the original decision, King continued that, “I imagine he begins to

see that McNaughton and Churchill were not unwise in wishing to keep the Canadian

army intact for final operations in Germany.”791 To King, the only logical course of

action was to reduce the size of the army by breaking up some units to use as

reinforcements for others.792 This is what the British had done by decreasing the size of

788 Ibid. 789 Ibid. 790 Ibid. 791 Ibid. 792 Ibid. 265

their brigades, and it was not a bad plan to preserve manpower but it did impact fighting

power, so Ralston had decided to take a stand in favour of conscription.

The underlying cause of the conscription crisis was the tooth-to-tail ratio of the

Canadian army, which, to put it simply, had too many cooks and not enough killers.793

Although having the Canadians united in First Canadian Army may not have prevented

Ralston’s 1944 push for conscription, it proved a useful excuse for Mackenzie King as

the crisis unfolded in October. Indeed, many in the Cabinet pointed to the division of the

army and the heavy fighting in Italy as the key factor now pushing the Government

toward conscription.

In the morning before a Cabinet War Committee meeting on 19 October,

Mackenzie King prepared himself for the imminent battle. He met with Arnold Heeney,

Clerk of the Privy Council and Cabinet Secretary, Norman Robertson, and Maurice Pope, who advised him that they had gone over the Cabinet War Committee minutes and were certain that King’s understanding of conscription—that it would be implemented only if necessary to win the war—was indeed the correct one. Thus conscription was not yet needed. They also confirmed that Stuart had told them in August when the 12th Brigade had been formed in Italy, that it would not cause a need for more infantry reinforcements.794

Later that day, Ralston announced to the Cabinet War Committee that, “as a result of my own observations and inquiries in the battle theatres, and on the information and

793 See Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises. 794 J.L. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, Volume 2, 1944-1945 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1968), 130. 266

advice received from my officers, that due to infantry casualties being much greater than

had been forecasted on the best information available,” it was now necessary to reinforce

the men overseas with conscripts.795 In support, he supplied the committee with a

memorandum by Stuart explaining in more detail the new requirements and why they

were being issued now, in the final throes of the war. It read that, “In August every

indication pointed to an early collapse of Germany…The estimate of casualties for [the]

last five months of 1944 that I gave to the War Committee was based on the old rates of

wastage. Actual and predicted casualties on new wastage rates for that period is nearer

60,000 than 40,000. This alone will serve to reduce the pool of reinforcements as of 31

Dec 1944 to very small proportions.” 796 Plus, soldiers in theatre were fighting without

leave and especially in Italy this was hurting morale. Fighting would remain intense, and

Stuart was not satisfied that there were enough reinforcements to meet future

requirements.797 Consequently Ralston felt he had no other choice but to recommend that

the NRMA men be sent overseas as reinforcements.

Mackenzie King went on the attack. He grilled Ralston and Stuart on the basis of

their recommendation, and openly disagreed with Ralston. On the advice of Norman

Robertson, King proposed that the “army should do as the British army had done, reduce its size and possibly its commitments. That is to say match the British in what they had done as to numbers, etc. by lessening the size of units, having less rigid regulations as to

795 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 246. 796 “Memorandum by Lt.-Gen. Stuart,” Prime Minister – Exchange of Cables with Ralston, Ralston Papers, Vol. 63. 797 Ibid. 267

age, etc.”798 With their heels dug in, Stuart and Ralston argued against this option for reasons of morale, King changed tack. He suggested that by pulling the Canadians out of combat in the short-term, he could alleviate some of the stress on the infantry. Stuart, however, believed that the operational tempo of the army in both theatres would continue, which might end the war at any time and that Canadian troops would want to play a part in the final show. King recoiled at Stuart’s use of the word “glory” to explain his line of thought, and argued such sentiment had no place when “it was a question of saving human lives.”799

In his anger, Mackenzie King finally linked Allied strategy to the attainment of

Canada’s political goals. He recalled that Stuart

painted a frightful picture of men [in Italy] having to stay out in the rain and drenched; more or less freezing and the like, in order to carry on through the winter but that was the strategy to press on. I asked if we had ever been consulted about strategy. He said something about Crerar and others keeping in touch. I asked had the govt. of Canada approved strategy of the kind? I said this was the first time the Cabinet had heard strategy involved action of the kind. That where the lives of Canadians were concerned, we were entitled to know what was involved in the strategy. That I for one felt better strategy would be that which Churchill had followed in regard to premature invasion of the Continent. Take a little longer but have [the] matter so arranged that lives would be saved and not sacrificed unnecessarily.800

Stuart must have been stunned both by King’s outburst and by his take on the way a country could “save lives” by fighting a holding operation in Italy. King recorded that,

“This point had never been apparently thought of either by Stuart or any members of the

Cabinet or Ralston, though Ralston in previous years has been very strong on our

798 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 19 October 1944. 799 Ibid. 800 Ibid. 268

knowing what [the] disposition was of all our forces…”801 With the two factions at

loggerheads over conscription, the War Committee agreed that a full Cabinet meeting would be called for 24 October.

For the next few days, Mackenzie King did his best to avoid conscription and to keep the Cabinet from fissuring—i.e. to keep Ralston from resigning. However, he was already planning for the scenario in which the Defence Minister did resign, and decided that if it came to it, he would ask McNaughton to replace Ralston. That night, Mackenzie

King recorded in his diary that,

The whole business really goes back to the struggle between Ralston and McNaughton. The separation of the Army for Italy at Ralston’s insistence as against McNaughton and Churchill’s wishes at the time. It is now clear that had the army been kept intact in England, there would be no need for reinforcements at this stage. If Ralston learns that McNaughton will be the one to take his place as the head of the army, if he does not fall in line with others, I doubt very much if he will tender his resignation.802

The crisis continued throughout the next week. The Cabinet War Committee met

on the 21st roiling with dissention, and again on the 24th in the morning before the full

meeting of the Cabinet. Ralston continued to argue that the conscription of NRMA

servicemen was the only way to alleviate the reinforcement problem plaguing the

infantry, while those in opposition continued to press for alternatives. In the meeting of

the full Cabinet, Ralston repeated his case, and this time supported it with reference to a

letter from Crerar written on 4 August, in which the army commander expressed his own

concern about the state of reinforcements.803 King rightly admonished Ralston for having

801 Ibid. 802 Ibid. 803 Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 144-145. 269

only brought this telegram to light now, and not before the Quebec Conference, or before

“we were asked to supply some 600 or 700 extra men in Italy” for the 12th Brigade.804

Minister of Defence for Air Chubby Power was not in favour of implementing conscription. He believed that the national commanders in the field were ultimately at fault for the situation now plaguing the government, because they had not carefully protected Canadian interests. He asked “if Sir Robert Borden had not refused to increase the number of troops after Passchendale [sic].”Later,

he referred to some of the Army [in the First World War] taking matters into their own hands, and having a sort of “Curragh” incident. That Burns in Italy was a good sort of fellow. I [King] said I had no concern on that score but I did feel what might arise from a controversy in which McNaughton and Ralston could be drawn in public. McNaughton having taken the ground that this would never have arisen if the army had not been divided.805

He was not the only one who saw Italy as the problem. The next day, Minister of

Agriculture Jimmy Gardiner phoned the Prime Minister to suggest that the corps be removed from Italy. “It was pointed out that we have five divisions in Italy [sic] and all are fighting at the present time. That should never have been contemplated so far as

Canada was concerned. One division should have been kept resting while others were fighting.”806 Since Ralston was against stripping some battalions for reinforcements,

King grasped at this straw. Seemingly unaware that in July Ralston had requested that 1st

Corps be moved to North-West Europe as soon as possible, King challenged Ralston that

“there has been mention of having our men in Italy brought to reinforce the men in the

804 Ibid. 805 Power likely referred to Currie’s confrontation with Haig over the Passchaendale offensive of October, 1917. W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, Diary, 24 October 1944. 806 Mackenzie King’s numbers were off. He may have meant that there were 5 divisions in total split between Italy and North-West Europe, or he meant to write “brigades” rather than “divisions”, although there were 7 including the 1st Armoured Brigade. Ibid., 25 October 1944. 270

north along the Channel. That Crerar had told me there was nothing he was more anxious

for than for it to be altogether at the end of the war. I could not see why this might not be

arranged rather than create the situation described. That other arrangements could be

made in Italy at this time.”807

As the conscription crisis unfolded in Ottawa, the Canadians in Italy became

embroiled in an emergency of their own. After the capture of Coriano Ridge on 13

September, the 1st Canadian Corps’ offensive had ground to a halt. As the summer heat

turned into autumn rain, and mud made forward progress difficult, Burns’ performance was once again called into question. Dick McCreery had taken over from Leese as GOC

Eighth Army on 1 October—Leese having been “promoted” to Army Group Commander in South East Asia. Later, Burns would say that McCreery decided to fire him because in comparable conditions at the Gari River in 1943, McCreery had managed to push his 10th

Corps ahead.808 In reality, Burns no longer had the trust of his divisional commanders

Vokes and Hoffmeister. During September and October, Burns flouted the chain of

command, regularly bypassing his divisional commanders and conferring directly with

his brigade and battalion commanders, thereby undermining the authority of the

former.809 Delaney writes, “This was poor practice, especially considering how much

influence the divisional commanders had on Burns’s future. The real outcome of Stuart’s

July consultations with the divisional commanders and staff was that it left Burns’s fate

in their hands. All they had to do was withdraw their support and Burns was all but

807 Ibid., 26 October 1944. 808 Burns, General Mud, 218. 809 Burns’ Personal War Diary, September and October 1944. 271

gone.”810 This they did. Hoffmeister was so angry about Burns’ impromptu visits to his

5th Canadian Armoured Division, that he demanded an audience with McCreery.811

Making matters worse, Vokes and Hoffmeister had disagreed with Burns’ operational decisions at the Fiumicino River in the first week in October, and their relationship with the corps commander neared insubordination.812 Indeed, it had deteriorated to the point that whenever Burns’ BGS Des Smith visited the division commanders, he “usually carried an olive branch as a token of peace.”813 McCreery informed Burns of the complaints against him,814 and also brought Alexander’s attention to the degenerating situation. For now, Alexander reined McCreery in; he had been in command of the army for only two weeks and Alexander believed it was too early for him to take action that would undoubtedly have political consequences.815

Nevertheless, the situation continued to deteriorate. On 16 October, Hoffmeister informed Weeks that his relationship with Burns had become “intolerable” and that he had lost all confidence in the General. Weeks proceeded to investigate the situation, and, upon his arrival at 1st Corps, Smith, Gilbride, Plow and Campbell all informed Weeks that they were considering going directly to McCreery about Burns’ performance. The

General’s attitude “lack[ed] dignity” when dealing with Hoffmeister and Vokes, causing

“unpleasant embarrassment”. The division commanders all but ignored his orders.816

810 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 118. 811 Ibid. 812 Ibid. 813 Smith interview with McAndrew, quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, FN 117, 321. 814 Delaney, Corps Commanders, 119. 815 Weeks to Montague, November 1944, “Vols I and II – Higher Command - Cdn Army Overseas,” Crerar Papers, Vol. 4. 816 Ibid. 272

Consequently on the 20th, McCreery again took the issue to Alexander, who now

realised the danger of the situation escalating. He determined that an official report and recommendation for removal should be prepared by the army commander, to be submitted through Jumbo Wilson to the U.K.817 By this point, Crerar too had become aware of what was happening in Italy. The Army Commander was in hospital in London, having temporarily relinquished command of First Canadian Army to Guy Simonds, while he recovered from a bout of dysentery and anemia.818 Inclined to assume that

British prejudice was again the root cause of the turmoil, Crerar messaged Burns on the

20th that he had yet to receive official communication from the War Office. When they did, he assured Burns that full consideration would be given to their recommendation on

“both governmental and command levels” before a decision was made.819 Crerar believed

that Burns’ fate was coloured more by nationality than by military considerations. He

believed that senior commanders in Italy did “not care” for Burns, and thus undermined

his position. “If Burns had had the 100% backing, obvious support and confidence and, if

required, the help of HQ. Eighth Army, this second situation would never have arisen. In

the absence of full evidence to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the Canadian

commander has had an unfair deal.” 820

McCreery had prepared his report and recommendation on Burns by the 24th, and

met with the Canadian general to show him the letter he intended to send to the WO. It

was unequivocal:

817 Ibid. 818 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 354. 819 Crerar to Burns, 20 October 1944, Vols I and II – Higher Command - Cdn Army Overseas, Crerar Papers, Vol. 4 820 Crerar M.G.A. Undated, handwritten note, Ibid. 273

I am strongly of opinion that a change of command is necessary in 1st Canadian Corps. Lieut-General Burns has not the attributes of a Higher Commander. I find that he is indecisive, and appears to lack that grasp of the whole situation which is essential in battle, in fact he does not lead. Owing to the handicap of not having commanded units and lower formations in battle, he lacks that knowledge of the many factors which must be weighed up in any tactical problem. This prevents him from ever making any constructive proposal, and causes his opinion to change, and puts him at a great disadvantage with his subordinate Commanders. Lieut-General Burns had had a very arduous time this year; he has never spared himself, and I am of the opinion that he is tired and needs a change. His manner is depressing, diffident and unenthusiastic, and he must completely fail to inspire his subordinate Commanders. At this stage of the war this quality of confidence, and enthusiasm in a Commander is of great importance. Lieut-General Burns had great ability in many directions, and I urge that his services be made use of in an appointment that does not entail direct command of troops in the Field.”821

McCreery recommended that Vokes be given the Corps, as he was, in McCreery’s opinion, a natural leader who had the confidence of his troops. 822 After the meeting,

Burns went on leave to Rome, where he remained until the dust settled and he was recalled to England.

Official word of Burns’ removal did not come to 1st Corps from the War Office for many days, as the WO and CMHQ each grappled with how to deal with the situation.

On the 24th, Crerar dined with Brooke, who had just returned from the Allied Conference in Moscow. The conversation turned to Burns and Crerar defended his corps commander.

But “to Crerar’s surprise,” writes Dickson, “Brooke was blunt: Burns was respected by

neither his superiors nor his subordinates.”823 His information had come first hand from

Alexander. On 22 October, en route home from a conference with Stalin in Moscow,

Churchill and Brooke had stopped for the night in Naples, where they dined with

821 McCreery to Alexander, 24 October 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 822 Ibid. 823 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 356. 274

Alexander and Wilson.824 They spoke of Burns, and Brooke left Italy convinced that

Burns would have to be replaced as Corps Commander.825

Crerar was obviously disturbed by the seriousness of the situation, but decided that the Canadians would have to conduct their own investigation before a decision could be made. His first move was to send for Lister on 28 October, who had recently moved to

France, to give him an account of the situation between Burns and his commanders as he

had experienced it. Lister’s account was not what Crerar had hoped to hear. He “indicated

that situation described by Brooke has basis in fact. Main reasons lack of personality on

part of Burns and failure to inspire affection and confidence.” 826 By now, Burns had

accepted his fate. On the 26th from Rome, Burns wrote to the Army Commander that the

time for his removal had come: “feel it would be better if another officer were now

appointed [commander] I [Canadian] Corps. Reasons generally same as previously put

forward. Vokes would be acceptable…feel I cannot carry on without confidence of

superiors and that change should be made.”827

Thus by 28 October, both the Canadian and British senior commanders, including

Burns, as well as Brooke, had accepted that Burns had to be removed from his command.

This did not mean that his removal was well-handled, and no official request was forthcoming. Here, the crises in Ottawa and Italy intersected. Indeed, this delay can be attributed in part to the conscription debate unfolding in Canada. On the 21st, Mackenzie

King had approached High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald about the cabinet crisis,

824 Alan Brooke, War Diaries, 612. 825 Crerar to Stuart, MGA 192, 31 October, Crerar Papers, Vol. 4. 826 Ibid. 827 Ibid. 275

and asked for British help in maneuvering out of it. King thought that Macdonald saw the

absurdity in imposing conscription in the 11th hour of the war, and told him that there was

really only one thing to do, and that was to ask Churchill “what he knew of the strategy

of the war and its probable duration; whether he thought it was necessary or desirable that

we should resort to conscription; also whether matters could not be so arranged as to keep

the Canadian army intact. In the light of all we had done, having matters arranged so that

the situation could be met without any question of conscription being raised at this

time.”828 King wanted Churchill to tell him that conscription was not necessary. Later,

Pope would be sent to Washington on a similar mission to Roosevelt, and recorded of his

task, “the gist of my instructions from Mr. King might be given as: ‘Tell him I want his

help!’”829 The message to Churchill was in the same vein.

The British War Cabinet assessed the situation in Canada. On 23 October, a report prepared for the War Cabinet observed that, “Controversy continues to rage over the statement by Major Smythe, a returned officer of the Canadian Army, that the reinforcements now being provided for that Army are green, inexperienced and only partly trained. Although the Ministry of National Defence has denied that this is the case, it has not allayed the general belief that there is much in Major Smythe’s allegations, which are said to have the support of the Premier of Ontario.”830 But Brooke was well

aware that every infantryman was critical to the ongoing operations in North West

Europe, so rather than assist Mackenzie King in outmaneuvering conscription by

828 Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 140. 829 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 254. 830 “War Cabinet Report for the Month of September 1944 for the Dominions, India, Burma and the Colonies and Mandated Territories,” 23 October 1944, TNA CAB 66/56/27. 276

reducing the Canadians’ operational tempo, he believed his challenge was to find more

reinforcements. The Germans were still fighting ferociously, and Brooke needed all his

divisions to finish the job. On the 25th, the day after his dinner with Crerar, the CIGS

recorded in his diary that, “Our main problem at this morning’s COS was how to procure

sufficient reinforcements out of Canada without upsetting the equilibrium of Mr.

Mackenzie King’s political position. There are plenty of trained men in Canada but they

are only conscripted for service within Canada and have no intention of volunteering for

service abroad.”831 The next day, Churchill sent Mackenzie King his unambiguous

answer that the war was likely to go into 1945, and that the Canadian army would be

engaged in large scale operations.832 It was not what Mackenzie King had hoped to hear.

Ottawa, London and Italy were in a state of flux for the next three days. King

thrashed about for a solution that would see the country avoid conscription without a

fissure in the Cabinet or a betrayal of the allies. In London, Montague pressed General

Nye, the VCIGS, to discover whether a formal request had been received from Italy

regarding Burns’ removal, and in Italy, Burns remained on leave in Rome.

The formal British request to remove Burns from his command was finally

delivered on 30 October.833 The next day, Jumbo Wilson wrote to the Under-Secretary of

State for War that he was “in complete agreement with the views expressed as to Lt.Gen.

831 Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 614. 832 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 450. 833 HQ AAI to Crerar, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 277

Burns’ capacity for Command and consider that for the maintenance of the efficiency in

the Canadian Corps a change in command should be implemented without delay.”834

Canadian acceptance of the British recommendation was not immediately

forthcoming, largely because the political situation in Canada remained unsettled. Plus,

the fate of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy in general was no longer certain. Perhaps informed

by Churchill during his stay in Italy, or by a well-positioned ally in London, Alexander had heard rumours about Mackenzie King’s plea from Ottawa to have the army re-united.

He wrote Wilson on the 31st, that

It has been suggested to me that there is likely to be heavy pressure from certain quarters to remove my Canadian divisions to join their comrades in France. Before I start detailed planning I must know precisely what forces will be at my disposal. I should therefore welcome an assurance that as far as can be foreseen there is no intention of withdrawing any more of the troops now under my command.835

He had good reason to be uncertain. In Ottawa the same day, Mackenzie King

faced a cabinet meeting at which the fate of the crisis would be decided. In the morning,

he received a memo from Mackenzie that foreshadowed what the Minister of Pensions

and Health would say later that afternoon. “We should demand that our men return from

Italy and have one Canadian army,” he counselled the Prime Minister.836 Mackenzie

King also met with McNaughton, who he kept waiting in the wings in case Ralston

resigned. McNaughton held a similar view of the role the Italian Campaign played in the

current crisis. He “always felt it was a mistake to divide the army and to have some of

834 Wilson to Under-Secretary of State, War Office, 31 October 1944, Vols I and II – Higher Command - Cdn Army Overseas, Crerar Papers, Vol. 4. 835 Alexander to Wilson, 30 October 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 836 W.L. Mackenzie King Papers, War Diary, 31 October 1944. 278

our men fighting in Italy as well as in northern Europe. That it was nonsense to talk about sending battalions there for training.” 837 Moreover, McNaughton felt that,

Canada was perfectly free to make her own decisions as to what disposition should be made of her troops. She could take out divisions, or lessen their strength and certainly she should not allow her men to be too long in the line and fight too continuously and have too large commitments… It was mostly Stuart, he said, who was responsible for sending our men to Italy. He asked me if I knew they were months in Italy doing nothing. That they had not what was required to fight with etc.” 838

Similar arguments were taken up by members of the cabinet later that afternoon.

He [Mackenzie] thought it was wholly unnecessary having our men on the Italian front. He then raised the point and said he for one, had not known about our troops going to Italy. That the War Cabinet had never given the whole Cabinet a chance to decide on that. They they [sic] had never been informed. LaFleche and Mulock joined in this. LaF[eche]. said he did not know until he learned that his own son was in Italy. Other members of the Cabinet – Mitchell, I think; I am not sure if Gibson did not, also agreed. I said surely there must be some mistake in that. I had always on any matter affecting the larger question or decision, taken particular care to bring the matter before the Cabinet as a whole.839

If the entire scale of Canadian operations could not be reduced, then the best solution was

to reunite the army in North West Europe.

Ralston believed these were simply delaying tactics, and that the question of

implementing conscription could not be deferred. King, however, argued that before the

decision on conscription was made, he needed to know Allied strategy. Forgetting what

Churchill had told him at Quebec, he “pointed out that strategy was not known. The plans were not known yet. I had the right to know these plans just as much as the President and

Churchill had. I could not get them from our defence officers. Mentioned that Ralston

837 Ibid. 838 Ibid. 839 Ibid. 279

had asked me to wire Churchill to support the sending of men to Italy, but now was

unwilling to let me telegraph Churchill about the present situation here.”840

By 31 October, the situation in Ottawa was grim,841 and the political turmoil in

Ottawa left Burns’ departure and replacement up in the air. Alexander wrote to Brooke

on 1 November that he would “be very grateful for anything you can do to speed things

up. It is of course quite out of the question for Burns to return to the Canadian Corps even

temporarily and the sooner he can be recalled to Canada or the U.K. the easier and better

it will be for Burns himself and everyone else concerned.”842 However, the CIGS’ hands

were tied. Crerar had told him that, “there should be no outward public irrevocable action

taken at the present time and the situation which now maintains should temporarily

continue, i.e., Burns on leave and Volkes [sic] temporarily acting in command of 1 Cdn

Corps. CIGS agreed to this proposal.”843

1 November would prove to be the day of reckoning in Ottawa. For the previous

week, Mackenzie King had hoped to avoid both conscription and Ralston’s resignation.

By the 1st, however, King no longer believed it would be possible, and had decided that

he would be willing to accept McNaughton as Ralston’s replacement. Before proceeding

to the cabinet meeting, King met with McNaughton to discuss the situation. McNaughton

wanted Ralston’s job, and knew what the Prime Minister wanted to hear. Even so, his

conception of the state of affairs at the front was circumspect, especially considering that

First Canadian Army had been fighting in the Scheldt Estuary from early September to

840 Ibid. 841 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 251. 842 Alexander to Brooke, 1 November 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 843 Crerar to Brooke, no date, [Estimated 31 October 1944] Vols I and II – Higher Command - Cdn Army Overseas, Crerar Papers, Vol. 4. 280

the start of November, while 1st Canadian Corps fought at the Gothic Line. King recorded

that McNaughton,

went on to say for example our men had intensive fighting for some 59 days. I think that is wrong. I do not think our army is being used rightly. I think that the mistake which has been made is there was a ‘let-down’ in production of cannon, of big guns and ammunition for them. They are rationed on the ammunition and it looks to me as though men were being used in the infantry line to make up for the lack of ammunition and guns which was something I had pointed out as wholly necessary. There should be a week in and a week off. It is wrong that our men should be used at the pace they have been used, and that I think has been due to this cause. That they have not had the necessary artillery ammunition.844

In the Cabinet meeting that afternoon, the battle lines between the pro and anti-

conscription ministers remained entrenched. They fundamentally disagreed on what

“conscription as necessary” really meant—necessary to win the war; or necessary to keep

the army at strength? Finally, King took action. He accepted the resignation letter that

Ralston had submitted two years earlier during the first conscription crisis. Ralston had

no idea this was coming. King felt Ralston’s departure would make room for “the man

who was prepared to see the situation through,” McNaughton.845 Ralston, who had

spearheaded the expansion of the Canadian army, had been unceremoniously dismissed

by the Prime Minister.

The conscription crisis was temporarily relieved, as McNaughton took time to try

and encourage more voluntary recruits. He believed that his personal popularity would

turn the tide and encourage new waves of volunteers. It took a few days before the crisis

in Italy, too, was settled. On 2 November, Vokes wrote to Penhale,

Things have reached a crisis here…but whether any action is taken by the parties responsible at your end is impossible to predict. If nothing is done & quickly,

844 W.L. Mackenzie King, Papers, 1 November 1944. 845 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 458. 281

Bert [Hoffmeeister] & myself plus Pres [Gilbride], Des [Smith] and [Johnny] Plow, and Collie [Campbell, respectively the DA&QMG, BGS, CRA, and CE at corps] are prepared to adopt the only course possible. Personally I am absolutely browned off. In spite of no able direction we have continued to bear the cross for an individual who lacks one iota of personality, appreciation of effort or the first goddamn thing in the application of book learning to what is practical in war & what isn’t. I’ve done my best to be loyal but goddammit the strain has been too bloody great.846

The same day, Montague met with Brooke who insisted that Burns’ had to be relieved immediately. Brooke told him that

‘The return of Burns to command is impossible – he cannot go back. I must tell Crerar that.’ I [Montague] informed him of the political situation which had developed, namely that Mr. Ralston had resigned as Minister of National Defence, and that General McNaughton had succeeded him and that my personal view was that the Government would be most anxious to not have any more disturbing factors injected into their present situation. He then said ‘I recognise that there may be a political situation but I must answer that there is a war on.’ The CIGS was most courteous and friendly with me, but I am bound to say his language was most decisive.847

Brooke’s own account of the meeting reported a similar outcome: “I found out from him

[Montague] that a Canadian Cabinet crisis was on, resulting in Ralston being dismissed and McNaughton appointed as Defence Minister. Therefore desirability to damp down troubles in Canada for the present!” 848 This meeting finally prompted Montague and

Crerar to take action. Crerar was still wary of the British, and was committed to doing due-diligence. Montague cabled Weeks in Italy on 2 November for a thorough account of the investigation he had conducted in October. It arrived shortly thereafter, and confirmed that Burns had to go.849 Still, the situation in Ottawa made it unfavourable to draw

846 Vokes to Penhale, 2 November 1944, quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 117. 847 Montague MGA, 2 November 1944, Vols I and II – Higher Command - Cdn Army Overseas, Crerar Papers, Vol. 4. 848 2 November 1944, Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 616. 849 Weeks to Montague, 2 November 1944, Vols I and II – Higher Command - Cdn Army Overseas, Crerar Papers, Vol. 4. 282

widespread attention to the situation in Italy. Brooke wrote to Wilson and Alexander on 4

November that he had spoken to Crerar regarding Burns and Vokes, but that the

“[s]ituation [was] delicate at present owing to Cabinet difficulties in Canada and Ralston replacement by McNaughton. Evidently Burns cannot return to Canadian Corps under any circumstances, but he should remain on leave in Italy until receipt of further orders.

Vokes to be acting Commander Canadian Corps for the present” 850 The Canadians were

aware that the Corps could not be left in limbo for much longer. Indeed, it had effectively

been without a commander for the better part of ten days, at a time when Eighth Army

was still embroiled in the difficult fighting north of the Gothic Line. Crerar observed on

5th November that the situation in Italy could not be left for more than a few days

longer.851

The pressure worked. Official word came that very day. At 1700 hours, Burns

was handed a copy of the memorandum from London reliving him of command of 1st

Canadian Corps, and recalling him to the United Kingdom.852 It had been one of

McNaughton’s first acts as Minister of National Defence, to fire a man whom he had already demoted once, two years earlier. Burns was obviously upset, but left graciously.

He wrote to thank Alexander for his “personal kindness” and consideration of his

feelings.853

850 Brooke to Wilson and Alexander, 4 November 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 851 Montague to Stuart and Murchie, 5 November 1944, Vols I and II – Higher Command - Cdn Army Overse r 1944, Crerar Papers, Vol. 4. 852 Weeks to Montague, 5 November 1944, Vols I and II – Higher Command - Cdn Army Overseas, Crerar Papers, Vol. 4. 853 Burns to Alexander, 7 November 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 283

Burns was replaced by Major-General Charles Foulkes, who was promoted from

his command of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. Alexander and McCreery had hoped for

Vokes, 854 whom they knew well and thought competent. Crerar intervened, however,

insisting that Foulkes was the better prospective Corps Commander than Vokes.855 One

Canadian officer later recalled that Foulkes was “one of Crerar’s boys who wouldn’t have

risen without him.”856 This had to have been frustrating for the British, although

McCreery would eventually concede that Foulkes was “a great improvement on

Burns.”857 The Canadians by and large thought so too, and one officer remembered him

as “quite able, certainly not stupid, though he had a not very attractive personality.”858

Alexander also finally received an answer from Wilson about the fate of Canadian

troops: “I have at present no information regarding the withdrawal of Canadian Division

under your command, and…I have no present intention to withdraw any of the forces

now at your disposal…”859 Indeed, despite Mackenzie King’s pleas to Churchill, the

Canadians would not be immediately removed from Italy to join the Army in North-West

Europe. Instead, General Charles Foulkes, acting GOC of 2nd Canadian Corps, was to

replace Burns. The corps was back in action at Lamone in December.

The way the crises in Italy and Ottawa unfolded at the end of October 1944 were

the bitter harvest of a military campaign plagued by strategic and political disinterest by

the Canadian Government, exacerbated by the bloody fighting the Canadians endured on

854 Alexander to Brooke, 1 November 1944, Ibid. 855 Quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 143. 856 Granatstein interview with Gen. S.F. Clark, Victoria, 24 February 1992, Granatstein Papers. 857 Quoted in Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 404. 858 Granatstein interview with Major-General M.P. Bogert, Donnington, U.K., 8 September 1991, Granatstein Papers. 859 Wilson to Alexander, 9 November 1944, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 284

the ground. King needed a way to save face. He blamed the original decision to deploy 1st

Corps to Italy as a major cause of conscription, conveniently forgetting his own role in this decision. Overlooked during his political machinations were the hard fighting men of the 1st Canadian Corps, who were temporarily left without a commander. Once again, words in Ottawa failed to match deeds in the field, as Mackenzie King’s apparent concern for the “question of saving human lives” appears in this case to be concerned primarily with the saving of his political skin and avoid a conscription crisis.

There is no indication that these crises served to impart the lesson to King that he had avoided being involved in grand or campaign strategy making at his own peril.

Instead, probably fortunately, King returned to his political intrigues, while the men of the 1st Corps fought under a British General of a Commonwealth Army, more concerned about the flag flying on the next German occupied hill than the patch sewn on the shoulder of the men from Canada.

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CONCLUSION

“Thank heaven I have at last got the whole of the Canadian Army now assembled in France!” Evaluating the Canadians’ Italian Campaign

After being forcefully confronted with the error of its ways during the

conscription crisis of November 1944, Mackenzie King’s government thereafter tried to

take a more active role in determining the fate of 1st Canadian Corps, although they

continued to remain in the dark as to overall Allied strategy. It was too late for that to

change. As Ralston had done previously, the Canadians informed the British that they

welcomed the transfer of 1st Canadian Corps to North-West Europe when military

conditions permitted it. When rumours that the 1st Canadian Corps might be deployed to

Yugoslavia reached Ottawa, King’s government issued a formal statement that they would not permit Canadian units to be used outside of Italy or—after negotiations,

Austria—without its agreement. In the meantime, they continued to drive home the point to the British that they wanted the 1st Corps in North West Europe post haste. In a

meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff and Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London in

mid-January 1945, Price Montague pressed the point that the Canadians definitely desired

their troops in Italy to be sent to North-West Europe.860 As Granatstein writes, “Defence

minister Andrew McNaughton’s insistence on bringing I Canadian Corps from Italy was

a belated but necessary exercise of national will.”861

At the end of the month, the opportunity presented itself for the Canadians to

finally get what they wanted. The Allies decided that it was necessary to reinforce North-

860 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 657-659. 861 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 303. 286

West Europe with more divisions from the Mediterranean so that a decisive victory could

be expedited in the heartland of Germany. Two corps and five divisions selected from

British Commonwealth forces were to be transferred to Eisenhower’s command.862

Brooke knew there were “great advantages” in having 1st Canadian Corps “join up with

the remainder of the Canadian forces in France [sic].”863 He presumably meant political advantages, but there were also military practicalities. A report on the feasibility of transferring units from Italy assessed the potential units on a number of factors, including their immediate readiness, the effect upon ongoing operations in Italy, and the implications of moving separate national supporting elements and installations. The

Canadians in Italy were in reserve through January and February, and thus their withdrawal would not immediately affect operations, although the report did warn that

AAI had hoped to have the Canadians available for forthcoming operations in Austria.864

The Canadians had national Lines of Communication troops that would have to be moved

with them, but the report said that these could be merged with existing units in North-

West Europe.865 The report concluded that unlike the New Zealand, South African, or

Polish units in Eighth Army, the Canadians were ready for immediate transfer.

On 4 February, 1st Canadian Corps received word that it would be transferred out

of Italy in Operation “Goldflake.” Montgomery gave the good news to Crerar, much to

862 Marshall said that the US Fifth Army should be left intact in Italy, Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 659. 863 Ibid. 864 “Transfer of Two Corps of Five Divisions from MTO to SHAEF,” January 1945, Alexander Papers, WO 214/55. 865 Ibid. 287

the Army Commander’s “great satisfaction.”866 Preparations were made in haste. The corps moved south to Naples and from there was transported to Marseille. By the end of

March most Canadian units had left Italy, prompting Brooke to write, “Thank heaven I have at last got the whole of the Canadian Army now assembled in France![sic]”867

From start to finish, 1st Canadian Corps’ time in Italy had illustrated myriad

problems to the Anglo-Canadian alliance. At its very root was the unfortunate fact that

Canada did not have a seat on the Combined Chiefs of Staff so as to remain well-

informed of Allied intentions. Without the regular, up-to-date information on the

evolution of strategy that would have been provided by such a seat, the Canadians were

forced to rely on informal communications networks with the British while they tried to

determine a course of action for the Canadian Army. This system of communication was

inherently flawed and woefully unsatisfactory. The Canadians often received out-dated or

inaccurate information, or simply no information at all, about key strategic decisions that

would have repercussions on Canada’s soldiers—for example, the switch to a strategy of

attrition in the Liri Valley in early 1944, and the launch of Operation Anvil in August

1944. It was a pattern that lasted the entire campaign. Rather than concertedly attempting

to fix this situation, however, Ralston and Stuart instead thought about the Italian

Campaign only in terms of what it could offer to or detract from Canada’s national,

political interests, or the interests of the Canadian Army. The strategic objectives of the

Italian Campaign had little place in Canada’s planning for or attention to the campaign.

866 Quoted in M.B. Huffman, “Operation ‘Goldflake,’ the Move of 1 Cdn Corps from Italy to North-West Europe, Feb-Mar 1945: CMHQ Report No. 181,” 9. 867 By March, the First Canadian Army was in Holland, not France. 19 March 1945, Brooke, War Diaries, 672. 288

The Canadians hoped that in this way, they could wage the war like loyal allies while still

preserving their independence on the operational level.

The unfortunate reality was quite the reverse. Ralston and Mackenzie King

realised only too late that grand strategy and campaign strategy mattered when it came to

whether Canada could achieve its own objectives for 1st Canadian Corps, and for that reason, Canada should have seriously considered Allied strategy and insisted upon regular, up-to-date information on the Mediterranean strategy as it developed. While

Ralston took tentative steps to address the situation throughout the summer of 1944,

Mackenzie King never truly admitted his own complicity, and instead blamed Ralston

and the British for this situation during the 1944 conscription crisis. Throughout the

Italian Campaign, the Combined Chiefs of Staff made decisions that directly affected the

Canadians in theatre, while Canada’s politicians remained in in the dark. This dynamic was double jeopardy in that it hindered, rather than helped, relations with the British. As had happened in spring 1944 when the Canadians requested that 1st Canadian Corps

rejoin First Canadian Army, the Canadians had a habit of making badly timed requests of

the British that the strategic situation did not allow for, because the Canadians were out

of the loop. Naturally this led to resentment and tension in London, and dismay and anger

in Ottawa. Plus, it was mirrored at the operational level in Italy, where politics and military expediency clashed.

In the summer and fall of 1943, the Canadians pressed the British to accept 1st

Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy, regardless of whether it

was in the best interest of the war effort, which the British insisted it was not. Allied

strategic negotiations over the Mediterranean Theatre including the pressures on Allied

289

shipping were only partly known to the Canadians. Both the British and Canadians share the blame for this communication breakdown. In the preparations for and aftermath of the bi-lateral conferences at Casablanca, Washington (“Trident”) and Quebec (“Quadrant”), the Canadians were often told what the British hoped the Americans would agree too, rather than what was in fact agreed to. With only partial information, and despite warnings that any corps sent to Italy might not be returned in time for the cross-channel invasion, Ralston and Stuart decided it was in the best interest of the Canadians and

Canadian Army to commit its forces to get operational experience, in preparation for the later attack on North West Europe, even if it meant possibly sacrificing First Canadian

Army headquarters.

With the knowledge and support of Mackenzie King, Ralston eventually pressured Churchill to accept the Canadians, much to the dismay of Brooke and other members of the British Chiefs of Staff. There were also military reasons for Brooke’s eventual acquiescence; sending the Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division to Italy allowed the vaunted 7th Armoured Division to be returned from Italy, which would help boost the number of British divisions to take place in the cross-channel invasion. Moreover, the Canadians agreed to send their units to Italy on the basis of an equipment swap. 1st Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division were to arrive in Italy only with their personal kit and 2” mortars, and take over the 7th Armoured Division’s guns, tanks, trucks and kit upon their arrival. This would significantly reduce the number of transport ships needed to be made available to get the Canadians to Italy. The British

Chiefs of Staff made this decision without referring to Alexander, or assessing the

290

military needs of the Italian Theatre. This oversight was a mistake, as events would

confirm.

In Italy, British Eighth Army and 15th Army Group more generally were already short of equipment, especially transport vehicles. All available equipment was being absorbed by combat units; anything left over was barely serviceable. This information was being transmitted from Italy to the War Office as early as August, however Ralston did not ask to assess the viability of the “swap” before agreeing to it, nor did Brooke offer him such information. The decision to send 1st Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian

Armoured Division to Italy in 1943 was built on a house of cards; neither Alexander nor

Leese wanted another corps or armoured division, much less an inexperienced one, nor

did they have enough equipment for them. Brooke warned the Canadians that if

additional units were sent to Italy, it would be hard to get them back in time for the cross-

channel invasion. Ralston and Stuart, however, were blinded by their desire for

immediate operational experience. It is clear that Ralston did not consider Allied strategic

objectives for the Campaign, much less the feasibility of the intended equipment “swap”,

when making the decision to send 1st Corps to Italy. This was not indicative of a mature

relationship among Allied partners.

As such, when Crerar arrived in Italy in October 1943, it was into a maelstrom.

Initially, his objectives seemed achievable. As the Canadian national commander in the

Mediterranean Theatre, he was to oversee the administration of the Canadian troops, and

in keeping with Canadian experiences in the First World War and the Visiting Forces

Act, to get 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 5th Canadian Armoured Division under his

command. He was then to get into action as quickly as possible. The prior experiences of

291

the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Sicily, where they had quickly made themselves a respected member of Eighth Army, suggested these objectives were obtainable. However,

British experiences in the war had taught them other lessons; working with an indivisible

Canadian corps limited operational flexibility, as did, at times, working with national commanders responsible to their political masters. They, instead, preferred to have

Commonwealth divisions absorbed into British corps. That the 1st Canadian Corps

headquarters was still inexperienced after four years of war certainly contributed to their

reservations, and rightly so.

The problems were immediately apparent. Proceeding to Italy on the basis of an

equipment swap, it was 15th Army Group’s responsibility to find equipment for the

Canadian Corps and 5th Canadian Armoured Division. In the minds of Eisenhower and

Alexander, there was no military expediency to having a Canadian Corps or armoured

division in Italy. In a theatre already short supplied, re-equipping front line units was

sensibly the priority. Politics, operational necessity, and personality conflict were all at

play, leading to a period of sustained tension in the Anglo-Canadian relationship. Despite

the desperate shipping situation, equipment had to be brought from England for 1st

Canadian Corps. It was only when operations were renewed in January on the Adriatic

Coast to support the American assault on Cassino that an operational role was found for

units of 5th Canadian Armoured Division and, subsequently, equipment for them.

However, the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade was attached to the 1st Canadian Infantry

Division under 5th Corps Headquarters for the attack on the Arielli. This was not the

operational experience that Crerar had hoped for before his return to England to

command First Canadian Army in March, 1943.

292

Ralston also had begun to lose hope that the Italian Campaign would fulfill the

country’s objectives of immediate operational experience, and his interest in the theatre

waned. As early as November 1943, he asked Brooke when the Canadian corps might be

returned to the UK to prepare for the cross-channel invasion, which he knew would be

the more important theatre. Brooke assured Ralston that there was little chance it would

make it back in time for D-Day. When Crerar returned to England without having led 1st

Canadian Corps in battle, Canadian politicians and high command lost interest in the

Italian campaign and began preparing for the invasion of France.

Not everything was at odds. In the subsequent period with Burns at the helm of

the corps, without political interference from Ottawa and London, relations between 1st

Canadian Corps and Eighth British Army improved. Burns and his divisional

commanders’ focused on learning to wage war in the Italian Theatre, and they did this by

coordinating with and learning from their British and Commonwealth counter-parts. This was abetted by Alexander’s decision in February to re-organise his armies and launch a new offensive in the Liri Valley in the spring, which included 1st Canadian Corps and 5th

Canadian Armoured Division in the order of battle, making them relevant to the military

operations in the Italian Theatre for the first time since they had arrived. An armoured

breakthrough of the Hitler Line was a critical part of Alexander’s plan to attrit the

German armies in Italy while advancing toward Rome and this critical job was assigned

to the Canadians. This operational purpose for the Canadians, coupled with their training

programme and the political disinterest from Ottawa and London, seemed temporarily to

alleviate some of the pressures on the Anglo-Canadian relationship in Italy. The détente

did not last long.

293

The subsequent attack on the Liri Valley witnessed the culmination of the

pressure, tension, and also training that had occurred in the previous months. Leese gave

the inexperienced Canadians the follow-up role through the Hitler Line. Despite his

growing confidence in Burns, the corps was still green, and thus Leese also used his

vaunted 13th Corps to push through the Hitler Line, bolstering their strength with the 78th

Infantry Division. Plus, at a point when 5th Canadian Armoured Division was slated to

start its breakout, Leese deployed the 6th Armoured Division through their lines. Leese’s

bad decision overwhelmed the wobbly Canadian staff work, and contributed to a traffic

jam of immense proportion. In turn, the Liri operation seemed to confirm Leese’s worst

fears that Burns’ green corps would fail its first test in battle. Alliance politics and

military operations played a part in the way the Liri Valley campaign was organised,

fought, and ultimately assessed.

As 1st Canadian Corps was finally fulfilling its original objective of achieving

operational experience for a united, two-division Canadian corps in Italy, the Canadian

government began showing a renewed interest in getting 1st Canadian Corps out of Italy.

Again for reasons of national interest, rather than the military conditions in Italy, Ralston

and Stuart, along with Crerar, decided that it was now time for 1st Canadian Corps to

return to England and rejoin the First Canadian Army. With the impending cross-channel invasion, Ralston and Stuart knew Italy was a theatre of secondary importance. Sensing the pressures on the reinforcement system divided between two theatres, the government believed that reunification could obviate the looming pressures on Canadian manpower which raised the ugly spectre of conscription. Crerar and Stuart also sensed that Crerar’s position as national commander within 21st Army Group would be strengthened by

294

having a five division, homogenous Canadian Army. However, Ralston continued to be in the dark regarding ongoing Allied strategic negotiations over the Italian Campaign, hearing only rumours. He had not known about the Allies’ new strategy of attrition in

Italy or what it could mean to the Canadians reinforcement situation. Furthermore, the

Allies had decided that Operation Anvil was to take place in August, 1944, meaning

American and French divisions would be removed from Alexander’s order of battle in

Italy to attack the South of France. The objectives for Alexander, however, remained the same—to attrit the Germans while moving into the north of Italy. Ralston was unaware of these developments and, with political and national reasons in mind, asked to have the

Canadians returned to the UK at the very moment that Brooke and Alexander could not spare the manpower. Ironically, had Ralston been aware of the Allied plans, and considered them while taking into consideration Canada’s national interest of avoiding conscription, he may have insisted that the Corps be removed. At arms-length from

Allied strategy, and having given up control over the 1st Canadian Corps, Ralston did not.

He inquired and pressured but did not demand their return.

However, Ralston had started to sense the weakness in the Canadians’ situation in

Italy in regards to Allied strategy. While Crerar and Montgomery were debating Crerar’s role as national commander in 21st Army Group,868 Leese asked to fire Burns from command of 1st Canadian Corps. He and Alexander went so far as to suggest that the

Canadian corps be dissolved, and its units spread piecemeal among other British corps’.

At the very least, they suggested that a competent British officer be put in command of

868 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 252-253, and chapter 6. 295

the corps. This was a non-starter and the British knew it. It was not in the Canadians’ best

interest, and the Canadian army and government would not allow it, but the suggestion

was enough to re-ignite Canadian suspicions about the intentions of British High

Command. With all of these factors at play, Brigadier Bradbrooke was deployed to Italy

to act as a liaison between CMHQ and Allied headquarters in Italy, on matters of politics

that were of interest to the Canadians. This band aid solution proved ineffective. It was

too little, too late. Bradbrooke was seen as a “spy” by Canadians and British alike, and doors remained closed to him.

The problems of Anglo-Canadian communication remained fundamental, and were not solved by the time the Gothic Line Campaign started at the end of August, 1944.

In this battle the Canadians performed well. After early success, Burns was supported with more units of Eighth Army to make the main offensive. However, Burns’ performance was thereafter hotly criticised by his own divisional commanders, and there was little choice left for Eighth Army and First Canadian Army but to remove him from command of the corps.

Yet, the Burns situation developed concurrently with the conscription crisis in

Canada. By October, Stuart had realised that the Canadian reinforcement system was not holding up; there were not enough infantry reinforcements in the manpower pool to keep units at strength. After visiting Italy and North-West Europe and viewing first-hand the strain on the troops in action, Ralston returned to Ottawa and formally recommended that

NRMA servicemen be conscripted for overseas service. As the crisis broke out, Canadian politicians finally saw the link between Allied strategy and their national goals. Indeed, the decision to divide the Army between two theatres and the consequent strain on the

296

reinforcement system was believed to be one of the reasons for conscription. Canadian politicians, Mackenzie King first among them, demanded to know why the Canadians had not been consulted on the making of the Mediterranean strategy, which had committed the Canadians to fight a war of attrition in Italy on a shoestring. Mackenzie

King conveniently and forcibly ignored his own complicity to this situation, and thus transferred the blame to Ralston and Brooke. While keeping the army united might not have prevented conscription, Canadian politicians had, at last, realised superficially that

Allied strategy did affect the degree to which the country’s national goals could be achieved.

Unfortunately, this realisation did not fundamentally change Mackenzie King’s approach to the war effort, and indeed the amateur nature of the Canadian war leadership is obvious in the way this crisis played out. While the Canadians in Ottawa were paying lip service to the idea that the country’s national interests could best be protected by being active, rather than passive, when it came to Allied strategy, the army in action was trying earnestly to act like a professional army. Eighth Army again called for the dismissal of Burns. After due investigation, Crerar realised this time that Burns’ could not, nor should not, be saved. He went on leave, awaiting his ultimate dismissal. And yet, thanks to the political chaos in Canada, the fate of the corps commander remained in limbo for weeks, owing to the pending conscription crisis. Neither Crerar nor the British wanted to give the Canadian government or public any more bad news to exacerbate the already tenuous political situation in Ottawa.

In the final analysis, despite Ralston’s best (albeit misguided) efforts, Canada’s national interest—ultimately defined as waging a recognisable, independent war effort

297

without imposing conscription—could not be fulfilled without being treated as a valued partner with timely access to Allied military strategy in the Mediterranean Theatre. The

Canadians believed that giving up a say into strategy and working with the British on the

operational level was the best they could expect, and that the system could preserve their

own independent interests. In fact the opposite was true. By leaving the direction of the

war to the British and Americans, the Canadians repeatedly asked for operational

concessions at times that understandably annoyed and inconvenienced the Allies. Had the

Canadians kept military strategy in view, thereby assessing their interests in consideration

of Allied interests, they might have done a better job of achieving their interests and

working with the British. Ralston bears the most responsibility for this negligence. He

deferred too readily to both Brooke and Stuart, and failed at key moments to ask the right

questions, or demand the information that the Canadians both deserved and needed as

later events would prove. He, and Mackenzie King, realised this all too late. Instead, they

alienated the British in London and in Italy, and after sending 1st Canadian Corps to Italy, had no say in when and for what purposes the corps was used in battle. Despite

Mackenzie King’s indignant claims that he had not been informed of how Canadian forces would be used, in fact, this was largely his doing.

The British also carry considerable blame, notably Brooke who consistently failed to give timely and accurate information to the Canadians, and instead took the burden of balancing Canada’s interests with those of the war on his own terms —which in turn alienated the Canadians. In Italy, the Canadian insistence on sending a corps created tension between Alexander, Leese, Crerar and Burns. Alexander and Leese tried to mitigate the potential effects of having an unwanted indivisible national corps by

298

prioritising operational imperatives over and above the Canadians’ political goals. After

all, they had a war to win and keeping the Canadians mollified was down the list. At some points they were successful in their endeavours, and yet, at other times the tension

affected the way that the Canadian Corps was used in action. It was mistake piled upon

mistake. In the end, a balance was not found. Ultimately, the Anglo-Canadian alliance in

Italy was hampered by tension and resentment; while the Canadians remained fixated on

their own national interests, the British prioritised decisions that would win the war,

assuaging the Canadians only when militarily possible to do so.

Fighting as a mid-sized power in the Grand Alliance, Canada was in an unfamiliar

position. Its economic, industrial and military clout would have allowed it to play an

effective “functional” part on the spectrum of war planning, from tactics to strategy.

Perhaps the entirety of the possibilities before him eluded Mackenzie King, or that he

simply preferred to keep focused on maintaining domestic tranquility. In the event, he

and his government failed to mesh their own policies with the battlefield. The result was

part farce and part irony, coming at the cost of some of the very objectives King so

awkwardly sought. Canada had hoped to promote its national interests on the operational

level by making the national commander responsible to the Canadian government. In

doing so, King assumed that the strategic direction of the war could be ceded to Britain

and the United States, leaving him to ensure a nationalist veneer and focus on the

homefront. This implies an acceptance on his part that Grand Strategy and even campaign

strategy was somehow unnecessary to Canada’s own war effort or beyond Canada’s

grasp, perhaps even something impure, better left to the more vulgar great powers. This

attitude created tension in both the Anglo-Canadian alliance in London and in the Italian

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Theatre. The dysfunctional relationship was never more apparent than in the tragicomic delay in the sacking of Burns, and meant that the Canadian Government and High

Command were regularly ignorant of the operational objectives their own troops in Italy were fighting for. Only too late, when faced with the conscription crisis, did the government begin to realise that Canada’s emergence as a moderate power required a holistic understanding of war and power. The pursuit of its national interest within the

Grand Alliance could only succeed if Canada demonstrated its sovereignty through a competent grasp of military strategy. Unfortunately, it was too little, too late, for

Canada’s D-Day Dodgers.

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