The Canadian Militia in the Interwar Years, 1919-39
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
THE POLICY OF NEGLECT: THE CANADIAN MILITIA IN THE INTERWAR YEARS, 1919-39 ___________________________________________________________ A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board ___________________________________________________________ in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY __________________________________________________________ by Britton Wade MacDonald January, 2009 iii © Copyright 2008 by Britton W. MacDonald iv ABSTRACT The Policy of Neglect: The Canadian Militia in the Interwar Years, 1919-1939 Britton W. MacDonald Doctor of Philosophy Temple University, 2008 Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin The Canadian Militia, since its beginning, has been underfunded and under-supported by the government, no matter which political party was in power. This trend continued throughout the interwar years of 1919 to 1939. During these years, the Militia’s members had to improvise a great deal of the time in their efforts to attain military effectiveness. This included much of their training, which they often funded with their own pay. They created their own training apparatuses, such as mock tanks, so that their preparations had a hint of realism. Officers designed interesting and unique exercises to challenge their personnel. All these actions helped create esprit de corps in the Militia, particularly the half composed of citizen soldiers, the Non- Permanent Active Militia. The regulars, the Permanent Active Militia (or Permanent Force), also relied on their own efforts to improve themselves as soldiers. They found intellectual nourishment in an excellent service journal, the Canadian Defence Quarterly, and British schools. The Militia learned to endure in these years because of all the trials its members faced. The interwar years are important for their impact on how the Canadian Army (as it was known after 1940) would fight the Second World War. To put it simply, the interwar years forced the Militia to focus on officer, NCO, and specialist development, creating a highly trained v and effective nucleus of key personnel. This leadership core led Canada’s land-based contribution to the war effort. Another important factor in the Canadian Army’s performance was the Militia’s interwar interest in mechanization, which revealed a remarkably progressive strain in this neglected organization. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation began life after I completed two classes on the world wars under the late Russell F. Weigley at Temple University. Given that I was the only Canadian in the classes, it seemed only natural to honor my heritage for my research essays. That I would face no competition for books or research materials also played a part, I will hasten to admit. In completing those essays, I became aware that there was a dearth of books on the Canadian Militia’s interwar years. As historians are trained to look for holes in the historiography and try to fill them, I soon realized I had found my dissertation topic. Writing this dissertation has been a long, hard road. And I owe many people my gratitude for their help along the way. First and foremost, I would like to thank the wonderful staff at the National Archives and Library of Canada, the University of Saskatchewan (particularly the interlibrary loans staff), and the Saskatoon Public Library. The patience of my advisor, Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin, was sorely tested in helping me complete this dissertation. He has done a yeoman’s work to smooth, compress, and generally aid my writing. Despite having said that, I absolve him of any errors and problems that may have crept into (or lingered in) the dissertation. I would also like to thank Drs. Richard Immerman, Jay Lockenour, and David Bercuson for sitting on my defense committee. Undoubtedly, their input has made this dissertation stronger. Finally, I cannot forget to thank my friends and family. My parents, Mary and David, provided more than generous financial and emotional support in the years that it took me to vii complete the dissertation, even if they could not quite remember what it was that I was doing. My brother, Scott, was a sounding board for ideas, arguments, and writing style. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Janelle. Her patience for me and loving support was always appreciated when I was depressed at how the project was going. So to her I dedicate this dissertation, along with all the brave men whose tale I am recounting herein. What I suffered through was nothing compared to what they had to endure, both in the interwar period and certainly in the Second World War. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... vi LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 2. THE MILITIA IN CANADA, 1812-1914 ........................................................................ 15 3. THE TEST OF BATTLE .................................................................................................. 53 4. “DEFENCE AGAINST WHOM?” .................................................................................. 85 5. POSTWAR PROBLEMS IN THE MILITIA .................................................................. 111 6. “A SENSELESS WASTE OF THE TAXPAYER’S MONEY”? .................................. 139 7. THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE MILITIA ...................................................... 171 8. “PREPARING OUR OWN MINDS” ............................................................................ 203 9. GETTING THE OBJECTIVE RIGHT ........................................................................... 237 10. POLITICS, ARMAMENT, AND SOVEREIGNTY, 1936-39 ...................................... 265 11. A “HETEROGENEOUS MASS” .................................................................................. 297 12. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 327 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 355 ix LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Comparison of the budgets of Canada’s three military services, 1935-39............................. 289 1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: THE NEGLECTED CANADIAN MILITIA By examining the Canadian Militia’s history, one thing becomes abundantly clear: until the country actually needed its military, whether for a crisis or a war, the government allowed it to languish, unfunded and nearly forgotten. But when needed, the Militia’s funding returned, providing equipment and weapons that had been withheld by years of governmental parsimony. Through much of Canada’s early history, only a clear and viable threat from the United States, such as during the American Civil War or the Fenian invasions of the post-bellum years, provided a reason to properly arm and equip the Militia. A handful of key developments in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century transformed the Militia from its colonial origins into something approaching a modern professional army. It had not yet reached that stage by the beginning of the First World War, but it had all the trappings of such a force. As suggested by its title, the Canadian Militia has historically been an organization of part- time soldiers. The government only created regulars, in the form of the Permanent Active Militia, or Permanent Force, in the 1870s. Ottawa did so because the British Army withdrew the majority of its garrisons from Canada, leaving the Militia without its teachers. For most of Canada’s history until the Second World War, the Dominion’s first-line of defense was not the regular forces, but its citizen soldiers in the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM). Due to the Militia Myth that emerged after the War of 1812 and gained strength after the 1880s, the government and the populace looked down on Canada’s regulars. The Permanent Force was often depicted as unnecessary and overly 2 expensive. Its members were seen as dilettantes, drunks or worse. On the other hand, the amateur citizen soldiers were noble, virtuous and often considered better soldiers than the regulars. The period following the South African War of 1899-1902 transformed the Militia. Its organization became more robust, adding services and evolving from an auxiliary force to nearly a self-contained army. This exception to the rule of government penny-pinching represented more a brief cultural trend than a change in Canadian society and politics. Military clubs, cadet corps and rifle ranges flourished as the public became interested in the military after Canada’s successful contribution to defeating the Boers. Following this fleeting interlude, the ministerial authority of Sir Sam Hughes ensured the ascendancy of the citizen soldier over the regular. This was no coincidence as Hughes was also the most senior officer among Canada’s part-time soldiers. Hughes detested regulars as minister of Militia from 1911 to 1916, he actively worked against their interests and development. He ignored the advice of the Permanent Force and General Staff, assuming that he knew better. Hughes’