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Pragmatism and Cooperation: Canadian-American Defence Activities in the Arctic, 1945-1951

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Pragmatism and Cooperation: Canadian-American Defence Activities in the Arctic, 1945-1951 Pragmatism and Cooperation: Canadian-American Defence Activities in the Arctic, 1945-1951 by Peter Kikkert A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts In History Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2009 © Peter Kikkert 2009 Author’s Declaration I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. ii Abstract During the early Cold War, as the Soviet menace placed Canada in between two hostile superpowers, the Canadian government decided to take steps to ensure that its sovereignty and national interests were not threatened by the Americans in the new strategic environment. This study examines the extent to which the Canadian government actually defended its sovereignty and rights against American intrusions in the early Cold War. At its core is an examination of the government’s policy of gradual acquisition in the Arctic between 1945 and 1951. This thesis explores the relationships that existed at the time, the essence of the negotiations, the state of international law and the potential costs and benefits of certain Canadian courses of action. It also explains how Canada’s quiet diplomacy allowed it to avoid alienating its chief ally, contribute to continental defence, and strengthen its sovereignty during this period. iii Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Whitney Lackenbauer, for his insight, constant encouragement and advice. His support will forever be appreciated. I also thank my fellow graduate students for their suggestions and diversions. Phil, thanks for always letting me bounce ideas off of you. Thank-you to my family, Anna and Ben for putting up with me during the more difficult portions of this journey. Without your love and support, I would have been hard pressed to finish. iv Table of Contents Introduction……………………………………………………………………….............1 1) In the Shadow of the Second World War…………………………………………….11 2) Negotiations…………………………………………………………………………..46 3) Letting the Americans In……………………………………………………………..79 4) Controlling the Arctic……………………………………………………………….111 5) Naval Missions and Airstrips………………………………………………………..143 6) Re-Canadianization………………………………………………………………….177 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………….187 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………195 v Introduction: Activists and Gradualists Concerns over Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic have arisen intermittently since the Second World War, provoking national anxiety. The irony of this powerful and familiar reaction is that when there appears to be no immediate threat to Canada’s control of its North, the entire region retreats to the all important “land of tomorrow” that can be forgotten today. When some kind of external threat looms over the Arctic, and Canadians suddenly perceive that other nations or foreign companies are developing strategic or commercial interests in the region, the place is rescued from the periphery of Canada’s national interests. “Arctic sovereignty seems to be the zombie – the dead issue that refuses to stay dead – of Canadian public affairs,” explain the authors of Arctic Front. “You think its settled, killed and buried, and then every decade or so it rises from the grave and totters into view again.”1 The issue has become a proverbial thorn in the side of Canadian governments. The threats to Canada’s sovereignty in the North have ranged from the influx of American personnel into the region during the Second World War and the early years of the Cold War, to the disputes over the status of the Northwest Passage spurred on by the voyages of the S.S. Manhattan in 1969 and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) cutter Polar Sea in 1985. As climate change warms the Arctic at an exceptional rate, contemporary challenges have drawn attention to disputes over boundaries, control over the Northwest Passage, and an alleged “race for resources.” How decision-makers read 1 Ken Coates, Whitney Lackenbauer, William Morrison, and Greg Poelzer, Arctic Front, (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008), 1. 1 pasts decisions will undoubtedly influence their perceptions of how to anticipate and deal with current and future ones.2 The gravest sovereignty crises that Canada faced historically shared two distinct features: they involved the Americans and they forced Canadian governments, both Liberal and Conservative, to choose between adopting a gradualist or activist stance on Arctic sovereignty. The gradualist approach is the more cautious of the two responses, characterized by careful negotiations and quiet diplomacy to achieve an implicit or explicit recognition of Canada’s sovereignty. Gradualists argue that sovereignty is strengthened over time and wish to avoid overly aggressive acts that might jeopardize Canada’s claims.3 An activist approach involves a more forthright and forceful pronouncement of Canadian sovereignty, such as the drawing of straight baselines by the Mulroney government. Both approaches seek the same objectives: the attainment of international recognition of Canada’s de jure sovereignty over the North, especially by the United States, and of de facto control of the Arctic land and waters.4 Canadian diplomats have had to walk a fine line in deciding how far to push the boundaries of international law and how much they could test the patience of the 2 Whitney Lackenbauer, “From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World,” paper for the Canadian International Council, July 2009. 3 Franklyn Griffiths, “Canadian Sovereignty and Arctic International Relations,” in The Arctic in Question, ed. E.J Dosman, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 144-148. 4 Sovereignty is officially defined as “The possession of supreme authority within a territory.” This concept is further split into de jure and de facto sovereignty. De facto “is the reality of control or possession, but not by right of law,” and basically involves exercising control over land and water. De jure is legitimate ownership under the law, and the recognition of others that one can use force in a designated territory; Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy: Canada and the United States in the Northwest Passage, (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 5; In 1946, Vice Chief of the General Staff D.C Spry defined sovereignty as “as power, right or authority over a clearly defined and delimited area, Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic in Relation to Joint Defence Undertakings, Memorandum from Department of National Defence to Cabinet Defence Committee, 18 May 1946, Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER) Volume 12, 1946, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967- ), 1555-1561. 2 Americans in affirming Canada’s sovereignty. For the most part, decision makers weighed the costs and benefits of a forceful assertion of sovereignty and erred on the side of caution. In the years of the early Cold War, the Liberal government faced this dilemma as the exigencies of continental defence brought the world’s attention squarely on the Arctic. In the spring of 1946, Canada’s senior diplomats pondered the troublesome problem of Arctic sovereignty as American defence plans piled up on their desks. The presence of a Soviet threat across the northern approaches could be plainly seen on the polar projection maps that Canadian and American officials began to use in place of their old Mercator projections. Canada found itself sandwiched between two superpower adversaries, and its American neighbour expected it to cooperate in defending the continent. Decision makers understood the implications of the new world situation for their country’s sovereignty. In order to defend North America from communist aggression, the Americans would demand the right to carry out defence operations and projects in the thinly occupied islands of the Arctic Archipelago: an area in which Canadian control and ownership seemed insecure. The documents from this period reflect an almost frantic worry over the establishment of an American presence in the North and the potential dangers this posed to Canada’s claims. It took Canadian officials several years to recover from the fallout of the mega-projects undertaken by the United States in the Canadian Northwest during the war, when the government had allowed the Americans onto Canadian territory en masse and with little regulation. Embarrassment and panic ensured that this oversight would not be repeated. 3 This time the Canadians insisted that American proposals be met with a measured response and effectively controlled from the start. Sitting in his office at 1746 Massachusetts Avenue NW on 5 June 1946, Lester B. Pearson, the Ambassador to the United States, pondered Canada’s sovereignty problem and decided that his country had an opportunity to gain formal and public acknowledgement of its claims in the Arctic. The American desire for defence rights in the region gave Canada a bargaining chip that it could use in its negotiations with the U.S. “I am wondering whether we could not take advantage of the present situation,” mused Pearson in a letter to Hume Wrong, the Acting Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, “to secure from the United States Government public recognition of our sovereignty of the total area of our northern coasts, based on the sector principle.”5 If his bid worked, Pearson’s activist approach would secure Canadian control over a large slice of the polar region in short order.6 Hume Wrong doubted that the State Department would simply “fall in line, if falling in line means that they are asked to proclaim their adhesion to the sector theory of Arctic sovereignty.”7 Wrong told Douglass Abbot, the Minister of National Defence, that Pearson “underestimate[d] the difficulties” faced by the United States. The Americans 5 “Ambassador in the United States to Acting Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, 5 June 1946,” Department of External Affairs, DCER Volume 12, 1946, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967- ), 1565-66.
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