DOCSLIB.ORG

USMA the War with Japan.Pt.1 1941-12 1942.08.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
USMA the War with Japan.Pt.1 1941-12 1942.08.Pdf THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE LIBRARY 940.542 U57w 1950 Call Number CGSC Form 154 (Rev) 22 Oct 52 USACGSC—PO-3396—1 Apr 60—5M RCftfRICTED THE WAR WITH JAPAN PART 1 (December 1941 to August 1942) mnn urn mt BY TAG m mmu DEPARTMENT OP MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT, NEW YORK 195O REQTIUOTHD THE WAR WITH JAPAN PART 1 (December 1941 to August 1942) DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT, NEW YORK 195O %\ (\ \! REOTRIOTBD PREFACE This account of the war with Japan has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the most part on material furnished by the Historical Division, Department of the Army. Much valuable information has been obtained from the publications of the United States Stra­ tegic Bombing Survey and the Office of Naval Intelligence. How­ ever, in acknowledging indebtedness to others it is not desired to place on them the responsibility for any factual errors or for any conclusions drawn. This and other pamphlets on World War II are constantly being revised as additional information becomes available. It will be ap­ preciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or dis­ crepancies, or who have comments or suggestions for the improve­ ment of the subject matter, will communicate them to: The Professor of Military Art and Engineering U. S. Military Academy West Point, N. Y. August 1947 ARMY-USMA. WEST PDINT. N.Y. 225O 4-3-5O CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION 1 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 2 JAPANESE WAR PLAN 8 JAPANESE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE y 10 InitiaLPlaris and Preparations 10 Central Pacific Operations 14 Pearl. Harbor ... " 14 Midway 29 Wake 29 Guam 30 Operations in East Asia 30 Hong Kong 30 Malaya, British Borneo, Thailand 32 Comments 43 First Philippine Campaign 46 Luzon 50 Visayas-Mindanao 82 Comments 84 First Burma Campaign 87 Comments 92 Conquest of the Netherlands East Indies ^ 93 Comments 104 South Seas Offensive 105 THE ALLIED REORGANIZATION 108 THE ALLIED DEFENSIVE-OFFENSIVE Ill Southwest Pacific Area Il l Pacific Ocean Areas 115 Raids by Naval Task Forces 116 Doolittle's Raid 116 Midway 117 Aleutians 121 GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE WAR UP TO 7 AUGUST 1942 . 123 REOTRICTED THE WAR WITH JAPAN PART I INTRODUCTION Japan's entry into World War II came at the end of a ten-year period of military conquest in Asia. In 1931 the Japanese overran all of Manchuria, and during the succeeding years they continually sought further territorial expansion in northern China (Map 1). United under the Central Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese people finally offered an adamant resistance to any further encroachment by Japan. The crisis came in July 1937, when Japan inaugurated the Sino- Japanese War* with an ambitious offensive calculated to reduce China to submission. Although large areas were easily overrun in 1937 and 1938, the Japanese found that they could not break the Chinese will to resist (Map 2). The seizure of Canton in late 1938 not only deprived China of a major port but isolated the British possession of Hong Kong as well. The fall of Hankow necessitated the shifting of China's capital to Chungking, in the west. In an effort to avoid any wasteful expenditure of strength in the China war Japan, after 1938, resorted to a policy of economic strangulation. During 1939 Hainan and the Spratly Islands were annexed, and strong amphibious expeditions seized all of the major ports along the southeast coast of China. In 1940 Japan's atten­ tion shifted still farther south; and the Vichy French Government was forced to yield important concessions in Indo-China, including the right of entry of Japanese troops. A treaty was concluded with Thailand; and by the end of the year the Japanese were dangerously close to the Burma Road, last important supply channel from the outside world to China. Japan's formal adherence to the Axis in September 1940 provided still another indication of her ultimate aims (Map 3). * An account of the Sino-Japanese War prior to 7 December 1941 is contained in the appendix. The year 1941 saw no important change in the situation in China. Serving as mediator in a territorial dispute between Thailand and Indo-China, Japan further improved her relations with Thailand by upholding that country's claims. In April she signed a five-year nonaggression pact with Russia. After this momentous diplomatic coup Japan turned southward again and completed her occupation of Indo-China by the end of July. As the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands joined in placing an economic em­ bargo on all trade with Japan, the situation in the Far East became increasingly explosive. The map shows the general situation just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The strategic importance of the many bases acquired by the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War should be evident. Having secured her flank and rear by diplomatic negotiations with Russia, Japan was now prepared to exploit her already large terri­ torial conquests by a further advance southward to vast strategic areas possessing the richest supply of natural resources in the Far East. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS The basis of Japan's bid for supremacy in the Far East was armed power. Beginning with the successful seizure of Manchuria in 1931 she displayed a complete disregard for the various treaties drawn up after World War I to insure the maintenance of peace in this hemisphere. While world attention was focused on the rearming of Germany, Japan converted her industries to war production and steadily increased the size and strength of her armed forces. Japan's decision to fight the combined forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth—as well as China and the Nether­ lands—was neither hasty nor irrational. It had long been obvious to her that the establishment of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" would inevitably result in conflict with the Occidental na­ tions. Unquestionably the crisis was now at hand. The stringent economic restrictions put into effect by the United States meant that Japan could no longer import the necessary raw materials for war production. Complete abandonment of her nationalistic ambitions was unthinkable; the only alternative was to make herself self- sufficient by seizing the rich Southern Resources Area, held only weakly by far-away England and the Netherlands Government in Exile. With a much inferior war potential, Japan did not delude herself into believing that she could defeat the combined forces of the Occi­ dental powers. To strike at them quickly and devastatingly, when their full strength could not be utilized against her, was her only chance for victory. It was in the timing of her attack that Japan's shrewdly calculated chances of success lay. From the Japanese point of view it was fortunate indeed that events transpiring in Europe favored Germany so heavily. The Nazi cause was ascendant, forcing the anti-Axis powers to the brink of the final precipice. France and the Netherlands were already out of the picture; Britain was fighting for her life in the Middle East; even Soviet Russia was struggling for survival under the relentless impact of the victorious German invasion armies. Never had the opportunity for conquest in the Far East seemed better than in late 1941. Only the United States could offer immediate resis­ tance of any consequence, and even she was largely preoccupied with the conflict in Europe. Unprepared for war on two fronts, the United States was already committed, through her lend-lease pro­ gram, to the support of the nations allied against the European Axis. Despite her tremendous potential strength she could not immediately put a large, well-trained force in the field for operations against Japan. Certainly the time was at hand for Japan to act with vigor and celerity if her dream of empire were ever to be realized. It would take several years for the United States and Britain to muster their full strength in the Pacific, precious years during which Japan could seize and develop the immense resources of the Far East and make herself impregnable against counterattack. During four and a half years of campaigning in China the soldiers of Japan had become inured to the rigors of war. Their training had been rounded out with actual combat experience; and their guns, tanks, planes, and other equipment had been tested as only the crucible of real war can test them. The close coordination of land, sea, and air power in joint operations had been mastered. The numerous amphibious attacks against China's seaports had taught many important lessons and had provided invaluable experience for future operations of this type. The increased combat efficiency of Japan's armed forces, as well as the gain in raw materials, had more than offset the comparatively small losses suffered in the fighting against the Chinese. In mid-1941 Japan quietly began to withdraw from China many of her seasoned and well-equipped units, replacing them with newly drafted troops who were generally provided with second-rate equipment. By 7 December the strength of the Japanese Army had increased to 2,400,000 trained men. Available reserves, only partially trained, totaled another 3,000,000. Japan's air fleet consisted of 7,500 planes, 2,675 of which were first-line combat aircraft. The Army and the Navy air forces normally functioned independently of each other and were about equal in strength. The Army air force had 1,375 combat planes; the Navy air force had 1,300, including about 500 carrier-based planes.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • THE PHILIPPINES, 1942-1944 James Kelly Morningstar, Doctor of History
    ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: WAR AND RESISTANCE: THE PHILIPPINES, 1942-1944 James Kelly Morningstar, Doctor of History, 2018 Dissertation directed by: Professor Jon T. Sumida, History Department What happened in the Philippine Islands between the surrender of Allied forces in May 1942 and MacArthur’s return in October 1944? Existing historiography is fragmentary and incomplete. Memoirs suffer from limited points of view and personal biases. No academic study has examined the Filipino resistance with a critical and interdisciplinary approach. No comprehensive narrative has yet captured the fighting by 260,000 guerrillas in 277 units across the archipelago. This dissertation begins with the political, economic, social and cultural history of Philippine guerrilla warfare. The diverse Islands connected only through kinship networks. The Americans reluctantly held the Islands against rising Japanese imperial interests and Filipino desires for independence and social justice. World War II revealed the inadequacy of MacArthur’s plans to defend the Islands. The General tepidly prepared for guerrilla operations while Filipinos spontaneously rose in armed resistance. After his departure, the chaotic mix of guerrilla groups were left on their own to battle the Japanese and each other. While guerrilla leaders vied for local power, several obtained radios to contact MacArthur and his headquarters sent submarine-delivered agents with supplies and radios that tie these groups into a united framework. MacArthur’s promise to return kept the resistance alive and dependent on the United States. The repercussions for social revolution would be fatal but the Filipinos’ shared sacrifice revitalized national consciousness and created a sense of deserved nationhood. The guerrillas played a key role in enabling MacArthur’s return.
    [Show full text]
  • THE ST* STRIPES Metz Ring Two -Thirds Closed
    New York London Edition(' Paris Daily German Lesson Daily French Lesson Koennen Sie Aushunft geben? II est tine heure Kernen Zee Ouskoonft gayben? Eel ay-t EWN UR Can you give information? THE ST* STRIPES Daily Newspaper of U.S. Armed Forces in the European Theater of Operations It is one o'clock VOL. 5 No. 10—Id. MONDAY Nov. 13, 1944 Metz Ring Two -Thirds Closed 'The Prettiest WAC in the United Kingdom' Pincers Drawing Shut Despite One Setback to the North With only a 15-mile gap separating the forces seeking to close a ring east of the fortified Metz area, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army met both success and setback in the fighting yesterday, losing two miles to, a German counter-attack north of Metk but gaining four miles on the southeast. Patton's pincers were two-thirds of the way around Metz, with its nine forts, whose big guns have not yet been in action, probably because of the Germans' inability to, use planes for spotting purposes. Troops of the 95th Division were only four miles from thd outskirts :of -Metz as they moved down from the north. To the south, the Sixth Armored Division brought up more tanks and' infantry to reinforce troops already across the Nied River, 8- miles southeast of the city. It's Rain, Mud Setback Near Kerling The setback came in •the Kerling area, 20 miles northeast of Metz, where And Blood for German tanks and troops attacked -at '6 AM in an attempt to break up the 90th Division's bridgehead over the Moselle, Third Army River.
    [Show full text]
  • Early Colonial History Four of Seven
    Early Colonial History Four of Seven Marianas History Conference Early Colonial History Guampedia.com This publication was produced by the Guampedia Foundation ⓒ2012 Guampedia Foundation, Inc. UOG Station Mangilao, Guam 96923 www.guampedia.com Table of Contents Early Colonial History Windfalls in Micronesia: Carolinians' environmental history in the Marianas ...................................................................................................1 By Rebecca Hofmann “Casa Real”: A Lost Church On Guam* .................................................13 By Andrea Jalandoni Magellan and San Vitores: Heroes or Madmen? ....................................25 By Donald Shuster, PhD Traditional Chamorro Farming Innovations during the Spanish and Philippine Contact Period on Northern Guam* ....................................31 By Boyd Dixon and Richard Schaefer and Todd McCurdy Islands in the Stream of Empire: Spain’s ‘Reformed’ Imperial Policy and the First Proposals to Colonize the Mariana Islands, 1565-1569 ....41 By Frank Quimby José de Quiroga y Losada: Conquest of the Marianas ...........................63 By Nicholas Goetzfridt, PhD. 19th Century Society in Agaña: Don Francisco Tudela, 1805-1856, Sargento Mayor of the Mariana Islands’ Garrison, 1841-1847, Retired on Guam, 1848-1856 ...............................................................................83 By Omaira Brunal-Perry Windfalls in Micronesia: Carolinians' environmental history in the Marianas By Rebecca Hofmann Research fellow in the project: 'Climates of Migration:
    [Show full text]
  • Checklist of Fish and Invertebrates Listed in the CITES Appendices
    JOINTS NATURE \=^ CONSERVATION COMMITTEE Checklist of fish and mvertebrates Usted in the CITES appendices JNCC REPORT (SSN0963-«OStl JOINT NATURE CONSERVATION COMMITTEE Report distribution Report Number: No. 238 Contract Number/JNCC project number: F7 1-12-332 Date received: 9 June 1995 Report tide: Checklist of fish and invertebrates listed in the CITES appendices Contract tide: Revised Checklists of CITES species database Contractor: World Conservation Monitoring Centre 219 Huntingdon Road, Cambridge, CB3 ODL Comments: A further fish and invertebrate edition in the Checklist series begun by NCC in 1979, revised and brought up to date with current CITES listings Restrictions: Distribution: JNCC report collection 2 copies Nature Conservancy Council for England, HQ, Library 1 copy Scottish Natural Heritage, HQ, Library 1 copy Countryside Council for Wales, HQ, Library 1 copy A T Smail, Copyright Libraries Agent, 100 Euston Road, London, NWl 2HQ 5 copies British Library, Legal Deposit Office, Boston Spa, Wetherby, West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 1 copy Chadwick-Healey Ltd, Cambridge Place, Cambridge, CB2 INR 1 copy BIOSIS UK, Garforth House, 54 Michlegate, York, YOl ILF 1 copy CITES Management and Scientific Authorities of EC Member States total 30 copies CITES Authorities, UK Dependencies total 13 copies CITES Secretariat 5 copies CITES Animals Committee chairman 1 copy European Commission DG Xl/D/2 1 copy World Conservation Monitoring Centre 20 copies TRAFFIC International 5 copies Animal Quarantine Station, Heathrow 1 copy Department of the Environment (GWD) 5 copies Foreign & Commonwealth Office (ESED) 1 copy HM Customs & Excise 3 copies M Bradley Taylor (ACPO) 1 copy ^\(\\ Joint Nature Conservation Committee Report No.
    [Show full text]
  • Bridges Across Oceans: Initial Impact Assessment of the Philippines Nautical Highway System and Lessons for Southeast Asia
    Bridges across Oceans Initial Impact Assessment of the Philippines Nautical Highway System and Lessons for Southeast Asia April 2010 0 2010 Asian Development Bank All rights reserved. Published 2010. Printed in the Philippines ISBN 978-971-561-896-0 Publication Stock No. RPT101731 Cataloging-In-Publication Data Bridges across Oceans: Initial Impact Assessment of the Philippines Nautical Highway System and Lessons for Southeast Asia. Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2010. 1. Transport Infrastructure. 2. Southeast Asia. I. Asian Development Bank. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area. ADB encourages printing or copying information exclusively for personal and noncommercial use with proper acknowledgment of ADB. Users are restricted from reselling, redistributing, or creating derivative works for commercial purposes without the express, written consent of ADB. Note: In this report, “$” refers to US dollars. 6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City 1550 Metro Manila, Philippines Tel +63 2 632
    [Show full text]
  • Hoshi Pharmaceuticals in the Interwar Years Timothy M. Yang Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Th
    Market, Medicine, and Empire: Hoshi Pharmaceuticals in the Interwar Years Timothy M. Yang Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2013 © 2013 Timothy M. Yang All rights reserved ABSTRACT Market, Medicine, and Empire: Hoshi Pharmaceuticals in the Interwar Years Timothy M. Yang This dissertation examines the connections between global capitalism, modern medicine, and empire through a close study of Hoshi Pharmaceuticals during the interwar years. As one of the leading drug companies in East Asia at the time, Hoshi embodied Japan's imperial aspirations, rapid industrial development, and burgeoning consumer culture. The company attempted to control every part of its supply and distribution chain: it managed plantations in the mountains of Taiwan and Peru for growing coca and cinchona (the raw material for quinine) and contracted Turkish poppy farmers to supply raw opium for government-owned refineries in Taiwan. Hoshi also helped shape modern consumer culture in Japan and its colonies, and indeed, became an emblem for it. At its peak in the early 1920s, Hoshi had a network of chain stores across Asia that sold Hoshi-brand patent medicines, hygiene products, and household goods. In 1925, however, the company's fortunes turned for the worse when an opium trading violation raised suspicions of Hoshi as a front for the smuggling of narcotics through Manchuria and China. Although the company was a key supplier of medicines to Japan's military during World War Two, it could not financially recover from the fallout of the opium scandal.
    [Show full text]
  • Canadian Infantry Combat Training During the Second World War
    SHARPENING THE SABRE: CANADIAN INFANTRY COMBAT TRAINING DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR By R. DANIEL PELLERIN BBA (Honours), Wilfrid Laurier University, 2007 BA (Honours), Wilfrid Laurier University, 2008 MA, University of Waterloo, 2009 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in History University of Ottawa Ottawa, Ontario, Canada © Raymond Daniel Ryan Pellerin, Ottawa, Canada, 2016 ii ABSTRACT “Sharpening the Sabre: Canadian Infantry Combat Training during the Second World War” Author: R. Daniel Pellerin Supervisor: Serge Marc Durflinger 2016 During the Second World War, training was the Canadian Army’s longest sustained activity. Aside from isolated engagements at Hong Kong and Dieppe, the Canadians did not fight in a protracted campaign until the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The years that Canadian infantry units spent training in the United Kingdom were formative in the history of the Canadian Army. Despite what much of the historical literature has suggested, training succeeded in making the Canadian infantry capable of succeeding in battle against German forces. Canadian infantry training showed a definite progression towards professionalism and away from a pervasive prewar mentality that the infantry was a largely unskilled arm and that training infantrymen did not require special expertise. From 1939 to 1941, Canadian infantry training suffered from problems ranging from equipment shortages to poor senior leadership. In late 1941, the Canadians were introduced to a new method of training called “battle drill,” which broke tactical manoeuvres into simple movements, encouraged initiative among junior leaders, and greatly boosted the men’s morale.
    [Show full text]
  • A Historiography of C Force
    Canadian Military History Volume 24 Issue 2 Article 10 2015 A Historiography of C Force Tony Banham Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Tony Banham "A Historiography of C Force." Canadian Military History 24, 2 (2015) This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : A Historiography of C Force FEATURE A Historiography of C Force TONY BANHAM Abstract: Following the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong in 1941, a small number of books covering the then Colony’s war experiences were published. Although swamped by larger and more significant battles, the volume of work has expanded in the years since and is no longer insignificant. This historiography documents that body of literature, examining trends and possible future directions for further study with particular respect to the coverage of C Force. h e f a t e o f the 1,975 men and two women of C Force, sent T to Hong Kong just before the Japanese invaded, has generated a surprising volume of literature. It was fate too that a Canadian, Major General Arthur Edward Grasett, was the outgoing commander of British troops in China— including the Hong Kong garrison— in mid-1941 (being replaced that August by Major General Christopher M altby of the Indian army), and fate that his determination that the garrison be reinforced would see a Briton, Brigadier John Kelburne Lawson, arrive from Canada in November 1941 as commander of this small force sent to bolster the colony’s defences.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russo-Japanese War, Britain's Military Observers, and British
    Born Soldiers Who March Under the Rising Sun: The Russo-Japanese War, Britain’s Military Observers, and British Impressions Regarding Japanese Martial Capabilities Prior to the First World War by Liam Caswell Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia December 2017 © Copyright by Liam Caswell, 2017 Table of Contents Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………… ii Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….. iii List of Abbreviations Used……………………………………………………………… iv Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………… v Chapter I Introduction……………………………………………………………………. 1 Chapter II “An Evident Manifestation of Sympathy”: The Relationship between the British Press and Japan at War………………………………………………………….. 25 Chapter III “Surely the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae were Not Braver than these Men”: British Observers and the Character and Ability of the Japanese Soldier…………………………………………………………………………………... 43 Chapter IV “Russia’s Invincible Foe”: Estimations of British Observers Regarding the Performance of the Imperial Japanese Army…………………………………………… 77 Chapter V A Most Impressive Pupil: Captain William Pakenham, R.N., and the Performance of the Imperial Japanese Navy during the War’s Maritime Operations……………………………………………………………………………... 118 Chapter VI Conclusion………………………………………………………………... 162 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………... 170 ii Abstract This thesis explores how Japan’s military triumphs during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-’05 influenced British opinions regarding
    [Show full text]
  • East India Company - Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
    East India Company - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_India_Company From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The English East India Company was an English and later (from 1707) East India Company British joint-stock company[1] formed for pursuing trade with the East Indies but which ended up trading mainly with the Indian subcontinent. The East India Company traded mainly in cotton, silk, indigo dye, salt, saltpetre, tea and opium. The Company was granted a Royal Charter in 1600,[2] making it the oldest among several similarly formed European East India Companies. Shares of the company were owned by wealthy merchants and aristocrats. The government owned no shares and had only indirect control. The Company eventually came to rule large areas of India Company flag after 1801 with its own private army, exercising military power and assuming Former type Public administrative functions.[3] Company rule in India effectively began in 1757 after the Battle of Plassey and lasted until 1858 when, following the Industry International trade Indian Rebellion of 1857, the Government of India Act 1858 led to the Fate Dissolved British Crown assuming direct control of India in the new British Raj. Founded 1600 The Company was dissolved in 1874 as a result of the East India Stock Defunct June 1, 1874 Dividend Redemption Act passed one year earlier, as the Government of India Act had by then rendered it vestigal, powerless and obsolete. Its Headquarters London, England functions had been fully absorbed into official government machinery in the British Raj and its private army had been nationalized by the British Colonial India Crown.
    [Show full text]
  • A Circular History of Modern Chamorro Activism
    Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont Pomona Senior Theses Pomona Student Scholarship 2021 The Past as "Ahead": A Circular History of Modern Chamorro Activism Gabby Lupola Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/pomona_theses Part of the Asian American Studies Commons, Ethnic Studies Commons, Indigenous Studies Commons, Micronesian Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Oral History Commons, Political History Commons, Social History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Lupola, Gabby, "The Past as "Ahead": A Circular History of Modern Chamorro Activism" (2021). Pomona Senior Theses. 246. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/pomona_theses/246 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Pomona Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pomona Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Past as “Ahead”: A Circular History of Modern Chamorro Activism Gabrielle Lynn Lupola A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in History at Pomona College. 23 April 2021 1 Table of Contents Images ………………………………………………………………….…………………2 Acknowledgments ……………………..……………………………………….…………3 Land Acknowledgment……………………………………….…………………………...5 Introduction: Conceptualizations of the Past …………………………….……………….7 Chapter 1: Embodied Sociopolitical Sovereignty on Pre-War Guam ……..……………22
    [Show full text]
  • DUTCH EAST INDIES CAMPAIGN Belligerents
    DUTCH EAST INDIES CAMPAIGN DATE: DECEMBER 08 1941 – MARCH 09 1942 Belligerents Empire of Japan ABDA Command: Netherlands Dutch East Indies United Kingdom United States Australia New Zealand The Dutch East Indies campaign of 1941–42 was the conquest of the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia) by forces from the Empire of Japan in the early days of the Pacific Campaign of World War II. Allied forces attempted unsuccessfully to defend the islands. The East Indies were targeted by the Japanese for their rich oil resources, which would become a vital asset during the war. The campaign and subsequent three-and-a-half year Japanese occupation was also a major factor in the end of Dutch colonial rule in the region. The East Indies was one of Japan's primary targets if and when it went to war because the colony possessed abundant valuable resources, the most important of which were its rubber plantations and oil fields; the colony was the fourth-largest exporter of oil in the world, behind the U.S., Iran, and Romania. The oil made the islands enormously important to the Japanese, so they sought to secure the supply for themselves. Realizing Japanese intentions, in late November 1941 the East Indies government began preparing for war. Ships of the Royal Netherlands Navy were sent to sea and the KNIL Air Force was mobilized. On December 4, three days after having decided on a policy of war against America, Britain and the Netherlands, the Japanese government decided instead to "treat the Netherlands as a quasi-enemy until actual hostilities..
    [Show full text]