Air University Review: May-June 1984, Volume XXXV, No. 4
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The Professional Journal of the United States Hovv lhe Army got its AirLand Batile Who should conirol air assets in the Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, concept—page 4 AirLand Batile?—page 16 and Brodie—How are they linked to our curreni nuclear posture? Should vve move now to ballistic missile defense?— page 54 Attendon The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air University. Rather, the contents reflect the authors’ ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thought- ful and informed contributions are always welcomed. Al R UNIVERSITYrcuicw May-June 1984 Vol XXXV, No 4 2 T he Next War Editorial 4 T he Evoli tion of the Air L and Battle Concept John L. Romjue 16 T acair Si ppo r t for Air L and Battle Maj. James A. Machos, USAF 25 T he Q i est for Unitv of Comma nd Col. Thomas A. Cardvvell 111, USAF 30 I ra C. Eaker Essav Competition Second-Prize Win n er L eaüer ship to Match O i r T echnologv Lt. Col. Harry R. Borowski, USAF 35 EQL ALITV IN THE COCKPIT Li. Col. Nancy B. Samuelson, USAF 47 T he Air Forc:e Wif e— H er Per spect ive Maj. Mark M. Warner, USAF Differing views and provocaiive 54 C lassical Mil it a r v Stratecy and quesuons on the nuclear issues oí Ballistic Miss il e Defense lhe 1980s—page 81 Maj. Owen E. Jensen, USAF Air Force Review 64 B il .i .v Mit c h el l a n d fhf. G rka i Transí;on i in f .n i ai. A ir Racf. of 1919 Dr. William M. Leary In My Opinion 77 Civ il Air Pa i roí. and i hf Foi ai.Forcf Glenn E. Overby II Address mantiscripis to Editor. Air Uriiversily Review. Bldg 1211. Maxwell Af B. AL 36112 Review Books, Images, and Ideas lelephone lislings are AU TO VO N 875-2773 and 81 T hf Nt ( l i ar Wi apons I)i ba i i commercial 205-293-2773 Manuscripis should be submiried tn duplicate. Military aiithors should \.\o Amer ica n Socif i v enclose a short bmgraphical sketch, including Da\id Maclsaai ptesent jnd previous assignments academir and professional milha') eduration; nonmililary wtil- 97 Potpourri ers should mdicate inmparable informalion. 107 Contributors Printed by Government Printing Office For sale by rhe Superintendem of Documents. U S Govern- ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C 20402, Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2. ISSN: 0002-2594 EDITORIAL THE NEXT WAR In my opinion it is in any case very difficult if not though these games cannot recreate the panic and impossible, to picture now what form a modem stress of war. And undergirding all of these prepara- war in Europe would take. We have at present a tions is the old standby: the thorough, systematic period of over thirty years of peace bebind us and study of military history (from the first recorded bat- I believe that in our outlook we have become tle at Meggido to the most recent engagements of very unwarlike in many ways. the Iran-lraq War), which aims to make us wise for- ever rather than clever for the next time, as Michael Colonel-General Helmuth Graf von Moltke to Kaiser Wilhelm II, circa 1905 Howard reminds us. What emerges from this ferment of physical and intellectual activity is a concept of the next war and AS THE younger von Moltke’s words illustrate, pre- an idea of how to fight it. These mental images are paring for the next war is a perennial challenge for codified, in a sense, in operational doctrine, which the military profession. Traditionally, the best way to will guide military operations in at least the opening ensure military preparedness has been to see that engagements of a future war. one’s forces are commanded by officers with combat One thing that tends to be missing from the Air experience, for such experience, according to Clause- Force portion of this ferment is an active, excited witz, is the lubricant that best overcomes the friction debate of the issues involved in getting ready for the of war (On War. Book l,Chapter8). But experienced next war. What do I mean by active and excited? commanders are not always available to a nation. Look back through the Marine Corps Gazetfe and With the Vietnam conflict more than a decade be- review the arguments over maneuver warfare. Pick hind us, combat-experienced officers are today a up a few past issues of Military Review and look at minority in the officer corps. This circumstance some of the articles on AirLand Battle. forces us back to what Clausewitz considered the Military Review's articles on AirLand Battle are part next best preparation for war, the use of maneuvers— of the “spirited doctrinal debate” that played an “a feeble substitute for the real thing: but even they important role in the process the Army used in de- can give an army an advantage over others whose veloping its new doctrine. This process is described in training is confined to routine, mechanical drill.” our lead article, where John Romjue discusses how Maneuvers are important in peacetime, for only they command experience, expectations of battlefield can give commanders a “feel” for handling massesof conditions, and military history were folded into the troops and units in the field. Maneuvers offer the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. best possibility of surfacing the many manifestations While the process used by the Army to develop of friction that cannot be anticipated by even the this doctrine is impressive, the process and its prod- most imaginative planner. uct have not, at least not yet, met with whole- However, today’s high costs and other limitations hearted approval in the Air Force. Major James Ma- force us to restrict the number of peacetime ma- chos of TAC addresses this situation in the second neuvers and resort to other methods of preparing for article. Machos contends that the Army developed war, methods not available in Clausewitz’s time. its new doctrine without adequate coordination with Within the discipline of operations research, for ex- the Air Force. Moreover, he holds that the AirLand ample, we use analytical techniques to evaluate the Battle concept invites greater control of air assets by effectiveness of new weapons and tactics. To prepare ground commanders—an Army position in clear our armed forces for the next war, we construct and conflict with basic Air Force doctrine that calls for use computerized war games, which allow us to prac- centralized control of air assets, a principie growing tice tactical and strategic decision making even out of combat experience in the North African cam- 9 paign of World War II (the last campaign, inciden- implementation of this concept. Cardwell concludes tally, in which the U.S. Army faced combat without that unity of command must be based on a "theater assured air superiority). perspective of war fighting" and will involve the con- AirLand Battle is not the only challenge to tradi- trol of all “air combat forces” by a “single air compo- tional Air Force thinking on centralized control of air nent commander.” assets. Indeed. a failure within DOD to achieve cen- There is little doubt that in the next war, no less tralized control of air assets seems to be a part of a than in World War II, the Air Force must be capable larger challenge our armed Services face—that of of winning control of the air. We must still be ready to achieving truly unified command in theater opera- contribute what only a professional Air Force can tions. In our third article, Colonel Thomas Cardwell give: control of the airspace over an extended battle- argues that although the concept of unified com- field on which our Army fights victoriously. To be so mand has been more or less accepted since World prepared, we must not only refine our capabilities War II and is incorporated in Joint Chiefs of Staff continuously but remain always open to new ideas. Publication 2, we still have not achieved an effective D.R.B. THE REVIEW INVITES COMMENTS Open debates oí strategn . tactical. doctrinal. and technical issuesaie vital in preparing for the next wai Sue h debates ean come onl\ from an oflicer corpsmade up of well-educated, well-informed. molivated ofliters who are free to express lheirviewsopenly. We assume we have such an of ficei corps and such debates and that the Soviets do not. Several recent articles in our professional literaiure raise doubts about these assumptions and tnake tis wonder about the vital ttv oí our own disc ussions of professional issues. We solit it yout v iewson the foilowing quota tions: l he greatest danger we face from the Soviet Army is not its numerical superiority but the possibililv tliat tts officer corps is intellec tually superior. The Soviet study of wai isinstilutionali/edand thebright RussianAitny officers are educated in lhe operational ai t. What would happen to NATO in the next wat il the Soviets indeed have operational superiority ovei the allies? Coi.onu U vi.i.vc.i 1*. Kra\/ "The Art ol War." I '.S. Army Wat College Ari of fiar Quarterly, September 19HS, p.