The Professional Journal of the United States Hovv lhe Army got its AirLand Batile Who should conirol air assets in the Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, concept—page 4 AirLand Batile?—page 16 and Brodie—How are they linked to our curreni nuclear posture? Should vve move now to ballistic missile defense?— page 54

Attendon

The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air University. Rather, the contents reflect the authors’ ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thought- ful and informed contributions are always welcomed.

Al R UNIVERSITYrcuicw May-June 1984 Vol XXXV, No 4

2 T he Next War Editorial 4 T he Evoli tion of the Air L and Battle Concept John L. Romjue 16 T acair Si ppo r t for Air L and Battle Maj. James A. Machos, USAF 25 T he Q i est for Unitv of Comma nd Col. Thomas A. Cardvvell 111, USAF 30 I ra C. Eaker Essav Competition Second-Prize Win n er L eaüer ship to Match O i r T echnologv Lt. Col. Harry R. Borowski, USAF 35 EQL ALITV IN THE COCKPIT Li. Col. Nancy B. Samuelson, USAF 47 T he Air Forc:e Wif e— H er Per spect ive Maj. Mark M. Warner, USAF Differing views and provocaiive 54 C lassical Mil it a r v Stratecy and quesuons on the nuclear issues oí Ballistic Miss il e Defense lhe 1980s—page 81 Maj. Owen E. Jensen, USAF Air Force Review 64 B il .i .v Mit c h el l a n d fhf. G rka i Transí;on i in f .n i ai. A ir Racf. of 1919 Dr. William M. Leary In My Opinion 77 Civ il Air Pa i roí. and i hf Foi ai.Forcf Glenn E. Overby II Address mantiscripis to Editor. Air Uriiversily Review. Bldg 1211. Maxwell Af B. AL 36112 Review Books, Images, and Ideas lelephone lislings are AU TO VO N 875-2773 and 81 T hf Nt ( l i ar Wi apons I)i ba i i commercial 205-293-2773 Manuscripis should be submiried tn duplicate. Military aiithors should \.\o Amer ica n Socif i v enclose a short bmgraphical sketch, including Da\id Maclsaai ptesent jnd previous assignments academir and professional milha') eduration; nonmililary wtil- 97 Potpourri ers should mdicate inmparable informalion. 107 Contributors Printed by Government Printing Office For sale by rhe Superintendem of Documents. U S Govern- ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C 20402, Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2. ISSN: 0002-2594 EDITORIAL

THE NEXT WAR

In my opinion it is in any case very difficult if not though these games cannot recreate the panic and impossible, to picture now what form a modem stress of war. And undergirding all of these prepara- war in Europe would take. We have at present a tions is the old standby: the thorough, systematic period of over thirty years of peace bebind us and study of military history (from the first recorded bat- I believe that in our outlook we have become tle at Meggido to the most recent engagements of very unwarlike in many ways. the Iran-lraq War), which aims to make us wise for- ever rather than clever for the next time, as Michael Colonel-General Helmuth Graf von Moltke to Kaiser Wilhelm II, circa 1905 Howard reminds us. What emerges from this ferment of physical and intellectual activity is a concept of the next war and AS THE younger von Moltke’s words illustrate, pre- an idea of how to fight it. These mental images are paring for the next war is a perennial challenge for codified, in a sense, in operational doctrine, which the military profession. Traditionally, the best way to will guide military operations in at least the opening ensure military preparedness has been to see that engagements of a future war. one’s forces are commanded by officers with combat One thing that tends to be missing from the Air experience, for such experience, according to Clause- Force portion of this ferment is an active, excited witz, is the lubricant that best overcomes the friction debate of the issues involved in getting ready for the of war (On War. Book l,Chapter8). But experienced next war. What do I mean by active and excited? commanders are not always available to a nation. Look back through the Marine Corps Gazetfe and With the Vietnam conflict more than a decade be- review the arguments over maneuver warfare. Pick hind us, combat-experienced officers are today a up a few past issues of Military Review and look at minority in the officer corps. This circumstance some of the articles on AirLand Battle. forces us back to what Clausewitz considered the Military Review's articles on AirLand Battle are part next best preparation for war, the use of maneuvers— of the “spirited doctrinal debate” that played an “a feeble substitute for the real thing: but even they important role in the process the Army used in de- can give an army an advantage over others whose veloping its new doctrine. This process is described in training is confined to routine, mechanical drill.” our lead article, where John Romjue discusses how Maneuvers are important in peacetime, for only they command experience, expectations of battlefield can give commanders a “feel” for handling massesof conditions, and military history were folded into the troops and units in the field. Maneuvers offer the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. best possibility of surfacing the many manifestations While the process used by the Army to develop of friction that cannot be anticipated by even the this doctrine is impressive, the process and its prod- most imaginative planner. uct have not, at least not yet, met with whole- However, today’s high costs and other limitations hearted approval in the Air Force. Major James Ma- force us to restrict the number of peacetime ma- chos of TAC addresses this situation in the second neuvers and resort to other methods of preparing for article. Machos contends that the Army developed war, methods not available in Clausewitz’s time. its new doctrine without adequate coordination with Within the discipline of operations research, for ex- the Air Force. Moreover, he holds that the AirLand ample, we use analytical techniques to evaluate the Battle concept invites greater control of air assets by effectiveness of new weapons and tactics. To prepare ground commanders—an Army position in clear our armed forces for the next war, we construct and conflict with basic Air Force doctrine that calls for use computerized war games, which allow us to prac- centralized control of air assets, a principie growing tice tactical and strategic decision making even out of combat experience in the North African cam-

9 paign of World War II (the last campaign, inciden- implementation of this concept. Cardwell concludes tally, in which the U.S. Army faced combat without that unity of command must be based on a "theater assured air superiority). perspective of war fighting" and will involve the con- AirLand Battle is not the only challenge to tradi- trol of all “air combat forces” by a “single air compo- tional Air Force thinking on centralized control of air nent commander.” assets. Indeed. a failure within DOD to achieve cen- There is little doubt that in the next war, no less tralized control of air assets seems to be a part of a than in World War II, the Air Force must be capable larger challenge our armed Services face—that of of winning control of the air. We must still be ready to achieving truly unified command in theater opera- contribute what only a professional Air Force can tions. In our third article, Colonel Thomas Cardwell give: control of the airspace over an extended battle- argues that although the concept of unified com- field on which our Army fights victoriously. To be so mand has been more or less accepted since World prepared, we must not only refine our capabilities War II and is incorporated in Joint Chiefs of Staff continuously but remain always open to new ideas. Publication 2, we still have not achieved an effective D.R.B.

THE REVIEW INVITES COMMENTS Open debates oí strategn . tactical. doctrinal. and technical issuesaie vital in preparing for the next wai Sue h debates ean come onl\ from an oflicer corpsmade up of well-educated, well-informed. molivated ofliters who are free to express lheirviewsopenly. We assume we have such an of ficei corps and such debates and that the Soviets do not. Several recent articles in our professional literaiure raise doubts about these assumptions and tnake tis wonder about the vital ttv oí our own disc ussions of professional issues. We solit it yout v iewson the foilowing quota tions:

l he greatest danger we face from the Soviet Army is not its numerical superiority but the possibililv tliat tts officer corps is intellec tually superior. The Soviet study of wai isinstilutionali/edand thebright RussianAitny officers are educated in lhe operational ai t. What would happen to NATO in the next wat il the Soviets indeed have operational superiority ovei the allies? Coi.onu U vi.i.vc.i 1*. Kra\/ "The Art ol War." I '.S. Army Wat College Ari of fiar Quarterly, September 19HS, p. 123

For reasons that are not vet cleat. Sov tet military wrilings in 1982 and 1983 stressed lhe lat tical use ol tnu leai weapons. Fusi was the publication of Tactical Maneuver, which appeared in late 1982. T heauthoi. a faculty metnbet of the Frunze Military Academv. took variousformsoí military engagements in Wotkl War II and thcn disc ussed lhe use oi mu leai weapons in similar ivpes oí battles. Throughoui lhe work is the impression ihat success in warfare toduv will go to the side that is bettei able to uiili/.e lhe residis ol nuc leai stnkes. 1 lad '/'eu In ol Manemer stood alone. withoul any lollovv ups by othei Soviet spokesmen. iI still would have been a mosí signific am work. But an artic lc in the January 1983 issue of Military I lera UI, lhe oflic ial joiu nal ol the Soviet Giound Forces, indicated that a high-level decision had been made lo emphasi/e the role ol nuc leai weapons in a theater wai. Indei lhe general heading," 1 heorv and Praciic e ol Combined Ai ms Battle" was an artic le entiiled. ' Swiftness and Continuousnt ssof the Offensive.” A note by the journais editorstateii tliat not all readers would agree with lhe aulhor'.\ opmions, and a discu.vsion of lhe article would be welcorned. 1 Fmphasis added. | < I his is a íavorile ploy w hen the leadership lias noi made up iis minei on a pariic ulai issue.) I)u. W tu i am F. Sc oi i "The Fhemes of Soviet Suaiegy." Air Force, Maich 1981. p 70

Have I SAF tactic s toniimied to develop to meet lhe [Soviet| threat? Or are we in danger ol becoming only "lec hnicians. ' of resling on our laurels as lat lic ians?

lactics developmenl in lhe Soviet \ ii Forces is a dvnamic and continuai process ihat should receive oui constam attenlion.

Captais R vna J. Pi nninc; icin "< llosing the Tactic s Gap." Air Fone. March 1981. p. 88 (àrmmeniaries should fie tvjx-d. double-spaced, and three lo five pages in lengih. Address ihein lo: Editor. AI' Heview. Bldg 1211. Maxwell AFB AL 36112 Zidiiinaitu v iuj J THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLAND BATTLE CONCEPT ohn L. R L. omjuf . AIRLAND BATTU• CONCEPT 5

NY revievv of U.S. Army tactical doc- cept becameofficial Army doctrine when further trine in the post-Vietnam eia must fo- developed and infused intoa revision of the key cus on the Army project ihai went tactical manual, FM 100-5, Operations, pub- underA the rubricof “the AirLand Battle.'’ Con- lished in August 1982. tained in the íused syllables oí this phrase were In great pari, the AirLand Battle concept significam changes in battle doctrine. I he sprang from the doctrinal perspective oí Gen- changes were the culmination of several years eral Donn A. Starry, who began a four-year of intensive doctrinal work by the U.S. Army tenure as the TRADOC commander at Fort Trainingand Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Monroe, Virgínia, in July 1977. T ogelher with and were marked by considerable debate both the major Army 86 Studies undertaken by within and outside the Army. This major proj- Starry and his planners during 1978-80 to de- ect reflected the seriousness wilh which the fine new tactical field organization, AirLand Army, since the early 1970s. had regarded the Battle doctrine bid fair to be the dominam in- technological edge that the Soviet Union was fluence on the modernizing Army of the I980s. gaining in that decade in the tactical weaponry The clevelopment of the AirLand Battle con- of its numerically stronger forces opposite cept and an explanation ol the concept itself NATO in Europe. In preliminary form, the will be the focus of this article. Since the con- new concept was first formally published in cept has roots that precede 1977, the contribu- March 1981. After wide briefing throughout tions of General William E. DePuv, the first the defense establishment and to the highest TRADOC commander, are worth considering leveis of government, the AirLand Battle con- first.

The DePuy Reforms When General DePuy took ovei TRADOC in 1973, oneof the most pressing problems that the Army faced was the need to update its weaponry. Fulfilling the immediate quantita- tive needs of lhe Vietnam War had interrupted the weapon development process for almost a decade, giving the Soviet Union nearly a gen- erational gain in most categories of combat equipment. With little prospect of adequate funding, General DePuy, his stafl. and his commanders set about defining and defending the engineering and development programs that would produce a mui h needed new gener- ation of weapons. In addition to his efforts in behalf of weap- ons development, DePuy had taken an intense imerest in the reform of tacticsand training, in line wilh tactical lessons draw n from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Out ol this imerest and at- tendant study had come the sharply revised Field M anual 100-5, Operations, of July 1976.1 The new manual emphasized the criticai de- 6 AIR l'Xll'ERSITY RIA II-IV

mands of “ihe first battle of the next vvar” on a the enemy’s massive second-echelon forces, baitlefield vvhere tempo and the destruction oí which, according to Sòviet doctrine, would roll materiel would dramatically surpass that oí through the first echelon and exploit any ad- previous wars. The manual stressed better vantages the first echelon niiglu have gained. training, suppressive tactics, terrain use, and In November 1978, through a major combined anus coordination to counter in- TRADOC planning document called the Bat- creased lethality of weaponsof the 197üs. From tlefield Developmem Plan. General Starry de- the 1976 manual ílovved a generation oí practi- picted a battlefield view and weapon require- cal “how-to-íight" tactical field manuais and ments concept based on fundamental compo- training literature. nents of the central battle, such as "target ser- Finally, General DePuy initiated efforts to vicing," suppression and counterfire, and air reorganize Army combat forces with the Divi- defense. To the central battle and its tasks were sioii Restructuring Sludy and Fvaluation of added the concept of “force generation” and its 1976-78. T his project aimed ai reorganizing the various subordinate tasks, such as interdiction heavy divisions to harness the combat povverof of enemy second-echelon forces at the com- the oncoming new weaponry.2 mander s discretion and reconstitution of his Fhese efforts, vvhich DePuy led, were nota- forces as the battle progressed.' In force genera- ble. Significam changes to modernize the Army tion, the central battle commander had a re- were well along when General Starry replaced sponsibility at least as importam as the iniiial General DePuy as ihecommander ofTRADOC assault. This responsibility involved “seeing in 1977. But there was still muc h tf)do. For one deep" into the enemy s rear and concentrating thing, the 1976 version of FM 100-5 had set in combat power to attack the enemy second- motion a pointed and lively doctrinal debate echelon forces before they reached the battle- that raised importam questions that needed to field. General Starry’saim in using the frame- be ansvvered. Fhese doc trinal questions, along work of the Battlefield Developmem Plan was with issues associated with the Army’s field to get division and corps comrnanders away organization, would consume much of Gen- from thinking in terms of branch organiza- eral Sian v senergy during his years as TRADOC tions and capabilities. He wanted them to commander. think instead in terms of new functions and concepts that he thought had becomecritically The Early Starry Initiatives importam in modem battle. Starry also questioned features of the Divi- In assuming command of TRADOC, Gen- sion Restructuring Study of his predecessor eral Starry brought with him aclose interest in and in October 1978 launched the m ajor Divi- tactical doctrine that had been sharpened by his sion 86 project. This study, a commandwide experience as a corps commander in Germany effort, was based on the battlefield view and betvveen 1976 and 1977. He saw the potential concepts of the Battlefield Developmem Plan. battle facing NATO forces asa structured “cen- The Division 86 Study stimulated doctrinal tral battle” to be fottght methodically and ag- thinking and was extended by theChief of Staff gressively against attacking heavily armored of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer, in Iate forces of the Warsaw Pact. Based on the active- 1979 into the largei Army 86 Study, encompass- defense tactics outlined in the 1976 version of ing not only the heavy division but the light FM 100-5, this centrai battle would focus on a division, corps, and echelons above corps or- firepower battle along the íorward edge of the ganizations of the future Army.4 battle area (FEBA). In General Starry’s eyes, At the same time, a spirited doctrinal debate this concept still overlooked a crucial factor— about the operations manual of 1976, FM 100- .-II KL AND BA TTLt CONChKT 7

5, was occurring both wilhin and outside lhe the corps. To handle this new depth ol the Army. Although critics generally liked and modem battlefield, U.S. land andair forces had welcomed the 1976 m anual for its clarity and to wage a synchronized, fully integrated Air- stress on the tactical ramifications of the new Land Battle. lethalitv of modem weapons, they scored it on a number of importam points. These included the manual’s perceived defensive orientation, iis dependence on tactics that appeared to em- In the interest of improved clarity, Gen- phasize firepower and attrition rather than eral Starry chose "AirLami Battle" as the maneuver. its apparem abandoningof the con- titlefor the new concept that involved such cept of a tactical reserve, and its emphasis on a close interaction between all air and theSoviet breakthrough operational maneuver. ground capabilities. As commander of the Armor Center at Fort Knox. Kentucky.during 1973-76. General Starry hadcontributed to thedevelopm ent of the 1976 The extended battlefield concept was much manual. Now, several years later. he found more offense-oriented than that ol the central htmself in the posiiion of defending and recon- battleoí tvvoyearsearlier. It reflected theeffects sidering different aspects of the manual. of the docirinal debate that centeredon the 1976 manuaFs alleged emphasis on the defense and The Extended Battlefield on attrition warfare. But the extended battle view also encompassed a significam new ele- Increasingly. thedoctrinal inquiries of Army ment. In answer to the manifest readiness of 86 had pursued the idea of a deeper battlefield Warsaw Pact forces to employ tac tical nuclear or. as Starrv and his planners began in 1980 to and Chemical weaponry, Army and TRADOC call it. the “extended battlefield." What they planners took steps during 1979-80 to include meant was that the battlefield had a deeper these aspects of what is known as the ‘‘inte- physical dimension, a time dimension, an air- grated battlefield” into their tactical planning. land dimension now more criticai than ever Noteworthy here were the results of the Ar- before, and a possible Chemical and nuclear my's tactical nuclear systems program revievv dimension. Brigade, division, and corps com- h e ld a t Fort Sí 11, O klahom a, in December 1979. manders had to see deep imo the enemy 's rear During the program revievv, Field Artillery and to act to delay. disrupi, and destroy enemy Center planners had laid out analytical de- second-echelon forces while simultaneously scriptions of the tactical nuclear battlefield foi fighting the assaulting forces. A brigade cora- the Army to see. A targeting analysis by the Fort rnander looking beyond his forward line of Sill planners showed that well-planned inter- ow n troops (FLOT) had to influenceevents up diction of lhe enetny’s second or “íollow-on” to 15 kilorneters into theenem y’s rear. A div i- echelons ncjt only could bluni the force of the sion commander had to influence events up to attac k but could critically interrupt itsmomen- 70 kilorneters beyond the FLOT. and the corps tum. Interdiction could, in this vvay, create pe- commander up to 150 kilorneters. The com- riodsof U.S. tactical superiority. During these manders' areasof imerest extended still deeper. periods, lhe initiaiive could be seized for offen- But more importam was the distance in time sive action and the release authority for tactical from the forward line to the oncoming enemy nuclear strikes, if needed, could be secured. echelons. for this time governs the point when Thus, well-planned interdiction cotdd create commanders must take action— 12 hours avvay “lime Windows” foi action that vvould not olh- lor the brigade. 21 for the division, and 72 for erwise exist, given the enemy’s great superior- H AM VNIVERSITY REV11AV ity in numbers and firepower, thereby offering overlapping in meaning. Even more awkward significantly wider opportunities for offensive was the use ol the two terms together todescribe action and maneuver.6 what TRADOC believed was emerging as a Still another doctrinal change occurred when, significam new doctrine. In the interest of im- under lhe influente of lhe Soviet invasion of proved clarity. General Starry chose “AirLand Afghanistan and the beginning of lhe Iranian Battle” as the tille for the new concept that hostage crisis in late 1979, Carier adm inistra- involved such a dose interaction between all lion officials grew interesied in the military air and ground capabilities.8 demands for the non-NATO world. For the The development of the new doctrine was Ariny, the change was formally announced by one thing; its acceptance by the Army and an General Meyer in a white paper of February influential cadre of civilian defense writers and 1980. ' TRADO Cs light division study of 1979- critics was another.9 Fresh in memory was the 80 and thesubsequent high-technology testbed debate over the 1976 version ol FM 100-5 with projecl undertaken by the 9th Infantry Divi- its active defense doctrine. In 1981, TRADOC sion ai Fort Lewis, Washington, inaugurated Headquarters proceeded differently from the doctrinal forays into the non-NATO arena. To way it had with the 1976concept. First, General these projects were added studies of a contin- Starry took pains to include the Army at large gent y corps antl its higher command echelon in lhe development of AirLand Battle, dissem- an d a 1983 effort to create a 10,000-man light inai ing information through briefings and division. wide circ ulation of Fort Leavenworth's draft of the new FM 100-5 during 1981. T he doctrine was well received. AirLand Battle wasan offense- Introducing the New Doctrine oriented doctrine that the Army found intellee- It was from these events of the 1970s that the tuallv, as well as analytically, convincing. extended battlefield concept emerged. TRADOC presenteei the concept at the Army Command- ers Conference of October 1980. and General Meyer approved it at that time. A tearn headed The concept called for early offensive ac- by the C.S. Army Combined Arms Combat De- tion, by air and land, to the full depth of velopments Activity at Fort Leavenworth, enemy formations to defeat an enemy Kansas, briefed the concept toall of the Artny's attack. major command headquarters in the ensuing months; and it was well received. Favorable responses also catne from C.S. Air Force and Second, after General Meyer approved the Army units briefed in Germany and Korea. dot irine, TRADOC seized the initiative in pre- Meyer approved additional team visits to the senting it to the military and civilian public. corps and divisions during the early part of TRADOC personnel at Fort Leavenworth and 1981. T he team also took part in a 3d Armored Fort Monroe developed briefingsabout AirLand Division test of a special fire support targeting Battle, as well as a future battle concept for the cell concept, which was developed to select 1995-2015 period(AirLand Battle2000). and pre- high-value targets for interdiction. In V Corps, senteei these briefings to Department of the Army the tearn dernonstrated how tactical air control action offit eis in the Pentagon and to the under- systems could support the targeting cells to secretariesand assistant sec retariesof DOD. I he press the deep aitack. AirLand Battlepresentation wasalsooffered to The terminology of “extended” and “inte- membersoí the Gongressional Reform Caucus grated" battlefields was awkward and, in part. and, subsequently, to still wider congressional AIRLAND BATTIL CONCEPT 9 circles. where it was well received. Ultimately, cal weapons should the Warsaw Pact employ thf briefings were given 10 all principais oí lhe its own large and well-trained Chemical forces Department oí Army staíf, to all lhe Service were ideas that could once more be discussed chieis and their deputies, and to Vice Presidem publicly, as they had been in the 1950s and George Bush. 1960s. These briefings stressed the importance of uníettered. imaginative doctrinal thinking. Against Soviet power, an attrition doctrine could not succeed. The LT.S. Army had to rely The AirLand Battle dealt with the on the strength of Western inan, had to exploit Army's major and most serious chal- his innovativeness. independem thinking, flexi- lenge—armored, mechanized, combined bility, and adaptability. According to these arms battle. briefings, the AirLand Battle could not be ade- quately described by the traditional football metaphor with its terrain orientation. Rather, The concept called for early offensive action, it should be seen in terms of a soccer game, by air and land, to the lull depth of enemy where the orientation is on the enemy, the ac- formations to defeat an enemy attack. Mindful tion is fluid, and independem action and ma- of lheabsenceof clear and consistem Amei ican neuver could lead to collapse of the enemy’s political aims in Vietnam and of the Clause- overloaded system.10 witzian maxim that “war is a continuation of The AirLand Battle briefings thus informed policy by other means,” the AirLand Battle influential Army, congressional, and adminis- concept stated: tration officials about the doctrinal develop- . . . once political authorities commit military mentsaccompanying the transition to Army 86 iorces in pursuit of political aims, military forces and the new weaponry coming into production must win something—else there will be no basis and deployment. The briefings of 1981-82 pre- from which political authorities can bargain to sented a doc trine that corrected the major prob- win politically. Therefore, the purpose of mili- letns of the 1976 FM 100-5 and appeared very tary opera dons cannot be simply to avert defeat— but rather it must be to win.12 sound. These were forthright statemenis, clear in The Operational Concept intent and disabusing the Soviet Union of any of AirLand Battle perception that shifting strategic power had opened for it a new freedom of action at theater The concept of the AirLand Battle pub- leveis. The AirLand Battle dealt with the Ar- lished in March 1981 was e x p lic it a bout the my’s majoi and most serious challenge—ar- conditionsoí modern battle. and it wascorres- mored, mechanized, combined arms battle. pondingly candid about how Army units in The new concept projected an explicitly offen- combat had to deal with those conditions if sive emphasis and had as its distinguishing thev were to fight, survive, and w in.11 Topics feature an extended view of the modern battle- that had previously been excluded fromdiscus- lield—extended in both distanceand time. The sion because oí prevailing national policies extended battlefield added emphasis on inte- onceagain surfaced in the debate. Holding the grated attack by land and air forces and pro- heavily armored and far more numerous War- vided options embracing the tactical nucleai saw Pact forces at risk by early continuous and Chemical dimensions of modern war. planning loemploy tac tical nuclear weapons if The authors of the concept did not see deep attar kedand threatening toretaliate with chemi- attack as a matter of choice but as an absolute 10 AIR V M I I RSITY REVIh IV

necessity forwinningin an East-Westconfron- finish the battle beíore the arrival of the ene- lation in Europe. The great numerical superi- my’s remaining follow-on armies. ority of ihe enemy's follow-on echelons, not The concept delineated clearly how the time lhe type of operational maneuver the Soviets element figured into the deep battle. It detailed rnight employ, was lhe significam factor iliat in hour-spans not only the time given to bri- demanded ii. l he oncoming second echelon gade, division, and corps commanders to attack had lo be slowed andbroken up by a baule deep their respective elements of the second-echelon in theenemy’s rear lhat would befoughtsimul- formations but also the time given to see the laneously with the close-in contesi. l he deep enemy formations in thestill moredistant rear. aitack required tight coordination with the Thus, each commander—brigade, division, and close-in battle so that scarce means of attack corps—hasdual responsibilities under thecon- would not be wasted. It required that planners cept: attack the enemy assault echelon and at- not only anticipate enemy vulnerabilities but tack the follow-on echelon of the assaulting view this two-part hattle as one engagement. force. With his second echelon disrupted, the enemy The concept embodied a detailed scenario would find his operational scheme undermined; for the second-echelon attack. Criticai here was and, having lost the initiative, he would be what TRADOC writers called ‘ intelligence forced to call off the attack. preparation of the battlefield.” Aided by a net- work of sophisticated sensor and Communica- tions systems, commanders would attack high- The overall rnessage conveyed by the Air- value targets to disrupt the enemy's forward momentum progressivelv. Three primary means Land Battle concept of 1981 was that the of deep attack existed: interdiction (including Army must leave behind the restricted air power, artillery, and special operating notion of winning the fight only in the forces), offensiveelectronic warfare, and decep- traditional "main battle area." tion. The concept stressed an absolute need for an integrated plan of attack aimed at both the assault and the follow-on echelon. Because of For effective implementation, the concept the depth of the attack against the second required sensors and surveillance systems to echelon, the air aspect would dominate the prevent surprise attack and to gain targeting early phase of lhe air and land battle. and surveillance information. Also needed vvere The concept stressed that the Army s transi- dual-capableconventional and nuclear systems tion to lhe tactical ideas of the AirLand Battle with the range and destructiveness to put had to begin at once. In line with the maxim enemy forces at risk, including forces in the "we must train as we will fight,” commanders second-echelon region. l he concept also re- in the field had to begin immediately to prac- quired command and control systems that op- tice the concepts by which they would fight in erate automatedly and in near real time. When the 1980s. Above all, special cells for second- combined, these means make possible a defen- echelon targeting had to be established in all sive battle. part of which takes place far for- fire support elements. These cells had to be ward of one s main defensive position. Vievv- capable of nuclear, conventional, and Chemical ing .he enemy far behind its forward line, targeting. To make it all work, thecorps had to commanders can begin early to delay and de- have control of the requisite aerial sensors and stroy follow-on echelons, whilesimultaneously intelligence processors. engaging and defeating the first-echelon as- The overall rnessage conveyed by the Air- sault; then they can transition to attack and to L a n d Battle co n ce p t of 1981 was th a t the Army AIRLAND li ATT Li CONCKPT 11

tniist leave behind the restricted noiion of win- Warsaw Pact, similarly organized Soviet “sur- ning the fight onlv in the traditional "main rogates" in Southwest and Noitheast Asia, or battle area.” The Army was now “entering a lighter well-equipped insurgents or terrorist new dimension of battle which permits the si- groups in other paris of the world. However, multaneous engagement of forces throughout the manual indicates that the land forces of the lhe corps and division areas of influence." It Soviet Union are the most serious challenge had to begin immediately to practice, learn, facing the modem Army. and refine the AirLand Battle concepl.l) Today, Soviet doctrine emphasizes the prin- cipies of mass and maneuver and seeks victory through a relentless prosecution of the offen- Concept to Doctrine: sive. If nuclear and Chemical weapons are re- The New FM 100-5 quired to ensure operational success, the So- At Fort Leavemvorth, in the meantime, work viets will use them. Indeed, their basicdoctrine was proceeding du r in g 1981 on the revision of assumes such use, and their armies are equipped, FM 100-5. Selected as principal author was armed. and trained to use nuclear and Chemical Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czega, an weapons without need to pause íor transition. officer assigned to the Command and General Against such an enemy, the manual notes, Staff College. General Starry mei often with all available military force of all the Services Wass de Czega and his assistants during the must be applied. In today’s warfare, as in the vvriting. Besides the wide staffing throughout past, the force that retains the initiative will the Army. TRADOC invited outside critics and win. On the integrated, air-land battlefield, the writers to review and discuss the drafts and key to retaining the initiative is disrupting an contribute their thoughts. TRADOC vvanted enemy's fighting capability with deep attack, the new FM 100-5 to embody fully the AirLand effective firepower, and decisive maneuver.16 Battle. In September 1981, the manual was Furthermore, U.S. forces must plan to expect published in draíi by Fort Leavemvorth.u This nuclear and Chemical operations from the be- draft was subjected to an extensive review by ginningof hostilities. First use of Chemical and lhe Army prior to publication of the finished nuclear weapons by the enemy cannot be per- manual in August 1982. mitted to decide the conflict. On the modem battlefield, nuclear fires might well be “the predominam expression of combat power,” In today's warfare, as in the past, the force with small tactical forces being used toexploit their effects. Suchengagements would be short that retains the initiative will win. and violem. Decisive battles might last hours, instead of days or weeks.17 Like its predecessor, the new Operations was Modem electronic countermeasures could a significam doctrinal statement.1’ Not only disrupt effective command and control severely, did it embody importam changes, but it re- placing a premium on the initiative of subor- flected, in line with the shiít in national stra- dinate commanders. Such initiative is a point tegic perceptions since the late 1970s, the more of emphasis in the new manual, which adapts confident tone of an offense-oriented military the German Army principie of Auftragstaktik, operational doctrine. the ability of subordinate leaders in combat to In the 1980s, the new FM 100-5 notes, the act independemly in thechangingbattle within U.S. Army could find itself in battle in any of a the context of the overall plan. Airmobility, number of places against a variety of oppo- now a Soviet as well as U.S. capability, would, nents: the modem mechanized armies of the together with air power, extern! the battlefield 12 AIR IXIVKRSITY REVI KW to great depths. For the U.S. Ariny, logistical gressively to defeal the enemy. . . . Army units lines vvould be long and vulnerable. Rear areas will---- attack the enemy in depth with fireand would be subject as nevei before to attack and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain disruption by subversion and terrorist actions the objective.” It also notes that “our opera- and by airmobile, amphibious, and airborne tions must be rapid, unpredictable, violem, forces, as well as by air interdiction and long- and disorienting to the enemy.”20 range fires. Combat in built-up areas, includ* An increase in clarity has been added by in- ing the extensive urbanized sections of West serting into the manual a new levei of military Germany, would be inevitable. All of ihis adds art. Between tactics and strategy, the manual up to a battlefield situation that would be ex- inseris the intermediate levei traditionally rec- tremely fluid. ognized by lhe German and other armies as the Under conditions sui h as these, battle would operational levei of large units (i.e., the opera- place a premi uni on leadership, unit cohesion, tions of armies and corps that involve activities and effective independem operations. Leaders below the levei oi military strategy and above would need to be more skillful, more imagina- lhe levei of tactics). Throughout the manual, tive, and more flexible than ever before. Train- the writers held to a clarifying distinction be- ing, the manual writers affirm, is the corner- tween circumstances and actions at the tactical stone of success in battle, and training for war levei and those at the operational levei. is the principal peacetime responsibility of all commanders: “On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as they Attacks that avoid the enemy's mair, were trained before battle.”18 In the Army’s units, training must concentrateon leaders and strength hut shatter his will or reduce hit combat teams. Commanders must focus on fighting capability are the fastest anh building coníidence and initiative in their cheapest way of winning. subordinate leaders. Unit training must be realistic andas rigorous for support units as for combat units. The addition of the operational levei re It is significam that the new manual again sulted from a decision made by General Starry’s places the principies of war and their applica- successorat TRADOC. General Glenn K. Otis. tion at the center of Army thinking. The prin- This decision was made late in the writing ot cipies of war had been pointedly omitted from the manual. The addition of the operational the operations m anual of 1976 in a conscious levei had been strongly urged bv the Army Wai attempt to avoid theory and to focus on the College and was discussed by German Army precise requirements of winning the defensive reviewers during the staff review process. In- “first battle of thenext war" in Central Europe. deed. there was much doctrinal interacdon W hat the writers of the 1982 m anual were striv- with the German Army General Staff during ing for instead was a concept broad enough to thecourseof the Army’sdevelopment of the new encompass operations in all anticipated cir- FM 100-5. General Starry favored a close doc- cumstances.19 trinal compatibility with German Army manual The new FM 100-5 adds precision to earlier 100-100, Command and Control in Battle. statements of the AirLand Battle concept. It is In outlining the dynamics of battle, FM 100- explicit about the intent of U.S. Army doctrine, 5 delineates the elements of combat power. and it conveys a vigorous offensive spirit. Air- Here, the manual departs from its predecessoí Land Battle doctrine “is based on securing or in emphasizing maneuver as the dynamic ele- retaining the initiative and exercising it ag- ment of combat. Maneuver is .11 l i L A N D HA I T I , h C O N C I U T 13

. . . the means of concenirating forces in criticai elements of the 1976 doctrine. In the new edi- areas to gain and use the advantages of surprise, tion, it gives way to a doctrine in which the psychological shock, position. and momentum defensive could vary from a static positional which enable snialler forces to defeat largei ones. . . . It is the employmeni of forces through defense to a deeper, more dynamic force-oriented movement supported bv fite toachievea position defense of maneuver, as the situation demanded. of advantage from which to desiroy or threaten Defense might be forward or in depth and destruction of the enemy.-1 miglu rely heavily on strong points. As with Firepower provides "lhe enabling, violem, the offense, the operational concept of the de- l lestructive force esseniial to successful ma- fense calls for engaging the enemy throughout íeuver." Maneuver and firepower are ‘‘insep- the depth of his íormaiion to disorganize him trable and complementary elements of com- and create opportunities for offensive action. i jat."-- Protection, theshieldingof lhefighting The new manual is more explicit than its • jotential of the force in physical and morale predecessor about the questiono! reserves. lhe erms. is another coinponent of combat power. 1976 m anual had asserted that a division com- The new manual places considerably more mander who spread two of his brigades thinly •mphasis on leadership than had its predeces- across a widearea, holding his third brigade in ior. Although not measurable, leadership isan reserve, would be defeated by a breakthrough •nduring military constam. "Leaders are the attat k.2* But the new manual returns to a more rrucial elemem of combat power.”25 traditional reliance on reserves. Commanders ' Into its doctrine of the offense—the destruc- down to brigade normally would retain about ion of enemy forces—the new FM 100-5 intro- one-thirdof their maneuver strength in reserve. iuces Clausewitz's idea lhat "when we speak of The shifting of forces by lateral movement iestroying the enemy’s forces . . . nothing that had characterized the active defense is dis- jbliges us toliinit this idea to physical forces: the couraged in the new manual. This movement noral elemem must also be considered.”24 is now seen to bean especially \ ulnerableoper- , rhus, attacks that avoid the enemy’s tnain ation that an enemy might easily disrupt or itrength but shatter his will or reduce his fight- prevení by air or artillery interdiction. More- ng capability are the fastest and cheapest vvay over, vacating a sector to move laterally actu- A winning. Attack against enemy weakness ally invites enemy penetration and is, in any rather than force-on-forceattrition battle) and case, psychologically difficult.26 jnaintaining the momentum of the initiative tre the keynotes of the offensive doctrine. l he uiihors of the manual drew freely on Clause- The new FM 100-5 recognizes the itisep- vitzs emphasis on violem effect, combining it ivilh Liddell Hart’s doctrine of the "indirect arability of tactics and logistics: what : ipproach," and joining these ideas to the Air- cannot be supported logistically cannot be j „and Battle emphases on initiative, deplh, accomplished tactically. igility, and synchronization. Five elements of jffensive action are highlighled as the inost undamental: concentration of effort, surprise, Additional sectionsof the new FM 100-5out- >peed of attack. flexibility, and audacity. line the problems ol how to support a fighting New emphases in defensive doctrine also are force whoseconsumption of ammunition, fuel, ;stablished in the new FM 100-5. The active repair parts, andolher logistical suppliescould rlefense. dependem on carefully concerted lat- be expected to be enormous. Emphasis is eral movements by elements of the defending placed on fast forward resupply, foward main- orce, had been one of the most controvérsia 1 lenance, and, where possible, conservation. II IIR rx m -.R S IT Y RF.VHW

T he nevv FM 100-5 recognizes the inseparabil- cannot be vvon . . . vvithout a national vvill and ily of tactics and logistics: vvhat cannot be sup- military torces equal to the task.'V8 ported logistically cannot beaccomplished tac- Also of importance is the laci that the “air- tically. An addition in ibe nevv manual is a land war" has changed in definition from its special section on joini and combined opera- 1976 meaning. No longer simply cooperation tions, since ibe U.S. Army in the most likely and mutual support betvveen the land and air vvarfighting situations vvill be figbting along- arms, AirLand Battle in the 1980s refers todual side another Service or as pari oi a combined and simultaneous battles on the forward line force. and deep in the enemy’s rear echelons, by air The nevv FM 100-5 reflecis a pronounced povver and ground forces working in dose sense of history by incorporating a number of concert. germane military maxims. For example, one Finally, and not least, the clear turn of finds in the nevv manual the Clausewitzian phrase and apt metaphor that readers ol the concept of friction, vvhich explains vvhy in war 1976 m anual had found striking are not lost in even "lhe simplest things become difficult. the nevv FM 100-5. Conscious that clear ideas Also included in the manual areexamples from turn on cogent phrases and lucid vvriting, the military history. such as General Patton’s use manuaFs vvriters vvorked to avoid the pitfalls of of the Norman roads togain surpriseandavoid jargon and specialty speech. In this aspect, they the heavily defended modem routes. There is both borrovved and invented, employing, for also the injunclion of Sun Tzu that “ the vvorst example, the arresting Clausewitzian image of policy of all is to besiege vvalled cities,” as the defense as “a shield of blovvs," along vvith borne out, for the vvriters, at Stalingrad and the AirLand Battle concepts of deef) battle and Tobruk.-’’ The manual also uses brief battle ol collapsing the enemy’s fighting structure. descriptions to illustratedoctrinal points. Two With publication of the revised FM 100-5 of examples are the Vicksburg Campaign, used to August 1982, the concept of AirLand Battle was illustrate the importance of speed and surprise established as the Armys fightingdoctrine for in the indirect approach, and Tannenberg, as a the decade ahead. Intimately bound up vvith demonstration of exploiting fluid conditions the restoration of U.S. strategic capabilities in to transition from the defense to the attack. the early 1980s, the nevv doctrine provides a Significantly, the nevv manual notes, as the forthright intellectual basis for an army that is 1976 m anual had not, the political aspect of reassumingan explicitly offense-oriented read- vvarfare. Defeating enemy forces in battle does iness. Since it puts the Army in a much better not always ensine victory. “Other national in- position to defeat a Soviet attack, AirLand Bat- strum entsof povver and persuasion vvill influ- tle is a notable contribution to deterrence as ence or even determine the results of vvars. Wars vvell. Fort Monroe, Virgínia

Notes 1. Field M anual 100-5, Operatiom, Headquarters Department of countcrfire. logistical support. atui command-control-comnuyii the Army, I July 1976. c .itions (C: l-elertronu warfarc I hecommanders live criticai ta>k 2, Seejohn L. Romjue, A History of Army 86, Vol. I, üivision 86: m force gencration were interdiction. C \ force mobility (mine The Developmenl of the Heavy Divi.uon, Headquarters TRADt)C, i leaiing and hridging). surveillanre-fusion, and reconstiiution Ju n e 1982. pp. 1-10 and 42-18. Several of the criticai tasks were later revised. 1. L.etter ATCD-PD, TRA D O C to distribution, 17 November 4. R om jue. p p . 10 II. and 124. 1978. subj: Battlefield Developmenl Plan. T en tasks were cnvi- .5. Foi a disc ussion of lhe caris debate in the Service and delens’ sioned as encompassing all asperts of battle. The five criticai tasks journals during 1976-78. see I RADOC Annual 1 listorical Re' ie"' of the central battle were target sen ic ing, air defense. suppression- Fisial Vear 1978. A ugust 1979, pp. 139-54. AIRLAND BATTIl CONCA.PT 15

li. General Donn A. Mariy. "Exrending ilu- Batllrlield,' Militan 10. Meinoranduin foi Record A 1'C.S-H, 1 RADOC llisloiical Kr.iru- Mar» h 1981. pp. 31-50. Oííiee, 30 Jariuary 1981. subj: Coneepls and Do» nin e C oníeiem e. 7 Chiei oi Slail. I S. Anny VVhitr Paper 1980. "A Frarnework lor 28-29 Jarmary 1981. Headquarieis 1 RADOC. Molding lhe Army o( tlu- I980s inlo a Disciplined. Well-Trained I I I RADOCPainphlri 525-5. Military Operations: Oprratiunal 1 iglu mg Forte.' 25 Februarv 1980. Concepls ) ij t lhe AirLand Hattle and (nr ps Operations— 25 8 M niagr 291305Z Januarv 1981. Commander TRADOC u> M au h 1981 disiribution. subj: Th»’ AirLand Baiile. 12. Ib id .. p 2. 9 Thf retord isclear thai lhe major intelleitual force behiud lhe 13. Ibid.. p. 21. ionnulalion oí AirLand Batile was (.eneral Donn Slarrv. Il<- was I 1 Field Manual 100-5. Operations (final drall). I St piernbei aided signiíitanily bv lhe FRADOC Dcputy Commanding Gen- 1981. eral. Lieulenam General William R Rn hardson. whoiommanded 15. Field M an u al 100-5. Operations. Hradcjuarters Di-parimeni lhe Gonibmed Arms Cenier ai Fort Leavemvorth. and bv Rn haid- oí lhe Anny, 20 Augusl 1982. son \ staff. in pariindar lhe author-designee lor lhe revision ol FM 16. Ibid.. pp. 1-5 an d 4-1. 100-5. Lieuienanl Colonel Huba Wass de C/cga. Major General 17- Ibid.. pp . 1-3 an d 4-4. Jark N Merrill (Field Artíllery Cenier Commander). Colonel An- 18. Ibid.. p. 1-1. ihonv G Pokornv. and Lieuienanl Colonel Steven Doerfel al Fort 19. Ibid.. jrp. B-l lo B-5. Sill helped develop theeoncepl analvticallv trom lheieniral baiile 20. Ibid.. p. 2-1. ideas oí 1977 lo A irLand Batile. Pokomy had had an earlier central 21. Ibid., p. 2-1. rolein thcformulationof lhe Batilelield Developmem Plan Bng- 22. Ibid.. pp. 2-4 and 7-7. adrer General Don Morelli plaved an active role. esperially in lhe 23. Ibid.. p. 2-6. brieiingoi Air I and Baiile lo DOD. congressional. and adminisira- 21. Ibid.. p. 8-4. lion circles. luipoiiam also in lhe lormulalive work was Morei lis 25. Field M anual 100-5. Operations, 1 July 1976. p. 5-3. depuiy. Colonel Edwin G. Scribner. and Colonel Frederiek M. 26. Field M anual 100-5. Operations. 20 Augusl 1982. pp. 11-8 and Frunks oí lhe TRADOC cornbai developmenis plannmg directo- 11-9. raic. Authorship musl be »onsidered inultiple and includes many 27. Ibid.. pp. 4-1. 3-5, and 3-8. planncrs not named here. 28. Ibid., p. 1-1.

^1

coming ... • War Fighting: Certain Uncertainty • MarlborougbTs Ghost in our July- • Creative Thinking at Air University August issue • Do You Understand Doctrine? TACAIR SUPPORT FOR AIRLAND BATTLE

Major J a .mks A. Machos

IRLAND Battle is the U.S. Army’s new ercises, nor does it concede unequivocal pri- fighting doctrine. l he name implies macy of AirLand Battle doctrine ovei estab- cooperation and agreemeni between lished Air Force doctrine. theA U.S. Army and Air Force, bul, in fact, Air- The advem of the U.S. Arm\ ’s AirLand Bat- Land Battle doctrine has been a unilateral de- tle doctrine has forced land commanders to velopment of the U.S. Army. Only recently has broaden their battlefield perspective—which, the Air Force become actively involved with the in turn, has increased Army interest in the doctrine. A Memorandum of Understanding, availability of tactical air (TACAIR) to sup- signed in April 1983 by Generais Edward C. port Army combat efforts. From the Army Meyer and Charles A. Gabriel, has been hailed commander's viewpoint, controlling allocated throughout much of the Army as fui 1 Air Force TACAIR is the best way to ensuie that TAC- endorsement of AirLand Battle doctrine. Hovv- AIR vvill be available to support his com- ever, to the more criticai observei, the agree- bat operations. On the other hand, the air ment represents only an official agreement for forces required to support ground forces oper- the Air Force and Army to cooperate in “joint ate under Air Force doctrine that calls for cem tactical training and field cxercises based on tralized control of air asseis to ensuie their ef- the AirLand Battle doctrine.”1 It does not ac- fective use. From the airm an’s viewpoint, air knowledge AirLand Battle doctrine as the sole assets must be concentrated first to win the governing principie for joint training and ex- battle in the air and lhen to carry out strategic

16 VAC AIR SVPRORT 17

operalions and operalions in suppori oí lhe gests ihai iis application can best be viewed land baitle. Obviously, íbis divergence in out- from a theater perspective. Centralized control look needs to be undersiood and reconciled. allows the air component commander to em- ployair power effectively throughout the thea- Air Power Doctrine and ter by focusing it on spec ifi< theater objettives vvhen necessary. T o accomplish the mission the Tactical Air Control System effectively, the air component commander dele- Basic Air Force doctrine is contained in Air gates to his subordinatecommanders responsi- Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doc- bility for detailed mission tasking, planning, trine of the i nited States Air Force, which de- and execution. scribes the fundamental principies governing Because of the capabilities arising from the the application of air power. Among lhe more air weapon’s flexibility, air power has become importam of ihese principies are centralized a major factor in warfare. Often it has provided control and decen trai izedexecution. Theexcep- the extra shock and extra firepower that were lional flexibility of air power (its ability to vital to success in ground combat operalions. transport personnel and equipment and to pro- Because air power has proved so valuable in ject firepower at greater ranges and speeds than supporting the ground battle, ground com- traditional land- and sea-based systems) sug- manders írequently have sought greater con- trol over air assets. Perhaps the most often cited example of the difficulties involved in ground commanders’ controlling air assets is the North African Campaign of 1942-43.2 Here, air units were attached initially to ground commanders in support of their individual operalions. Among the difficulties that emerged were a lack of coordinated use of air assets and needless loss of aircraft when small, dispersed air units en- countered larger, concentrated enemy units. Later, by centrally directing the air effort, commanders wereable to win the battleagainst 18 AIR 1'NUERSITY HEVIEIV

enemy air power and support the ground integration of air operations with the activities battle. and operations of the other services. From lhe standpoint of air operaiions, the In most established theaters, the Army liai- North African experience indicated that “there son element in the TACC is the battlefield must be a command structure to conirol the coordination element (BCE). As the land com- assigned air power coherently and consistently ponent representative, the BCE provides to tac- a n d to e n s u r e t h a t . . . a i r p o w e r is n o t f r i tt e r e d tical air planners a clear perception of the land away by dividing it among” various other component’s plans, operations, and require- commandsd ments for FACAIR support. Being collocated A point worth cmphasizing is the battlefield with the TACC, the BCE can provide feedback perspective resulting from operations in North on the current ground situation and TACAIR África: air power must be viewed and employed support efforts and facilitate the crossflow of as a theater assei. It is the theater perspective, other operational data between land and air arisingout of combat experience. that leads the forces. It provides a tneans for the air compo- Air Force to hold that air power must be cen- nent commander, through the TACC. to react, trally controlled to be effective. Thus, central- replan. reorganize, or redeploy air assets quickly ized control of air power is a basic element of and correctly to support ground operations. Air Force doctrine; it reflects what combat ex- Thus, Air Force insistence on centralized perience indicates is fundamental to the success control of air resources rests on two key points: of theater air operations. the necessity for a theater perspective in apply- Air Force doctrine further identifies nine ing tactical air power to decisive points on the basic operational missions for air forces. Of battlefield and the fact that the established these, three are the primary responsibility of Communications and intelligence capabilities tactical air forces: close air support, air inter- of the TACC facilitate the rapid and effective diction, and counterair operations.■' In con- application of TACAIR to these decisive points. ducting those three theater missions, the aii component commander Controls the emplov- AirLand Battle ment of TACAIR forces through the tactical air control System (TACS). Field Manual 100-5, Operations, is the basic The heart of the TACS is the tactical air document describing how the U.S. Army in- control center (TACC), which is the focal point tends to fight in futureconflicts. Theapproach for all air-related command, control. Communi- to combat outlined in this manual is what is cations, and intelligence (C'I) activities. (De- .known as AirLand Battle. “It emphasizes tacti- pending on the total number of forces em- cal flexibility and speed as well as mission ployed in a theater, there may be more than one orders, initiative among subordinates, and the TACC.) Furthermore, theTACCs intelligence spirit of the offense.”5, According to this man- capabilities and its access to national intelli- ual, modem conflict presents the Army with gence-gathering systems make it the theater thesechallenges: the nonlinearitv of future bat- focal point for near-real-time information on tlefields, the development of imaginative and the enemy. This access to intelligence data, flexible leadership, maintenance of unit readi- plus the concentration of Communications ca- ness, and unit and individual training. I o op- pabilities, makes the TACC the logical com- erateon the modem battlefield, the Army must mand and control center for effective theater- be ready to fight as a team in joint and com- wide application of tactical air power. The binai operations, for only by coordinating all TACC also includes liaison elements from available military forces in pursuitof common other services in the theater, facilitating closer objectives can the United States hope to win. TA CAIR si rrou r 19

AirLand Baule doctrine relies on comple- area of influence. (See Figure 2.) Of special note- mentai v actions by combat forces of all Ser- is that while areas of influence do not ovei lap, vices. B\ carefully synchronizing lhe various areas ot interest often do. organic and supporling fires, the ground com- mander can create the synergism necessary for Figure 2 The Area of Interest

him toengage and defeat nnmericallv superior Aiea ot imerest foes. TACAIR provides a large pari of the ground commander’s fire support and there- fore has assumed a high prioritv in his plan- ning for offensive actions.

AirLand Battle Focus: Corps Operations For the Army, the corps is the focal point for AirLand Baule. To fight the battle and give coherence to overall control of battleíield oper- ations, the corps will fight the enemy in an assigned “area of influence.” (See Figure 1.) I heactual geographical sizeol these areas is determinei! by various situational factors6and Figure 1 The Area of influence the reaction time that a partic ulai unit needs to coumer new battleíield developments. Foi a corps, the normal reaction lime is 72 hours. Thus, the normal corps area of influence ex- tends to 72 hours, while the area of interest ends ai about 96 hours. These time guidelines are translated intodistances basedon enemy move- inent capability, terrain, etc., resulting in nom- inal corps boundai ies of 150 kilometers beyond the forward lineofown troops (FLOT) for the areaof influence and 300 kilometers foi the area of interest. In executing AirLand Battle doc trine, corps This area normally contains enemy forces commanders will integrate the actions of all whose actions can affect the corps’close-in bat- organic and support combat elements to ac hieve tle; its boundaries are assigned bv higher land their battleíieldobjec tives. They will attempt to headquarters. In a multicorps situation. these extend combat operations to the maximum boundaries ensure that the operations of one depth of the opposing enemy íormations. In so corps will not interfere with those of an adja- doing, they will be guided by several funda- cent corps. Adjacent corps are required to com - mentais of AirLand Battle doctrine. These dinate on operations that cross or may cross fundamentais stress indirect approaches, speed into another corps' area of influence. and flexibility, offensive initiative, clearly de- roacquire the necessary inielligence to sup- íined objec tives and operalional concepts, a port its attat ks on the enemy. the corps moni- clearly designated main effort, rapid follow- tors activities in an area talled the “area of up, and deep attack. The last oí these funda- interest. which extends beyond the assigned mentais is perhaps the most controvérsia! ele- 20 AIR UNIIERSITY REVIEAY

meni of ihe Army‘s new docirine, for ii is “deep This firepower should permit the corps com- attack" that many equate to AirLand Battle mander to isolate and defeat enemy forces in doctrine. detail (i.e., to isolate small groups of enemy forces and attack them with locally superior Deep Attack friendly forces). An added benefii is theconfu- sion, delay, and deterioration of command and The central importance of deep attack to comrol that should occur in the enemy forma- AirLand Battle doctrine is clearly established tions because of the deep attacks. As shown in in FM 100-5: “Deep attack is neither asideshow Figure 3, the corps commander conducts this nor an unimportant optional activity; it is an form of deep attack with his own organic fire inseparable pari of a unified plan of opera- support in coordination with lhe TACAIR tion.’’ Deep attack refers not only to actual effort. attacks against enemy formations at greater In the second form of deep attack, firepower distantes from the FLOT than that tradition- is diret ted against enemy forces in depth not ally associated with organic tire support capa- only toprevent them from reinforcingcommit- hilities but to operations planned in depth of ted enemy units but also to prevent them from time, distance, and resources. To the ground interfering with friendly offensive actions commander, this means that he must carefully against the flank or the rear of close-in battle plan all of hisactions (logistics, maneuver, f ire forces. (See Figure 4.) support, etc.) as far in advance as possible. The corps commander’s principal assets for deep Figure 4 Deep Attack II attacks are anillery and TACAIR support.8 He is expected to orchestrate the use of these and other available assets to delay, disrupt, divert, and, when possible, destroy selected enemy forces to accomplish specific goals in support of his operation. Doctrinally, deep attacks are carried out for four basic reasons that give them slightly dif- ferent forms.9 In the lirst form, firepower is used to disrupt enemy forces and delay their entry into the main battle area. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3. Deep Attack I The third form of deep attack is more com- plex anddifficult tocarry out. (See Figure 5.) It involves engaging enemy forces far to the rear, using both firepower and maneuver ground forces, whilecoiu urrently fighting the close-in battle. These operations prevent the enemy from massing his forces and destroy his combat momentum by subjecting bis entire force to attacks by friendly firepower. This form of deepattack requirescombined arms fighting in dose coordination with supporting forces (i.e., the Air Force). TACA!li SUPPORT 21

tack enemy forces far beyond the FLOT. Army doctrine requires that these commanders plan operalions so as to anticipate and take advan- tage of opportuniiies that these deep attacks will create in the close-in battle. From their perspective, they can best do that by “calling the shots” themselves in the conduct of deep attacks. However, to allow each corps com mandei the luxury of "calling his own shots" with air inierdiction would fragment the theater air in- terdiction efíort. The theater perspective would be replaced by several narrow, possibly com- peting, corps perspectives. The success ol air The fourth foi m of deep attack is carried out inierdiction missions in support of ground op- todestroy or neutralize particular enemy threats erations would rest heavily on personalities or advantages. (See Figure 6.) Exaniples of and the individual "bargaining" power of each these might be enemy nuclear-capable weap- corps commander. In at least some ways, such a ons Systems or enemy bridging units and situation constitutes a return to practices that proved unworkable during the North African Figure 6 Deep Attack IV campaign. The result? TACAIR's ability to mass forces to meet and deíeai the enemy at the criticai time and place would be eroded. AirLand Battle doctrine has indeed broad- ened the perspective of ground commanders. However, FM 100-5's emphasis on corps opera- tions and the Army’s general reluctance to ac- knowledge more than Iogistical and support responsibilities for echelons above corps create an imbalance in perspective oi the two major components of joint warfare. The air compo- nent commander concerns himself with air op- erations across the theater, while the Army’s corps emphasis in ground operations tends to equipment. Such deep attacks focus narrowly splinter the land perspective in the theater. on the destruction of specific targets to achieve To remedy this situation, the Army needs to lhe stated objective. recognize an operational responsibility for Army echelons above corps (e.g., Field Army, Joint AirLand Battle? Army Group) to function at the theater levei, providing overall guidance and continuity to AirLand Battledoctrine puts groundcom- ground operations through planning and di- manders, especially corps commanders, in the recting long-range land campaigns.10 This ap- position of being extremely interested in the proach would give the Army and the Air Force use and control of air inierdiction to accom- equivalem air and land comrnand leveis and plish their deep attack objectives, for they have permit planning campaigns from a common only limited organic assets with vvhich to at- theater perspective. Such a common perspec- 22 AIR 1’NH'ERSITY REV1EW

tive would ensure thai air and land efforts At the next levei, using the guidance of the would complement one another. theater commanders strategy and his alloca- How would such a conceptually balanced lion of resources, the air and land component approach to theater warfare beapplied in prac- commanders plan specific campaigns and es- tice? To begin with, combat operations within tablish priorities of effort for the forces under a theater of operations would be viewed in their command. Based on the air apportion- terms of “stratified responsibilities.” (See Fig- ment and the assignment of ground asseis, the ure 7.) land component commander idemifies specific objectives and sets priorities for available TAC- Figure 7 Stratified Responsibilities AIR, fire, and logistics support for each of his Theater Commander corps. Unitied At the next levei of responsibility, command Strategy and control elements monitor and direct day- to-day operations to achieve campaign objec- tives. Working within the priorities established Component Commanders by the land component commander, the corps Air Land commanders communicate directly with the Campaign Campaign Plans Plans BCE at the air component commander’s TACC tocoordinate their TACAIR support,ensuring O \Jr that any newly developed targetsare identified, TACC CORPS prioritized, and integrated into the air support Centralized Decentralized effort. Air Planning Land Planning At the lowest levei, tactical combat unitsexe- ATO Corps OPS cute specific missions and fight battles to ac- complish their assigned objectives. Wings, Squadrons Corps Divisions Brigades Battalions In effect, this model assigns to the theater Decentraiized and component commanders responsibility for Execution of Air Missions Fight Battles establishing “priorities of effort,’’ which in- clude a list of approved targets target types. The TACC and corps and division headquar- Broadly speaking, the theater commander is ters are responsible for developing and refining responsible for developing a unified strategy specific target lists. Combat elements of the involving achievable objectives, given avail- wings. squadrons, corps. divisions, brigades, able logistical support and political constraints and battalions then attack selected targets. applicable to his particular situation. Through the air apportionment process, the theater TACAIR and Deep Attack commander establishes priorities for the air ef- fort. lhe air component commander then How might this “stratified responsibilities" knows how he must distributeair assets among model be applied in providing TACAIR sup- his different missions. In a process similar to port to AirLand Balile deep attacks? Again, the air apportionment, the theater commander as- four forms of deep attack demand some vari- signs available ground forces and logistical ations. support for the land campaign. The land com- In the first form of deep attack, TACAIR ponent commander then knows what resources would assist in restricting the presentation rate he will have for his portion of the theater of enemy forces primarily by air interdiction campaign. missions controlled and directed by the I ACC. TACAlli St TTOHT 23

(See Figure 3.) Targeting based on the broad corps to use close air support and attack lieli- objectives of the planned ground operalion copter asseis in deep attack operations. Thus, would be planned by the TACC. in consulta- the ah componends major contribution to the tion with the BCE. Although these objectives deep attack may be in the air-to-air arena. At would stem initially from the land componem the same time, J-SEAD operations would be commander s guidance, they would be retined needed to support both the aii interdiction ef- subsequently by each corps. Corps objectives fort and the close aii support sorties flown in would then be uransmitted to the BCE I ACC, support of the maneuver ground forces. and the corps could nominate largeis for attack to the BCE TACC when those targets ap- peared to be beyond the attack capability of FO R air and land forces to func- organic systems and the corps' close air support tion together effeciively in joim operations, it sorties. is imperative that the Air Force and Army have The execution of the second form of deep equivalem command leveis and a common attack would be much like the first. with the perception oí objectives and the actions re- added responsibility of flank rearprotection of quired to support those objectives. friendly forces. (See Figure 4.) Again, thiscould II Air Land Battle doc trine is adhered to, each be accomplished by broad objective guidance corps commander vvill have planned hisopera- for air interdiction support (e.g., “protect 3rd tion well in advance. By providing land cam- Infantry Divisions Southern flank”), coupled paign plans to his BCE early in the planning with corps direction for specific close air sup- stage, the land component commander can in- port attacks when and where needed. form the air component commander ol the fu- The fourth form of deep attack (Figure 6) is ture main ground effort, allowing him suíli- perhaps the least complicated. Operations to cient time to plan and apply air support for destroy specific enemy capabilities, by their that effort throughout the Army planning pe- very nature, could be orchestrated entirely at nod. as well as during the battle. Even if the the component levei, much as major air inter- main ground effort is known only in general diction campaigns and joim suppression of terms, early knowledge of that effort allows enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) campaigns are TACAIR to disrupt, delay, divert, or destroy structured now to be carried out.11 They re- enemy forces as they move toward theobjective quire only that the separate air and land attacks area, while concurrently protecting oi isolat- be coordinated in timing and purpose. ing friendly approac h avenues to the battlefield It is the third form of deep attack that re- area. By the time lhe opetation begins, air in- quires the highest degree of air and land coor- terdiction missions will have already been dination for success. (See Figure 5.) The extern flown to support lhe operalion. Additional air- of such operations demands long lead-time to-air sorties can be provided, if necessary, to coordination and planning by the staffs of the allow Air Force CAS and Army attack helicop- air and land forces involved. The broad spec- ter assets to conduct operations free from the trum of air and land operations to support such threat of enemy fighters. Thus, TAGAIR will a battle plan may require rapid and effective be supporting the ground operalion from in- shifts of emphasis in attacks both deep in the ception throughout execution. enemy s rear and close to the FLOT. Also, such During operations similar to the third form jointly complementary operations may demand of deep attack, each corps undoubtedly will the expenditure of considerable additional air detect, identify, and select targets for attack that assets to establish localized air superionty over it feels are crucial to its battle plan. Providing decisive areas of the battlefield and enable the the BCE with these targets will allow the 2-1 AIR VNtVERSITY RFV1EW

TACC, in consultation with the BCF, toadjusi operation, gaining the full advantages of the air inierdiction (or battlefield aír inierdiction) flexibilily of air power. By sharing the respon- missions effectively to suppori the main effort sibility for locating, identifying, and develop- of a particular corps, a division, or other ing deep attack targets, corps can focus their ground unit. Decisions on where to apply intelligence collection efforts on thosé areas of available air interdiction missions would be the battlefield that areof immediate concern to based on knowledge of each corps’ operational their advancing, engaged, or forward deployed plans, the current ground situation, and the forces. Closer-in targets could be attacked with priorities and objectives of the land component minimum delay by organic corps assets or close commander. At thesame time, the corps will be air support assets while air interdiction mis- employing their organic and other supporting sions would attack deeper targets identified by assets against targets developing as the battle the corps or the TACC/ BCE, based on the unfolds. Thus, the corps would have the ílexi- corps’ battlefield objectives. Thus, TACAIR bility to direct their more immediately avail- would have the flexibilily toconcentrate forces able firepower assets (close air support, ar- effectively to meet decisive developments in the tillery, and attack helicopters) to decisive areas enemy disposition across lheentire battle front. of the battlefield, if necessary under a “protec- tive umbrella” provided by the Air Force. IN sim rE OF the acknowledged need for close Deep attack operations planned and con- coordination between air and land forces on ducted in such manner do not allow each indi- the modem battlefield, there is often consider- vidual corps commander to “bank” on a prede- able discord as each service tends to adhere to its termined number of air inierdiction sorties in own unique doctrinal position. But success in support of his operation. However, this coor- future wars demands that the U.S. Air Force dinated approach does ensure that the main and Army achieve procedural harmony on the ground effort in the theater will receive an ap- battlefield. The “stratified responsibilities” propriate weight of the theater air support ef- model outlined here is one possible way to recon- fort. Likewise, should the need arise, the theater cile our differences to ensure battlefield success. aii support effort could be rapidly concentrated Air-Land Forces Application Agency and redirected to support any individual corps Langley Air Force Base, Virgínia

Notes 1. Department of the Army. Department of the Air Force, Memo- and special operations. randum of l nderstandmg on Joinl ISA VSAF Efforts for En- 5. Departm ent of the Army. Field M anual 100-5. Operations hancement of Jomí Employmcnt of the AirLand Hnttle Doctrine, (Washington: l fcadcjuariers Department of lhe Army. 1982). Preí- 21 April 1983. ace, p. t. Subsequent explanations of AirLand Battle doctrine and 2. Arthur W. Fedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs o) deep atiack were developed from c hapters I. 2. and 7. Marshal of lhe Hoyal Air Force, Lord Tedder. C.C.B. (Boston: 6. Ibid., p. 2-2. These factors are described as mission. enemv, Little. Brown and Cio.. 1966). l he set tion "Middle Fast. November terrain. troops, and time available (MKTT- I ). 1940-May 19*13" c o n ta i n s a n e x c e lle n t a c c ount of the air pouer 7. Ibid., p. 7-2. struggle in North Alrica. 8. Ibid., p. 7-13. 3. General William VV. Momyer, USAF (Ret), Air Power in Three 9. Ibid.. pp. 7-16, 7-17. Wars: WW ll. Korea, 1'ietnam (Washington: U.S. Govemrhent 10. In all fairness. the l .S. Army I i.iining and Doctrine Com- P rinting Office, 1978), p. 39. mand i rRADOC) and Army Wat Gol lege are presently workingon 4. Department of the Air Force. Air Force Manual l-l. Functions a ” Fheater Operations Concepl" to fill the doctrinal void for Army and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Fone (Washington: echelons afxrve corps. U.S. Governm ent P rin tin g Office, 1979). C hapter 2, "Functions I I USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-3 Trainingand Doctrine Com- and Missions of the United States Air Force," lists the nine basic mand Training Tcxt 100--H-I Faitual Air Gommand Pamphlet operational missions as: strategic aerospaceoffense. strategic aero- 30-23. Joint Suppression of Enemy An Defenses i J-SF.ADi Opera- space defense, space operations, airlift, close air support, air inier- tions. 11 June 1983, contains detailsof lhe concepl and protedures diction, counterair operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, for J-SEAD operations. THE QUEST FOR UNITY OF COMMAND COLONEL THOMAS A. CARDWELL III

O ACCOMPLISH theaier militarv ob- that an importam aspect of this approach is a jectives in support oí national policy unified command strueture in which a single requires a coherent approach to war commander Controls all forces assigned to a Tfighting. Such an approach involves a detailedtheater for operations. So wideiy accepted is knowledge of warfare that includes military this concepl of unity of command that it is history, Service doctrine, tactics, and lhe capa- often viewed as a basic principie of war. A bilities of one’s ovvn forces. History suggesis unified command strueture permits combat povver to be effectively directed toward an ob- jective and redirected in response to contin- gency requirements, thus ensuring concentra- tion of combat power against the enemy and increased flexibility. In the U.S. military context, foices are allo- cated to theater commands to accomplish com- bat missions based on their ability to contrib- ute to the overall effort. These assigned forces are divided into functional components—land, air, and sea—and placed under commanders whoareresponsible to the unified or joint force commander. Although all U.S. Servicesclaim toaccept the unity of command principie, we have been un- able to develop a strueture and policy that per- 26 AIR VNIVERSITY REl lFAV

m it true unity of comm and. Since 1940, the The Combined Ghiefs soon established a uni- concepi underlying U.S. command siructures fied com m and arrangem ent for the 1942 Allied has gradually evolved from a doc trine of coop- invasion of North África and approved a uni- eration to a doctrine of unifiedoperations, and fied command structure for the European theater.4 now, back to mutual cooperation. But mutual The unified command structure that was de- cooperation is not the doctrine in Joint Chieis veloped in Europeduring World War II placed of Staíf Publication (JCS Pub) 2, which out- the combined allied armies, navies, and air lines doctrine and principies formally accepted forces under a single commander in each of two by all the military Services. European theaters. Within the combined ar- In reviewing the evolution of the U.S. mili- mies structure, separatecommanders were named tary's command structure and doctrine for for land and air forces. This structure became jo in t and combined operations since 1940, I the foundation for three important develop- would argue that we have failed to achieve true ments in the U.S. command structure for unity of command. Furthermore, when one theater warfare: it confirmed the unity of com- examines current Service philosophies, it ap- mand doctrine, laid the groundwork for a sep- pears that these philosophies thwart efforts to arate air force, and established a model for the achieve unity of command as required by JCS unified command structure. Pub 2. In 1947, the Joint Ghiefs of Staff (JCS) pro- posed a reorganization of the U.S. military. Historical Review T h e N ational Security Act of 1947 embodied some of the JCS recommendations and pro- World VVar II was a turning point in the vided for the unified direction of the armed development by the United States of a unified forces and for their integration intoan efficient organization for theater war, as it was the first team of land, sea, and air forces. Additionally, time the United States used the unified ap- this act created three military departments proach to war fighting.1 When the war started, (Department of the Army, Department of the the United States did not possess a unified Navy, and Department of the Air Force), estab- command structure. In the event of war, the lished the Air Force as a separate Service, and Services vvere expected to cooperate voluntarily; formally recognized the unified command struc- this was known as the doctrine of mutual coop- ture. In 1949, the National Security Act of 1947 eration. However, the United States had lhe was amended to give the Secretary of Defense option to invoke the doctrine of unity of com- direct authority and control over the Services.5 mand if cooperation proved inadequate.5 Associated with these developments in the By early 1942, it was apparent to inany mili- postwar era were disc ussions of military com- tary leaders that the doctrine of mutual cooper- mand structures, as the newly created military ation would not work under the pressure of departments attempted to develop a workable war. T hus. in the spring of 1942. overall com - command arrangement for theater war. Each mand of the Pacific Ocean area was vested in Service had its own view of how to make the the Commander in Chiefof the PacificFleet. At command organization function. Against this nearly thesame time, General Douglas tWacAr- backdrop, the United States entered the Korean thur was placed in charge of a second unified conílict in 1950. command, with responsibility for the South- Early in the war, General Douglas MacAr- west Pacific area. Some months later, in the thur. Commander in Chief, United Nations European theater, the British Ghiefs of Staff Command, did not organize his forces along recommended a command structure along the the lines of the approved unified command lines of the U.S. unity of command doctrine. structure.6 Basically. the United Nations Com- CMTY ()t COMMAND 27 mand did not havea naval. land. or air compo- Vietnamese units. Fhis organization lasted un- nent.' Soou General MacArthur recognized til the early 1960s. that the command arrangement lie had devel- In 1962, the Military Assistance Command, oped was noi operating as he desired; lie then Yietnam, known as MACV, was formed. MACV established a land component command and was an operational headquarters and had the direcied lhe other iwo components, Far F.ast staff elements needed to direct military opera- Air Forces and Naval Forces Far East, to pro- tions. Soon the Artny and Air Force began to vide the air and naval support that he. as argue that MACV should be a theater unified theater commander, required.8 command with land, sea, and air components. MacArthur s korean structure set the stage The Navy opposed such an arrangement and for the first full-scale experiment with a true argued that the Pacific Command (PACOM) unified command structure having three com- should provide the unified command structure ponents. There were problems, for the Navy for Yietnam, with the Commander in Chief, would not put the naval air asseis involved in Pacific,controllingall forces assigned to Yietnam.10 supporting the land war under the control oi a The result of all this was an incredibly com- single air component commander. preferring plex command structure in Vietnam. At the top instead to ‘‘coordinate” its air operations with of the structure was the Pacific Command, the those of the Air Force. However, on the whole, unified command with three components: Pa- the unified command system proved an effec- cific Air Forces: Pacific Fleet; and l T.S. Army tive means to control theater-assigned asseis.9 Pacific. The U.S. Military Assistance Com- The Korean War provided theconceptual foun- mand, Vietnam was a subunified command, datton for the control of operational theater subordinate to Pacific Command: the MACV forces in Yietnam. commandei was responsible for the U.S. war Between the Korean and Yietnam wars, there effort in Vietnam, yet PACOM controlled most wasrelatively littlediscussion of commandand of the air campaign against North Yietnam. control of theater-assigned assets. One major Further, the MACV air component commander development during this time, however, was did not exercise operational control over B-52s the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which taking pari in the war, and during most of the separated the forces of the unified and specified conflict he had no authority over Marine air commands from the military departments and units based in South Vietnam. The commander, stipulated that operational control over all MACV, had no continuing operational control combat-ready forces would beexercised by uni- over 7th Fleet units operating off the coast of fied and specified commanders. When theater North and South Vietnam, and he had no au- operations were required. the Services were to thority over South Vietnamese forces.11 provide forces to a theater organization that This command structure soon proved un- would be commanded by a single commander. workable, and some sênior military leaders be- The Yietnam experience provided another gan to argue for a single, simplified command opportunity to achieve a unified command structure to handle the expanding war. With structure. During the early stages of our Yiet- the war spreading into Laos, new questions nam involvement, the structure used to control about command relations arose. In an effort to activities in Vietnam was the Military Advisory resolve these matters, the Army recommended Group (MAG), which was established on 17 that all forces in Vietnam and Thailand be September 1950. In 1955, the MAG was redes- placed under the commander of MACV. The ignated the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Navy disagreed with this idea.12 After four years Yietnam, which supervised U.S. military activ- of discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided ity that was limiied to organizing and training not to change the command structure but 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

simply to realign some of ihe forces. components lha* are integrated imo the unifiec \ The issue of a single manager for air and command. The Army and Air Force believe questions aboul the command structure were that the functional components (air, land, anc raised in 19b7. In 1968, the Deputy Secreiary of sea) should be the basic elements of a theate: ■ Defense directed that Marineairassets based in organization—land forces would come unde: í South Vietnam would come under the control the land component, air forces under the aii1 of the Air Deputy, MACV.1' component, and naval forces under the nava In spite of considerable efforts to resolve component. However, the Navy and Marint command issues, numerous command prob- Corps believe that Service components (USA lems remained until the Vietnam War of fi- USN, USAF, USMC) should be the basic build ei a 11 y ended in 1973. Since then. the Services ing blocks of the theater structure, which have confronted the issúe of unified command means that control of air asseis would be dividec j in other situations, notably in the creation of among the Marines, the Navy, and the Aii the Rapid Deployment Joini Task Force and Force. the debate over the control of tactical air assets Another important areaof disagreementeon, in theaters of operations. But we still do not cerns disposition of Marine Corps forces. The have a command structure ref lecting the philos- Army and the Air Force believe that the Marint ophy in JCS Pub 2. A major reason for tliis force should come under the naval componen continuing íailure is conflicting Service philos- when involved in amphibious operations oi ophies. other operations in support of naval cam paigns, but they assert that Marine com ba. forces should be assigned to the operationa Theater Command Structure: control of the land and air component com JCSPub 2 mandeis during sustained operations ashore versus Service Philosophies The Marine Corps agrees that when operating in amphibious or naval operations its forcei! JCS publications provide guidance for the should come under the naval unified or nava U.S. conduct of theater war. The Basic princi- component commander; but during sustainec pie ol these publications is unity of effort, the operations ashore, the Marine Corps believe? idea that effective military operations require that its forces should come directly under tht the combined activities of land, sea, and air theater or joint task force commander. Thus. forces. This combination of activities is ac- the Marine Corps wouldoperate as a uniseruict complished through unity of command, which command.15 is provided through a unified command struc- In regard to control of naval air forces, the ture. Thus, when two or more Services are re- Navy has similar views to thoseof the Marines quired to accomplish a specific military objec- According to the Navy, all naval assets, includ- tive, they are employed as a team under the ing naval aviation, should come under the na- direction of a single commander. The unified val component commander. Even when nava) commander has operational command of these aviation assets are employed over the land, they forces and exercises this command through his should remain under the operational control ol component commanders.14 the naval component commander and operate V. hile all of the Services formally acknowl- in an in-support-of role. edge the principie of unity of effort, each Ser- vice applies the principie in accordance wilh its own Service perspective. A basic difference T H IS article began with the ob- that surfaces centers on how one defines the servation that unity of command is virtually s UNITY Oh COMMANl) 29

jrinciple of war. In reviewing forty years of strategy mappedout by the theater commander. J.S. military history, however, it is apparem The doctrine guiding lhe operation of this hat U.S. Armed Forces have failed 10 achieve theater command structure must be that of cen- ull unity of command. While all four Services tralized control and decentralized execution. n today's DOD establishmem formally agree Centralized control permits combat powei to ivith the principies of war fighting and theaier be directed toward an objective and redirected jrganization as specified in JCS publications, in response to contingency requirements. On hey appl> the principies in different manners. theother hand, decentralized execution gives to True unity of command will come only lower-command echelons the flexibility they ,vhen all Services accept a theater perspective of need to take advantage of transient opportuni- var fighting. LTnder such a perspective, all ties offered by a rapidly changing combat and combat forces are employed under a single environment. and component commander, all naval forces Mather AFB, Califórnia jare employed under a single naval commander, and all air combat forces are employed under a single air component commander—with each I wish lo ihank Major Jeífrey \V. CoyU'. l ’SAF. toi providing of these commanders responsive to the overall editorial assistance in lhe preparai ion oí ih is arlicle.

Notes 9. Ibid., p. 55. General Otlo P. Weyland reached this same 1. Command and Employment of Military Forces. Vol. II. Pari C, conclusion vvhen, on lOOctobei 1950, he sialed: "Whenever com- Vii War College. F xitn sio n Piogram. Maxwell VFB. Alabama. binai lon ol A ii Force. A rn iy, and Nav y are in a jo in i command it is 1932. p. 3. See also John L. Frisbee. New l.ifeíor JCSat Foity," Air esseniial lha i the Commander-in-Chief ha ve a jo in i staff vviih pro- rurce. Fcbrtiarv 1982. p. 86. Frisbee States tliai from the late 170()s portionale representation ol iheseivices involved." U niil ibcearly 1940-. lhedireuion oí l '.S. fort es in w ailiine has been 10. General VVílliam W. Moniyei, l'S A F (Rei). Air Power in i loosc processcalled mutual rooperalion. Fia m 1903 until 1942 lhe Three 11’ar.v (Washington: Government P rin lin g Office. 1978). pp . oinl Army-Naw Boaid opeialed under lhe dom ine oi mutual 66-68. , noperation. I bus. in theearly íorties, we in ellecí had two separale I 1. Lieutenanl Colunei John J. Land, Jr.. Command and Control ommand siructures—une foi naval forcei and one foi land forces, and Communications Structure in Soutlieast A\iu Arra (Maxwell rho l T S. Chieis of Siaff did not approve lhe dom ine oí command AFB. Alabatna: Airpower Research Instiiuie. 1981). U niil A p ril 1912. 12. Ibid.. pp. 68-78. fo r a discussion on lhe A ii Fone poini ol 2. Frisbee. p. 86. vievv on unilie d command and the a ii component. see Colonel 3. Command and F.mployment of Military Forces, p. 5. l he Thomas A. Cardvvell III. "Managing l healer An Asseis." Military domine ol unity ol command could be placed in effect by agree- /temeu1, May 1982. p p . 10-45. T h i s artic le uates lhe A n Force vievv roem beiween lhe Secretaries ol W ar and Navv, by lhe commanders on single inanager fot air. See also General Momyei s book Air pí lhe seivice forces, or bv lhe Presidem. Power in Three H'ar.v. pp. 20-68. 4. Ib id . 13. " Lhe Single Managei Problem: l he Crealion ol an Opeia- 3 John L Frisbee. "Command Lines lo i Combat Forces." De- tional Control System for t ’S Factical \n ui 1 Càjrps ol South ’i s e 8 1 , Augusl 1981. p. 10. Viemam during 1968," (Washington: JCS 14istorical D ivisio n, July 6. It is interesliug to note ih .il asearly as 1916. lhe Joint Chieis ol 1976), pp. 1-25. Previously < lassified. Dei lassified by S M -I97-81,20 all had issued a direciive iJC s 1259 27. I I December 1916) lo March 1981. See also General M o m y e r, Air Power in Three I Va rs, p. ea ler commanders which required unilied commanders to esta b- 82: and ( >eneral VVilliain C. Wesimorelartd. A Soldier Reporls (New «h a jo in i siaff toprovide lhe sjx-i lali/ed kuowledgeand advu e fui York: Doubleday, 1967). pp. 3.35-40. eemplovmenl of land. naval, and a ii lorce forces. See Robert F. I I. JC S P u b 2. Uni{ied Action Armed Forces (l XAAF ). Ociobei jlre ll, The United States lir Force in Korea. 1950-1953 (New 1974. pp. 9. 44. 16. Íark: Duel. Sloan and Pearce. 1961). p. 44. 15. J C S P u b l i c a t i o n I . lhetionary of Military and Associated 7. Fulre ll. p. 41. Terrrts. September 1971. d e f in e s uniservice command as "a com- 8 Ibid. mand compriscd ol forces ol a single Service.” IRA C. EAKER SECOND-PRIZE WINNER

LEADERSHIPTO MATCH OUR TECHNOLOGY

Lieut enant Colonel Harrv R. Borowski

THE United States, military our state-of-the-art technology and curreni llJrv doctrine and planning are shaped budgets will permit, they are not hardened oi by three forces: economic re- capable of withstanding damage from attack sources, political considerations, or jamming without suffering significant losseí and, particularly since World War II, technol- in reliability. In short,our command and con- ogy—both existing and potential. This last trol is vulnerable to failure in a wartime envi- element has come to dominate the process of ronment. While we enjoy somesystem redun- doctrinal development in thiscountry and has da ncy, our faliback Solutions must look to the overshadowed other aspects that are criticai leadershipabilityof local commandersand,in to overall military capability. In fact, Ameri- some cases, other individuaIs to carry out crit- ca^ affinity for and increasing reliance on icai actions at appropriate times. This means technology as a mainstay for its military doc- of course, more delegation of authority tc trine have led our nation into a dangerous lower leveis—a reversal of a 125-year trend. approach to force employment. Command History sheds much light on how centralized and control of combat forces today, specifi- command and control evolved by way of ad- cally that of our NATO armies poised to fight vancing technology. in Western Europe, falis woefully behind our capability to bring mass destruction to the battlefield. y^MERICANS have always prided Command and control of Western armies themselves on their problem-solving ability today is heavily centralized at high leveis and As coloniais in a wilderness, they survived on overwhelminglydependenton electroniccom- common sense, innovation, and a reliance on munication systems of varying sophistication. individualism. Encounteringchronic labor short- While these systems represent the best that ages, they found Solutions in mechanical de- vices and other technological advances; it is what difference this centralized control be- not surprising that the reaper and sewing ma- hind the lines may have made on the course chines were invented in the United States. The of the war but, at the very least, it created a Franklins and the Edisons found a proper en- gap between the fighters and their com- vironment in our free-market society to de- manders. Meanwhile, on the seas, the Allies velop their skills, register their patents, and countered the U-boat threat by using the earn profits. In the nineteenth century, Amer- convoy system. In this new approach, Admirai icans developed the habit of using machines William S. Sims commanded vessels in three wherever possible, instead of muscle or even distant geographical locations, not from the capital; and this tendency spilled over into quarterdeck of a warship, but from a desk in military operations. Rifles, weapons, railroads, London. and the telegraph represented significant Communication systems improved and be- technological advances in the world’s first came more widespread by World War II, and modern conflict, the American Civil War. with the improvements carne more evidence Specifically, the telegraph soon found its way of centralized command and control. Twen- into the command and control of armies and tieth Air Force, operating from the Marianas, the way Americans waged war. carne directly under the control of the Joint Jefferson Davis, a West Point graduate and Chiefs of Staff in Washington, much to the seasoned commander from the Mexican War, chagrin of the theater commander, Admirai always held hisown generalship in the highest Chester Nimitz. Later, during the Korean War, regard. During the Civil War, as President of the combination of command capabilities the Confederacy, he decided to control his and military stalemate resulted in warfare in military commanders through departmental- which battalion commanders often directed ization, aided by the new Communications platoon movements. The Vietnam conflict marvel, the telegraph. At one point in 1864, he was not such a stalemate, but helicopters directed General Robert E. Lee, operating prompted an even further increase in central- north of the James River in Virgínia, to route ized control. Aloof from the ground condi- his messages to General Pierre G. T. Beaure- tions, higher commanders attempted to di- gard, situated just a few miles away south of rect small units, to the frustration of their pla- the river, via the War Office in Richmond. The toon and company leaders. The advent of sat- telegraph made this arrangement possible— ellites and sophisticated telecommunications unfortunately for the Confederacy, as it turned accelerated the trend even further. President out. Lyndon B. Johnson and his staff controlled By World War I, improved Communications combat execution to an unprecedented de- and field telephones permitted even greater gree during the war. Stories of targeting deci- dispersai of field unitsand their headquarters. sions made on Pennsylvania Avenue are well Because of the large numbers of soldiers fight- known to military officers; the resulting dam- ing and the extended range of artillery, head- age or value of the process remains open to quarters sat far behind the lines. As a result, speculation. commanders and staff officers often lacked More recently, we know about the elabo- personal knowledge of conditions at the front. rate Communications link between President After the Battle of the Somme in 1916, for Jimmy Carter in Washington and Colonel example, the British Expeditionary Force’s Charles Beckwith in Southern Iran during the iChief of Staff finally toured the front and ex- aborted hostage rescue mission in 1980. Beck- claimed: “Good God! Did we really send men with decided to cancel the mission when to fight in that?” One can only speculate preagreed conditions did not materialize.

3I Nonetheless, communication with the com- about defense in the skies. Eventually, some mander in chief was deemed necessary be- effective defense system will emerge against fore the ill-fated return began. MILSTAR, and so the battle in weapons tech- Without belaboring the point, it isclearthat nology will continue. technology over the past century and a half Meanwhile, we may be overlooking other has permitted rapid Communications between elements that might be useful in our struggles wartime commanders over increasingly greater to build the desired CM system in Western distances. The result has been a growing re- Europe. Specifically, military leaders may not liance on technology for command and con- be paying enough attention to the intangible trol, a promise of greater flexibility for using human elements that translate into effective forces, and more centralized direction farther leadership. The fruits of technology can never from the combat zone. ripen without them. The effect of this trend, especially in the Here again, history can be instructive. Fred- face of potential battlefield conditions in Eu- erick the Great and generais of the Napoleonic rope, is certainly open to question. Given the era, for instance, placed great emphasis on vulnerability of NATO command, control, coup d’oeil—the ability of a commander to Communications, and intelligence (Cd) Sys- observe the battle from above the fray and, tems today, Western military leaders are grave- with the sweep of his eye, assay the course of ly concerned. Not unexpectedly, their plan- the battle and determine the action necessary ners are looking toward technology for Solu- to bring victory. Timing was central to success. tions. For example, a projected system of After his classic victory at Austerlitz, Napo- communication satellites designed solely for leon recalled that if he had prematurely worldwide military use,called MILSTAR (mili- committed or delayed the advance of his cen- tary strategic tactical and relay system), will ter and reserves, he would have suffered provide the minimum essential Communica- defeat. tions for strategic and tactical forces in com- The Prussians, unwilling to pin their hopes bat. Great care has gone into the engineering on such individual genius, took a new ap- of this new system to ensure its survivability, proach to battlefield command. Their offi- durability,and flexibility. Designersstressthat cers, trained in the most advanced military MILSTAR will be virtually jam-proof because schools of the time, clearly understood Prus- of its narrow operating band system and will sian military doctrine and goals in a given be safe from hunter-killer satellites. On paper conflict. Commanders at all leveis enjoyed and in theory, MILSTAR should greatly en- the confidence of their superiors to execute hance our total CM capability. their part of a war plan in consonance with the Despite our current optimism concerning overall objective. Von Moltke the Elder un- such systems, it is wise to remember that other derstood the "fog of war" and knew that the engineers in the past spoke glowingly about best answer to it lav with trained commanders other systems, only to see unanticipated events capable of independent action directed to- upset their "apple carts." Repeatedly in the ward a common objective. Prussia s impres- history of warfare, new inventions have ap- sive defeat of France in 1870-71 stemmed, in peared to give their holder an advantage but part, from the flexibility enjoyed by Prussian soon another system or tactic emerged to ne- field commanders. When German generais gate that edge. Tanks, for example, took executed the Schlieffen Plan forty-four years much away from the machine gun; and when later, they still held freedom to command, but the British coupled radar with fighters, they evidence suggests that centralized control disproved the early ideas of air pioneers from the general staff was developing. One could argue, thereíore. that a negative we need now. The SAC command post, for correlation exists between advances in Com- example, soon became the hub of control, munications technology and the levei of re- approving aircraft takeoffs and landings and liance on independent command judgments. giving wide-ranging advice to aircrews facing Over the years,some would contend. the U.S. problems in the air. The practice spread to military, wittingly or unwittingly, has moved other commands. Military Airlift Command, steadily in this direction. If this tendency con- in particular, adopted and patterned many tinues, at some point we may be placing our centralized control procedures after SAC. In military in unnecessarily difficult and poten- the late 1970s, however, the commander of tially disastrous positions. Are we there now? MAC undertook a deliberate effort to reverse As noted earlier, technology promises to this trend by directing that aircraft command- advance the flexibility of force employment. ers be given back their exercise of command But with sophisticated command and control, to the greatest possible extent. Whatever the the converse more often proves true. If a su- results of this program, it acknowledged that perior commander enjoys instant access to his we had not been doing all we could to devel- subordinates, there is great temptation for op command judgment among our officers. him to assume responsibilities more approp- If history is any indicator, the opening bat- riately belonging to a lower levei of leader- tles of the next conflict will not match ex- ship. Consequently, the on-scene commander pected scenarios and may well be won or lost may be unable to take advantage of opportun- by the judgments of a few key men—judg- ities that suddenly arise. The result is rigidity in ments made when established plans and proce- command, control, and execution of forces, dures offer no answers. At the point where not flexibility! technology fails and unexpected events de- velop, our commanders will be stripped to their basic leadership skills—skills they began So WHAT needs to be done? to develop as cadets and junior officers, skills Our military must pay more attention to de- they need to exercise and broaden continu- veloping independent decision-making and ally as they become commanders. If our Sys- command-judgmentability in ourofficercorps tem does not permit this growth, it carries the in the likely event our highly developed tech- seeds of eventual failure. nical Systems sputter or fail us. Unfortunately, The 1970s gave us two interesting examples sínce World War II, we seem to be less con- of the type of leadership we will need at the cerned about whether our commanders pos- highest and lowest leveis. During the Maya- sess this ability. Within the Air Force, Strategic guez rescue mission, poor intelligence and Air Command probably started this trend. the initial absence of forward air controllers When General Curtis E. LeMay inherited the led to complete chãos in the air, exacerbated job of building SAC and fulfilling the awe- by everyone talking on the radio. A lieuten- some responsibilities given to him by the na- ant, Donald Backlund, recognized that no tion’s leaders, he found it necessary to devel- one was taking charge. By force of his person- op standard operating procedures for every ality, he gained control of the radio and kept task and for every officer serving in the com- some semblance of order among the airborne mand. In fairness to General LeMay, there was helicopters until the forward air controllers no other way of building this command effi- arrived. His initiative and judgment prevented ciently for a variety of reasons. But the system the mission from deteriorating further and carried within it some seeds of trouble: it gave it the chance for success. Three Air Force inhibited the type of leadership development Crosses were awarded to fliers for actions taken that day. Certainly, they were brave of- function if systems fail or become disrupted? ficers; but the margin for their success came Would it be valuable for our commanders to from their ability to execute the necessary have more training in independent battlefield actions independently without direction from action and to carry commensurate authority “above.” to pursue known objectives? Are there not Similarly, when the Yom Kippur War erupt- clear gains to be realized in developing coup ed, existing plans and procedures failed to d'oeil within a twentieth-century framework provide the Military Airlift Command with or borrowing some training philosophiesfrom the execution authority and direction neces- the Prussians to complement a system which, sary for airlift across the Mediterranean to by some professional judgments, is vulnera- Israel. The commanders of MAC and the Sixth ble to complete breakdown? Fleet made telephone contact, worked out a deployment pia n, and carried out the mission consistent with national policy. They knew I n the last analysis, command and control ul- what U.S. objectives were, understood the timately rests with human decision makers, circumstances, and possessed the decisive- advanced technology notwithstanding. Fail- ness to take the necessary action. ure to develop that human skill and to equip Whether at the company grade levei or at our officers with the ability to execute inde- star rank, decisive command judgment under pendently may hinder our forces decisively in fire is invaluable. In the area of command and wars to come. In seeking Solutions to CM control on a European battlefield, it may be problems, military planners would do well to equal to a MILSTAR or a well-organized recognize that developed human capabilities command post back in Belgium. In the nine- are as important as technology. Command teenth century, the fog of war rolled gently leadership needs to be a full-time player in onto European battlefields; in the 1980s, it the realm of C3I concepts. would dash in with hurricane force. Will our USAF Academy, Colorado current command and control System, heavily dependent on technology and greatly cen- tralized, serve us well in an environment that Note we can only approximate, even in our most 1. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War 7974-7978 (Boston: Little. realistic exercises? How well will our officers Brown and Company, 1930). p. 343.

34 EQUALITY IN THE COCKPIT a brief history of women in aviation

L ie i texan iCoLOxt l. nanca B. S amielson

Someday, / dare say. RK women who fly aircrafi in the 1980s women can be flyers still considered curiosities? Retem con- and yet not be versations and correspondence with Air regarded as curiosities?' A Force feinale pilots and navigators indicate Amélia Earhart lhat many individuais in both themililary and

"Fifmella." a Walt-Dtsney-designed gremlin (sliown above). wa\ the mascot of the Woinen's Airforce Service Pilots I W.iSP) (hiring World War //.... Women have been active m aviation throughout its history. 36 AIR VNIVERSITY REVIEW

civilian segmems of society still consider thern couraged in a variety of ways from entering so. The reentry of women imo military flight nontraditional or hazardous jobs or careers. training programs in the 1970s provoked an Certain views of the general population, state- excessive amount of publication, especially ments and decisions of specific influential in- vvhen one realizes how fevv women actually dividuais, and many policies of institutions entered these programs and how limited iheir and government agencies have served to limit dulies were to be. Even the A ir Force T nnes was women’s participation in aviation and other guilty of some sensationalism in its article “manly” careers. litled, ‘‘Dangers to Female Pilots to be Checked Yet the history of women in aviation is worth on Planes,” yet 'he only problem the article examining, and women’s achievements in mili- identified was that flight suits and boots (de- tary aviation merit recognition. Similarly, in signed for men, of course) were too large for thisera in which our nation needs the maximal women!- Surely not a very serious problem nor benefits of its human potential, it may be help- a difficult one to sol ve. ful to explore the role that specific individuais After the WASP (Women’s Airforce Service and institutions have had in discouraging Pilots) was disbanded in 1944, m ilitary avia- women from entering or fully participating in tion was virtually closed to women. The civil- aviation careers. ian sector of society did not encourage women to enter living occupations in the post-VVorld The Beginning through World War I War II era either. A number of the WASP and other female pilots attempted to enter commer- According to early records, women’s involve- cial aviation, but they were discouraged in a ment in aviation seems to have begun less than variety of ways. Not until 1973 did a female seven months after the first manned balloon pilot fly as a regular crew member of a sched- flight: Madame Thible of Lyons, France, went uled American airline.’ for a balloon ride on 4 June 1784. During that Since women have been involved in aviation same year, the famous balloonist Jean Pierre from the days of the early balloon flights and Blanchard began his flights; and twenty years have piloted everything from balloons tospace later, in 1804, his young second wife (Marie- vehiçles, why are women who fly still regarded Madeleine-Sophie Armant Blanchard) made asexceptionsandçuriosities? Oneof theanswers her first flight. Madame Blanchard later was to that question is obvious. The "now society” appointed as Chief of Napoleon's Air Service, of our modern era, concerned with "real-time” replacing another great balloonist, M. Gar- events, ”state-of-the-art” technologies, and "fu- nerin. Her primary duties seem to have been ture shock” scenarios, spends little time study- exhibition flyingfor theentertainmentòf crowds. ing and contemplating past history. Even in Her career as the best-known woman aeronaut such aviation-oriented communities as the Air ended in July 1819. however, when her balloon Force, there is little knowledge of women’s caught fire from fireworks attached to it. She achievements in aviation. (The pioneering ef- crashed near Tivoli Gardens and died of a forts of male pilots are not common knowledge broken neck.4 either; however, documentation on male con- In 1903, about five months before the Wright tributions is much easier to find than that cov- Brothers made their first flight at kitty Hawk, ering female achievements.) Aida de Acosta made a solo flight in a dirigible Another factor that has limited recognition powered with a three-horsepower engine. Bra- of women s aviation contributions is a societal zilian air pioneer Alberto Santos-Dumont built attitude that women in many other areas have this craft. Miss De Acosta had expressed a great encountered also. Simply put, women are dis- deal of curiosity about the machine, and Santos- EQJL'AIJTY IN TUI• COCKTIT 37

Dumoni had answered her questions and shown award was a diamond-studded medal bearing her how to operate i(. She was photographed by the inscription, "First Woman Aviator in Amer- a newspaper repórter while flying the machine ica." She and hei husband designed and buili over the suburbs ol Paris. Her family was horri- aircraft and worked with the Wrights for a fied at the publicity, and her molher extracted a time. Later, she gave up flying and became a promise from Santos-Dumont that he would physician.8 never mention theepisode in any of his wniings.’ Women whowere not pilots supported avia- B\ 1910. aviation was already flourishing in tion in other ways. Various stories about Kath- both Europe and North America. In Europe, erine Wright's support of her brothers were several women were gaining recognition. Ün 8 reported. Some claimed that she contributed March 1910. Baroness Raymonde de la Roche pari ol her salary as a school teacher to her passed a qualifying test and was issued a license brothers’ aircraft business; others said that she bv the Aero Club of France. She is believed to be actually assisted in various stages of construc- the first woinan in the world to receive a pilot's tion of aircraft. Most of these accounts have license. A few months later, she was seriously been dismissed today as "fables,” yet we do injured in a crash, but. fully recovered, she was know that Miss Wright traveled with her racing again within two years. In 1913, the brothers, was feted at parades and other cele- baroness won the Coupe Femina, an award brations, and flew as a passenger with her established to honor women fliers. She was brothers on occasion. Another aviation sup- killed in 1919 when flying an experim ental porter was Mrs. Alexander Graham Bell, who plane that crashed. financed and named the Aerial Experiment As- Meanwhile, in 1909, Hélène D utrieu of Bel- sociation. Other members of the group in- gium began flying, and in May 1911, she en- cluded Mr. Bell, Glen Curtiss, and Lieutenant tered a race in Florence, Italy. She was the onlv Thoraas K. Selfridge. Theii objective was to woman in the group of fifteen fliers compet- advance the Science of aviation.9 ing, and she outflew her rivais to win the co\- With the advem of World War I, a number of eted Italian king's Cup. Later, she set a nevv well-known female pilots volunteered lor mili- world nonstop flight record for women, and in tary Service, but only a few were actually per- 1913, she was awarded France’s Legion of mitted to serve in the military. Hélène Dutrieu Honor.6 volunteered for war Service with France’s Air In the United States, women were very much Patrol in 1914 and was accepted. She made part of the action in aviation. Blanche Scott flights from Paris to check on the location and and Bessica Raiche were the first two American movement of German troops.10 women to solo. Scott soloed on 2 September In Rússia, Princess Eugenie M. Shakovskaya 1910, but there was considerable doubt about was assigned duty as an artillery and reconnais- whether she intended to do so. A gust of wind sance pilot; Lyubov A. Golanchikova, a test may have caused her to become unexpectedly pilot, contributed her airplane to the czarist airborne, or she may have talked a mechanic armies; Helen P. Samsonova was assigned to into speeding up the governor in order to solo the 5th Corps Air Squadron as a reconnais- before her instructor, Glen Curtiss, thought sance pilot; Princess Sophie A. Dolgorukaya she was ready.7 But there was no doubt about was a pilot and observei with the 26th Corps inteni when Bessica Raiche flevv solo on 16 Air Squadron; and Nadeshda Degtereva was September 1910. Subsequently, a m onth later, posted to the Galician From, where she flew Raiche was honored by the Aeronautical So- reconnaissance missions.11 ciety of America (American Division of the In the Llnited States, many women had estab- Fédération Aeronautique International). Her lished outstanding flying reeords, and several volunteered repeatedly for duty as military pi- lots. Congressman Murray Hulbert of New York introduced a bill in Congress to permit women nr join lhe Flying Corps and go 10 France; however, lhe bill did not pass. Women lhen found other ways to support lhe war effori.12 The famous Slinson familv was very active in aviation. Katherine was a well-known stunt tlier. By age nineteen, she had flown in Eng- laml. C hina, Jap an , and Canada. In 1917, she set a new world nonstop distance record for both men and women. Her sister Marjorie was a licensed piloi also. The girls taught their brolhers, Eddie and Jack, to fly; and in 1915, the Stinsonsestablished San Antonio’s Stinson Field and began a flight training school. The brothers were later to found Stinson Aircraft Com pany, but in 1915. Katherine and Marjorie During lhe Second World M ar, American women fleu> in a were the principal instructors at the school. cariety of support roles, which included ferrying aircrajt, Marjorie became known as theoriginal “flying towing largeis for . Irrny artillery practice. testing repaired school marm.’’ A numberof Canadians trained aircrajt. and helping to Irani their male counterparls. Tlie M/S/3 < and ida le above is posed atop a Fairchild-123. One at the school went on to England and received of lhe IY.4SP graduating classes of 1943 is shown below. commissions in the Royal Naval Air Service. EQUAUTY IN Tlll. COCKPIT 39

In June l'UI. the se IVA SPs ivere headed for long cross- seas Service League and went to the front as a counlry fliglil t (note the suitcases); by llie end of tliiil year. canteen worker. She was awarded the Groix de II ISP u a i dubanded. Guerre and numerous American citations for her work. Bryant submitted re|reated applica- tions to fly in combat but ended up as a test This group of students was referred tf) as lhe pilot and instructor. For a time, sheassisted the Texas Escadrille; all of its members were Goodyear Gompany in building military diri- inale.15 gí bles. I fodge taught U.S. aviation radets and Katherine vvanted to enlist as a fighter pilot made exhibition flights for lhe war efíori.15 bLii was turned down. She toured the couniry Ruth Law, another well-known stunt pilot. and collected pledges for nearly $2,000,000 for "bombed" American cities with circulars ask- the Red Cross. f fer nonstop distanterecord was ing for Red Cross donations. She also made a established while she was touring the country 2500-milecross-country flight toadvertise Lib- on a Liberty Bond Drive. Later, she weni to erty Bonds. Air Gorps officials decided that she t.urope as an ambulante driver. She became would beof help in recruitingmen to be pilots. seriously ill asa result of her Kuropean service She was authorized to wear a military uniform and never flew again after World War I.u and posed for a number of recruiting posters. Other female pilota— Bernetta Miller, Alys Although she was also authorized to teach McKey Bryant, and Helen Hodge—found other military fliers, her fund-raising and recruiting way s to serve. Miller joined the Women's Over- activities left her little lime for instructing.16 1» IIR l Vltb.RSlTY REVIFAV

1920 to World War II to exploit her achievements throughout her life. Yet, there is little doubt that her accom- During lhe uvo decades following World plishments in aviation were significam. She Wat I, the field of aviation expanded bv leaps held private, industrial, commercial, and trans- and bounds. Records were set, only 10 be port pilot licenses. She was the first person in broken vvithin weeks or days sometimes. Air the world to cross the Atlantic by aii twice, first rates became popular, aviation clubs and asso- as a passenger and second as a solo pilot. She ciations were formed, oceans were crossed, was active in aviation research and served as an transcontinemal Hights became common, and advisor in aeronautics at Purdue University. barnstormers and moviestunt pilots per formed She was the first person to fly nonstop from seemingly impossible feats of daring. Aviators Newark. New Jersey, to México City and to fly went farlher, faster. and higher than ever from Hawaii to Califórnia. She made the first before—and vvomen were a pari of ii all. continental flight in an autogyro (aircraft with Ruth Law s name continued to be synony- a horizontal rotor, which was a forerunner of mous with sumi living. Phoebe Faii grave Omlie the helicopter). In 1932, Amélia was awarded athieved similar fame as a siuntflier for the botli the Distinguished Flying Cross and the movies by her piloting in “The Perils of Pau- National Geographic Special Medal for her line.” Ebnor Smith, at age séventeen, earned solo flight across the Atlantic. Additionally, international acclaim and a reprimand from she served as aviation editor for Cosmopolitan the Depai tment of Commerce for flying under and wrote at least three books about her avia- all four of the East River Bridges in New York tion experiences. City. Smith, Viola Gentry, and Bobbie Trout One of Earhart’s most lasting contributions outdid each other in setting new endurance to aviation was the first organization of vvomen records for vvomen. Trout and Smith were the 11 íeis. It was named the Ninety-Nines for the first civilian pilots to refuel in midair. In Janu- number of charter members and, of course, ar\ 1929. ihey stayedin th e a ir for 45 h o u rsa n d Amélia Earhart served as the first presidem. 5 m inutes. In January 1931, T rout and Edna Today, it is still a very active international May Cooper set another refueling record of 122 organization of licensed vvomen pilots, which hours and 20 minutes. In August 1932, Louise continues to work for the advancement of Thaden and Francês Marsalis stayed aloft foi vvomen in aviation. The Ninety-Nines sponsor more than eight days.17 (By contrast, on 1 Jan- not only an Amélia Earhart Scholarship trust uary 1929, five pilots aboard the Question fund to prepare vvomen for careers in aviation Mark set the lirst Air Corps refueling record of but also the All-Woman Transcontinental Air 150 hours and 40 minutes.) Race (betier knovvti as the Powder Puíf Derby) One feminine name connected with aviation and a number of other competitive and profi- became a common household word—Amélia ciency-building flying activ ities to encourage Earhart. Amélia wassponsored and finant ially flying skills. They also are active in many air bat ked by millionaire-publisher George Palmei safety programsandcharitablerelief activities.18 Putnam. Putnam arranged for and financed Amélia Earhart s career ended when she dis- many ol her Hights, exploiting her achieve- appeared in 1937 wbile attem pting another ments through books written by “AE” (as he first—a flight around the world at theequator. called her). lecture tours, productendorsements, I ler disappearance became and remains one of and campaigns íeaturing Earhart in person. the greatest mysteries of aviation history. Yet. He marketed everything from sports clothes to regardless of her fate in the South Pacific, her luggage, using Amélia Earharfs name. Amélia name and legend li ve on. married Putnam eventually, and he continued Another recipient of a National Geographic EQl ALITY IN TIIE COCKTII 41

Medal for achievement in aviaiion was Anne Before her life ended, she had accumulated an Lindbergh. Her husband, Charles, is still widely extremely impressive number ol awards and remembered for his history-making aviation honors, including the Distinguished Service achievements; however, few people today are Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished auare of Anne's contributions to some of lhe Flying Cross (three times), the Gold Medal ol famous Lindbergh flights. A pilot and an ac- the Fédération Astronautique International, romplished navigator and radio operator. Anne the International Harmon Trophy (fourteen flew as copilot and radio operator with her times), the French Legion of Honor, and the husband over lhe O rie n t in 1931 an d a round Wings of the Spanish Air Force.21 the inner rim of the four cominents that border the Atlantic in 1933. She was the íirst female World War II recipient of the National Geographic Hubbard Medal in 193-1. She was cited for greatly increas- Some of Cochran’s most impressive achieve- íng public interest and support of an impor- ments carne while she was in the Women s tam industry and for encouraging millions of Airforce Service Pilots in World War II. Indeed. people to appreciate air travei as being safe, Cochran was a driving force in getting this comforiable, and ‘enchanting.”*9 Today, Anne organization started. She inadeat least two un- Lindbergh is best known as an author. Two of successful attempts to get General Henry H. her earliest books. Xorth to the Orient and “Hap” Arnold, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Listen! The II ind, are about the flights for Forces, toestablish a groupof women pilots in which shereceived the Hubbard Medal in 1934. the Army Air Forces, with her as head of the One other very well-known aviatrix of the group. Arnold later stated that he had doubts era was Jacqueline Cochran, who apparently about “whether a slip of a young girl còuld ihrived on adversity and challenges. She was fight the Controls of a B-17.”22 Failing in her reared by foster parents in sawmill camps in the efforts to persuade U.S. military leaders, she rural South and went to work in the cotton turned her attention to England. Cochran mills ai age ten or eleven. Determined to better knew that the British were using women pilots her lot in life, she obtained work in a beauty in their Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA), so in shopandowned her own shop whilestill in her 1942 she recruited twenty-five seasoned A m eri- teens. She became interested in living as a pos- can female pilots and took them to England to sible tool for marketing cosmetics. She received íly for the ATA. In the meanwhile, without any her license in 1932 and became the owner and knowledge of Cochran’s proposals to Arnold, manager of a very successful cosmetic firm. Nancy Harkness Love activated a group of However. flying became her new and real voca- twenty-eight women pilots to ferry aircraft lion. Larly in her flying career, she rnarried under the auspices of Air Transport Com- financier Floyd Odlum. Like Earhart, she had mand. This group, originally based ai New extensive private financial backing from her Castle Army Airfield in Wilmington, Dela- husband for most of her aviation activities. By ware, was known as the Women's Auxiliary age thirty-five, she was acknowledged as the Ferrying Squadron (WAFS), and Love was number-one female flier in the United States. appointed as its com mandei. In 1938. she won the Bendix race and. in the Cochran, always ambitious and determined process, set a new west-east transcontinental to head any group of American women pilots, record for women. In 1940. she set two speed carne batk to the United States and again saw records for rnen as well as women.20 General Arnold. Apparently more convincing Cochran played a vital role in World War II than she had been earlier, Cochran was ap- andcontinued tosei records well into the 1960s. pointed Director of the Womens FlyingTrain- In 1953. Presidem Dwight l). Fiscnhoiver, ivith Secretary of ing Deiachmcnt (WFTD)at AAF Headquarters Defense Charles I Wilson and Secretary of the Air Force in 1 louston, Texas. Sometime later, the VVAFS Ilarold !•. Talbott, presented Jacqueline Cochran with one of Iterfourteen "Ainatrix" Harmon International trophies— and WFTI) were merged to become the WASP. this one for breakmg the sound barrier and establishing a headquartered at Avenger Field in Sweetwater, wom en's speed record in an F-S6 Sabre jet. Major Charles Texas. Love remained as executive officer, F. "Chuck" Yeager, anotlier aviation pioneer, received the " 1,’iator" Harmon International Trophy. Cochran con- while Cochran became Director of Women tinued to sei records well into the I960s. Pilots. As the WASP geared up for operations, over 25,000 applications were received. Of these, 1830 women were accepted and 1074 won wings. The primary mission of the WASP was to ferry aircraft from manufacturers or repair depots to operational bases in the CONUS. (It is a common tnisconception that the WASP

12 I QI II ITY IN IIII COCKPIT 43 flew aircraft 10 Europe: they were nevei permit- Betty Gillies were scheduled to ferry a B-17 to led todo this. On 17 June 1941, Cochran did fly Prestwick, Scotland, but when ihey reached a bomber to England. However, when male Goose Bay, the Ílight was caiu eled by direction ferry pilots learned oí this proposed ílight, they of General Arnold. Arnold had ordered lhat no threatened a strike. Thus, Cochran u as permil- vvomen fly iransoceanic planes until he had ted to make the Ílight only alter she agreed to time to study and approve lhe matter; he never relinquish thecomrolsof the aircraft tocopilot approved such flights.) The WASP also towed Captain Grafton Carlisle during takeoíl and targets for Army units training new gunnery landing. In September 1913, Nancy Love and crews, did radio control ílying, tested aircraft after repairs, gave instrument instruction to male pilots, and flew a variety of other mis- In August 1V7T. lhe firsl ciass of femule lu Force officers sions. Thirty-eight (eleven trainingand twenty- graduated from lhe Air Force Vndergraduale Pilol Train- mgcourse. The.se len wornen have been jollowed b\others seven operational) WASP died in serxice dur- eagrr to be a nlal pari of the Air Force leam m the 1‘hSO.s. ing the war.í} 11 AIR l WII ERSITY REVltAV

The WASP lived under miliiary rule and were even more impressive. Over a million So- discipline but were not aecorded miliiary staius viet women served in the Armed Forces, and and benefits until 1977. vvhen Senaior Barry many saw combat, including women pilots. Goldwater’s bill "to provide recognition to lhe The performance of these female pilots was Woinen’s Airforce Service Pilots for the service outstanding. The Soviets had three all-female to their country during World War II” was air regíments, and many other female pilots finally approved. VVith the passage of ihis act. flew in other unils. One female fighter regi- the WASP were assigned veteran status and ment carriedout 4419 combat missions and the issned honorable discharges.24 woinen's 587th night bomber regiment flew l he WASP established an outstanding fly- 25,000 combat sorties. Flight Commander Irina ing record. They flew everything in the Army Soodova flew lOOHoperational sorties. Another Air Corps inventory, and their safety record woman commanded an otherwise all-male air was better than that of inale pilots living sim- regiment that flew bombing missions behind ilar missions. They lost less time for reasons of enemy lines.29 In 1943, the 588th regiment was physical disability than ditl their inale col- awarded elite status which was denoted by a leagues. (Several sources suggest that their new unil designation—I6th Guards Regiment. lower time loss can be attributed to less drink- By the end of the war, every woman in this ing by female pilots and to the propensity of regiment had been decorated, and twenty-three males to travei vvith ”a linle black book.”)26 of them were honored with the coveted title As the war began to wind down, many flighl "Hero of the Soviet Union.”50 instructor programs phased down also.and a Hanna Reitsch and other women served as num ber of male instructor pilots vvho had been test pilots in Germany, and a few other women training cadels in t ivilian schools were looking flew as military pilots in other countries. for new jobs. These male pilots wanted to take Clearly by the time World War II was over, ovei the ferrying missions that WASP had been women had proved that they were first-class performing. Without “required government pilots in both civilian and military roles, capa- job” status, these male pilots becamesubject to ble of flying any aircraft in the world. the draft as well as unemployment. The dis- placecl male pilots were championed by Con- gressman Robert Ramspeck, and a bitter battle ^)e SPITE their experiences dur- ensued. Ramspeck won, and in late 1944 the ing World War II, women were forced into the WASP was disbanded.27 fringes of aviation after the war. not uncom- In acldition to the WASP, other female mili- monly having to move into wholly unrelated tary pilots flew during World War II. They too career fields. Why the giant leap backward? established excellent records. The British ATA For countless generations, society as a whole had more than 100 ‘ata girls,” who accounted has held strong altitudes about what women for about one-quarter of the total ATA pilot can and should be allowed to do—even in the force. These women pilots flew every plane in sometimes flamboyant eras of invention and the British inventory—120 different types of change. Thus, as early as 1795, the Chief of aircraft. Seventeen of them (fourteen pilots, Police of Paris expressed his view that women one flight engineer, one nursing sister, andone could not possibly stand up to the strain of cadet; forfeited their lives while flying vvith the riding in balloons. He felt, for their own sakes, ATA.28 women must be protected from the temptation While theaccomplishmentsof the women of to fly.51 WASP and ATA were significam, the achieve- Sim ilarly, more than acentury later, in 1911, ments of Soviet female pilots in World War II the sheriff of Nassau County, New York, de- EQUALITY IN TIII COCKM 45 cided that he would curtail Mathilde Moisant s considered first and the bearing of children sec- flying activilies by arresting hei for flying on ond, if not third.55 Sunday. She avoided him by flying to another Even female pilot Jackie Cochran expressed airfield. (Laier, a court decided that flying on similar views: Sunday was no more immoral than driving a I've alwavs assumed that we would never put car on that day.)52 women into cornbat. If for no other reason than In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Administra- because women are the bearers of children, they lion (CAA) established experimental fliglu should not be in cornbat . . . A woman can do training programs for men only. Laier, one almost anything if she works hard enough. But female was allowed to participate for every ten there’s something in me that says a battlefield is not the place for women.56 males. But in 19-41, war seemed immineni and women were again eliminated from the train- During lhe four decades since the WASP of ing. These programs were viewed as training World War 11 was disbanded, altitudes have for fighting military pilots and as “no place for changed very little. Asa result. women today are a woman.” A comment by Al Williams, a navy still limited in what they are permitted to do in pilot who set two world speed records, illus- aviation, regardless of their aspirations or their trates well the attitude toward women in avia- talems. There are 185 female Air Force pilots; tion that prevailed in the United States on the and while one or two are test pilots, these eve of World War II: women are restricted, for the most pari, to fly- I admit I may be a bit old fashioned. but I don t ing noncombat aircraft. NASA has admitted a believe we as a nation are ready to send women few females into its astronaut program, yet into cornbat. Woman is entitled to equal rights only one American woman has flown in space. with man—even though she is something apart Furthermore, the female astronauts have all from and finer than man. The moral indices and been designated “mission specialists;” none real worth of any nation lies in the fitness of its women—as women.'5 are mission pilots. Few of todav’s women who would be fliers Other influential persons in aviation who were have the bankroll of a George Putnam or a aware of womens accomplishments and might Floyd Odlum to pay for their flight training have helped to expand the roles of women in and the purchase of high-períormance aircraft. aviation were also surprisingly restrictive in (Even very wealthy individuais could not af- their views. Eddie Rickenbacker took the exec- ford to buy SR-71s, F-15s, and other sophisti- utives of Boeing to task in 1930 for hiring the cated aircraft.) Modem state-of-the-art equip- first airline stewardess. He argued that flying ment is entirely in the hands ol the military, was a man’s occupation and should stay that other government agencies, or large civilian way. Ironically, Ellen Church, the first steward- corporations—structures that still retain male- ess, was a pilot and was seekingemployment as dominated decision-making processes. By law, such when Boeing hired her to serve food and policy, and practice, these agencies have lim- look after passengers.54 ited the utilization of women. In the 1980s and Charles Lindbergh also had ideas about beyond, significam advances in aviation re- “woman s place” in aviation: search will be achieved, new flight records will There is no reason whv women should not fly, be attained, and many missions will be flown but they should not be encouraged in entering to ensure the defense of our nation and the aviation as an occupation. Their greatest contri- freedom of peoples elsewhere. Until they are buiion to life can be made in other and less mate- rial ways. How can a civilization be classified as admitted in more than token numbers to the high when its women are moved from home to circles accomplishing these acts, women who industrv, when the material efficiency of life is fly will continue to he regarded as curiosities, 46 nu i wii EKsrry re. view

and equality in the cockpit will remain liule 14. May. p p . 7 1-77. 15. C la u d ia M. O akcs. I 'nited States Wornen in hiation llirougfã more than an abstraci goal. World H ui / (Washington. D.C.: Siaithsonian lnslitution Press, 1978). pp. 20-23. AFROTC Detaehment //5 lti. May. pp. 80-81 Cniversity of Connecticut, Slorrs 17. Ynn FJodgman and Rudv Djahharoll. Skx Slars |New York: Atheneurn. 19811. pp. 64-07 18. Saundra F.apsley and Gene Nora Jcssen, The Xinety-Xinesí Ini. lOkl.ihoma City l he Ninety-Nines. Iue.. n.d.). Fntire booklel. 19. " l he Society Awatds Hubbard Medal to Anne Morrow Lind- hergh." Xutiunnl Ceographu Magazine, June 1943. pp. 791-94. 20. Moolman. p. 133. Notes 21. Vttli Memorial Heunton II IST (Specíal Booklel) (Fort 1. A m é l i a F a r h a r l . 1'lie Fun o f It (New York: Harcouri Braceand W orth. Fexas: Heritage Publications, 1972). C o m p ain . 1932). p. 95. 22. M oolman, p. 135. 2. Iir Force Tones. 21 March 1977. p. 2. 23. 3títh Memorial licunion WAST. 3. P au la Kane. .SV.v Ohject.s oi lhe Sky (Chicago: Follell Publish- 24. H o d g m an and D jahharoll, p. 148. ing Company, 1974), p. 106. 25. Olivei L.aForge, The F.agle in the Egg (Boston. Massachu- 1 Chailes F Planck. Unmett willi ll /ugv (Neu York: Flarpei setis: Moughton Miftlin Company. 1949). |i. 140. Brothers. 1941), pp. 2-4. 26. Moolman, p. 151. 5. Ibid.. pp. 6-7. 27. Mic hael Beehe, "Years ol No Recognition St111 Prone to hei 6. Valerie Moolman. H ome» lloft i Alexandria. \'irginia: rirne- Sting foi YVASP." Ledger-Star. 9 M arch 1977. p. B-l. Life Books, 1981). pp. 14-17. 28. Moolman. pp. 139-40. 7. Charles Paul May. I tu meu in Aeronauttt •> (New \

Major Mark M. Warner

Since the American wife first began to accept pay for airmen’s wives, supporting Air Force activities, work outside her home, she has been vanously or promoting squadron morale and spirit. The described. She’s been compared with . . . Lizzie idea was that wives had definite responsibilities Borden, Florence Nightmgale and Joan of Are. She’s been dended because she abdicated her traditional in support of their husbands. If they fulfilled place m her home, applauded because she allernately their “duties,” they could claim half of every toils in the halls of commerce and the walls of promotion, every success, and every medal earned domesticity.1 by their husbands.2 In other words, ihe tradi- tional role of Air Force wives was to follow and S THE world moves into the mid-1980s, support their husbands and maintain happy Athe role of women in the family and home homes. is undergoing significam changes. The women's The purpose of this discussion is to examine liberation movement, an inflaiionary economy, the changing role and perspectives of Air Force and changing value Systems are contributing wives in the light of ongoing trends in American factors in these changes. The Air Force com- society. AreAir Force wives still oriented to their munity reflects these societal changes in a traditional roles, or have other pursuits become number of areas. For example, traditionally more important? What do they want? What are closed career fields, such as pilot utilization, are their points of view? Should tney have a role? now open to women. More than twenty-five Should they be required or expected to partici- years ago Nancy Shea, in a book titled The pate in Air Force activities? What do they want Air Force Wife, concluded that military wives from life? Does the Air Force complement or had three basic responsibilities: to create conge- conflict with their personal lives, jobs, families, nial homes, to rear quality families, and to husbands, or sense of selves? A number of stud- strengthen their husbands’ morale. And de- ies reveal that few people have bothered to ask pending on the rank held by their husbands, Air Force wives for their opinions of themselves they assumedadditional responsibilities outside and the Air Force. A survey conducted by the lhe home. such as setting good examples for author asked Air Force wives to describe their

17 18 llli 1 'Ml'F.RSITY REVIEW attitudes regarding social and recreational activ- ticipating in Air Force activities,” two-thirds or ities in the military, roles expected of them, and 66.1 percent of the wives stated that they enjoy the impact of military policies on their personal these events. They qualified this statement with lives. such comments as "I enjoy participating when The survey was conducted among wives of it fits me; only if I am not expected to partici- students and faculty members at the Sênior pate; it depends on the activity and the base; or I Noncommissioned Officer Academy, Squadron only enjoy them sometimes.” When asked about Officer School, Air Command and Staff Col- the worth of Air Force activities, two-thirds or lege, and Air War College, and wives of non- 66.4 percent of the wives again agreed that they commissioned officers serving in the Headquar- are worthwhile (5.1 percent disagreed), and only ters Squadron at Maxwell Air Force Base. Alto- 40 percent agreed that current involvement in gether.242 surveys were returned from a total these activities is reasonable. Approximately 58 sample of 480, a return rate of approximately 50 percent of the total group did not desire any percent. While the sample is fairly representative more activities, and 12.9 percent desired more of theparticipatingorganizations, noattempt was involvement. Approximately one-third or 33.9 made to draw inferences conceming groups of wives percent of the wives felt that Air Force activities representing specific organizations or ranks. should be more meaningful and responsive to The survey asked wives to indicate agreement their needs and desires. They felt that involve- or disagreement with a series of statements and ment in activities should be strictly voluntary gave them the option of including written and that many activities are overly organized, comments. It also required specific responses to “busy work,” expensive, inefficient, time-con- a number of open-ended questions. The results suming, and somewhat purposeless. They stated were broken down into percentages of total further that the Air Force was not responsible for responses for four groups by rank: noncommis- entertaining them. Wives seeking more varied sioned officer, lieutenant/captain, major, and activities suggested increased emphasis on cur- lieutenant colonel/colonel; a combined tabula- rent Air Force issues, personal development, and tion showed average percentages for all groups. informational groups. Percentages discussed here do not include neu- More than 60 percent of the wives agree that tral responses, such as “neither agree nor disagree.” they should not be expected to participate in Air They reflect either positive responses, “strongly Force activities. They felt that participation agree’’ and “ agree,” or negative should be strictly voluntary but that support for responses, "disagree” and strongly disagree.” husbands is also important. Thirty-seven per- Although percentages between ranks varied cent felt pressured to participate, and 47 percent somewhat, this discussion reflects combined felt no pressure. Twenty-seven percent thought total percentages only. Three major divisions of their husbands had been pressured to have them the survey investigated wives’ perceptions of Air participate, and 55 percent had detected no pressure. Force activities, their roles, and their personal Comments in this area centered around the idea needs and desires. that the amount of pressure depended on the personality of the commander and his wife’s attitude, their bases of assignment, and the Air Force Activities nature of particular activities. Increased rank A’r Force activities were defined in the survey brought increased pressure. Some felt more as wives’ clubs, volunteer work, projects, fund pressure 10 years ago than today, and still others raisers, coffees, command performances, or other felt pressured by a sense of duty. In response to activities requiring wives to give freely of their the statement, "I believe it is necessary for me to time. In response to the statement, "I enjoy par- participate in Air Force activities for my hus- / ///• AIR FOliCE Wlhl 49

band 10 be promoted,” 62.9 perceni disagreed, these activities if they are voluntary, not expected, and 26.3 percent agreed. Again. many stated that and freedom of choice is observed. Most wives the necessity to participate in activities to assist feel that their participation in activities does not in promotion of their husbands increased with determine whether their husbands are promoted, rank. Although most wives disagreed with the but participation nray be helpful, especially statement, they commented that participation is with increased rank. They stated that they need neverdetrimental and isgenerally helpful. Many no more activities generated by the Air Force. wives thought that their husbands would be Activities considered more important than Air promoted regardless oí their actions. In reflect- Force activities centered around the family. The ing on the tone of Air Force activities, 35.7 per- most liked activity was volunteer work, and the cent of the wives felt that activities are not least liked was the officers' wives club. Appar- patronizing events, and 31.9 percent perceived ently, some Air Force activities have more mean- that they are patronizing. The word dependent ing and worth than others, and wives will con- was viewed as irritating: many wives are not tinue to select activities that appeal to them as dependent, and some make more money than individuais. their husbands. More than two-thirds or 69.1 percent agreed that participation in other activi- Role of Air Force Wives ties is more important to them than Air Force activities, and only 8.7 percent disagreed with The next major area of the survey dealt with the statement. The leading outside activity more the role of Air Force wives. The survey revealed important than all others is any event involving strong negative reaction to the statement, “I the family. Other more important activities are think the ‘traditional role’ (wife is expected to church, jobs, and school functions. follow and support the husband in his profes- Wives were divided on two open-ended ques- sion and not work outside the home) of the tions concerning Air Force activities. For exam- military wife is important and should be the ple, the question, "Which Air Force activity do model for the future" (75.7 percent disagreement you like the most?” brought a variety of responses and 12.4 percent agreement). Most wives felt that indicating the most significam preferences for they could follow and support their husbands volunteer work, ranging from Red Cross to thrift and still work outside the home, but others also shop, and for activities involving the husband’s agreed that the economy has forced many women squadron or immediate work area. Officers’ to work outside the home to finance family wives club and small group get-togethers were needs and desires. Some felt that traditional also high on the list. Opportunities to meet new roles in this respect would become more impor- people, joint husband/wdfe functions, travei, tant with increased rank or that the pressure diningouts, baseopen houses, youth programs, would at least increase. Still others mentioned general socializing, and family activities were that either the individual or the couple should often mentioned. Interestingly, a similar number establish its own guidelines but that mutual of wives reported that officers’ wives clubs are support was important in any event. Finally, the high on their list of least liked activities. Other matter of individual identity and total accep- less desirable activities are cocktail parties, tance of working wives has become an Air Force command performances, fund raisers, formal issue. receptions, large gatherings, dining outs, and More than 87 percent of the women surveyed nonjoint husband/wife events. felt that roles of Air Force wives are changing. The responses to questions and statements The main idea was that many women are about Air Force activities seem to indicate that returning to work in search of additional money wives generally do not object to participating in and personal fulfillment. Further, most of the 50 AIR i ’NH ERS1TY Rl-A ll W

sample felt that their roles are changing too only in relation to the Air Force but also within slowly. When asked whether wives should have the framework of a good marriage. Many wives roles in the Air Force, 54.0 percent agreed and stated that they understood their roles in sup- 23.4 percent disagreed. Wives who agreed felt port of their husbands but that they should also that their roles should be self-defined but sup- be able to pursue their own goals at the same portive of their husbands. Those who disagreed time. Some felt that their roles should be a mat- stated that their husbands, not they, were paid ter of individual choice—friend, lover, help- for working and that the Air Force should no mate, mother, homemaker, or careerist apart longer expect toget “two forone.” Others stated from the husband. Still others felt that they are that they were equal partners with their hus- part of a joint support System; that is, husbands bands and that mutual support centered on the should support their wives just as wives support family. More than 53 percent agreed and 22.9 them. And some stated that they should have no percent disagreed when asked whether Air Force role in Air Force affairs. leaders expect wives to act in traditional roles. Regarding roles, the respondents felt that the Generally, most wives felt that although some traditional role of the Air Force wife is changing leaders favor traditional roles, wives' roles will to the extent that today wives are more responsive change during the next 10 years to the point that to societal demands and the State of the economy work outside the home will be totally acceptable. than ever before. They believe that they should The survey showed mixed responses to the have a role, but that it should be self-defined, statement, “When my husband comes home and support-oriented, and compatible with individual says that I am expected to attend an Air Force- desires. related event, I am happy to participate regard- less of my interest in the function or my other Personal Needs and Desires personal commitments” (53.3 percent disagreed and 28.7 percent agreed). Many wives explained The last major area of the survey dealt with a that willingness to participate depends on the variety of issues concerning the effects of official event. Others stated that their husbands would policies and programs on the personal needs never expect such behavior and that they make and desires of Air Force wives. When asked to joint decisions on such matters. Still others compare their needs and desires with those of stated that they would attend events in support their husbands, 93.7 percent of the wives felt of their husbands. In responding to the state- strongly that their values are just as important as ment, “The Air Force is a specialized profession; those of their husbands. Most wives felt that they therefore, it requires more from me than might live in partnership with their husbands and that be expected in the civilian world,” 53.3 percent together they function as family units. They of the sample agreed and 36.4 percent disagreed. expressed a somewhat different reaction to the For example, alerts required by the Strategic Air statement, “Air Force leaders are sensitive to my Command and periods of war definitely make needs and desires.” In this instance, 38.1 percent the Air Force more specialized and require more disagreed and 31.6 percent agreed. Many wives of wives. But most comments indicated that cer- stated that while some leaders are sensitive to their tain types of civilian jobs are just as specialized needs, others are insensitive; others felt that as jobs in the Air Force. leaders need not be sensitive to their needs, since One survey question concerning the roles of the Air Force mission comes first; and still others Air Force wives was open-ended: “I think the suggested that many leaders pay lip Service to role(s) of the Air Force wife should be. . . By their needs and desires. Some of the wives stated far the most frequent response was that Air that leaders are slowly becoming more sensitive Force wives should support their husbands not in this area. Fifty-six percent of the sample THE AIK l-ORCE W'1/ E fj|

agreed and 17.5 percent disagreed that the Air ily life and only 18.5 percent felt that it conflicts Force shouldexert moreeffort in requestingand with the family. The wives ciied traveling, meet- encouraging wives to assume supporting respon- ing new people, broadening experiences, and sibilities rather than expectmg them to play speci- proinoting family closeness as the greatest en- fied roles. Such comments as "You get more hancements, and long working hours and TDYs done if you ask,” “no one likes to be told,” and as major sources of disenchantment. The state- “please is a nice word” reflect attitudes in this ment, “The Air Force conflicts with my per- area. Most wives felt that, after making requests sonal life," brought 57.4 percent disagreement of them. the Air Force should “graciously accept and 23.5 percent agreement. Some wives stated whatever answers they give" and thank them for that the Air Force is “part of my personal life" their efforts. and that it provides a wealth of valuable expe- The survey results were interesting in the rience. Forty-nine percent of the wives disagreed importam area of jobs. In describing their hus- and 42.4 percent agreed that the Air Force bands’ careers, 69.9 percent of the wives agreed provides adequate compensation (money and that their husbands are solely responsible for benefits) for the quality of life desired for their their own progression. They qualified their families. Most women felt that the income was agreement by stating that support and help adequate but that Air Force jobs should be more from the family are beneficiai, but at the other closely aligned with their civilian counterparts. end of the spectrum, 55.1 percent agreed and A major complaint focused on the lack of bene- 37.0 percent disagreed with the statement that fits for family dental care, routine moving ex- wives should be free to “do their own thing” in penses, and compensation for losses from the life without any adverse effect on their hus- sale of homes required by PCS moves. Many bands' careers. However, they also felt that wives wives perceive an erosion of benefits in the face should exercise this freedom "within moral lim- of concurrent demands from the Air Force for its” and never in conflict with husbands. The more effort. The statement, “I enjoy the new idea of mutual support and teamwork in the opportunities, new friends, and changes in my marriage is important. They indicated that environment (home, job, etc.) associated with wives should not bring embarrassment to their Air Force PCS moves," brought 77.8 percent husbands and that they should keep their behav- agreement and only 11 percent disagreement. ior “within the limits of good taste.” More than Most wives felt that living in different areas of 85 percent stated that their jobs are just as the country and the world is one of the most important as their husbands’ jobs. The survey positive benefits offered by the Air Force. The defined jobs as whatever the wives believed them only major concerns centered on the difficulties to be: jobs as housewives or jobs outside the of leaving and finding jobs and the emotional home. Again, the concept of mutual support shock for high school children forced to leave and team effort was deemed the important issue their friends at the peak of their teenage years. in perceptions of jobs in either category. More One can draw a number of conclusions from than 55 percent of the wives disagreed with the this part of the survey. statement that the Air Force “conflicts with my • Air Force wives view their needs and desires as job." Most comments suggested that PCS moves important as those of their husbands, and they handicap them in getting promoted or holding jobs. perceive that Air Force leaders are sometimes insensitive to these concerns. The final area concerning the needs and desires of wives centered in the family. As to • Husbands are solely responsible for their whether the Air Force conflicts with or enhances careers, but some help from the family is family life, 55 percent felt that it enhances fam- beneficiai. 52 AIR UNII RRSITY REVIEW

• Wives should be free to "do their own thing,” mission and the military family now compete and the Air Force does not significantly conflict for the same resource, the Service member’s time with their jobs, families, or personal lives. and commitment. Mission requirements have traditionally demanded priority over the family, Finally, when asked whether or not they were but many modem military families place their happy with Air Force life, 83.7 percent of the own needs above the mission.4 With changes in wives felt happiness, and only 6.3 percent felt the traditional roles of Air Force wives have come unhappiness. This is a good testimony for the similar changes in the social activities that Air Force lifestyle. commit them as hostesses and participants. The Air Force must accept situations that do not The Air Force Wife in Perspective require active participation of wives; command- ers must fill gaps when wives are unable or What are the causes of these changing atti- unwilling to participate; and many activities tudes among Air Force wives? For one thing, involving wives must be reorganized, elimi- American society as a whole is changing because nated, or appropriated. The Office of Air Force people are demanding greater freedom in select- Family Matters conducts continuing studies ing their personal and family lifestyles. Cer- reflecting interest in these and other issues, such tainly, the women’s liberation movement has as dual-career families, spouse employment, opened many doors formerly closed to women. retirement, retention, parenting, midlife crisis, Continuing problems with the national econ- and reluctance to move. And as American omy have forced many women into the job society continues to change, these and other market and out of their traditional roles to pro- issues will continue to receive emphasis. vide funds for children of college age and to Finally, the last portion of the survey asked support a desired quality of life. In recent for resDonses to the statement, "If I could change decades, the accelerated rate of change in tech- one thing in the Air Force, Iwould change. . . nology, legal relationships, social behavior, Here the wives offered some significam recom- education, and economic systems has created mendations. They admit a sense of excitement vastly diverse experiences in value program- in moving, but many felt that they move too ming between generations, and these shifts are often. They frequently asked “What is wrong reflected in the attitudes and lifestyles of today's with staying at the same job more than three to Air Force families. Many men and women are five years as long as their husbands are happy seeking new balances between work and family and productive?” They suggested that the Air responsibilities, and they are searching for Force could save millions of dollars by reducing greater meaning in leisure activities and family the number and frequency of moves. But when it companionship. Work has declined as a central becomes necessary to move, they felt that mili- interest in life and as a primary determinam of tary families should receive morecompensation self-images. Traditional family patterns have to offset major costs not reflected in current shifted to nontraditional patterns that sanction benefits. Many wives perceived a lack of quality the employment of wives outside the home and in medicai facilities, particularly mentioning give priority to the family over the husbands’ irritating appointment systems, their sense of careers.* being treated like second-class citizens, and The impact of these changes on Air Force inadequate dental care. Others suggested improve- policies is significam. Since Air Force wives ments in base housing facilities and preference play central roles in the lives of military members for lower-ranking families whocannot afford to and their families, they exercise a direct influ- live off-base. As a group, the wives desire fewer ence on the Air Force mission. The military remote tours and TDYs for their husbands and THE AM FORCE IVIFE 53

more emphasis on family needs and desires, voluntary and if wives are free to choose pre- with less pressure to join traditional organ- ferred activities. iza tions. • Traditional roles of Air Force wives have The wives indicated that they would raise changed allowing them more freedom to pursue many of these same issues if they “could tell the individual interests and maintain support for Chief of Staff of the Air Force one thing about husbands ai the same time. Air Force life.” Emphasis on the family, fewer • Most wives are happy with Air Force life PCS moves, more money when moves are neces- insofar as the military does not significantly sary. and better medicai and dental programs are conflict with their jobs, their families, or their recommendations that stand out. Some wives personal lives. suggested that the Chief should explain to the civilian world the hardships of militarv life and As participants in Air Force life, we must all the lack of comparable pay and benefits. Others consider the implications of these views and, desire more significam roles in selecting assign- wrhen appropriate, accept constructive changes ments, and many w-ould tell the Chief that the consistem with the Air Force mission. Perhaps Air Force is indeed “a great way of life.” the following comment by one Air Force wife Responses included such typical comments as captures the essence of attitudes held by other these: “It is a good life”; “I love it"; “Thank wdves toward military life: “Aside from being you . . . Sir”; “Godspeed.” left alone to contend with broken cars, sick kids, blizzards, and heatwaves, it’s a hell of a way of life.” T he RESPONSES to the survey apparently reflect Air Command and Staff College three basic conclusions: • • Air Force wives do not object to participat- Complete tabular data in rank percentagesareavailable through the ing in Air Force activities if they are strictly Air University Review office.

Notes (Reston. Virgínia, 1979). p. 21; Dennis K. Orthner, Families in Blue, 1. Marv Kay Murphy and Carol Bowles Parker. Fittmg mas a New Office of the Chief of Chaplains. USAF, 1980. p. 9; Larry W. Black. Service Wife IHarTÍsburg. Pennsylvania, 1966), p. 135. "Changíng Pattems of Air Force Families," student paper, Air 2. Nancy Shea. The Air Force Wife (New York. 1966). pp. 9-12. C om m and and Staff College, 1982, p. iii. 3. Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Richard Carr. USAF, Dr. Dennis K. 4. Cecile S. Landrum, "The Conflicis Surrounding Family and Orthner. and Chaplain (Maj.) Richard J Brown 111. USAFR, "Liv- Children versus Mission Responsibilities," Office of Externai Affairs, ing and Familv Pauems in the Air Force," Air Vntversity Review, ACS/Studies and Analysis, Headquariers. United States Air Force, January-February 1980. p. 76; Morris Massey, The People Puzzle 1979, p. 3. CLASSICAL MIUTARY STRATEGY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Major Owen El. J ensen

The application of lessons of the past to current and predicted military issues always required a proper appreciation of changed technological conditions, but not until the latter half of the nineteenth centuvy did the probleni of adjustment offer any difficulties. In the twentieth century it becarne increasingly criticai, and with the advent of nuclear weapons the entire value of past military experience as a guide to the future was called basically into question. Bernard Brodie1

HIS seems to be conventional wisdom: nuclear weapons have changed every- tliing. Yet in many respects the nuclear Tage can be seen not as a break with past stra- tegic theory but as the culm ination of the evo- lution of strategy—the latest (and perhaps fi- nal) stage of military thought. VVhile many tactical principies—whether of a general na- ture, suc h as the benefits offered by holding “interior lines,” or of a specific nature, such as Frederick the Great's “obliqueorder of march”— may indeed by outdated, principies of grand CLASSICAI. MIUTAHY STRATEGY 55 straiegy have continued to evolve. Today ... with uuly cosmic forces hai nessed to Military thinkers of the pasi were not neces- ihc machines of war, we have a sítuatioii foi the first time in history where the opening event by sarilv wrong in iheir identification of underly- which a great nation enters a war—an evem ing elements of grand straiegy. but tfiey may which must reflect die prepaiations it lias made have been wrong in seeing those elements as or íailed to make beforehand—can decide irre- constam and unchanging. Similar themes, trievably whether or not it will continue to exist. ideas, and principies have seemed to recur in Obviously, therefore, we cannot go on blithely letting one group of specialists decide how to every conflict, but their recurrence ovei lime wage war and another decide when and to what was on a constantly ascending scale. In this purpose, with only lhe most casual and spas- article, I shall discuss specific instances to sup- tnodic communication between them.2 port this thesis, but ai this point one other War ... is an act of policy. Were it a complete, general thought needs to be considered. That is umrammeled, absolute manifestation of violence the idea that grand straiegv developed differ- (as tlie pure concept would require), war would of its own independem will usurp the place of ently in what we now call the Western nations policy the moinem policy had brought it into (particularly in the United States) than it did in being; it would then drive policy out of office and the Soviet L nion. Although both are equally rule by the laws ol its own nature. . . . It is cleai, rooted in classical strategic theory and both are conséquemly, that war is not a mere act of policy valid expressions of grand straiegy. the strate- but a true political instrumem, a continuation ol political activity by othei means.5 gies of today’s East-West rivais, like races of men evolved from a single ancestor, gradually Clausewitz began his treatise On War with acquireddistinctive features. With thisinmind. an exploration into the nature of war and ex- let us examine theoriginsof U.S. nuc lear strai- amined it as a totally violent experiente. To egy. then consider options to that straiegy, him, that was an abstrati concept. With the and, finally, assess the impact of opposing present State of weapons evolution, it has be- choices on dedsions for or against ballistic co me reality. missile defense. He then qualified his concept, however, and allowed that wars were not theory but reality, Nuclear Strategy: and in reality they are not fought merely for the sake of violence but to achieve political goals. Links with the Past Clausewitz also stressed that military aims had As the magnitude of war increased, the need to be subjugated to political goals and that for political control over the initiation, the ex- "this conception would be ineluctable even ií tent, and the cessation of hostilities also in- war were total w ar."1 Today, in an era in which creased. a first sirike may be theentire war, domination 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVltAV oi iniliiary aims by political goals is para- ing to the bitter end—aeçepting total war as mount not only in theory bul in reality as well. having no worse consequences than surrender. In no nation today is the military given ad- History is replete with examples. Athens had vance approval for firsi use of nuclear weap- every prospect of maintaining its empire ad ons. Historically (and even today regarding infinitum until it decided to attempt complete conventional weapons), military commanders hegemony in the middleof the Peloponnesian have been authorized to tire bat k if fired upon. War by invading Sicily. By thus overreaching However, this authorization does not apply to its military capability, the empire was lost.6 nuclear weapons. For almost every contin- Likewise, Carthage had the strength to main- gency, advance approval for even second (or tain its territory versus Rome, but by resorting responsive) use of nuclear devices has been to total war, it lost totally. When the third vvithheld. Because the destructive capacity of Punic War was over, “nine-tenths of the [Car- weaponry has increased to the point vvhere pol- thaginian] population had perished. . . . By icy Controls military imperatives, Clausewitz’s order of the Roman Senate . . . [Carthage] was dictum has reached its purest form. completely destroyed, and the survivors sold as The main queslion, however, is whether slaves."7 The reason why no decisive “Napo- there are any political goals that may be leonic" victories were achieved in the Ameri- achieved by nuclear weapons. Hasn’t the awe- can Civil War while they were won in the some powei of such weapons canceled out any Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian warswas possibility that war can even be considered as a not that weapons technology had given a deci- political instrument? That answer may also be sive advantage to the defense (for the defending found in Clausewitz and an examination of the Furopeans had weapons of equal destructive evolution of military history, expressed as: power), but that the North was attempting to Political goals themselves must be realistic impose a totally new order on the South, which and not overreach military capabilities. caused an escalation to total war. In Europe, on Clausewitz defined war as an “act of force to the other hand, Bismarck and Moltke made it compel our enemy to doour will”5 and pointed plain that their objectives were much more lim- out that mere destruction of forces or occupa- ited and not worth complete mutual destruc- tion of territory was sometimes insufficiem to tion. In contrast, Napoleon and Hitler risked accomplish that goal. He noted his own native all and lost all by allowing political goals to Prússia as an example where complete defeat exceed military capability in the face of adver- and occupation (by Napoleon) nevertheless saries who were fighting for the preservation of failed to effect a lasting change of will. To the their very societies. contrary, \apoleon’s overambitious political My point here is to suggest that because nu- goals eventually led to significam, permanent clear war today has evolved ir.to what would be changes mostly for his own coumry, France. an act of total violence (a concept that for The Iessons of this are twofold: If an attacker Clausewitz was merely abstract), it has crystal- realizes that by prosecutinga total war (versus a lized the ultimate consequences, and therefore limited war) it may be in danger of allowing thechoices, involved in total war. Where it was political goals to exceed military capability possible for Athens, Carthage, Napoíeonic and thereby risking the destruction of itself, the France, or Nazi Germany to mistakenly con- very society it is attempting to impose or pro- template victory or at the worst (if defeated) a tect, then the attacker would be foolish to ini- maintenance of the prewar status quo, such tiate the war at a 11; and if a defender is faced error in thought is no longer possible. By with the complete uprooting of the essence of evolving to its pure form, war has identified its its society, then it has nothing to fear by fight- own consequences with absolute clarity. An CLASSICAL MH.ITAHY STHATIM.Y 57

attackei today does risk total destruction ií it tion. Jomini made no secret of his preference attacks a defendei that can retaliate massively. for the olfensive over the defensive and stressed Recall that Clausewitz held that il war were a that the whole purpose of strategy was to bring "complete, unirammeled, absolute manilesia- forces into battle with the object of destroying tion of violente (as the pure concept would an enemy’s army. Jomini called for boldness in require). vvar would of its own independem warfare: "I would make [war] brisk, bold, im- will usurp the place of policy the momeni pol- pet uous, perhaps somei i mes even audacious."11 icv had brought it into being.”8 That is ob- As U.S. military strategy began to be em- viously true today and was equally true in the ployed beyond its own bordeis, it was embod- past. Certainiy for Carthage and to a lesser ied in the iNavy; and naval thought at the time extern for both Germany and Rússia in World for all of thegreat naval powers focused almost War II. the consequences of war rivaled the exclusively on the ideas ol Alfred Thayer possible results of nuclear holocaust. The les- Mahan. son is that war has not changed from being a Mahan pored through the pages of Jomini in practical political instrument into an imprac- his effort to formulate a new Science of naval tical political instrument in the nuclear era, strategy, and many of the principies of naval war vvhich he suggested are naval applications of Jo- but thaL at its extreme it was always impracti- mini's precepts.12 cal. The difference is that as war's destructive- Jomini’s dictum that the organized forces of ness has evolved in magnitude, this lesson has lhe enemy are the chief objective pierces like a been made obvious where before it was ob- two-edged sword to the joints and marrow of scured. The only way to use war as a policy many specious propositions. . . . the enemy’s instrument now (as before) is by lim iting its ships and fleets are the true objects to be assailed application—either by restraining political ob- on all occasions.15 jectives or by increasing the effectiveness of As air power entered into U.S. strategic defense. thought it was borne in the writings of Italian Brigadier General Giulio Douhet, a total pro- U.S. Strategy: A Preference ponentof theoffensive. “Hisbasic argument is two-fold: first, the nature of airpower requires for the Offensive that ‘command of the air’ be won by aggressive Bernard Brodie instructs that "military doc- bombing rather than by aerial fighting, and trine is universallv, and has been since the time second, an air force which achieves command of Napoleon, imbued with the ‘spirit of the thereby ensures victory all down the line."11 He offensive.' ”9 While the universality of his saw no hope for air defenses and every likeli- statement may be criticized, it has certainiy hood of rapid, total victory through bombard- held true with regard to U.S. strategic thought. ment of an enemy’s cities and resources. It may At the beginningof the Civil War, "the image be safely stated that there was not an atom of of Napoleonic war with its brief, climactic bat- support for defenses in all his work. tles had impressed ttself upon the popular The connection of Douhet to U.S. strategy mind as well as upon soldiers . .. and it stimu- was direct, via members of the Bolling Com- lated the usual popular impatience [especially mission, who were considerably influenced by in America] to have warsover with promptly.”10 his concepts on a fact-finding tour examining Nearly every one of the leading generais on military aviation during 1917;11 and indirect, both sides in the Civil War had been educated in that Douhet merely expressed what was gen- at West Point during an era when the strategic: erally a consensus of knowledgeable Western, thought of Jomini, Napoleon's Swiss exposi- opinion of that time. Subsequently, U.S. air tor, provided the bedrock of military instruc- doctrine "adopted Douhet’s de-emphasis of 58 AIR VNIVERSITY REVIEW

fighters, whether for defense or for escort of tributed . . . which considered that strategic sta- bombers, and a corresponding emphasis on bility vvas a military assei, and in which the his- destroying the enemy’s air force ai its bases.”16 torically amuzing theory developed that vulnera- bility contributed to peace and invulnerability Even General William "Billy” MitchelFs writ- contributed to risks of war. Such a theory could ing(although ii is largely tactical and probably developand be widely acceptedonly in a country not derived from the Italian) is ‘‘pure Douhet”17 that had nevei addressed the problem of the bal- where it discusses thestrategic use of air power. ance of power as a historiçal phenomenon. And As the United States entered the nuclear era, . . . only also on a eoniinent which was looking for any exc use toavoid analysisof lhe perils it was its choices seemed almost preordained. Al- facing and that vvas looking for an easy way out.19 though at lirst, both air defense and strategit Adopting the MAD stralegy, the United bombing progressed together under Eisen- States consciously and willingly entrusted the hower’s New Look stralegy, clearly it vvas the fateof the nation to the Kremlin’sself-restraint. offensive side that received the primary empha- For other nations such a policy would truly be sis; and vvhatever balance existed did not sur- considered “mad.” ‘‘Since emphasis on active vive the transition to the missileage. It was not defense was nearly nonexistent, official policy the balanced offensive and defensive force struc- [also] considered civil defense almost point- ture advocated by Bernard Brodie in his 1959 less. In short, U.S. nuclear decision-makers book. Stralegy in the Missile Age, that was strove to retain sharp swords, but defensive chosen, but rather thecourse advocated by Os- shields were foregone.”20 kar Morgenstern in The Question of National Defense (also 1959), which advocated reliance on the creation of powerful strategic offensive Alternative Evolutionary Patterns forces.18 During the Kennedy-Johnson- While U.S, strategic thought has focused McNamara years, defenses against bombers almost entirely on the offensive over the past vverealmost totally scrapped; and in the Nixon- century, options recognizing the benefits of Eord-Schlesinger years, antiballistic missile Sys- defensive strategy have evolved in other socie- tems were given up as well. ties, most notably in the Soviet Union. These As a result, the United States was left with an options were also rooted in past strategic the- unnerving and rather absurd reliance on a ory and practice. strategy of mutual assured destruc tion (MAD), In the middle of the fourteenth century, the trusting the fate of American society to the Battle of Crécy between forces under Edward rationality of nuclear adversaries. It wassaidto III of Englandand Philip VI of Francedemon- be in our U.S. interest to forgo defenses totally strated the ability of the English longbow to in favor of the oífense, making the nation penetrate armor and overcome the theretofore vulnerable so that the other side would not unassailable dominance of mounted knights. suspect it of planning a first strike. To many For the first time in nearly a thousand years, observers, however, the MAD strategy was defensive infantry gained the upper hand shortsighted. It ignored the possibility of tech- against mounted troops.21 Previously heavy nological breakthroughs that could render of- cavalry, employed exclusively on the attack. fensive forces themselves vulnerable and lead to had dominated warfare; and armies unfortu- dangerousconsequences. Only in North Amer- nate enough to find themselves on the defen- ica, vhere the ravages of war were largely un- sive had been forced to retreat inside fortresses known. could vulnerability have been con- andsuffer the starvation and privation of siege. tei ved as an asset. As Henry Kissinger observed: Thus, technological change opened a new era One reason [ behind this strategy | vvas the growth of military history; and since Crécy (with its of the school ol thought to whic h I. myself, con- verdict solidly reaffirmed 70 years later at Agin- Cl.ASSIC. U. Mll.l TA li V S TH A T H Y 59

court), "infaniry has remained lhe priinary that weapons for strategic defense are consid- elemem of ground combai torces. ered separately from those of strategic o lie n se Change indicated ai Crécy, however, spread and conscious choices must be made regarding slowly toihearmiesof Europe. Decades passed which type of System will receive budgetary beforeii began toimpaci military development allocations. in ihe Russian Empire, vvhich at lhe lime of Defeai for Rússia in World War I was inex- Crécy was siill being ravaged by mounted tricably intertwined with internai political col- Mongolian ai mies. Neverlheless, lhe ascendancy lapse and revolution, but the civil war that ofcommon infamry, emphasizing lhestrengih followed found foreign expedilionary forces of Russian numbers, along with defensive ad- once more swallowed up by the vastness of the vantage offered by possession of vasl lerriiory territory and the numerical superiority of a for reireai and maneuver. was lo have profound peasant army. In the Second World War, tradi- influence on lhe development of strategy in tional Russian strategy was classically em- Rússia. ployed yet again as Hitlei met a fate nearly In 1708-09. the tactical geniusof Charles XII identical to that of Charles XII and Napoleon. oí Sweden took him into combai deep in lhe By accepling losses in both land and man- rkraine. where Russian retreat, maneuver. and power that would have been disastrous for scorched-earth strategies brought the Swedish smaller nations, the Soviets absorbed the Nazi army to exhaustion and total defeai by a huge offensive thrust andhusbanded its strength un- army under Peter the Great.A pattern ol Rus- til a killing counterblow could be delivered. sian sirategy was thereby established. Ii ac- Clausewitz may not have approved of the cru- cepted severe sacrilices in territory and lives dity and inefficiency of the campaign, but he while maintaining a strategic defensive to ex- would have accepted the conclusion as inevi- haust an adversary until he could be over- table. whelmed. That strategy continues to this day. In the nuclear age, the only change in fun- Even the great Napoleon, on whose cam- damental Soviet strategy is that the counter- paigns offensive doctrine rests, experienced de- blow will not bedelayed. While great sacrilices feat from this simple bui effective Russian undoubtedly will have to be made, this pros- strategy when he marched to Moscow in 1812. pect is not a new idea. And at thesame time that Although his final defeat was averted for some punishment is being accepted, it will be re- time, the final demise of his empire began turned with overpowering force. However, when he crossed the Russian frontier and be- aware that their nation has experienced the gan pouring the resources of France upon ravages of invasion many times in its history, empty steppes. The implications of this lesson the Soviets are not contem to entrust their fate were largely ignored by one great Napoleonic merely to the rationality of their adversary and interpreter, Jomini, who chose instead to em- theability of their empire toaccept and survive phasize the magnificence of Napoleon’s con- an onslaught. They intend to mount an active quests. However, another interpreter, Clause- defense-in-depth and think it insane to do witz, understood the inherent strength of de- otherwise. fensive strategy and chose to stress heavily that In lhe mid- to late-1950s, when lhe Soviets were "defense is a stronger form of fighting than assessing what kind of strategy and matching aitack.”*’1 rhus a divergente in strategic theory capabilities were required for war in the nuclear began that emphasized the differing geopoliti- age, an interlocking defense network composed cal realities in East and West and evolved to the of antiaircraft antiballistk missile systems and adequate protection for the civilian population distinctly different military postures of today. and industry was high on tfie list of priorities.... These differences are particularly clear now [A decade later, as Kosygin confessed to Lyndon (>0 AIR r X l\ ERSlTY Rt.VIEW

Johnson, the Soviets were | palpably myslified by effect of defense along with the effects from lhe lack, afier more than iwo decades of stralegic offensive action that stralegic possibilities can competilion, of a coherent American domine be examined realistically. and strategy for allaining a meaningful v ictory out of nuclear war.” A second historical lesson applicable to to- . . . the l'.S. must look at Spviet defensive day’s choices between strategies and their asso- < apability in terms of ballistic missiledefense, air ciated specialized weapons Systems is the reali- deíense. and civil defense. A recem Central Intel- zation that military means must be related to ligence Agency Study determined that Soviet civil political ends. I his fundamental Clausewitz- defense efforts cannot neutralize the U.S. re- sponse with nuclear weapons to a Soviet firsl ian precept has often been forgotten at great stiike. That study is absolutely correctas far as it cost in the past. In World War I, for example, goes . . . but it misses the vvhole point. fl the “Foch gives little indications in his writings of Russians can achieve an antiballistic missile having thoughl about the matter at a 11. . . . Yet technology breakthrough and add that to their if the total war of the future is fated to be one active air defense capability, then civil defense where \ ictory is pursuedblindly, and therefore takes on an entirely different role. This is one reason whv development of high-energy-laser at wholly incommensurate costs which destroy and c harged-particle-beam weapons has become its meaning, it will be more akin to the first so importam.... The USSR does not have to have than the second of the two world wars.”28Once an air-tight defense but only the capability to a nation is equipped with sufficient offensive li mil damage toan acceptable levei as it perceives arms to obliterate its potemial adversaries. it.2* further increases in offensive weaponry add lit- l luis Soviet strategy has developed on his- tle to security or the advancement of political torically sound experience, yet in a way differ- goals. The cosí of multiplying this offensive em Irorn U.S. strategy. l he Soviets do not dis- firepower is simply disproportionately high to miss vvar and the huge loss it will bring as the benefits derived. "unthinkable." They accept that it might oc- But that is not trueof defensive investment— cur, tnake plans to keep the damage to accept- partic ularly in the United States where so little able leveis (by their standards), and build defense exists. In fact, initial expenditures on weaponry capable of delivering a killing blow defensive measures would probably bring the to their opponent. highest return for U.S. military dollars because there is so much room for investment before the Prescriptions for Change onset of diminishing returns. In the first place, active defenses could help History seems to show that a balance be- protect U.S. stralegic offensive weapons, hope- tween offensive and defensive capability is fully destroying a portion of any Soviet attack needed. Asa Royal Air Forceofficer, reflecting capability launchecf against counterforce targets on Douhet’s theoriesafter the Battleoí Britain. and preserving U.S. retaliatory might. Results commented: “If it is true that ‘the bomber will following a Soviet first strike might therefore always get throngh,' as it is popularly stated, it not reflect such a gross asymmetry in favor of isequally true that notall the bombers will get the U.S.S.R. as is currently contemplated. To through' against adequate defenses.”27 With Bernard Brodie, this point constitutes a basic proper emphasis and investment in research, principie about defense in general: the same observation could be made regarding stralegic missiles. And as the various elements Known ability to defend our retaliatory force constitutes the only unilaterally attainable situa- of both active and passive defense are brought tion that provides potentially a perfect defense of together, the contribution of each will be mul- our homeland. Conversely, a conspicuous inabil- tiplied. It is only by looking at the “whole" ite or unreadiness to defend our retaliatory lorce CL.ISSIC.IL MH.ÍTAHY STRATIA.V 61

must cend to provoke the opponent to destroy ít; louted as possessing good capability against in other words, it trmpts him to an aggression he limited or Nth-country (China) atlacks.'0 Even- might not otherwise contemplate.21' tually, il both sides drew down to, say, 200 Second, active defenseoffersa tealistic possi- launchers, defensive weapons might begin to bilit\—perhaps iheonly tealistic possibility— achieve virtually certain protection. Further- of reducing or eliminating the frightening more, any reluctance to take the final step specter of nuclear holocaust that has haunted beyond reductions to total nuclear disarma- most of the world for over three decades. One ment, steinming from a desit e to retain at least approach might be for both sides to develop limited options to employ weapons of mass massive and highly effective defenses on a scale destruction in times of crisis, might be over- of both quantity and quality that could meet come. Where withoul defenses there could be and destroy any combination of nuclear attack great misgivings about total nuclear disarma- launchedagainst them. Bv usingvarious weap- ment, it it could be shown that small offensive ons and tactics, such defenses would reduce the weapons reserves were useless in the face of effectiveness of offensive systems so drastically effective defenses, incentives would exist to that a climate and a motive conducive to dis- continue the arms reduction process. In other armament could result. Such a development, words, defensive weapons would promote both however, envisions a highly optimistic evolit- a climate and a motive for disarmament by tion of defensive versus offensive weaponry, eliminating any threat of surprise. Such pros- which is historically and logicalh questiona- pects however, depend on the development of ble. It would be better to assume that if both defensive systems on both sides before they are offensive and defensive weaponry continue to needed. Obviously, the sooner development be developed, each will contain elements of can begin, the better. strength and weakness with neither achieving total dominance. In such an event. defenses would comribute to deterrence only to the ex- I n summary, then, one can see tern that greater uncertainty was introduced to that the fundamentais of current grand strate- offensive planning. Nuclear attack would be gies are deeply rooted in past strategic theory forestalled by eliminating certainty of destruc- and, in fact, represem the culmination ol tlas- tion and replacing it with less quantifiable sical theory in its purest form. A distinct differ- probabilities. ence between l T.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine Another (more realistic) way of eliminating exists, with the United States preferring to the specter of nuclear war would be foi defen- stress the offensive while the Soviets pursue a sive strategies to beemployedalong with nego- more balanceei approach. Io remove Soviet tiated arms reductions. Assuming that reduc- temptation to strike ai vulnerable U.S. weap- tions in strategic nuclear weapons will be ap- ons and to serve as a “m ultiplier" to any arms proved eventually by both the United States reductions, U.S. adoption of some elements of and the Soviet Union, it is obvious that ballis- defensive strategy and development of asso- lic missile defense (BMD) systems would mul- ciated weaponry seem reasonable and worth- tiply the effect of such reductions. It is gener- while. ally held that the primary problem with BMD Admittedly, there are those who claim that is the sheer mass of incoming missiles that BMD is destabilizing. They point out that if would have to be faced in a short time. If the either nation perceives the other to begaininga numbers were reduced, associated defensive So- technological breakthrough—deployingdefen- lutions would be more viable. Even first- sive systems unilaterally and gaining protec- generation ABMs (Sprint Safeguard) were tion that the other cannot obtain—it may feel 62 AIR UNH ERSITY Rl l ll-W

forcecl 10 launeh a preemptive strike before effective BMD weapons, then it can set the pace such defenses could be sei in place. Such argu- for mutual deployment; il it is not in a position ments, however, do not miliiaie against U.S. to keep up with the Soviets, however, the development of BMD but only against the United States will be faced with the uncomfort- manner and timing of deployingsuch systems. able possibility that the Soviets may not be If the United States finds itself facing a nu- willing to modify or restrain their deployment merically superior nuclear force capable of de- schedule. stroying tvvo legs of its triad (ICBMs and In the end, however, the debate could be bombers), Soviet temptation to strike at this moot. Given the present state of research and area of vulnerability. as pointedout by Bernard development of vai ious forms of BMD on both Brodie, might provide a motive for attack. If sides and the investment emphasis placed on such a Soviet force were augmentèd by com- pushing those programs ahead, defensive Sys- prehensive antimissile defenses, that motive tems for both of the superpowers could be de- would be even stronger because the means of veloped at about the sante time. It the United negating a substantiul portion of the remain- States accepts lhe importante and logic of stra- ing LT.S. weapons, the SLBMs, would be in tegic defenses as the Soviets have, it might only hand. The United States would, in effect, face be necessary for each nation to pursue diplo- forceiul cancellation of its strategic forces alto- matic contacts and intelligence gathering to gether by theoffensiveand defensivecombina- ensure themselves that no short-term, unilat- tion of Soviet arms. eral disadvantages developed. Regardlessof the If, on the other hand, the United States likelihood of conc urrem timing. it is clear that pushed ahead as rapidly as possible vvith re- the United States should pursue antimissile search and development, then unilateral de- defense as vigorously as possible, recogni/ing ployment of BMD systems by the Soviets would that it is the only typeof strategic program still be obviated by U.S. ability to deploy similar capable of matching political goals with mili- systems apace. Onçe both nations have defen- tary aims. The inertia ot U.S. preference for sive systems in place, those systems will begin offensive strategy. whethei disguised as theo- to produce the beneficiai, stabilizing effects ries such as mutual assured destruetionor pseu- discussed earlier. The issue is how to get safely doscientific investigations such as cost-benefit from here to there. Clearly, however, if the analysis, must be overcome. United States attains the capability to deploy ,\aval Postgraduate School M onterey, CaIifornia

Notes Kl. Russcll F. VVcigliy. lhe American Way of tl’«r: A H istorxof I Bernard Brodie, Stratrgy in the Misxile Age (Princeton. New I nilrd State\ Mihlary Stralegx and Ihiliex i New 5 oik Mac millan, Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1959). p. I 19. 1973). p. 93. 2. Ibid.. p. 7. 11. A .11. J o m in i. Surnmaty of lhe Ari of War. cdiled by Licuien- 3. CatI von dausewiiz, On lt'«r, editedand translated by Michael aiil Coloiu l J D. I tiltlc(Han isburg. Pc-nns\ lvania: Milil.u \ Service Howardand Peter Paret (Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton l'niver- Publishini* O )., 1917). p. 103. sits Press. 1976), p. 87. 12. W ciglcy. p. 171. 4. Ibid.. p. 605. 13. Allied I haçer M.dian. From Anil Io Steam: lieiollertion.s ol 5. Ibid.. p. 75. Xnval Life (New 3'uik tlarp er & Companv. 1907). p. 28.3. 6. T nicvdides. The Feloponnesmn IIVi r. Introduction by John 14. Brodie. p. 82. It. Finley, Ji. (New York: Randoni Honse, 1951). 15. Ibid., pp. 71-72. 7. R Ernesi Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupny, The F.ncyclopedia of lu. Ibid.. p. 74. Mihlary I hstorx from 7500 fí.C. Io lhe Tresent (New 5 ork: liar per lk 17. Ibid., p. 77. Row, 1977). p. 89. 18. Oskai Morgenstcrn, The Qtteshon ol Xalional Defense (New 8. Claiisewitr. p. 87. York: Random Honse. 1959). 9. Brodie. p. 12. 19. I Ie im A KisMiiger. " 1 he Future ol NA I ().' I lie II ashing- CLASS1CAI. Mll.lTARY STRATI-.GY 03 lon Quarterly. \u lu in n 1979. pp . 5-6 sive (uinpaign ol 1812- 20. Jnliii M Colhns. ( S.-Soviet Mitilary Hnlnner: Com rpl.s aml 25. Mark K. Millei. "Sosiel Suategú rtioughi: l he Ind ol an CapabitiUes l^oO-I^S» i \\ .ishington Library <>1 (ongiess. 1980). p. tra?" International Srcurity líeriew. Winlei 1980-1981, pp. 8 and 2 122. 26. Clareiue A. Robmson. Missile Delensi Cains Suppurl." 21 Dupuy and Dupuy. p. 357. Iviation Week à- Spaie Tn linology, 22 Ot lobei 1979. p. 16 I bis 22. Ibid. i|UOle was laken laigely liotn remaiks ailribuu-d to John M Qd- 23. Roberi K Massie, Peter the (irrat: lli.t Life and World (New lins, sciiini reseau her loi lhe I .ilnaiy ol Congress I' mpbasis added. \ork: Alfrrd A. knopf. 19811. P a n I brct 1 hcGteai Norlheni Uai. 27 Brodie, p. 105. pp. 289-516. 28. Ibid.. pp. 53-55. 21 Clausewii*. p. 81 and Book Si\. li inuM be ai knowltdged. 29. Ibid.. p. 185. houtvrr. that his rationale un ihis ponn was derived priinarily 30. Jerom e II. kah an , .Securily tn lhe S mirai Age I Washington: (rom lhe warsof Frederu k lheGreal ralhei ihan lhe Russian defen- Biookings Insliiulion, 1975). pp. 150-55.

Air Cniversity s Center íor Aerospace Research, Doctrine, and Education (CADRE) held a uorkshop on “Low-Intensity Conílict and Modem Technology” on 22-23 March 1984. Sixty-one participants, including officers from all Services, representatives (rom defense industries, and scholarsgathered toanaly/e seventeen articles prepared íor the uorkshop. The ariicles examined various policy, doctrinal, and technological ques- tions relaiing to low-imensiiy conflict and were designed to raise ques- tionson the role oí military pouer in the”small wars" that are part ol today’s world. CADRE plans to publish the uorkshop proceedings at a future date. For further information on theconferenceand the publication of lhe proceedings, contact CADRE RIC, AT EOVON 875-5307 or commercial (205) 293-5307. air force review

BILLY MITCHELL AND THE GREAT TRANSCONTINENTAL AIR RACE OF 1919

D r . W illiam M. Lea r y

ENERAL William "Billy” Mitchell climbed to the top of the mountain during the Great War and saw the shape of the future. A new world opened before him, an age in which G"the destinies of all people will be controlled through the air." The dawning of this "aeronautical era" (Mitchell came to believe, with the passion of an Old Testament prophet) meant that the security— and greatness— of the United States depended on the creation of an air force second to none. Returning from France in March 1919 to take charge of the Air Service’s Training and Operations Group, the flamboyant airman set out to preach the gospel of air power to the unenlightened.1 The essential first step along the road to aerial superiority, Mit- chell argued, was an independent air force. At his urging, congres- sional supporters introduced legislation in midsummer 1919 to establish an expanded, unified air Service modeled on Great Brit- ain's Royal Air Force. But with powerful opponents arrayed against the scheme (Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and President Woodrow Wilson all came out against independence), the reorganization bill seemed certain to fail.2 Undaunted by the dismal Outlook on Capitol Hill, Mitchell counted on favorable public opinion to silence all opposition. With Congress scheduled to consider the unification proposal and military appro- priations in the fali, he drew up an imaginative plan to focus national attention on aviation. T o demonstrate the progress ihat aeronautics had made during the recent war, Mitchell announced that the Air Service would fly across the North American continent en masse.3

64 Mitchell's scheme was breathtaking. Although a number of aviators had flown across the United States since Cal Rodgers first accomplished the feat in 1911, the transcontinental trip was still a hazardous adventure. Landing areas were few and far between, especially in the western part of the country; aircraft instrumentation could be best described as primitive, and navigational aids and accurate weather informa- tion did not exist. Yet Mitchell wanted to race from New York to Califórnia. The Air Service insisted on the official designation of "Transcontinental Reliability and

General William "Billy"M itchell. who mastermmded the transcontinental race. is shown on the fai m g /jage gmngadvu r toa pilol wlto unllfly in thecornpelition. . . . fíelow, l.ieutenunt Belvin IV. Maynard. who will wtn the race. is about to begin the 1 s()-rnile teg across the Rocktes. Ma\nard‘s dog Tnxte accompunied hnn on lhe fliglit and can beseen in the rearof the plane

65

The airheld.s tn l'H'J lacked lhe rnanx convenientes and lhe orderly appearance oj luda\ > airports. The 1)11-1 tn lhe foreground i» down for refuehng dunng oneoj lhe 30-minute slopoven of tlie race.. .. l.teulen- anl C.olonel Itarold B Harllev, comrnander o) lhe Isl Pursuil (ifoup tn France duniuç World Mar / and one of the preracr fai ontes, i\ shown ileft. below/ tn lhe Sf.-S ungle-seaterpursuit plane lhal lie flew in the ra< e.

Endurance Test but no one harbored illusions about the true nature of the event. As the New York Times announced. Americans were about to witness "the greatest air race ever attempted."4 Preparations went forward without delay. Air Service officers selected a route that would run from New York to Buffalo. skirtmg the Appalachian Mountains, then along Lake Erie to Cieveland before turning westward to Chicago and Omaha. Aviators would pick up the tracks of the Union Pacific Railroad at Omaha, continuing to San Francisco via Cheyenne. Salt Lake City, Reno. and Sacramento. The railroad route was compelling it followed favorable terrain, supplies and equipment could be moved easily by rail to mtermediate pomts, and the tracks— known to airmen as the "iron compass — would serve as the primary navigational aid from Omaha to San Francisco

07 In deference to the operational limitations of contemporary aircraft, which cruised at about 100 miles per hour and carried enough fuel to keep aloft for only two or three hours, MitchelTs planners established twenty refueling or control points along the 2701 -mile route. Contest rules called for a minimum stop of thirty minutes at each point. Also, in the interests of safety, flying was restricted to daylight. Originally conceived as a one-way Crossing, with contestants starting at New York and San Francisco, the Air Service responded to criticism and changed the event to a round-trip race— thus neutralizing the possible advantage of prevailing westerly winds.5 The starting date— 8 October 1919— turned out to be opportune: Americans needed a diversion after a terrible summer of nationwide unrest and violence. Scattered racial incidents had culminated in a bloody Chicago race riot in late July, which left 36 dead. September saw the climax of postwar labor troubles, with a police strike in Boston and a bitter dispute in the Steel industry. Two days before the air race was scheduled to begin, federal troops occupied Gary, Indiana, in an effort to quell mounting violence in the Steel town. And all this came at a time when Woodrow

68 The twin-engine Martin bomber jlown by Cap- tam Roy Traiu is attracted a crowd al Bingham- ton, New York, on its westward journey. It later crashed near Omaha, Nebraska. (Bolh Captam Francis and lus passenger. French Captam Paul de Lavergne, survwed lhe crash.) One of lhe Mar- tin's engines was used to replace Maynard's en- gine, which failed due to a broken crankshajt.

Wilson hovered near death: the President.in the midst of a raging national debate over ratification of the Versailles Treaty, had collapsed following a speech at Pueblo, Colorado, on 25 September.6 For a brief time, at least, people could put aside thoughts of the nation’s ills and turn their attention to Roosevelt Field, Long Island. By early October, some 48 airplanes stood ready to start the great air race. A few esoteric models attracted considerable interest (a captured German Fokker and a twin-engined Martin bomber particularly stood out), but the bulk of the competing aircraft were staid DH-4s, a wartime biplane of British (de Havilland) design and American manufacture. The press speculated on the outcome of the contest. Prerace favorites included Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Hartney, former commander of the 1 st Pursuit Group in France; Captain Field K. Kindley, fifth-ranking American ace; and Lieutenant Belvin W. Maynard, recent winner of the New York-to-Toronto race.7 The morning of 8 October dawned clear and cool with a fresh northeasterly wind. More than 2000 spectators showed up for the day’s festivities. The 22d Infantry Band provided music, while ladies of the War Camp Community Service passed out

69 sandwiches and coffee to contestants and guests. Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell, a friend of the Air Service and supporter of unification, represented Secretary Baker, who tactfully had found better things to do. Billy Mitchell, of course, had come from Washington, where he had been testifying in support of a separate air force before House and Senate committees. Shortly before 9:00, the throaty roar of a dozen engines caught the crowd's attention. Starting honors went to Commodore L. E. O. Charlton. British air attaché, who was participating as a courtesy. But Charlton's Bristo! fighter developed engine trouble, and Lieutenant J. B. Machle, next in line, took off first at 9:13. Conforming to rules, Machle rose to 1000 feet and circled the field before setting course for the first control point at Binghamton, New York. Departures were routine until it came time for Lieutenant Maynard to leave. As he prepared to start the 400-hp Liberty engine of his DH-4, the fliers dog, Trixie, ran up to the airplane, barking and jumping with excitement. Maynard climbed down, picked up the Belgian police dog, and hopped back on board. He took off with the obviously delighted Trixie hanging over the side of the open cockpit. The crowd cheered with pleasure. Secretary Crowell took advantage of a lull in the proceeding to speak with the press. "It is beyond dispute," he said, "the greatest aerial contest in the world." Pointing out that the United States lagged sadly behind Europe in the development of aeronautics, Crowell voiced the hope that the race "will awaken people" to the need for increased American effort in this criticai area. The secretary then decided to get into the spirit of things and asked to be taken up for a ride. Mitchell promptly made the necessary arrangements. Sporting borrowed goggles and a leather coat. Crowell waved to the crowd as he clambered into the cockpit of a Curtiss biplane. The aircraft taxied to the edge of the field, turned into the wind, and began its takeoff run. Just as the wheels left the ground, the engine failed. The Curtiss stalled to the right, a wing tip struck the ground, and the aircraft turned over on its back. After a moment of stunned silence, the crowd rushed out onto the field. Crowell and pilot M. G. Cleary emerged from the wreck, shaken but uninjured, That’s the shortest flight on record," Crowell quipped to reporters. The secretary said that he was ready to go up again, but unfortunately, a "pressing appointment" in the city prevented his making another flight. Assuring Captain Cleary that the accident was not his fault, he posed for a photograph with the embarrassed aviator before hastily leaving the field.8 There was a good deal less excitement in San Francisco, where a small group of fifteen contestants stood ready to depart. Even the weather— seasonal low clouds and fog— seemed in keeping with the subdued mood. Although few in numbers, the West Coast contingent did boast several noted fliers, including Major Carl Spaatz, assistant air officer for the region; Major Dana Crissey, commander of Mather Field at Sacramento; and Captain Lowell H. Smith, who had flown for Pancho Villa in the early phases of the Mexican revolution. Colonel Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, destined to lead the Army Air Forces in World War II but at that time in charge of military aviation on the Pacific coast, joined a group of local officials to bid farewell to the airmen.9 The end of the first day saw Lieutenant Maynard— dubbed the "flying parson" by the press because he had left a Baptist seminary in 1917 to join the Air Service— clearly in front. Maynard reached Chicago by dark, a distance of 810 miles from New York, while his three nearest competitors spent the night in Bryan, Ohio. These were the fortunate ones. Eighteen fliers failed to get beyond Buffalo. The eastern half of the transcontinental route was strewn with debris. Commodore

70 Charlton, who had departed after engine repairs, wrecked his Bristol fighter during an emergency landing near Ithaca, New York. Lieutenant George McDonald's DH-4 suffered a similar fate when he was forced down in Pennsylvania. Lieutenant D.G. Gish and his observer. Captain Paul de Lavergne, French air attaché, narrowly escaped death when their aircraft caught tire over Livingston County, New York. Neither had a parachute; Gish managed to crash the DH-4, his only alternative, before flames reached the cockpit. The intrepid de Lavergne transferred to a Martin bomber, piloted by Captain Roy Francis. and resumed his trip across the country. Sergeant W. H Nevitt, observer in a de Havilland flown by Colonel Joseph Brant, was not so lucky as Gish and de Lavergne. Engine trouble forced down Colonel Brant near Deposit, New York. The airplane crashed on landing. and Nevitt was killed. Meanwhile, the racers eastbound from San Francisco managed to cross the treacherous Sierra Nevada Mountains without incident. Eleven of the fifteen fliers reached Salt Lake City by afternoon There. due to poor field conditions at the next control point, they were held overnight. But the first day had brought tragedy to this group also. Major Crissey and his observer, Sergeant Virgil Thomas, arrived over Salt Lake City in late afternoon shortly after 5:00. Crissey circled the field, waving to the crowd that had gathered to greet the airmen. All seemed in order until the final approach Cnssey carne in at an abnormally steep angle. The aircraft stalled and them plummeted to the ground. Both occupants were killed. On Thursday, 9 October, Maynard left Chicago at first light Encountering severe turbulence en route to Des Moines, he became airsick for the first time in his flying career. At North Platte, Nebraska, he met and exchanged greetings with the east- bound leader, Captain Lowell Smith. Maynard continued on to Cheyenne, while Smith spent the night in Omaha. The "flying parson" ended the day with a lead over Smith of 236 miles, or a little more than two hours' flying time. Casualties continued to mount behind the leaders. Rainstorms east of the Missis- sippi caused numerous forced landings, and four aircraft suffered major damage. Lieutenant A. M Roberts and his observer survived an especially close brush with death. In an effort to make up for lost time, Roberts chose the direct route, over Lake Er:e. between Buffalo and Cleveland. His engine failed, and he had to ditch in the lake. Luckily, a passmg freighter saw the crash and picked up the two men. Snowstorms over Wyoming led to a fatality in the west. Lieutenants E. V. Wales and William Goldsborough were en route to Rawlins from Cheyenne, flying close to the ground below iow clouds, when they encountered a snowstorm. Wales lost forward visibility. Suddenly, a mountain loomed ahead. Wales threw the aircraft into a violent turn, stalled. and dove into the ground. Lieutenant Goldsborough emerged from the wreck with serious injuries but managed to walk three painful miles for help. His effort was m vain When rescuers returned to the aircraft, they found Wales dead. The third day of the race began with problems for Lieutenant Maynard, who had hoped to arrive in San Francisco by sundown. Frosty overnight temperatures at Cheyenne resulted in an ice-clogged overflow pipe, which, in turn, caused the engine to overheat on starting, damaging the radiator. Sergeant William E. Kline, Maynard s observer-mechamc, made the necessary repairs, but the job took five hours. Maynard ended the day at Saldura, Utah, three control points and 518 miles from his final destination. Meanwhile, Captain Smith continued to lead the eastbound contingent, with Major Spaatz and Lieutenant Emil Kiel in hot— and acrimonious— pursuit. Kiel arrived at Des Moines twenty-four minutes before Spaatz. When the major landed, he pro- tested that Kiel had left Omaha, the previous control point, two minutes before the required thirty minutes for stopovers. The officer-in-charge honored Spaatz's com- plaint and forced Kiel to wait an additional two minutes at Des Moines. Shortly before nightfall, Spaatz and Kiel caught up with Smith at Bryan, Ohio. New York lay only 560 miles away, and they would have the advantage of the early rising sun. Maynards lead m the west had vanished. Unfortunately, the third day of the race also saw three serious accidents and one more fatality. Major A. L. Sneed, piloting a DH-4 short of fuel, made a very hard landing at Buffalo. The aircraft bounced high in the air and then smashed down on its nose. The observer, Sergeant Worth C. McCIure, catapulted out of his seat, suffering a broken neck. On Saturday, 11 October, the end of the first phase of the Transcontinental Air Race proved anticlimactic. Maynard left Saldura at first light, found ideal weather en route, and arrived m San Francisco without incident at 1:12 in the afternoon. On hand to greet the slender, bespectacled aviator, who had just set a new transcontinental speed record, was the chief of the Air Service, Major General C. T. Mehoher, who was accompanied by Colonel Arnold and a small group of officials and spectators. Maynard had won because the eastbound fliers had run into trouble. Smith, Spaatz, and Kiel left Bryan at dawn, headed straight into threatening weather. Captain Smith, battling rainstorms, could not find the airtield at Cleveland. Corning down to ask directions, he damaged the landing gear and propeller of his de Havilland. Repairs took five hours, putting him out of contention. Spaatz and Kiel located Cleveland without difficulty, but minor mechnical prob-

Seirral < lerman Fokkerscapturedduring World Warl flew ni tlir race. The Fokker shown here on lhe starl- ing day of lhe rontest still bore its German markmgs.

72 lems plagued their journey. In late afternoon, Spaatz arrived at Bmghamton, where he encountered a brief delay. Kiel, who landed shortly after Spaatz, was asked to delay his departure until ten minutes after the major left, in deference to his sênior. Kiel refused, and both men took off at the same time. Spaatz gained the lead en route to New York, but he landed by mistake at the Hazelhurst airport, adjacent to Roosevelt Field. Discovering his error, Spaatz took off immediately. It was too late. Kiel beat him to Roosevelt by twenty seconds. Mercifully, the day had been free of serious accidents. Sunday, 12 October, offered twenty-four hours of rest under contest rules and provided time to take stock of the past week’s events. A majority of contestants had yet to complete the one-way Crossing, and the race already had claimed five lives (seven, if the deaths of two fliers en route to the starting point were counted) and produced numerous injuries. The press tended to be philosophical about the losses. "Man," an editorial in the New York Tribune announced, "is compelled to pay the toll to a nature which is jealous of his progress." But some of the participants took a less detached view. Major Spaatz. destined to become the first chief of staff of the United States Air Torce in 1947, opposed continuation of the race. No further useful purpose. he believed, could be served by going ahead. If the War Department insisted, then the fliers should return at a leisurely pace via a less hazardous Southern route Lieutenant Kiel was even more outspoken. "No one," he told a repórter, can make rne race back to Califórnia__ The train will be good enough for me " The American Flying Club urged Washington to call an end to the contest. The War Department remained unmoved. The Army was the Army. Orders called

A camouflaged La Pere two-seater prepares U> tuke off from one of lhe grassy airfields used irt the race. tcadents fjlagued the transcontinental race. Some a c c id e n ts occu rred ex>en b efo re th e raie started. T h is DH-4 crashed at Bustleton, Pennsylvania, as lhe pilot was en route to tlie start of the contest. Including two Ihers who were killed en route to lhe starting pom t, seven fliers lost tlieir li-,'es as a resull of the nu e.

for a double Crossing of the continent, and orders would be obeyed. Lieutenant Maynard resumed his flight in accordance with contest rules (not countmg Sunday, forty-eight hours after his arrival) on Tuesday afternoon, 14 Oc- tober. Spaatz got under way from New York the next morning. followed by Captain Smith. Lieutenant Kiel, who did not receive a train ticket from his superiors, com- plained that his aircraft needed extensive repairs and delayed his departure. Monday and Tuesday had been marked by a number of accidents, as stragglers completed the first leg of the race. Wednesday, 15 October, however, brought fatalities. Lieutenants French Kirby and Stanley C. Miller experienced an engine failure near Evanston, Wyoming. Their aircraft stalled during an attempted deadstick landing, and both men died in the resultant crash. The demise of Kirby and Miller produced the first severe public criticism of the air race. The Chicago Daily Tribune led the way, terrning the contest ‘‘rank stupidity.” Even Congressman Fiorello LaGuardia, one of the Air Services staunchest support- ers, spoke out in opposition The casualties, he noted, were out of all proportion to those that might be expected in cross-country flying.10 This growing hostility stung Billy Mitchell, architect of the contest, and he re- sponded in testimony before Congress. The blame, he argued. lay with the de Havillands, aircraft that had been foisted on a reluetant Air Service by Washington officialdom. The DH-4 (all of the fatal accidents had involved this type) had an unprotected gasoline tank. Moreover. the tank was placed in a hazardous location behind the pilot; during crash landings, pilots were likely to be crushed between the tank and the engine. Mitchell left the distinct impression that the race would have been much safer if different aircraft had been used.” Mitchell s attack on the favorite whipping boy of the Air Service, the “ infamous flaming coffin" of World War I, did not pass unchallenged. As Lieutenant Maynard and others would later point out, the plane's record was a good deal better than its reputation. The DH-4 had a pressure-feed (rather than a gravity-feed) fuel tank that lacked the rubber covering of tanks in some other aircraft and could explode when hit by a bullet. But pressure-feed tanks were common in airplanes flown during the Great War, nor was the absence of a rubber coating unusual. Certainly, the place- ment of the tank was unfortunate, and the British corrected this in the DH-9. Yet,

7 I again, this basic design was not remarkable. About half of the war's combat aircraft had tanks located behind the pilot, including the famous Spad and Sopwith Camel. Thus, although the DH-4. like the B-26 of World War II, did have detractors and skeptical critics, many fliers swore by the airplane.'2 In any event, none of the five fatal accidents could be attributed to design problems. Modern accident investigators— perhaps too easily— would likely have singled out pilot error as a major factor. Two incidents (Crissey and Sneed) clearly were due to poor landmg technique. Two others (Kirby and Brant) occurred on deadstick landmgs. Engine failure was an everyday event in 1919, and pilots were expected to come down safely in such circumstances. Lieutenant Wales’s accident, if it happened today, would likely be blamed on poor judgment: the pilot had flown into weather conditions beyond his ability to handle. Mitchell had wanted publicity but not the kind that followed the latest fatalities. Nevertheiess, the race continued. It seemed almost like a matter of pride for Mitchell— perhaps not personal pride, but pride in the Air Service. On 16 October, fate turned against Lieutenant Maynard. A broken crankshaft forced him down forty miles west of Omaha. The "flying parson" needed a new engine. Even if he could find one, normally it took about three days to make the necessary repairs. But Maynard was a resourceful and determined young man. He located a Liberty motor in Omaha, courtesy of Captain Roy Francis, whose Martin bomber had crashed earlier in the week. Although the airplane had been demol- ished, one of its engines had escaped damage. Francis had the engine trucked to Maynard and arranged for searchlights so that the repair crew could work through the mght. Sergeant Kline, in charge of the engine change, performed a minor miracle: the airplane was ready to fly in eighteen hours. Captain Lowell Smith, an equally determined individual who had become the westbound leader, ran into problems also. On the evening of 15 October, his aircraft was destroyed by fire in Buffalo when lanterns being used by mechanics ignited a wmg. He received permission to continue the race if he could find a replacement aircraft Prospects seemed dim until Major Spaatz arrived on the 17th. It took only a little pleading before Spaatz agreed to turn over his DH-4 to the eager captain. Happily, Spaatz bowed out of a race which he now considered pointless. Smith, who later would lead the first round-the-world flight in 1924, went on to conquer wind and weather, becommg the first West Coast flier to complete the round trip when he arrived in San Francisco on 21 October. Maynard, however, had already won the race. The lieutenant had no serious problems after Omaha and landed at Roosevelt Field in the early afternoon of Saturday, 18 October. More than 1000 people turned out for the victory ceremony, including the aviators wife and two young daughters. The girls seemed especially happy to see Trixie, surely the first dog to make the double Crossing of the North American continent by air When asked to explain his success, Maynard credited Sergeant Klmes mechanical feats, good luck, and the fact that he had relied extensively on his compass for point-to-point navigation. General Mitchell took the opportunity to announce that Maynard's arrival marked the end of America's isola- tion. The race, he said, amply demonstrated the capability of air power. Maynard, collecting his family and T rixie, headed for home. Three years later, on 7 September 1922, the young pilot would meet his death while stunt flying at a county fair in Rutland, Vermont.13 Although the Great Transcontinental Air Race disappeared from the front pages of the nation's newspapers with Maynard's arrival in New York, the contest continued.

75 B the time it officially ended on 31 October, thirty-three aircraft had completed a one-way Crossing and eight had made the round trip. While accidents continued during the final stages of the race, there were no more fatalities. The human cost— seven lives— had been high, even during a period when flying could be an extremely hazardous business. The Air Service lost seventy-four avia- tors in cross-country operations during 1919 at a rate of one man killed every 274 flying hours. But fatalities in the air race occurred at the rate of one per 180 hours. Put another way, losses in the race fell just one short of the number of Americans killed while serving in France with the Lafayette Escadrille during twenty-two months of combat.'4 And what was accomplished? The announced purpose of the contest was to test the reliability and endurance of Air Service equipment. The race certainly demonstrated that the aircraft of 1919 were far from reliable and that endurance was more human than mechanical. But these results could have been obtained in a far less costly manner. Mitchell, of course, had had other motives. He had wanted to create a congenial climate of public opinion so that Congress would approve plans for unification and vote substantial appropriations. His scheme did not work. A separate air force remained years away; in 1920, Congress would slash Air Service funds to the bone.’5 Mitchell failed to realize his objectives through the transcontinental race, and even more bitter disappointments lay ahead for the outspoken airman. Still, while histori- ans may call into question the effectiveness of Mitchells role in promoting the needs of the Air Service after World War I and during the 1020s,’6 his compelling vision of the future of aviation was vindicated in time. In the final analysis, General William Billy" Mitchell proved to be the prophet of air power for the United States. University of Geórgia, Athens

Notes 1 See Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The Army Air Forces m World War II, 7 vols (Chicago. 1948-1958), I, pp. 24-25, and Altred F Hurley. Billy Mitchell: Crusader tor Air Power (New York, 1964), pp 39-40 The quotation is from General Mitchells Winged Detense (New York, 1925), p. 3 2 Hurley, pp. 45-51. 3. Isaac Don Levine. Mitchell: Pioneer of Air Power (Cleveland, 1944), pp 191-92 4 New York Times, 8 October, 1919 5. Details of preparation can be found in File 373. Transcontinental Reliability Flight, Army Air Forces, Central Decimal File, 1917-38, Record Group, 18. National Archives. and Office of Director of Air Service, Report on First Transcontinental Reliability and Endurance Test.' 5 February 1920, Air Service Information Circular, vol. I SeealsoRay L Bowers's excellent article, The Transcontinental Reliability Test. Airpower Htstonan, January 1961, pp 45-54. and April 1961. pp. 88-100. 6. the turbulent postwar period is detailed by Burl Noggle. Into lhe Twenties The United States from Armistice to Normatcy (Urbana. 1974). 7. New York Times, 8 October 1919 8. Details of the race, except where notes, are taken from the New York Times, 9-31 October 1919 9. San Francisco Chromcle. 9 October 1919 10. Chicago Daily Tribune. 18 October 1919; New York Times, 18 October 1919 11 U.S House of Representatives. Subcommittee No 1 (Aviation) of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, Hearings, 66th Congress, 1 st Session (Washington, 1920), pp 2644-50 12 See testimony by Maynard and Maior James A Meissner. ibid , pp 3657-64, 3773-78 13. On Maynard s death, see the New York Times. 8 and 12 September 1922 14 Bowers, pp. 97-98 15 Despite claims by Levine (Mitchell, p 192) and others. the air race did not make a major contribution to the later establishment of the Post Offices transcontinental air mail route. 16 For a sharply criticai Ireatment of Mitchell s activities, see Thomas Worth Walterman. Airpower and Private Enterprise Federal-lndustrial Relations in the Aeronautics Field. 1918-1926," doctoral dissertalion. Washington Umver- sity. 1970

7f, CIVIL AIR PATROL AND THE TOTAL FORCE G lknn E. O vfrbv II

The total force is an entity composed of WOstaiemenis from authoriiative Air Forte active duty military and full-time < nnlian sources, yeiobviously in contradit lion? T)(xjs personnel, lhe reserve components of tlie l niled TGeorge Forschler’s strikingly direct commem States, and allied forcesd [Civil Air Patrol] /> a vital part of lhe indicate an official shili of opinion, or is ii Total Force Policy. simply an impret ise t hoice of words ihai hap- pened io be quoted? In exploring theactual relaiionship between the Air Force and its official civilian auxiliai y, 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIFAY

I shall discuss the mission oi the Civil Air Pa- tions.”'5 Emergency Services operations can be trol (CAP). the relationship of that mission to subdivided into air search and rescue, in supl the Air Force mission, and the í urrem image port of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery that Air Force and the Civil Air Patrol have of Service, and disaster relief, in support of vari- one another. Iu so doing, 1 hope to point the ous State and couniy agencies. When CAP unils vvay to where An Force doctrine on the Civil pei foi m searc h and rescue on c all from the Air Air Patrol should be. Force, the Aii Force reiinburses the ( Ii\ i 1 Air l he Civil Air Patrol has three coequal mis- Patrol and its members for certain fuel, oi 1, sions whic h, when accomplished togethei, ful- maintenance, and Communications expenses. (ill the purposes that its congressional charter Fhese three missions are prosecuted by an seis iorth. These missions are aerospace educa- all-volunteer force of some 65,000 members, of tion, the cadet program, and emergency Services. whom about 10,000 are sênior (adult) members Fhe aerospace education mission is "to pro- and the other 25,000 are teenage cadets. This is \ ide an understanding of the nature of the a force comparable in sue to a numbered air earth’s atmospheric and outer space environ- force and equivalem also to nearly iwo-lhirds ments, the vehicles which travei through these of the entire Air National Guard roster. environments, and the social, political, eco- nomic, technical. and philosophical impacts of these environments and vehicles upon a glob- ^ \L L of this is well and good, but al society."5 This mission has two program how does it affect the Air Force? subdivisions: externai programs (vvorkshops, Fhese CAP missions contribute directly to seminais, demonstrations, etc.) for educating the success of Air Force functions and missions nonmembers in the community at large and in three ways: internai programs of formal training for CAP • The cadet program provides a manpower members. base for future enlisted and officer personnel. The cadet program mission is ‘‘to produce • l he entire CAP program provides com- Dynamic Americans and Aerospace Leaders.”4 munity outreach for the Air Force. CAP cadets are young people who are 13 to 20 • CAP operations under the Aerospace Rescue years old. Their training program involves five and Recovery Service in emergencies provide areas: aerospace education, leadership labora- an expeditious, cost-effective contributiún to toty, moral leadership, physical fitness, and an an Air Force function importam to the nation. activity program to reinforce these aspects. Cadets wear a modified Air Force uniform, par- manpower base ticipate in a military structure in their home squadrons, and earn cadet grades (with posi- The Civil Air Patrol cadet program takes thou- tions of commensurate responsibility) ranging sandsof aerospace- or military-minded teenag- from cadet airman through cadet colonel. ers eac h year and exposes them to the Air Force Cadet training is sufficiently varied and de- in miniature. The Air Force derives its greatest manding that only 600 cadets nationwide have benefits from the Civil Air Patrol in this risen all the way to the cadet colonel grade manner. during CAP s history. Among Air Force Academy nominees. The emergency Services mission is theaspect AFROTC enrollees and scholarship winners, for which the Civil Air Patrol is best knovvn. It and service enlistees, CAP cadets and formei is “to save lives and minimize disasters through cadets are ioiind in far greater proportions than its search and resc ue, communication, and disas- what they consíitute in the overall teenage ter relief facilities and Civil Defense affilia- population. Furthermore, these cadets and IN M V OPINION 79

former cadets enter Service life with knowledge resources to help < ivilians in distress.8 of military customs and courtesies, familiarity Our military training must provide a smooth transition from theciv ilian to the military way of with aerospace subject matter and terminol- life. ogv. and leadership experience—all of which Proíessiona! military education (P\1 l\) is de- place these former cadets "a cut above" their signed to give our people the necessary skills and peers from the start. education to becoine effective leaders. . . . ( PMEJ Recognizing the benefits of cadet training, provides an in-depth \ iew of the role of the mili- tary in a democratic socieiy.9 the Air Force has established a basic training bvpass program and initial advancement as What do these areas have in common? The high as pay grade E-3 for qualified cadets. Civil Air Patrol is involved in all ol these functions. community outreach The Civil Air Patrol ilies 70-75 percent of all T he Civil Air Patrol operates more than 1900 search and rescue hours flown under the Aero- units disseminated through every state in the space Rescue and Recov ery Service. CAP mem- l'nion. Often these squadrons are in small bers train ou their own time, at their own ex- towns or sparsely populated areas that are tens pense. Even vvhen the Civil Air Patrol is flying or hundreds of miles from An Force installa- for the Air Force, the Air Force expends only a tions. In many communities, the local CAP fraction of the actual cost for each CAP mem- squadron is the area’s only week-io-iveek con- her involved in search duties. Also, CAP air- tact with the Air Force. The presence of Civil craft are smaller, more fuel-efficient, and better Air Patrol around the country increases the suited to low-altitude visual search than Air amount of direct exposure that many of our Force aircraft. The wholearrangement adds up citizens have to the Air Force. to a tidy cost savings for the Air Force. Furthennore, rnost CAP units maintain a But the CAP-USAF relationship is not as variety of contacts in tlieir host cities and clean and tidy as 1 have implied so far. The towns, often participating in all manner of primary reason is ignorance—wiihin both or- community activities as well as supporting lo- ganizations. Many Air Force people have no cal relief efforts in emergencies. Such functions idea or have erroneous ideas about what the are readily seen by the citizenry as the “Air CA v i 1 Ait Patrol is and what n does. In partir u- Force” reaching out to help and to work with lar, the ways in which CAP activities directly the “man in the Street” and the community at benefil the Air Force are not widely known. large. On the other side of the balance sheet, many CAP members íail to realize the clirect link to cost-effectiveness the “real” Air Force that inost civilians impute Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic to the Civ il Air Patrol. CAP oíficers are some- Doctrine of the United States Air Force, the times “commissioned” with as little as eight fundamental doctrine outlining what the Air hours of formal ttaining. Many members are Force is all about, identifies several Ait Force not even required to wear the uniform, and functions that are sometimes far removed from mostwill tolerate the most blatant violationsof lhe battlefield. uniform regulations because these “are not important so long as we get the job done." Public confidence and stability are advanced But underqualified oíficers and sloppy uni- by . . . providing emergency relieí in time of natural disaster.6 forms do not simply diminish the CAP reputa- Ue must provide strategic defensive forces to tion—they reflect adversely on the Air Force. It .. . support a national civil defense System.7 is no wonder that hostility exists in some . . . our rescue and recovery units use their quarters. 80 AIR 1'NJrt.RSITY RIAlEll

change is considered for adoption. Air Force WHA r is Civil Air Patrol's rela- personnel need to be more aware of their own tionship to the Total Force policy? auxiliary, to realize its contributions and its Civil Air Patrol, in my opinion, is a contr ib- limitations, and to think about hovv m utual ntor tolhe Total Force and a part thereof, and 1 cooperation can best be achieved. Meanwhile, believe ihat Air Force doctrine should recog- CAP members need to recognize their respon- nize this fact. sibility for upholding the Air Force image. The The tripanite mission of the Civil Air Patrol trend tovvard more training and professional provides contimiing, tlirect support to the Air education for CAP officers needs to be acceler- Force in íulfilling necessary Air Force non- ated, and uniform standaids must be adhered combatant rnissions. Fnrthermore, becausethis to. Furthermore, since all CAP rnissions con- inexpensive support Irees Air Force resourc.es tribute to the Air Force mission, all CAP for better exet ution of other rnissions, the Civil members should concentrate on upholding all Aii Patrol supports indirectly the Air Force three rnissions. combat role as vvell. Through this proposededucating ol all con- While the minor doctrinal point I have pro- ter ned and through a belaied official acknowj posed is little more than formal acknowledg- edgment ol the USAF-CAP relationship, I be- ment of a fait accompli, I also believe that both lieve that the Civil Air Patrol—our “unnum- the Aii Force and the Civil Air Patrol have bered air force”—will take its proper placeasa some sotd-searc hing to tio in regard to the sta- minor but importam part of the natioiTsTotal tus and valueof the Civil Air Patrol. This soul- Force. searching is needed even if no formal doctrinal IIcj Michigan M’m | Civil An Patrol. West Iam

Xotes 1. A KM I -1 . Funclions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air -t. Ibid.. p. 3. Fone. H February 1979. p. 3-10. 5. Ibid. 2. George P A. Forschler, Deputy Assistam Secreiaryof the Ait 6. A FM l-l. pp. I-4-1-5. Forte foi Reserve Affairs, quoteil in Ui.nl lir Patrol .Vetes. Aptil 7. Ibid.. p. 1-8. 1982. 8. Ibid., p. 2-30. i. Civil Air Patrol National Headquarters. l he lielalioiiships of 9. Ibid.. p. 1-10. the Purposes. Missions and Programs of Civil Air Patrol (GAP Pam phlet 304), Maxwell AFB. Alabama, 18 May 1981, p. 2. books and ideas

THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEBATE AND AMERICAN SOCIETY a review of recent literature

D avid M acIsaac

.Vo matter how sai age lhe nature of war, it is chained to human weakness; and no one will be surpnsed at lhe contradiction tliat man seeks and creates lhe iery danger that lie fears. Carl von Clausewitz On Itur. III. 16 f 82 AIR l ’\'in :R S IT Y REVIEAV

F ONE were to judge from lhe nurnber anil soon quieted when the Presidem managed to variety of recent articles, books, and speec lies force through a limited test-ban treaty in 1963.) denouncing the present administration’s plans Nor was there any widespread criticism of our forI modernizing our mu lear forces, one could then recently announced declaratory policy of make the case that lhe consensus widely pre- counterforce targeting; i.e., aimingour nuclear sumed to have been revealed by the 1980 elec- weapons at Soviet military forces and capabili- tion results was among theshortest-lived of any ties, both nuclear and conventional, as op- we have seen regarditig defense policy. This posed to Soviet industry or cities. review of some of the more strident examples By the midsixties, with a new U.S. Presidem from the recent atui nuclear literature will in- distracted by both Vietnam and his goals for clude some speculations as to why that might the Great Society, the secretary of defense had be so. Perhaps it vvould be best to begin, how- abandoned c ounterforceand was talking about ever, by questioning theassumption that, where assured destruction, the ability to destroy, even atomic and latei nuc lear weapons have been il we werealtackedfirst, 67-70 percent of enemy concerned, there has ever been wide agreement industry and 25-30 percent of enemy popula- in the United States. tion. Ehe goal of this policy shift, so lar as the For most Americans, questions oi nuclear public was told, was to create a condition of weapons polic\ nevei became íront-burner mutually assured deterrence by assuring the issues until October 1957, vvhen the result of a Soviets that under any conditions of war initia- Soviet tec hnological experiment, Sputnik, was tion the result could be nothing other lhan interpreted to signal our immediate vulnera- their ceriain obliteration. Despite the horrific bilitv, the existence of a “missile gap,” and the implications of this announced policy, the dire need to "do something” about both of general public did little more than ume in (or these new and frightening siluations. Earlier out), watch (or turn away), and trust in the scares—like the Soviets’ first atomic explosion higher authorities. Until, that is, 1969 and the announced in September 1949 and their first debate over whether to create, and if so where to claimed thermonuclear test in August 1953— base, an antiballistic missile system. had been safei\ weathered, owing largely to a Shootingour bullet at their incoming bullet, general feeling that we so outnumbered the both of them nuclear-tipped, with theencoun- Soviets in both weapons and the capability to ter taking place over the United States, while deliver them that they would not dare chal- technically challenging, proved politically un- lenge us "on the nuclear front.” In a sense, saleable. When the idea was seemingly put to then. it could be argued that a consensus view rest asa part of theS A L T I agreem ents in 1972, held generally firm to late 1957, at least am ong the public relaxed onceagain, althougli listen- the public at large. ing and watching more closely now and hold- After Sputnik, consensus became harder to ing out high hopes for future SALT agree- findand, where it could be located(or claimed), ments and a continuing relaxation ol tensions existed at a lesser levei of general aceeptance. with lhe Soviet U nion (and, after 1972, China); The Kennedy administration decisions to ex- detenle was not yet a dirty word except among pand both our conventional and nuclear capa- those who had opposed the idea from the bilities did not meei with wide resistance and, beginning. lor tl e prototypical man in the Street, certainly T hen carne 1976. the election of Mr. Carter, seemed to have been prudent during the first and the almost immediate perception—first flush of “victory” following theCuban missile broughi on by his early and fumblingattempts crisis. (Some objections were raised to the Pres- todeal with the energy crisis—ofa weakness in identa handling of that crisis, but most were leadership ability in the person ol the Presi- BOOKS. /MACf.S. AND IDEAS 83

dent. On the nuclear weapons issue, however. tinuclear weapons movement, they w ill surely the Presidem at first gave every indication of look for at least some hints in the books re- sharíng the public's gut feeling thai it was high viewed here. time to putacapon thecompetition in nuclear arms and take positive steps to reduce the weapons inventories on both sides. And yet, by I lUGH SIDF.Y began a short es- the end of 1979, whatever hopes the Presidem sav on “Corning toTerms with Nukes” (Time, had originally entertained regarding limits on 5 December 1988) w ith a rem inder thai “ it was nuclear weapons had been dashed, brought Britian’s Field Marshal Douglas Haig in World down bv a combination of Sovíet brigades in War I whoconfessed he never went to the front Cuba, challenges to both his anti-B-1 decision lest thesqualid honor of trench warfaredimin- and his pro-MX decision, the revolution in ish his will to send armies to their death." Ue Iran, the hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of went on: Afghanistan, and, finally, the failure of the There is in the current protests against our nu- Tehran rescue mission. Held personally re- clear arsenais at least lhe laint echo of the ques- sponsible for these setbacks by a goodly portion tion raised more than hall a century ago aboul of the electorate and accosted by defense con- Haig. Are the tnen and women in the While House, Pentagon, and State Department grown servatives for whom any intimations of parity so callous from their endless wat games and box with the Soviet Union were anathema. Presi- Stores of missiles and megatonnage that the po- dem Carter by 1980 had lost any chance he tential human ttagedy has receded in their delibera- might ever have had of influencing the public tions? on issuesaffectingeither nuclear weapons pol- One man who answers Sidey’s question in icy or dealing w ith the Soviet Union. the affirmative is Los Angeles Times writer “In defense circles," as the journalists say, Robert Scheer in With Enough Shovels: Rea- Mr. Reagan s election in Xovember 1980 vvas gan, Bush, and Nuclear War.} The book has a widely perceived to reflect a nevv consensus, if three-part theme: (1) those in charge of arms not indeed a mandate, for increased defense control measures in the Reagan administration spending, particularlv in those areas needed to are and have long been inveterate foes of deal- close an emerging “window of vulnerability” ing with the Russians on anything, but espe- brought on b\ an ‘‘unprecedenied" Soviet cially on arms control; (2) these same tnen. buildup of strategic forces during the 1970s, virtualh all civilians of an intellectual bent, when the United States, lulled by “the false believe that we can endlessly stockpile nuclear hopes of détente,” sat idly by doing “nothing.” weapons and threaten to use them, without at Outside the so-called defense circles. among the same time inc reasing the tisks of war; and the general public. plenty of support was (3) these individuais reveal a curious gap be- available at first. And yet. w ithin monlhs, the tween the bloodinessof their rhetoric, to which new administration found its \ iews on nuclear they have become hostage, and the apparent weapons policy coming under fire. l he rapid- absence of any ability to visualize lhe physical ity w ith which this o< < urred w ill puz/Ie histo- consequences of what they advocate. Strong rians in lhe years to come. In struggling tofind stiiíí this, suggestingsomelhingclose to Irias or answers to why the years 1981 th rough 1988 perhaps even personal animus.1 For this rea- spawned suth a widespread and virulent an- son, the author’s orientation and research me-

| Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982, $14.95), xx + 286 pages. 84 UR VNIVRRSITY RIVUAV

thods immediately take on a singular im- tails about this and arranged for an interview. poriance. In lhe course of their discussions, Mr. Jones is Mr. Scheer is forty-seven, married, lhe faiher reported to have uttered the foliou ing thoughts of ihree, and Iives in Califórnia. A foriner edi- (printed on the dusl jacket of Scheer’s book, toi of Ramparts magazine, he has taughi at separated byellipses): “Diga hole,cover it with City College, Atuioch, and Berkeley, and has a couple of doors and then throw three feet of publishedarticles in Esquive, Washington Post, dirt on top . . . . It’s the dirt that does it . . .. If and Playboy. In 1976, lie became a staff writer there are enough shovels to go around, every- lor lhe Los Angeles Times, where much of the body’s going to make it.” material in this book first appeared under his When Scheer’s report of this interview was by-line between 1980 and 1982. published in the Los Angeles Times on 16 1 he book’s arrangement is unusual. OI iis January 1982, it created a m inor uproar. By approximately 300 total pages, the texí proper March, the editorial writers for the New York takes up only 121 pages and is divided into nine Times were muttering about “The Dirt on short chapters on topics such as “The Commit- T. R. Jones" and wondering aloud whether he tee on the Present Danger,” “Team B," “The was only a c haracter in Doonesbury oi perhaps Window of V ulnerability,’’ and “ Civil lhe peace movements mole inside the Reagan Defense.’' There follovv some 90 pages of notes, administration. A subcommittee of the Senate \vhi( h pro\ ide both his sources and conuncn- Foreign Relations Committee demanded that tary thereon (along u i th additional examples he appear for questioning, a demand parried of the point in the text that is supported by the three times until Senator Larry Pressler (R- footnoie). Foi example, one note runs a full South Dakota) threatened to send the sergeant- seven pages (158-64) and another runs to five at-arms to round up Mr. Jones. The subcom- pages (190-94). The final 80 pages contain por- mittee refused to accept the assurances of Assis- tions of eight interviews conducted between tam Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle that 1980 and 1982 with presidential candidates he, and not Mr. Jones, spoke for the adminis- Ronald Reagan and George Bush (summer tration on Soviet civil defense. Eventually, fali 1980), then-Direc tor of the Arms Control Jones appeared and backed away from some of and Disarmament Agency Eugene Rostow and his earlier statements.5 formei director Paul Warnke (both in 1981), Although Mr. Jones thus takes a central role former Secretary of Defense Robert Mc Namara in Scheer s portrayal of what he sees as the and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance “curious mind-set” affecting civilian policy- (both in 1982), and physicists Herbert York and makers in the Reagan administration, Jones Hans Bethe(both in 1982). does not stand alone. Others holding views that ScheeUs title is lilted from thenow notorious Scheer finds equally puzzling include Perle, interview he conducted “very late one autumn Richard Burt (Director of Department of State s night in 1981“ with Thom as K. Jones, who Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs), Richard works lor the Undersecretary of Defense for Pipes (then a staff member of the National Research and Engineei ingand whoseduty title Sec urity Council), Eugene V. Rostow, Paul II. is Deputy Undersecretary for Strategic and Nitze, and Louis O. Giúffrida (Director of the Theater Nuclear Forces. Mr. Jones, a former Federal Emergency Management Agency). Boeing engineer, had been quoted to the effect Sc:heer’s particular concern, aboveall, seems to that Soviet civil defense measures were such he with the world vieu of the Committee on the that 98 percent of the people living in the So- Present Danger, founded by Rostow and Nitze viet Union would survive a major nuclear at- in 1976 and dedicated to “righting the balance” tack.2 Scheer decided he'd like to get some de- between the United States and Soviet strategic liOOKS, ÍM.K.I S, INI) 11)1.AS 85

forces. On pages 144-46, Scheer lists no fewei fornia at Berkeley by 1980. His princ ipal íind- lhan fifty-one members of lhe commillee’s ings werefirstgiven widei circ ulation by Rich- board of directors who have held positions in ard J. Barnet in a longpieceon ‘‘TheSearch for thepreseniadministration, a list headed by lhe National Securily,” which appeared in the Presidem himself. New Yorker for 27 April 1981. Now w ehave the In sum. Mr. Scheer seems 10 havecomeaway published book, one whose cone lusions raise a from his research and interviews ihoroughly question as to how Sanders presenteei himself convinced that if ii is not true that a bunch oí to the key personalities of the CPI) who coop- “crazys” are 100 close to the nuclear buiton. erated with him, heavows, both willinglyand there are noneiheless a few who now and lhen graciously.6 at least sound a bit eccentric. He would have Sanders begins in 1950 with NSC-68 and been less surprised, perhaps, if he had knovvn “the militat ization of comainment,’’ which led of this exchange that took place in September to the establishmem ol "Containment Miliia- 1980 under a pre\ ious adminisuration. rism,” a doctrine which he says held sway in Senator GLENN: I get losí in what iscredibleand out governm ent until at least 1968, when it not credible. This whole thing gets so incredible began to give way to a new doctrine of détente. when you consider wiping out whole nations, ii In doing so, he reminds us that the first Com- is difficult to establish credibility. mittee on the Present Danger was founded in Secretary fof Defense] BROU N: That is whv we 1950 by Jam es B. C onanl. Tracy Voorhees, and sound a liitle crazv when we talk aboul it. Vannevar Bush. CPD-I, as he calls it, was polit- ically bipartisan, recruiting its members from Senator GLENN: That is the best statement of the internationalist wing of both parties and the day. I agree with you.4 dedicated to support oí the Truman adminis- Noneiheless, Scheer perseveres, all the while tra tion’s rearmamem program brought on by acting the role of the offended virgin and all the outbreak of the war in korea. Following but luxuriating in the “lunatic hilarity” of that program's general acceptanceand theelec- some of the commenis his questions elicited.* tion of General Dwight I). Eisenhower to the Hissavinggrace, which readers will find sober- presidency, it disbanded in 1953. ing as well. is that he does more quoting than CPD-II, cofounded in 1976 by Eugene Ros- commenting. One thing is certain: there are tow and Paul Nit/.e (and consciously drawing some people in government who are not likely its name from lhe earlier committee), was dif- to invite Mr. Scheer and his tape recordei back ferent in at least two major respects: lirst, it was for another interview. established in opposition to government, ini- tially to Gerald Ford and I lenry Kissinger and T he Commiuee on the Present shortly thereafter, with heightened vehemence, Danger, to which Scheer devoted a short chapter, to Jimtny Carter; and second, it was distinc11 y is thesubject of a book-length treatment by soc i- partisan, drawing its membership exclusively ologist Jerry W. Sanders, whose Peddlers of from among so-called right-wing defense con- Crisis“haspassed through many seasons.” ! I lis servatives for whom the short-lived era of dé- investigations began in 1977, he writes, andgrew tente was seen to foreshadow America’s decline into a dissertation for the University of CiaIi- coupled with the Soviet UnioiTs rise to a posi-

fjerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston: South End Press, 1983, $20.00), xiv + 371 pages. 86 AIR VNIVERSITY REVIEW tion of unassailable strength, a position from pages after acknowledging Mr. Nitze’s willing vvhic h it could then be relied upon to try to take and gracious assistance, he describes him as “a ovei lhe world, by threat if not by force.7 veteran leader of apocryphal threats, gaps, and Sanders then recounts the major triumphsof other assorted hysterias, [now in 1976]opening ihe commiuee: ihe successful challenge to ilie a new house of mirrors, this time featuring a early and midseventies CIA estimates of Soviet ‘window of vulnerability.’ ” (pp. xi, 9) In fact, sirengths and inientions (symbolized by the on the very first page of his Introduction, di- viciory of the outside consultants, headed by rectly after quoting Eugene Rostovv and Nitze, Ric hard Pipes, vvho formed Eeam B in lhe fali he quotes the late C. Wright Mills: “Such men of 1976); the “war” against the Senaie confir- as these are crackpot realists: in the name of mation of Paul YVarnke, Presidem Carter’s realism they have constructed a paranoid real- nominee to head the Arms Control and Disar- ity all their own.” (The fact that the comment mament Agency; and the campaign to sink the by Mills dates from 1956, whereas those of Ros- SALT II treaty. Regarding the latter instance, tow a n d Xitze are from 1981 a n d 1980, respec- Sanders describes a $2,000,000 campaign tively, is buried in the end notes to the book; it launched by thecom m ittee in September 1978, is difficult not to infer devious intent in this whic h carne to involve the distribution of some accurate but nonetheless potentially mislead- 200,000 pamphlets, testimony before congres- ing technique.)8 sional committees by seventeen CPD members, Seheer and Sanders are by no means alone in and a total of 179 television and radio talk shovv discerning an unbroken pattern of thinking appearances. Taken altogether, he sees the regarding the Soviets that has long reigned su- storyof thecommittee as "an extraordinary tale preme in the highercouncilsof government.9 I of elite intrigue and mass manipulation, one shall return to this subject later but for the vvith grave impliçations for this nation and the moinem vvould point out one theme that thus world.” (p. 8) far bodes only ill for all of us: the people on Military members active and retired will both sides of the nuclear weapons debate tend ha ve a tough time with this book if they are to start from diameirically opposed positions among the majority who have assumed all v regarding the Soviet Union and itsaspirations— along lhat the committee vvas and is “on our and then talk right past one another. side." Nonetheless, the detailed description of the committee’s assumptions and accompany- ing zeal might give some pause to those who ^K n OTHER recent book treating feel that the committeeVs conclusions and rec- primarily civilian contributions to nuclear ommendations are both self-evident and un- strategy is Ered Kaplan’s The Wizards of Ar- exaggerated. If so, one must ask, why all the mageddon.f kaplan is a young journalist for frantic lobbying? Also, despite thesociologisfs lhe Boston Globe who holds a Ph.D. in politi- tendency to labei things rather than simply cal Science from Massat husetts Institute of describe them, Sanders’s arguments are for the Technology. His basic message is spelled out most part laid out in plain English. in boldfaceon thedust jacket: “For thirtyyears In the end. as vvith Seheer, one is led to a small group inside the U.S. strategic: com- wonder whether Sanders is likely to be wel- munity has devised the plans and shaped the comed back for further interviews. Several policies on how to use the bomb. 1 his is their

| Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Amiagcddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, $18.95), 452 pages. HOOKS. IM .K.I S, AND IDl-.AS 87

untold story.” II we forgive lhe usual publish- It is this issue oí “calculated vulnerability,” er's hype oí "untold. we can find in these leaping across the thirty years since 1954, that pages the story of the men. ptimarily ol lhe Kaplan sees as the central explanation for the Rand Corporation, who have elaborated the present posture of those now in tharge oí nu- various theoriesof deterrencesince 1945. Among clear weapons policy. LikeScheer and Sanders, the central players treated by Kaplan are the Kaplan seems to view today's fears as illusory late Bernard Brodieand Herman kahn, Robert or at least exaggerated, but nonetheless com- S. McNamara, Henry Rowen, James R. Schle- pelling and probably impossible to ignore or singer. Albert J. Wohlstetter, and William simply deny, by those who leel obligated by Kauímann (under whom Kaplan apparenlly their responsibilities to find some “perfect” studied al MIT). answer to our problems. While kaplan’s tale defies easy summary, Despite its many strong poims, this book has owing to the number oí players involved (and one truly major failing that will lead many the complexities, real or contrived, oí their rnilitary readers to discount it. The author thinking), it is nonetheless a sobering, even simply can’t get the rnilitary parts ol the story disturbing, account; one in which personal straight, committing a string ol egregious er- ambitions. jealousies, and severe second rors that are all but mind-boggling. l he U.S. thoughts about the verv nature oí their work Strategic Bombing survey was not "a group of play larger roles than most people have real- economists” (p. 35); General George Kenney i/ed. His portrayals oí Brodie and Wohlstetter did not retireon leaving SAC in 1948 (p. 43); the are particularly striking, the latter ol the tvvo occasion for Billy MitchelFs court-martial was seeming to emerge, although not labeled sue h, not as Kaplan States (p. 54); it is not true that as the Dr. Strangelove oí kaplans story.10 Cen- General Nathan Twining, commander ol the tral to this analysis is the story oí the Rand Fifteenth Air Force from 1943 to 1945. did “ tac- "vulnerability study” oí 1953-54, spearheaded tical, not strategic, bombing during World b\ Wohlstetter and addressing the emerging War II” (p. 239); SAG in 1960 was not “ merely vulnerability oí Strategic Air Command, both one ol several commands under the Ait Siaffs in the United States and ai overseas bases, as the wings” (p. 245). Our various Berlin adventures Soviets began to atquire an alomic striking seem to pose a particular problem for Kaplan. capability.11 With that report, Kaplan writes, In 1948, he has us “dropping packages of aid into thecity by parachute | ! ] for more than 300 VVohlstettei made the issue oí calc ulated vulnera- days” (p. 291), and in 1958-59, he has the biht> the central foc usoí strategic analysis gener- United States sending in “very-high-altitude ally...... Vs the theory trickled down not just transport planes, which Soviel fighters altemp- through thecorridorsol RAND butalsoin Wash- ington and other settors of the "strategic com- ted but failed to intercept.” (p. 292) munity," lhe concern about vulnerability grew Krrors of the kind cited here pose a difíicult intoan iníatuation, then an obsession and li na 11 y problem for a reviewer, who cannot help a fetish í»í sorts. Eventually, it would wend its wondering whether they are matched by sim- way into the political realm and—apart from Wohlstetter s original intentions or logic— ilar ones regarding the civilians on whom Ka- becomeentangled with dai ms ol a “missilegap;" plan concentrates. I suspect not but cannot be n would sit at lhe center of grisly scenarios about certain. Nevertheless, with this major caveat, I Sovíet íirst-strikes and American weakness; it am led to recommend the book especially to would provide the rationalc for a host of nevv weapons that the rnilitary wanted u> build;and it those who haveat one timeor another played a would serve as a powerful engine driving at least pari in the business of nuclear deterrence but the American side of the nuclear artns rate over have never beíore íound the opportunity to the next cjuarter centuryand beyond (pp. 109-10). study the associated problems and proposed or 88 AIR L NITF.RSITY RFllFAV adopted solulions ovei the long haul since Third World has become the overriding con- 1915. Such readers, who will come equipped sideration in US foreign policy,” (p. 278) wilh iheii guard up, will find much ihai is new which he sees as nefariously interventionist. to them. From this sweeping generalization, he goes on to conclude that the competition in nuclear arms is not the root problem we face. “Theroot ^\N O T H E R recent book ou nu- problem, as I see it, is more basic. I can most t leai weapons and straiegy lhat provides a succinctly describe it as personal selfishness perspective from inside the weapons industry is and the urge to control." (p. 291) The first Robert Aldridge's First Stnke!~\ From lhe late charge applies presumably to defense industry 1950s until ihe end oí 1972, Aldridge was an and the second to government, although this engineer wilh lhe Lockheed Missiles and Space distinction must be inferred. Company, where he led an advanced-designed Such a serious indictment results in a story group that workedon the Polarisand Poseidon with too many villains to keep up with. But missiles. O n 2 Jan u ary 1973 he q u it, having one need notaccept Aldridge’sentireargument become convinced that the work he was doing to find some value in lhe author’s insights and was immoral. Since ihen, he has been giving dot umented assertions. \\’hile a little less lay- talks and writing ariicles. In his own words, ing on of blame would have helped his case, he I started gathering highly technical and isolated is obviously both serious-minded and knowl- facts and putting them together nsing common edgeable. Aldridge seems to be saying that we language so people coukl understand whai is need to be thinking seriously about matters of happening. As I delved deeper into Pentagon weapons acquisition and use. rather than let- activitç I discovered a panem more sinister than I had imagined. Evidente indicated that the Pen- tingindustry run wild while we sit back accept- tagon is looking far beyond what is needed for ing on faith whatever the government at any defense. li is developing the instruments which given moment sees fit to tell us. will allow the United States .... to launch a He also has a gift for c asual asides. The tar- disabling and unanswerable first sn ike. (p. 19) geting of the enemy’s governmental control Hence th is book and its title. apparatus (the so-called decapitation option) Aldridge opens with background chapters sounds to him "like international assassina- on “The First Strike Syndrome” and “The tion plots gone nuclear." (p. 35) In discussing Strategic Nuc learTriad.” Subsequentchapters so-called counterforce targeting, he reminds us treat the developmental history oí both the that when we seek the capability we labei it Trident and MX missiles (both excellent chap- “damage limitation" but when we see the So- ters), as well as such other topics as penetrating viets doing it we call it “war-fighting doc- bombers, cruise missiles, antisubmarine war- trine." (Not everyone who writes on these mat- fare, missile and bomber defense, space war- ters has Aldridge’s feel for the nuances of nu- fare, and command and control. A concluding clear Newspeak.) In short, this is a valuable chapter on “The Profit Imperative” makes it book, deserving of a largei audience than it is tlear that the sinister Pentagon of his Prologue likely to get, especially from among those who has plenty oí oulside help iti form ulating its become uncomfortable reading bareknuckled designs. In íact, Aldridge is convinced that in- critic ism of government policy. Perhaps most vestment by "giant US corporations in the significam is that the book is symptomatic ol a

f Robert C. AlclricJge, First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War (Boston: South End Press, 1983, $20.00), x + 325 pages. BOOKS. IMAOES, AND IDEAS X!)

growing feeling ihat the legitimate bounds foi operational plan), is misleading, situe the secrecy have been 100 long and too roughly book’s principal lopit is not past and preseni overridden, sometimes for purposes, however operations plans for nuclear war but rather the well meam originally, that have little to rec- command and control lechniques and hard- ommend them any longer. ware designed for warning, relcase, and launch orders. In treating these matters, the authors go into detail in a nuinber of sensitive areas such S e YERAL recent books musl be as SIGINT, ELINT, ERCS, lhe DSP, etc.»’ giving nightmares to those in the Pentagon Many will find all this a bit unnerving, as did and elsewhere charged with keeping the se- many of the officers with whom the authors crets. Three that variously fit this category are discussed their project, but they will not find Peter Pringle and \\ í 11 iam Arkin $ SIOT;f the actual details of any SIOP, past or present. Paul Bracken’s Command and Control of Nu- The real concern of the authors is whether clear Forces:^t and lhe first volume of The the SIOP has become a mere Symbol ol presi- Nuclear WeaponsDatabook by FhomasCoch- dential control ovei nuclear weapons, a control ran, William Arkin, and Milton H oenig.ftt capability which they seeas beingeroded by lhe Peter Pringle is The [LondonJ Obsen>er's increasing elaboration of the so-called Cd net- man in Washington, and William Arkin is Di- works. Their feeling is that presidential con- rector of the Arms Race and Nuclear Weapons trol in reality no longer exists in any but the Project of the Institute for Policy Studies. (The most ideal circumstances. More importam, IPS is widely regarded in the conservative press they believe that in a worst-case scenario, “ il as “radical Left"; those associated with it pay the civilian authority is destroyed, the new Sys- that price but do not seem to let it bother them tem also ensures that the military is able to inuch.) In their book, it appears that Arkin carry on to fight a nuclear war—on its own." crunched the numbefs while Pringle wielded (p. 225) Even in a less than worst-case scenario, the pen. One strong point up front for bolli they suggest that the net effect of current and authors: it is clear they have done more real programmed developments (specifically, the world researc h than many writers. Apparently, IONDS, or integrated operational nuclear de- they both accompanied a B-52 training mission tection system) might be “to increase lhe influ- with the 51h Bomb Wing at Minot (bouncing ence of the military in any decision to use nu- along at 100 íeet an d a 11). F uriherm ore, they clear weapons.” In their words: seem toknow moreabout launch-control proce- dttres in Minuteman and Poseidon cockpits It would work like this. The military, with their than someof us will feel comfortable with their highly sophisticaied sensors and computeis giv- spelling out. ing them immediate information of events as they happen, would beable to present persuasive Nonetheless, their tule, SIOP (pronounced arguments to lhe presidem about what heshould "sigh op” and standing for single integrated do next by asserting that their information has

fPeler Pringle and William Arkin, SIOP: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983, S16.95), 287 pages. tfPauI J. Rracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Vale University Press, 1983, $19.95), xii + 252 pages. t tTThomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, The Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Massachuselts: Ballinger, 1984, $38.00; $19.95 paperbatk), xx + 340 pages. 90 AIR LNIVFRSITY REVIFAY

morerelevance than any political considerations. tion) and the NUTs (nuclear use theorists). His ( p .239) focus instead ison the management of forces at Thisconcern is widely shared in thecurrent the moment they would goon alert and as they literatureM and can be expected to become a would perform during a war. His goal is to hotly debated matter in lhe monihs ahead. It identify potential flashpoims and triggers that will prove uncomfortable for the Services, but might lead tocatastrophe. Someof these might neither wishing it avvay nor trying lo squelch be correctable, but, more important, a clear discussion will work in theend. The problems awareness of their existence might lead both we now face are of our own making and, for an sides to therealization that thearmscontrollers increasing segment of the public, unacceptable need to shift their emphasis from weapons to in their present form. As Pringle and Arkin the establishment of what he calls nuclear poim out (and this view is central to the rising “rides ol lhe road” governing the operation of chorus of criticism), “United States strategic forces and alerts. As things now stand, or as nuclear policy was never ‘approved’ by any they are likely to stand following any number part of the democratic process . . . [but talher of lec hnic al fixes to the C5I network,16 the verti- was] conceived and nurtured in the greatest cal integration of intelligence, warning, alert- secrecy.” (pp. 244—15) ing, and c ommand functions has led both sides If a stated or implied sense of resentment to the point where we have, in effect, “institu- regarding the record of secrecy in nuclear tionalized a nuclear showdown." He then planning can be said to pervade all the books shows in detail how, “at any moment these thus far mentioned—thereby rendering their forces can be triggered into alert, and decades of arguments moot in the eyes of many long- sleepy, unexamined confidence that it can’t accustomed to view secrecy in such matters as happen here' would disappear.” (pp. 1 and both necessary and good—no such argument 239) can be raised against Paul Bracken’s Command Bracken’s approach is both historical and and Contrai of Nuclear Forces. Bracken, a analytical. Following chapters on the evolu- young professor at the Yale School of Organi- tion of the U.S. and Soviet warning and intelli- zai ion and Management, has no time for re- gence networks, be summariz.es the history of sentmentsor blarne laying. I Iisconcern is vvith U.S. nuclear war planning and then gets to the our warning, intelligence,andalertingsystems heart of his analvsis in a chaptet on “Problems and how they actually function in crisis or of Assessment.” Here he contrasts peacetime near-crisis situations. As Air Force Magazine and wartime information regimes, the latterof was quick to note immediately on the book s which he convinc ingly shows will lead to “in- public ation in December, Brac ken’s is a "pene- formationallv decentralized nuclear wars” con- trating and often disturbing study of nuclear duc ted by separate “islands” of disconnected force management." My own feeling is that forces. “The source of bis insight." one re- this is an understatemeni; that Bracken, in fact, viewer writes, “is the recognition that the Sys- has produced the single most important book tem involves organizations which turn any cri- on nuclear issues that has appeared in the last sis into a series of discrete questions requiring decade.15 human decisions and control.”1' “When time Hardware (whether oi weapons, delivery Sys- may be short, and when the danger in passivity tems, or Communications engineering) is not seems great,” another reviewer writes, his concern. Neither are any of the various nu- who can tell what kind of alerting aclion a par- clear employment theories or the no-win de- ticular commander may urgem what such ac tion bates that rage between the MADmen (those may call forth from others? . . . Mr. Bracken favoring mutually assured deterrence destruc- persuasively argues that the kind of nuclear war BOOKS. ÍMAC.i.S, ANI) IDl./iS 91

we are leasi Iikely 10 have is lhe kind thui is more than the rest of us, must force themselves usually assumed by those ivho play war games— at all times to: lhe kind in which centralized command andcon- • remain skeptical oí purported technologi- trol persisi. and each side is assumed to be able to assess iheaciionsol theother. Kven il command cal Solutions to probletns that havedeeporgani- and control .. . remain complete mio lhe depihs izational roots (p. Ib8), of a crisis, no une can tell what particular at tion « remember that the rea/problemsare things might cause the tightly coiled spring to snap like crossed lines of authority, confusion, in- [leading toj \iiiorv only for chãos.18 ability of standard operating procedures to B\ far the scariesi of Bracken’schapters is the solve probletns, and a less than confidence- one on "The Special Probletns oí War in Eu- inspiring integration of political and military rope.” the most informativechapter on nuclear decisionmaking (except on paper; witness, foi weapons in Europe I have ever seen. Here he example, the travails of the Pueblo and Lib- givesall the numbersanddescribes the typesof erty), and Systems (no less than nine), vulnerabililies, in- • avoid at all costs the connnon infatuation teracting effects of alerts on both sides, and with the Communications engineering aspects improbabilities of ei>er resolving go no-go de- of command and control, lest they becoine like cisions at political leveis of the alliance. Al- thedrunk who looks for his lost keys under the most teasingly, he shows that the hopelessly streetlight because that's where the light is. (p. complicated command structure governing nu- 220) clear weapons in Europe is tlosely related to a political strategy that emphasizes deterrence above all. Theater nuclear war in the perspec- T H E final item in our trilogy of tive of Europeans is not intended to be an in- niglnmare-producing books is the íirsi volume termedia te substrategic war, nor is it designed of a projected eight-volume Nuclear Weapons to regain battlefield advantage—the ways in Databook, already touted in the press as among which Americans usually envisage it. Rather, the most unwelcome books the Pentagon has in the European view, it is specifically intended seen in tnany a season. Theauthors of thisfirst to enforce deterrence by requiring any major volume. U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, war to bea nuclear one. His conclusion bordeis are Thomas Cochran, a physicist currently on the perverse. with the National Resources Defense Council. Inc. (like the IPS, generally criticai of current The NATO strategy of relying on nuclear vveap- policies); William Arkin, coauthor of SIOP; ons is polititally and militarily credible because lhe governing command structure is so unstable and Milton Hoenig, a Cornell University phys- and accident-prone that national leaders would icist formerlyassociated with the ArmsControl exercise littlepractical control ovei it in wartime. and Disarmament Agency. Future volumes in What othet command mechanism could possibly the series will treat, among other topics, Soviet be built . . . that. for all practical purposes, is nuclear forces, U.S. nuclear weapons produc- tantamount toa regional doomsday mac hine?(p. 164) tion facilities, the history of U.S. mu lear weap- ons, and the inventories and capabilities of Again unlike a number of other writers, other nuclear-armed nations. Bracken concludes with some suggestions for The book is essentially an encyclopedic improving things. (pp. 238-47 )These are worth presentation of nuclear weapons systems, rang- serious consideration, but not more so than ing as far back as the Genie air defense inissile several of his en route warnings direcied to oí the 1950s(which the authors claim is still on those presently charged with improving our line in some Air National Guard squadrons) command and control mechanisms. They, even and as far into the future as the Army’s alleged

Continurd on page 91 A Sampler from the Nuclear Bookshelf

Well over 200 books on nuclcai weapons issues have Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of been published in Fnglish during lhe last two years Flexible Response, Rand Report # R-2964-FF, alone. l he books, articles, essays, and papers lisied April 1983. lu re represem only a sampling from ainong lhe best Donald M. Snow, The Nuclear Future: Toutard a literalure I haveseen. Foi reasons primai ilç ofspace, Strategy of i'ncertainty (Tuscaloosa: University noneof lhe books treaied in iheaccompanyingessa} of Alabama Press. 1983), urges a nut lear strategy is included in this supplemenlary Iist. based on and enhancing uncertainty, the '‘central reality” in the area of nuclear armaments. George W. Tiller, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Ar- guments of Anxiety: The Nuclear Debate and Books American Strategy (Air War College Research Michael Carver, A Policy for Peace (London: Faber Report No. AU AWC-83-236, April 1983). Winner & Fabei, 1982). Field Marshal Lord Carver. formei ol the CommandanFs Award, AWC Class of 1983. Chiei of Defense Siaff. Cnited Kingdom, argues Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal: 1’nderstanding Weapons in against any reliance on nucleai weapons. the Nuclear Age (New York: Simon & Schuster, Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear 1984). Strategy (New York: Si. M artins Press, 1982). So U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, lar lhe best single-volume history; originally The Fffects of Nuclear II «r( 1979). In 1982, Che- published in London, 1980. shire Books released a jazzed-up version of this Robert Jervis, The Madness beyond MAD: The II- gloomy report under lhe title The Day after logic of A merican Nuclear Strategy (fortheoming Midnight. from Cornell University Press). A stinging cri- Leon Wieseltier, Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace (New tique of the so-called “countervailing strategy.” York: Holt, Rinehart, 8c Winston, 1983). Origi- George Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion (New York: nally appeared as a special issue ol the New lie- Pantheon, 1982). Kennan sadly reiterates what he public, 10 and 17 J a n u a n 1983. See also George has been preat hing, primarilv todeal ears, for the W. Bali s reviewessay. "Sovietizing U.S. Policv,” past thirty years. in lhe New York Times Book Review, 2 February Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question (New 1984. York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); The Harold Willens, The Trimtab Factor: llow Busi- Nuclear Revolution (Cambridge University Press, ness Executives Can Help Solve the Nuclear 1982); and The Nuclear Future (Ithaca, New Weapons Crisis (New York: William Morrow, York: Cornell University Press, 1988). 1984). Laurence Martin, editor, Strategic Thought in the Solly Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality Nuclear Age (Ballimore, Maryland: Johns Hop- (New York: Yiking Press, 1982). Lord Zucker- kins Press, 1979). See especially Chaptei 5. "The man s thesis is stated in a single sement e: "Once F.volution oí Nuclear Doctrine," by Henry S. lhe numbers game took over, reason flew out the Rowen. window.” Thomas Powers, Thinking about the Next War (New York: Knopf, 1982). Nineteen provocative essays originally published in Commonweal be- Articles Essays/Papers tween 1976 and 1982. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Farth (New York: Desmond Bali, “U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would Avon Books, 1982). The manifesto of theantinu- I hey Be Used?” International Security, Winter clear weapons movement, originally serialized in 1982 83. See also bis "Can Nut lear War Be Con- three consecutive issues of lhe New Yorker dur- trolled?” Adelphi Papers, No. 169, Autumn 1981, ing February 1982. and "Targeting for Strategic Deterrence,’ Adel- David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas plu Papers, No. 185, Summer 1983. While Gray (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983). An (in hisartic le listed on facing page) argues the need unsettling history of the alliance’s nuclear strate- to at least plan for controlling nuclear war. Bali gies that reads like a comedy of errors. For a says that sut h planning is inevitablç based on lalse shorter account, see J. Michael Legge, Theater assumptions. | Paul Bracken and Martin Shubik, "Strategic War: Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role ol Nu- What Are the Questions atui VVho Should Ask t leai Weapons: Perceptionsand Misperceptions," Theni?" Technology in Suciety, vol. I, no. 3 Toreign Affairs. Fali 1983. Although the fonner (1982). secretary ol defense still refuses locomeoutof tlu Bernard Brodie, "The Developznent of Ntu Iear Strat- closet on matters related to Vietnam, he is now egy.” International Security. Spring 1978. l he speaking and wt iting widely on nuclear weapons final statemeiu from thelatedean of l.S. nuclear issues. strategists. whose Strategy m the Missile Age Michael Nacht, “Nucleat Deterrence to the End ol (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Universily lhe Ceutury," Naval II'ar College Review. Novetn- Press, 1959) retnains even toda\ the best book ber-December 1983. e\er written ou iis topic. Thomas Powers, "Choosing a Strategy lot World Theodore Draper, "How Not u> I hink about Nu- War III," Atlantic Monthly, Novembet 1982. I he clear War.” .Veie York Times Book Review, 15 first detailed accounting of lhe origins ol Presi- Julv 1982. and the ensuing exi hange in the issue dential Directive-59 toappear in the open litera- of 23 September 1982. See ulso his ”l)eai Mr. ture. See also his "Whal Is It About?” Atlantic Weinberger: An Open Reply toan Open Letter." Monthly, January 1984. l he " it" ol the title is lhe and “On Nuclear War: An Exchange with the Soviet-Ameiican global competition, especialh Secretary of Deíense,” same Journal, issues foi 1 in nuclear weapons. November 1982 and 18 August 1983. Also see his David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins ol Overkill: "Nuclear Temptations," sarne jout nal, 19 Janu- Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945- ar> 1984. 60.” International Security, Spring 1983. A truly Aaron L. Friedberg, A llistorv of the C.S. Strategit ground-breaking essay by a young hislorian 'Doctrine,’ 1945 to 1980.” Journal of Strategic widely viewed as the leader in his field. See also Studies, Decembei 1980. his pri/.e-winning "American Atomic Strateg\ Nieholas H. Fritz, jr. (Colonel, CSAE), "Clausewitz and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," Journal of and L .S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," Air Vniver- American IIistory, Ju n e 1979. sity Review, November-Decembei 1982. Carl Sagan, "Nucleat Wat and Climalit Catas- Ravmond L. Garthoff. "The NATO Det ision on ttophe: Some Policy Implications," Foreign Af- 1 heater Nuclear Forces,” Rolitual Science Quar- fairs. Winter 1983 1984. T h e "Nuclear Winter terly, Sumtner 1983. thesis in an artidedesigned for la\ readets; see tlu Leslie H. Gelb, Is the Nuclear lineal Manage- 23 Decembei 1983 issue of Science lot twoarth les able?" .Xew York Times Magazine. 1 March 1981. on the details ol the scientific analyses invohed. Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: l he Case for a Jonathan Schell, "Abolition,” New Yorker, 2 and 9 rheory of V ictoryInternationalSecurity, Sum- January 1984. SchelEs answer to hiscritics who mer 1979. complained that he finished The Fale of the .Michael Howard, "On Fighting a Nucleat War," Eartlt without offcring anv solution to the prob- International Security, Spring 1981. Originalh lems he described. presented ai CCLA on 20 November 1980 as the Leon SIoss and Marc Dean Millot, "C.S. Nucleat first annual Bernard Biodie Disiinguished Lec- Strategy in Evolution," Strategic Review, Winter ture on Politics and War. Mr. Howard ts the 1984. Candid analysis of the evolution ol the Regius Professor of Modem Histon at Oxford “countetvailing strategy" by one ol its authors and lhe author. more recently, of "Reassurance [Slossj. and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s." John Steinbruner, "Launt h ttnder Attack." Scien- Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982 1983. tifn American, January 1984, argues that the pol- Fred Charles Iklé, "Strategic Principies of the Rea- icy would actually endanger our missiles while gan Administration," .S/ra/egic Review, Fali 1983. they would be in flighl. I he offictal word from lhe undersecretary ol de- Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Slatesmen, and Olhei fense for policy. Strategists on the Bdmbing of Innocents," Com- Benjamin S. Lambeth and Kevin N. Lewis, "Eco- mentury, June 1983. See also the Decembei 1983 nomic Targeting in Nuclear War: l T.S. and So- issue (same journal) lot the extended discussion viet Approaches,” Orbis. Spring 1983. engendered by th is article. 94 AIR l 'NIVERSITY REI'// 11 plaris for making the Assauli Breaker missile doesn t mean that it is [or was] true!”19 They “dual capable.” l he authors staie that \ve pres- also must have short memories regarding the ently have a stockpile of some 26,000 nucleai accuracy of unsvvorn testimony offered to con- weapons, of twenty-four different types, rang- gressional committees by special pleaders ol all ing in explosive power from the equivalent of stripes. I heir tendency is to takeall advertised 200,000 to 18.000,000.000 pounds of TNT. numbers and capabilities at face value. Here we They staie that the total cost of nuclear weap- have no mention whatever of the mixed record ons runs to some $35,000,000,000.00 a year; of cruise missile and Pershing II operational that, on average, five nevv weapons are manu- tests, nor anything on the now three-year-old factured each day (while three are withdrawn); debate over ICBM accuracy. The overall effect and that current plans call for the production is to leave the impression that the authors have of nineteen new types (as against thirteen that sought to present the most horrific possible will be retiredor replaced), leading eventually pictureof the power at our disposal. Unstated, to an inventory of 28,665 weapons. Along the but easily inferred, is the authors’ apparent way, they State that there are presently 1 I I n a - feeling that spilling the beans about our weap- val vessels and 73 altack submarines that rou- ons capabilities is both necessary and good. tinely carry nuclear weapons, that at least 15 Not everyone will agree, and many in posi- types of tactical aircraft are dual-capable, and tions of authority and responsibility will be that a total of 722 U.S. “combat units,” com- dismayed. Nonetheless, this effort—like prising 110,000 miliiary personnel, are “certi- Bracken’s, but for different reasons—represents lied” for nuclear warfare. a delayed-fuze time bomb oí sorts. No writer of Inlike theannual military balance volumes consequence on these matters is likely to neg- of the International Institute for Strategic Stud- iect it. And others will not refraiti frornquoting ies in London (abbreviated each year in the its figures as gospel (especially when they can December issue of Air Force Magazine) or the be made to help support a conclusion already SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research arrivedat). In this sense, the authors have suc- Institute) yearbooks on World Armaments and ceeded in what was perhaps their principal Disarmament, this first volume of the Data- purpose: getting the numbers game out in the book is impressively (il incompleiely) docu- open, down to specifics, and open to debate. mented. It contains literally hundreds of foot- notes that provide the sources for the authors’ numbers and projections (if not their mean- T M IS excursion into some of the ing). Those sources are mainly technical jour- recent literatureon nuclear weapons and poli- nals, congressional hearings, and some 200- cies will have ac hieved its purpose il it no more plus documents declassified following success- than alerts those on active Service that, where lul challenges under the Freedom of Informa- nuc lear policy isconcerned, there is something tion Act. sei ious going on out there in American societv. A major problem with this mix of sources The freeze movement; films like The Day A fter involves the extraction therefrom of disçrete and Testament (the first Hollywood produc- items which. when placed together in a partic - tions in twenty years focused on the results of ular context, sometimes add up, in the figura- nuclear war); the formation of proíessional tive sense, to more than is warranted. Another groups atnong lawyers, businessmen. and phy- is that the information is not always accurate. sic ians committed to puttinga capon the arms The authors, like many others caught up in the competition; the reports of discontents in tu- Washington maelstrom, often forget a cardinal roperegarding trends in U.S.-Soviet relations rule: “Just because it is [or was] (lassified these and olhei manifestations ol a rising con- HOOKS, IM.lC.t.S, INI) 11)1AS 95

cern are hard to miss, howevei ill-advised they it.) Noneof us need (all into the trap that Majoi may seem. General Howard Estes decried in these pages in The general public is beginning to wonder November 1982 when heobserved that the most whether somethinghasgotieamiss somewhere severe critics of seeking agreement with the along the line. ‘ The View from lhe Street Soviets regarding nuclear weapons are soine- Comer," as Time labeled it in its first issue for times “totally uninformed” officers who don't 1984. is tending in thedirection of questioning know much about strategic arins limitation whether things are quite right (or under con- "but are quite sure they do not like” the idea. trol) regarding nuclear weapons. Stated in its This was no put-down of anybody, but rather a starkesi and least welcome form, what seeins to plea, based primarily on his own experiences be emerging is a more general feeling thal there while still on active duty, for "lhe encourage- is not. nor has there ever been, a clearly logical ment by top Air Force leadership of the liank sei of guiding piinciples supporting U.S. nu- expression of vievvs that might not be univer- clear strategy; thal our policies and attendant sally popular, eithei within or wilhoui tfie De- strategies may not be well matched; thal what partment of Defense.” (To which line, we may we really ha\e is a pile of capabilities and op- be assured, the shades of all Aii Corps Tac lical tions thal are likely to be employed, il deter- School faculty members rose in applause!) rence appears to be failing, according to the What General Estes was saying, in effect, was altitudes and biases oi those in charge at anv that the Servicecould well beat thepoint w here given moment; that those altitudes are nevei it could use more oflicers like those whoin Ma- íully formed (and, in fact, nevei can be until the jor General I. B. Holley, Jr., lias longsought to moment of decision has arrived); and that the recruit in these pages—those who, once free inost far-reaching and long-lasting results of from thedaily responsibilities attendant to the employing our capabilities will be those neither cockpit or launch control facility, "w ill goout intended nor foreseen. And all this despite ol their way to seek and w elcome evident e that what “the other side" may have in mind. seems toconfuseor contradict thereceived wis- So if any of this is true, where does a person dom of their own, most cherished beliefs." A go froin here? Not into hiding, I would hope, tall order, to be sure, and not the salest path on and not into the readily available defensive whic h to plot acareei . But with that approac h. mode that rejects all criticism as subversively previously hidden questions can suríace, some- intended (or, to coin a phrase, disinforma- times leading nowhere but at other times lead- tionally wroughn. l he critics may be wrong, ing to new answers (or at least new approac lies partic ularh regarding details to which they are to problems shaped in c iit umstances ol an ear- not privy, but they are serious. Not only that, lierera). Theboitom line in all this is that those but they include among their number more on activeduty bear a heavy responsibility tosee than a few formerly very sênior officials oí the that matters don't get out of hand and that l nited States government. military as well as impopular oi uncomloi table problems are not civilian. I hat fac t alone should give pause to ignored. Cliange is more likely to be prcxlut tive those who would dismiss the critics otit of il di iven from within ralhei than direc tcd Iroin hand—oíten by citing the illogic of some ol withoui. their arguments oi the kooky (lunatic?) behav- Ccnter for Aerospace Doctrine, ior of the fanatirs among ihem. (Kvery view- Research, and Educai ion poitu must live with fanatics on both sides of Air I 'nivcrsily % IIR l.X/l lRSITY REVI KW

Notes Spiuig 1983. pp. 950-70. (Prolessor Johnson s "olhei myths" in- 1 See especiaily pages 13 atui 120-21. // animosttv ispiesem. n is t lude N.SC-68. the 1955 killian Report. and lhe 1957 Gaither Re- well disgtnsed. S< heei gives every indii ation ilial he spenl a great pott Johnson rvrites Irom lhe experiente ol having yvorked on the deal ni time "liendingovei bat kwards" in hiseltort 10 be tli.it vvhich NSC siail in the mid-l950s yvhen the Killian and Gaither reports he could not be; i.e., imparlial. vvere presented.) 2 For lhe backgroundand detailsof tlusasserlion. see the folloyv- 10. Slrangelove is here used in its nuvv altnost genetít sen se. ing icpori.apparently notdistovered by Si heer. IndustrialSuwiinl (Kaplán. by lhe rvar, seenis unayvare of Stanley Kubrirk s often anil Recove r\ alter Xuclear Altai k: I Report h> llie loinl Comrnit- statedt lairn ihat he modeled Slrangelove ona professoral 1 larvard tee on Delense Proiluction. I S. Congress, prepared by lhe Boeing uamed Kissinget .1 ike tnost yvt iters. Kaplau seenis to thittk kiibrit k \eiospace Compaiiv. a division ol lhe Boeing Company, Seattle. had Herman Kahn in mind.) Washington. 18 November 1976 (availahle írom the Delense 1 ech- 1 I. Originally Rand Report R-21I-S (untilled). closely held but itieal Information Ceniri i See in particular pp. B-l through B-10. b u e fe d a t S A C and lhe Pentagon begitming in M arth of 1953; laler yvhere Mr. Jones teplies n fourleenspei ilit questionsregardinglhe un otporated as thesummary al the beginningol A. J. Wohlslettet et somewhat less than scieniilit basts lot bis ealeulalions regarding al.. Selei lion and l se ol Strategir hr Bases, RAND R-266. April populalion survival. 1951. yvhit h yvasa ntassive. 121-pag eT o p Sei tet siudy. 1 he lirst that 3. 1 hese evettis (not irealed by St heer in bis Ixrok cxrepl tangen- lhe publit heaid abottl the implit ations ol these sludies yvas in tially in the notes on pp. 138-10) can be Irated in: Los Angeles Wohlstetter s artitle " I he Delitaie Balance ol 1 ertor," Foreign rimes, 16 Januai y 1982. p. 1. and 15 Man h 1982. Pai i II, p. 9 (yvhere Affairs, Jainiatv 1959. pp. 211-31. Mr Jones, yviih unconsc tons irony. advised that "Civil Delense for 12. 1 loyv else Io account lot the cousislent inisspelling of "Mac- Vinei ii a K No Laugliing Multei " l; Inquiry, 15 M a n b 1982, pp . 3-1 Nainara" Ihroughout lhe book. a relerence lo Melvitt Latird asa ( .alltnvs Hunioral lhe Pentagon"); Washington Post, 17 M a r t h lormer "SenalOr. and the omission ol Arkin s middle intlial, 1982, p. I, Seu York Limes. 17 M a u h 1982, p. 16, and 19 Man h yvhit h he elsevvhere alyvays uses? 1982 d o r ediloi tal relet red to); Inne. 29 March 1982. p. 21 (" D ig a 13. Signals intelligeme.elet ironit intelligence, F.tnergenty Rotkel Hole" i; Chicago Sun Limes, I Vpril 1982 editorial. "A Nesl Kgg lot (.ommtiuitations Sysiem, lhe Delense Suppoii Progtam; all ile- Doomsday"; Washington Post, 1 .Vpril 1982. p. 1, "Pentagon Offi- lails regarding these temaiii highly tlassilied. but Pringle and < tal Rctieals. Calls A-VVar l'nyvinnable," and p. 3, yvhere Maty Vi kiti (and Btat ken i ptovide general descíiptions of eaclt. includ- Mt Ctorv t (imtnenls) atisttrallv on Jones s long-arvailed lestimony: ing hatdyvare iuvolved. assotíated io sIs , and funtlional history. Ballnnore Sun. 2 April 1982, p. 15 lot John L. Ffesss t ommenls, I I. John Sieinhiuner. lot example. yytiies ol the "potentially yvhit h lotulude. In lhe vvoids ol Mt Reagan, lei ns pray;" and oy eryvhelining presstttes | on responsible inililary commanders| lor Washington Post. 12 May 1982. yvhere Judv Mann promoled Mr. ouitight preemption ttnder iniense ttisis cirtumstances yvhen lhe Jones to "Gen." prospet t ol a n uuavoidable yy ai yvould be lai ing lltem." See p. I I ol I Xuclear II ar Slrategy, Hearings before lhe Commiuee on his artit le lisled in the Samplet on p. 93 ol this issue. Foreign Relalions. C.S Sertate. 96th Congress. 2tl session ( Idp I 5. An extreme slatcmeul. to be sure. but ollered yvithoul apolo- Set ret hearing held on 16 Septembei 1980; sanitt/ed and pt inted on gies. l ot knoyvledgeable il mote resirained suppon, see the rcvicrvs 18 Febitiatv 1981), p. 22. by l.ayvtence Freedman (in Book World. II Detemhet 198.3) and 5 fhe t|Uoied phrase is borroyved írom Anlhony l.etviss com- McGeoigeBundy nnlhe.Vcte York Times Book Reiiew, 9 Octohtr ments on "Aloms and Politics." Xeu York Limes, 8 Novemhet 1983). Freedman talls lhe book "biilliaut" and observes that 1982, p. 17. "Br.nken has sutieeded in pulting lhe nutleai debate on a neyv 6. Peddlers oi ( nsis. p. xt. lor both the qouted yvords and the plane." Buiidy says stmplv tltai lheie is nolhing beltet in theopeit teíereiife lo lhe "quite yvilling, indeed gracious" coopcratton lhe lilerature. attihoi teeeivetl írom. arnongothers, Paul Niize. Jeane Kirkpatrick. It). Regarding the ( I nelyvork. I cantiol tesisi quotiug here the Rithartl Allen. Xormatt Podheret/, Charles Iyioler II. Max Kam- lusi footnote m Brai ken's book "Some refcieiues in the pasl leyy pelman, Chatles Burlou Marshall, and Lieutenant General Daniel years employ the phrase ■command.conirol, Communications.and <) Gtabatn, CSA (Ret). intel ligem e. or even ‘tommund, tomrol. communit aiions, com- 7. For a bt ief att ount of lhet onnections betvvcen lhe lyvoeoniinit- puteis, intelligence. and infortnational ptotessing.' An ttnder- tees. see Samuel F. Wells. Jt . " ! he Cnited States and the Ptesent slandingol lhe defini lion ol i omniand andcontroi yvill shotv the.se Datiger. Lhe journal oi Strategii Studies, M an b 1981. pp. 60-70. additíonal leiitis to be redundant." (p. 3) 8. Peddlers oi Cnsis. p. 7 and (.. Wrighl Mills, The Power Elite 17. See lhe rer lerv by L.ayvreme Freedman. i iled in note 15 abo Ve. i Ness 5 ork: Oxford Cnivetsíly Piess, 1956), p. 356. 18 McGeorge Bundy in the revieyv cited in note 15 above. 9 fite periodical lilerature (extluding Cornmentary and The 19. In its pure lorui, this "law " is statedas folloyvs: "Just because \ aliomil Re-. ien i atld the ()p-Fd pages are iull ol sut h |rte< es these il's < lassilietl tloni inean it's truel" I am indebled to Don Ober- day s For one ol the best, see Robet t H. Johnson. "Periods of Peril: dorlei. diplomata < orrespondcnt ol lhe Washington Post loi point- I he Wtndoyv ol \'ulnerability and Other Myths," Foreign Affairs, tng this out lo me one das i tising, lo he sure. beltet grammai i. POTPOURRI

Fighling Armies: NATO and lhe Warsaw Pacl (Volume tliors populat with lhe Department ol lhe Army.» 1 hen I), Fighiing Armies, Aniagonists in lhe Middle Easi comments on lhe lack oi a national strategii doctrine to (Volume 2). and Fighting Armies, Nonaligned, Third guide lhe use ol military lotees, tiaining, and theeíícctsof World, and Olher Ground Armies (Volume 3) edited by i areei ism on the oflic et corps are well worih reading. Also. Riçhard A. Gabriel. Westport. Connec lii ul: Greenwood the ovetall section on lhe I otal Force, espei ially problems Press. 198.1.250 pages. 173 pages. 273 pages, respectively, vvitli the Army Reserve component. traik verv well with $95.00. olhei studies on the subjet t. On the olher hand, theauthoi s Making war is a unique mixlure of men. machines. seetn overly concerned about the si/< ol the ollicer corps, determination, iraining, skill. and luik lhat makes true setting 5 percent as the optimum percent ol ollicers to combat tapabiliiies difficuh io assess. Yet ihis is ihe task enlisted men. It seems to tne that rather than i omparing lhe lhat editor Rit hard A Gabriel lias sei for himselí and his sizeof T.S. At my officer corps to some hard and last peii en- contributors in his new trilogy Fighling Armies: XATO tage. it would be wise to examine the sophistication ol lhe and llie IFarsaie Pai t; Fighling Armies: Aniagonists in llie military force and lhe size and cotnplexity ol the logística) Middle Easl; and Fighling Armies: Xonaligned. Third traiu. Su< h analysis seems to be beyond these authors. World, and Olher Ground Armies. VVithin the T.S. sei tion is a long ilisi ussion ol the qual- The ihree works are divided into < hapters, eaili survey- ity ol Army tecruits, sotial alienation ol lhe individual ing lhe tombai capabilities oí a selected nation. Not all recruits, ovei representai ion ol minorities, and drug prob- nations in a gíven category are covered: for example. only lems. The botloin line ol the authors' analysis is that seven NA I O powers and three Warsaw Paet powers ate siupid. alienated, doped soldiers do not fight well—not included in Volume 1. Throughout lhe three volumes, the exactly a shocking revelation to a militaiy piolessional. chapters are íairlv well standardized. There is the usual Most of the soune material that the authors used for thís manpowerandequipment tallv. bul lhekey seclionsol the pai t of theit sluily carnefrom the 1978 to 1980 time pet iod, a chapters are assessments of recent combat experience, time when thedispat ity betvveen i ivilian pay and militat v iraining and doctrine. the officer corps, the NCO cot ps, pay was at its highest and the sei vices were unahle to and conclusions drawn (rom the information presented. compele suicessfully with the civilian sector íot quality l he Iatter make these volumes imeresting reading. situe people. This situation has situe been remedied, so that in the combat capabilities ol tnen always are cruc ial in war. 1981 the Services ate hav ing theii best recruiting vear evet We know what the contributors attempied to accom- and atiracting high-quality recruits lot both the enlisted plish. The queslion now becomes: How well have thev force and lhe officer corps. I he authors' contei n about the accomphshed lheir objeciive? l he answer is that although high proportion of minorities and the low social class ol there is some variante in quality. for the most part. thev recruits seems ill-founded. l he problem is not that vvehave have dane their task verv well. too many minorities in the military or that the Services The chapters on Greece and Turkey are excellent. Well atirai I mdiv iduals in low soi ial and itu onie i lasses. ( »ood documenied, well written, anil thoughtlully organi/ed, pay, coupled with high standards, ensines a high-quality thev are as good an analv sts ol tliis sensitiveand ovei looked force. Thus the past two years have yielded increasingly NATO ílank as 1 have seen. 1'lte military, sotial. and promising recruits and a steadily improving ovetall lotee. political problems are woven carefully into a tapestry tliat Similarly, the lenient policy on drug abuse that the sen ices portrays the combat capabilities ol these two nations verv adopted during the late 1970s has been adjusted, and the clearly. arrned forces have made substantial progress on the drug The chapter on Israel is also excellent, but the authors abuse problem during lhe past three years. (two cqrrespondents with Time maga/ine, one ol whom Wliile the T.S. Army can be judged to have been shorted had combat experiente in the Istaeli forces) managed it all in this trilogy ol assessments, I believe, its Soviet cotimer- without the use ol a single footnole. so it reads somewhat part has been treated ver v well. In lhe section on the Soviet s, likea Time article. The lack of documemation may annoy written by Richard A. Gabriel and William Mattel, one readers who like to know specifíc sources ol information. notices the lack ol any dist ussion ol drug oi alcohol abuse I hechapter on Iran mav be more satisly ing for st bolais: it in the Soviet arrned forces. Yet heavy useoí alcohol in the is well footnoted. informaüve, and well written. Soviet Union is well documenied by other analysis, and sei i- Probabiy the intrst provocative chapters contem V.S. ous drug abuse is stis[xu ted. Furthermore, Gabriel and Mat - and Sov iet combat capabilities. f lie T.S. sei tion is written tel do not mention the problem the Soviets have with social bv Rwhard A. Gabriel and Paul I.. Savage. who achieved alienation and integralion of theit minorities into the fame with Crisis in Command: M ismanagemenl in lhe arrny. although numerous sources indicate that the prob- Army (1978;. Mui h oí lhat book is synopsized in the T.S. lem is significam anil that the Russians are making little section. (I read Crisis in Command shortlv after its publii a- headway in relieving it. Foran authorol GabrieFscapabil- tion and found it to be an excellent and insightful work. ities to highlight the alienation and drug problems oí the However, the book certainly could not have made the au- T.S. Army and theti to omit them from the analysis of the

97 98 AIR l XIILRSITY RFAIUV

Soviets is i auic foi concern. As (ar as covering theactual than olheis, hui all ol lhe contributors demonsirate ana- com ba i capability <>1 the Soviei army, lhe sedion is lyiic skill and tleíi vvriting. The onlv excessively academic ilioughi-provoking and wcll ilone. Highlighted are lhe essay is a pieceon political and sirategic vvarning. vvritten ucmendous rcsources the Soviets expend for their armed hv ( ierald W. Hopple; hui even ii has us insights beneath lon es. the doe trineol the offensive. lhe will lo use militarv the language of pseudoscientific international relations lorre, and lhe prohlems lhe Sov iels ha ve had in dev eloping lheory. a professional NCO and oííiccr corps. Mosí irnpressíve is Bv and large. Military Lessons treais the salient areas of lhe iliscussiun on lhe Soviets* use ol reserves. l he aulhors operalional interest: suhmarine a« iiviiv. operationsof sul- State ihat six ol lhe «iglu divisions initially deployed in fate vesselsand maritimeav iation, theair vvar. amphibious Aíghanistan vverc reserves vvho vvere inohili/ed within ten operai ions, and ground vvarfare. Ruhe's short«hapter on dav s and deploved in the lield for ninetv «lav s before being "smart vveapons" is especiallv interesling, and coediior lepLued hv normal rotaiion. Die Soviei capabilily in this Dunn provides a useful summary ot the lessons, as does aiea is iinmaii hed and perhaps represents lhe grealesi William raylor in the iniroduetion. These lessons are strength ol lhe Red Army. Hovvever, if the reader relied on crafted espetially foi American readers. They focuson the GabrieFs vvork onlv, I think he vvould get the impression detnands of “out ol theater" air-maritiine operations, the ihai the Soviets stand ten feet tall and are viriually unbeat- perils of figlning even second-rate povvers that have rnod- able. On lhe othet hand, balaneed vvith other v iewpoints, ei n vveapons and some men skilled and courageous enough this ccalu.uion of ihe Soviet army vvould he helpful in to use them. and the likelihood that the Falklands War's aiiaining uhai is probably lhe true pieture; ihai is. the quaint Vii lorian character has obscured its relevante to the Soviels have a military force vvith enormous capabilities developmeni of vvarfare since 1915. sadilled vvith a political and so< ial svstem thai siifies imag- Although this book has rich material for military ana- ination and reiards formalion of inisi and respect among lysts, iis usefulness might begreater il it tontainedsepaiate ranks. < hapiers on ihe full range ol elec tronic vvarfare, iheconduci I was verv lavorablv impressed vvith ihese three volumes of operations at night and in foul vveather, and the role of and vvould recommend them as an excellent survey vvork. air-ground coordination in the land campaign. Sisrne of espetially for oíficers vvho vvould like to broadeti lheir lhe aulhors might also be slightlv tainted vvith anglo- km iwlcilgt ab«>ut the ai miesol a large numhet of countt ies. philia, hui lhe Argetuines have not yet heen verv forthcom- They vvould be espetially useful as a starting poini for ing in discussing tlien miluarv lessons (except for those furihei reseati h

A Hero for Our Time is noi scholarly in thc cusiomary tics, operational advantages. and potential for lurlher de- sense, and iis inspiration owes far more to journalism than velopment l he opeiling chapter outlines thesequenceol to political Science. Basically, it is a series oí short and events ihat made up the British campaign iu lhe South highly personal \ignettes, chronologically arranged from Atlantic. Ten subsequent chapters contain personal remi- John F. kennedy's early vears to his death and focusing on niscences. Basically. Harrier is anothei book on the Falk- hts presidency. Someof its "revelations" mighi better have lands Wat, seen througli British eyes; but it is a good one appeared in lhe National Enquner, but one supposes thai and worth waiting for. Godden has obtained personal ai- the text was reviewed careíully b\ a libel lawyer before counts from an intereslingly broad t ross-section of pai ui i- publication. The personal escapades that adorn its pages pants: Royal Navy squadron commanders, Royal Aii Force are generallv in the íorm of quoialions from kennedy piiots, and Navy Air Force engineers and lechnicians, in- associates rather than assertioiis of lati by the auihor. iluding both officers and enlisted men. Revealed are m- Ralph Martin. sighis into lactics, weapon delivery, escape and evasion. How many oí the inumate details of Kennedy's lile re- search and rescue. battle damage repair. and most olhei corded here are accurate and how nrany are not is hard to aspecisoí the human and lechnical challenges faced in war. determine. Certainly every rumor that I atn aware of is The stories are told with liberal helpings oí Biitish un- discussed: Kennedv's love life. his Addison's disease, his derstatement, but the sheer satisfaction oí a job well done serere baek problems. his tempesiuous relationship with and the levei of excitement that operational coinbat genei- Jacqueline. his cynicism. etc. Vet the book is not mean- ated shine through clearly. rhe underlying message from spirited, and from its well-wruten pages emerges tlte figure theaccounts is that the highest possible siandardsof peace- of a pri\ ileged and complex man of great gifts who grew time training will pay dividends when put to the lest in tremendouslv while in officeand captured the imagination war. To quote one of lhe Navy Harrier piiots, lhe com- of a generation. mander of No. 809 Squadron, "It was to be my last opera- Readers interested in the kennedy presidency will find tional flving appointment and it was my first continuous this book hard to put down. but the account is not a combat experience in twenty years ol almost nonstop liv- substitute for more serious analvses. The Kennedy books by ing. . . . I think the most satisfving feature of my living Sorensen. Schlesinger. and Halberstam. for example, put career was that the training and experience of those twenty many of the events imo clearer political and historical years hadproved toberight. There was little waste in those perspective. But a book like.-l Hero for Our Time provides years . . . We d i d n o t f a i l . " a human dimension to the events of the era. The kennedy This is a well-illustrated book, containing over 100 rmstique is still a force to be reckoned with in Democralii photographs—a good number oí them published for the circles and nattonal politics, and this volume describes lirst time. Bm lhe personal accounts provide the real worih how it began. ol the book: nearly all the previous book-lengthcoverageof Most interesting are the speculations on the 1964 cam- the war has been written by nonmililary observeis and paign and a possible second Kennedy term. A kennedy- anaiysts. These ten personal narratives by Harrier opera- Goldwatercontest would have been far moreedifying than tors and maintainers offer a rich sourceof insight into the the character assassinationsand the "Daisy Girl" commer- high-speed, complex demands of modern warfare. cials that otcurred in 1964. M am possibilities for his sec- Anothei point worth noting: the Harrier seems to be ond term were discussed: a rapprochement with China, quite a good aircraít! Thus, British Aerospace may be sotial legislaiion on a more realistic scale than the Great forgiven for telling us so. Twenty-five years after the lirst Socieiy. and a jrosstble (but not ai all certain) extrai tion of design efforts toward it were initiated, the Harriei proved C.S. mtlitary elements from Vietnam. It is interesting to iis worth in a unique demonstration ol versatilily and speculate, but pari of the mystique is that we shall nevei operational effectiveness. Godden's compilation explains know. in exciting detail how the aircrali went to war and "ski- Di John Allen Williams jumped" to victory. Lo\ola Unhiersity of Chicago VVing Commander Phil Wilkinson, RAF An Command and Staff College Maxwell AFR, Alabama Harrier: Ski-jump to Victorv edited by John Godden. Ox- ford.tngland. and Washington: Pergamon-Brassey In- ternational Defence P ublishers. 1983. 132 pages. S I8.00 Changing U.S. Military Manpower Realities edited by

cominand lhe interest ii still deserves. Furthermore, lhe youth—views and values military Service and the way U.S. results of more recent conferentes or studies of lhe subject— military Services view themselves and society. "Today," notably, lhe Report of the Atlantic Council of the United Margiotta asserts. “it is increasingly difficult to convince States (which documented serious deficiencies in the míl- voung Americans to adopt the values, norms, and sacTifices itary manpower system) and the Report of the President s of military service in a peacetime environment, and it is Military Manpower Task Force (which essentially ratified increasingly difficult toraiionalizeconiinued military sacri- existi ng policies)—have appeared already. So why bother ficeand Service to quality military members." Furthermore, with another book on the subject? There are several reasons. as the military has tried to adjust to changing social trends. First, despite lhe overwhelming success of the All Volun- "the self-image of the military as a macho, almost all-male, teer Force (AVF) since late-1980, serious problems remain relatively white insdtution has been shattered "Theresult is unaddressed. Certainly, better pay, improved personnel "a senseof quiet doubt and frustration."This military iden- management. and a much improved public image have tity crisis would exist regardlessof what military manpower combined to make military Service attractive again. But the procurement and retention system the United States em- improvement in the A\’F's fortunes coincided also with the ployed, Margiotta contends. longest, deepest recession since the end of World War II, Thus, despite its clear shortcomings, Margiotta believes leaving lingering doubts about the ability of the AVF to that the All Volunteer Forcewill continue for the foreseeable attract and retain quality and quantity in a healthy econ- future "barringa major and threatening international crisis, omv Also unanswered by the AVF's eurrent success are or a significam shift in the U.S. political system and the questions about its ability to maintain the strength of both Congress... ." His recommendations, which includea more the active and reserve components in a shrinking demogra- systematic and integraied approach to manpower policy phit pool. Yet another set of unanswered questions emerges formulation, are worth reading, as are the other essays in this from the dramatic increase of married enlisted members, collection. single-parent military families, women in nontraditional Lieutenant Colònel Robert K. Grifíith, Jr., USA m ilitan sktlls, etc. All of these issues are addressed in this U.S. Arrny Center of Military History volume. Washington, D.C. Several essavs in Changing U.S. Military Manpower Realities. written by some of the better-known scholars in the field (Coffev, Janowitz. Blair, and Segai), are restate- ments of familiar critiques. Essays addressing Air Force Strategic Studies: A Criticai Assessment by Colin S. Gray. women in nontraditional jobs (by Roben Caldwell, David Boulder. Colorado: Greenwood Press, 1982, 161 pages. Hale, Frank J. Kane, and Patrícia Dallenbach), Anne Hoi- S27.50. berg's essav on women in the Navy, and threeessays probing the subject of the military family (by Edna Hunter, Richard Colin Gray boldly States that Strategic Studies is based on Brown III, et al.. and Sabra Woolley-Downs) are important the following assumptions: because of State structure and additions that give this volume an unusual breadth for geopolitics. the Soviet Union is a permanent adversary (not booksof this genera. Toooften. analysesof military person- a "misguided friend"); since knowledgeof nuclear-weapon nel matters play numbers games with the quantity, quality, technologv is already widelv dispersed, it cannot beremoved gender, and representativeness of the armed forces. Family as a permanent. important factor in world politics; interna- issues receive almost no attention at all. T he inclusion of tional politics is a dynamic process wherein States rise and women and families in this collection make it worthy of fali in relative influence, and nuclear weapons. though special consideradon. important, have not altered the basic nature of international The introductory essay by Franklin D. Margiotta, which political rivalry; and military power, even military’ nuclear sets this book apart from most of the recent publications on power. remains the ultima ratio of securitv Communications. the subject of military manpower, merits particular atten- For Gray. there are noalternatives tostrategy and strategic don. Margiotta's thesis—essentially the message underlving studies. They are a fact of life, and the bottom line for the theentirecollection—is that “changing military' manpower United States is that we just don t have another option. It is, realities may be the single most criticai and persistem issue of course, regrettable that too often strategy has been impinging upon U.S. policy in the 1980s and 1990s." That "designed in error and executed without skill," but this position is not new, but I have not read a better single essay circumstance does not change the essential situation. Soviet in support of that view in the half-dozen books on the strategists are busy preparing to wage war efficiently. Gray subject that haveappeared since 1980. M argiotta reviews the believes, while, simultaneouslvand unfortunately, the strate- familiar facts and trends before reaching the same conclu- gists and politiciansof the United States are moreconcerned sion as others: “The sum of the evidence . . . suggests that with "the process of arms race and crisis" than with the legitimate questions remain about the ability of the [all actual conduct of war. Even the literature that pours out of volur teer] military' to defend the United States adequately in the U.S. strategy think tanks is thin of actual operational the near future." Margiotta does not stop with the numbers analvsis. game. He believes that theroot cause of the military’s people Gray’s ability todistinguish between fair and unfair criti- problems is social, not demographic or economic. During cism of strategic studies is well illustrated in this interesting the decades since World War II, the United States has expe- volume. Thus the author States that while it is easy to rienced a revolution in social normsand values. Theresult is criticize the errors of lhe studies conducted in the 1950s and a fundamental change in the way our society—especially 1960s, most of that criticism is misdirected. Even critics can BOOkS. IM.KH-.S, IX I) IDI .1S 101

miss the mark. The sensible thing to do. according to lhe their success remainsdubious. Childs does not probedeeply author. is to criticize the sulgarization of strategic thinking into the way things anual ly happen in lhe GDR. asopposed that occuned dunng the second half of the I960s in the to the way they are supposed to happen. Nevertheless. he McNamara Pentagon—an exampleof which is the policy of demonstrates that East Germans at all leveis, intellectuals mutual assured destrurtion (MAD). Today, defense strate- and workers alike, continue toquestion, tochallenge.and to gists are almost in consensus that the U.S. theorv of nuclear identify more wáth Germany as an entity than with the deterrence of the 1960s was w rong (or inappropriate). that Democratic Republic under which they live. This enduring the theorv of "limited war" does not work in the terms of altitude, in turn, guaramees the GDR's survival as a police domestic poiitieal viability. and. finally. that the T.S. State—"liberal" by the standards of Heinrich Himmler or approach to arms control in the 1970s was not appropriate Lavrenti Beria perhaps, but a police state nonetheless, and for dealing with the Soviet Union. As for the future, “the far more deserving of characterizaiion as such than Child’s several demonstrable weaknesses in strategic studies should soft-shoe approach allows. beviewed not as discouragement. but ratherasachallenge to Dr. Dennis E. Showaher do better in the future.” Colorado College, Colorado Spnngs Strategic Studies is a valuable book worth reading and discussing bv all students. Dr. Robert H. Terry York College of Pennsylvama The First of the Few: Fighter Pilots of the First World War by Denis Winter. Athens: University of Geórgia Press. 1983, 223 pages, 517.50. TheGDR: Moscow'sGerman Ally by DavidChilds. London: Don'i be fooled by this book's ambiguous and somewhat Allen and Unwin. 1983. 352 pages. 530.00 cloth. 514.50 deceptive title. It is neither a "rehash" of the aerial cam- paper. paigns of the Great War nor another set of biographies of the The German Democratic Republic (GDR), with a rich first aces. Author Denis Winter has adopted an altogether heritage that is definitely and unmistakably Western, should fresh approach. By examining a large number of pilot offer an ideal case studv of the applicabilitv of Marxism- memoirsand importam archival material, hehas provided a Leninism under highlv favorable conditions. Yet David composite picture of hoiv the first British fighter pilots Childs of Nottingham Universitv combines poiitieal history trained, foughi, lived. and died. and structural analysis of the East German system to present Two motifs run through this volume and give it a fresh- a chronology of failure. He is embarTassingly reluctant to ness not always found in Great War monographs. The first stress that fact. His book jacket summary refers to the GDR as is the terrible human price technological inferiority exacts "one of the most successful socialist experiments of our in war. By 1909, Britain had spent£2500on aircraft research time." One hopes the ironv wasdeliberate. Childs isat pains and development as compared with £47.000 in France and to show that the GDR began as an advanced industrial £400,000 in Germany. (p. 18) This halting prewar aviation region. Its defense budget is hardlv backbreaking. Itsoften- effort forced the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) to design or cited burdens of reparations and population loss—the latter develop literally everyihing required to flv and fight—from checked bv some of the most physically obvious barriers aircraft to trainíng programs to flight medicine. If the results anvwhere in the world—seem to be far in the past. On page were heroic and ultimately successful, the cost was horrify- after page. Childs establishes the burdens of irrelevant and ing. British losses were four times the German totais; and of incompeient planning. Still. heconcludes that it is “a matter the 14,166 RFC RAF pilot deaths in the War. fully 8000 of judgment" as to why the GDR s alleged economic pro- occurred in training accidents in the United Kingdom. (p. gress has provided so little of the good life for its ordinary 36) citizens. Perhaps he is too victimized by British intellectual Winter’s second recurring theme is the essential conti- "goodthink" to State the obvious. What is wrong in the nuity of Great W'arcombat flying with World War II and, by GDR is the fundamental approach of "scientific socialism": implication, with today. Despite the groundbreaking. at the mania for centralized control. the insistence on making times groping. efforts of the early fighter pilots, the Great every aspect of human life a poiitieal matter. War aviators managed to develop the lactics. doctrines, and Childs is more effective in tracing the GDR's development altitudes that formed the core of fighter pilot procedures in from a zone of occupation to a client State that has become all air forces of the 1939-45 conflict and heavily influence us moreCommunist than the Soviet Union. TheGDR‘sgrow- today—a remarkable achievement despite the fearsome cost. ing intemational legitimacy has involved other powers' First of the Few is a brilliant little book which told me abandonment or modification of posilions rather than any more about air-lo-air combat in the Great War than any significam initiatives or achievements of the GDR itself. other single volume. The author even managed to include a Childs demonstraies clearly, albeit unwillingly, the fatuity short chapter on aircraft maintenance and the pecuiiar prob- of détente and Ostpolihk applied to a system more com- lemsand pitfallsof servicing the first fighters. For Great War pletely politicized. more dependem on the goodwill of the aficionados, for the airman interested in his “roots," and Soviet Union, than any other in Eastern Europe. even for the Projecl Warrior seminar or study group, this However. while lhe GDR has produced its own brand of treatment of the development of Britain's fighter arm will ideologues working to make the system's control absolute, prove informative and entertaining—while offering impor- 102 UH rSIVERSITY RF.V1EW

tam insights into the complex relationships of man, tech- The effects of this shortcoming are exacerbated by the nology, and combat. absence of a comprehensive analytical overview. The point is Captain Gar>' Cox. USAF most easilv made by example: Three photographs show a late AFIT! Unwcrsity of Virginta production Me 262 A-la with an odd, checkerboard pattern, Charlottesville defense of the Reich tail marking. (pp. 350-51) This marking, the authors concl ude, indicates theaircraft's probableassign- ment toan IndustrieSchutzSchwarm, an indusirv protection unit. Both lhe marking and the assignment of first-line jet Jei Planes of the Third Reich by J. Richard Smith and Eddie fighters to this typeof unit were previously unknown to me, J. Creek. Boylston, Massachusetts: Monogram Aviation having encountered no reference to either in the secondary Pubhcations, 1982, 400 pages, $69.95. literature, and knowledge of them is certainly not common- The qualities of this lavishly illustrated and beautifully place. Yet we are not told how the authors arrived at their produced book can be surfimed up in two words: magnificeni conclusion or on what evidence. They give us no hint of how and frustraung. widespread this practice may have been. The intelligent orgam/ation, comprehensive scope, and— If, in fact, the Third Reich assigned numbers of its tacti- particularlv—the effective use of pictorial material richly callv most potent fighter to decentralized. ad hoc, local pro- merit the "magnificene.” for the "frustrating," read on. tection units—and the evidence of the photographs is The hundreds of carefully selected photographs, many persuasive—it helps to explain why such superior weapons previously unpublished, plus judiciously chosen plans, were, in the aggregate, so ineffective. Certainly. clear evidence perspective drawings. and full-color paintings illustrating of a mind-set capable of producing the dysfunctional disper- the ntind-boggling gamut of Nazi Germany's principal jet sion of operational assets as indicated isof major significance aircraft programs. explain thesteeppriceandareat theheart in itself; the point cries for documentalion and amplification. of this book's appeal. The effective use of relevam pictorial On a more general levei, explicit reference is never made to material, well integrated with thesmoothly written text and the Third Reic h's counterproductive fragmentation of devel- displayed to full advantage in the 9” x 1" format on high- opmental effort, to which this book offers eloquent, if inad- qualitv paper, is arguablv the book's strongest point. This is vertent, testimony. Indeed, the Nazi regime’s dispersion and not simplv amatter of visual attractiveness, for the photos are dilution of some truly remarkable engineering talent is the themselves a major source of evidence. The authors clearly major theme of the book; it is unfortunate that it remains an know their photographic sources inside out. They have. unstated one. We can only hope that Monogram, whose moreover, intelligently defined the scope of their study and praiseworthy publishing efforts are unmatched in many are to becommended for resisting the urge todepict scores of important respects, will see fit to make use of historically vvild-eyed, pie-in-the-sky turbojet and ramjet proposals that trained editors for future offerings of this sort. The price they never progressed beyond general arrangement drawings. pav bv not doing so is to reduce a potentially definitive work concentrating instead on projects on which metal was actu- to a nicelv packaged collection of source photographs for the allv cm. This still covers a lot of ground—rocket-boosted specialist and an engaging narrative and tantalizing picture variants of the Messerschmitt Me 262 and alternate engine book for the general reader. installations for the Arado Ar 234 aregiven full treatment. for Dr John F. Guilmartin. Jr. example—but the study retains its focus. Rite Unwersity The authors’ research appears to have been exhaustive and Houston. Texas has produced not only a balanced chronical but some sur- prises as well: the extern of efforts to makea night fighteroui of the Ar 234 bomber, for instance, and theconvoluted evolu- tion of the Heinkel He 162 Volksjãger among them. The The Miracle of Dunkirk by Walter Lord. New York: Viking narrative is apparentlv accurate, at least within the limits of Press, 1982. 323 pages, SI7.95. my abilitv to check and is more comprehensive than anv other readily available source. seven of the nineteen chapters As a popular military author, Walter Lord generally and two of the four appendixes being devoted to the opera- approaches his subject from a "heroic perspective." His tional record. latest effort. a retelling of the Dunkirk evacuation of May- Frustration emerges with “appears" and "apparentlv” in June 1940, is no exception. It combines his fast-paced writ- the preceding paragTaph, for the authors use no footnotes. ing style with an eye for the dramatic so that the role of the Except where it is clear that they are relving on pictorial participants often comes alive for the reader. Especiallv well evidence or interviews with surviving participants, we can etched is his description of Vice-Admirai Sir Bertram Ram- only guess at their sources. This is not a trivial matter, since, say, "a resourceful, resilient man," whodirected the evacua- by implicit admission (p. 8), the authors are apparentlv tion effort from his headquarters in Dover and who later limited ia their abilitv to deal with original German texts. gained even gTeater renown as the naval commander for The value of the work to serious scholars is sharply reduced Overlord. Equally interestingare Lord’snumerous vignettes as a result and without benefit to the general reader. This is a of lesser-known personssuch as Douglas Tough, a Tedding- poini of particular frustration, since the addilion of citations ton dock operator, who requested and at times comman- would haveentailed negligiblecost to the publisherand little deered boatson lheThames toassist in the evacuation. Lord additional effort by the authors, whose research, onesuspects, was able to include sim ilar sketches by contacting some 500 was both thorough and sound. survivors, often with the helpof the Dunkirk Veterans Asso- BOOKS. IMAdES. AND IDI-.AS 103

ciation in Leeds, and lhe individual reports provide ihe questions that war might present from the seat of a coekpii backdrop for what those nine emotion-filled days were reallv bul instead vividly narrates lhe stirring, hard-living, some- like. times riotous existence of the fighter pilot at war. Although While the author concentrates on lhe British side oí the Dunn offers a fatalistic account of the death and misery story. the French allv and the German enemy are not alto- which was superimposed over the off-duty merriment, his gether neglected. Hitlers famous "hall order" of 24 May, tale, nevertheless, does not lack compassion. He is deeply which allowed the AIlies a three-day respite to establish an moved by the suíferings of lhe maimed and by those who effectivedefensive perimeier around Dunkirk. is particularly sacrifice their lives in combat. Still, on all occasions, Dunn is well described as is lhe valor of the French soldiers during absolutely convinced that he is performing a necessary duty the final hours before the surrender. The book is further and that the cause he is fighting for is a noble one. Of course, enhanced bv clear, well-placed maps and excellent photo- that does not prevent him from venting his wrath at the graphs, manv of which have never been published before. desk-bound planners he considers responsible for sending so Nevertheless. despite its many positive features, Lord's many young men to untimely deaths on poorly organized, account does have some disturbing aspects. For one thing, futile missions. he overemphasizes lhe part plaved by the Stuka dive- Dunn had extensive experience flying the British Hurri- bomber at the expense of the Me-109 and other Luftwaffe cane and Spitfire as well as the American P-47 Thunderbolt aircraft. In addition. though generally well researched, he and P-51 Mustang. In a provocative appendix, he evaluates does not seem to have consulted such standard works as the leading Allied fighters of World War II and also offers Jacobsen, Bond. and volume two of the German official insightful comments on the battle worthiness of an oppo- history. He has also failed to use the British War Cabinet and nent he faced countless times in combat, the Messerschmitt the Chiefs of Staff papers. and thus his treaiment of Allied 109. Dunns opinions may surprise some veteran fighter decision making at the highest leveis is not as precise as it pilots and students of air warfare, particularly his direct might have been. In fact, he seldom moves past the descrip- comparison of the Thunderbolt and Mustang. tive to the analyiical levei. As a result, the broader issues Fighter Pilot is a true-life adventure story that can appeal surrounding the Dunkirk operation—such as how it fits to both the general reader and the military historian. It is historicallv into World War II and the twentieth century and highly recommended. why it is importam—these considerations make up only a First Lieutenant Kenneth Schaffel, USAF small poriion of the narrative. Yet it is good to keep in mind Office of Air Force History that Lord is not interested primarily in an analytical Bolling AFB, D.C. approach but rather in giving an accurate. yet vivid recrea- lion of how 338.226 Allied soldiers managed to escape from almost ceriaín captivity to fight another day. In this respect, The Miracle of Dunkirk is eminently successful. Alexander of Rússia: Napoleon’s Conqueror by Henri Dr Alan F. Wilt Troyat. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1983, 335 pages. $17.95. Air War College Maxwell AFB. Alabama Here is a lively, popular biogTaphy of the czar of Rússia who grew to maturiiy and ruled during the Enlightenment era of the French Revolution and Napoleon. The author, a Russian-born Frenchman, is very sympalhetic to his subject, Fighter Pilot: The First American Ace of World War II who by turns is shown as mystical and naive, cruel and by William R Dunn. Lexington: University Press of calculating. As in his previous works on Tolstoy and on Kentucky, 1982, 234 pages, $18.00. Catherine the Great. Henri Troyat is a fine storyteller; his writing is suspenseful and vivid, particularly on the private As the title implies, William R. Dunn earned the distinc- life of the czar. There is not much novelty in Troyat’s inter- tion of becoming the first American ace of the Second World pretation of events, which takes little account of English and War. Heaccomplished that feat before the United States had German works. His sources are primarily French and Rus- entered the war, while serving in the British Roval Air sian memoirs of court life—lestimonics to vanished gilded Force's American-manned Eagle Squadron. Only twenty- splendor. five years old at the time. Dunn was already a veteran of both In Troyat s account. we learn that Alexander did not wish the Canadian and American armies. After service with the to rule, at least not on the death of his grandmoiher Cathe- Eagle Squadron. he transferred to the American Army Air rine; that he felt lifelongguilt about themurder of hisfather, Forces in 1943 and saw action in the European and China- the eccentric Paul I; and that despite his talk of reform, he Burma-India theaters. After the war, Dunn advised and was a firm believer in the autocracv of old Rússia. Like fought for the Chinese Nationalist Air Force and later Stalin later, Alexander understood the necessity of appeal- becameair consultam to the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Riza ing to nationalism when his country was invaded. Believing Pahlevi. He missed involvement in the Korean conflict but that he had been chosen by God to destroy the evil Napo- made up for it in Vietnam, where, although no longer on leon. Alexander readily proposed messíanic plans;of course, flying duty. he added to a vast eollection of medals by he himself had fallen under Bonaparte’s spell at Tilsit. After earning a second Bronze Star during the Battle of Saigon. 1815, the peak of his European popularity, Alexander may Dunnoutlines his tumultuous military career in straight- well have suffered an identity crisis. His announced consti- forward prose He does not reflect on the philosophical tutional projects carne to naught, always stopped short of 101 aih t \'iri-Rsrn revirw execulion. Napoleon ihought "something was always miss- Long s The Civil War Day by Day, Mark M. Boatner's The ing in the Czar"; Metternich found in him "a strangc com- Civil War Dictionary, and Ezra J. Warner's two reliable bination of masculine virtues and feminine weakness.” For source books, Generais in Gray: Lives of the Confederate those who wish to learn something of Alexander and aboui Commanders and Generais in Blue: Lives of the Union Rnssian character in general, Henri Troyat has provided a Commanders. The indusion of an introduction by distin- most readable version. guished historian Henry Steele Commager adds weight to Dr Maarten Ultee the book. Probing the reasons whv modem America con- University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa tinues to be fascinated with the Civil War. Commager con- cludes that while the war settled many issues, many more remain open and current. Immediately following the introduction is a section on The Plot to Steal Florida: James Madison’s Phony War bv the chronological history of the causes of the war, the war Joseph Burkholder Smith. New York: Arbor House. 1983, itself, and reconstruction. Opening with a treatment of the 314 pages, SI6.95. introduction of black indentured servants into Virgínia in 1619, what follows thereafter is largely a recapitulation of Thatoneof the Founding Fathers. James Madison. could The Civil War Day by Day in condensei! form. No mention finance a shabby land-grab operation on lhe flimsiest of or credit is given to the author(s) of this section. excuses and show how truewas hisdirtum that governmen- The section on weapons of the war contributes nothing tal "pow er... will ever be liable toabuse" are therevelations new or original. Indeed, it is introductory in nature. and with which Joseph B. Smith hopes to surprise us. material that is presented is often quite meager. For exam- This sensationally titled book, The Plot to Steal Florida: ple, two excellent illustrations are captioned "Civil War James Madison’s Phony War, has a double purpose. Smith cannons," with no attempt at more precise identification. explores a negletted and largely unsuccessful attempt by the Another illustration of a Napoleonic piece appears to be a f .S. government, through bullying, to acquire the Floridas cTude line drawing pasted in as an afterthought. cheaply from Spain when Spain was weak, Theauthor then The brief section on naval warfare is well written but tries to make analogies between Madison's Floridian dab- without anv identification of the contributor(s). It too lacks blings and U.S. covert operations elsewhere approximately depth, and no citations are given. 160 vears later. Smith does better with his first aim than with The final section contains biographies of major leaderson his second. both sides—political figures as well as military personnel. It The method of acquiring Florida was to persuade Anglos, seems useful and would be particularlv helpful to those so-called patriots living under Spanish rule, to revolt, starting to study the Civil War. The information was com- declare an independem republic, and almost at oncerequest plete: but again. no citations or author credits are provided. its annexation by the United States. I( resident Anglos were Leaving much to be desired, the illustrations, in many content under the Spanish flag, then spurious armed patri- instances, are either poorly captioned or fictitious. A color ots (enlisted on promises of Floridian land) could be intro- rendition of Union uniforms, taken from a well-known duced from neighboring States of the American union. In modern series of prints, is labeled as a Union recruiting 1810, this technique worked in that part of Spanish West pôster. Florida around Batí iRouge;andin 1812, in East Florida at For the uninitiated, The Civil War Almanac is an excel- Fernandina. However, then. at theonsetof war with Britain, lent introduction; for the scholar or the seasoned profes- Madison withdrew hissupport for the East Florida patriots. sional soldier, it leaves much to be desired. There is no Part of West Florida staved American. bibliogTaphv and absolutely no indication of sources for the Smith recounts all of the events in an interesting, even material within. Much of the information appears to have exciting way. Sometimes, however, when he seéms to be been culled from standard secondarv works—mainly The striving for literary effect, he strikes a wrong note—for Civil War Day by Day. Editors who may have worked with example, describing seventeenth-ceniury Indians as doing Bowman are not listed.and there is no hint to theauthorship "the hard-hat work" in buildinga fort. or having the Found- of the various sections. The Civil War Almanac fails as a ing Fathers "put on their togas one arm at a time.” Smith reference. offering no new or significam contribution to the errs. too. with such generalizations as “the Wrar of 1812 and study of the American Civil War. the Vieinam War are broadly analogous" and "James Madi- son wasgreatlv like them [i.e.. Nixon and Kissinger] but not Dr. Robert D. England entirely." Such strainedcomparisons spoil The Plot to Steal Arkansas State University Florida. Dr. R F. A. Fabel Auburn Cniversity, Alabama Jane's Airport Equipment edited by David F. Rider. London: Jane's; Boston: Science Books International, 1982, 471 pages, 5140.00. The Civil War Almanac edited by John S. Bowman. New York: Facts on File. 1983, 400 pages, 519.95 cloth. This is another first in the Jane's line of technical annu- als. Obviously. it is not something that every Revieu) reader The Civil War Almanac, edited by John S. Bowman, has will run right out and buy, but this particular volume will pretensions of sittingon the same shelf as E. B. and Barbara certainly prove valuable to some.Air Force operations. liOOKS. IM.K.I S. AMD IDEAS 105

Followinga short iniroduction by the editor. David Rider. for a well-organized, thorough, pictorial coverage of U.S. and a glossarv of specialized terms. lhe bulk oí farte s Airporl commercial aircraft that have been developed through the Equipment covers every conceivable piece of equipmeni years. involved in both military and civilian airfield operaiions. Dr. Don E. Alberts The major areas covered are emergency and fuel Services, Air Force T al and F.valuation (.enter passenger and cargo handling. as well as lhe principal pieces Kirlland AFB, New México necessary foraircraft maintenance. Air traffic control equip- ment is also detailed. including airfield lighiing, radar, navaids. and Communications. Each item is thoroughly covered and well illusiraied. American Com ba t Flanes by Ray Wagner. Garden City, Who is likely to find this book helpful? Those flving out New \'<>ik: Doubleday, 1982. 565 pages, $29.95. of Andrews to all varietiesof airfields will find this informa- tiveas will USAF aerial port squadrons. logisiics planners. This is the third edition of this voluminous work. and base operations personnel. Air Force civil engineering and it is a good start loi anyone completing a referente mighi also find it worthwhile, as well as Military Airlift library on American military aircraft. American Combat Command crews flving into non-TSAF airfields overseas. Planes covers the emite range ol U.S. military tombai aiicralt from the very earliest daysof the Wright íliers upto Captam Don Rightmyer, USAF 1982. Although n rnakes no attempt to cover the cargo oi Mountai» Home AFB. Idaho liaison aiicralt of the military, it is probably the best cur- rent soutee ol quick referente material on U.S. combat planes. 1 his is the typeoí book that vou would use to look U.S. Commercial Aircraft by Kenneth Munson. London: up that elusive aircraft vou’ve Iteard of but nevei seen or to identify that strange-looking airplane vou photographed Jane’s, 1982, 223 pages, $19.95. at the last military open house. At first glanct. this book appears to be just another illus- The thirty-threec haptet s ol the book are well organ- trated history of American airliners; but. in fact, its scope is ized ituo threemajor se< tiorts, with eat h t haptet tovei ing a much broader than that. Kenneth Munson, the prolific major aiicralt caiegory. For example, in Pari I: Lhe Bi- author oí U.S. Commercial Aircraft, has done an excellent plane Period, 1917-32, there are separate chapters on mul- jobof presentinga chronologv of domestic aircraft employed liengine bombers, At mv pursuits, \av \ flying patrol boats, bv the nations airlines (large and small) and by private firms and a good introduetory t haptet on the tole oi the combat and individuais tn a wide variety of commercial appli- plane. cations. Rav Wagner in< lttdes virtuallv everv typeof military As might be expected, Munson’s book is designed around combat plane, whether it was a mainstay with thousands a "Jane’s" format. Each aircraft is presented in at least one produced, a prolotype, a limited produetion, or. in some excellent photograph, accompanied by a narrative indicat- cases, only a rnockup (such as the mysterious Republic ing major technical and operational characteristics. VVith XF-103). l he text is necessaiily limited bv theam oum ol only one or two paragraphs available per plane, the author information available on eaçh type of aiteraft. and it ofíers cannot describe everv variam and model change; but he does no combat information or tales about the exploits of par- include those that are significam. Munson covers every thing ticular aircraft or pilots. Instead, tire book provides a from the earliest Benoist flying boats of 1913 to the Boeing wealth ol inform ation on povver plams, perftrrmancec hai - 757 and 767 airliners of 1982. T he famous planes of Fokker. acteristics, and armament. Douglas, Lockheed, andothers are there, as are such obscure The new third edition is up-to-daie with the latest creationsas the Barnhart "Wampus Kat" and Budd ‘Cones- information on the F-16and the F A-18. l he only soutee toga." Lightplanesand helicopters used in commercial roles material possibly moret urrem would bea weekly industrv are included also. magazine, such as Aviation Week ir Space Technology. .As the publisher s dust jacket descripiion indicates. the I hose interested in the h igh lovv technology mix proposed book does not really unfold the story of the airline industry bv somedefenseexperist an find some interesting parallels that many of ihese aircraft were designed to serve. Neverthe- in lhe past by simply thumbing through this book. For less, because the presentation of each subject airplane is example, in the U.S. quest to produt ea cheap fighter out oí chronological, Munson presents sufficiem background to nonstrategic materiais during World War II, two Wooden give the reader some senseof continuity. In addition, Mun- Bell XP-77 fighter prototypes were built and tested. " The son has written an introduction that does sketch the devel- basit concept that a small. maneuverable fighter could be opment of U.S. domestic and overseas commercial aviation produced of nonstrategic materialsat less than averagecost before, during, and after the Second World War He also and time was not boi ne out. Performance fell below the 350 includes a brief, alphabetically arranged listing of most mile [x i hour estimated, and a low-speed fighter that can- U.S. airlines, together with their significam formation and not force an enemy to do battle does not suii offensive operating dates. These help fill in lhe background to the tacties." This sounds remarkably like the resulls one could aircraft subsequently described, as does his appended tech- expect il lhe United States adopted lhe idea loday that a nical data chart, which expands on lhe information pro- "skv íull of F-5s is better than a squadron oí F-15s." Per- vtded in the main body of the book. haps we can learn from history. As one experienced histo- The book should be helpful to those readers having a need rian rommcnted afiei reading the section on the XP-77, 106 AIR UM I ERSITY REVIEW

"Here was an airplane ihat could do everything less well tnany, Japan, Swit/erland, lurkey, the United Kmgdom, than iis coniemporaries. but ai a lesser cost.” and lhe Soviet Union. This work is not a book to curl up with and read by While Winged Wonders: The Story of the Flying lhe (ire. Ralher, íi is lhe períect type «rí refereme lo use to IVings is not the only book available on tailless aircraft, it researchan indiv idual aircralt quiekly in its various inodi- can be labeled the lirst comprehensive history that covers fications and models or to review a period of rnilitary their development in both the United States and Europe. aviation. Wiih more than 1400 photographs and a well- Wooldridge provides both a pictorial history of tailless writteti text,. Imerican Coinbal Ritmes is an excellent um- aircraft and the words to bring his subject to liíe. In doing tribution to aviation history. so. he has done a sei vii e to the aircraft bufí as well as those interested in aviation history. Cjptain James I . Putnam, USAI- Aerospace Drcision, St/uadron Officer St hool Captain T. F. Wagner. USAF Maxwell lir to n e Base. .llabamn t.ducational Development Centex Maxwell AFB. Alabama

Winged Wonders: The Story of the Flying Wings by E. T. The Wildcat in World War II by Barrett Tillman. Annapo- Wooldridge. Washington: Smithsonian Institution lis. Maryland: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Com- Picss, 198:4. 185 pages. $25.00 < lo th . $1 1.95 paper. pany of America. 1985, 288 pages, SI7.95. l he central themeof E. T. Wooldridge’s effort is the The last in Barrett T illm an’s series of aircralt "biog- historical development of tailless aircraíi from Alphonse raphies," which he initiated with The Dauntless Dive Penaud's rubber-band-powered model (1871) to the grace- Bomber of World 11 a> II in 1976. The Wildcat m World ful ílightsof John Norlhrop’s winged bombers during the War II continues the same outstanding formatas its prede- 1940s. IVinged Wonders isdeveloped in three parts. Part I is cessors. It is an authoritative. well-documented, flowing a history ol tailless aircralt development from around the narrative of the WildcaTs history. Throughoul the book. world prior to 1959. Part II. on the “N orthrup Years." unitnposing footnotes authenticate the lesser-known facts. covers the development of the American flying wings while the documeniation collectively appears at the end. from lhe early 1920s to the scrapping <>1 the Northrup The book does not cover every variation of engine. arrna- B-55 1419 b o m b e r s d u r i n g t h e ea r l y I950s. Part II also ment, or ecjuipment employed by the Wildcat: instead, it inc 1 udes a section that discusses the application of tail- concentrates on the operational phases of aircraft. less aircralt technology to both the rnilitary and general Tillman has included many outstanding opetational aviation markets from the early 1950s through the ultimate photographs. personal insights of formei Wildcat pilots in tailless aircraft. lhe space shutlle Columbia. The third and Grumman aircraft officials, and views ol historians part, oi Appendixes. providesa wealth of information for who are specialists in theii fields of aviation history . His theain raft bufí. Includedaredelailsabout thestep-by-step bibliography is divided conveniently into books and arti- restoration of the Northrop N-1M (Northrop's fiist true cles. followed by a lengthy and comprehensive itidex. flying w ing); the airt raft specifications for the XB-35. YB- Wildcat has a remarkable personal qualitv often ab- 55, and the YB-35A Flying Wings; the Flying Wing sent from operational histories; it is not drama documented Bomber Reccnd; and a Table of Early Iailless Aircraft. with history. but historical fact presenteei as it happened, Th is book started out to be the stoi v of the restoration with all the frailties, tnistakes, inconsistenc ies, and humor of the Northrop N-l M at the National Air and Space Mu- that tnake up life. While the readers do not witness the seum's Paul F. Ciarber Facility. As tIre author gathered pilots more mundane routine, they can still feel the pain of material for his account, hediscovered that as significam as broken bones caused by the whii litig landing crank as the lhe Northrop contributions were, they vvere only a stnall pilot sticks his knee in its path to keep it from totallv part ol the historical development of theconcept of tailless unwinding! Although some ol the nomenclature may be aircraft. Thus, hisstudy expanded in breadlh in its present foreign to some readers, most isold ha t toaviation enthusi- forrn. asts, and tables are provided for the newer words. I ables Wooldridge has done an excellent job in presenting also indicate total produetion iate, naval and marineaces. historical facts that he gathered not only from written Wildcat model variants, and existing Wildcats foi those sources but also from firsthand interviewsof those people who would like to get a bit closer to history . intimately involved in the development of the flying Without question, 1 illtnan s account ol the \\ ildcat wings. His chapters are thoroughlv footnoted and sup- is a must foi those who are interested in the a\ iation history ported by an exhaustive bibliography, which contains of lhe Pacific theater during World War II. sources found not only in the United States but also in other (oúntries involved in the historical development of First Lieutenaiii Rov Flouchin II. I SAI tailless aircraft. namely. Canada. Denmark, France, Ger- Tinker A o Forte lltise. Oklalioina the contributors

John L. Romjuc (B.A.. M.A . Univeisity of M issouri) is D rpuiy Staff H istoriai» loi Field C o lu n e i T h o m a s A. C ard w ell III (B.B.A ., History with iht* l ' S. Army Training .uul Fexas A&M U nivcrsity; M S.. U niversity o| Doctrine Com m and at Fort M onroe. Virgínia. Southern C alifórnia) ts D eputy (Tornrnander Licutenant Colonel N ano B. Samuelson, Prevtously. he was a Staff Histonan at U.S. foi O petations. 323d Flvtng Train in g VVing USAF (Rei). (B A . H aui> F*m hers College. Naval Facilities Com m and. Port Huenem e. , \ IC d. M ather A FB. C alifó rn ia . H e llew 100 M .B.A.. Svracuse U nivcrsity; retem ly reliied Califórnia, and Comm and Historiau at l '.S m issions in the F*4 duiing the Yictnam War as A ssistam Professor of Aerospace Studies. Army Gombai Developmetm Lxperimenta- and also has flow n the F- 102. F-106, T-33, AFROTC Deiachment 115. Um versitvof Con tion Comm and. Fort Ord, Calilom ia. W hilc 1 -37. 1-39. and 1-13. C olonel C ardw ell has nectic ut. Farliei she served in various supply serving w ith the Armv in C errnany, he w as a servcd ui a vaiiety of CSAF and NA IO staíf p o sitio n s iu lhe U nited States, l rigland. and F u lb ríg h i S cholar a t the U nivrr.sity o í H eideL |K*sitions He is a Distinguished Graduate ol rhailand. She isa popular sfxaker on woinrn berg, w herc he did graduate w ork in M odern An War College and a gtaduate ol Squadron in themiliiary and in managemeni. hastaught tu ro p e a n Flistory an d C crm an L itetatu re. Officer School. Air Com m and and Staíf Col- rnanagenient and marketing courses, and is a Romjue is author ol A History of Army 86 and lege. and Industrial College ol the Arrned previous contt ibutor to the Rnnrw and other other historical monographs. and he has con- Forces. C olonel C ardw ell is a previous to n - publications. Colonel Samuelson is a gradu- tributcd reviews to Military Rnnrw. National uibuior to the Rrview. ate oí Squadron Officer School. Air Com - Defense. Itifantry. and other journals. m and and Staíf College, Arrned Fortes Staff College. and Air W ar College.

M ajor James A. M achos B A .. Kast Fexas State I niversiiy; M.A.. Universíty oí C tah) is a Jotnt Air O perai tons Staíf Officer w ith the L ieu fen an t C o lo n el H arry R. B orow ski (B.A .. Air-Land Forces Application (ALFA) Agency. Keariiev State College: M.A . Cniversity of Fie has an extensive background in opera- C olorado; P h D.. U niversíty of C alifórnia. tional living iF-1/ and has servcd as an cx- Santa B arbara) is D irectorol M ilitary H istory changeofficer w ith theG erm an Air Force He at the U nited States Air Force Acadcm v. He is is author of an artirlerecentJy published in the a (orm er KC-135 navigator and is author of A Major Mark M. W arner (B. A.. M onm ouih Col- Military Review. M ajor Machos is a graduate Ho liou? Thrfut: Strategir Air Rawer and Con- lege. Illin o is; B.S., C o rn ell U niversíty; M .A.. oí Squadron Officer School. Air Com m and lamment beforr Korra (Greenwood. 1982). State Universíty of New York. Plattsburgh) is and Staíf College. Dcíense L anguageIm titute Colonel Borowski is a graduate of Arrned asstgned to the íarults at Air Com m and and (Germana and the National Security M an- Forces Staff 0)1 lege and isa previous contrib- Staff C ollege. H e has served as instruetor pilot agem ent Coursc. uioi to lhe Rnnrw. and w ing staff officer. A TC ; B-52 aircraft

107 commander and missíon drvcloper. and a SAC in a variely oí positions at H eadquariers plans program manager: and rescarch and M itlugan W ingand Headquartrrs Great I^ikes drvelopmcnt systetns managei wich Air Force Region. Civil \u Pairol. M ajor Overby is a Systems Com m and. M ajor W arner is a gradu- graduaie of Squadron Ofíicer Schonl, An ate oí Squadron Ofíicer Srhool and of Air C o m m an d an d Siafl Ciollrge. and ( a \il Air Comm and and Stafí College. P atrol N ational Stafí College

VVi 11iam M. Leaiy (Ph.D.. Princelon thuver* siIs i is Assoeiale Professor of H isioiv ai lhe University of Geórgia. Lasi suminer he served as a V isiling Research Professor ai lhe Na- lional Air and Space M useum . I)r. Leary was w ith lhe Air Forc e ai Radcna Air Base. Okin- aw a. during lhe Rotean Wat He has w rilien exrensivelv ou Am erican aeronauiic.il ac livity m Kasl Asiaand isauihorof Tcrilou.s Mt.ssion* (C niversily of A labam u Press. 1981), covei m g C i v i l A i r 1 1 ansport and Cl A covert opeiatious in Asia. Soon to be pubiished is his laiest David M adsaai \.B . 1 rinitv College: A.M hook. To Conquer Time and Space, an ac- Vale I niversitv; Ph.D . Duke lhiiversiiy) is a c ount ol ihe early years of lhe C.S. Air Mail Semor Researc h Fellow in lhe Airpower Rr- Major Owen E. Jensen K \ , Iniversiiv of Service. seaith Inslitute oí An l niversitv s C.emer for Illinois: M.P.A.. Cnivcrsiiy of Oklahoma; Aerospace Docti ine. Research.and Kducation. M A Naval PosigraduateSchooI) is Assistam Prioi to liis retirement from the Air Force in Air Attac hé to Canada Prior u> hetom iug an 1981. he sei ved on the l.ic ulty ol Air War Col- \H r pipelinc student. he served m a wide lege loi threeyears. Farlier. he taughi military variety of assignments connected with aii de* histoiv .tml strategv at the l s An Force fense ai lhe squadron. au division, and MAJ- Academy and at lhe Naval Wat College. was a COM leveis He has llown lhe 1-3‘ÍA. F-102, G lenn E. Overby is a major in lhe Headquar Fellow ar lhe Woodrow Wilson International and F-106. Majo» Jensen is auihor of several teis M ichigan W irig, Civil Air Pattol. serving Centei foi Scholars. and served with the Air pubiished anic les and is a graduatc of Squad- as plans and program s ofíicer. In c ivilian life, Force Advisoiy Group m \ letnain. Di Mac- run Ofíicer School and Air Command and he isa parm er in a finn lhal produces software Isaac has been a fiequeut contiibuiw to the Stuíf College for personal com puiers. He previouslv served Rcvicw.

AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "The Inferno of People’s War,” by Major Thomas G. Waller, Jr., USA, as the outstanding article in the March-April 1984 issue of the Review. Editorial Staff

LlEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD R BAUCOM, USAF, Editor JANICE M. BECK. Managing Editor MAJOR EARL H. TILFORD. JR . USAF, Associate Editor JOHN A. WESTCOTT. Art Director and Production Manager ENRIQUE GASTON. Associate Editor, Spanish Language E.dition LIA MIDOSI MAY PATTERSON. Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition STEVEN C. GARST, Art Editor and Illustrator HATTIE DIXON MINTER. Copy Editor RAYMOND F. MATHIS, Financial and Admimstrative Manager

Advisers

DR RICHARD H KOHN, Chief, Office of Air Force History COLONEL YVALTER D. MILLER. Hq Air Force Logistics Command COLONEL ALAN M. SHOEMAKER. Hq Air Force Systems Command COLONEL THOMAS A. MAYPOLE, Hq Air Traming Command FRANCIS VV. JENNINGS, Air Force Service Information b News Center COLONEL WILLIAM G. HALPIN, Hq Strategic An Command COLONEL RONALD B JOHNSON. Hq Tactical Air Command PROFESSOR I. B. HOLLEY. JR.. Duke University, Major General, Air Force Reserve (Ret) LT COLONEL JOHN F. GUILMARTIN, JR., USAF (RET)

AIR U N I VE R S ITY

JULY-AUGUST 1984

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