Theories of Warfare

French Operations in Indo-China

Author Programme Alexander Hagelkvist Officers Programme, OP 12-15 Tutor Number of pages Stéphane Taillat 71

Scholarship provider: Hosting unit: Swedish National Defence Report date: 2015-06-02 Écoles de Saint-Cyr University Coëtquidan (FRANCE)

Subject: War Science Unclassified Institution: CREC (le Centre de Level: Bachelor Thesis Recherche des Écoles de Coëtquidan) Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I offer my sincerest gratitude to the Swedish Defence University for the scholarship that made my exchange possible. Furthermore to Écoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan for their hospitality, as well as le Centre de Recherche des Écoles de Coëtquidan.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to Director Doare, Principal of the Faculty, for providing me with all the necessary facilities for the research. I also want to thank Colonel Renoux for constant support and availability with all the surroundings that concerned my work at the C.R.E.C.

And to my supervisor, Stéphane Taillat, who has supported me throughout my thesis with his patience and knowledge whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. I attribute the completion of my Bachelor thesis to his encouragement and effort and without him this thesis, would not have been completed.

I am also grateful to Lieutenant Colonel Marco Smedberg, who has provided me with the interest and motivation for my subject. I am thankful and grateful to him for sharing expertise and valuable guidance.

I take this opportunity to express gratitude to Guy Skingsley at the Foreign Languages Section, War Studies at the Swedish Defence University for his help and support on the linguistic parts of the thesis. I am also grateful to my partner who supported me through this venture.

Finally to Captain Masquelier at the International Department for the support they provided me with during my stay. I also thank Gérard de Boisboissel for making my exchange memorable and filled with experiences from Bretagne.

I also place on record my sense of gratitude to one and all who, directly or indirectly, have lent their hand in this venture.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Abstract

Human nature would usually organize and sort events to help bring order and clarity to your life. This also applies to analysis and studies of war, therefore the aim of this thesis is to determine to what extent the French use maneuver warfare or attritional warfare during operations in Indo-China (today known as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos). The author’s intent is also to contribute to existing research on the subject of analyzing military operations through maneuver warfare and attritional warfare. The research has been conducted with qualitative literature studies of the war in French Indo-China (1946-1954).

The thesis begins with a concept analysis of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare, which renders into an analytical tool. Through the lens of the analytical tool an analysis of four operations during the Indo-China war is conducted. The conclusions of each operation are presented using three levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical).

The analysis shows that both theories of warfare are present during each operation but on different levels and sometimes both are present at the same level. Therefore the author found that it is not possible to classify French operations in Indo-China as operations based solely upon maneuver warfare or attritional warfare.

Key words Maneuver warfare, Manoeuver culture, War of attrition, Attritional warfare, Indo-China.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... 2 Abstract ...... 3 Key words ...... 3 1. Introduction ...... 6 1.1 Background ...... 6 1.2 Purpose ...... 8 1.3 Aim and research questions ...... 9 1.4 Disposition ...... 9 1.5 Demarcations ...... 10 1.6 Terminology ...... 11 1.7 Previous research ...... 13 2. Method ...... 15 2.1 Systematizing ...... 15 2.2 Concept analysis ...... 16 2.3 Qualitative literature analysis ...... 17 2.4 Validity and reliability of research material and method ...... 18 3. Theoretical framework ...... 19 3.1 Maneuver warfare ...... 20 3.2 Indicators, maneuver warfare ...... 31 3.3 Attritional warfare ...... 32 3.4 Indicators, attritional warfare ...... 37 3.5 Analysis tool ...... 39 4. Analysis ...... 40 4.1 Background ...... 40 4.2 OPERATION LÉA, 1947 ...... 41 4.2.1 Analysis of OPERATION LÉA, 1947 ...... 44 4.2.2 Conclusion ...... 45 4.3 Battle of Hóa Binh, 1951 ...... 46 4.3.1 Analysis of Hóa Binh, 1951 ...... 49 4.3.2 Conclusion ...... 50 4.4 OPERATION LORRAINE, 1952 ...... 51 4.4.1 Analysis of OPERATION LORRAINE, 1952 ...... 54 4.4.2 Conclusion ...... 55 4.5 OPERATION CAMARGUE, 1953 ...... 56 4.5.1 Analysis of OPERATION CAMARGUE, 1953 ...... 60 4.5.2 Conclusion ...... 61 4.6 Summary of conclusions ...... 62 4.6.1 OPERATION LÉA, 1947 ...... 62 4.6.2 Battle of Hóa Binh, 1951 ...... 62 4.6.3 OPERATION LORRAINE, 1952 ...... 62 4.6.4 OPERATION CAMARGUE, 1953 ...... 62 4.6.5 Conclusion analytical indicators ...... 63 5. Result and Discussion ...... 64 5.1 Main research question ...... 64 5.2 Sub-question ...... 64 5.3 Discussion ...... 65

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

6. Summary ...... 66 6.1 Suggestions for further studies ...... 66 6.2 Reflection ...... 66 7. References ...... 69 7.1 Books ...... 69 7.2 Articles ...... 70 7.3 Doctrines ...... 70 7.4 Studies ...... 71 7.5 Pictures/ Maps ...... 71

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

1. Introduction

1.1 Background One of the main problems in studies of war and warfare is how we should analyze and classify these phenomenon. Could it be that attritional warfare, maneuver warfare or total war “exist” in the empiricism world or are they analytical tools, that support our understanding of a complicated reality? How can war or warfare be categorized? According to Clausewitz war is a continuation of politics by other means and war should be understood as an instrument for achieving political goals:1

“[W]e maintain . . . that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear that war itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.”2

Widén and Ångström explain the need for measurable concepts of war; only when you succeeded in making something measurable could you begin your analysis. Human reason would usually organize and sort events to help bring order and clarity to your life. This also applies to analysis and studies of war, we sort war into different compartments to get some order on the complex phenomenon that war represents.3 Therefore this thesis will not analyze war as a continuation of politics by other means; instead the focus will be on warfare, which is the exercise of military power and military force.4 It covers everything from indirectly influencing an opponent to behave in a way that promotes your own interests, to persuasion or attraction and how to crush an opponent by brute force, i.e. warfare is the conduct of war. It ranges from military strategy to military tactics, armaments and organizations.5

1 Karlsson, Ingemar (red.). Res publica: Östlings bokförlag Symposions teoretiska och litterära tidskrift. 54, Krig, Brutus Östlings bokförlag Symposion, Eslöv, 2002. pp. 31-41 2 Ångström, Jan & Widén, Jerker. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war, Routedge. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 2015. p. 19 3 Widén, Jerker & Ångström, Jan. Militärteorins grunder. Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2005. pp. 34-35 4 Rekkedal, Nils Marius. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring, 3., rev. uppl. Krigsvetenskapliga institutionen, försvarshögsk, Stockholm, 2004. p. 19-20 5 Ångström, Jan & Widén, Jerker. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war, Routedge. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 2015. pp. 7-9

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

It is often argued today that the nature of warfare has changed significantly over the 200 years since the Napoleonic wars. A common standpoint for this approach is that during the classic era of warfare, the prerequisite for success was to defeat the enemy’s main force. Nowadays it is considered that an attack against the enemy’s central parts or rear units, like logistics or command and control units, could be sufficient to break the enemy’s will to continue. 6

At least that is the case in debates surrounding maneuver warfare in the US military between the end of the 70s and the 80s. For example, the US developed the Air-Land battle7 between the 80s and 90s: Air-Land Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces, i.e. using air forces in order to stop reinforcement to the front or taking out essential command and control units. The concept could be used to implement both perspectives depending on the estimated center of gravity.

This can be divided into two different statements:

• Destroy the enemy’s military strength/ capacity. • Destroy the enemy’s continued fighting spirit/ will to fight.

To connect these two statements to military theories that have been developed in order to understand the phenomenon’s of warfare, we need to look at two distinctly different military principals that were identified in Western countries in the 1980s. These military principals can be divided into the following main groups:8

• War of Attrition – also known as attritional culture or attritional warfare. • Maneuver Warfare – also known as mobile culture or manoeuver culture.

6 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 20 7 Leonhard, Robert R. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle, Presidio Press, CA, 1991. pp. 157-186 8 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 453

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

In most countries doctrines are maneuver thinking and maneuver warfare key concepts, even so in the Swedish military strategic doctrine that came in 2011.9 The Swedish military strategic doctrine determines that mission-type tactics is the foundation of the Swedish Armed Forces’ actions. The standpoint is based on studies conducted on historical wars; for instance, the Second World War with the German blitzkrieg concept as a basis; other examples are the wars of Napoleon and his revolutionary thoughts. It is also tied to the greater strategic picture, namely the standardization of armies in the western world toward waging expeditionary wars.

In my thesis I intend to analyze a war that entailed relatively low stakes for France in comparison to the opponent, who may be considered to have fought a total war. I will analyze the war in French Indo-China that lasted for eight years, from 1946 to 1954. I want to determine whether, and if so how, this war can be classified into those two main types, attritional warfare or maneuver warfare. The reason for choosing this war is that it takes place right after the Second World War and I would like to study whether France adapted to the new maneuver tactics and if they used them after the Second World War.

1.2 Purpose The aim of my thesis is to contribute to the existing research on the subject of analyzing military operations through maneuver warfare and attritional warfare. Most of the research that compares maneuver warfare and attritional warfare dates back to the First- and Second World War. The comparisons made to other wars is limited, hence my motivation for devoting this thesis to comparing maneuver warfare and attritional warfare on the French operations in Indo-China.

The aim of the thesis is not to find any general method to classify warfare in general, but the purpose is to study operations during the Indo-China war and analyze the basis of their unique conditions. The aim is furthermore only to study the French use of military force in the war.

Both the French and the Swedish Armed Forces will almost certainly conduct joint and multinational military operations in the future, hence my choice to focus on France as the country to analyze. Furthermore, the author’s goal is that this thesis will be inspirational for

9 Militärstrategisk doktrin. Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2011. s. 119-130

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” more research on military operations, so that the academic world will benefit from different points of view, and this is how we make sure that we contribute to the combined knowledge of warfare.

1.3 Aim and research questions The aim of my research is to determine to what extent the French use maneuver warfare or attritional warfare during operations in Indo-China (today known as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos). My intent is to focus on the military operations conducted by the French during the war between 1946-1954.

My research questions are:

• Could we classify French operations in Indo-China 1946-1954 as operations based upon maneuver warfare or attritional warfare?

• How could we classify the individual operations, were they based upon different theories of warfare?

1.4 Disposition This thesis proceeds as follows:

Chapter 1 presents why the chosen subject is of interest, it further contains the stated research questions for the thesis. The chapter also consists of background, purpose, demarcations and validity.

Chapter 2 the material and methods of the thesis are presented.

Chapter 3 the theoretical concepts of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare are discussed and, as a result of the discussion indicators for the analysis are generated.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Chapter 4 contains the analysis of four separate operations during the Indo-China war and they are analyzed at three levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical). The chapter also contains a summary of the different operations and indicators.

Chapter 5 presents the answers to the research questions and thereafter a discussion follows on the research and the results that have been found.

Chapter 6 contains suggestions for future studies and a reflection on the subject.

Chapter 7 contains a list of all references used in the thesis.

1.5 Demarcations The thesis will only focus on the period between 1946-1954, and not analyze how previous wars have affected the use of one theory of warfare or the other. The main focus is to determine if the operations could be classified as operations with maneuver warfare or attritional warfare.

The thesis will only analyze the war through the French perspective, because the foundation of my analysis is based upon theories invented by the western society and thus internalized by French military, that is why I want to apply them to the French way of conducting warfare during this period.

I will use four different operations during the war in order to determine if there were any operations that could be classified differently. This will also allow me to get a general understanding of progression during the war. Since I will analyze four battles I will have to choose them carefully so that they represent a fair picture of the entire war.

A distinction between war and warfare is of importance in this thesis since only the latter will be analyzed. According to Clausewitz the nature of war consists of two elements: the “duel”, the basic antagonism which ultimately implied that war is violent, dynamic and changing; as

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” well as the so-called “triad”, which ultimately meant that war is politically instrumental.10 If we choose to see war as politics by other means, it implies that war is not fought in a vacuum but in a political context that sets the scene and makes war understandable. What distinguishes war from other policies, however, are the means and methods employed; armed forces and violence. Thus, according to Clausewitz, we can understand war in terms of the political objectives that are pursued, thereby characterizing war as rational and instrumental.11 This means that war is so much more than just battles between two parties and therefore very complex, hence why I choose to only focus on warfare in the thesis.

Warfare in this thesis can be explained as the “duel”; as Clausewitz explains it, the basic antagonism which ultimately implies that war is violent. Warfare is the exercise of military power and military force. 12 It covers everything from indirectly influencing an opponent to behave in a way that promotes your own interests, to persuasion or attraction and how to crush an opponent by brute force, i.e. warfare is the conduct of war. It ranges from military strategy to military tactics, armaments and organizations, this means that the thesis will not analyze the political or the “peoples” effect on the outcome of the war, it will focus on battles and analyze warfare.13

With the demarcation to only analyze the case according to theories of warfare rather than the complex phenomenon of war, it will allow me to limit the view of strategy. The analysis of strategy in the case study will then focus on military strategic goals and not political ones.

1.6 Terminology By war of attrition (attritional culture or attritional warfare) I refer to that method of fighting wars, campaigns and battles in which the friendly force attempts to defeat an enemy through the destruction of the enemy’s mass. In addition, attritional warfare also focuses on exhausting enemy forces by either disturbing their deployment or eliminating them at a higher rate than they can be replaced. The problem with those conceptions of attrition is that

10 Ångström, Jan & Widén, Jerker. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war, Routedge. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 2015. p. 19 11 Ibid. p. 19 12 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 19-20 13 Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. pp. 7-9

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” one cannot really say if it is a matter of tactics or a matter of strategy (articulating ways, means and ends).

By maneuver warfare (mobile culture or manoeuver culture) I refer to that method of fighting wars, campaigns and battles in which the friendly force attempts to defeat an enemy through breaking the enemy’s spirit and will to continue. In addition, maneuver warfare also focuses on moving fast, probe defences, and exploit success, carrying battle deep into the enemy’s rear, and in this way forcing the enemy to react rather than taking the initiative.

There are different levels of warfare;14 in order to analyze warfare a division into levels is often used as an instrument of clarification. The level of warfare as an analytical instrument is, to great extent dependent on the nature of war, and among military theorists the interpretations of the concept vary, and in some cases the divisions of levels per se.15 That is why I will determine each level so the reader knows how the author interprets each level of warfare.

Strategic level: The rational process that tries to create a connection between, and coherence of, military means and political ends.16 17

“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”18

Operational level: The planning level of war that constructs campaigns and major operations in order to accomplish the theatre goals articulated at the strategic planning level; the intermediate planning level that integrates tactical efforts and events into a campaign.19

14 Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: a history. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. p. 206 15 Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. p. 7 16 Ibid. p. 54 17 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 7 18 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 193 19 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. pp. 8-9

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

In other words: The art of translating tactical actions in order to gain strategic effects.20

Tactical level: The planning level of war that deals with battles and engagements.21

Center of gravity: Determining ends and means in strategy is closely associated with a concept called Center of gravity (CoG). In military planning and the execution of a military operation, designed to quickly and effectively defeat the enemy, it is crucial to determine the strengths and weaknesses of both the opponents and one’s own forces. But throughout history there have been different opinions of the meaning of CoG.22

In this thesis the author has chosen to use the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrines interpretation of CoG. In Sweden it is named “tyngdpunkt”, meaning that CoG specifies the conditions in which one side of the conflict will gain their goals, while his opponents is prevented from reaching theirs.23

CoG is present at all levels of warfare and may be of moral, conceptual and physical nature. Examples of strategic priorities are a charismatic leader, an ideology, the people’s will and main combat forces.24

1.7 Previous research When regarding maneuver warfare and war of attrition several researchers and military theorists have contributed analyses and data in order to gain a general perspective on these two concepts of warfare. As previously mentioned the author has compared several works in order to gain a high validity in the concept analysis of each theory.

20 Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. p. 73 21 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 9 22 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. pp. 395-404 23 Militärstrategisk doktrin. p. 127 24 Ibid. pp. 127-128

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

The author has used a previous thesis as motivation for his own and in general that thesis laid the foundation for this one. It is a thesis produced by Major Håkan Josefsson and it analyzes the Falklands war though maneuver warfare and attritional warfare. His results showed that it was not possible to determine if the Falklands war was conducted with attritional style warfare or maneuver warfare; but he described the conflict as a war fought mainly as a war of attrition but with influences of maneuver warfare, thus as the war progressed the more it became a war of attrition.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

2. Method

2.1 Systematizing The research is based upon two different theories of warfare; initially I will start with a concept analysis25 of maneuver warfare theory and then the attritional warfare theory. The purpose is to analyze the different theories to generate indicators, which allows me to create an analytical tool26. In previous research to determine the occurrence of maneuver warfare or attritional warfare Håkan Josefsson27 created an analytical tool to analyze the data.

The analytical tool will allow me to determine the presence of one or the other during the analysis. The data from the analysis is read through the lens of the analytical tool, I screen the texts for similarities to the different theories.

This is followed by a qualitative literature analysis28 of events (operations) from the war in Indo-China in form of case studies29. The analysis of the war will be divided into different operations in order to answer my second question, how could we classify the individual operations, were they based upon different theories of warfare? Since the war will be divided into different periods they will be selected so that they represent the whole war in general, so that it creates a general picture of theories during the whole period.

Thereafter the results from the analysis will be presented and discussed at the end of the thesis in order to get as accurate results as possible, so that the research question can be answered. Using case studies as a model could be affected by the author’s own perceptions, as it is the author that has chosen the specific data from which to make general assumptions;30 therefore the demarcations and the reliability of this thesis have been thoroughly discussed.

25 Friberg, Febe (red.), Dags för uppsats: vägledning för litteraturbaserade examensarbeten, 2., [rev.] uppl., Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2012. pp. 98-109 26 Ibid. pp. 101-108 27 Josefsson, Håkan. Falklandskriget 1982: Manöver eller utnötning?. Bachelor thesis, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm, 2004 28 Denscombe, M. (Translated by Larson. P.), Forskningshandboken: för småskaliga forskningsprojekt inom samhällsvetenskaperna. 2nd ed. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011. pp. 367-388 29 Ibid. pp. 59-73 30 Ibid. p. 72

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Figure 1: Research design.

2.2 Concept analysis By clarifying what characterizes a certain concept, the meaning of it becomes clear, as well as what it does not mean. Most concepts have both a general and a particular meaning if one studies the concept related to a specific context.31

There are several reasons to use a concept analysis, in this thesis that reason is to analyze the concepts of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare. The analysis then leads to the development of an analytical tool and through this determine the occurrence of one or the other.32

31 Friberg. Dags för uppsats: vägledning för litteraturbaserade examensarbeten. pp. 101-102 32 Ibid. pp. 103

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

By implementing a concept analysis the understanding of a concept increases by analyzing a broad foundation of previous interpretations. The idea is to collect as many sources as possible and analyze the data collected to determine the conditions for each concept. Many concepts exist only if certain conditions are met; and so the conditions are therefore important in the process of understanding.33

2.3 Qualitative literature analysis Qualitative studies have increased understanding as an ultimate goal; with qualitative studies as a foundation one can gain a deeper understanding of the data that is being processed.34 Through this statement I will use this method to analyze my raw data. The data will be analyzed several times and against multiple sources to achieve a high reliability.35

The qualitative literature analysis will be used as a method both to implement the concept analysis of the theories and also to interpret the data available about the war in Indo-China. The analysis of the data will be repetitive in order to get solid conclusions from the data.36

Throughout the thesis I will take an objective approach to the data that is being analyzed in order to eliminate personal opinions. 37 The analysis will also be repetitive to demonstrate that several sources have been taken into account.38

The use of qualitative literature analysis is a method in which you analyze and validate the data through an inductive process: in other words, the use of repetition of data from multiple sources to validate the results. Throughout this thesis the use of multiple sources will be used to validate the conclusions. 39

33 Friberg. Dags för uppsats: vägledning för litteraturbaserade examensarbeten. pp. 105-107 34 Ibid. p. 121 35 Denscombe. Forskningshandboken: för småskaliga forskningsprojekt inom samhällsvetenskaperna. p. 367 36 Ibid. p. 367 37 Ibid. p. 368 38 Ibid. p. 368 39 Ibid. 368-369

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

2.4 Validity and reliability of research material and method Through my work I have used secondary data. The magnitude of my subject has meant that the topics could only be studied cursorily. It has not been possible to conduct any study of sources; I have tried to compensate for this by crosschecking my sources against each other.40 My intention has been to analyze the same theories but from different perspectives in order to validate my theoretical framework.

The method for the thesis is interpretative and hence open for critique regarding reliability; since it is likely that two analysts may find different answers to a given question, not only depending on what data they find but also depending on their respective foreknowledge.

In this respect I declare that I have a military background, which means that it is likely that I interpret descriptions of military activities differently than analysts without such experience would do. However, I presuppose that the reader will have some foreknowledge about war and warfare, since the extent of my thesis does not allow me to elaborate every keyword. But perhaps my foreknowledge may also prove to be useful if I can capture and interpret certain nuances in order to determine the difference between strategic, operational and tactical level of warfare.

However, this circumstance might also mean that I fail to interpret data objectively. Naturally, this potential problem is hard to surmount since I cannot disregard my military foreknowledge during analysis. What I can do, however, is to present this circumstance here for the sake of transparency. Reliability could be increased by further development of the indicators of the analytical tool. However, since this is a first attempt I will attempt to keep them general enough to determine which theory of warfare I have at hand.

Another restriction to this thesis has been the literature available in English on operations during the Indo- China war. Therefore I have used three different sources and cross- referenced them in order to gain a high validity, and one of the authors had been in the war himself and was a French citizen. I have also chosen operations that have been mentioned in all three sources so that a cross-reference is possible.

40 Friberg. Dags för uppsats: vägledning för litteraturbaserade examensarbeten. p. 122

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

3. Theoretical framework

Maneuver warfare and attritional warfare is nothing new. Maneuver warfare probably occurred the first time a caveman surprised an enemy from behind, instead of meeting him face to face. There are several clear examples of maneuver warfare through history: at the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC, they won the battle by a surprise attack on the enemy’s flank.

But what is maneuver warfare, sometimes the expression “maneuver” is used as a synonym to movement, for example, in discussions of “move and strike”41 when it comes to tactics for smaller units. When maneuver is used to express maneuver warfare it involves so much more; and the same thing applies for war of attrition, there is so much more to the concepts. In order to carry out an analysis of the concepts of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare, a deeper understanding is required of what they really mean.42

Boyd explained the distinction between the two concepts: attritional warfare focused on the physical domain and using firepower as a destructive force, whilst maneuver warfare focused on the mental domain where the aim was to generate “surprise and shock” by using uncertainty, mobility and deception.43

41 Leonhard, Robert R. Fighting by minutes: time and the art of war. Praeger Published, Westport, 1994. pp. 14- 16 42 Lind, William S. Handbok i manöverkrigföring. Krigsvetenskapliga institutionen, Försvarshögsk, Stockholm, 2002. p. 13 43 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 199

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

3.1 Maneuver warfare In contrast to attrition, which has the objective of killing enemy troops or destroying enemy equipment, maneuver warfare has as a “primary objective” to break the spirit and the will of opposing forces’ high command by creating unexpected and unfavourable operational or strategic situations.44

The aim is to move fast, probe defences, and exploit success, carrying the battle deep into the enemy’s rear. The spirit of maneuver warfare is offensive and in line with Boyd’s determination to get inside the enemy’s OODA loop:

“The underlying purpose of every encounter with the enemy is to seize or retain independence of action. To do this we must make decisions and act more quickly than the enemy to disorganize his forces and to keep him off balance” 45

Original idea Liddell Hart describes that an attack would be like water running down a hillside passing over the enemy, where the highest parts of the surface (where the enemy is at his strongest) would be by-passed while the lowest parts of the surface (where the enemy is at his weakest) would be immersed and small islands formed. After this it was then thought that the attacking force would knock out vital enemy resistance nests and facilities, and that the oncoming second wave of troops would eliminate the remaining pockets of resistance. This description of maneuver warfare is very graphic in order to begin to understand the concept.46

William S. Lind has another description of the concept at hand, it could be seen as a kind of “military judo,” i.e. a method to fight smart and to defeat an enemy through cunning rather than by brute force. For him, the term maneuver warfare is more than just movement. It is a way to gain an advantage over the enemy by always being faster in order to undermine the enemy’s ability to remain organized in battle.47 But faster how? One way of being faster than your opponent is to make decisions and to execute them faster than your enemy.

44 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 200 45 Ibid. p. 201 46 Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. p. 116 47 Ibid. pp. 116-117

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Tempo Colonel John Boyd, an American fighter pilot with experience going back to the Korean War, developed a theory on how to be faster than your enemy. He began with analyzing dogfights during the early stages of the air war over Vietnam. After an intensive analysis of the competing aircraft, Boyd concluded that the key quality was not absolute speed, but agility.

Boyd summed all this up as the “OODA loop.” OODA stands for observation, orientation, decision and action. Observe Orient The sequence starts with observation, as data concerning the environment is collected, then analyzed in the orientation stage, leading to a decision and then to the Act Decide execution of an action.48 Figure 2: Image of OODA loop

The individual or organization that could undergo such a decision cycle faster than the opponent would have a decisive advantage. This had also been the case in air combat conducted during the Korean war, in which the pilots of US fighters had better visibility from the cockpit and were able to switch from one maneuver to another faster than their opponents, despite facing fighters that could maintain a higher speed, climb faster and had superior turning radius. But by repeating the OODA loop, the pilot who could react faster would eventually force the opponent into even more difficult situations in which his behaviour became gradually obsolete.49

Figure 3: The principle of OODA loop50

48 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 196 49 Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. pp. 117 50 Militärstrategisk doktrin. p. 101

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The analysis was based on dogfights but Boyd felt that the OODA loop could be applied to any situation in which it was necessary to keep or gain the initiative. The aim was always to disorient the opponent, who would be unable to grasp a situation developing more quickly than anticipated and in unexpected ways, and thus paralyzed into indecision.51

William S. Lind suggested that the aim of maneuver warfare is to get through Boyd’s decision cycle faster than the opponent. The suggestion implies three fundamental requirements for a military organization wishing to conduct maneuver warfare:

First, only a decentralized52 led military force could go through such a decision cycle fast enough. Second, anyone who practices maneuver warfare must accept the confusion and disorder which prevails on the battlefield and use those frictions53 to their advantage. Third and last, all patterns, recipes and formulas must be avoided to prevent the enemy from predicting what we will do next.54

According to Lind, mission-type tactics is a central part of the concept of maneuver warfare and that only through mission-type tactics is it possible to uphold a higher tempo then the opponent;55 which leads into an analysis of the term “mission-type tactics”.

Mission-type tactics One possible definition is that the commander with mission-type tactics gives the subordinate a mission, i.e. specifies what is to be achieved. Within this framework the subordinates have the ability to choose a way to achieve the mission at hand. The commander also has to designate what kind of resources will be available in order for the subordinated to succeed: most commonly which attached units or/and which terrain to use.56

51 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 196 52 Smedberg, Marco. Militär ledning: från Napoleonkrigen till fredsbevarande insatser. Historiska media, Lund, 2010. pp. 247-251 53 Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. p. 3 54 Ibid. pp. 116-117 55 Zetterling, Niklas. Manus till artikel för puplikation i KKrVAHT. Uppdragstaktik och tidsfaktorn. FHS/Opl, 2000-02-01. p. 2 56 Ibid. p. 1

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

An important element of mission-type tactics is that subordinates are expected to act in accordance with the overall situation. To achieve this the focus is not only on the command structures, rather mission-type tactics it should be seen as a collective term for methods to achieve the following objectives:57

• Empowerment of staff • Involve more people in the planning-, decision-making- and implementation process. • Creating a better position to focus on overachieving issues • Place commanders closer to implementation in the field • Creating greater flexibility and adaptively • Allow for greater initiative • Create better improvisational skills (e.g. a question of organization and leadership)

To conduct the “command and control” in maneuver warfare, it is very important that you seek a clear decentralized command structure. As previously stated, the importance of having a higher tempo than your opponent has been explained and in order to do so you cannot get stuck with a centralized organization. A command using mission-type tactics is a prerequisite for having and maintaining a high tempo when carrying out operations. Mission-type tactics requires that subordinates may and can take initiatives, responsibility, that there is autonomous decision-making and a mutual trust between superiors and subordinates.58

It is important that the superior clearly defines the commander’s intent so that everyone in the organization has the overall objective. This is of the utmost importance so that the subordinate has the opportunity to act in the commander’s nature. Another critical factor is the need for both commander and subordinate to share similar meanings on the context, their mission and how to fulfill it. This leads back to the importance of a doctrine to create a common ground within the military organization.

57 Zetterling. Uppdragstaktik och tidsfaktorn. p. 1 58 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. pp. 418-419

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For the mission-type tactics to work, it is desirable that every subordinate knows the superior’s intent at least two levels above their own. That way he can act even if the superior has not yet given the order, as long as it is in line with the purpose and goal of the operation.59

A decentralized command structure may be described as a system that uses “directive control” (mission-type tactics), and is based on the assumption that the man on the spot is the best judge of his immediate surroundings. German officers, most notably von Moltke, recognized that it was impossible to maintain communications between the front line and senior commanders to the rear and still achieve tempo.60

The solution adopted was to provide commanders on the spot with all the information as to the general situation that they could find out for themselves and to guide them with directives in the form of their superior’s intent. Senior commanders then allowed their subordinates considerable room for action, trusting that in this way they would be able to make best use of each and every opportunity to further that intent.61

The key elements of this system are that free rein is given to the individual creativity of subordinate commanders, while superiors seek to identify the decisive point, direct their subordinates towards it and to reinforce success, even if other than at the chosen point, if it offeres to bring about a decision.62

Center of gravity “[T]hat point where enemy is most vulnerable and where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive.”63

The quote above is Clausewitz view on how to see the center of gravity and how it is identified as the source of the opponent’s power and strength; it could also refer to an alliance or national will. Another explanation of the concept is that it is that point or set of points

59 Lind. Handbok i manöverkrigföring. pp. 20-21 60 Samuels, Martin. Command or control?: command, training, and tactics in the British and German armies, 1888-1918. Frank Cass, London, 1995. p. 283 61 Ibid. p. 283 62 Ibid. pp. 283-285 63 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 208

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” where the application of military force would be most likely to result in the enemy’s surrender.64

But the hard part is to determine the enemy’s center of gravity since it could be basically anything; it could refer to a target or number of targets. The center might be identified because it constituted a source of enemy strength and/or a critical vulnerability. It could be found in the physical, psychological, or political spheres. If all went well, once the center is defeated the result would be decisive or else have consequences with potentially decisive effects, though this might depend on being combined with other significant events. So basically it is very hard to determine the center of gravity of the enemy in order to break his will to fight, and since there are so many ways of determining the center of gravity there is a lot of confusion as to what it really is.65 Those who deal with the subject are in agreement that centers of gravity cannot be reduced to something materially tangible such as a building, a combat unit, or a person, but the concept is rather understood as a non-material force, a being, or an element that relies on such material things.66

An assessment of different centers of gravity is of great importance to all military planning and operational activity. Such analyses determine the priorities, sort out primary and secondary objectives, and decide how limited resources should be allocated to be used as efficiently as possible.67

Indirect approach “[C]ircumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. The goal is the application of strength against selected enemy weakness. By definition, maneuver relies on speed and surprise, for without either we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness.”68

The concept was not invented by B. H. Liddell Hart, which he does not claim. Generals associated with battles, campaigns and major wars had long exploited indirect methods.

64 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 205 65 Ibid. p. 209 66 Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. pp. 63-64 67 Ibid. p. 63 68 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 206

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According to Liddell Hart, he studied 240 battles and campaigns with the aim of finding what characterized the key features of those who won.69

He summarized his studies with the idea that the great majority of the victors of these battles and campaigns used some form of indirect method; bypass, containment/ encirclement or infiltration possibly combined with misdirection.70

However, his theory is to be regarded as a philosophy or an attitude and not a ready-made recipe on how to win wars. One could explain the keystone of Liddell Hart’s theory with a quote:

”The perfection of strategy would… be to produce a decision – the destruction of the enemy’s armed forced through their unarming and surrender – without any fighting.”71

He developed a concept called the indirect approach and it involves finesse, deception, and the avoidance of enemy strength. Robert Leonhard discusses the integration of the indirect approach in theory of maneuver and he lists three goals in order to use the theory:

• To avoid enemy strength. Specifically, to disallow the enemy’s use of his strength in its proper medium. • To deceive the enemy. Although this idea is somewhat different from the first, it is ultimately aimed at the same end: to refuse the enemy the opportunity to bring his strength to bear. • To create and attack enemy vulnerabilities.72

With regards to the last of these, he discusses three types of vulnerabilities: geographical, functional and psychological. Geographical vulnerabilities could be exemplified by a hill overlooking the enemy camp, or a bridge cutting off enemy retreat. Functional vulnerabilities relate either to attacking an enemy through a medium against which he has no defense or

69 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 352 70 Ibid. p. 352 71 Ibid. p. 354 72 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. pp. 46-47

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” forcing the enemy into a medium in which his strength becomes weakness. Attacks on psychological vulnerabilities are aimed at convincing the enemy commander and troops that they are defeated. The outcome at Goose Green in the Falkland conflict is one example of when the British managed to effect the enemy’s psychological vulnerabilities. Often, maneuvers against the enemy’s rear have such an effect.73

Sometimes people think that the indirect approach is the same as maneuver warfare, but one should see the indirect approach as a tool in the maneuver warfare concept. For example, one can use the direct approach in maneuver warfare if it is appropriate. It depends on the phase of the operation at hand.74

This is consistent with how Liddell Hart explains the indirect approach. He believes that one should concentrate efforts against enemy weaknesses and at the least expected place. In order for this to work, it is necessary to have spread your forces and then muster them at the right time and place. This way one can achieve a shift in the balance of power and create a favourable situation for your own forces. This shift in balance is fundamental in the indirect approach.75

The shift can be both physical and psychological. Physically, it can be achieved through a maneuver such as limiting the opponent’s freedom of action. Psychological displacement is mainly an effect of logical confusion and feeling of incapability.76

One can also talk about implementing interventions along an operation line, a line that is not a natural line but rather a course of action against the opponent’s center of gravity. On the operation line there are a number of crucial points that lead to the center of gravity. Of course there is also a direct method that involves directly attacking the opponents center of gravity or crucial points, but the main effort in maneuver warfare is to use the indirect approach where possible.77

73 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 47 74 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. pp. 351-353 75 Militärstrategisk doktrin. p. 125 76 Ibid. p. 125 77 Ibid. pp. 125-126, 129

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Liddell Hart also offered a theory of modern maneuver, which he called the man-in-the-dark theory. The concept could be described as two people fighting in a dark room. As each one tries to locate the other, he advances with one arm outstretched, both for security and in order to contact his foe. Once one touches the enemy, he grasps him with the forward hand, in order to hold him at bay and to keep him stationary for the main blow. Meanwhile, he first cocks his other arm and then launches his fist at the enemy’s head for the knockout punch.78

Liddell Hart’s analogy is useful, because it is a modern application of Sun Tzu’s ideas on force dichotomy which is very similar to the man-in-the-dark theory.79 In order to succeed with the indirect approach it is important or at least easier when you have the element of surprise.

Surprise and deception Appearing in an unexpected time, place and manner contributes to the element of surprise. An accelerating pace of the battle, movements and actions that often change direction or intent are also elements of surprise. Even misdirection is of great significance and in some cases you could use a small part of your own force in order bind the enemy in a credible way with the direct method, in order to create an element of surprise with the main force.80

Surprise requires secrecy and deception, which are of importance to outmaneuver your opponent and gain an upper hand. To temporarily suspend the paradox of logic by implementing the element of surprise, however, implies certain risks. A high degree of secrecy tends to inhibit the planning of own operations and confidentiality about the operations is rarely or never upheld, some information always tends to leak out. In order to counter such leaks you mix up false information with correct information in order to mislead your enemy, in that way the enemy do not know what to think.81

Effective misdirection requires that parts of your resources are used in a context that differs from the actual objective of the operational activities and, thus, those resources cannot be

78 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 47 79 Ibid. pp. 47-48 80 Militärstrategisk doktrin. pp. 125-126 81 Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 77

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” used to aid the actual operation. However, there is a risk when implementing “the unexpected” after which such an operation usually becomes more demanding and complex than a regular operation. In the strict logical sense a repeated use of the “unexpected” becomes the “expected”. Terms like “surprise”, “conventional” and “expectation” are dependent on how the other party interprets one’s own actions. 82

Trying to repeal the paradox of logic is a timeless problem in strategy and has been considered by political and military thinkers since the beginning of time. Sun Tzu found that all warfare is based upon cunning and deception; it is necessary to find out the enemy’s intention while concealing one’s own;83

When you are strong, give the impression that you are weak, when you are weak, give the appearance of strength.

Even Mao Tse-tung addressed the importance of surprise and deception in warfare, both at tactical, operational and strategic level.84 We can assume that an adversary intends to protect his own center of gravity with all available means, therefore, the intention is to make him believe that we are in one place to execute one thing while in fact we are somewhere else and doing something completely different.85

The element of surprise, however, is no guarantee for success even through it undoubtedly increases the prospects for successful results. A successful surprise can create effective output that exceeds the value of the work and equipment used in the operation. An enemy who is shocked, distracted or out of balance, also loses the initiative, which is one of the goals of using the element of surprise.86

82 Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 77 83 Van Creveld, Martin. Air power and maneuver warfare. Reprinted from the 1994 edition, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002. p. 5 84 Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 78 85 Van Creveld. Air power and maneuver warfare. pp. 3-5 86 Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 134

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

In maneuver theory, there are several descriptions of what is important for maneuver warfare: I will present what defines maneuver warfare according to some of the most representative theorists of maneuver theory. These are as follows, William S. Lind, Martin van Creveld and Sir Basil Liddell Hart.

William S Lind According to Lind the central parts of maneuver warfare theory are the following:87 88

• Mission-type tactics • Recon pull • Center of gravity • Surface and gaps • OODA loop

Martin van Creveld Van Creveld describes six principles that are to be used in order to use maneuver warfare.89

• The first principle that van Creveld mentions is tempo and it is connected to Boyd’s OODA-loop. • The second principle is center of gravity. • Third principle is surprise. • Fourth principle is the use of combined arms, the principle of using different kinds of weapon systems at the same time when effecting the enemy. • Fifth principle is to be flexible and master the fictions of war. • Sixth and last principle is to have a strongly decentralized organization that uses mission-type tactics.

87 Lind. Handbok i manöverkrigföring. pp. 13-26 88 Ångström & Widén. Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war. pp. 117-119 89 Van Creveld. Air power and maneuver warfare. pp. 3-7

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Liddell Hart When studying Liddell’s indirect approach Leonhard listed three kinds efforts that could be integrated into maneuver warfare:90

1. To avoid enemy strength. Specifically, to disallow the enemy’s use of his strength in its proper medium. 2. To deceive the enemy. Although this idea is somewhat different from the first, it is ultimately aimed at the same end: to refuse the enemy the opportunity to bring his strength to bear. 3. To create and attack enemy vulnerabilities.

3.2 Indicators, maneuver warfare

Within maneuver theory, there are several concepts that are central and which could be indicators of maneuver warfare. You can use maneuver warfare regardless of what level of warfare you are conducting: strategic, operational or tactical. At the same time, it may be that you use attritional warfare on the tactical level and on the other hand you use maneuver warfare on the strategic level.

When determining the indicators in order to analyze the theory of maneuver warfare there were some indicators which could coincide within both theories; but in this case it is mainly these indicators that prove the occurrence of maneuver warfare:

• Tempo • Mission-type tactics • Indirect approach • Center of gravity • Surprise and/or deception

90 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. p. 47

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

3.3 Attritional warfare While maneuver warfare is a positive idealtype, attrition warfare is a negative one; it is a concept which derives its very existence from its dissimilarities with the former, i.e. it can only be defined by comparison to maneuver warfare and not in itself. In contrast to maneuver warfare, which has the objective to break the spirit and the will of opposing forces’ high command by creating unexpected and unfavourable operational or strategic situations. Attritional warfare has the objective to destroy the enemy’s military force/ capacity.91 Attritional warfare seeks to smash the enemy’s assets one by one until few or none are left, it takes aim at the enemy’s strengths. Regardless of the size of the engagement, attritional warfare focuses on the immediate battle or on a decisive one. That means that attrition warfare could either rely on exhaustion or on annihilation.92

During the 1980s followers of maneuver warfare created an opposite theory, war of attrition, also known as “industrial warfare”, so that they could define their own theory. Because attritional warfare dose not have any self-proclaimed followers and is mainly a caricature. Despite that, the theory of attritional warfare is of value in order to understand and analyze warfare.

Original idea Edward N. Luttwak is one of those who contributed with important thoughts about war of attrition. He implies that attritional warfare is “war waged by industrial methods”. The opponent is regarded primarily as a series of targets and you succeed through:

“[T]he cumulative effect of superior firepower and material strength”93

When you have affected the opponent with firepower and material strength it ultimately leads to the elimination of your opponent’s overall capacity, or, it leads to his retreat/ surrender. This is the aim of a war of attrition, to defeat the opponent’s military strength in order to win the war.94

91 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 20 92 Van Creveld. Air power and maneuver warfare. p. 9 93 Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 182 94 Van Creveld. Air power and maneuver warfare. p. 9

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

The larger the attritional element is in war, Luttwak implies, the more machine-like the techniques for identifying movement, targets and logistics become. Furthermore, tactical actions tend to become more mechanical and the need for operational thinking fades.95

A victory can be assured if the use of overwhelming firepower could be placed within reach of stationary targets like defensive positions or cities, if the firepower possesses sufficient qualitative and quantitative properties, if the enemy is forced to concentrate his forces or if your own forces can maintain material superiority. Implied with this type of warfare is that the enemy’s firepower will be absorbed by your own military force.96

John F. Antal, explains “war of attrition” as follows:

“(…) The attrition style of warfare focuses on the destruction of the enemy’s forces. Attrition deals with destruction of personnel and equipment over time. Attrition warfare reduces the enemy through the application of superior firepower or superior numbers (…)”97

So attrition warfare is distinct from maneuver warfare in that it seeks to aim at another target, namely enemy material forces (especially military ones, but it could also be infrastructure, command and control, and so on). John Warden thus defines a third approach in addition to annihilation versus exhaustion, namely paralysis. He assumed that it is possible to characterize the opponent as a system and that it is possible to induce system paralysis by decapitation of the systems’s core, i.e. applying firepower in order to affect the enemy’s core.98

Firepower The purpose of firepower in war of attrition is to inflict damage on the enemy in order to reduce his military force. This means that firepower is one of the most important tools one can have as a follower of attritional warfare. In contrast to maneuver warfare, attritional

95 Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. p. 183 96 Ibid. p. 183 97 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. pp. 383-384 98 Widén & Ångström. Militärteorins grunder. pp. 265-267

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” warfare uses movement only to get to a better firing position and not to outmaneuver in order to inflict a system collapse. The use of movement has one purpose and that is to inflict more damage with the use of superior firepower.99

This implies the fact that firepower can be substituted for maneuver. It recognizes that movement in warfare is inherently dangerous and should be avoided. Therefore, rather than move the follower of attritional culture will remain in a protected posture and simply fire at the enemy. Movement is accomplished implicitly though the range and lethality of strike operations.100

While firepower is important, the means to protect is also highly valued within war of attrition. Protection against firepower is of importance in order to absorb an enemy attack with as few losses as possible. Protection can be achieved by dug-in formations or fortifications from which one may deliver fire.101

The use of firepower to influence the opponent means that one tries to defeat the enemy’s forces in the form of his tactical units. This is normally achieved by ensuring that you have an enhanced killing potential, namely the creation of a favourable balance of power. It means mobilizing a stronger fighting force than the enemy in order to succeed.102

As attritional warfare is characterized by systematic and mathematical calculations which try to determine how much input is needed in order to get the best output to win the war, the need for battle plans becomes mandatory.

Battle plan Within attritional warfare one values security and certainty during operations, which leads to a time-consuming planning process. As a result the planning process becomes almost mathematic in correlation to available resources. Furthermore, there exists a strong desire to

99 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring, 3. p. 414, 454 100 Leonhard. Fighting by minutes: time and the art of war. p. 25 101 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 454 102 Ibid. p. 454

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” create and ensure some kind of “order” in the nature of war, hence the creation of an ultimate battle plane is supposed to ensure “order” in all the chaos.103

Consequently one prioritizes characteristics like administrative talent and an eye for detail. It is normally considered important to collect data and create solutions to events that might be of importance to the operation. The purpose of this is the desire to achieve success, i.e. through quantity of solutions prove that the operation is going according to plan.104

Lawrence Freedman explained the complexity of using the method of measuring input in order to predict the output, especially if one side uses non-linearly methods like maneuver warfare:

“Those looking for stability and regularity could find themselves having to cope with the opposite. If effects were uncertain, especially in more complex settings and longer conflicts, how could a responsible strategist think through the consequences of actions. Along with the sociological “laws” of unanticipated consequences and self-fulfilling expectations came the cybernetic concepts of feedback loops and non-linearity. If inputs and outputs were proportional then variables could be plotted along a straight line, as in a linear equation, but with non-linear equations there could be no such plot because the relationships were complex and outcomes would be disproportionate to effects.

The first thought that might be drawn from this was that all strategy was doomed to failure. The second might be that the process could only truly be managed during its early stages, so the best option was to concentrate on getting the initial advantage.”105

The conclusion of this statement by Freedman could be that this is why attritional warfare puts so much effort into the planning process.

103 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 455 104 Ibid. p. 455 105 Freedman. Strategy: a history. p. 198

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Movement Marshal Ferdinand Foch, a French colonel before the First World War, published his collected lectures on the operational art under the title ‘Des Principles de la Guerre’. He was a fervent believer in offensive action, and that the “engagement” was the decisive act in war. The operational art and movement according to Foch only had one purpose; to bring about an engagement on the most favourable terms. In his view of firepower, he saw a mean necessary to get in to a more favourable position over the enemy and then defeat him in close quarter combat.106 So, in his view, what we today call "attrition warfare" was premised on the measurability of another element of the clash of will and arms, that is the morale.

Consequently, maneuver is only a medium used to move one’s firepower from one place to another, so that the effect of it can be maintained or improved. Furthermore, maneuver is used in the context of moving one’s own resources (troops, logistics). Ideally, movement is highly controlled and predetermined as part of a plan, not as a loose and improvised activity where the enemy’s movements are the source of inspiration.107

It is also typical for attritional warfare to point out the danger associated with movement, rather than the opportunities that may present themselves, thus, creativity is not encouraged. J. R. Moore expressed this in the following sentence:

”The plan becomes a triumph of structure over events, and does not readily welcome the creation and exploitation of fleeting opportunities. Given the chaos of war this inflexibility is the most significant weakness of attritional approach.”108

Seize and defend terrain. In order to explain the way to evaluate terrain according to war of attrition the use of L. W. Garu’s explanation of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare is a good example:

106 Graham, Dominic & Bidwell Shelford. Coalitions, politicians & generals: Some aspects of command in two world wars. Brassey, London, New York, 1993. p. 24 107 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 455 108 Ibid. p. 456

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

“[War of attrition] is roughly analogous to U.S football. An attacking and defending side face one another on line. After a short period of concerted effort to gain or deny ground or advantage, both sides regroup and reform to try again. [Maneuver warfare] is roughly analogous to (European) soccer. There is constant activity with players on the same team simultaneously defending, attacking or making the transition between the two. Team members rapidly coalesce into temporary attack or defensive groups and then disperse again (…).”109

The importance of terrain in war of attrition is that it serves as a measure of whether you are succeeding or losing. The desire to occupy a country and conquer territory is larger than a deeper analysis of the benefits, of what that particular terrain infers for one’s side or the enemy’s. When seizing terrain it is important to consolidate as quickly as possible, which costs time and resources. However, when successful in consolidating it creates a sense of security and stability during an operation, which re-establishes the organization that is lost during frictions like movement and combat.110

Time and tempo The definition of time in attritional warfare is used to display how long it takes to collect and then move equipment needed for battle. This can be exemplified by the foundation of attritional warfare as a way of grinding down your opponent, this means that you try to make him lose more military capacity than he is able to produce. If your industry can create military equipment faster than the enemy you will gain an upper hand. During the First and Second World Wars the industrial capacity was essential for the outcome of the wars. The concept of tempo is characterized primarily by the benefit gained if one manages to be superior in the use of resources in comparison to the enemy’s corresponding ability.111

3.4 Indicators, attritional warfare Within attritional warfare theory, there are several characteristics that are central and which could be associated with maneuver warfare. When analyzing war of attrition in order to

109 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. p. 453 110 Ibid. p. 455 111 Ibid. p. 454

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” determine indicators I have mainly used Nils Marius Rekkedal’s book about Modern art of war: he identifies the following characteristics from his book:112

• Firepower • Time • Tempo • Superiority in order to ensure success • To seize and hold terrain • Battle plans • Movement

Related to previous discussions and descriptions of attritional warfare and maneuver warfare, I note that in the theory of attrition it is mainly these indicators that can detect the presence of attritional warfare:

• Firepower and/or protection • To seize and hold terrain • Movement • Battle plans

Though it is important to stress the issue at hand when analyzing the concept of attrition, attrition warfare could be used to serve a strategy aiming at exhausting the enemy rather than annihilating him. Terrain could thus be exchanged against time and time against willpower. That is why one has to distinguish between tactics and strategy when analyzing attrition against maneuver.

112 Rekkedal. Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring. pp. 454-455

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

3.5 Analysis tool When summarizing the theories of the two different methods of warfare, maneuver warfare and attritional warfare, we see that it brings forth a number of indicators which indicate the existence of the different ways of waging war. Some indicators are common for both theories, but many are clearly differentiated. The following table lists the indicators that I believe to best represent each theory.

Maneuver Warfare Attritional Warfare Tempo Firepower and/or Protection Mission-type tactics To seize and hold terrain Indirect approach Movement Center of Gravity Battle plans Surprise and/or Deception

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

4. Analysis

4.1 Background The French experience from the First World War was that firepower and a good line of defense were key features for victory. Due to this experience they developed a doctrine based on static fortifications and indirect fire. This is the main reason why they put their main effort in building the Maginot line to defend France after the First World War. Command and control was also based on the experiences from that time which among other things spoke of centralized planning and a centralized detailed-order tactics113.114 The commanders were located far from the action and without the possibility to directly influence their subordinates. When you try to explain War of Attrition to someone you often use the battles from the First World War in order to give them a mental picture of the theory. Basically the French way of fighting was focused on destroying the enemy’s military strength/ capacity with firepower.

As the French put all their effort into firepower and fortifications, the Germans (being on the losing side of WW1) made a different evaluation of how a future war would be fought. Through mission-type tactics115 and maneuverability they would avoid the enemy’s main forces and break the enemy’s continued fighting spirit/ will to fight.

Both France and Germany fought against each other in the war but drew quite different conclusions after the war ended. Could it be that whoever won the war believed they could use the same tactics again to achieve the same victory? The opposite can then apply for the losing side, it must adapt its tactics to succeed in the future and that then leads to something new and maybe improved.

In the following chapter an analysis will be conducted on four operations executed by the French during the Indo-China period (1946-1954). The aim is as previously stated to determine whether the French operations in Indo-China after the Second World War were based upon maneuver warfare or attritional warfare.

113 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. pp. 52-53 114 Wedin, Lars. Marianne och Athena: franskt militärt tänkande från 1700-talet till idag. Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm, 2007. pp. 240-242 115 Leonhard. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle. pp. 48-50

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

4.2 OPERATION LÉA, 1947 After the initial French reoccupation of Indo-China in 1945-6 operations in the Far East had low priority, and the Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO) was in constant competition for men and equipment with France’s NATO forces in Germany. The financial cost of the war was a serious drain on a country that had to deal with the imbalance within its own country, and the interest in the colonial wars was limited within the general population.116 117

In Indo-China, the Viet Minh areas of control held about 10 million of the population – about 40 per cent of the total. The level of control initially established by the French reduced the guerilla activity, but it soon settled to a relatively tolerable level of insecurity.118

The Viet Minh main force was station in the Chu Luc and preparing for a long, patient war. The area was more or less remote and inaccessible to the French, cloaked by forest, and inhabited by loyal population, which provided Giap’s regulars with a safe heaven. In 1947 the force was about 30,000 men strong, but had a shortage of weapons. The issue of getting more weapons and ammunitions crippled a rapid expansion of Giap’s regular force.119

In the beginning of 1947 the French high command tried to get rid of the Viet Minh in the south Indo-China but failed. In practical terms the French Army controlled a shifting pattern of invisible islands in the human landscape of Indo-China, due to the lack of available troops; not only the Viet Minh but also various other armed groups roamed the spaces between them.120

The French government sought to grip the whole Viet Minh force in a series of ever-widening classical “pincers”. Particularly during autumn of 1947, a fairly ambitious undertaking, dubbed “operation Léa” and combining paratroop drops within deep armored stabs, sought to wipe out the revolution by capturing its top leaders.121

116 Windrow, Martin. The last valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2004. p. 92 117 Férier, Gilles, Les trois guerres d'Indochine, Cambodge - Politique et gouvernement - 1979-, Lyon, 1993. pp- 49-50 118 Ibid. p. 93 119 Ibid. p. 94 120 Ibid. p. 95 121 Fall, Bernard. Street Without Joy, History. Barnsley, 2005. p. 28

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Operation Léa was a wild gamble at finishing the whole war in one single masterstroke. There were two reasons for this:

• The French legislature was beginning to balk at the cost of the Indo-China war and the French government had promised to reduce French forces from 115,000 to 90,000 men. • A small rebellion had broken out on the island of Madagascar and 15,000 troops were needed there to deal with the issue.

The French high command felt compelled to use all its available reserves before they would be withdrawn. On the French side, twenty battalions and support units totaling 15,000 men were thrown into the fight to defeat Ho Chi Minh; the French command requested double this in order to succeed with the operation, but the motion was rejected. On the enemy side more than 40,000 well-armed men defended a 100 by 100 mile (160 by 160km) triangle of Tonkin’s most inaccessible jungles and mountain crags.122

The French plan provided for a concentric attack by three columns: Airborne Half-Brigade, a main force of three armored, three infantry and three artillery battalions, reinforced by an engineering and a transport battalion, and a shipborne three-battalion force. The Fourth Fighter Group equipped with “Spitfire” -9s supported the whole operation.123

At dawn on October 7, 1947, airborne groupement “S” jumped on the headquarters of the enemy in the area at Bac-Kan, Cho Moi and Cho Don with so little warning that they still found Ho Chi Minh’s mail on his working table. But the main prizes, Ho Chi Minh, General Giap and the other senior leaders had escaped.124

In the meantime, groupement “B” had left the border of Lang-Son but was delayed due to the difficult terrain along Road 4. The plan was to seal off the enemy’s retreat north towards China and safety (sanctuary). On October 12 the taskforce had succeeded with one of the

122 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 28 123 Ibid. p. 28 124 Ibid. p. 29

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” pincer moves to seal off the enemy. The river-borne groupement “C”, two infantry battalions and some commando units began on October 9 to move up the Red and Clear Rivers. They ran into trouble with sandbanks but eventually landed one battalion at Tuyen-Quang and pushed on northward against the Viet Minh forces, which began to feel the pressure of the second French pincer closing in.125

Figure 4: OPERATION LÉA126

On October 19, 1947, the pincer move was completed and the French forces met at Chiem- Hoa. The main Viet Minh force was encircled by the French pincer operation, but the fact was that due to the terrain the term “encirclement” was meaningless. Between towns and key

125 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 29 126 OPERATION LÉA. Picture retrieved from: URL: http://jcr3.free.fr/cahier-journalier/pages/Albums/cartes/pages/carte-ope-Lea-1_gif.htm [Electronic resource] (retrieved at 2015-04-28).

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” points the French now garrisoned along the triangle there were vast stretches where whole Viet Minh regiments could slip through. On November 8, one month after it had begun, operation Léa was called off.127

4.2.1 Analysis of OPERATION LÉA, 1947 On the strategic level the French acted very quickly and used tempo in order to gain the element of surprise over the enemy. Due to pressure on the French high command to reduce the number of forces stationed in Indo-China the operation had to be conducted on a relative short timetable. The mission was based on high risk and high reward principals. If the plan succeeded the Viet Minh would take a serious blow and it might even end the war. The use of paratroopers to eliminate the high command of the Viet Minh shows an active use of surprise within the strategic level.

On the operative level the aim was to encircle the enemy in order to cut off its retreat towards China. This could be traced back to Center of Gravity: to ensure that if the paratroopers were to fail with their objective to eliminate the high command, the French forces still had the enemy surrounded so that they could fix them elsewhere. The main issue in this operation was the difficult terrain of the operation. Even if they brought in extra effort with engineers and logistic components the advance was delayed because of harsh terrain and sabotaged bridges.128

On the tactical level the French army focused on seizing terrain in the form of towns and key points through the operation area. The encirclement through a pincer move was a success in the sense of maneuver but it failed to hold the enemy, due to the enormous and difficult terrain. The terrain was used by the Viet Minh to move past French occupied areas and due to limited forces the French could not cover all areas. So on the tactical level the French focused on seizing and holding on to terrain in order to fulfill their operational and strategic goals.

127 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 30 128 Ibid. pp. 28-30

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

4.2.2 Conclusion The following table presents a graphic picture of which indicators that were present during this operation:

Indicators Strategic Operational Tactical

Maneuver warfare Tempo Yes Mission-type tactics Indirect approach Center of Gravity Yes Yes Surprise and/or Deception Yes

Attritional Warfare Firepower and/or Protection To seize and hold terrain Yes Movement Battle plans

OPERATION LÉA has clear strategic connections to maneuver warfare. The decision to act against the enemy’s high command was a high risk and high reward operation, whose purpose was to end the war quickly. The French army’s way of conducting the operation was based upon conventional tactics and the seizing of key points but the enemy did not prize the key points and that is why the encirclement did not work as planned. But could have been very successful if the enemy high command had not had the time to withdraw from the area.

The tactical level in the operation had connections to attritional warfare and the absence of maneuver when key positions were seized. The thought was to seize and hold key terrain and deny enemy movement outside the perimeter.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

4.3 Battle of Hóa Binh, 1951 Giap’s decision after the rains of 1951 was to send Division 312 southwest across the Red River to attack Nghia Lo, a strategic French post in the hills between the Red and Black rivers, which had important tracks thorough the Thai Highlands. Nghia Lo was assaulted in October, but the French stood their ground. The success at Nghia Lo was hailed as another French victory, vindicating a policy of maintaining isolated garrisons, which could be reinforced by parachute if attacked.129

After several successful encounters with the Viet Minh, General de Lattre followed up on the defensive victories of the spring by lunching an ambitious thrust southwest from the Delta to recapture Hóa Binh, about 25miles (40km) from the nearest secure base.130 This was an unexpected direction: instead of aiming at the enemy’s main centers of resistance in the northeast, he struck out across the bend of the Black River and went for the city of Hóa Binh.131

The reason for focusing upon Hóa Binh had several practical and political considerations:132

• Hóa Binh constituted, on the tactical side, a major road link between the northeastern Viet Minh strongholds that received aid and equipment from the Viet Minh stronghold around Thanh Hóa. The occupation of this area would force the Viet Minh to confront superior French firepower. • To maintain the allegiance with the Muong mountaineers whom so far remained loyal to the French. • The French National Assembly was about to debate the Indo-China budget for next year and the French government needed a victory in order to get more funding, a victory would also contribute to more American support.133

At dawn on November 14th, 1951, three French paratroop battalions descended upon Hóa Binh, occupying the city without resistance. At the same time, a total of fifteen infantry

129 Windrow. The last valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. p. 117 130 Ibid. p. 117 131 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 47 132 Ibid. p. 48 133 Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. UCL Press, London, 1999. p. 64

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” battalions, seven artillery battalions, two armored groups reinforced by two Dinassauts134 and engineering forces, began to churn their way into the narrow Black River valley. The following day all major objectives were in French hands with a minimum of losses and almost no resistance.135

Giap was faithful to his methods and refused engagement with the French as long as his troops had neither numerical superiority nor an adequate route for withdrawal. But on the other hand the French invasion of the wooded areas appeared as an opportunity to repeat the ambushes conducted on Road 4 in 1950. Therefore, Giap ordered almost all of his regulars to the battle for Hóa Binh: the 304th, 308th and 312th infantry divisions with artillery, anti-aircraft and engineering troops; and the regional troops (semi-regular forces) stationed to the west of the Red River Delta. Finally, the 316th and 320th infantry divisions, the former being stationed on the northern flank of the delta and the latter being partially infiltrated along the Day River front, were given the order to penetrate deeply into the French lowland positions and to disorganize French supply lines feeding the Hóa Binh operation.136

Only two major avenues of approach were available to the French to reach Hóa Binh, Road 6 and along the Black River. But the problem was that road 6 had suffered sabotage by the Viet Minh and could at most be considered an unimproved path, and along the Black River the distance became three times the distance than road 6. Thus, in the case of the river route as well as that of road 6, the French had developed a system of forts and strong points strung out on both sides of the communications artery which was costly both in manpower and equipment.137

134 “Naval Assault Infantry Division”, a type of riverine military unit employed by the French Navy during the Indo-China war. 135 Fall. Street Without Joy. pp. 48-49 136 Ibid. p. 49 137 Ibid. pp. 49-51

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Figure 5: Battle of Hóa Binh138

As the battle proceeded, the problem of resupplying the main force in Hóa Binh became more and more difficult due to ambushes, but yet more difficult was the task to resupply the post that protected the supply lines. In December the Viet Minh attacked with division 304 against French positions along Black River and the following month divisions 304, 308 and 312 closed in around Hóa Binh and road 6. In the same time divisions 316 and 320 infiltrated from north and south to harass the French rear areas. During the battle de Lattre’s condition (cancer) took a turn for the worse and he was transported back to France. General Raoul Salan took his place and was faced with the immediate problem that his five battalions holding Hóa Binh were about to be cut off.139

Due to heavy losses along the Black River approach to Hóa Binh, transport along that route stopped and the main focus of both forces became road 6. In the second half of January 1952

138 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 50 139 Windrow. The last valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. p. 118

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

General Salan launched a major operation to force the Viet Minh back from road 6 and the operation took 12 days, before reaching Hóa Binh. When the French forces reached Hóa Binh General Salan order the garrison to withdraw from the area. During the Hóa Binh campaign it was notices that Viet Minh infantry tactics had become more sophisticated, that concealed 75mm guns, and heavy anti-aircraft machine guns supported them. The Viet Minh logistical capabilities hade also improved significantly since the early engagements.140

The battle was supposed to draw out the enemy so that the Viet Minh were forced to fight on French terms, but the fact is that both sides had the same thought. The campaign can best be described as a “meat grinder” were both sides suffered great losses. The operation focused on its long and precarious supply lines on both sides. The Viet Minh refused to abandon their strategy of leaving small units to fend for themselves, even if that meant sacrificing some of them.141 Since the Viet Minh refuse to fight on French terms both sides tried to affect the supply lines in order to wear the other down and on a piecemeal basis, one company annihilated here, one battalion mauled there, a truck convoy lost in some other place, the battle for Hóa Binh hade became a “meat grinder” for both sides.142

4.3.1 Analysis of Hóa Binh, 1951 After several victories against Viet Minh offensives, the French sought to take the fight to them and make sure that they fought on French terms. General de Lattre choose the center of Hóa Binh for different reasons (one could be the element of surprise since an attack against the enemy’s main force was expected), hence an attack against Hóa Binh could also be seen as an attack with intentions associated with to seize and hold terrain. The purpose of the operation was to make the Viet Minh fight on French terms by effecting their supply lines, this is associated with attritional warfare. Since the purpose was not to effect the enemy’s will to fight, but to draw him out, one cannot connect the strategic level to maneuver warfare.

The purpose of occupying the center of Hóa Binh was to draw out the enemy and destroy them with overwhelming firepower. This could be associated with the will to seize and hold terrain in order to get to a more favorable position in which one can use firepower to defeat

140 Windrow. The last valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. pp. 118-119 141 Tucker. Vietnam. pp. 66-67 142 Fall. Street Without Joy. pp. 51-60

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

the enemy on the operational and tactical level. Since there were no major battles during the battle for Hóa Binh, one cannot clearly define the tactical approach during this operation. But one can connect the will to defend the supply lines with fortifications to the tactical level, as to use firepower and protection in order to secure supply routes.

4.3.2 Conclusion To present a graphic picture of which indicators that were present during this operation I will use the following table:

Indicators Strategic Operational Tactical

Maneuver warfare Tempo Mission-type tactics Indirect approach Center of Gravity Surprise and/or Deception Yes

Attritional Warfare Firepower and/or Protection Yes Yes To seize and hold terrain Yes Yes Movement Battle plans

On the strategic level the French used surprise but only so with the intention of defeating its military force. The intention was not to deny the enemy his supplies but to force him to act against the French occupants of Hóa Binh. In conclusion the strategy of how to affect the enemy’s main force could be traced to maneuver warfare, hence, the main purpose was to defeat him by direct confrontation with his main force, which is associated with attritional warfare. The battle of Hóa Binh became and was intended to be a war of attrition with the aim of wearing down the enemy’s main force.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

4.4 OPERATION LORRAINE, 1952 During 1952 the Viet Minh was on the offensive and during the advance they had not used roads or motor vehicles. The Viet Minh were soon to reach the Lao border, and in this war without fronts, the Viet Minh could be, as Giap put it, “everywhere and nowhere.”143

In October 1952, General de Linarès entrusted the defense of the middle Black River and Route Provinciale 41 to an Operational Group commanded by a paratroop Colonel, Jean Gilles. East of Tuan Giao the road was overlooked by a cluster of hills around an airstrip at Na San, and Colonel Gilles was ordered to prepare this position for defense. Although the French had no road links into the High Region, General Salan believed that a strong garrison, with artillery support, could be planted and sustained far from the Red River Delta by airlift alone and Na San was to be the testing ground for the theory of “base aero-terrestre’”.144

By the beginning of November the enemy had reached the hill line between Black River and Nam-Ma where the French had organized the strong point of Na San which had been rapidly fortified by four infantry battalions, one artillery group, and engineering forces. Realizing that a battle at Na Sam was going to be an expensive assault without strategic result, the Viet Minh by-passed the fortification. While by-passing the French forces they continued the advance across the wide empty spaces of the mountainous north. The small airfield of Dien Bien Phu fell to enemy hands on November 30, 1952.145

In view of the rapidly deteriorating situation, the French High Command decided to once more conduct a deep stab into the enemy’s communication lines and supply system along the Red River, in hope that this would lead the enemy commander to withdraw a large part of his assault force in the northwest, to defend his rear areas. This was the strategic assumption that gave rise to the launch of OPERATION LORRAINE.146

The operation consisted of four different phases:147

143 Tucker. Vietnam. p. 66 144 Windrow. The last valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. p. 123 145 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 77 146 Ibid. p. 77 147 Ibid. pp. 77-78

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

1. Open bridgehead across the Red River in the direction of Phu Tho. 2. Link up with the other bridgehead and another taskforce heading north from Viet Tri. Then together they would progress towards Phu Doan where Airborne Group One would be dropped upon the taskforce arrival. 3. During this stage the French forces would destroy the numerous enemy equipment and materiel depots known to be located in the Phu Doan area: which in turn would bring a rapid withdrawal of the Viet Minh forces to secure their remaining depots. 4. The fourth stage was dependent on the Viet Minh reaction: the French would either permanently occupy the area or push on further into Viet Minh territory.

The forces allotted by the French High Command to OPERATION LORRAINE were perhaps the largest ever assembled in Indo-China for any single operation: four complete mobile groups, one airborne group with three parachute battalions, two infantry battalions and five commando units. In addition they deployed two armored sub-groups, two tank destroyers, reconnaissance squadrons, engineering forces, costal artillery support and two artillery battalions, a total of 30,000 men.148

The enemy was well aware of the operation before it began and estimated that the French operation would run out of steam before it could reach the vital supply centers in Yen Bay and Thai Nguyen. On the French side, the very size and heaviness of the units involved in the offensive made the restoration of roads and bridges an overriding condition of movement and slowed down the whole operation. The engineering forces had to work day and night in order to get forward and the Viet Minh forces sabotaged the road and bridges, in order to slow down the French advance.149

Initially using two routes, the French bridged the river at Thrung Ha and Viet Tri and advanced in parallel, but by the time they got moving all surprise had been lost. In bad weather, and repeatedly blocked and ambushed by Viet Minh regional troops, it took them until November the 5th to reach Phu Tho where phase two was beginning. Thereafter they advanced up a single narrow road deep into enemy territory. On November the 9th 2,350

148 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 78 149 Ibid. p. 79

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” paratroopers dropped over Phu Doan, meeting light resistance. The Viet Minh was ordered not to engage the French but to withdraw from the area and fade into the forest.150

The next day on the 10th of November the French forces reached the depot areas and spread out to find and destroy the enemy’s stores. The French found and destroyed a lot of Viet Minh resources and were sitting on an important knot in the Viet Minh road network. The problem for such a large force is that it cannot stay there forever, and Giap refused to take the French bait and remained passive. But what he did do was to infiltrate the French defense line “De Lattre Line” and keep the French garrisons occupied. Since the forces deployed mainly came from stationary post around the De Lattre Line, it was spread thinly during OPERATION LORRAINE and exposed to enemy attacks.151

Figure 6: OPERATION LORRAINE152 The strain of supplying such a large force forced the French to withdraw from the area, and on the 14th of November General Salan gave the order to withdraw. The French met strong

150 Windrow. The last valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. p. 124 151 Ibid. p. 124 152 OPERATION LORRAINE. Picture retrieved from: URL: http://indochine54.free.fr/ops/lorraine.html [Electronic resource] (retrieved at 2015-04-28).

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” resistance when withdrawing from the area, consisting of ambushes conducted by the Viet Minh along the narrow road leading back to French-controlled territory. This was when the fighting began and the initiative lay with the Viet Minh forces.153

In all the operation had cost a lot of casualties from the French side and it had failed to reach the Viet Minh’s vital storages in Yen Bay and Thai Nguyen. Although the operation had cost the enemy substantial material damage, the depots destroyed could be made up with the swelling flow of resources from China.154 155

4.4.1 Analysis of OPERATION LORRAINE, 1952 The strategic assumption in OPERATION LORRAINE was that if the French were able to inflict sufficient losses on Viet Minh logistic elements in the northern areas, it would force the enemy to stop the advance southward 156 and to withdraw to protect its logistics depots in order to be able to resupply. Here the French were able to locate the enemy’s Center of Gravity (supply depots) to some extent but they were not able to achieve results due to resupply problems with their own forces.

But what they did do was to try to affect the enemy’s main force by affecting their logistic “units” instead of trying to attack head on. This shows an active use of principles from the Indirect approach.

On the operational level the operation was based upon an elaborate battle plan especially because the road had to be fixed before it could be used, 157 and during the second phase an airdrop had to be timed with the arrival of ground forces. This shows tendencies of elaborate battle plans on the operational level and a strict timetable since supplies were scarce. But in the initial stages the French tried to move fast and reach the supply bases before the Viet Minh had the opportunity to hide their supplies, and this shows the intention of trying to act within the OODA-loop and reach the goal before the enemy can act.

153 Windrow. The last valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. p. 124 154 Ibid. p. 124 155 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 95 156 Ibid. p. 77 157 Ibid. p. 79

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

On the tactical level there is not much to analyze since there were no major battles fought during the advancement of the operation. The Viet Minh only affected the French during the withdrawal from the area. But in the meantime when looking into how the operation proceeded you can make out that the French relied upon firepower and protection in order to reach the supply depots. The use of armored cars, naval support and airdrops combined shows a high priority of protection.

4.4.2 Conclusion To present a graphic picture of which indicators that were present during this operation I will use the following table:

Indicators Strategic Operational Tactical

Maneuver warfare Tempo Yes Mission-type tactics Indirect approach Yes Center of Gravity To some extent Surprise and/or Deception

Attritional Warfare Firepower and/or Protection Yes To seize and hold terrain Movement Battle plans Yes

During OPERATION LORRAINE in 1952, the French High Command tried to affect the enemy’s rear units in order to affect its main force and break their fighting spirit. The aim was to make the enemy withdraw from their southern positions and protect the rear supply lines. Even though the operation failed to reach the supply depots that were vital to the Viet Minh, it shows that the French High Command deliberately tried to use maneuver warfare in order to gain an upper hand. On the operational and tactical level, the operation mainly used attritional warfare in order to succeed with the strategic goals. The reason for this could be the inaccessible terrain that drastically reduces the ability to maneuver, which forces the French to rely upon what they could use (firepower in order to gain protection).

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

4.5 OPERATION CAMARGUE, 1953 In July 1953 a new commander, General Navarre, arrived in Indo-China. The French had estimated the enemy’s combined forces at a total of 350,000-400,000 men. The French had secured promising support from the US. During 1953-4 General Navarre planned to avoid major confrontations with the Viet Minh forces in the northern theatre, while at the same time increasing his forces and initiating a pacification program in the Red River Delta. He planned to take the offensive in the Central Highlands to forestall Viet Minh attacks there and as a prelude to complete French control of the south.158

To keep the Viet Minh off balance and on the defensive General Navarre launched a series of smaller attacks. Although it provided more of a psychological lift than anything else, General Navarre’s offensive spirit injected enthusiasm among the French military. After the smaller operations General Navarre sought to execute his next operation, CAMARGUE, which began in July 1953.159

For years the communications along the central Annam coast had been plagued by Viet Minh attacks against Road 1, the main north-south artery along the coast. The principal source of trouble was a string of heavily fortified villages from Hué to Quang-Tri. The French High Command had assembled sufficient reserves in the area to attempt to clear up Road 1 once and for all.160

OPERATION CAMARGUE was the name of the operation designed to clean up Road 1 (aka. Street Without Joy). The operation involved the simultaneous landing of troops along the coast of central Annam, coupled with two coordinated thrusts by armored units, with airborne forces remaining as reserve to seal off attempts at escape by the Viet Minh forces.161

With the elements of ten infantry regiments, two airborne battalions, three armored regiments, one squadron of armored launches and one armored train, four artillery battalions; and air

158 Tucker. Vietnam. pp. 67-69 159 Ibid. p. 69 160 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 144 161 Ibid. p. 144

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” support consisting of four transport aircraft, six reconnaissance aircraft and twenty-two fighter-bombers; and about twelve Navy ships.162

The basic idea of the operation was to encircle the enemy and then conduct a “mopping up” in the area around Road 1 and systematically destroy the enemy forces trapped in the encirclement. The attack was to be carried out by two amphibious forces, three land-borne groupements and one airborne force, under the overall command of General Leblanc.163

During the operation groupement “A” was to land on the coast on July 28, at dawn. Goupement “B” was to advance overland in the line of advance of groupement “A”. Groupment “C” was to participate in the attack at the same time as groupement “B” and advance directly on the Van Trinh Canal and push all enemy elements west of the canal against the canal or across it. Groupement “C” was to pay particular attention to the coordination of its movements with groupement “D” which was to land south of groupement “A” on the northern peninsula of the lagoon. Groupement “D” in turn was to land as early as possible and push north across the peninsula in order to form a common front with groupement “C” as soon as possible. The two airborne battalions were held in reserve at the disposal of the High Command and were to be committed only upon express permission from the High Command.164

The operation seemed promising: the French had far more men than the Viet Minh and on paper the encirclement would succeed. But what made the operation so difficult for the French was, as in all other operations in Indo-China, the terrain.165

The Viet Minh forces in the area consisted of regiment 95, which was a regular unit from the Viet Minh’s main force that had infiltrated Route 1. The enemy had spent more than two years fortifying the villages with an interlocking system of trenches and tunnels, underground arms depots, and first-aid stations, which no single brutal thrust by large mobile forces could

162 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 144 163 Ibid. p. 145 164 Ibid. p. 145 165 Ibid. p. 145

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” uncover or destroy. This zone of villages constituted the heart of the Viet Minh resistance zone along the Annam coast.166

OPERATION CAMARGUE began at dawn on July 28,1953, with the disembarkment of the amphibious groupement “A” on the central coast of Annam. Immediately after landing on the beaches they seized the first hillcrest line overlooking the coastal dunes. While Groupement “A” forward elements were breaching the dune barrier unopposed, two of groupement “B” battalions crossed the Van Trịnh Canal. When they made visual contact with the Crabs and Alligators of Groupement “A”, they had succeeded in sealing off the northern escape route of the enemy’s Regiment 95. 167

The Moroccan Spahis also reached the canal, having had difficulty crossing the swamps on the landward side with their tanks. No French units had made any major contact with the Viet Minh. A minor fire-fight had taken place on the southern edge of groupement “B” advance when an Algerian company exchanged fire with 20–30 Viet Minh and suffered the first French fatalities.168

Simultaneously, groupement “C” had advanced into the center of the area of operation, and executed the most complicated maneuver of the operation. This involved crossing Route One and sealing off the landside of the operational area. Groupement “D” were thereafter tasked with advancing south from its landing point to close off an escape route that ran between the sea and an inland lagoon towards the city of Hué. When this was completed the Viet Minh Regiment 95 was trapped within the French area of operations.169

Hereafter began the hardest phase of the operation, the mopping-up. On the northern end of Route 1 groupment “B” began a methodical sweep of every village, an operation that had to be carried out with greatest of care, regardless of result. Each village was first surrounded and sealed off. Then the infantry moved in and searched the houses while mine detectors and

166 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 147 167 Ibid. pp. 147-149 168 Ibid. pp. 149-150 169 Ibid. pp. 150-151

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” bloodhound teams probed in bushes and palm-trees for hidden entrances to underground storages.170

Within the area of operation the French had encircled the Viet Minh forces, but the problem was that there were some gaps in the southern part of the area which had not been completely sealed off. The groupement that was tasked with sealing the gaps were delayed by stay-behind enemy forces in order to gain time for the main bulk to escape. General Leblanc realized the enemy’s intent and ordered the airdrop of the first paratroop battalion to secure the gap, but this was delayed due to the chain of command. The problem was that when they landed and sealed the gap night was already upon them. The French forces were scarce in the area but tried to cover as much ground as possible. The following day the advance continued inwards but with no sight of the enemy. Then it was realized the enemy had successfully withdrawn through gaps in the French encirclement during the night.171

Figure 7: OPERATION CAMARGUE172

170 Fall. Street Without Joy. pp. 151-152 171 Ibid. pp. 152-168 172 Ibid. p. 146

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“The steel jaws of a modern armed force, supported by naval ships, amphibious tanks, and aircraft, had slammed shut on a force led by men, who in only a few cases, had received the training of corporals and sergeants. A trap ten times the size of the force to be trapped, had shut and caught nothing.”173

On August 4, 1953, the High Command called off OPERATION CAMARGUE. The French had succeeded in retaking Route 1 but without capturing the enemy’s main force in the area. Regarding the tactics used to seal off a pocket in an airtight fashion, it had once again proved impossible due to the inaccessible terrain of Indo-China. When battalions had to hold more than 1,500 yards (about 1400 meters) of ground it proved impossible; during the operation battalions had to cover as much as 3,000 yards (about 2700 meters) in some cases. Hence the purpose of the operation was not the surface occupation of the villages but the flushing-out of the enemy from his well-camouflaged hiding places and underground installations; any speed- up of the advance would be at the expense of the thoroughness of the search for weapons, men and secret administrative organizations.174

4.5.1 Analysis of OPERATION CAMARGUE, 1953 On the operational level the purpose was the clear Route 1 so that French convoys could use the road and not be affected by Viet Minh ambushes. The French wanted to encircle the enemy and trap him within the area of operations by sheer force. The plan was simple and the purpose clear, a force consistent with at least 10-1 was to encircle the enemy then systematically destroy strongholds, supply depots and capture men. The problem was - as in previous missions - the terrain, which made it impossible to oversee every gap between the friendly forces. From the planning stage of the operation one can see that fire and protection as to seize and hold terrain is important for the operation.

The plan was simple, yet it required a strict timetable in order to succeed in capturing the enemy within the area. This shows a limited possibility for commanders to act upon upcoming situations. The paratroopers were kept as a reserve, this shows a thought on how to

173 Fall. Street Without Joy. p. 168 174 Ibid. pp. 170-171

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handle the unknown, and could be connected to tempo (to be able to react to an enemy movement and gain the initiative).

On the tactical level during the operation the French used terrain to seal off the enemy and then movement to get in closer so that they could use firepower if necessary. It was a very systematic operation with few engagements.

4.5.2 Conclusion To present a graphic picture of which indicators that were present during this operation I will use the following table:

Indicators Strategic Operational Tactical

Maneuver warfare Tempo Yes Mission-type tactics Indirect approach Center of Gravity Surprise and/or Deception

Attritional Warfare Firepower and/or Protection Yes Yes To seize and hold terrain Yes Yes Movement Battle plans Yes

The strategic level does not effect this operation since it is a mopping-up. The main reason for this operation is to remove the Viet Minh from the area and has little to do with the whole picture of the war in Indo-China. The longer the war drags on the more the French tend to affect the enemy by force. This operation shows an increase of attritional warfare tactics. One wants to encircle the enemy and destroy him with force, but with no clear Center of Gravity.

The element of surprise is hard to achieve against an enemy that only uses infantry and is supported by the people, who relay important information. They are light and can move in any terrain; since the terrain for armored vehicles is limited they know where they cannot be

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” reached by the French. Yet the French show some thoughts that can be traced back to maneuver warfare theory and that is the use of airborne troops as a reserve to act against upcoming situations.

4.6 Summary of conclusions

4.6.1 OPERATION LÉA, 1947 The French High Command showed clear use of maneuver warfare when conducting OPERATION LÉA since they were able to do something unsuspected to the enemy. They were also able to determine the enemy’s Center of Gravity that at the time was the senior command, which, if eliminated might have caused the enemy to lose the will to fight. Even if the operational and tactical level showed connections to attritional culture the purpose of the operation was to affect the Center of Gravity, which is associated with maneuver warfare.

4.6.2 Battle of Hóa Binh, 1951 The purpose of the operation was to defeat the enemy’s main force, which is clearly associated with war of attrition. The means of how to reach the enemy’s main force, however, is connected to maneuver warfare. But since the purpose of the operation was to defeat the enemy’s main force and not to make him lose his will to fight, it could only be focused on attritional warfare.

4.6.3 OPERATION LORRAINE, 1952 This operation has similarities to the battle of Hóa Binh, hence different purposes. The purpose of the operation is to affect the enemy’s rear units in order to get him off balance and relieve pressure from the front. The possible synergy effect of the operation was to succeed in destroying the enemy’s vital supply depots and by this cripple his ability to fight. On the whole the operation was mainly built upon theories associated with maneuver warfare.

4.6.4 OPERATION CAMARGUE, 1953 This last operation shows no connection to maneuver warfare since the main purpose of it was to destroy the enemy in the area. There is nothing to connect to the strategic level, and when

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

looking at the operational and tactical level it is an operation that has influences to attritional warfare. One used movement to gain a position of advantage where the French could use firepower to destroy the enemy systematically.

4.6.5 Conclusion analytical indicators The purpose of this conclusion is to present a graphic picture of which indicators that were present during all of the operations:

Indicators Strategic Operational Tactical

Maneuver warfare Tempo 1 3, 4 Mission-type tactics Indirect approach 3 Center of Gravity 1, (3) 1 Surprise and/or Deception 1, 2

Attritional Warfare Firepower and/or Protection 2, 4 2, 3, 4 To seize and hold terrain 2 2,4 1, 4 Movement Battle plans 3, 4

1. OPERATION LÉA 2. Battle of Hóa Binh 3. OPERATION LORRAINE 4. OPERATION CAMARGUE

When summarizing indicators from the analysis one can conclude that on the strategic level, maneuver warfare is present throughout most of the operations. This shows that one tends to make strategic goals with thoughts based upon maneuver warfare, hence on the operational level one tends to use attritional warfare to empower the strategic objectives. But on the tactical level one uses attritional warfare to defeat the enemy in combat.

The graphics show that as the war progresses one tends to use more and more attritional warfare. As a whole one can make the conclusion that the operations during this war are based upon maneuver warfare but executed using attrition.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

5. Result and Discussion

5.1 Main research question • Could we classify French operations in Indo-China 1946-1954, as operations based upon maneuver warfare or attritional warfare?

The analysis shows that both theories of warfare are present during each operation but on different levels, and sometimes both are present at the same level. Therefore it is not possible to classify French operations in Indo-China as operations based upon maneuver warfare or attritional warfare.

5.2 Sub-question • How could we classify the individual operations, were they based upon different theories of warfare?

Yes, the operations were based upon different theories of warfare; but they were never solely based upon the same theory of warfare on all levels. Considering strategy as the superior level one can classify the operations based upon the different theories.

• OPERATION LÉA, 1947: Maneuver warfare • Battle of Hóa Binh, 1951: Attritional warfare • OPERATION LORRAINE, 1952: Maneuver warfare • OPERATION CAMARGUE, 1953: Attritional warfare

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5.3 Discussion After the analysis it has become clear that it is not possible to classify the war/ operations in Indo-China as operations based upon the different theories. The reason could be that they were different operations/ periods that can be classified differently and therefore it is not possible to determine whether operations during the Indo-China war were based upon one or the other. Basically, the operations during the Indo-China war can be classified as operations based upon maneuver warfare, but executed with attritional warfare, hence as the war progresses the more attritional warfare is shown in the operations conducted by the French.

One problem with classifying the operations is that most of them consist of elements from both; attritional warfare and maneuver warfare, but on different levels. If one specifies strategy as the general rule of the operation then that is the level which determines the basis of the operation, hence if it is maneuver warfare or attritional warfare. However, all levels of warfare have to be considered when analyzing according to one theory or the other; therefore one cannot determine whether the operation is based upon maneuver warfare or attritional warfare by just analyzing the strategic level.

Why different types of warfare were used on different levels during the operations in Indo- China could have many reasons; it could be that the terrain did not permit the use of maneuverability, or that one simply was not aware that they used one theory or the other. The only focus might have been to defeat the enemy at hand and not so much which theory was applicable.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

6. Summary

6.1 Suggestions for further studies While working on this thesis, a number of questions have been raised, some of which could be subjects for further studies.

Instead of trying to determine the occurrence of one or the other one should try to analyze from more perspectives of warfare in order to gain a deeper understanding of where and when to use them. This could further lead to developments of theories that have yet to be discovered and also contribute to a deeper understanding of warfare.

The use of force in the modern world is not the same as force used during the twentieth- century; today conflicts within the state are more common than state-to-state war. The armed forces need to be able to handle all kinds of conflict even though it might not involve brute force as the primary method. A research on the utility of force in modern “wars/ conflicts” could therefore contribute to a new way of understanding warfare in our time.

6.2 Reflection Writing about the different theories of warfare, maneuver warfare and attritional warfare, especially when analyzing them in context of the Indo-China war, raised a lot of thoughts; thoughts which the major theorists like Clausewitz have tried to put into words, phenomena like war and warfare, how to succeed, conflicts in the modern world, and so on. It often came down to discussions of what the future war will look like, and what will we think of the theories that we have today. Will they be rendered obsolete or will they evolve into something new? How will one view upon the utility of force in the future? These are all questions raised during this thesis but unfortunately remain without answer.

The process has been interesting both in the matter of gaining a deeper knowledge on the two theories of warfare and also in getting familiar with different perspectives from theorists like Lind, Leonhard, van Creveld and Liddell Hart. It has certainly broadened my perspective on warfare and provided me with valuable insights that will undoubtedly be of use to me in my future in the Armed Forces.

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Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China”

Analyzing though the lens of maneuver warfare and attritional warfare with the use of indicators, has put the theories in opposition to each other. It can be discussed if that really is the case. If one cannot find any indicators to prove the occurrence of one theory is it then automatically the other? I consider that it is possible to determine whether it is attritional warfare if indicators of maneuver warfare could not be found; hence, if one could not find indicators of attritional warfare it is not necessarily proof of maneuver warfare. This conclusion makes it difficult to analyze maneuver warfare as a counterpart to war of attrition, but then again it has brought me a valuable lesson that most things are neither black nor white.

One other challenge with the concept of attrition is that one can have a hard time analyzing depending on whether it is a matter of tactics or a matter of strategy (articulating ways, means and ends). Through the thesis I found that one can use “maneuver warfare” on the tactical level in order to benefit an attrition strategy, i.e. one can strike the enemy’s logistics in order to stop his reinforcements to the battlefield, in this way one limits the opponent’s ability to sustain his fighting force. Then through attritional warfare as a strategy one will succeed in defeating the enemy at this spot with the aid of “maneuver warfare” as a tactical measure. But how does one know if the use of “maneuver warfare” in this case was intentional or just matter of ingeniousness? I found through my analysis that it is not possible to determine whether an operation can be classified as one theory or the other; what this means is that one often use both types of warfare but on different levels. But for me this thesis has definatley opened my eyes to the complexity of war and warfare.

”War is a science so obscure and imperfect that, in general, no rules of conduct can be given in it, which are reducible to absolute certainties; custom and prejudice, confirmed by 175 ignorance, are its sole foundation and support.”

- Marshal Hermann Maurice de Saxe

175 Wedin. Marianne och Athena: franskt militärt tänkande från 1700-talet till idag. p. 34

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It has been most rewarding to conclude three years of studies in war with something as interesting as theories of warfare and to do so outside my national borders. Just prior to graduating as an officer, the research process conducted forms a life lesson that has increased my urge and interest to further study theories of warfare.

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7. References

7.1 Books Denscombe, M. (Translated by Larson. P.), Forskningshandboken: för småskaliga forskningsprojekt inom samhällsvetenskaperna. 2nd ed. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011

Fall, Bernard. Street Without Joy, History. Barnsley, 2005

Férier, Gilles, Les trois guerres d'Indochine, Cambodge - Politique et gouvernement - 1979, Lyon, 1993.

Freedman, Lawrence, Strategy: a history. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013

Friberg, Febe (red.), Dags för uppsats: vägledning för litteraturbaserade examensarbeten, 2., [rev.] uppl., Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2012

Karlsson, Ingemar (red.). Res publica: Östlings bokförlag Symposions teoretiska och litterära tidskrift. 54, Krig, Brutus Östlings bokförlag Symposion, Eslöv, 2002

Leonhard, Robert R. Fighting by minutes: time and the art of war. Praeger Published, Westport, 1994

Leonhard, Robert R. The art of maneuver-warfare theory and airland battle, Presidio Press, CA, 1991

Lind, William S. Handbok i manöverkrigföring. Krigsvetenskapliga institutionen, Försvarshögsk, Stockholm, 2002

Rekkedal, Nils Marius, Modern krigskonst: militärmakt i förändring, 3., rev. uppl. Krigsvetenskapliga institutionen, försvarshögsk, Stockholm, 2004

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Samuels, Martin. Command or control?: command, training, and tactics in the British and German armies, 1888-1918. Frank Cass, London, 1995

Smedberg, Marco. Militär ledning: från Napoleonkrigen till fredsbevarande insatser. Historiska media, Lund, 2010

Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. UCL Press, London, 1999

Van Creveld, Martin. Air power and maneuver warfare. Reprinted from the 1994 edition, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002

Wedin, Lars. Marianne och Athena: franskt militärt tänkande från 1700-talet till idag. Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm, 2007

Widén, Jerker & Ångström, Jan, Militärteorins grunder. Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2005

Windrow, Martin. The last valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2004

Ångström, Jan & Widén, Jerker, Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war, Routedge. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 2015

7.2 Articles Zetterling, Niklas. Manus till artikel för puplikation i KKrVAHT. Uppdragstaktik och tidsfaktorn. FHS/Opl, 2000-02-01

Graham, Dominic & Bidwell Shelford. Coalitions, politicians & generals: Some aspects of command in two world wars. Brassey, London, New York, 1993

7.3 Doctrines Militärstrategisk doktrin. Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2011

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7.4 Studies Josefsson, Håkan. Falklandskriget 1982: Manöver eller utnötning?. Bachelor thesis, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm, 2004

7.5 Pictures/ Maps OPERATION LÉA. Picture retrieved from: URL: http://jcr3.free.fr/cahier-journalier/pages/Albums/cartes/pages/carte-ope-Lea-1_gif.htm [Electronic resource] (retrieved at 2015-04-28)

OPERATION LORRAINE. Picture retrieved from: URL: http://indochine54.free.fr/ops/lorraine.html [Electronic resource] (retrieved at 2015-04-28)

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