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Copyright by John Michael Meyer 2020 Copyright by John Michael Meyer 2020 The Dissertation Committee for John Michael Meyer Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Dissertation. One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the Adoption of ‘Special Forces’ Tactics and Strategies (1903-1944) Committee: Ami Pedahzur, Supervisor Zoltan D. Barany David M. Buss William Roger Louis Thomas G. Palaima Paul B. Woodruff One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the Adoption of ‘Special Forces’ Tactics and Strategies (1903-1944) by John Michael Meyer Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin May 2020 Dedication To Ami Pedahzur and Wm. Roger Louis who guided me on this endeavor from start to finish and To Lorna Paterson Wingate Smith. Acknowledgements Ami Pedahzur and Wm. Roger Louis have helped me immeasurably throughout my time at the University of Texas, and I wish that everyone could benefit from teachers so rigorous and open minded. I will never forget the compassion and strength that they demonstrated over the course of this project. Zoltan Barany developed my skills as a teacher, and provided a thoughtful reading of my first peer-reviewed article. David M. Buss kept an open mind when I approached him about this interdisciplinary project, and has remained a model of patience while I worked towards its completion. My work with Tom Palaima and Paul Woodruff began with collaboration, and then moved to friendship. Inevitably, I became their student, though they had been teaching me all along. I have received financial or academic support on this project from the British Studies Program, the Schusterman Center for Jewish Studies, the Government Department, the Harry Ransom Center, the Imperial War Museum, the National Archives at Kew, the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the Haganah Museum, and the National Center for Science and Civic Engagement. I wish to thank Lucy Catling for her warmth and friendship. I deeply appreciate her gracious permission to quote extensively from her mother’s audio memoir for the purposes of academic research. I also wish to thank Dr. John Igbino for granting me permission to quote from both our private conversations and his published work. John Krivine was also generous with his insights, and helped me better understand his imaginative interpretation of Lorna Paterson’s life and times. I deeply appreciate Professor Rose McDermott’s insightful reading of the first chapter, and Professor Simon Anglim for the professional advice regarding my present research program. This dissertation is based upon work that was supported through a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE-1110007. Any errors, omissions, or faults are entirely of my own making. v Abstract One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the Adoption of ‘Special Forces’ Tactics and Strategies (1903-1944) John Michael Meyer, PhD The University of Texas at Austin, 2020 Supervisor: Ami Pedahzur Winston Churchill declared Major-General Orde Wingate ‘a man of genius’ for developing what he considered low-cost, high-risk, and high-leverage operations in three theaters of the Second World War. One Way to Live: Orde Wingate and the adoption of 'special forces' tactics and strategies (1903-1944) tries to answer two questions: Why did Wingate and his superiors adopt 'special forces' strategies and tactics, and why did individuals choose to join his 'special forces' units? I use biography and comparative biography to help answer these two questions. I provide a narrative of Wingate's life, but I also construct biographical sketches of some of his peers, rivals, superiors, and followers during his campaigns in Sudan, Mandatory Palestine, Abyssinia, and Burma. I ultimately find that while Wingate's unusual upbringing contributed to his propensity for creating new military units, it was ultimately his aggressive competition with other British officers for scarce honor and prestige that spurred him to create the units he branded 'special forces.' His leaders, on the other hand, adopted Wingate's special forces strategies out of desperation, and only when they lacked the resources to win 'traditional' campaigns. Wingate's followers did not always volunteer to join his units (compulsion occurred in several instances), but many officers joined his ranks with the intention of obtaining a role in violent combat; like Wingate, they sought the prestige and role-fulfillment that some soldiers seek through war. Despite the inherent risks of special forces tactics, many soldiers vi paradoxically thought their odds of survival were higher with Wingate than in traditional military formations. In many instances, the competition between soldiers required more personal investment than any action against the ‘enemy.’ The extensive use of comparative biography encourages the examination of previously unused sources, including unpublished memoirs and oral histories. My writing, at times, examines stories that do not answer the central questions of the dissertation, but provide a rich understanding of the behavior of British soldiers in Palestine, Abyssinia, and elsewhere. As a social scientist, I attempt to understand the subject as a salient example of organized violence, and not just as a series of unique historical incidents. vii Table of Contents 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 Orde Wingate and the adoption of 'special forces' tactics and strategies (1903-1944) .......................................................... 1 1. Outline of Dissertation .................................................................................. 5 2. Preliminary Conclusions .............................................................................. 10 3. The study of aggression, violence, and organized violence ............................. 15 References for Introduction .................................................................. 24 2. “These are the bites of their lair brothers” ............................................................ 31 1. Father ....................................................................................................... 33 2. Mother ...................................................................................................... 36 3. Growing up a Wingate ................................................................................ 38 4. Charterhouse ............................................................................................. 46 5. Royal Military Academy at Woolwich ............................................................ 48 6. Broader Academy Culture ........................................................................... 55 References for Chapter 2 ..................................................................... 57 3. “I only ask that my evidence be taken into account” ............................................. 60 Lorna Wingate, Orde Wingate, and status and sex among soldiers and survivors of the Second World War .................... 60 viii Postmodern Wingate ........................................................................... 62 Sex and Mates ............................................................................................... 65 First Engagement ................................................................................ 66 Lorna Paterson Meets Wingate ............................................................. 68 Reproductive Effort ........................................................................................ 75 Marital Infidelity ............................................................................................. 77 Breaking a Stereotype .................................................................................... 83 The Experience of Ruthlessness ...................................................................... 87 Tensions and Connections within Marriage ....................................................... 94 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 97 References for Chapter 3 ................................................................... 100 4. “To play for his own ends” ................................................................................ 103 Orde Wingate and the adoption of ‘special forces’ tactics and strategies ......................................................................... 103 Wingate the Competitor ............................................................................... 104 Palestine, 1937-1939 ......................................................................... 110 Abyssinia, 1940-1941 ........................................................................ 122 Wingate in Burma, 1942-1944 ............................................................ 130 ix References for Chapter 4 ................................................................... 145 5. Wingate’s Leaders: Trying to escape a “welter of inefficiency and lassitude” .......... 148 Why did Wingate’s leaders adopt special forces tactics and strategies? ............................................................. 160 References for Chapter 5 ................................................................... 163 6. Wingate’s Soldiers: “We need not...suspect ourselves of selfish or interested motives” ......................................................................
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