2K12 Kub mobile surface-to-air missile system fires during multinational live-fire training exercise Shabla 19, in Shabla, Bulgaria, June 12, 2019 (U.S. Army/Thomas Mort)
This article provides the first orga- Getting the Joint nizational history of the joint functions in order to better understand why dif- ferences persist in how this concept is implemented in the United States versus Functions Right its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners. Doing so allows us to By Thomas Crosbie better understand enduring challenges in interoperability and persistent cultural clashes within the Alliance. The history reveals that today’s joint functions are built n July 2017, the Chairman of the of Defense (DOD) thinking and around a core of four kinetic principles Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a practice.1 A 2018 article by Alexus G. (leadership or command and control [C2], special out-of-cycle revision to joint Grynkewich in this journal elaborated I maneuver, firepower, and protection), doctrine, adding information to the on why this matters to the national to which subsequent revisions have at- joint functions. The significance of security community.2 Nevertheless, tempted to add a range of “softer” military this policy change was highlighted despite these clear signals that DOD fields (intelligence, information, sustain- by the Secretary of Defense in a Sep- takes the joint functions seriously, and ment, and civil-military cooperation), tember 2017 endorsement, where he despite their centrality in military doc- sometimes successfully, sometimes not. stressed that inclusion in the joint trine, the joint functions remain little The history of the joint functions is functions signaled an “elevation” of understood by those who have not a history of overcoming the resistance information throughout Department served in an operational staff role. in U.S. military thought to placing soft and hard elements of the contemporary battlefield on an equal footing. Viewed Dr. Thomas Crosbie is an Assistant Professor in the Centre of Joint Operations, Institute of Military from this perspective, another set of ques- Operations, at the Royal Danish Defence College. tions is raised concerning the persistence
96 Joint Doctrine / Getting the Joint Functions Right JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 of U.S. vulnerabilities to foreign military Table. The Joint Staff Directorates and Joint Functions powers focused on exploiting the gray Joint Staff Directorates Joint Functions zone between hard and soft power. J1, Manpower and Personnel No equivalent Combining Arms and Domains J2, Intelligence Intelligence Jointness is not easy, but it is good— J3, Operations Movement and maneuver + fires + protection that has been the clear consensus from J4, Logistics Sustainment scholars and practitioners for decades, J5, Strategy, Plans and Policy No equivalent amply demonstrated in the pages of this J6, Command, Control, Communications and Command and control journal.3 What makes it difficult is the Computers/Cyber clash of cultures, command structures, J7, Joint Force Development No equivalent and egos that inevitably occurs when J8, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment No equivalent two or more distinct organizations are tasked with working hand-in-glove.4 In this sense, the challenges of joint- instruments of power is particularly a joint staff can give structure to the ness are not unique to the military and useful. They are in this sense a sort of enormous complexity of contemporary are faced by any complex organization checklist to ensure that the latent poten- military operations. that needs levels of coordination. The tial of jointness is in fact being realized. While a joint staff is designed to benefits are, however, unique, as Robert In U.S. doctrine there are today seven organize its work around the joint func- Leonhard and others have argued.5 joint functions: intelligence, movement tions, the joint functions should not be All else being equal, we expect a force and maneuver, fires, information, protec- confused with the Joint Staff Directorates that is better at combining arms and tion, sustainment, and C2. For the rest of (J1–J8), which they superficially resemble crossing domains will win out over its the NATO community, there are eight, (see table). The relationship is clearly competitors because jointness enables since NATO doctrine also includes civil- accounted for in doctrine. The purpose commanders to compensate for the military cooperation (CIMIC). Despite behind the staff directorates is to ensure weaknesses in one weapons system with their importance doctrinally and orga- that a joint staff has the right mix of the strengths of another and to exploit nizationally, the joint functions are little expertise across key areas. The doctrine a wider array of vulnerabilities in one’s known and rarely discussed in the national makes clear that an actual staff needs to opponent while minimizing one’s own security community and are often poorly break up the silos that can be created by exposure to risk. Axiomatically, then, understood by officers entering joint the directorates, and instead the experts jointness provides benefits in efficiency, staffs. This is not entirely surprising. The should mix together in a number of sub- freedom of action, and flexibility.6 joint functions are a paradox of stability groups (listed in the doctrine as “centers, The spirit of combining instruments and change. On one hand, they are the groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, of power informs policy development at pillars of operational doctrine, establishing working groups, and planning teams”7). virtually every level and is shared by most, a coherent framework for what a joint Once reassigned to their subgroup, staff- if not all, of America’s allied militaries. By staff can and should do at the operational ers need to achieve certain types of effects. contrast, the failure to combine is rou- level of war. On the other hand, the list The most important effects are sorted into tinely disparaged as evidence of Service has undergone significant revision over six categories and are the joint functions parochialism or even corruption. While the years, reflecting deep disagreements mentioned above: C2, intelligence, fires, critics can be found, the weight of histori- on which concepts merit inclusion—and movement and maneuver, protection, and cal evidence and of informed opinion is even what each concept means. And while sustainment. More recently, as described clearly on the side of jointness. the term itself is fairly new, having only below, U.S. and NATO doctrine have What does this mean in practice? entered common usage with its inclusion both changed to include information Most important during times of conflict, in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, to this list, while NATO doctrine also instruments of power are combined and in 2006 (and adopted into NATO doc- includes CIMIC. Thus, while staffs are integrated through the joint force com- trine in 2011), it reflects ideas that have commonly divided into eight director- mander and his or her staff. Officially, appeared off and on in U.S. Army doc- ates and are expected to achieve effects a joint force is joint when it includes trine for well over a hundred years. through seven or eight functions, the two elements from more than one Service. The challenge facing doctrine writ- things are ultimately quite different. However, it only does jointness when it ers is how to realize the latent benefits The joint functions, then, were never actively combines instruments of power of jointness given real-world limitations intended to be another level of organiza- in some productive way. The term joint in time, attention, and resources. That tion. Rather, they are a heuristic model functions has emerged in doctrine as is where the joint functions come in. By for understanding descriptively the way a shorthand way of expressing those focusing on a delimited set of prioritized power can be directed to achieve ends on dimensions of conflict where combining areas where joint effects can be achieved, the battlefield.
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Crosbie 97 Figure 1. Elements of Combined Arms in FM 100-5 (1914–1962) entails would not arrive until the fourth 1914 1923 1939 1941 1944 1949 1954 1962 edition (1914), where combined arms are described as the effective balanc- Infantry ing of the Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers Special Troops (mostly Engineers), and Artillery* Heavy Field Artillery.9 Cavalry (Armor)** In these early days, manual writers Air Corps*** focused on what made up the combined Signal Corps arms. The 1923 edition adds the Signal Corps and Air Service and renames Chemical Warfare “Special Troops” as “Engineers.” It also Medical states clearly the value of combining arms: Quartermaster “No one arm wins battles. The combined Ordnance employment of all arms is equal to suc- Transportation cess.”10 Five more editions followed (in Military Police 1939, 1941, 1944, 1949, and 1954), with each adding elements to the list. By Key: 1954, the list had grown to include 10 * Until 1949, artillery was divided between normal and heavy field artillery. components: Infantry, Armor, Artillery, ** Until 1944, cavalry included both armored and horse cavalry. *** In 1944, air power was discussed in a separate chapter. the Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, Chemical Corps, Army Medical Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Transportation Figure 2. Joint Functions in FM 100-5 (1968–1993), FM 3-0 (2001–2017), Corps, and Military Police Corps. So AJP 3 (2002–2019) and JP 3-0 (2006–2018) unwieldy was this list that the 1962 edi- 1982– 2008– 2011– 2006– 2011– tion cut back to the original 1923 list: 1968 1993 2001 2017 2002 2019 2010 2017 2018 Infantry, Engineers, Artillery, and Armor. Command and Notably, information and intelligence Control elements are entirely absent throughout, Movement and since these were viewed as separate from Maneuver the combined arms. Fires What we can conclude is that Army Protection doctrine writers have long been com- Intelligence mitted to the idea that the combining of Sustainment land power elements enables gains on the battlefield. This belief has tended toward Information * ** a kitchen-sink effect, with more and CIMIC more elements highlighted as standing to Planning benefit from combination until order is Targeting restored by a return to first principles— clearly visible in figure 1. Prodigality Key: balances against parsimony. Green indicates U.S. Army doctrine, purple indicates U.S. joint doctrine, and blue indicates NATO doctrine. A quirk of the doctrine up to this * NATO doctrine in 2002 splits the Information function into “Public Information” and “Information point is that the writers never quite got Operations” around to explaining how a commander ** U.S. JP 3-0 in 2006 (revised in 2008 and 2010) lists information tasks under the heading “Other should manage all of this complexity. Activities and Capabilities” The doctrine exhorted combined effects and described the elements that needed to be combined, but it failed to specify Joint Functions in Army back over the history of the doctrine. how the elements should be balanced. Doctrine, 1905–1954 The starting point is 1905 with the In hindsight, then, FM 100-5 from But why these particular functions, publication of the U.S. Army’s first 1905 through 1954 had fairly modest and what does it mean for the integrity combined arms manual, Field Manual aims, ensuring only that future lead- of the list that this has changed and (FM) 100-5, Field Service Regulations.8 ers, when called on to lead a campaign, remains contested? To answer these Surprisingly, the first extended discus- would at least know what arrows were in questions, it is necessary to briefly look sion of what combining arms actually their quiver.
98 Joint Doctrine / Getting the Joint Functions Right JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Joint Functions in Army, editions. Nevertheless, Army doctrine NATO and U.S. joint doctrine were Joint, and Alliance writers were still very much commit- finally coordinated with the revision of Doctrine, 1968–2019 ted to these concepts, and in the 2001 NATO AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for The major intellectual breakthrough edition of Army operational doctrine the Conduct of Operations, in 2011.16 came with the doctrine revisions of the (redesignated from FM 100-5 to FM NATO’s joint capabilities became joint 1960s, when the doctrine writers finally 3-0), a new element of combat power functions. Public information was folded began to nail down the specific ways was added to the list: information. This into information operations, and the combining arms can lead to better out- was not to last. Interestingly, the next outlier concepts planning and targeting comes (see figure 2). In the 1968 revi- edition, released in 2008, drops informa- were dropped entirely. In 2019, the doc- sion of FM 100-5, the writers switched tion and brings back intelligence, which trine underwent one last revision, with from presenting a laundry list of func- had been missing since the 1968 edition, information operations renamed simply tional elements that can be combined to and defines these elements of combat information to align it with the 2017– identifying the types of needs that these power as “warfighting functions.” This 2018 U.S. doctrine. The current state elements can address. The doctrine now remains, as of 2018, the current state of of NATO doctrine thus defines eight described the need for “multicapable Army thought, which builds its descrip- joint functions: command and control, forces” that combine their elements to tion of the Army’s capabilities around six maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, achieve better outcomes in five fields: warfighting functions: mission command information, protection, and CIMIC. intelligence, mobility, firepower, combat (the new name for C2), movement and The current state of U.S. joint doctrine is service support, and C3 (command, maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustain- identical, except it excludes CIMIC. control, and computers).11 ment, and protection. For a time, this insight was forgotten. Looking at the joint and Alliance Joint Functions Doctrine: When General William E. DePuy drafted levels, the idiosyncrasies of Army thought Lessons Learned the famous “Active Defense” edition of come into focus. In 2002, NATO pub- At the center of military innovation FM 100-5 (1976), he dispensed with lished its first joint operations doctrine, since World War II has been the promise much of the verbiage and most of the Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3, Allied of realizing tactical, operational, and concepts of earlier manuals, preferring a Joint Operations.14 The imprint of U.S. strategic gains through combining arms livelier style, with vivid examples drawn Army doctrine is plain to see in this docu- and crossing domains. Combining, inte- from recent experience. Dissatisfaction ment, with the elements of combat power grating, and making joint: these are the with DePuy’s manual led General Donn now renamed “Joint Capabilities,” which explicit goals of the joint force, DOD, A. Starry to oversee the publication of the included most of the persistent elements and the unified combatant commands, equally renowned “AirLand Battle” edi- of the Army manuals (C2, maneuver, and they are now routinely celebrated by tion (1982).12 Here, DePuy’s ideas about fires, intelligence, and sustainment, the separate Services as well. The joint active defense were blended with Starry’s renamed logistics), dropped protection, functions are the doctrinal culmination ideas about AirLand Battle and with the and added a number of unfamiliar items: of taking jointness seriously, and the 1968 manual’s ideas of multicapable planning, targeting, and CIMIC. Also shifts we have traced in what constitutes forces. In the 1982, 1986, and 1993 edi- included were two information func- the joint functions can be taken as a tions, this intuition was refined through tions: information operations and public broader history of joint thought at the discussion of the so-called elements of information. Where Army doctrine operational level of war. combat power, now listed as maneuver, downgraded the role of information in What, then, should we make of this firepower, protection, and leadership, this period, NATO emphasized it. storied history? The most important les- which replaced C3. This tighter focus— Meanwhile, American joint doctrine son concerns the nature of doctrine itself. dropping intelligence and combat service was revised in 2006 to finally incorporate Although the joint functions may seem support from the discussion—perfectly the Army’s elements of combat power, evolutionary, their history is filled with reflects what has been described as the now named for the first time as joint starts and stops, with detours and road- Army’s cultural shift toward preparing functions. Where NATO doctrine split blocks, each signaling a shift in how the for high-tempo, conventional force information between information opera- doctrine writers understood the nature of engagements.13 tions and public information, U.S. joint war. The impermanence and inconsisten- Despite the prominent place given doctrine included it in the vague category cies of the doctrine studied here can serve to these “elements of combat power” “Other Activities and Capabilities,” a as a reminder that no doctrine is ever in the Army manuals of 1982, 1986 seventh joint function encompassing final, nor will it ever replace informed and 1993, the first joint publication on psychological operations and deception. judgment. the topic, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, The 2011 and 2017 versions of JP 3-0 Similarly, there is a lesson here in the Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1993, dispensed with information entirely but false appearance of uniformity. As the makes no mention of these principles. brought it back as a fully fledged joint doctrine has developed, the writers seek Nor do they appear in the 1995 or 2001 function with much fanfare in 2018.15 agreement in language and expression,
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Crosbie 99 but this may mask deeper disagreements in the actual meanings of words. NATO joint functions are not exactly DOD joint Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision functions—nor are they Army warfight- (to be signed within 6 months) ing functions. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States Finally, this brief history raises another JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence set of questions that demand reflection. If the joint functions express the military’s JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations collective wisdom on how to best com- JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations bine arms and cross domains—how to do JP 5-0, Joint Planning jointness—then what should we conclude from the reluctance of the doctrine to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System put soft power concepts (information, most notably, but also intelligence and JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) CIMIC) on equal footing as hard power JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations concepts (fires, maneuver, protection)? Does the adoption of information as JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations a joint function in 2017 resolve this JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support problem, or do these same vulnerabilities JP 3-16, Multinational Operations persist? These and other questions about how to develop the right doctrine at the JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations right time remain to be answered. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations This historical understanding of the JP 4-0, Joint Logistics joint functions is intended to overcome the longstanding reluctance to place soft JP 4-04, Contingency Basing power elements of the modern battle- JP 4-09, Distribution Operations field on the same footing as hard power JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support elements. Given that competitors are increasingly oriented toward exploiting our political vulnerabilities, getting the joint functions right—striking the right 5 Robert Leonhart, The Art of Maneuver: Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, Changing balance between hard and soft power—is Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle an Army: An Oral History of General William (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), 93–94. E. DePuy, USA Retired (Washington, DC: more important than ever. JFQ See also Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary U.S. Military History Institute and U.S. Army Military Theory, 95. Center of Military History, 1986); and John 6 Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Notes Military Theory, 95. Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 7 Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, Joint Task 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical 1 James N. Mattis, memorandum, “In- Force Headquarters (Washington, DC: The Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- formation as a Joint Function,” September Joint Staff, 2007). mand, 1984). 15, 2017, available at
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