Getting the Joint Functions Right JFQ 94, 3Rd Quarter 2019 of U.S
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2K12 Kub mobile surface-to-air missile system fires during multinational live-fire training exercise Shabla 19, in Shabla, Bulgaria, June 12, 2019 (U.S. Army/Thomas Mort) This article provides the first orga- Getting the Joint nizational history of the joint functions in order to better understand why dif- ferences persist in how this concept is implemented in the United States versus Functions Right its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners. Doing so allows us to By Thomas Crosbie better understand enduring challenges in interoperability and persistent cultural clashes within the Alliance. The history reveals that today’s joint functions are built n July 2017, the Chairman of the of Defense (DOD) thinking and around a core of four kinetic principles Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a practice.1 A 2018 article by Alexus G. (leadership or command and control [C2], special out-of-cycle revision to joint Grynkewich in this journal elaborated I maneuver, firepower, and protection), doctrine, adding information to the on why this matters to the national to which subsequent revisions have at- joint functions. The significance of security community.2 Nevertheless, tempted to add a range of “softer” military this policy change was highlighted despite these clear signals that DOD fields (intelligence, information, sustain- by the Secretary of Defense in a Sep- takes the joint functions seriously, and ment, and civil-military cooperation), tember 2017 endorsement, where he despite their centrality in military doc- sometimes successfully, sometimes not. stressed that inclusion in the joint trine, the joint functions remain little The history of the joint functions is functions signaled an “elevation” of understood by those who have not a history of overcoming the resistance information throughout Department served in an operational staff role. in U.S. military thought to placing soft and hard elements of the contemporary battlefield on an equal footing. Viewed Dr. Thomas Crosbie is an Assistant Professor in the Centre of Joint Operations, Institute of Military from this perspective, another set of ques- Operations, at the Royal Danish Defence College. tions is raised concerning the persistence 96 Joint Doctrine / Getting the Joint Functions Right JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 of U.S. vulnerabilities to foreign military Table. The Joint Staff Directorates and Joint Functions powers focused on exploiting the gray Joint Staff Directorates Joint Functions zone between hard and soft power. J1, Manpower and Personnel No equivalent Combining Arms and Domains J2, Intelligence Intelligence Jointness is not easy, but it is good— J3, Operations Movement and maneuver + fires + protection that has been the clear consensus from J4, Logistics Sustainment scholars and practitioners for decades, J5, Strategy, Plans and Policy No equivalent amply demonstrated in the pages of this J6, Command, Control, Communications and Command and control journal.3 What makes it difficult is the Computers/Cyber clash of cultures, command structures, J7, Joint Force Development No equivalent and egos that inevitably occurs when J8, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment No equivalent two or more distinct organizations are tasked with working hand-in-glove.4 In this sense, the challenges of joint- instruments of power is particularly a joint staff can give structure to the ness are not unique to the military and useful. They are in this sense a sort of enormous complexity of contemporary are faced by any complex organization checklist to ensure that the latent poten- military operations. that needs levels of coordination. The tial of jointness is in fact being realized. While a joint staff is designed to benefits are, however, unique, as Robert In U.S. doctrine there are today seven organize its work around the joint func- Leonhard and others have argued.5 joint functions: intelligence, movement tions, the joint functions should not be All else being equal, we expect a force and maneuver, fires, information, protec- confused with the Joint Staff Directorates that is better at combining arms and tion, sustainment, and C2. For the rest of (J1–J8), which they superficially resemble crossing domains will win out over its the NATO community, there are eight, (see table). The relationship is clearly competitors because jointness enables since NATO doctrine also includes civil- accounted for in doctrine. The purpose commanders to compensate for the military cooperation (CIMIC). Despite behind the staff directorates is to ensure weaknesses in one weapons system with their importance doctrinally and orga- that a joint staff has the right mix of the strengths of another and to exploit nizationally, the joint functions are little expertise across key areas. The doctrine a wider array of vulnerabilities in one’s known and rarely discussed in the national makes clear that an actual staff needs to opponent while minimizing one’s own security community and are often poorly break up the silos that can be created by exposure to risk. Axiomatically, then, understood by officers entering joint the directorates, and instead the experts jointness provides benefits in efficiency, staffs. This is not entirely surprising. The should mix together in a number of sub- freedom of action, and flexibility.6 joint functions are a paradox of stability groups (listed in the doctrine as “centers, The spirit of combining instruments and change. On one hand, they are the groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, of power informs policy development at pillars of operational doctrine, establishing working groups, and planning teams”7). virtually every level and is shared by most, a coherent framework for what a joint Once reassigned to their subgroup, staff- if not all, of America’s allied militaries. By staff can and should do at the operational ers need to achieve certain types of effects. contrast, the failure to combine is rou- level of war. On the other hand, the list The most important effects are sorted into tinely disparaged as evidence of Service has undergone significant revision over six categories and are the joint functions parochialism or even corruption. While the years, reflecting deep disagreements mentioned above: C2, intelligence, fires, critics can be found, the weight of histori- on which concepts merit inclusion—and movement and maneuver, protection, and cal evidence and of informed opinion is even what each concept means. And while sustainment. More recently, as described clearly on the side of jointness. the term itself is fairly new, having only below, U.S. and NATO doctrine have What does this mean in practice? entered common usage with its inclusion both changed to include information Most important during times of conflict, in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, to this list, while NATO doctrine also instruments of power are combined and in 2006 (and adopted into NATO doc- includes CIMIC. Thus, while staffs are integrated through the joint force com- trine in 2011), it reflects ideas that have commonly divided into eight director- mander and his or her staff. Officially, appeared off and on in U.S. Army doc- ates and are expected to achieve effects a joint force is joint when it includes trine for well over a hundred years. through seven or eight functions, the two elements from more than one Service. The challenge facing doctrine writ- things are ultimately quite different. However, it only does jointness when it ers is how to realize the latent benefits The joint functions, then, were never actively combines instruments of power of jointness given real-world limitations intended to be another level of organiza- in some productive way. The term joint in time, attention, and resources. That tion. Rather, they are a heuristic model functions has emerged in doctrine as is where the joint functions come in. By for understanding descriptively the way a shorthand way of expressing those focusing on a delimited set of prioritized power can be directed to achieve ends on dimensions of conflict where combining areas where joint effects can be achieved, the battlefield. JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Crosbie 97 Figure 1. Elements of Combined Arms in FM 100-5 (1914–1962) entails would not arrive until the fourth 1914 1923 1939 1941 1944 1949 1954 1962 edition (1914), where combined arms are described as the effective balanc- Infantry ing of the Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers Special Troops (mostly Engineers), and Artillery* Heavy Field Artillery.9 Cavalry (Armor)** In these early days, manual writers Air Corps*** focused on what made up the combined Signal Corps arms. The 1923 edition adds the Signal Corps and Air Service and renames Chemical Warfare “Special Troops” as “Engineers.” It also Medical states clearly the value of combining arms: Quartermaster “No one arm wins battles. The combined Ordnance employment of all arms is equal to suc- Transportation cess.”10 Five more editions followed (in Military Police 1939, 1941, 1944, 1949, and 1954), with each adding elements to the list. By Key: 1954, the list had grown to include 10 * Until 1949, artillery was divided between normal and heavy field artillery. components: Infantry, Armor, Artillery, ** Until 1944, cavalry included both armored and horse cavalry. *** In 1944, air power was discussed in a separate chapter. the Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, Chemical Corps, Army Medical Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Transportation Figure 2. Joint Functions in FM 100-5 (1968–1993), FM 3-0 (2001–2017), Corps, and Military Police Corps. So AJP 3 (2002–2019) and JP 3-0 (2006–2018) unwieldy was this list that the 1962 edi- 1982– 2008– 2011– 2006– 2011– tion cut back to the original 1923 list: 1968 1993 2001 2017 2002 2019 2010 2017 2018 Infantry, Engineers, Artillery, and Armor. Command and Notably, information and intelligence Control elements are entirely absent throughout, Movement and since these were viewed as separate from Maneuver the combined arms. Fires What we can conclude is that Army Protection doctrine writers have long been com- Intelligence mitted to the idea that the combining of Sustainment land power elements enables gains on the battlefield.