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Maanpuolustuskorkeako MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU POHJOIS-KOREAN YDINASE KYLMÄN SODAN YDINASETEORIOI- DEN NÄKÖKULMASTA Pro gradu -tutkielma Luutnantti Harri-Antero Lähde Sotatieteiden maisterikurssi 1 Kenttätykistöopintosuunta Toukokuu 2011 MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Kurssi Opintosuunta Sotatieteiden maisterikurssi 1 Kenttätykistöopintosuunta Tekijä Luutnantti Harri-Antero Lähde Opinnäytetyön nimi POHJOIS-KOREAN YDINASE KYLMÄN SODAN YDINASETEORIOIDEN NÄKÖKULMASTA Oppiaine, johon työ liittyy Säilytyspaikka Sotahistoria Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun kurssikirjasto Aika Tekstisivuja 85 Liitesivuja 16 Toukokuu 2011 TIIVISTELMÄ Poliittinen tilanne Korean niemimaalla on ollut kireä Korean sodan päättymisestä saakka. Sota päättyi aseleposopimukseen, eikä rauhansopimusta sodan osapuolten Yhdysvaltain, Etelä- ja Pohjois-Korean välillä ole allekirjoitettu. Tämän seurauksena Pohjois-Korea on militarisoinut yhteiskuntaansa 1960-luvulta alkaen ja kehittänyt sotilaallista iskukykyään mahdollista uutta sotaa varten. Sotilaallisen iskukyvyn kehittämisen painopiste on ollut ballististen ohjusten ja ydinaseiden kehittämisessä. Tutkimuksen tehtävänä on selvittää päätutkimuskysymyksen avulla, millainen Pohjois-Korean ydinasedoktriini on Kylmän sodan ydinaseteorioiden näkökulmasta. Alatutkimuskysymysten avulla selvitetään, millainen on valtion iskukyky ydinasein, kyky suojautua ydinaseiskua vas- taan sekä sen ydinaseen pelotevaikutus Kylmän sodan ydinaseteorioiden näkökulmasta. Lisäk- si alatutkimuskysymysten avulla selvitetään, miksi Pohjois-Korea on kehittänyt ydinaseen. Tutkimus on toteutettu laadullisena asiakirjatutkimuksena. Bernard Brodien, Herman Kahnin, Ferdinand Otto Mikschen ja Vasili Sokolovskin teorioita on käytetty Pohjois-Korean ydin- aseen käyttömahdollisuuksien ja niistä syntyvän doktriinin analysointiin. Pohjois-Korean ydinaseen ominaisuuksia on tutkittu pääosin kansainväliseen politiikkaan sekä Pohjois- Korean Kansanarmeijaan keskittyneiden tutkimuslaitosten ja lehtien julkaisujen perusteella. Tutkimuksen perusteella Pohjois-Korean iskukyky ydinasein on rajallinen valtion ydinaseiden pienestä lukumäärästä sekä niiden kantoalustan, ballistisen ohjuksen, rajoitetusta kantamasta johtuen. Ydinaseidensa avulla Pohjois-Korea kykenee uhkaamaan konkreettisesti ainoastaan Etelä-Koreaa ja Japania. Vaikka ydinase lisää valtion sotilaallista iskukykyä, ovat valtion konventionaaliset joukot edelleen sen sotilaallisen iskukyvyn ydin. Ydinaseen merkittävin hyöty valtiolle on sen aiheut- tama pelotevaikutus, jonka perustana on muiden valtioiden, erityisesti Yhdysvaltain, epävar- muus Pohjois-Korean ydinaseiden todellisesta iskukyvystä. Muiden valtioiden epävarmuutta Pohjois-Korea kykenee ylläpitämään militaristisen ja sulkeutuneen yhteiskuntansa avulla. Pohjois-Korealle tärkeintä on ydinaseen pelotevaikutuksen myötä valtion lisääntynyt poliitti- nen vaikutusvalta, ei sotilaallinen iskukyky. On epätodennäköistä, että valtio käyttää ydinaset- ta sotatilanteessa kuin äärimmäisessä hädässä, koska se poistaisi mahdollisuuden käyttää ydinasetta pelotteena ja neuvotteluvälineenä. Ydinaseen käyttö oikeuttaisi Yhdysvallat toteut- tamaan vastaiskun ydinasein, mikä olisi tuhoisa Pohjois-Korealle. AVAINSANAT Pohjois-Korea, ydinase, ballistinen ohjus, iskukyky, pelotevaikutus, doktriini POHJOIS-KOREAN YDINASE KYLMÄN SODAN YDINASETEORIOIDEN NÄKÖ- KULMASTA 1 JOHDANTO 1 1.1 JOHDATUS TUTKIMUSAIHEESEEN 1 1.2 TUTKIMUSKYSYMYKSET JA TUTKITTAVAN AIHEEN RAJAUS 2 1.3 AIEMMAT AIHEESEEN LIITTYVÄT TUTKIMUKSET JA TUTKIMUKSEN LÄHDEAINEISTO 3 1.4 TUTKIMUSMENETELMÄ JA TEOREETTINEN VIITEKEHYS 5 2 POHJOIS-KOREAN YDINASEEN HISTORIA 6 2.1 KYLMÄN SODAN PERINTÖ – TARVE OMALLE YDINASEELLE 6 2.2 POHJOIS -KOREAN YDINASEOHJELMAN HISTORIA 11 2.3 POHJOIS -KOREAN BALLISTISTEN OHJUSTEN HISTORIA 15 2.4 JOHTOPÄÄTÖKSET 20 3 YDINASEEN PELOTEVAIKUTUS 23 3.1 PELOTEVAIKUTUS TEORIOIDEN NÄKÖKULMASTA 23 3.2 POHJOIS -KOREAN SOTILAALLINEN PELOTE 28 3.2.1 Pohjois-Korean konventionaalisten aseiden pelote 28 3.2.2 Pohjois-Korean ydinaseen pelote 30 3.3 JOHTOPÄÄTÖKSET 35 4 YDINASEIN TOTEUTETTAVA ISKU 39 4.1 YDINASEISKUN TOTEUTTAMINEN TEORIOIDEN MUKAAN 39 4.2 POHJOIS -KOREAN ISKUKYKY YDINASEIN 52 4.2.1 Käytettävissä oleva kalusto 52 4.2.2 Kyky toteuttaa ydinaseisku 57 4.3 JOHTOPÄÄTÖKSET 58 5 PUOLUSTUS YDINASEITA VASTAAN 61 5.1 PUOLUSTUKSEN MERKITYS YDINSODASSA 61 5.2 POHJOIS -KOREAN PUOLUSTUSKYKY YDINASEITA VASTAAN 72 5.2.1 Aktiivisin menetelmin 72 5.2.2 Passiivisin menetelmin 75 5.3 JOHTOPÄÄTÖKSET 78 6 YHTEENVETO 81 7 LÄHTEET 86 8 LIITTEET 106 1 POHJOIS-KOREAN YDINASE KYLMÄN SODAN YDINASETEORIOI- DEN NÄKÖKULMASTA 1 JOHDANTO 1.1 Johdatus tutkimusaiheeseen Korean sota päättyi 27.7.1953 allekirjoitettuun aseleposopimukseen, jonka allekirjoittivat Yh- distyneitten kansakuntien joukkoja johtanut Yhdysvallat, Kiina sekä Korean demokraattisen kansantasavalta (Pohjois-Korea). Korean tasavalta (Etelä-Korea) sen sijaan ei allekirjoittanut aseleposopimusta, jonka myötä uudeksi rajalinjaksi määritettiin 38. leveyspiiri. Tämä leveys- piiri leikkaa Korean niemimaan suurpiirteisesti keskeltä. Koska Yhdysvallat ja Etelä-Korea eivät ole vieläkään neuvotelleet rauhansopimusta Pohjois-Korean kanssa, on vuoden 1953 aseleposopimus ainoa sotilaallisia yhteenottoja rajoittava sopimus edellä mainittujen valtioi- den välillä. Koska Pohjois- ja Etelä-Korea ovat teknisesti katsoen edelleen sotatilassa keske- nään, on valtiot jakava demilitarisoitu vyöhyke maailman vahvimmin vartioitu rajavyöhyke sotilaallisesti. 1 Kylmän sodan aikana 1960-luvulla Kiina ja Neuvostoliitto tukivat Pohjois-Koreaa ja antoivat sille turvallisuustakuut Yhdysvaltain sekä Etelä-Korean sotilaallisia aggressioita vastaan. Poh- jois-Korea kuitenkin uskoi vihollistensa, erityisesti Yhdysvaltain, uhan olevan suurempi kuin liittolaistensa kyvyn torjua tätä uhkaa turvallisuustakuilla. Lisäksi 1960-luvun lopulta lähtien 2 Kiinan ja Neuvostoliiton kiinnostus Pohjois-Korean tukemiseksi alkoi laantua. 1 BBC News , The Korean War Armistice, 22.7.2003. 2 Chun, Kwang Ho: North Korea´s Nuclear Question: Sense of Vulnerability, Defensive Motivation, and Peace- ful Solution , Strategic Studies Institute, joulukuu 2010, ss. v–vi. 2 Korean sodan päättymisen jälkeisinä vuosikymmeninä Pohjois-Korea oli sotilaallisesti selke- ästi Etelä-Koreaa vahvempi ja sen tavoitteena oli yhdistää Korean niemimaa. Etelä-Korean valtaamisen esteenä oli kuitenkin Yhdysvaltlat, joka oli Pohjois-Korealle myös hyökkäyksel- linen uhka. Tavoitteen toteuttaminen oli mahdollista ainoastaan, jos Yhdysvaltoja kohtaan ky- ettäisiin luomaan sotilaallinen pelote, joka estäisi sitä puuttumasta Etelä- ja Pohjois-Korean väliseen sotaan. 3 Saavuttaakseen status quo -tilanteen Yhdysvaltain kanssa ja mahdollistaakseen yhden tär- keimmän poliittisen tavoitteensa, Korean niemimaan yhdistämisen, pyrki Pohjois-Korea hankkimaan ydin- ja ohjusteknologiaa liittolaisiltaan Kiinalta ja Neuvostoliitolta aina 1960- luvulta lähtien. Koska Pohjois-Korea ei pitänyt Neuvostoliiton ja Kiinan turvallisuustakuita riittävinä, pyrki se käynnistämään oman ydinaseiden ja ballististen ohjusten tuotantonsa oma- varaisuuteen perustuvan juche-ideologiansa mukaisesti. 4 Vuonna 2006 Pohjois-Korea toteutti ensimmäisen ydinkokeensa, jonka avulla se osoitti kyke- nevänsä valmistamaan ydinaseita. 5 Epäselvää sen sijaan on, miten Pohjois-Korea tarvittaessa käyttää ydinasettaan. Toteuttaako Pohjois-Korea mahdollisen sodan alkaessa laajamittaisia ydiniskuja ballististen ohjustensa kantaman puitteissa vai säilyykö ydinase sodankin aikana vihollisen sotilaallista toimintaa rajoittava pelotteena? 1.2 Tutkimuskysymykset ja tutkittavan aiheen rajaus Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on vastata tutkimuksen pääkysymykseen: Millainen on Pohjois- Korean ydinasedoktriini Kylmän sodan ydinaseteorioiden näkökulmasta? Pääkysymyksen sel- vittämiseksi tutkimuksen on ensin vastattava seuraaviin alakysymyksiin: - Miksi Pohjois-Korea käynnisti ydinaseohjelmansa? - Mikä on Pohjois-Korean kyky toteuttaa ydinaseisku Kylmän sodan ydinaseteorioiden opein? - Mikä on Pohjois-Korean kyky puolustautua ydinaseiskulta Kylmän sodan ydinaseteo- rioiden opein? 3 Pinkston, Daniel A.: The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Demystifying North Korea , Strategic Studies Institute, helmikuu 2008, s. 5. 4 Pinkston (2008), ss. 14–15. 5 Lin, Liu: The North Korean Nuclear Test and Its Implications , Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Uppsala, marraskuu 2006, s. 1. 3 - Miten Pohjois-Korea on hyödyntänyt ydinaseidensa pelotevaikutusta Kylmän sodan ydinaseteorioiden näkökulmasta? Tutkimuksen alkuperäinen, laaja viitekehys oli ydinase 2000-luvulla, joka oli pro gradu -ta- son opinnäytetyöksi liian laaja. Tutkimus onkin rajattu käsittelemään Pohjois-Korean ydin- asetta. Jotta tutkimus toteutuu sotahistorian eikä strategian tutkimuksena, pyrkii se selvittä- mään alakysymyksen avulla Pohjois-Korean ydinaseohjelman synnyn taustalla olevat histori- alliset motiivit. Muiden alakysymysten mukaisesti Pohjois-Korean ydinasedoktriinin ja sen käyttömahdolli- suuksien analysointi on rajattu kolmeen ydinaseeseen liittyvään tekijään: - iskukykyyn - puolustuskykyyn - pelotevaikutukseen. Tutkimuksen rajaaminen edellä mainittuihin tekijöihin perustuu analysoinnissa käytettäviin ydinaseteorioihin, erityisesti Herman Kahnin ja Bernard Brodien teorioihin. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan Pohjois-Korean ydinasetta Kylmän sodan ydinaseteorioiden näkökulmasta edellä mainittujen kolmen tekijän avulla päätutkimuskysymyksen selvittämiseksi. 1.3 Aiemmat aiheeseen liittyvät tutkimukset ja tutkimuksen lähdeaineisto Pohjois-Korean
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