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Análisis Militar Del Conflicto De Siria

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Análisis Militar Del Conflicto De Siria ANÁLISIS MILITAR DEL CONFLICTO DE SIRIA FERNANDO MORENO LAMAS INTRODUCIÓN El conflicto sirio comienza en 2011 como resultado de la agitación social producida por el movimiento de la primavera árabe, a la que siguió una brutal represión por parte del gobierno de Bashar Al-Assad (actual presidente, y que lleva en el cargo desde el año 200 cuando sucede a su padre Hafez Al-Assad). Esta brutal represión provocará una guerra civil multipolar, en la que podemos diferenciar varias facciones participantes: Fuerzas gubernamentales Fuerzas de la oposición, ejército libre sirio Fuerzas de la oposición, Frente Al-Nusra Fuerzas de la oposición, Frente Islámico Rojava, Kurdistán sirio Estado Islámico de Irak y el Levante (DAESH) El gran número de facciones beligerantes, así como la brutalidad demostrada por los mismos ha llevado a Siria al caos, produciendo hasta la fecha más de 200 mil muertos y un desplazamiento humano sin precedentes. Los diferentes grupos en conflicto tienen acceso a una gran variedad de armamento, debido principalmente a a) El apoyo extranjero; b) El contrabando de armas desde Libia y c) Los constantes intercambios de material en “capturas” tras operaciones militares; y es de vital importancia conocer el tipo, cantidad y origen de dicho armamento con la máxima precisión posible. ACTORES I. Fuerzas gubernamentales: Líder del gobierno: BASHAR AL-ASSAD Líder del ejército: MARISCAL BASHAR AL-ASSAD, GENERAL FAHED YASEM AL-FRIJ Apoyo militar: RUSIA, IRÁN, (INDICIOS DE APOYO IRAKÍ) (VENTA DE ARMAMENTO CHINO). Fuerzas militares de Assad: Ejército de tierra: - Entre 150 y 200 mil militares profesionales. Entre 300 y 500 mil reservistas. Alto número de desertores, lo que impide conocer el total de fuerzas con exactitud. - Aproximadamente 4000 vehículos blindados pesados, fabricados en Rusia (Importados): . T-72 Adra (Modificación siria, blindaje reactivo anti-RPG) . T-72M . T-62M . T-55 . T-55 ARV (Vehículo de recuperación de unidades pesadas dañadas) . T-54 - Aproximadamente 3000 vehículos blindados ligeros, fabricados en Rusia (Importados): . BMP-1 . BMP-2 . BTR-50 - Entre 1500 y 2000 vehículos blindados medios sobre ruedas (BMR), fabricados en Rusia (Importados): . BTR-60 . BTR-70 . BTR-152 . BTR-40 . BRDM-2 - Sistemas de lanzamiento de cohetes: . Type-63 MRLS 107mm (Fabricación china) . BM-21 Grad MRLS (Multiple Rocket Launch System) 122 mm (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 300 aparatos) . Raad 240mm (Fabricación iraní, conocido como Fajdr-3) . Khaibar 302mm (Fabricación china, de la familia de los SCAIC Weishi) - Sistemas de misiles T-T: . 9K52 Luna-M (Designación OTAN “FROG-7”) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de entre 18 y 30 aparatos) . OTR-21 Tochka (Designación OTAN “SS-21”) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 20 aparatos) . R-17 Elbrus (Designación OTAN SCUD B) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 20 aparatos) . SCUD C (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 10 aparatos) . SCUD D (Fabricación rusa, indeterminado) . Fateh-110 M600 (Versión Siria del sistema de fabricación iraní Fateh 110, indeterminado) . P-35 (Designación OTAN SS-C-1B Sepal) (Versión modernizada, indeterminado) . P-15 Termit (Misil naval. Designación OTAN SS-C-3 Styx) (Fabricación rusa, indeterminado) - Sistemas de misiles T-A, de fabricación rusa (Importados): . S-75 Dvina (Designación OTAN SA-2 Guideline) (Estimación de 100 aparatos) . S-125 Neva/Pechora (Designación OTAN SA-3 Goa) (Indeterminado) . S-200 (Designación OTAN SA-5 Gammon) (Indeterminado) . 2K12 Kub (Designación OTAN SA-6 Gainful) (Estimación de 50 aparatos) . 9K311 Strela (Designación OTAN SA-9 Gaskin) (Estimación de 20 aparatos) . 9K33 Osa (Designación OTAN SA-8 Gecko) (Estimación de 60 aparatos) . Sistemas Buk M1 y Buk M2 (Indeterminado) . 9K35 Strela-10 (Denominación OTAN SA-13 Gopher) (Estimación de 35 aparatos) . S-1 Pantsir (Denominación OTAN SA-22 Grayhound) (Sistema combinado de artillería y misiles) (Estimación de 12 aparatos) . TOR-M1 (Denominación OTAN SA-15 Gauntlet) (Indeterminado). - Artillería, de fabricación rusa (Importados): . M-1931 122mm/M-1937 122mm/M-1938 122mm (Estimación de 250 piezas) . D-30 122mm Howitzer (Estimación de 600 piezas) . M-46 130mm (Estimación de 600 piezas) . D-20 152mm (Estimación de 20 piezas) . M-1937 152mm (Estimación de 50 piezas) . S-23 180mm (Estimación de 50 piezas) - Artillería autopropulsada, de fabricación rusa (Importados): . D-30 122mm Montado sobre T-74 (Estimación de 50 piezas) . 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm (Estimación de 400 piezas) . 2S3 Akatsiya 152mm (Estimación de 50 piezas) - Artillería antiaérea, de fabricación rusa (Importados): . ZU-23-2 23mm (Estimación de 650 piezas) . M-1939 37mm (Estimación de 300 piezas) . S-60 57mm (Estimación de 675 piezas) . KS-12 85mm (Estimación de 25 piezas) . KS-19 100mm (Estimación de 25 piezas) . ZPU-2 114mm (Indeterminado) - Artillería antiaérea autopropulsada, de fabricación rusa (Importados): . ZSU-23-4 Shilka 23mm (Estimación de 400 unidades) . 2K22M1 Tunguska 30mm y misiles Igla (Estimación de 6 unidades) - Helicópteros: . Mil Mi-2 (Transporte blindado) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 20 aparatos) . Mil Mi-8 (Transporte blindado/artillado) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 100 aparatos) . Mil Mi-17 (Transporte blindado/artillado) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 40 aparatos) . Mil Mi-25 (Versión para exportación del modelo Mi-24D “Hind”, helicóptero de ataque) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 36 aparatos) . SA 341 Gazelle (Ligero) (Fabricación francesa, indeterminado) Armada: - Fragatas: . Al-Assari 1-508 . Al-Hirasa 2-508 - Torpederos y buques lanzamisiles: . Clase OSA (I y II) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 20 unidades) . TIR II (IPS-18) (Fabricación Iraní, estimación de 10 unidades) - Barcos de desembarco anfibio: . Clase Polcnocny-B (Fabricación polaca, estimación de 3 unidades) - Buscaminas: . Clases Sonya, Yevgenya y Natya (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 7 unidades) - Patrulleras: . Clase Zhuk (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 8 unidades) . Clases MIG-S-1800, MIG-S-1900 y MIG-S-2000 (Fabricación iraní, estimación de 6 unidades) - Submarinos: . Clase Romeo (Estimación de 2 unidades, inoperativos) - Helicópteros: . Kamov Ka-25 (Fabricación rusa, indeterminado) . Kamov Ka-28 (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 5 aparatos) . Mil Mi-14 (Lucha submarina) (Fabricación rusa, estimación de 20 aparatos) Fuerza aérea: - Aviones de combate fabricados en Rusia (Estimación entre 350 y 400 aparatos): . MIG-29 Fulcrum/MIG-25 Foxbat/MIG-23 Flogger/MIG-21 Fishbed . Sukhoi SU-24 Fencer (Comprados a la fuerza aérea iraní) / Sukhoi SU-22 Fitter - Aviones de entrenamiento: . L-39 Albatros (Fabricado en la antigua Checoslovaquia, indeterminado) . MBB-233 (Fabricado en la antigua república federal alemana) . MFI-17 Mushshak (Fabricado en Pakistán, indeterminado) . Yak-130 (Fabricado en Rusia, indeterminado) Armamento no convencional: - Armas Químicas: Siria dispone de vectores de lanzamiento adecuados para situar ojivas con carga química en su territorio nacional, así como de un arsenal de armas químicas (cuya destrucción se comprometió a acometer, aunque no hay certeza de que así haya sido). Así mismo, se han constatado ataques con gas cloro y gas mostaza (aunque la autoría no ha sido confirmada). - Armas Nucleares: Siria no dispone de programa nuclear y, a priori, sus pre- instalaciones fueron destruidas por el ejército israelí varios años antes del conflicto. - Armas Biológicas: No hay indicios de ningún tipo de armamento biológico en Siria. Además de las unidades reseñadas cabe destacar la posesión por parte de la infantería de armas ligeras antitanque (RPG-7 y RPG-22), morteros (82-BM-37), así como equipos antiaéreos rusos de la clase IGLA. Las armas de infantería son, de base, las manufacturadas por los gigantes rusos como la corporación Izhmash (AK-47, AK-74, SVD Dragunov, Makarov, Tokarev, RPK, RPD, etc.) aunque todo parece indicar que sería posible encontrar los iraníes Sayad-2, los belgas FN FAL, o los austríacos Steyr AUG y Steyr SSG-69. Así mismo, hay indicios de la presencia de armas ligeras chinas como el Type 56 (versión china de bajo coste del AK-47). Análisis/Síntesis CCC: Siria obtiene casi la totalidad de su armamento de Rusia, quien vende a Siria su material de guerra desfasado (años 30, 40 y 50) así como material tecnológicamente avanzado (pero siempre por debajo del primer escalón de desarrollo armamentístico). La pequeña porción de armamento sirio que no proviene de Rusia, es de origen iraní. Irán vende a Siria armamento de producción propia, así como armamento de origen ruso. Las fuerzas de tierra sirias son abundantes y se encuentran bastante bien armadas, aunque la incidencia de deserciones es un problema grave. Están bien provistas de vehículos blindados, piezas de artillería y piezas de artillería antiaérea y lanzamiento de misiles T-T y T-A (donde Siria puede presumir de poseer algunas piezas de última generación). La fuerza aérea Siria dispone de aparatos desfasados en comparación con las fuerzas aéreas rusa, china u occidental. Se compone básicamente de aparatos rusos (MiG, Sukhoi) de mediados de los 60 y 70, pero son suficientes para tener superioridad aérea en este conflicto. La armada Siria es testimonial. Consta de un par de fragatas, buscaminas, torpederos y patrulleras, además de una pequeña flota de helicópteros y dos submarinos convencionales inoperativos. A nivel de logística, el hecho de que Siria obtenga casi la totalidad de su armamento de Rusia e Irán les asegura munición, suministros y recambios, limitando la efectividad de los embargos internacionales de armas.
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