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The Military Balance Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia

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The Military Balance Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia This article was downloaded by: [RFE/RL Prague Library], [Mr Martina Boudova] On: 11 February 2015, At: 01:21 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The Military Balance Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tmib20 Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia Published online: 10 Feb 2015. Click for updates To cite this article: (2015) Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance, 115:1, 159-206, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2015.996357 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2015.996357 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. 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Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions Chapter Five Russia and Eurasia RUSSIA (see ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ŬŪūŭ ǰȱ ǯȱ ūųųǼȱ Ȯȱ ȱ - ¢ȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ Ȭȱǰȱȱěȱȱ ŬŪŪŲȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ūŭŪǰŪŪŪȱ ȱ ŭŪǰŪŪŪȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ęȬȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŬŪūŮǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱDzȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȬȬǰȱ Ȭ ȱȱǯ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ - Ȭǰȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ǰȱ Russia and Eurasia ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŬŪūŮȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ Ǽȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱŬŰȱ¢ȱȱŭȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ - ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ - ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ - ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢Dzȱȱ ȱěǯȱ ȱȱȬȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ - ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ The ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȬĚȱ Military Balance ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱĴ - ȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ - ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱǯȱǻȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱūųųűȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱDzȱĚȱȱȱȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŬŪūŭǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯǼ ȱȱ¢ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱŬŪūŮDzȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱŬŪŪŲȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ Ěȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ȭ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȬȱǯȱȱ¢ȱ- ȱȬȱǯȱęȱȱȬ ǰȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȬ ȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȮȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȮȱ ȱȱ Downloaded byDownloaded [RFE/RL Prague Library], [Mr Martina Boudova] at 01:21 11 February 2015 ¢ȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱȬȱǯ ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱěȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȁȬȂǰȱȁ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ - ȱȁȂȱ ǰȱȱȱȱǻȱǯȱ ¢ǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ūűȮŬŪǼǯ ȱȱȱȱȱůůƖǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱŰůƖǯȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ - ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȮȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ - ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ 160 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ - ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ Ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯ ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȬȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱǻȱ¡¡ǰȱǯȱūŰŭǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱǯȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱĴȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ - ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ ȁȂǰȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȁ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝǯȱ ȱ - ȱǯȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱȱŬŪūŮȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȬĚȂǰȱȁȂȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȁȬȂȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ - ȱȱŬŪūŪǯȱȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ - ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ęȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱŬŪūŭǯ ǻȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȬȱȱȮȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ūūǰȱ ůŰȱ ȱ Ųŭȱ ǯǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȁ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȮȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱDzȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȮȱȱěȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȬĚȱ - ȱĜǯȱ¢ȱȬŬŪūŮǰȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬĚȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ - ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱęȱȱǻ Ǽȱȱȱ ȱȱȬȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ Bumerang ǯ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ - ȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȬ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȬȱȂȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱȬųŪȱȱĴȱȱǻǼȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǻŬŪūŰȮŬůǼǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭŭȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ę¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Downloaded byDownloaded [RFE/RL Prague Library], [Mr Martina Boudova] at 01:21 11 February 2015 ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȬŲŬȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱ¡¡ǰȱǯȱūŰŰǼǯ ȱ ęǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȬŪŮ ȱ ¢ȦȬ ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȬűŬȱ Land forces ȱĚȱȱȱȬűŬŭȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ Military Balance ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ Iskander ȱȱ Tochka-U ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŰŲȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȬȂȱ ȱȱųȱ¢ȱŬŪūůȱȱ ǯȱȱęȱȱ Russia and Eurasia 161 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȬŮŪŪȱ ȬȬȱ ȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱŬŪūŮǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȬȱȱȱȱȱ Armata ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱŬŬŪȱę¡Ȭȱȱ Dzȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȭ ȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱ - ǻǼȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ Kurganets ȬŬůȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ PAK DA ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Dzȱ ȱ ȱ Bumerang Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŬŪūŮǯȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁĚ¢ȱ Ȃȱȱ ȱȱ Typhoon ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȬŬȱ Spirit ȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŬŪūųǰȱȱ¢ȱ ŬŪūŮȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱŬŪŬůǯ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȬȱȱȱȂȱęȬȱ PAK ǯ FA ȱ ȱĜ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ - ŬŪūŰǰȱ ȱ ȁȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȬȬȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŬŪūůȱȱǻȱȱǰȱ ȬȬȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱǰȱȱŬŮȱȱȱȱ Kurganets ȬŬůȱ ¢ȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ- ȱȱȱȱ Ǽǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ¢Ȭȱ¡ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ¢ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Russia and Eurasia ȱęȱȱȱęȱǯȱȱ ȱ ęȬȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ ȱǰȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱūŰŮȮŰűǼǯ ȱȱǯ ȱ¢ȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ¡ - Air force ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȬūŪūȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱDZȱ - ȱ ȬŭŬȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȁȱȂȱ¢ȱǻȱ The Military Balance ǯȱ ȱ Ȭůůůȱ ǻȬūůȱ Kent Ǽȱ ǰȱ ŬŪūŬ ǰȱǯȱūŲŰǼȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢Ȯȱȁ ȱȂȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ Ȭůůůȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱŬŪŬŪǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȁȱ ȱ Ȃǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱŭŪȱȱȱȱȱęǯ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱěȱę¡Ȭȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĚȱȱȱ ȱ¢Ȭ ȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱěǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱůŪŪȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ĝȱ ȬȬȱ ȱ ȱ - ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Downloaded byDownloaded [RFE/RL Prague Library], [Mr Martina Boudova] at 01:21 11 February 2015 ȱȮȱȱǯ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ Ȭȱǰȱ ǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȬŬŪŪŲȱȱȱ¢Ȭȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ Ȭěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱȁȱȂȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱęȱȱȱŬŪȱǼȱȱ¢ȱ ¢Ȭȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ Ȃȱ Skat ǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ŬŪȬȱ ȱ ȱ - ȱȱǯ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱĚ¢ȱ¢ȱŬŪūŲǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱŬŪūŭǰȱůŰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ę¡Ȭ ȱ ǰȱ ūŬŬȱ ȱ ȱǯ 162 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015 Figure 7 Equipment Analysis: Russian Flanker Combat Aircraft Development The Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱĜȱDzȱ the prototype aircraft underwent complete redesign in the late 1970s to address performance shortcomings. The aircraft ȱȱȱȱȬȱȱȱȬȱęȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ detection and engagement ranges of potential targets. Originally intended for the export arena, the Russian air force ordered 48 Su-35S in 2009, and deliveries should be completed during 2015.
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