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Latet from the OC pecial Monitoring Miion to Ukraine (MM), aed on information received a of 19:30, 17 Decemer 2018 KYIV 18 December 2018 This report is for the media and the general public. Summary Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasere violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasere to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure as well as damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at two weapons storage sites in non- government-controlled-areas of Donetsk region, as well as Novoamvrosiivske and Makiivka and close to Voznesenivka, a non- government-controlled area of Luhansk region near the border with the Russian Federation.* Ceasefire violations[1] In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 45 explosions). More than half of the ceasere violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasere violations (of which more than half were recorded in the security zone), including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (85 explosions). More than half of the explosions were recorded in areas south of Syrotyne (government-controlled, 71km north-west of Luhansk) and south-east of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement areas section below). About 190 ceasere violations, including about 130 explosions, were assessed as live-re training (outside the security zone). Disengagement areas[2] On the evening of 16 December, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60kmwest of Luhansk) recorded nine projectiles in ight from south-south-east to north-north-west at an assessed range of 1-3km east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). In the afternoon of 17 December, positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-10km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a calm situation.[3] Withdrawal of weapons The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of the withdrawal lines Government-controlled areas 16 December An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted: 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Hnutove (20km north- east of Mariupol); and a surface-to-air missile system (9K31 Strela-1) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk). 17 December Ten self-propelled howitzers (seven 2S1 and three 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka; Two self-propelled howitzers (2S3) heading south-west on road H-20 near Kostiantynivka; Five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) on a train near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk); Three self-propelled howitzers (2S3) heading south on road H-20 near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk) Non-government-controlled areas 16 December An SMM long-range UAV spotted: a tank (T-64) next to a residential house in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol). An SMM mini-UAV spotted: four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) (For previous observations in that area, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2018 ) and an MLRS (BM-21) at a training area south-east of Miusynsk (62km south- west of Luhansk). Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites Government-controlled areas 16 December An SMM mini-UAV spotted: a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). 17 December A surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in Kalchyk (24km north of Mariupol). Non-government-controlled areas 16 December An SMM mini-UAV spotted: ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six towed howitzer (D-30), four surface-to- air missile systems (9K35) and three tanks (T-64) at a training area south- east of Miusynsk. 17 December Three tanks (T-72) at a training area south-east of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk). Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn[4] Weapon storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled-area of Donetsk region* 17 December Two towed howitzers (D-30) remained missing. Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5] Government-controlled areas 15 December An SMM mini-UAV spotted: two infantry ghting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), about 100m north of the Zolote disengagement area. 16 December An SMM long-range (UAV) spotted: two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one MT-LB and one BTR variant) near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk); an APC (possible BTR) near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk); an APC (BTR-80) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol); an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Hnutove; an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk); two IFVs (BMP variants) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk); an APC (BTR variant) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk); and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk). 17 December Two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina; Three IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote; Six IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); An APC (BTR-70) near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk); and An APC (BTR-70) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and Non-government-controlled areas 16 December An SMM long-range UAV spotted: a probable IFV (BMP variant) in a residential area of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 26km north-east of Mariupol); three IFVs (BMP-2) and two APCs (BTR-80 and MT-LB) in a residential area of Sosnivske (35km north-east of Mariupol); and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk). 17 December Four APCs (two MT-LB and two undetermined variants) and two IFVs (BMP variants) near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk). Mine hazard signs The Mission observed several new wooden sticks on both sides of a 800m stretch of road C051132 near a cemetery in Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south- west of Donetsk), of which some had mine signs (red background with a skull and cross bones and “Stop, Mines” written in Ukrainian and “Danger, Mines” in English). (For previous observations in that area, see SMM Daily Report 30 November 2018) SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasere to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non- government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), to power lines near Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) as well as to enable an assessment of a water pipeline near Popasna. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). Border areas not under government control At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 26 cars (seven with Ukrainian and 17 with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates) and a bus with Russian Federation licence plates and about 20 people on board in a queue to exit Ukraine. About ten minutes after the SMM’s arrival, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw about 100 stationary uncovered cargo wagons (unable to see whether empty or loaded) and 20 tank wagons parked on rails. After about ve minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 60 minutes, the SMM saw 20 cars (four with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and ten with “DPR” plates) and three pedestrians (two men in their thirties and one woman in her sixties) exiting Ukraine. The Mission also saw 11 cars (three with Ukrainian licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates) and three pedestrians (two women in their sixties and one man in his thirties) entering Ukraine. The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv. *Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.
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