Latet from the OC pecial Monitoring Miion to (MM), aed on information received a of 19:30, 28 Januar 2019 KYIV 29 January 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM observed a similar number of ceasere violations in Donetsk region and no ceasere violations in Luhansk region. The SMM followed up on reports of a man who died while crossing the contact line in Stanytsia Luhanska. The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasere to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted near Horlivka.*

Ceasere violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasere violations, including a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The highest number of ceasere violations was recorded in areas west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), while the highest number of explosions was recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasere violations, compared with the previous 24 hours, when the SMM recorded ceasere violations, including one explosion.

Man died while crossing the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

The SMM followed up on reports that a man (68 years old) died while crossing the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on 28 January. At the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), a representative of an international organization said that a man had collapsed at 13:45 near a humanitarian container used as a heating point and had not been able to be revived, despite having been provided rst aid. A police ocer at the same location told the SMM that the man had been traveling to non-government-controlled areas with his wife and son and that his body had been taken to the morgue in Stanytsia Luhanska.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned in the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

14 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six anti- guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 28 December 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

a self-propelled (-S, 120mm) stationary inside the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) waiting to be loaded onto trains. 28 January

The SMM saw:

eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a military compound near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk) and a military truck towing a mortar (2B9) near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

19 (18 T-64 and one T-72), 11 towed mortars (120mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at a training area near Buhaivka (weapons in violation seen at the same location, see above) and 11 tanks (ten T-64 and one T-72 with main gun removed) at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 28 December 2018).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

28 January

The SMM saw:

an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Saxon) about 3.5km north-east of Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk); an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck and two APCs (a BTR-60 and a Saxon), all in areas north- west of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); two infantry ghting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-1 and a BMP variant) and an APC military ambulance (MT-LB type) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military vehicle on an APC (MT-LB) chassis west of Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

28 January

The SMM saw:

an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military truck in Luhansk city.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasere to facilitate repairs to water pipelines near Berezove (government- controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) and to facilitate the inspection of water wells at a pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Public gathering in honour of Maidan activist

In Kyiv, on 26 January, the SMM observed about 80 people (mostly men, about 20-50 years-old) marching from Mykhailivska Square to an area near Dynamo Stadium in tribute to a Maidan activist who lost his life on 22 January 2014. Some participants were wearing camouage military-style uniforms and others were carrying torches as well as ags, including those of the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People's Self-Defence and the Right Sector. The SMM observed 15 police ocers present along the route and a bus of about 30 police ocers in riot gear near the stadium. The SMM did not observe any incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fullment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an armed man wearing camouage clothing told the SMM that it had to leave the area because his “superior” was not informed about the SMM’s arrival. The SMM explained its mandate, and the armed man then asked the SMM to wait. About ten minutes later, another man in camouage clothing told the SMM it had to leave the area, as he had spoken with “people in Donetsk”, and that the SMM had no right to be present at the checkpoint or speak with civilians present.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identied as important for eective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasere violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of the majority of the SMM cameras throughout the reporting period.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Contact Dragana Nikolic-Solomon Liudmyla Palamar Chief of Press and Public Information Unit National Outreach Ocer OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 26 Turhenievska Street 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv 01054 Kyiv Ukraine Ukraine Oce: +380 44 392 08 55 Oce: +380 44 392 0965 Mobile: +380 95 291 99 18 Mobile: +38 067 828 06 79 [email protected] Mobile: +38 050 387 93 98 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]