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Russia's Limit of Advance: Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations

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Russia's Limit of Advance: Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations C O R P O R A T I O N BEN CONNABLE, ABBY DOLL, ALYSSA DEMUS, DARA MASSICOT, CLINT REACH, ANTHONY ATLER, WILLIAM MACKENZIE, MATTHEW POVLOCK, LAUREN SKRABALA Russia’s Limit of Advance Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2563 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0241-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the project Defeating Rus- sian Deployed Joint Forces, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to assess challenges that deployed Russian forces pose to U.S. Army forces; identify opportunities to defeat Russian deployed forces in a range of envi- ronments and at various levels of conflict; identify limitations to Russia’s ground force deploy- ment capabilities, including logistics, lines of communication, deployed force protection, air defense, system ranges, command and control, and joint integration; and recommend ways for the U.S. Army and the joint force to defeat Russia’s deployed forces in multiple prospective combat scenarios. A companion report, Russia’s Limit of Advance: Scenarios, available online at www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2563z1, presents additional details on the scenarios described here. This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army. RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this com- pliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. government. iii Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Figures ...........................................................................................................vii Tables ............................................................................................................ ix Summary ........................................................................................................ xi Acknowledgments ........................................................................................... xxv Abbreviations ................................................................................................xxvii CHAPTER ONE Analyzing Russian Ground Forces Deployment Capability ............................................ 1 What Is the RGF? ................................................................................................ 1 Why Analyze Russian Deployment Capabilities? ............................................................ 2 Criteria for Assessing Russian Ground Combat Deployment Capability ................................. 4 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 7 Structure of This Report .......................................................................................10 CHAPTER TWO The RGF Deployment Calculator ..........................................................................13 The Benefits and Limits of a Deployment Calculator ......................................................13 A Note on Sources for the Calculator ........................................................................14 Overview of Notional Scenarios ..............................................................................15 Description of the RGF Deployment Calculator ............................................................15 Advice for Using the RGF Deployment Calculator ........................................................ 26 CHAPTER THREE Notional Scenario Example: Kuril Islands ............................................................... 27 Six (+1) Russian Deployment Scenarios ..................................................................... 27 Format of the Scenarios ....................................................................................... 28 Example: Kuril Islands Scenario ............................................................................. 28 Summary of the Notional Kuril Islands Scenario .......................................................... 44 CHAPTER FOUR Analysis of RGF Deployment Capability .................................................................47 Stresses on Deployment Capability Across Six Notional Scenarios .......................................47 Russian Deployment Strengths ................................................................................51 Russian Deployment Limitations .............................................................................53 Key Finding: The RGF Has a Sharply Limited Effective Deployment Range ......................... 64 v vi Russia’s Limit of Advance: Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations Recommendation: Develop a Russian Ground Power Projection Model ............................... 64 APPENDIXES A. Case Analyses of Russian Deployments ..............................................................65 B. Order of Battle ............................................................................................69 References .......................................................................................................81 Figures S.1. Distance Variable for Deployment Capability Analysis .......................................xii S.2. Comparative Analysis of Russian Organic Airlift and Sealift Capacity, 1992 and 2017 ........................................................................................... xix S.3. Assessment of Russian Ground Force Sustainability, by Case Distance ....................xx S.4. Assessment of International Basing, Overflight, and Naval Access .........................xx S.5. Assessment of Line-of-Communication Vulnerability, by Distance ........................ xxi S.6. Assessment of RGF Effective Deployment Ranges .......................................... xxii 1.1. Distance Variable for Deployment Analysis ..................................................... 6 1.2. Generic Battalion Tactical Group Organization ................................................ 7 1.3. Russian Military Districts ........................................................................10 2.1. Russian Rail Network ............................................................................ 24 3.1. Kuril Islands Scenario Range.....................................................................29 3.2. Kuril Islands Scenario Overview .................................................................29 3.3. Kuril Islands Road to War ....................................................................... 30 3.4. Kuril Islands Geographic Orientation ...........................................................31 3.5. Kuril Islands Scenario Strategic Considerations ...............................................31 3.6. Kuril Islands Scenario BTG Analysis ...........................................................32 3.7. Kuril Islands Scenario Assumptions and Notional Impact ...................................33 3.8. Russian Unit Sourcing in the Kuril Islands Scenario ........................................ 34 3.9. Notional Predeployment Force Laydown in the Kuril Islands Scenario ....................35 3.10. Russian Forces in the Kuril Islands Scenario .................................................. 36 3.11. Kuril Islands Scenario Deployment Waves .................................................... 36 3.12. Kuril Islands Scenario, Wave 1 Movement .....................................................37 3.13. Kuril Islands Scenario, Wave 2 Movement .....................................................37
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