SPECIAL EDITION 42 October 2005

SUMMARY

After the fall of Communism, Reading Russia reverted to czarism. Russia Right But more importantly, Russia embraced capitalism. Although Dmitri Trenin Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace not democratic, Russia is

largely free. Property rights are ore than twenty years after Russian leader understanding of what today’s Russia is and more deeply anchored than MMikhail Gorbachev began his policies of where it is headed. Available analyses of Russia perestroika and glasnost that led to the end of barely scratch the surface and are either too short they were five years ago, and the Cold War, a chill has entered relations sighted in their outlook or politically motivated. the once-collectivist society is between Russia and the West. Even as President These are serious and potentially dangerous Vladimir Putin prepares to assume the presi- flaws. Effective Western policies toward Russia going private. Indeed, private dency of the G-8, he is frequently criticized for demand a close, cool, and dispassionate view of consumption is the main driver taking Russia in the wrong direction. The very fundamental developments there. people who in 2000 called Putin a man with of economic growth. Russia’s whom they could do business are having second Russian Politics: Free but Not Democratic future now depends heavily on thoughts. Those once fascinated by Putin now publicly rebuke him. As they were exiting from communism in the how fast a middle class— Putin is shooting back, accusing the West of 1990s, most nations initially reached back, trying to weaken and dismember Russia. As almost instinctively, to their immediate pre- a self-identified group with politicians in the United States and Europe communist pasts. The Baltic states revived personal stakes in having a compare him to Mugabe or Mussolini, Putin’s their constitutions of the 1930s, the Armeni- aides invoke the Munich appeasers who tried to ans and the Azeris revived their political par- law-based government push Hitler eastward. In his September 4, 2005, ties of the late 1910s, and Eastern Europe, accountable to tax payers— address following the Beslan school tragedy, with the exception of East Germany, which Putin himself blamed the West for trying to promptly reunited with the Federal Republic, can be created. The West needs channel Muslim radicalism toward Russia. The once again became Mitteleuropa. This revival to take the long view, stay Kremlin now brands the so-called color revolu- of the past was a source of concern for West tions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan as a Europeans and Americans, who feared the engaged, and maximize contacts, Western ploy to install pro-American regimes reemergence of historical enmities and ten- especially with younger on Russia’s periphery and then to engineer a sions. These fears were realized in the former regime change in Russia itself. Yugoslavia, and they underpinned the dual Russians. ■ There is confusion in Western policies enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty toward Russia, in large measure resulting from Organization (NATO) and the European disillusionment but also rooted in profound mis- Union (EU).

2 Policy Brief

Russia also reached backward to czarism, reigned, he was the real constitution. “Czar although initially this was not obvious. Boris Boris” was not interested in institution building, Yeltsin banned the Communist Party, dis- only in keeping his position as the supreme mantled the Soviet Union, was friendly to the arbiter. Thus, Putin is not destroying democratic West, tolerated open debate, and privatized institutions, which never existed in the first the economy. He was given the benefit of the place, but is the top bureaucrat controlling a doubt in Washington and the European capi- huge government bureaucracy, for which he sees tals, and his anti-communism was elevated to no need and, frankly, no possibility for demo- a surrogate of democracy. cratic institutions. But the picture Russia presented to the The czarist analogy is very bad news for outside world in the 1990s was massively dis- optimists who saw Russia becoming another torted. Russia was doubtless freer than ever Poland or joining post–World War II Dmitri Trenin is senior associ- before in all respects—both good and bad. Germany in thoroughly cleansing itself from ate and deputy director of the Parliament was lively but essentially power- its past. However, this analogy is more accu- Carnegie Moscow Center. He less. The electronic media were routinely crit- rate than the often used neo-Soviet one. Of retired from the Russian Army ical of the authorities but were owned by a course, calling the current regime czarist does after a military career that handful of people, known as oligarchs, and not mean that there is no difference between included participating in the depended on their owners’ tastes, interests, the Russia of 2005 and 1913, but it does Geneva strategic arms control and fates. The oligarchs were allowed to pri- mean that Russia is back on its historical path negotiations and teaching at vatize the best parts of the economy, and in of development—roughly at the point where the Military Institute. Trenin collusion with the top bureaucracy, they took things started to go wrong—and has a chance was the first Russian officer over vital parts of the state. Yeltsin’s election of doing better this time. victory in 1996 and his handover of power to to be selected for the NATO Putin, like a king to his dauphin, tell us more A New Beginning Defense College and is a about his regime of electoral monarchy than Russia does not have to relive its tragic history. member of the International almost anything else. It would be a mistake to The domestic situation, the global environment, Institute of Strategic Studies. burnish Yeltsin’s reputation in order to brand and the historical memory of its people all mili- He holds a Ph.D. from the Putin as a renegade. tate for a better future. A close observer would Institute of the U.S.A. and Putin’s regime is openly czarist, a term note that Russia is like Western Europe in the Canada (1984), and was a more precise than “authoritarian,” which sense that it will have to advance economically, senior fellow at the Institute evokes the image of a traditional trains- socially, and politically, by itself and in stages. It of Europe from 1993 to 1997. running-on-time dictatorship. The defining is not like Central Europe, which could luckily He is the author of numerous element in present-day Russia is that the pres- fast-forward through some of these stages articles and books on Russian idency, or rather the president, a modern czar, because of its NATO–EU membership. security issues, including is the only functioning institution. A czar This distinction means that we need to be Russia’s Restless Frontier: The may be strong or weak, given to liberal or more careful in using the language of democ- Chechnya Factor in Post- reactionary ideas, but he is the sole decision racy when talking about Russia. Democracy maker. Putin’s Duma is much like that of everywhere in the West has been a fairly late Soviet Russia (Carnegie, 2004) Nicholas II, docile and acquiescent, while child of capitalism because it requires a self- and a forthcoming book on many of his governors are also like Nicholas’ conscious middle class to take root and flour- Russia and the new West, governor-generals. The capitalism now being ish. This can only be produced by successful which will be published in practiced is dependent on the authorities and and sustained capitalist development. Russia Russian by the Carnegie plays no independent role in politics. Indeed, is currently generating this kind of develop- Moscow Center in 2006. This politics in Russia today is court-driven and ment, but the process will take time. brief is based on an editorial essentially Byzantine. Democracy can only consolidate in a country published in the Taipei Times, This does not, however, constitute a rollback when the bulk of its society has standards well March 21, 2005. of democracy in contrast to the Yeltsin era. above minimal subsistence levels; otherwise Yeltsin may have enacted Russia’s first demo- an attempt to install democratic government cratic constitution, but in reality, as long as he will produce populism. Reading Russia Right 3

We also need to distinguish between rary Russia. This situation, truly unique democracy and freedom. Freedom comes first among post-communist and post-Soviet coun- and, through the cultivation of responsibility, tries, was self-defeating for the first batch of prepares the ground for a democratic polity. Russia’s liberal reformers. Russia, though undemocratic, is largely free. The need now is for a kind of hard- It is this freedom to worship, make money, headed liberalism that stands for freedom, and move around that pushes the country reform, and the Russian nation-state. In prin- forward: Freedom favors the activists. Politics, ciple, this brand of liberalism can emerge however, is the one area where this freedom is from the ranks of the new bourgeoisie and currently missing. the rising urban middle classes. A 2005 At present, Russia’s politics belongs to a INDEM report estimates that Russian busi- narrow and self-absorbed elite. Its antiquated nesspeople pay $316 billion in bribes annu- system of government by bureaucracy is both ally; they can hardly be expected to carry wasteful and dysfunctional. If the country is such a burden indefinitely, especially since to move forward along the path of democ- bribes do not always guarantee results. At racy, its leaders must agree about who owns some point, businesspeople are likely to start what, who makes the rules, and how to organizing themselves, first at the local level, change the rules. Establishing this baseline in favor of a more effective way of pressing will not introduce democracy into the coun- try, but it would help institutionalize free- doms and produce a genuine constitutional Putin’s regime is openly czarist. Its rule of law. In other words, the task at hand is defining element is that the presidency to turn today’s czarist Russia into a latter-day version of a European monarchy embracing is the only functioning institution. constitutionalism—not yet a democracy, but a huge step forward. Only forces rallied their demands and ensuring accountability. around a liberal agenda can accomplish this By the same token, people who have moved feat. But does Russia have these forces and up into newer houses or better apartments where are they? will gradually look beyond their door to The Kremlin officials and propagandists take care of the social and political environ- like to repeat the convenient nineteenth- ment in which they live. Grass-roots self- century maxim that in Russia the only true organization of civil society, alongside a new European is the government. Yet, the smug role for business, could be the basis for major conservatism of the rulers and loyal elites is social and, ultimately, political change. essentially sterile. On one hand, those who exit Such a new liberalism will not be run by the twentieth century by way of the nineteenth the intelligentsia, and on occasion will appear have little to offer to others. Political technol- coarse and anti-intellectual. It will be less ogy is not the same thing as a sound policy, concerned with social justice and human and opportunism by definition lacks a sense of rights and more concerned with good gover- direction. On the other hand, the traditional nance. Over time, however, it could perform liberalism of intelligentsia reformers has basi- the singular feat of marrying liberal and cally run its course. The well-respected and national values, thus undercutting the con- once-hopeful figures from the 1990s are no servatives’ and reactionaries’ monopoly on longer players (and, frankly, have not been so patriotism. In foreign policy terms, the new since Yeltsin’s departure years ago). One of version of liberalism would tend to be their major problems has been such a deep Western rather than pro-Western. It would perceived disinterest in things national that the espouse the core values of the West without notions of liberalism and patriotism have come aligning Russia formally with Western politi- to be seen as mutually exclusive in contempo- cal institutions.

4 Policy Brief

Is this only a hypothesis or are these arrest was exactly what the Russian business forces really emerging? With so much being community was hoping Putin would do. In written about Putin’s Russia (essentially the other words, if you do not play power politics, Kremlin and the bureaucracy), the rest of the you will be safe. Universal application of jus- country is often overlooked. Ever since tice would likely land the whole business class Gorbachev unleashed people’s energies that (and the entire government bureaucracy) in had been chained by the Soviet communist jail. Of course, the Kremlin’s actions in system, the impact of the Kremlin on the response to the perceived challenge from nation has been constantly diminishing. In Khodorkovsky have not only resulted in the other words, the Kremlin is still unchallenged destruction of the country’s best-run company domestically, but it is increasingly less rele- but also led to a profound loss of business con- vant. Even if one-man rule is likely to persist, fidence and a surge of corruption, unprece- perhaps only gradually mellowing into some dented even for Russia. However, things have a kind of a constitutional monarchy (the prede- tendency of moving on, as a hike in foreign direct investment in early 2005 suggests. Not all the oligarchs are in jail or in exile. Universal application of justice would According to one estimate, just twenty-two land the business class and the entire people own roughly 40 percent of the Russian national economy—a minuscule number com- government bureaucracy in jail. pared to the number of robber barons in the United States at the turn of the last century. cessor of a representative democracy), it will Russia’s official count of millionaires (in dol- be the economy, rather than politics, that will lars), at a mere 88,000, is likely understated. drive the process. Despite the scandalous concentration of wealth in the hands of the well-connected few, Russian Russia’s Revolution of Money and capitalism is not only, or even primarily, about the Emergence of a Middle Class the oligarchy. Muscovites’ average incomes are Russia has a free wheeling rather than a free superior to those in many capitals of the new market economy, but it is definitely capitalist. EU entrants. All Russia (144 million people) is In 1987 Gorbachev promoted the law on not Moscow or St. Petersburg (10 and 5 mil- cooperatives and election of Communist lion people, respectively), but each provincial Party officials, and in 1993 Yeltsin defeated capital in the country is a Moscow of sorts to its the communist and nationalist oppositions neighborhood. All are ringed by thousands of and adopted the new constitution. These newly built, expensive dachas (summerhouses), events framed the most recent Russian revo- all have traffic jams (only partly due to bad lution, which was above all a revolution of driving habits and lack of parking discipline), money. Its gains are now well secured: Private and all have stores open around the clock sell- property and private businesses—practically ing goods for which there is a market. nonexistent in the Soviet Union in 1985 Moreover, this market is expanding. when Gorbachev started what he thought was Freedom House’s index ranks Russia very low only a renovation of the system—have on the democracy scale, but the “IKEA” become irreversible realities in Russia. Its index (named after the Swedish chain-store business climate is still difficult, but the coun- company) reveals a different dimension. try is basically on track economically, even if Giant IKEA furniture and home accessories its course is rather irregular. stores are fanning out from Moscow to nearly Western critics have been accusing Putin all major cities in the country. Russia is of selectively applying justice for political unlikely to go through a political revolution motives in the arrest of Russia’s richest man, anytime soon, but it is in the midst of a revo- Mikhail Khodorkovsky. But ironically the lution in retail trade. Although this develop-

Reading Russia Right 5

ment promises no triumph of democracy, it aspects of today’s Russia could be better does give many a very real right of choice. understood by comparing them with the real- Consumers have arrived in Russia, but citi- ities of post–World War II Europe, such as zens are not yet in place. politics in France or the economy in Italy. Millions of ordinary Russians exercise their Commercial values are advancing, while right to choose in the expanding market. For warrior values are retreating. Even the advent example, planeloads of business travelers con- of the so-called siloviki (members of Putin’s verge on London, Zurich, and Frankfurt daily; entourage who have police or, more often, a hundreds of thousands of Russians, thinking security service background), somewhat over- they have lost the Crimea as a vacation destina- valued and much misunderstood, distorts tion, are rediscovering the Mediterranean or, rather than blocks that process. Ironically, for those living in Siberia and the Far East, the because most of the siloviki are ex-members Yellow Sea. Of the 6.5 million Russians who of the security services and not the military, traveled abroad in 2004, 1.5 million went to for instance, their ethos is individualistic Turkey, and around 1 million each to Egypt rather than collectivist. Few people in the and China. All of these people are part of a Soviet system were less ideological and more Russia beyond Putin’s Russia—one that will pragmatic than the foreign arm of the KGB. grow and develop even when Putin is no These qualities and useful connections longer in power. explain the commercial success of so many The fundamental cultural change is that among them. The rise of the siloviki has Russia, once the paragon of collectivism, is going private. Increasingly, people take pride The retail revolution promises no not in their country’s missile forces, ballet companies, and mammoth dam construction triumph of democracy. Consumers projects, but in the homes they own, the cars they drive, and the schools to which they have arrived in Russia, but citizens send their children. Even in sports, women’s tennis singles are faring better than the ice are not yet in place. hockey teams. In fact, Russian women tennis players hold four of the ten top positions in resulted not in the reemergence of the the World Tennis Association’s August 2005 national security state but in the corruption ratings. The fundamental change is the emer- of those who have risen to the top. While gence of a middle class, composed of self- they are busy carving up budget allocations conscious individuals, who over time will for their own benefit, the plight of the armed form the bedrock of the Russian demos. forces continues to worsen, and the quality of Democracy’s foundation in Russia will be tax- the security services personnel (and their payers, not dissidents or street demonstrators. effectiveness) has eroded. True, Russia’s current system of values is different from those of present-day United A New Foreign Policy: States or Western Europe (differences Russia’s Business Is Russia between these two notwithstanding), but the Today’s Russia is post- rather than neo- existing value gap is of a socioeconomic and imperialist. The range of its effective foreign historical, not ideological, nature, as in the policy activity has shrunk to the former Soviet Soviet days. In terms of per capita gross space. Even there, Moscow has been on the domestic product (GDP), Russia, over the retreat, grudgingly ceding one position after course of the last two centuries, has trailed another. Recently, it has been engaged in rear- the leaders of the Western world by 40–60 guard action in defense of a status quo that years, according to Yegor Gaidar in his 2005 arguably does not suit it very well but is deemed book, Dolgoye Vremya (Long Time). Many preferable to the vagaries of an uncertain future.

6 Policy Brief

Exiting from an empire is never quick or easy, on the frozen conflicts in Moldova and and Russia is no exception, especially since its Georgia, which are increasingly seen as empire was contiguous and closely integrated opportunities to influence the political, eco- with the metropolitan core. Within this con- nomic, and security policies of the new states. text, the 2004 Ukraine debacle can be seen as This coming change will be a final act of a turning point. self-liberation from the imperial burden, with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and others the result of raising Russia’s competitiveness are convincing Russian elites, still reeling from in its neighboring markets. This new role, the fall from the great power status, that in the however, requires a level of competence and twenty-first century Russia’s business must be commitment generally lacking among Russia itself. In this, the “color revolutions” are Russia’s elites. Recent cases of Poland- doing Moscow a huge favor. Russia is not dis- bashing, the double failure of border treaties engaging from its neighborhood, but its mode with Estonia and Latvia, and chronic tensions of engagement is changing. It is increasingly with Georgia point to the difficulty Moscow approaching the new countries as full-fledged experiences in dealing with smaller neighbors states, rather than parts of the long-defunct beset (and occasionally obsessed) with histor- whole, and is being guided by specific national ical grievances against it. interests. In the process, imperialistic illusions The Kremlin’s ideal of Russia’s interna- will be dropped (to the relief of the neigh- tional role is that of a modern great power: bors), together with the system of imperial economically viable, technologically compe- preferences (to their dismay). Russian eco- tent, socially and culturally attractive, and nomic expansion will continue, but it will be militarily strong. In a highly competitive global environment, Russia hopes to eventu- Once the paragon of collectivism, ally become competitive. A great power in the twenty-first century should be able to func- Russia is going private. Tennis tion as a self-standing unit in a world where there are several major poles of attraction. singles players, not ice hockey According to Alexander III’s oft-cited maxim, Russia’s only true allies in the nineteenth cen- teams, are faring best. tury were its army and its navy; its allies today are oil and gas—as long as prices stay high. driven by companies (some of them govern- Because Russia is close to the major poles of ment-owned) pursuing concrete interests and international power—the United States, the so will not be territorial. EU, China, India, and Japan—as well as the It is finally dawning on the Kremlin that amorphous and turbulent Muslim world, political union beyond Belarus is impossible Moscow’s foreign policy, its architects believe, and that economic integration beyond must be multidirectional. Kazakhstan (and Belarus) is undesirable. With the European Union (the near Russia is building security arrangements West), the objective is cooperation, not inte- with an eye on Central Asia, not Central gration. Russia hopes to build a loose associa- Europe, and will need to take into account tion with the EU, on a more or less equal basis, the mercurial nature of the region’s politics. but this may be overly optimistic. The idea of Even though Uzbekistan’s recent security joining the union is too far-fetched, with little reorientation from Washington to Moscow support in Russia and virtually none in the and Beijing appears a victory to some in EU. However, partial integration outside of Russia, the Kremlin continues to lack both formal institutions can succeed over the long the resources and the will for a real “Great term. Another important issue on the Russian Game” revisited. The Kremlin is edging government’s EU agenda is easing the visa toward accepting cooperation with the EU regime for western-bound Russian travelers.

Reading Russia Right 7

Russia’s relations with its NATO neighbors nil. Russian forces engage in friendly exercises are becoming demilitarized. A war between with China’s Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), Russia and Germany is as unthinkable today as even though in the long run, if push comes to one between Germany and France. But there shove, the General Staff in Moscow can only can be no full reconciliation between Russia pin its hopes on nuclear deterrence to hold its and the rest of Europe before history is put to own in the Far East. Both Russia and the rest between Moscow, on the one hand, and United States are battling Islamists separately, the Baltic States and Poland, on the other. but neither did anything to organize regional Relations with the United States are char- antiterrorist cooperation in Central Asia while acterized by a fair amount of disillusionment, their relationship warmed in the wake of 9/11. mistrust, and even hostility. There is no Now that the relationship has cooled, the prospect of Russia becoming a junior partner United States and Russia are engaged in what or a formal ally of the United States. Yet, appears to be a tug-of-war over military bases Moscow tacitly recognizes U.S. primacy and in the region. does not seek confrontation with it. Russia Russia’s new central battleground is in sees the relationship above all in terms of Chechnya and increasingly in the rest of the what the United States can contribute to its North Caucasus, where it fights Islamist ter- modernization effort, with WTO member- ship topping the list. The Kremlin resents Russia’s effective foreign policy has U.S. activities in the new states of the former Soviet Union, so it can be expected to hold shrunk to the former Soviet space. Even on to Belarus and to help push out the United States where circumstances permit, there, Moscow has been on the retreat. but it realizes it cannot fully fill the vacuum there. Thus, Russia’s U.S. policy is a combi- rorists, separatists, and bandits. One year nation of modernization assistance, limited after the terrorist attack at Beslan, Russia is partnership, and localized competition. still far from achieving a turning point in that Russia’s recent rapprochement with China struggle because of the lack of an effective seems logical in view of cooler relations and strategy, adequate instruments, and compe- lower expectations with Europe and the tent leadership. Pervasive corruption stifles United States. The two countries are neighbors every effort in the socioeconomic sphere, clan and share a range of interests, above all eco- politics hampers administrative improve- nomic ones. True, the 2005 joint military exer- ments, and human rights abuses recruit new cises and the joint stand against continued fighters for the cause. In the words of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia sought Kremlin’s Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav to send a message to Washington, but the mes- Surkov, the “subterranean fire” of regional sage delivered was that Moscow wanted to instability continues to rage unabated. demonstrate its strategic independence and its Chechnya explains much in Putin’s and, desire to be taken more seriously. Despite more broadly, the Kremlin’s attitude toward newly arisen fears, Russia is not about to Western policies. The refusal of the U.S. and embrace China as its new ally and mentor. EU governments to treat Chechnya as part of Even as the relationship between the two the war on terror breeds constant resentment. grows closer, it remains testy, with neither Asylum given to separatist leaders whom country seeing the other as its first priority. Moscow accuses of terrorism leads to suspi- Against this backdrop, Russia’s security cion about the West’s “hidden agenda.” On policy remains schizophrenic. Moscow contin- this, its most important security issue, the ues to prepare for defense against an air-space Kremlin feels isolated from its nominal part- attack (that is, a war against the United States), ners in the West. This situation is an open even though the likelihood of that scenario is invitation to those peddling age-old ideas of

8 Policy Brief

Western hostility toward Russia to concoct but not European (if Europe is defined in terms absurdities of Europeans and others turning of EU membership). This transfiguration is by Russians into “twenty-first-century interna- no means unique. Japan was the first country tional outcasts,” to quote Gleb Pavlovsky, the to succeed in this national endeavor. In the Kremlin’s chief spin doctor. twenty-first century, alongside the “Old West” of Europe, the United States, and Japan, a Western Interests “New West” is emerging—and Russia could Western relations with Russia can no longer well be part of it in the long term. be described in terms of integration, as it is Nothing is preordained, of course. If traditionally understood, that is, gradually Russia fails, as it might, it is likely to become drawing Russia into the Western institutional something like a “Euro-China,” a backward orbit. For that, there is neither particular periphery-cum-raw-materials appendage to demand on the part of Russia nor sufficient its two principal neighbors, with China as the supply on the part of the United States or the likely beneficiary. At the same time, Russia’s EU. NATO and the EU, which were so suc- Muslim neighborhoods, ranging from the North Caucasus and up the Volga, could be Russian elites, reeling from the fall from sucked into the Greater Middle East, which would be an unwelcome prospect. great power status, are learning that Even now, Russia has evidently caught the “Dutch disease” and can fall into the trap Russia’s business must be Russia itself. of becoming a petro-state. Without a system of rule of law, its politics are inherently driven cessfully used with regard to the countries of by crisis. If Russian elites and public are not Central and Eastern Europe, will have to careful, Russia can also succumb to the remain idle in the case of Russia. The famous demons of ultranationalism, chauvinism, “double integration elevator” cannot take even fascism, which are all gaining strength. Russia aboard because Western institutions After all, 1913, the Romanov monarchy’s last simply do not have the capacity to do so. peaceful year, was replete with massive con- The difference between Russia, on the tradictions that broke loose with the one hand, and the countries of Central and Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Eastern Europe, and even western However, a critical mass of relative well- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), being may have been established by now to on the other, is that while Russia has keep the country afloat in stormy weather, so embarked on the path of modernization, it that even a plunge in oil prices, when it does not particularly want to belong to a comes, would be more of a stimulus for eco- larger institutionalized grouping. Russia is nomic and administrative reform than a thus unlikely to “join” the West by means of a death knell for stability. When the Russian formal accession to the Euro-Atlantic institu- economy received a major blow from the out- tions and is instead integrating into the wider side in the 1998 financial crisis, it bounced world by means of organizations such as the back in two years, profiting greatly from the WTO and forums such as the G-8. It has also drastic devaluation of the ruble. found acceptable formulas for doing business A more fundamental question, however, is: with NATO (within a special council) and Should the West care? At present, Russia is not the EU (in the “four spaces” matrix). an economic heavyweight (except in energy Culturally and geographically European, matters); it has limited political influence out- but not Western, Russia can paradoxically side of its borders (in areas of secondary or ter- become Western (in terms of first principles of tiary importance to the United States and economic, political, and societal organization), Europe); its military is weak (apart from the

Reading Russia Right 9

nuclear arsenal, which has limited usability); and India will doubtless challenge U.S. pri- and its population is declining rapidly. There is macy and lead to a new distribution of power. no question that Russia is less important, for As America’s interest in Russia slackens, good or bad, to the outside world than it has China’s interest will increase. Even now, been for nearly 300 years. Yet, despite the fact Beijing is becoming nearly as important to that the Western ability to directly affect Moscow as Washington. This shift merits Russia’s evolution is very limited, its stakes serious attention. concerning Russia are not negligible. Top among the West’s immediate inter- Policy Recommendations: ests is energy security. Russia’s oil and natural The Way Forward gas supplies are vital for Europe and are In addressing their interests, U.S. and EU becoming important for Asia. If Russia man- governments need to be realistic. They should ages to market liquefied natural gas, it has the refuse to be carried away by their own rheto- potential to become a substantial source of ric. Russia is not turning out like some of the energy for the United States as well. Russia’s former Soviet satellite nations, and there is no semiprivate energy companies are emerging revolutionary shortcut to making it a full- as long-term partners of the West. Rather fledged democracy. Thus, Western govern- than treating them as latter-day versions of ments and Japan should take a long view. Fix- Soviet tank columns, the West would achieve ation on 2008, the year of Russia’s next more through integrating them into the presidential election, only makes sense if there international economic system. is a chance of a radical pro-Western power New security threats—ranging from Islamist terrorism to proliferation of weapons Russia sees its relationship with the of mass destruction to regional security con- cerns to health hazards in Eurasia—are more U.S. in terms of what it can contribute reasons for cooperation. Although they often see one another as competitors and disagree to Russia’s modernization. about strategies, Russia, the United States, and the EU share an interest in stability and shift in the Kremlin. This is highly unlikely, security building in parts of the Greater however, and Putin’s successor probably will Middle East, including Iran and Afghanistan, not please the Western chanceries any more and in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. than Putin did. In the early twenty-first century, NATO is Governments also have a duty to explain more concerned about Central Asia than to their electorates that Russia’s inclusion in Central Europe, which is precisely the focus the G-8 was primarily about Russian leaders’ of Russian security planning as well. socialization and global governance, not a Moreover, Russia is a player in the Korean reflection of its democracy or economic nuclear standoff and shares a common neigh- maturity. With Russia as a member of the borhood with the EU, where its cooperation forum, the G-8 has ceased to be an old is indispensable for resolving conflicts in Western club. In defense of a principle, of places such as Moldova and the South course, Russia can be expelled, but the conse- Caucasus and making Europe’s southeastern quences of that decision should not be approaches safer. ignored. As an alternative to exclusion, a Geopolitics is usually considered out of gradual expansion of the group would make fashion, and in many ways it is. Although the much more sense. With China, India, Brazil, current international system still revolves and South Africa as members, a G-12 could around the United States, this is likely to turn into a useful forum for global manage- change in the long term. The rise of China ment, an ideal venue for thrashing out matters

10 Policy Brief

before legalizing agreed decisions through the Western business investments in Russia UN process. To lead the world by consent of are a close second. They are not so much an its senior players would certainly make higher “aid to the regime” as they are a means to help demands on the United States as a function- transform the country, little by little, through ing world leader. introduction of new technologies and a new In dealing with Russia realistically, the managerial and business culture. The cultural United States and the EU need to distinguish aspect, it needs to be stressed, is immensely between what they can influence and what more important than the financial one. they cannot, which would help eliminate That said, the channel between Western both unnecessary despair and deceptive illu- leaders and the Russian president, whatever his name, should be exploited for all its worth, but without undue expectations. U.S. and EU governments’ refusal to Summit meetings are not the place for lec- tures and litanies. Instead, they are a unique treat Chechnya as part of the war on vehicle for serious give-and-take and building understanding at the top. Any Kremlin ruler terror breeds constant resentment. is a lonely person in his country, with his only peers being fellow chief executives of the sions. The West needs to realize that its most world’s major powers, starting with the powerful instruments with respect to Russia United States. This channel, however, works are not its king-making abilities at the very best when there is confidence on both sides. top, but human contacts of all kinds at all lev- In dealing with the various deficiencies it els, especially among the younger generation. sees in Russia, the West needs to be more Creating more stipends for Russian students, practical. The human rights situation in both at home and abroad, is the best invest- Russia, for example, would be far better ment in Russia’s future. helped by negotiating specific programs to

Looking Ahead

The U.S. and EU governments should look to the future where Russia is concerned:

■ Be patient. Take a long view, beyond the 2007–2008 election cycle, because building capitalism takes time. ■ Be concrete. Address Russia’s various deficiencies by offering specific pro- grams rather than harangues. ■ Be market-savvy. Expand contacts with Russia’s new generation. ■ Be friendly. Mean what you say and say what you mean; avoid large gaps between what you say in private and what you say before cameras at summits. ■ Be inclusive. Expand the G-8 further by admitting India and China rather than expelling Russia.

Reading Russia Right 11

improve conditions in Russian prisons and to with today’s policy makers in Washington raise the professionalism of judges and police- should not obscure the country’s potential men than by a pro forma raising, for the future role. umpteenth time, of some judicial cause Finally, there are several things not to be celebre. Similarly, for Chechnya, general pleas attempted. Disengaging from Russia, treating for “stopping atrocities” need to be replaced it as a pariah (or rogue) state “while the by a bona fide willingness to engage and offer authoritarian regime lasts,” expelling it from serious suggestions to improve the situation. the G-8, or political and economic contain- This is not charity: Should the situation in ment in Eurasia will not help democrats into the North Caucasus deteriorate, it will affect power in Moscow and will only leave the countries other than Russia. Criticism of all Kremlin with a much narrower range of kinds has a far better chance of being taken domestic and international choices. seriously if the Russian authorities realize that Conversely, too close engagement and too it is given in good faith, with a reasonable intimate involvement in Russia’s domestic understanding of their predicament and processes can carry their own sets of dangers accompanied by workable ideas. as well. Trying to pick and groom future Above all, Europe and the United States Kremlin leaders is a game of delusion. need to be patient. Of course, what happens during the 2007–2008 election cycle is a matter Should the Kremlin favor a third of serious interest and should not be ignored. Western leaders need to impress on Russian term under whatever pretext, the decision makers the importance of abiding by the letter as well as the spirit of the Russian con- domestic legitimacy of the entire stitution when Putin’s time is up in 2008. This will be crucial for continued domestic and political system will erode. worldwide acceptance of the legitimacy of the Russian leadership. Should the Kremlin decide Russian politics, still intensely personal and in favor of a third term for the incumbent, under largely nontransparent, should be left to the whatever pretext, the domestic legitimacy of the Russians themselves. The West needs to stop entire political system will start to erode, paving thinking about what is good for Russia and the way to a major crisis down the road, with focus on what is good for itself. At some unknowable consequences. point down the road, there may be a surpris- However, the Western governments also ingly large overlap between the two. ■ need to set their sights on 2020, or better 2030, the time frame of the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s reports. A new Russian The Carnegie Endowment normally does not take capitalism will come of age as the interna- institutional positions on public policy issues; the tional system is adjusting to China’s rise. By views presented here do not necessarily reflect the that time, Russia is likely to be back in play as views of the Endowment, its officers, staff, or trustees. a significant international actor, weighing in considerably on the shape and sense of the © 2005 Carnegie Endowment for International world system as a whole. Russia’s low profile Peace. All rights reserved. org .

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