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What Russia Sees Chaillot Paper January 2005 n°74 What Russia sees Dmitry Danilov, Sergei Karaganov, Dov Lynch, Alexey Pushkov, Dmitri Trenin and Andrei Zagorski Edited by Dov Lynch cp-74-cover-test.qxp 16/02/2005 11:43 Page 2 In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) beca- me an autonomous Paris-based agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further development of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of the European security and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels. Chaillot Papers are monographs on topical questions written either by a member of the ISS research team or by outside authors chosen and commissioned by the Institute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a semi- nar or study group of experts convened by the Institute and publication indicates that the paper is considered by the ISS as a useful and authoritative contribution to the debate on CFSP/ESDP. Responsibility for the views expressed in them lies exclusively with authors. Chaillot Papers are also accessible via the Institute’s Website: www.iss-eu.org cp-74.qxp 16/02/2005 10:32 Page 1 Chaillot Paper January 2005 n°74 What Russia sees Dmitry Danilov, Sergei Karaganov, Dov Lynch, Alexey Pushkov, Dmitri Trenin and Andrei Zagorski Edited by Dov Lynch Institute for Security Studies European Union Paris cp-74.qxp 16/02/2005 10:32 Page 2 Institute for Security Studies European Union Paris Director: Nicole Gnesotto © EU Institute for Security Studies 2005. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EU Institute for Security Studies. ISSN 1017-7566 ISBN 92-9198-066-8 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris). cp-74.qxp 16/02/2005 10:32 Page 3 Contents n°74 January 2005 Préface Nicole Gnesotto 5 1 Misperceptions and divergences 7 Dov Lynch • Divergences in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ 9 • Structure of this paper 19 2 Russia and the international order 23 Sergei Karaganov • The world around Russia 23 • Trends in Russia 30 • The tasks ahead 36 3 Putin at the helm 45 Alexey Pushkov • Year 2000: getting Russia back on its feet 46 • By 2004: the emergence of a new system of rule 49 • New challenges 54 • Year 2008: what kind of Russia? 58 4 Russia and the shared neighbourhood 61 Andrei Zagorski • Different neighbours 62 • Russian policies 68 • Areas of potential conflict and cooperation 73 • Conclusion 76 5 Russia and European security 79 Dmitry Danilov • Russia and NATO 80 • Russia and the European Union 86 • Russia and the OSCE 91 • Conclusion 96 cp-74.qxp 16/02/2005 10:32 Page 4 6 Russia and anti-terrorism 99 Dmitri Trenin • Aspects of terrorism 99 • Chechnya at the root of terrorism in Russia 100 • The 1999 watershed 101 • Putin’s arc of instability 102 • Russia, terrorism and the West 103 • Chechen terrorism in central Russia 106 • Dealing with terrorism 107 • The Central Asian dimension and outreach to the Islamic world 109 • Beslan and its aftermath 111 • Conclusion 112 7 Struggling with an indispensable partner 115 Dov Lynch • Stakes, constraints and trends 116 • The Common Strategy framework 120 • Towards policy assessment 123 • The new framework 127 • Prospects 133 Annexes 137 • About the authors 137 • Abbreviations 139 4 cp-74.qxp 16/02/2005 10:32 Page 5 Préface Nicole Gnesotto e toutes les inconnues qui s’accumulent dans le système interna- tional, alors qu’aucun de ses éléments, fût-ce la puissance améri- D caine, ne fait plus figure de socle immuable, l’évolution politique de la Russie est devenue pour les Européens une source d’interrogation majeure. Depuis plus d’une année, et indépendamment des événements en Ukraine, les relations entre la Russie, les Etats-Unis et l’Union européenne ont en effet connu une nette détérioration. Ce Cahier de Chaillot cent pour cent russe pourra sembler inhabituel à certains. Et il l’est à bien des égards. Parce que les perceptions façonnent le monde tout autant que la réalité des faits, nous avons en effet choisi de pro- poser aux lecteurs une photographie la plus complète possible de ce que sont aujourd’hui les perceptions dominantes au sein de la communauté stratégique russe. Comment voient-ils le monde ? Que pensent-ils de l’Union ? Que veulent-ils des Etats-Unis ? De quoi ont-ils peur ? Telles sont les questions à l’origine de ce Cahier de Chaillot, parce qu’elles sont aussi au cœur des interrogations et des incertitudes européennes sur l’évolution de la Russie. Sous la direction de Dov Lynch, responsable des études russes et eurasi- ennes à l’Institut, cinq des experts russes les plus reconnus sur la scène inter- nationale ont accepté de nous livrer leurs perceptions et leurs analyses des principaux dilemmes que rencontre aujourd’hui la Russie. Cette immer- sion dans un mode de pensée proprement russe est fascinante. Au-delà des leçons qu’en tire Dov Lynch dans son remarquable chapitre de conclusion, trois réflexions méritent également considération. Si les Européens sont désormais perplexes, voire inquiets, devant les évo- lutions russes, le sentiment de perplexité et d’inquiétude n’en est pas moins dominant en Russie. Alors que Poutine avait fait du terrorisme la priorité de sa politique étrangère et le socle de sa coopération stratégique avec Georges Bush, les événements dans le voisinage immédiat de la Russie (Georgie, Mol- davie, Ukraine) l’obligent désormais à redescendre dans la réalité complexe de l’Europe, celle d’une Union en cours d’intégration, celle d’une ex-CEI en voie de désintégration. Or ces deux axes extrêmes de la politique russe, le ter- rorisme global et l’étranger proche, suscitent chacun des tensions et des per- ceptions contradictoires : déception et frustration sont les maîtres mots qui reviennent, sous la plume de nos auteurs, à l’égard d’une Amérique qui n’aurait guère récompensé Moscou de son soutien dans la lutte contre le ter- rorisme radical islamiste ; irritation et divergences ne cessent de croître également au regard de l’Union européenne, dont la politique de voisinage 5 cp-74.qxp 16/02/2005 10:32 Page 6 Préface est perçue comme directement conflictuelle avec les intérêts russes dans l’ex- CEI. Ce fantasme de l’encerclement ou de la trahison n’est certes pas une première dans l’histoire de la pensée russe. Mais il n’est pas dans l’intérêt de l’Union qu’il devienne le seul moteur de la politique européenne de la Russie. Le deuxième enseignement concerne les relations entre politique étrangère et politique intérieure. Depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir de Vladimir Poutine, une sorte de trade-off semblait fonctionner entre trois éléments : l’affichage d’une politique étrangère coopérative avec l’Occident, et notam- ment les Etats-Unis ; le retour à une politique plus autoritaire à l’intérieur de la Russie elle-même ; et le maintien d’un processus de modernisation économique de la Russie. Nombre d’Occidentaux, mais davantage aux Etats-Unis que dans l’Union européenne, avaient tacitement accepté d’en- tériner ce découplage entre la politique étrangère de la Russie et son évolu- tion intérieure, au nom d’un intérêt commun en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme international. La Tchétchénie, tout comme la démocratisation politique de la Russie, en faisait plus ou moins les frais. Or cette perception occidentale commence à se révéler pour ce qu’elle est, à l’égard de la Russie comme d’ailleurs de toute autre puissance : une illusion, de celles qui mar- quent précisément la faille de la realpolitik comme mode de gouvernement du monde. Troisièmement enfin, il est frappant de voir à quel point les orientations contradictoires de la politique russe reflètent des interrogations existen- tielles sur l’identité même de la Russie, ses limites géographiques, son projet politique fédérateur, son rôle dans la communauté du monde. Certains n’y verront qu’une étape normale de tout processus de décolonisation et de délitement impérial ; à charge donc pour les Russes de résoudre seuls ce défi identitaire. D’autres y verront plutôt des interrogations qui sonnent de façon très familière à l’oreille des Européens, confrontés, pour de tout autres raisons, à des questionnements existentiels du même type. Ceux-là souhai- teraient que l’Union s’investisse aussi, de la façon la plus positive possible, dans la réussite démocratique de cette nouvelle révolution russe. Paris, janvier 2005 6 cp-74.qxp 16/02/2005 10:32 Page 7 Misperceptions and divergences What Russia sees Dov Lynch 1 The Cold War is finally ending in Europe and the shape of a new order is visible. Certainly, its institutional structure is different from that of the bipolar era or even the transition years of the 1990s. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is assum- ing a more global profile and less direct responsibility in Europe itself. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has entered a deep crisis, in which major participating states are challenging its enduring utility. Meanwhile, a new organ- isation is emerging as the continent’s security provider – the Euro- pean Union (EU).
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