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Russian Advocacy Coalitions

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Russian Advocacy Coalitions Russian Advocacy Coalitions A study in Power Resources This study examines the advocacy coalitions in Russia. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it looks at the power resource distribution amongst the coalitions, and how this distribution affects Russian foreign policy. The power resources examined are: Formal Legal Authority; Public Opinion; Information; Mobilizable Troops; and Financial Resources. In addition to this, the study used quantitative and qualitative methods to identify these resources. There are a couple of conclusions we may draw from this study. The method is useful in identifying power resources. It is not enough to use only the distribution of resources amongst coalitions in order to explain policy changes. It is found that the distribution of resources, coupled with coalition interaction, is enough to explain changes in Russian foreign policy. KEYWORDS: Advocacy Coalition Framework, Russia, Power Resources, Natural Gas WORDS: 24,368 Author: Robert Granlund Supervisor: Fredrik Bynander Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 PURPOSE .................................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................................................ 2 1.3 OUTLINE................................................................................................................................... 3 1.4 DELIMINATIONS AND MATERIAL ............................................................................................. 4 1.5 DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................ 7 1.6 PREVIOUS RESEARCH............................................................................................................... 8 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................................... 10 2.1 MODEL OF THE INDIVIDUAL .................................................................................................. 10 2.2 COALITION BUILDING ............................................................................................................ 15 2.3 POWER RESOURCES .............................................................................................................. 16 2.4 POLICY CHANGE ..................................................................................................................... 18 3. RUSSIAN ADVOCACY COALITIONS ................................................................................................. 20 3.1 COALITION METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................. 20 3.2 COALITION OBSERVATIONS ................................................................................................... 22 3.3 COALITION ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................. 25 4. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................. 27 4.1 RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................ 29 4.1.1 FORMAL LEGAL AUTHORITY .............................................................................................. 29 4.1.2 PUBLIC OPINION ................................................................................................................ 33 4.1.3 INFORMATION ................................................................................................................... 34 4.1.4 MOBILIZABLE TROOPS ....................................................................................................... 36 4.1.5 FINANCIAL RESOURCES ..................................................................................................... 39 4.2 FOREIGN POLICY .................................................................................................................... 41 4.3 ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................... 44 5. OBSERVATIONS .............................................................................................................................. 44 5.1 RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................ 45 5.1.1 FORMAL LEGAL AUTHORITY .............................................................................................. 45 5.1.2 PUBLIC OPINION ................................................................................................................ 47 5.1.3 INFORMATION ................................................................................................................... 48 5.1.4 MOBILIZABLE TROOPS ....................................................................................................... 49 5.1.5 FINANCIAL RESOURCES ..................................................................................................... 53 5.2 FOREIGN POLICY .................................................................................................................... 55 6. ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................................... 57 6.1 RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................ 57 6.1.1 FORMAL LEGAL AUTHORITY .............................................................................................. 57 6.1.2 PUBLIC OPINION ................................................................................................................ 61 6.1.3 INFORMATION ................................................................................................................... 62 6.1.4 MOBILIZABLE TROOPS ....................................................................................................... 64 6.1.5 FINANCIAL RESOURCES ..................................................................................................... 66 6.2 FOREIGN POLICY .................................................................................................................... 68 6.3 ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................... 74 7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 79 1. INTRODUCTION In the 1990’s Russia was facing major political and economic changes. The old Soviet Union had ceased to exist and Russia had embarked on a reform process that would see much of the old system dismantled. Throughout this period there had been a continuous political conflict between several factions, Westernizing liberals and social democrats on the one hand, and nationalists and communists on the other. The political infighting, coupled with rampant corruption, poor state finances, and brewing conflicts in the Caucasus, made for a chaotic decade. It was towards the end of this decade that the powers that be deemed Vladimir Putin capable of reigning in the turmoil. Putin had served as a KGB officer in the 1980’s and had moved on to work for the reformist Mayor of St. Petersburg during the collapse of the Soviet Union. His background in both the conservative security services as well as in the liberal Mayor’s office was such that he could appeal to and mediate between both sides of the political divide in Kremlin. The factions, or coalitions, are a perennial feature in Russian politics. They existed during the Soviet era, through the chaotic 90’s, all the way up to present day. These coalitions span the full spectrum of political thought, and can be found at all levels of government. The Advocacy Coalition Framework is a framework that assumes that policy is created by advocacy coalitions, and this means that it should be useful in explaining policy changes in Russia. The most commonly applied method in Advocacy Coalition Frameworks is interviews. This study will instead use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in establishing the basic parameters of the framework. 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this study is two-fold. The first purpose is to develop a quantitative method for examining and measuring the power resources that coalitions, groups, and individuals use in order to get their favored policy through These resources will be explained in detail later, but they include formal legal authority, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, and financial resources. Advocacy Coalition Framework studies tend to rely on interviews when establishing both coalitions and the resources they have. Though this 1 method is very useful for identification of coalitions, the resources identified are likely to be perceived rather than actual resources. Given that the resources occupy a vital position in the framework, creating an objective method for identifying these
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