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The Killing of William Browder THE KILLING OF WILLIAM BROWDER THE KILLING OF WILLIAM BROWDER Bill Browder, the fa lse crusader for justice and human rights and the self - styled No. 1 enemy of Vladimir Putin has perpetrated a brazen and dangerous deception upon the Weste rn world. This book traces the anatomy of this deception, unmasking the powerful forces that are pushing the West ern world toward yet another great war with Russia. ALEX KRAINER EQUILIBRIUM MONACO First published in Monaco in 20 17 Copyright © 201 7 by Alex Krainer ISBN 978 - 2 - 9556923 - 2 - 5 Material contained in this book may be reproduced with permission from its author and/or publisher, except for attributed brief quotations Cover page design, content editing a nd copy editing by Alex Krainer. Set in Times New Roman, book title in Imprint MT shadow To the people of Russia and the United States wh o together, hold the keys to the future of humanity. Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body and mind will vanish like the evil spirits at the dawn of day. Thomas Jefferson Table of Contents 1. Bill Browder and I ................................ ................................ ............... 1 Browder’s 2005 presentation in Monaco ................................ .............. 2 Harvard club presentation in 2010 ................................ ........................ 3 Ru ssophobia and Putin - bashing in the West ................................ ......... 4 Red notice ................................ ................................ ............................ 6 Reading and rereading Browder’s story ................................ ......... 7 It’s all true! ................................ ................................ .................... 7 Bill Browder, the complex hero ................................ ...................... 8 Russia is a terrible place and Russians terrible peo ple .................... 9 Vladimir Putin is a greedy, brazen tyrant ................................ ...... 12 2. Red Notice – play by play ................................ ................................ .. 13 The opening chapters ................................ ................................ ......... 14 The plot thickens ................................ ................................ ................ 19 Chapter 18: “Fifty percent” ................................ ......................... 19 Chapter 20: “Vogue Café” ................................ ........................... 23 Chapter 21: “The G8” ................................ ................................ 24 Chapter 22: “The Raids” ................................ ............................. 26 Chapter 23: “Department K” ................................ ....................... 27 Chapter 24: “But Russian Stories Never Have Happy Endings” ... 28 C hapter 25: “High - pitched Jamming Equipment” ........................ 30 Chapter 26: “The Riddle” ................................ ............................ 31 Chapter 27: “DHL” ................................ ................................ ..... 32 Chapter 28: “Khabarovsk” ................................ .......................... 37 Chapter 29: “Ninth Commandment” ................................ ............ 39 Chapter 30: “16 November 2009” ................................ ................ 42 Chapter 31: “The Katyn Principle” ................................ .............. 43 Chapter 32: “Kyle Parker’s War” ................................ ................ 45 Chapter 33: “Russell 241” ................................ ........................... 46 Chapter 34: “Russian untouchables” ................................ ........... 47 Chapters 35 , 36: “The Swiss Accounts” and “The Tax Princess” . 48 i Chapter 37: “Sausage - making” ................................ ................... 50 Chapter 38: “The Malkin Delegation” ................................ ......... 51 Chapter 39: “Justice for Sergey” ................................ ................. 52 Chapter 40: “Humiliator, humiliatee” ................................ .......... 53 Chapter 41: “Red Notice” ................................ ............................ 54 Chapter 42: “Feelings” ................................ ............................... 54 3. Russia in the 1990s: The missing context ................................ ........... 56 Russia decides to go from communism to capitalism .......................... 57 The Harvard connection ................................ ............................... 59 1992: the shock therapy gets underway ................................ ........ 60 Voucher privatization ................................ ................................ ... 62 Loans for shares scheme ................................ ............................... 65 Lawmakers’ revolt and the constitutiona l crisis of 1993 ..................... 67 Yeltsin’s violent crackdown ................................ .......................... 69 The Americans came for the best of reasons ................................ ....... 71 IMF’s strangulation of Russian economy ................................ ...... 72 The Enterprise ................................ ................................ ................... 76 Reagan administration cold warriors form ulate the policy… ........ 77 Preparing the ground in the Soviet Union ................................ ..... 80 Fallout: the economic genocide ................................ .......................... 84 Did it have to be that way? ................................ ................................ 89 4. Enter Vladimir Putin ................................ ................................ .......... 93 Regime change ................................ ................................ .................. 93 Vladimir Putin’s disastrous contribution to Russia’s history ............... 95 Economic reforms ................................ ................................ ........ 96 Social and demographic improvements ................................ ......... 98 Impressions of modern Russia ................................ .................... 103 So, who is Vladimir Putin ................................ ................................ 109 Working for the people… ................................ ............................ 109 A hard working leader ................................ ................................ 110 Fight against terrorism ................................ ............................... 111 Forgiving Cuba’s debts ................................ .............................. 112 ii Edward Snowden asylum ................................ ............................ 113 The corruption thing ................................ ................................ ... 114 Kursk submarine tragedy ................................ ............................ 117 5. Bill Browder, the great pretender ................................ ..................... 119 The su perentrepreneur ................................ ................................ ...... 120 The Murmansk asylum ................................ ................................ 120 Thirty meetings in four days ................................ ....................... 121 Browder’s excellent adventure in Davos ................................ ..... 121 Protection in high places ................................ ................................ .. 123 Bill’s tall tale unravels ................................ ................................ ..... 124 U.K. High Court of Justice: Pavel Karpov v. William Browder ... 128 U.S. District Court – So . Distr . of New York: USA v. Prevezon ... 129 The tax fraud thing ................................ ................................ ..... 130 Misrepresenting Sergei Magnitsky ................................ .............. 132 Framing the Russians fo r the $230 million tax fraud ................... 134 Edmond Safra’s lieutenant ................................ ............................... 138 Republic National Bank’s money planes ................................ ..... 138 For he’s a jolly good felon… and so say all of us! ....................... 141 Browder and the West’s criminal plunder of Russia .................... 143 The $230 million tax fraud: whodunit? ................................ ............. 145 Working a lot with Renaissance Capital ................................ ..... 146 Browder’s defector lawyers ................................ ........................ 148 Laundering AVISMA’s profits ................................ ..................... 149 Dirty dishonesty of Bill Browder ................................ ...................... 150 Monopolizing “truth” ................................ ................................ 151 Desecrating Sergei Magnitsky ................................ .................... 153 Escaping American gestapo ................................ ........................ 155 6. War and peace ................................ ................................ ................. 157 The dangers of demonization ................................ ........................... 160 Rise of the military industrial complex ................................ ............. 162 The endless cast of enemies and threats ................................ ............ 164 Our American friends and partners ................................ ................... 168 iii The first U.S. – Russian alliance ................................ ...................... 170 Russian intervention in U.S. Civil War (1861 - 1865) ..................
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