The Russian Legitimation Formula - 1991-2000
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THE RUSSIAN LEGITIMATION FORMULA - 1991-2000 Carolina Vendil The Government Department LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE Thesis submitted for PhD degree Supervisor: Professor Dominic Lieven Advisor: Professor Rodney Barker - 1 - UMI Number: U174000 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U174000 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Ti-f£$£ IP ^6^771 Abstract The Russian legitimation formula contains the arguments the Russian leadership advanced to promote its state-building project between 1991 and 2000. The period of investigation coincides with Yeltsin’s presidency. The focus is on how the legitimation rhetoric was adjusted both to changing circumstances over time and to three main audiences: the Russian domestic population, the Russian domestic elites and the international community. In order to analyse the contents of the legitimation formula a framework was developed which divided the different arguments used by the Russian leadership into six main categories (democratic, national, charismatic, eudaemonic, external and negative arguments). The material selected for analysis had to relate to basic features of statehood. Firstly, how did the Russian leadership seek to legitimate the new borders of the Russian Federation? Secondly, how did it legitimate the new constitution of 1993 and the way the constitution was introduced? Finally, the arguments used to introduce, abolish and remodel state rituals and symbols were examined. The main conclusion is that the Russian leadership did not change its core legitimation rhetoric over time or across audiences. Democratic arguments, centring on elections and a popular mandate as prerequisites for legitimate authority, dominated the legitimation formula both over time and for all the main audiences. Instead, the Russian leadership used subtle nuances and historic references to adapt its legitimation formula to changing circumstances over time and to the expectations of different audiences. Overall, the absence of national arguments was striking, as was the strong tendency to rely on negative arguments. The threat of Russian disintegration and civil war was frequently invoked, which suggests that the Russian leadership perceived this as a resounding argument among all the audiences it directed its legitimation formula at. -2- Acknowledgements First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Professor Dominic Lieven. Many are the insights into Russian politics that I owe to him. His eye for which inferences could be drawn (and which could not) as well as for details greatly improved my drafts. He exacted clarifications where there were gaps in my train of thought and made me realise the importance of looking at what was not said by the Russian leadership (as well as at what was said). Criticism was ever provided in a congenial and encouraging manner. On a more personal note, he was able to provide me with morale when such was badly needed. Professor Rodney Barker, my advisor, generously spared his time and effort to read through drafts (even when down with flu). I am immensely grateful to him for taking an interest in my thesis far beyond his undertaking as advisor. He generously shared his thoughts on legitimacy and legitimation - knowledge that was conveyed with humour and enthusiasm. Thanks are also due to those who read individual chapters and helped me develop my thinking and analysis of the Russian legitimation formula and commented on details. Dr. Chris Binns spared the time to read and comment on my first draft chapter. I profited especially from his comments on and comparisons with Soviet rituals. Dr. James Hughes commented both on my analytical framework and on a first draft dealing with the borders of the Russian Federation. His comments were insightful and made me think hard again about my definitions. I am also very grateful for the rigorous scrutiny of my first chapters made by Dr. Bo Petersson, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at University of Lund, Sweden. The comments he provided greatly improved my analysis of Russian legitimation and his interest and encouragement of the project helped me along. Dr. Elena Hellberg-Him, reader at the Department of Slavonic and Baltic Languages and Literature at Helsinki University, Finland, kindly read my chapter on symbols and rituals. Staffan Skott, journalist and author of several books on Russian and Soviet history, read and commented on my section on the burial of Lenin and Nicholas II. I would also like to thank my fellow PhD students for their comments and advice provided in seminars and during coffee breaks. Especially, the PhD seminar on Russia and Eastern Europe organised by Dr. Gwen Sasse was a source of inspiration - it gathered people with an interest in the area, but with research interests spanning everything from IR to sociology. I also had the opportunity to present a paper based on parts of chapters two and three at the ICCEES congress in Tampere in 2000. This was a useful experience and I benefited greatly from the comments I got from the panel participants. I was also asked to present my research at a seminar at Uppsala University, where the seminar participants were kind enough to take an interest in my work. Their probing questions sharpened my thinking about legitimation in general and the legitimation formula for the borders of the Russian Federation in particular. I am also grateful to people who have helped me find material and checked my use of language - both English and Russian. Marilyn Seney’s professional editing of my final draft improved my English greatly. Any mistakes that are still there are entirely my own and due to additions after Marilyn had checked my draft. Mats Foyer at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow helped me with advice on where to find material and who to talk with when I was in Moscow. Professor Daniel Tarschys, former president of the Council of Europe, advised me when it came to finding material on the Russian quest for membership of the Council of Europe. Marina Normark, a native Russian speaker, checked my translation and interpretation of certain Russian words and phrases. Special thanks also go to Dr. Karin Sarsenov, who helped me find an elusive Pushkin quote. My friend, Lee Wermelin, helped me record Russian television while renting my flat in Stockholm (I am afraid I asked her to get up on a Sunday morning to record military parades on Victory Day - thank you, Lee). My friend and flatmate, Provence Maydew, helped me in a multitude of ways and edited an early draft of my first chapter. Finally, my entire family deserve thanks for their patience and understanding during these years. Thank you, Krister, for your ever-present support - even when the light went on for the fourth time at three in the morning. A note on spelling, abbreviations and the different designations of Russian institutions In an effort to make this text accessible not only to readers who are already quite familiar with Russian politics, I have tried to keep the use of acronyms to a minimum. Nevertheless, it proved difficult to avoid them completely. Certain acronyms of institutions were included when I considered the full-length title of the institution in question too cumbersome. Thus, I have used the acronym ‘RSFSR’ for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and ‘KPRF’ for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, acronyms appear in some of the quotes I have included in the text and it was therefore practical to use them in the body text as well. That is also the reason why I have used the acronym derived from the Russian expression in question (i.e., KPRF instead of CPRF). Two exceptions are the acronyms used for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the CPSU) and that for the Soviet Union itself (the USSR) since these acronyms are widely used. Words like ‘president’ and ‘constitution’ have all been spelled with small initials letters except in quotes where the original text used initial capitals (‘President’ and ‘Constitution’). A short note is called for on an institution, which developed into somewhat of a Nemesis for Boris Yeltsin - the Russian parliament. In 1991, the Russian parliament consisted of two assemblies: the Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR, which was the highest decision-making body and met only a few times a year, and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, which was the working parliament and consisted of deputies elected from the Congress of People’s Deputies. These institutions are sometimes referred to as ‘the Congress’ or ‘the Supreme Soviet’. (There were corresponding bodies that existed on the Soviet level as well, but it is usually the RSFSR assemblies that feature in the text. The Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR is mentioned once in chapter five.) When the new constitution was adopted in 1993, both the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet ceased to exist. Instead, the parliament was called the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and consisted of two chambers: the upper house - the Federation Council of the Russian Federation (which consisted of two representatives from each of the 89 constituent parts of the Russian Federation), and the lower house - the State Duma of the Russian Federation (which consisted of elected deputies).