Regional Elections and Political Stability in Russia : E Pluribus Unum

Home , Eduard Rossel, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Udmurtia, Viktor Ishayev, Yuri Shabanov

TITLE : REGIONAL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN RUSSIA : E PLURIBUS UNUM

AUTHOR : JEFFREY W . HAHN, Villanova University

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FO R EURASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

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DATE : September 25, 1997

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The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Titl e VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s) . CONTENTS

Executive Summary i

I . The Problem 1

II Russian Regional Politics 1

III. The Regional Elections of 1996 : Who won? 3

IV. Alternative Futures : Federalism or Separatism? 5

V. Net Assessment : Cautious Optimism 8

VI. Implications for the United States 9

Appendix: Russian Regional Executives 1 0

Endnotes 15 EXECUTIVESUMMAR Y

This paper addresses the question of the possible de-stabilization or eve n disintegration of the Russian Federation in the face of growing regional independence . In particular, it analyzes the election of chief executives in most of Russia's regions between 1 September 1996 and 20 June 1997 . Now that virtually all chief executives in Russia's region s owe their jobs to their constituents rather than to President Yeltsin as most did, to wha t extent will they assert regional and local interests at the expense of national ones? I n answering this question the paper begins by looking at the evolution of regional politics sinc e 1989 . Then it describes the political composition of regional chief executives, both those who won the recent elections and all current office holders . Pressures for regional independence are then discussed along with options available to the center to control it . The paper ends with the author's assessment of the implications of these developments for American polic y toward Russia . With respect to the political composition of the regional executives, the results of the elections for the Yeltsin administration are ambiguous : on the one hand, compared to the situation before September 1996, they have lost much of their control over regiona l executives ; on the other, they can still count on support from more than a third of them, a little more than their opposition . The rest of the seats are up for grabs . Two other point s seem appropriate regarding winners and losers . First, ideology doesn't appear to have bee n as important in these races as it was in the race for President a few months earlier; voter s chose pragmatically those who were seen as best able to deliver for their region . It is likely that the new executives will make deals for their regions regardless of ideology . The second point is that with few exceptions the elections were held on time, were held honestly, and th e results were accepted by the losers indicating progress in terms of basic democrati c procedures. Despite fears on the part of the Yeltsin administration that they will no longer be abl e to control what happens on the regions, there are a variety of mechanisms available to the m by which to do so . These include using municipal executives (mayors) as checks and balances on governors, playing off the divergent interests of different regions in the Federation Council, using the center's ability to cut favorable deals with those regional head s willing to cooperate, and distributing subsidies in such a way as to maximize influence . While disintegration of the Federation into regional components does not appear likely , clearly regional heads will have greater independence than before . While some wil l undoubtedly abuse their new authority, greater regional independence can also become th e basis for the emergence of a stable federal system in Russia .

i REGIONAL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN RUSSIA : E PLURIBUS UNUM? ' by Jeffrey W . Hahn Political Science Department Villanova University

I. The Problem Over the next decade, Russia will most likely continue to lurch forward towar d becoming something like a modern European nation-state with an increasingly stable quasi - market economy and democratic political institutions. There is no certainty about thi s optimistic prediction and there are a number of plausible "dark scenarios ." The achievement of an optimistic outcome will depend on how well Russia deals with the multiple domesti c dangers facing it . This paper deals with one of these : the possible disintegration of the Russian Federation in the face of growing regional independence .The resolution of thi s problem is intimately entwined with solving other problems including economic stabilization , democratic institutionalization, ethnic identity, and even foreign relations . Despite its apparent importance to so many aspects of Russian development, failure to achieve stable federalism is often neglected in considering how Russia might come apart at the seams . Thi s lack of attention is likely to change over the next decade . The election of chief executives i n most of Russia's regions starting in September 1996 may set in motion centrifuga l tendencies that could do just that . II. Russian Regional Politic s In assessing the national implications of these regional trends, it may be useful t o clarify what is at stake . What do we mean by regional politics? According to the Constitutio n adopted in December 1993 Russia is formally a federation comprising eighty-nine sub - national members (in Russian, sub'ekty) . Among these members are forty-nine province s (oblasts), twenty-one republics, ten national districts (autonomous okrugs), six territorie s (krais), two large cities (Moscow and St . Petersburg) and the Jewish Autonomous oblast . The term "regional" is most accurately used to refer to politics and government in the oblasts , krais and two largest cities of the Russian Federation (all of which have the administrativ e

1The author wishes to thank Marc Zlotnik for sharing data on regional executives many of whic h appear at one point or another in this paper . He would also like to commend the Kennan Institute and it s Director, Blair Ruble, for supporting the study of Russia's regions and for helping to publish the weekly , Russian Regional Report, together with the Institute of East West Studies. The RRR is indispensable to those of us interested in this important issue .

1 status of an oblast) . although it is commonly extended to cover the republics as well . The republics, as well as okrugs and the Jewish autonomous oblast, are defined with reference t o their ethnic composition and have special rights as a result . In this paper, the term regiona l politics is used broadly to refer to politics at levels of government below the national level . Until 1990 all the regions were governed by legislative councils known as soviets whose members were nominated by the Party and "elected" without opposition by a reporte d 99% of the electorate . The councils then elected, unanimously, an executive committe e which administered local affairs in accordance with central policies . The introduction o f competitive elections in March 1990 led to fundamental changes in the way regions wer e governed .2 In Moscow and Leningrad anti-establishment, reformist majorities were electe d over candidates endorsed by the regional Communist Party leadership . They also did well i n large cities . Elsewhere, however, and especially in rural areas, members of the old Part y elite did well . The result was that many new regional legislatures were controlled by force s hostile to Yeltsin and the reformists of the "democratic movement ." Nevertheless, in an effort to get the regions to support him in his struggle with Gorbachev, Yeltsin, in Augus t 1990, told the regional leaders to : "take as much sovereignty as you can stomach." After the USSR collapsed in December 1991, this injunction proved problematical . To counteract what he perceived as communist dominated regional legislatures, Yeltsin had called earleir i n 1991 for the institution of directly elected executives who could no longer be removed by th e legislative councils 3 . When it became clear in the wake of the failed coup attempt of Augus t 1990 that many of the regional governors would come from those opposed to his reforms , Yeltsin obtained the right to suspend gubernatorial elections and to appoint them for on e year. This did not apply to the twenty-one republics, however, and elections of republica n presidents began as early as 1990 . More often than not, chief executives elected in th e republics came from the Party nomenklatura that held power before the USSR collapsed , including seven former obkom secretaries ; as of June 1997 perhaps five of these twenty-on e leaders can be considered sympathetic to the kinds of reforms pursued by the Yeltsi n administration (see Table I, page 4 ; and the Appendix, page 10) . Throughout 1992 and 1993 the chief political tendency in Russia, locally as well a s nationally, was the growing polarization between the legislatures where the older elites wer e relatively strong, and the appointed executives who were drawn largely from the ranks of the democratic reform movement . Given the political climate, Yeltsin continued to resist demands that governors be elected ; with few exceptions' those he appointed remained in place ensuring a vertical chain of executive authority loyal to the center . The resulting

2 stalemate between the branches of government was broken only when Yeltsin abolished th e national parliament, called the Supreme Soviet, in October 1993 . Local soviets were abolished soon afterward . The Russian Constitution approved in December 1993 established a strong presidentia l regime in Russia . Local and regional governments formed in the next year reflected thi s tendency toward executive dominance . While deputies had to stand for elections to new, and comparatively powerless, local legislatures in 1994-95, the appointed governors remained in office with enhanced power . In a decree published in October 1994 Yeltsin reaffirmed hi s right to nominate and dismiss governors and declared that no elections of executives woul d take place without his permission . 5 Broadly speaking, the evolution of regional government in Russia between 1990 and 1996 was toward virtually unlimited rule by regional executive s almost all of whom, except in the republics, were not popularly elected but appointed by th e President . By the end of 1995, it was possible to speak of a new "Russian prefect" similar i n stature to the provincial party first secretaries of the Soviet period . ' III . The Regional Electionsof1996: Who Won ? One can speak of governors as "new prefects" only as long as they are appointed b y the President and not elected . Until December 17, 1995, only five of the governors in offic e at that time had been elected out of a possible sixty-eight .7 In the twenty-one Republics , elections of one sort or another had taken place . Concurrently with the State Duma election s held on that date, Yeltsin permitted the election of twelve more governors, largely, but no t exclusively in regions where the incumbents were likely to win .' The remainder were to be chosen in Fall of 1996, well after the Presidential elections of June 1996 . Between September 1, 1996 and June 20, 1997, forty-six more governors and eight more republican executive s have been elected leaving only a handful of regional executives who do not owe their jobs t o their electorate. By June 1997 in all regions but one (Kemerovo) they are elected ; there ar e two vacancies (Nizhny Novgorod and Irkutsk) . Who won? On one level it is possible to identify winners and losers by dichotomizin g the list of candidates between incumbents who were appointed by Yeltsin, and presumabl y loyal to him, and the opposition led by Ziuganov's Communist Party of the Russia n Federation (CPRF) in alliance with its umbrella movement the Popular-Patriotic Union o f Russia (NPSR) . Using this approach, of the forty-six incumbent governors up for election between 1 September 1996 and 20 June 1997, twenty-six of them lost and twenty wo n reelection Both the Yeltsin campaign team and the opposition have claimed victory 9 : the NPSR argued that they had won the majority of the twenty-six seats that incumbents lost ;

Yeltsin's team argued that out of forty-six elected, twenty were progovernment incumbents . eighteen were independent "strong manager" types with whom they could work, and tha t hard core NPSR candidates won in only eight regions . In reality, the picture is much less clear . Given the administration's early prediction s that the NPSR would only gain 5-10 seats, the opposition did better than expected . But , although sixteen of the twenty-six new governors were supported by the NPSR, another nin e must be regarded as independents . One (in Murmansk) is close to Lebed and one (in Pskov ) was supported by Zhirinovsky's LDPR . 10 Furthermore, some of those elected with NPS R support have indicated a willingness to work with the administration . This hardly amounts t o a "red shift," especially because ten of the twelve elected in late 1995 were also incumbent s (see Table I) .

Table I . The Political Composition of Russia's Regional Executives, 20 June 1997 * Provinces (68 ) Republics (21 ) Total (89) Overall Since Overall Since Overall Since 9/1/96 9/1/96 9/1/96 NPSR/KPRF/CPSU 22 16 7 3 29 1 9 Pro-Government/Yeltsin 31 21 5 3 36 24 Independents 11 9 7 2 18 1 1 Lebed 1 1 1 1 LDPR (Zhirinovsky) 1 1 1 1 Unknown 2 2 Vacancy 2 2 2 2

68 50 21 8 89 5 8

Sources : A. Glubotskii, A . Mukhin, N . Tiukov, Organy vlasti sub'ektov Rossiikoi Federatsii, (Moscow, Panorama, 1995); OMRI, and, Institute for East-West Studies, Russian Regional Report , September 1996-June 1997 ; Marc Zlotkin, "Russia's Elected Governors : A Force to be Reckoned With" Demokratizatsia (forthcoming); Russian press articles .

* The goal of this table is to provide a rough estimate of the political composition of Russia's regiona l executives . As specialists on Russian regional politics well know, assigning partisan support t o executive office holders in this manner can be a subjective undertaking . These figures are the author' s best guesses based on the sources available to him . They are intended as a point of departure and are subject to revision .

4 If we consider the composition of the regional executives as a whole and not only the outcome of recent elections, the ambiguity of the results for the administration becomes eve n clearer: on the one hand, compared to the situation before September 1996, they have los t much of their control over regional executives : on the other . they can still count on support from more than a third of them, a little more than their opposition . The rest are up for grab s (see the "totals" column, Table 1) . Two other points seem appropriate regarding winners an d losers . First, ideology doesn't appear to have been as important in these races as it was i n the race for President a few months earlier: voters chose pragmatically those who were seen as best able to deliver for their region . Given the existing weakness of party ties to begi n with it is likely that the new executives will make deals for their regions regardless o f ideology . This is especially true for the executives in the so-called "donor" regions, the te n or so regions which send more revenue to the national budget than they receive ." Th e second point is that with few exceptions the elections were held on time, were held honestly , and the results were accepted by the losers indicating, as Laura Belin has noted that "basi c democratic procedures are taking root in Russia ."12 IV. Alternative Futures : Federalism or Separatism ? The response to the regional elections among Russian liberals, including those close to the Yeltsin administration, has been one of alarm . On November 4, 1996 as it became clearer that more incumbents would fall than the Yeltsin team expected, First Deputy Chief of Staff Aleksander Kazakov, who headed the election effort and was the administration' s chief "spin doctor" expressed dismay that governors "will not be controlled by the President , the government, the local legislatures, or anyone at all . I try hard to find a single positiv e element in the very idea of these elections and I can't ." Leonid Smirnyagin, a member of the Presidential Council and a leading specialist on regional politics, warned that a loose confederation could result from "a drastic strengthening of regional power against a backdrop of the destruction of federal power at the local level ." The immediate concern among thes e observers is that without the ability to appoint and remove recalcitrant officials, the administration will lose all leverage to pursue its reformist agenda . By January 1997 , Kazakov claimed it had been a "mistake" to hold gubernatorial electionsand that "by takin g the route of elections, we weakened the vertical hierarchy, we weakened the possibility o f efficient administration, and we eliminated the possibility of rotating personnel ."13 The long term fear is that the Federation will disintegrate . In an interview in Rossiskievesti on 20 May 1997 Smirnyagin warned that national integrity was threatened by "a hidden process of social disintegration on a regional scale ."

5 Concern with these possibilities has led to renewed discussion of ways to reasser t central control over the regions. including calls for legislation that would give the Presiden t the right to curb or even remove regional leaders who refuse to implement presidentia l decrees . In April 1997, Yeltsin was said to be considering adopting a decree that would giv e Presidential Representatives expanded authority in all the federation members to review loca l legislation to ensure that it conformed to federal law . Another decree was aimed at giving th e Prime Minister greater ability to challenge local authorities in the courts if they refused t o nullify acts considered by the government in violation of federal policies .''14. There have als o been suggestions that the regions be reorganized or integrated into mega-regions whos e leadership would answer to the center . In this vein, on 26 February 1997, Moscow Mayo r Yuri Luzhkov suggested that the number of federation members be reduced from eighty-nin e to a dozen or so . Yet another way to check the growth of executive power in the regions i s to strengthen the powers of municipal institutions, especially mayors, who represent the tie r of executive power within the regions . Executives in Primorskii krai, Udmurtia and Sverdlovsk oblast all tried to undermine local authority in early 1997 . 1 ' Mayors seeking to resist encroachments on their powers may find a natural ally in the Federal government . In return mayors could act as "checks and balances" on regional executives. Yeltsin has indicated a willingness to play this card ; on 29 May 1997 he revitalized an existing federa l Council on Local Self Government and appointed Deputy Chief of Staff Maksim Boiko t o organize it . Yet, attempts to reestablish central control through legal means seem less likely tha n ever because the upper house of parliament, the Federation Council, is composed of the chie f executive and chief legislator from each of the federal units ex officio and there may be less support for Presidential initiatives there now that executives no longer owe their jobs to him . They are hardly likely to look favorably on legislation aimed at reducing their authority . Support for such initiatives is likely to be even less when elections are held to local legislatures later in 1997 . Elections to these bodies for two year terms were held in 1994-95 , but in a decree of December 1995, Yeltsin had them postponed until 1997 so they would no t interfere with the Presidential and gubernatorial elections scheduled for 1996 . Regiona l legislatures are even more likely to choose speakers from among members of the old nomenklatura . 16 If anything the Federation Council may be more disposed to conside r constitutional amendments aimed at reducing presidential power such as those proposed by its Chairman, Yegor Stroev, in January of this year . ' Despite these concerns, the center is not entirely without other ways of countering

6 moves toward regional separatism . Some of these are already in place . With respect to the Federation Council, while it is true that administration support is diminished and that effort s to restore central authority through constitutional amendments would fall short of the needed two-thirds, the reverse is also true: the opposition, though stronger, doesn't appear to hav e the two-thirds needed to override a presidential veto . Moreover, the Federation Council ma y be divided between richer and poorer regions in ways that could produce unexpecte d coalitions between the administration and CPRF regions seeking to preserve their share of th e national budget.Finally, there is ample evidence to suggest that newly elected elites who were supported by the opposition are more than willing to make their peace with the administration . Even newly the elected governor from Kursk, Yeltsin nemesis Aleksande r Rutskoi, found it useful to meet with Chief of Staff Anatolii Chubias, though he had vilifie d him during the campaign . Regarding the republics, the early resistance to incorporation in the Russia n Federation among some has faded despite the fact that the 1993 Constitution reduced some o f the asymmetries favoring the republics which had been part of the Federal Agreement signe d between Russia and the republics in March 1992 . With the notable exception of Chechnya , separatist movements in the republics have been either nonexistent or, as in the recent case o f Kabardino-Balkaria, short-lived . One of the reasons for this is the conclusion of a series of bilateral power sharing treaties the first of which was signed by the federal government wit h Tatarstan in February 1994 . The treaty established special rights for the republic in areas such as resources management and taxation while acknowledging Tatarstan's membershi p within the Russian Federation as a "sovereign" state . By May 1996 eight more republics had signed such treaties. Because the provinces objected that this violates the "equality" of federation members promised by the Constitution, similar agreements have been negotiate d with oblasts and krais, and with St . Petersburg, although not with any Autonomous Okrugs . The first of these was Sverdlovsk in January 1996 . By March 1997 there were twenty-seve n such agreements in place with five more already drafted by the government and ready to b e signed with Bryansk, Samara, Astrakhan, Kirov and Saratov for a total of thiry-two. It ma y be objected that such treatment merely accelerates separatist tendencies, but one Wester n analyst, James Hughes argues that "the asymmetric nature [of the agreements] has restrained secessionist tendencies."' It has made staying in the Federation more palatable . Finally, it is important to note that Moscow has used and can continue to use it s ability to collect and redistribute revenues to exert influence over the regions . As noted, only ten of the eighty-nine regions are net "donors" to the national budget ; the rest are in varyin g

7 degrees subsidized. The poorest regions which need this help the most are also likely to b e those where the CPRF did well . One study of patterns of regional revenue distribution use d multiple regression analysis to demonstrate that the Yeltsin administration appeared to b e following a strategy of benefiting most those regions which were giving it trouble, or as th e author suggests "buying off the regions that threatened the status quo . Moreover, he argued that it worked: "increases in central aid appear to demobilize regional protest ."' However it is distributed, the dependence of all but a handful of regional executives on federa l subsidies almost certainly accounts for their willingness to work pragmatically with th e government . V . Net Assessment : Cautious Optimism One thing is clear from the foregoing analysis : regional executives now owe their positions to their constituents rather than to the President of the Russian Federation; that h e can no longer appoint or remove them from office makes them less dependent on him tha n before . The consequences of this shift in the balance of power between the center and th e periphery are less clear although the role which regional leaders will play in the political an d economic development of Russia over the next four years is almost certain to increase . Beyond this, it is probably true that the Yeltsin administration will have less control over th e implantation of reform policies . Freed from presidential directives, already empowered regional executives may use their new popular mandate to advance local interests, regardles s of what is good for the nation . It is also true that most local elites come from the old part y nomenklatura (as much as 82% by one estimate)20 and many will try to misuse their offic e for personal gain . Control over local levers of power, including the media, could help ensur e that popular opposition will be muted . At the same time, the centrifugal forces released by stronger regional leadershi p appear unlikely to lead to disintegration or even instability of the Federation . Pragmatism o n the part of the center in the form of negotiated power sharing treaties and revenue redistribution has been matched by pragmatism in the regions . Moreover, there are strong arguments in favor of assertive regional leadership . Popularly elected regional executives can be expected to enjoy a degree of legitimacy they lacked when they were appointed . Such legitimacy could increase their effectiveness in mobilizing their constituents and leadership i n introducing reforms . The best argument for the emergence of strong regions, however, is that a stable federal system can contribute to democracy : legitimate and effectively functioning regional governments can act to limit central power; their absence creates more opportunity for the abuse of that power . The argument that most regional elites will misus e

8 their power is as speculative as the argument that most want to do a good job . What is clear , however, is that local executives who do so are now subject to the limit that all democracie s place on would-be tyrants : periodic public accountability . VI. Implications for the United States Clearly, American interests in this part of the world would not be served by th e disintegration of the Russian Federation or, less dramatically, by separatist tendencies leadin g to a loose confederation . The fault lines of possible regional conflict are numerous : region s against the center; the Russian provinces against the ethnically based republics ; rich regions versus poor ones ; North against South; Siberia against European Russia, are among the scenarios of chaos and instability that would result if regionalism were to get out of hand . A t the same time, America's interests are not advanced by seeing an increased concentration o f power in Moscow at the expense of the regions . We are best served by the emergence of stable federalism in which the spheres of competence between center and region are well defined and honored by both sides. As it stands now there is a potentially dangerous concentration of power in the hands of the President . That may suit us as long as Yeltsin i s the incumbent, but if someone less to our liking should take over, a stable federal system could act as a check on any abuse of presidential authority or dramatic swings in policy , including an attempt to restore the old order . Over the next four years, it is reasonable to anticipate an increase in pressure fo r regional independence for the reasons analyzed in this paper . Rather than resist such a development, we should support the emergence of stable federalism . Some regional elites will be more palatable than others . We should remember, however, that they were chosen i n elections that for the most part were free and fair .

Appendix RUSSIAN REGIONAL EXECUTIVE S as of 20 June 1997 Date of RegionChief Executive ElectionParty Support/Incumbenc y PROVINCES (66) : (Oblasts (49), Krais (6), Autonomus Okrugs (10), Citie s (2), Autonomous Oblast (1) ) Aga-Buriat AO Bair Shamsuyev 2/2/97 Independent; incumbent lost Altai Krai Aleksandr Surikov 12/1/96 NPSR ; incumbent lost Amur Anatoli Belonogov 3/23/97 NPSR ; incumbent lost Arkhangel Anatoli Yefrimov 12/22/96 Incumbent ; pro-government Astrakhan' Anatoli Guzhvin 12/8/96 Incumbent ; pro-government Belgorod Yevgeny Savchenko 12/17/95 Incumbent; pro-governmen t Bryansk Yury Lodkin 12/6/96 NPSR; incumbent los t Chelyabinsk Peter Sumin 12/22/96 NPSR; incumbent lost Chita Ravil Geniatulin 10/27/96 Incumbent ; pro-government Chukotka (AO) Aleksandr Nazarov 12/22/96 Incumbent ; pro-government Irkutsk VACANCY as of Incumbent (from 3/94) Yury 6/20/97 Nozhikov resigned o n 3/21/97 ; elections July 1997

Ivanova Vladislav Tikhomirov 12/1/96 Incumbent; pro-government Jewish (AOblast) Nikolai Volkov 10/20/96 Incumbent ; pro-government Kaliningrad Leonid Gorbenko 10/20/96 Independent ; Shakrai's PRES ; incumbent lost narrowly

Kaluga Valerii Sudarenkov 11/9/96 NPSR; incumbent lost Kamchatka Vladimir Biryukov 12/1/96 Incumbent; pro-government

1 0 Kemerovo Mikhail Kislyuk Yeltsin Unpopular incumbent : appt . ' 91 election scheduled for 10/19/97 ; last governo r appoimted by Yeltsin Khabarovsk Krai Viktor Ishayev 12/8/96 Incumbent ; pro-government Khanti-Mansi AO Aleksander Filipenko 10/27/96 Incumbent ; pro-government Kirov Vladimir Seregyenkov 10/20/96 NPSR; Yabloko ; Incumbent lost Komi-Permyak AO Nikolai Poluyanov 11/17/96 Incumbent; pro-government Koryak AO Valentina Bronevich 11/17/96 Independent; Patriotic Union; only woman governor; Incumbent lost Kostroma Viktor Shershunov 12/22/96 NPSR; Lebed : Incumbent lost Krasnodar Krai Nikolai Kondratenko 12/22/96 82% NPSR; unsupporte d Incumbent N . Yegorov lost ; Krasnoyarsk Krai Valerii Zubov 4/93 Incumbent; pro - government . ; elections pending Kurgan Oleg Bogomolov 12/8/96 NPSR; incumbent lost Kursk Aleksander Rutskoi 10/20/96 Independent ; incumbent lost ; Yeltsin's former VP Leningrad oblast Vadim Gustov 9/29/96 Independent; (KPRF ; Yabloko) ; incumbent lost Lipetsk Mikhail Narolin 4/11/93 KPRF incumbent; election pending Magadan Valentin Tsvetkov 11/3/96 Independent . ; (KPRF) ; incumbent lost

Moscow City Yury Luzhkov, Mayor 6/16/96 Incumbent; pro-governmen t Moscow oblast Anatoli Tyazhlov 12/30/95 Incumbent; pro-government Murmansk Yuri Yevdokimov 12/1/96 Independent (Lebed ; KPRF) ; incumbent lost

Nenets AO Vladimir Butov 12/13/96 Independent ; incumbent lost

1 1 Nizhny Novgorod VACANT as o f Governor Nemtsov resigne d 6/20/97 in April 1997 to join Yeltsin administration: election s 6/97 Novgorod Mikhail Prusak 12/17/95 Incumbent; NDR reforme r Novosibirsk Vitalii Mukha 12/24/95 KPRF ; incumbent lost ; moderate previous governor Omsk Leonid Polozhaev 12/17/95 Incumbent ; NDR Orel Yegor Stroyev 4/4/93 KPRF; Chair of Federation Council ; works with Yeltsin ; new election due in 199 7 Orenberg Vladimir Yelagin 12/17/95 Incumbent; NDR Penza Anatoli Kovlyagin 4/4/93 KPRF ; new election due i n 1997 ; was anti-Yeltsin Perm' Gennadii Igumnov 12/22/96 Incumbent; pro-government Primorski Krai Yevgenii Nazdratenko 12/17/95 Independent ; incumben t Pskov Yevgenii Mikhailov 11/3/96 LDPR ; (KPRF) ; incumbent lost; only LDPR governo r Rostov Vladimir Chub 9/29/96 Incumbent ; NDR; KPRF court challenge failed Ryazan' Vyacheslav Liubimov 12/22/96 NPSR; incumbent lost St. Petersburg Vladimir Yakovlev , 6/2/96 Luzhkov ; PM backed Mayor incumbent Sobchak los t Sakhalin Igor Farkhutdinov 10/20/96 Incumbent; pro-governmen t Samara Konstantin Titov 12/1/96 Incumbent; NDR Saratov Dmitri Ayatskov 9/1/96 Incumbent ; pro-government Smolensk Anatoli Glushenkov 4/93 KPRF; (reformist incumben t lost) ; supported Yeltsin i n 1996; election due in 199 7

Stavropol' Krai Aleksandr Chernogorov 11/17/96 NPSR; incumbent lost Sverdlovsk Eduard Rossel 8/20/95 Independent; incumbent lost ; For Yeltsin in 1996

1 2 Taimir AO Gennadii Nedelin 12/22/96 Incumbent; pro-government Tambov Aleksandr Ryabov 12/24/95 KPRF ; incumbent lost ; only governor for Ziuganov in 9 6

Tiumen' Leonid Roketskii 1/12/97 Incumbent ; NDR Tomsk Viktor Kress 12/17/95 Incumbent; NDR Tula Vasilii Starodubstev 3/23/97 NPSR; incumbent lost ; he' s one of the 1991 cou p plotters Tver' Vladimir Platov 12/17/95 Yabloko ; incumbent lost

Ulyanovsk Yuri Goryachev 12/22/96 Incumbent not supported b y Moscow; close to KPRF Ust-orda Buryat AO Valery Maleyev 11/17/96 Independent ; incumbent lost Vladimir Nikolai Vinogradov 12/8/96 NPSR; incumbent lost Volgograd Nikolai Maksiuta 12/29/96 NPSR; incumbent los t Vologda Vyacheslav Pozgalev 10/6/96 Incumbent; pro-government Voronezh Ivan Shabanov 12/8/96 NPSR; incumbent lost Yamalo-Nenets AO Yuri Neelov 10/13/96 Incumbent; pro-government Yaroslavl' Anatoli Lisitsyn 12/17/95 Incumbent ; pro-government Yevenki AO Aleksandr Bokovikov 3/16/97 NPSR; incumbent lost

REPUBLICS (21 )

Adygeya (R) Aslan Dzharimov , 1/12/97 Incumbent; pro-government President Altai (R) Valerii Chaptinov , 1/30/97 Former Obkom 1st Secretary Premier elected by El elected to Chair legislature Kurultaia (legislature) in 2/94 . Anti-Yeltsin Bashkortostan (R) Murtazar Rakhimov , 12/12/93 Incumbent; independent ; President former CPSU apparat

1 3 Buryatia (R) Leonid Potapov . 6/94 1st Obkom Secretary (1990) : President CPSU apparat Chechnia (R) Asian Mashkado v 1/27/97 Was Chief of Staff; 65% ; President only comparatively moderat e Chuvashia (R) Nikolai Federov , 12/12/93 Pro-Yeltsin despite 63 % President Ziuganov vote in 199 6 Dagestan (R) Magomedali 7/27/94 Former Republic CM chair ; Magomedov . Chair , former gorkom 1s t State Council secretary . Ingushetia (R) Ruslan Aushev , 2/27/94 Re-elected by 95% ; Afghan President vet; vs . separation form RF Kabardino-Balkari a Valerii Kokov . 1/12/97 Re-elected by 99% ; former (R) President Obkom 1st secretary . Kalmykiia (R) Kisan Iliumzhnov , 1/13/93 Indpendent; entrepreneur ; President member of Union o f Cossacks; unpredictabl e Karachai-Cherkes s Viktor Savelev, Chair , 4/94 Former Cherkess gor- (R) Peoples' Assembly ispolkom chair; uncertain politic s Karelia (R) Viktor Stepanov, Chai r 4/17/94 Communists of Karelia of Government Khakasiia (R) Aleksei Lebed, Chair 12/22/96 Independent (supported b y Council of Ministers his brother Aleksandr Lebed) Komi (R) Yuri Spiridonov, Head 5/94 Former Komi Obkom 1st of Republic secretary . ; not pro - government Mari-el (R) Vyacheslav Kislitsyn , 1/4/97 NPSR; defeated LDPR President candidate Mordovia (R) Nikolai Merkushin , 10/16/90 Agrarian; elected by Head of the Republik Constitutional Assembl y (provisionally) pending election North Ossetia (R) Akhsarbek Galazov , 1 / 16/94 NDR; former obkom 1st President secretary; favors staying within Russian Federation

1 4 Sakha (R) Mikhail Nikolaev . 12/2/96 Incumbent; pro-government President defeated NPSR

Tatarstan (R) Mintimer Shamiev , 3/96 Incumbent (originally elected President 1991) ; former obkom 1st secretary ; for Yeltsin 1996

Tuva (R) Shering-ool Oorzhak , 3/16/97 Incumbent; NDR President

Udmurtiia (R) Aleksander Volkov , 4/95 Independent; opposed and Chair, State Council then supported the center ; 1997 tried to abolish Udmurt local self-government

ENDNOTES

1. This includes not only government at the oblast and republic level (called institutions of "state power") , but at the city and district level (officially referred to as local self-government) as well . When differentiating levels of government is necessary, the appropriate terminology will be used . Although mos t of the paper focuses on regional politics in the oblasts, differences between republican and oblast politic s are also addressed. A distinction will be made at times between the twenty-one Republics and th e remaining sixty-eight federation units which will be referred to as provinces .

2. A more detailed analysis of the changes in regional Russian politics from 1990-1996 may be found in : Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Democratization and Political Participation in Russia's Regions", chapter 4 in Kare n Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, (eds.) Democratic changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine , Belarus, and Moldova, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University press, 1997) .

3. In the republics, these were usually called "presidents", in the oblasts and krais, they were calle d "governors " and in the cities, "mayors" .

4 .The one notable exception to the appointment of governors was the agreement to allow elections to tak e place in seven oblasts in April 1993 . The outcome was hardly reassuring to the administration : six of these (Orel, Cheliabinsk, Bryansk, Penza, Lipetsk, Smolensk) were won by opposition candidates ; one (Krasnoyarsk krai) by a Yeltsin supporter .

5 . In fact, two special elections were allowed by way of exceptions between April 1993 and Decembe r 1995 : in Irkutsk in March 1994 and in Sverdlovsk in August 1995 .

6.The use of this term to describe the obkom first Secretary's position in the old Soviet system can b e found in the now classic work by Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects, (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1969) .

7 . Of the nine who had been elected, four had been removed from office in the wake of the events o f October 1993 .

15 8. The twelve elections were held in Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, Belgorod . Novgorod. Novosibirsk . Orenberg, Tambov . Tomsk. Tver' and Yaroslavl' and Moscow oblasts and Primorskii krai . Oppositio n candidates won in Tambov and Novosibirsk .

9. See for example, Gleb Cherkasov and Vladimir Shpak, "Regional Elections : Everyone is Celebrating, " Segodnia, 12 December 1996 . p.2, and Laura Belin, "All Sides Claim Victory in the Gubernatoria l Elections," Transition, 21 February 1997, pp.24-27 .

10. At least one of the incumbents elected (in Ulyanovsk) was not actively supported by th e administration.

11. The members of this club differ somewhat from year to year and from analyst to analyst, but usuall y include: Moscow, St . Petersburg, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan . Khany-Mansi AO, Yamal-Nenets AO , Lipetsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Sverdlovsk . and Yaroslavl' . See for example, Daniel Treisman , "Moscow's Struggle to Control the Regions Through Taxation, "Transition 20 September 1996 p . 47 .

12. Belin, op .cit . p .26 .

13. See his interview in Rossiiskie vesti . 22 January 1997 .

14. These decrees and other administration efforts to control regional executives are discussed in Russian Regional Report, vol . 2, #13 (17 April 1997) .

15. In Udmurtia, the State Council headed by Aleksander Volkov adopted legislation which essentiall y abolished municipal government in the republic . Since this violates the Russian Constitution, the federal government brought the case to the Constitutional Court and won . Udmurtia complied only under th e pressure of a presidentail decree of March 10, 1997 . In Sverdlovsk oblast, Governor Eduard Rossel trie d to establish a prefectural system in which municipal governments would answer to appointe d representatives in combined districts . This, too, was rejected .

16. This point was also made by Leonid Smirnyagin at a conference on regional politics held at the Moscow Carnegie Center on 12 February 1997 . See Russian Regional Report vol .2, #7 (20 February 1997) .

17. For a discussion of Stroyev's proposals see Konstantin Katanian, "Stroyev Insists on His Point o f View," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 14 January 1997 p. 2 .

18. See James Hughes, "Moscow's Bilateral Treaties Add to the Confusion", Transition, 20 Septembe r 1996, p .43 .

19. See David Treisman, "Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation", Transition, 2 0 September 1996, p.49 .

20. See Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite," Europe- Asia Studies, vol. 48, #4 (1996) .

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