The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement
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The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement Chanda Allana Leckie Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts In Political Science Charles Taylor, Chair Scott Nelson Edward Weisband May 04, 2005 Blacksburg, Virginia Keywords: OSCE Minsk Group, geopolitics, conflict settlement The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement Chanda Allana Leckie Abstract----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Out of the violent conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the war over Nagorno- Karabakh is the most threatening to the future development of the region, both economically and politically, as it is no closer to a solution than when the fighting ended in 1994. This is regrettable as there are some opportunities that provide the warring parties enough flexibility to move forward in the negotiation process. This thesis analyzes the evolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group from 1992 to the present. It discusses not only the history of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict and what went wrong with the Minsk Group’s attempts to find a fair and objective solution to the conflict, but also the obstacles and opportunities for a settlement. From this discussion, suggestions to improve the Minsk Group’s performance are presented, and future predictions of a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will also be discussed. Acknowledgements------------------------------------------------------------------------- I wish to thank my committee chair Dr. Charles Taylor for his guidance, support, and collaboration on this thesis and throughout my time at Virginia Tech. During this process, he has been an appreciated source of advice, direction, and encouragement. I could not have had a better advisor. I extend a special thanks to Dr. Scott Nelson and Dr. Edward Weisband for their assistance on this project. I feel very fortunate to have had such a great committee to help see this thesis to its completion. Thank you! Lastly, I would like to thank my Mom, Dad, and Tarek for supporting me along this journey. iii Contents--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Abstract..............................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................iii Table of Contents...........................................................................................................iv-v Introduction........................................................................................................................1 II. Purpose............................................................................................................................2 III. Chapter Summary..................................................................................…....................2 Chapter One…...................................................................................................................3 I. Background Information...................................................................................…............3 II. Main Issues Regarding the Conflict…...............................................................…......4-5 III. Geopolitics..................................................................................................…............5-9 Chapter Two: Mediation Attempts and Annual Developments: 1992-1999………...9 I. 1992-1993..................................................................................................................10-11 II. 1994-1995................................................................................................................11-12 III. 1996-1997….…......................................................................................................12-15 IV.1998-1999................................................................................................................15-17 Chapter Three: Mediation Attempts and Annual Developments: 2000-2004……..18 I. 2000................................................................................................................................18 II. 2001…………..........................................................................................................18-20 III. 2002........................................................................................................................20-21 IV. 2003........................................................................................................................21-22 V. 2004…………….....................................................................................................22-23 Chapter Four: Positions of the Involved Parties….......................................................24 I. Azerbaijan…………………………………….........................................................24-28 II. Armenia…………………………………..………………………………………..28-30 III. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic...........................................................................30-31 IV. The Russian Federation..........................................................................................31-32 V. The United States......................................................................................….......…32-34 VI. Turkey….………............................................................................................…….....34 VII. The European Union.............................................................................................35-36 VIII. The Council of Europe & the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.....................36-37 Chapter Five: Obstacles to Finding a Settlement….....................................................37 I. Mutual Distrust & Misunderstanding........................................................................38-39 II. Political Instability...................................................................................................39-41 III. Refugees.................................................................................................................41-42 IV. Timing: Package vs. Phased...................................................................................42-43 V. International Law..........................................................................................…............43 VI. “Outside Agitators”................................................................................................43-44 iv Chapter Six: Shortcomings of the OSCE Minsk Group..............................................44 I. Different Mindsets, Same Negotiating Table............................................................44-45 II. Credibility of the Minsk Group co-chairs................................................................45-48 III. Inconsistency of OSCE Principles..............................................................….............48 IV. Unbalanced Nature of the Negotiating Process......................................................49-50 V. Secrecy of the Peace Plans and Peace Talks...........................................................50-51 VI. Structure of the Minsk Group……..............................................................................51 VII. Lack of Security Guarantees Group……..............................................................52-53 Chapter Seven: Opportunities for a Settlement……....................................................54 I. Economic Incentives………………………….........................................................54-56 II. Renewed Commitment to Resolve the Conflict.......................................................56-57 III. Regional Security System.......................................................................................57-58 IV. Common-State Peace Plan.....................................................................................58-59 Conclusion……...........................................................................................................59-61 Bibliography................................................................................................................62-68 v Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Many scholars believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict involving Armenia and Azerbaijan is by far the most threatening in the region since it involves two independent states and could potentially have even larger humanitarian and regional implications. When the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter OSCE) Minsk Group was created in 19921 to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenians and Azerbaijanis held high hopes in this negotiating body. The OSCE Minsk Group represented not only the major powers in this region, Russia and Turkey, but also several European and North American countries. Many believed that such broad representation would result in impartial peacemaking negotiations. Thirteen years later and the negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are still at a deadlock. The political battles are more heated than ever and favorable public opinion toward the Minsk Group is at a record low. Political leadership in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Nagorno-Karabakh