HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT Caspian Studies Program

Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabagh: Where Do We Go From Here?

April 23, 2001

Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University

Summary and Transcript From a Panel Discussion with:

Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, U.S. Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh and NIS Regional Conflicts, OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Professor Hamlet Isaxanli, President of Khazar University, Baku Professor Ronald Suny, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago Chair: Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program

PREFACE

At the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, we have been following the Nagorno-Karabagh peace process with great interest and have been encouraged by significant signs of progress this spring. Following the April 3-7 negotiations convened in Key West, Florida by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Caspian Studies Program organized a special panel discussion entitled “Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabagh: Where Do We Go From here?” on April 23, 2001 in Cambridge. Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Research Director at the Caspian Studies Program, moderated the panel which included Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, U.S. Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh and NIS Regional Conflicts and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair; Professor Hamlet Isaxanli, President of Khazar University in Baku; and Professor Ronald Suny, Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. The panelists discussed the progress made at Key West, the prospects for peace moving forward, and the challenges to establishing lasting peace in the region.

More than one hundred researchers, graduate students, current and former U.S., Azerbaijani, and Armenian government officials, journalists, and other members of the Harvard community attended the panel and engaged the panelists in a rich and lively discussion after their presentations. The panel received extensive press coverage in the U.S. and in the region.

This report, prepared by the Caspian Studies Program staff, contains a summary and full transcript of the panel discussion as well as photographs from the event. Emily Van Buskirk authored the summary of the event and Pamela Jewett transcribed the panel discussion. The full report, along with numerous other research products, articles, and event summaries relating to the Nagorno-Karabagh peace process are available on our web page: www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/sdi.

The Caspian Studies Program seeks to locate the Caspian region on the maps of the American policy-making community as an area in which the U.S. has important national interests and where U.S. policy can make major differences. Through its research and teaching, the Program attempts to raise the profile of the Caspian region’s opportunities and problems. Undoubtedly, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is one of the greatest challenges facing the region and one of the most important steps toward development and improving the lives of the people in the Caspian region. The next round of negotiations, initially planned for June in Switzerland, has been postponed. Nevertheless, we hope that the momentum gained over the past few months, and the high level U.S. and international involvement—demonstrated by Secretary Powell’s participation in the Key West negotiations, and President Bush, President Chirac, and President Putin’s bilateral meetings with Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and Armenian President Robert Kocharian—combined with the numerous ongoing local and international non- governmental initiatives for peace, will lead to a successful, lasting peace settlement.

Melissa Carr Program Director, Caspian Studies Program

ii HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT Caspian Studies Program

Contents

Preface ii

Panel Summary 2

Panel Transcript 8

Photographs Center (following page 15)

iii PANEL SUMMARY

Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabagh: Where Do We Go From Here?

Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University April 23, 2001

Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, U.S. Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh and NIS Regional Conflicts, OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Professor Hamlet Isaxanli, President of Khazar University, Baku Professor Ronald Suny, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago Chair: Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program

From April 3-7, 2001 the Organization for Pursuant to the Key West peace talks, the Security and Cooperation in Europe convened Caspian Studies Program at Harvard negotiations in Key West, Florida, aimed at University’s John F. Kennedy School of achieving a peace settlement for the Nagorno- Government held a panel discussion entitled, Karabagh conflict.1 U.S. Secretary of State “Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabagh: Where Colin Powell opened this set of talks between do we go from here?” on April 23, 2001. Dr. Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and Brenda Shaffer, Research Director at the Armenian President Robert Kocharian, each Caspian Studies Program, moderated the of whom met separately with Secretary panel, which included Ambassador Carey Powell in Florida and, subsequently, in Cavanaugh, Professor Hamlet Isaxanli, and Washington D.C. with President Bush. The Professor Ronald Suny. Together, the United States, France and Russia were the panelists discussed the progress made at Key mediators at the negotiations, as co-chairs of West, potential policies for selling peace to the OSCE “Minsk Group” (which includes 13 the populations of Azerbaijan and Armenia, countries) established in 1992 as part of an and the prospects for peace moving forward. effort to end the conflict.2 The chief negotiator on the U.S. side at Key West was Ambassador BRENDA SHAFFER framed the discussion Carey Cavanaugh, who is the State with a series of questions for the panelists. Department’s Special Negotiator for the She asked, what are the potential pitfalls on conflict on a constant basis. The negotiations the path to peace? What role do history and were held in proximity format, meaning that identity (or their construction) play in the facilitators held separate talks with each of conflicts and their resolution? How does one the heads of Azerbaijan and Armenia. prepare public opinion for peace? She discussed the role of democracy in peace negotiations, pointing out that successful 1 The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan negotiations often demand secrecy, that over Nagorno-Karabagh, a mountainous enclave presidents are elected to lead and that within Azerbaijan’s borders but with a majority leadership often demands making unpopular Armenian population for decades, has waged since 1988, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and decisions. over a million internally displaced persons. A ceasefire has held since 1994. AMBASSADOR CAVANAUGH opened by 2 The current members of the Minsk Group are explaining the need for peace in the region, Norway, Austria, Belarus, Germany, Italy, arguing that “Peace is a prerequisite for Sweden, Finland, Turkey, France, the Russian progress” in all spheres, especially economic Federation, the United States, Armenia, and development. The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict Azerbaijan.

2 PANEL SUMMARY has already killed 35,000 and there continues find workable solutions. The presidents know to be a casualty rate of 1 person per day. The that “peace cannot be perfect, but it must be population of Armenia is hemorrhaging from better than the present,” and that while the an enormous outflow of economic refugees, peace will please some, it will anger others. and 800,000 Azerbaijanis are sitting in However, it is essential to realize that very refugee camps. It is the task of the presidents few people have come up with viable of both countries to explain to their publics alternatives to a peace solution: a resumption that peace is “possible, permissible, and of war would lead to a deplorable situation practical.” which would benefit neither side. Fighting in the past did not yield for either country what The international community, through the they need or want. “Peace is the only way,” OSCE Minsk Group, has been involved in the Cavanaugh concluded. peace process for the past ten years. But the structure of negotiations has changed over The progress between the two time. Ambassador Cavanaugh explained that after the presidents rejected three proposals presidents has been so great that from the Minsk Group in 1997-98, it was felt they are ahead of their people. a better indication of what might be possible was needed. This led to direct engagement According to HAMLET ISAXANLI, the optimal between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and proposal for peace would be a “common Armenia. house” solution between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This solution would entail a power “Peace is a prerequisite for sharing agreement (“shared competencies”) progress” –Ambassador for Nagorno-Karabagh but also a vertical link from Karabagh to the center of the country in Cavanaugh Baku. The “common house” would allow transparency of borders between Armenia and The two presidents have met 16 times since Azerbaijan, trade development between the 1999, and the details of those talks have been two countries, academic initiatives, and confidential. Earlier this year the format cooperative regional educational and cultural changed again as the presidents met with one developments. He described such another in Paris and then with French arrangements of shared competencies as ideal President Jacques Chirac. After a second for Georgia as well. meeting in Paris, a different format was chosen which would bring mediation While Azerbaijanis are of one mind that performed by the Minsk Group co-chairs to “peace is good,” they also believe that the peace negotiations between the presidents: so- peace must be “just.” Professor Isaxanli called “proximity talks.” The Key West cautioned that the armed forces and certain summit occurred in this new format, and political and powers in Azerbaijan are against afterwards all parties agreed that substantial any kind of power sharing, and that a military progress had been made, and that the format frame of mind is taking hold of increasing should be repeated in June in Geneva, numbers of Azerbaijanis. He suggested that a Switzerland. (This round has since been “market for peace” could be created only with postponed.) the participation of the opposition parties: Musavat, the Popular Front, the Azerbaijan In fact, Ambassador Cavanaugh continued, National Independence Party and others (these the progress between the two presidents has parties are influential, while they do not been so great he believes that they are ahead recognize the legitimacy of the Azerbaijani of their people in their acknowledgment of the Parliament). Finally, he argued, “Historical necessity of peace and their willingness to justification by all parties is important for

3 PANEL SUMMARY understanding the political situation of history of at least approximations of such an collective identity, but not in solving the arrangement. problem.” Finally, Professor Suny turned to the subject RONALD SUNY sees reasons for both of negotiations. In 1997, President Aliyev and pessimism and optimism concerning peace former President Ter-Petrossian came very prospects in the South Caucasus. From a close to reaching a peace settlement that had negative angle, the political regimes can be two main ideas: 1) Karabagh should be run by seen as controlled by elite institutions plagued the majority population (ethnic Armenian); by infighting and having quasi-democratic and 2) The principle of territorial integrity practices that lend only some degree of must also be respected. In other words, legitimacy. On the positive side, states of the Karabagh would formally remain part of South Caucasus have a “long history of Azerbaijan (“very formally, perhaps a flag interaction and dependency” and they “can over the city hall”), but be run as a fully only grow stronger with the end of these independent state by local people, the debilitating conflicts.” Each state has a strong majority of who are Armenians. Suny interest in peace, which alone can bring speculated that the present negotiations seem prosperity.3 to have gone in a different direction, although thankfully he said the idea of a territorial Professor Suny contrasted lessons from the “swap” seems to be off the table. He academy with the worldview of nationalists. speculated that current proposals involve The latter speak of “ancient hatreds” and “linking Karabagh and Lachin directly to consider identity to be “primordial and Armenia, and giving Azerbaijan some kind of continuous.” The vast majority of academics, connection to Nakhichevan through on the other hand, have a modernist- Armenia.” constructivist view of identity: “the way people think about themselves is a human If identity is a construct, it can be construction built up over time,” based on memories that have been “silenced and reconstructed and thought of in repressed,” as well as those that have been new ways, which has positive accented, Suny explained. And if identity is a implications for peace and construct, it can be reconstructed and thought of in new ways, which has positive friendship in the Caucasus. implications for peace and friendship in the Caucasus. He concluded by discussing the prospects for “selling” this particular solution to the Broadly, Professor Suny called the idea of the publics, suggesting that the nature of politics nation-state—the idea that every nation in both countries (only democracies in the should have one state, and every state should formal sense) means elites have tremendous have one nation or one dominant nation— power to manipulate public opinion. “I think problematic . It is necessary to “rethink the that Armenians could be convinced to accept notion of sovereignty,” he argued. The a solution in which Karabagh and Lachin Caucasus is an ideal place to pioneer the idea were formally part of Armenia, and no longer of “shared sovereignty,” or multiple under Azerbaijani sovereignty, and even sovereignties because this region has a long concede a sovereign road to Nakhichevan. I am very doubtful that the Azerbaijani public will accept such a thing.” He noted that 3 Professor Suny drew these points from Laitin, bellicose attitudes are currently more David D. and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Karabakh: prevalent in Azerbaijan. Thinking a Way Out,” Middle East Policy VII, 1 (October 1999), pp. 145-176 and from a talk that he gave a year ago to a State Department forum.

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Discussion that the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. has The question and answer discussion brought made the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict a high out several interesting points about the private profile issue, so that it receives attention at the nature of the peace talks, international highest levels, which is a fully positive cooperation, the participation of diasporas, development. preparations for peace, and changes that are expected to follow a settlement. Ronald Suny In response to criticism of the private nature noted that if Azerbaijan and Armenia were of the peace talks, Ambassador Cavanaugh real democracies, things such as minority argued that progress has been made because rights would be easier to guarantee. When of the private nature of the talks, not in spite asked about the return of refugees, and of of it. Both presidents “look over their expatriates living in Russia, Suny explained shoulders” at the Middle East, and notice that that once the architecture for peace is in place, as elements of Arafat and Barak’s discussions people would naturally move back. Russian became public, they were ripped apart, even companies, too, have a lot to gain from though the proposal on the whole could have political stabilization and will invest in the been acceptable to everybody. In his view, the region. private factor for Azerbaijan and Armenia bodes well for the future: it will be positive if Suny and Cavanaugh agreed that Russia leaders are able to present peace as a whole seems to be playing with “the same game package that can be a reality “tomorrow,” plan” as the United States and France in the versus proceeding in steps, which might Caucasus, realizing that it is time to encourage radicalism in the domestic political peacefully settle the conflicts, and that scene. Both Presidents, he remarked, have stability would be beneficial to its interests. already taken steps signaling to the people to Professor Isaxanli was more skeptical, be ready for peace. arguing that Russian diplomacy has two faces, “it speaks one way but acts another.” Ambassador Cavanaugh concluded with a few Russia’s current position even without peace words about the Bush Administration’s is favorable, he said, involving “access to involvement in the search for peace. It is Caspian energy resources, pipeline significant, said Cavanaugh, that President investments in Azerbaijan, and a strategic Bush was talking about Nagorno-Karabagh partnership with Armenia.” (with President Chirac) on the tenth day of his administration, and that peace talks were held When asked about the nature of the role of the in the U.S. in the tenth week. He noted, with Armenian diaspora in the peace process, optimism, “You have a high, high level of Ambassador Cavanaugh described the engagement here that I think people would not political views of the diaspora as diverse. In have expected. But it is reflective of the general, he argued, the Armenian leaders are preparedness of the United States and this ahead of the diaspora in their level of administration to assist and facilitate peace compromise and realism. However, many in processes when the leaders are really working the diaspora recognize that peace is good for to move them forward. And, it is reflective of Armenia, and thus support it despite the our belief that there is a genuine chance here, implied concessions. The Ambassador added now, to move this forward.”

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TRANSCRIPT

Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabagh: Where Do We Go From Here? April 23, 2001 Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University

Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, U.S. Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh and NIS Regional Conflicts, OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Professor Hamlet Isaxanli, President of Khazar University, Baku Professor Ronald Suny, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago Chair: Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program

DR BRENDA SHAFFER: On behalf of the Caspian Studies Program and Melissa Carr who is Program Director of the Caspian Studies Program, we would like to welcome you to this event on Nagorno-Karabagh. I think the number of people here is a great testament to what an important issue this is. First I would like to thank Emily Goodhue, who made this event possible with all of her organization and planning. I would especially like to welcome Elin Suleymanov who came from the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Washington D.C. to attend this event. We have many friends here from the press. I would like to emphasize that this is an academic event. It is very important to us to have a free flow of information and exchange. We would be happy for you to report on some of the statements here, because we think it is very important that ideas get out to the region and to other people dealing with the Karabagh issue. However, we would ask you to please, because it is an academic exchange, check your quotes with the speakers to make sure that they agree to be quoted and in this certain manner. But we welcome you and your presentations of the events here. Also, regarding the format of this event: We would like to think of it as looking forward, not backwards. In other words, we hope that this exchange will not be about “my position” versus “that position,” or who is right, who was first, who is wrong or who did what to whom. But rather, considering the mess the region is in, how can we move forward? And, what is the best way to do it? I think that what happened under Carey Cavanaugh’s leadership in Key West is a sign that this is a turning point. There is a watershed. Let’s hope that the style of this event will also be a turning point and a watershed. Emphasize your comments and questions towards how we can move forward, and not “what has happened in the past,” no matter what the various views are on that. I would like to open with a few research questions for our panelists, and then I will introduce the panelists to you. What I would like our speakers to talk about is the minefield that is ahead of us. There is a possibility of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. What are the potential mines that each society may be encountering on the way? How do we defuse these mines? Or, how do we overstep them? How do we find some sort of map that will guide us through? I would especially like to ask Professor Isaxanli and Professor Suny, in introducing us to trends in Azerbaijani and Armenian society today, what is the role of history and identity? So much has been written in the context of this conflict about ancient hatreds, separate identities, and Christians versus Muslims. Maybe intellectuals and elites in each society can take those different labels and those different ideas and package them in such a way as to lessen the influence of those events.

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We have many histories of the Caucasus. It could be a history of interaction, of mutual fostering of cultures, of intermarriage or of inter-trade. Or, we also have a history of violence and massacres. How can elites in each society emphasize the events that were of cooperation and interaction instead of the other side? Also, do we really need second track diplomacy? This is a term used for bringing people together from the region and sharing ideas. Maybe in the Caucasus, Armenians and Azerbaijanis are actually not so different and far apart. Maybe they actually do know each other and like interacting with one another. Is second track something necessary in diffusing this conflict? If so, is it necessary between Baku and Yerevan or maybe Baku and Stepanakert? In the process of identity, can intellectuals and academics such as yourselves and other people in Armenian and Azerbaijani society play a role in the process of each country, each state, building the “we” and putting less emphasize on the “they,” “the other group next door?” Even though the process of identity is of course about setting borders between different peoples, different groups and different periods, can we de-emphasize the “they” in the construction of the “we?” On public opinion. All the time we hear about the region: “Well, public opinion is against this or that.” Is public opinion an objective force? Or do we lead—“we” being you, as the intellectuals from the region and those influencing the region? Can you lead public opinion to be more prone to peace? What is the way to do it? Give us the guide. I would especially like to ask the lead negotiator, what are the changes that have made this breakthrough, if it is a breakthrough, possible? Colin Powell said when he was entering office that he was not so interested in the U.S. taking such an active daily role in the management of conflicts. How committed is the U.S. government, and why does it seem that the U.S. government is very committed to solving this conflict? I would also like to ask Ambassador Cavanaugh how we market the peace. How do we package it? How great a role should the international community play? The Caucasus has been plagued by rivalries, mostly between the U.S. and Russia. This has caused a lot of escalation in the region. Are those relations different now? Has that contributed to the crucial shift in what seems to be a breakthrough in the negotiations? How do we preserve the good working relations between Russia and the U.S. in this region, so that again the region is not plagued by rivalries? And actually, if the Caucasus is now a place of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, and the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations seems to be at a relative low, can the Caucasus be a starting point for better overall relations? On democracy and negotiations. We always learn that the press is the watchdog and that democracy makes better policy. But in the case of negotiations, do we have a problem that leadership, in making hard decisions, good decisions, for a region, sometimes is required to make unpopular decisions which don’t always jive with public opinion, and which political forces often take advantage of? Can we make peace at a time of a “daily referendum” in a sense, which is the state of many democratic regimes? What is the message to the refugees? 800,000 Azerbaijani refugees, 300,000 Armenian refugees, most of them now settled—but initially refugees. They have not used violence against civilian targets in this conflict. In other parts of the world when refugees use violence, we talk about right of return. We talk about their rights. But in many cases, we have ignored the refugees in the Caucasus because they have been quiet and non-violent. So I would like to ask Ambassador Cavanaugh to address the issue of the U.S. rewarding non-violence in terms of its treatment of refugees. The last question for all of our speakers is, what is the price if the negotiations do not succeed? Can there be a renewed threat of war in the region? What is the price of the status quo? Can Armenia continue to endure a situation where it is having large emigration from its state due to the situation of no peace-no war? Can Azerbaijan endure a situation of no peace-no war that is stagnating its economy and political development?

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With these short questions, I would like to introduce Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh who is the Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh and for the regional conflicts in the Newly Independent States. He has led the negotiation process for Nagorno-Karabagh, Georgia, and Moldova. He has served as a trouble -shooter for the State Department, focusing on conflict prevention assistance and humanitarian issues in Europe. He opened the U.S. Embassy in Georgia in 1992 and later was part of the team that coordinated the direct assistance to Russia and the Newly Independent States. Ambassador Cavanaugh was also coordinator for Cyprus in the State Department, and spearheaded efforts to diffuse tensions between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. He also served in the U.S. Embassy in Bern, Moscow, Berlin and Rome, and now he is back in Washington. Ambassador Cavanaugh, please.

AMBASSADOR CAVANAUGH: I am a little intimidated by all of the questions Brenda raised. I was trying to write down furiously the ones I would try to answer. But even that was too many. What I hope to do today is give you a good feeling on what is going on in the Caucasus, what lies ahead, and what might be possible. First let me thank the Kennedy School of Government for having me here today. And, Brenda, Graham Allison and everyone else who was instrumental in making it possible for me to appear here with you today. Let me thank all of you for coming. I think that it is very important that the American people have a direct opportunity to hear about the foreign policy of the United States from people involved in making your foreign policy. It lets us know if you think we are doing a good job or a bad job. It sometimes can give us some very helpful feedback into the process as we try to move American interests forward. Let me say too that I am very proud to be doing this work for the United States government. It is very unique work. It is positive work. It is biblically sanctioned, as I had a nun once point out to me on an airplane. I knew that. I went to Notre Dame and you learn at Notre Dame that in the book of Matthew, peacemakers are blessed. But it is still nice to hear it from nuns. It is a job, though, that I must point out is very hard. It is not one that you can do as a 9-5 job. It isn’t even one you can do as a 16 hour a day job, but the weekends are yours; it is very much an all the time job. The dilemma is that many people’s lives depend on whether you are successful or not. Not whether they live or die, but often how well they live or what futures they have. So, in that sense it becomes a very trying job, but a very important one. And as I said, I am proud to be able to do it for the United States. I am not home much. So I get a lot of complaints. And, actually soon I will need to turn my peacekeeping skills in a domestic direction. But my children both offered to help me today. They said that since I had been helping them with homework, they would help me with what I would talk about at Harvard today. I asked them how to do that. My first grader said that they had taught him in school the importance of alliteration: that alliteration was very good for your audience because it made people pay attention and remember. My seventh grader chimed in and said that he had learned the same thing. They had been telling them to be alliterative in their writing; and that every time they used the same letter, it made it sink in. So, today I am going to abandon my usual practice which is to speak about things in threes - this is also what you get at Notre Dame, everything is a trinity. What I will do instead is to positively pound you with a plethora of “p” words. So if it sounds like they are non-stop, it is on purpose, and you can blame my children. Let me start with how I will end. It is with two key points. Peace is a prerequisite for progress in the Caucasus. And, the presidents in the Caucasus need to persuade people that peace is possible. And, that a peace package is permissible and practical. A lot of “p’s” already. I think what is important in Nagorno-Karabagh and in the Southern Caucasus is that in the past year or two there has been a realization that peace is key. There is an understanding that without peace, this region will never be what it should be and needs to be. And, it is an

8 PANEL TRANSCRIPT understanding that is felt by all the presidents in that region. It is felt by President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, by President Kocharian of Armenia, and by President Shevardnadze of Georgia as well. It is an understanding that the status quo does not work. There are a lot of places around the world that have what are called “frozen conflicts,” and people look at them and say, “that is fine.” As long as they stay frozen, they do not bother a lot of people. But I think there is a feeling in the Caucasus that both of these conflicts will not stay frozen, and that the current cost of them being unresolved is a cost that is too high. Just a few words about the past because you could talk about this region for hours. But the conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh already cost 35,000 lives. It already displaced, as Brenda said, over one million people. There has been a ceasefire, so it is no longer a “hot” conflict. At the same time, people die there every week. For many years, there has been an average of a death per day due to incidents on the line of contact, land mine accidents, or shootings back and forth across the border. And there is a feeling that that human price is too high. But as I said, there is much more than just a human price in cost of life. There is a human price in loss of opportunity. You have today in Azerbaijan up to 800,000 people sitting in camps. They are not working. They are not living normal lives. They are not building on their own homes, developing their farms or property, or building businesses and futures. Their children are not living the kinds of lives that they need to have. It is a country that has stalled due to the lack of peace and due to the lack of a settlement on this issue. If you go to Armenia, you don’t have the same problem with refugee camps. But, you have a similar problem with people leaving the country, with, in effect, economic refugees. The lack of economic opportunity in Armenia has led to an enormous outflow, if not hemorrhage, of population. In the past few years, it has begun to threaten the integrity of the country. It does not mean that the country is going to disappear. It doesn’t mean that someday everyone would leave. They would not. But it starts undermining the real basis of the nation itself. And there are problems that the leadership in Armenia, and as I said before, the leadership in Azerbaijan, have both recognized. If you do not tackle the problem of peace, you cannot build the future you need for your countries. So there is a real understanding of the urgency and the essentiality of finding peace. Let me give you a few words about the peace process and how it has worked in this conflict. It has had a long history. It is a varied history. For about a decade there has been a group set up to help with negotiations over the dispute over Nagorno-Karabagh called the Minsk Group that has had in it about a dozen countries under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Its composition changes a little from year to year. But they have been working with the leadership in both countries and with local authorities in Karabakh to try to find a solution to this problem. They have not made tons of headway, and you will hear both the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan criticize them—that for a decade the international community has not been able to deliver peace here. You could also hear criticism in other parts of the world that for half a century the international community has not been able to deliver peace in the Middle East. Or, for 25 years, the international community has not been able to deliver peace in Cyprus. Peace is not something, in fact, that the international community tends to deliver. A lot of things are required to make it possible. But for over ten years, the international community has signaled its willingness to help here. And, it has been engaged in trying to help. The Minsk Group worked on proposals and developed three peace proposals, which it presented to the politicians in the region. They rejected them, one after the other. One would dislike one proposal for one reason and another proposal for a different reason. And, there was an understanding after the third proposal that this was a process that could go forever. The Minsk Group could create a thousand proposals perhaps, and never hit upon a proposal that would really be instantly embraced by the leadership of the region.

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So there was a feeling that we would do better—the international community. We needed greater guidance from the region itself on how to find peace. What that led to, and what I think has been very effective and helpful, is a direct dialog between the president of Armenia and the president of Azerbaijan. It started about two years ago, almost exactly two years ago, on the margins of the NATO summit in Washington. Since then, they have met each other about 16 times; 16 times in a two year period is a remarkably big track record for two countries officially at war and with the differences that divide these two. But you have a situation where the top leadership of both countries have actually started sitting down at a table, often alone, and sorting through what is needed to bring peace to this region. Their direct dialog has had ups and downs, but they have maintained it. They felt it was important. And, the international community and the Minsk Group in working with them also felt that it was important. They have kept it private because of a feeling that the only way to advance peace in this region is in fact to have a package that is largely worked out before it is presented to people. And, in their discussions with the Minsk Group and the co-chairman of the Minsk Group, they have been supportive of that—that it is a logical approach to this peace process. I should add that there has been a change in how the Minsk Group operated. As I said, originally it gave them proposals and then realized that they weren’t going anywhere. It also changed in its structure, and a few years ago shifted to where it has three chairmen: the United States, Russia and France. It was three countries coming together to take the leadership of that body and to put behind it enormous political, economic and even military clout. In effect, a lot of muscle to show that the international community was concerned and a lot of diplomatic muscle to show that if the parties were prepared to find a path to peace, the world was prepared to help them. The direct dialog between the presidents has been positive and fruitful. It helped give us a better indication of what might be possible. That led to another change in this peace process early this year when the two presidents met in Paris. Not only did they meet one another, but they met the next day with French President Jacques Chirac. So they moved from a direct private dialog between the two, to a dialog that included one of the co-chairs of the negotiating team. And, that moved the process a little bit further. They met again in Paris with Jacques Chirac in March. There was a feeling at that meeting that not only had they made progress in their direct dialog, but this new format, where an outsider was brought in, also helped them move even further. And, that you could go even further with yet a different format that would put at the table not simply the French, but also the United States and Russia. Because of those meetings in Paris, we made a decision to invite them to “Paradise.” We had a discussion between France, Russia and the United States about bringing the two presidents to the United States. We all agreed very quickly that in fact the opportunity looked very promising. We raised it with the two presidents directly, and they both instantly embraced the idea. We changed their format yet again from one of direct dialog to one of what are called in diplomatic terms, “proximity talks.” They come and do not primarily meet with one another, but meet with negotiators who then serve as intermediaries between the two. What they did in “Paradise,” when we brought them to Key West, Florida in the beginning of April, was very different from anything they had ever done before. They had had dialogs. They had been talking about concepts. They had met often—as I said, 16 times. But they would usually meet for only an hour or two. We had them come to the United States for four days of basically non-stop negotiations. And in fact, they came prepared to have 6 days of non-stop negotiations if we needed more time when we were in Florida. The results of those talks are still private. As I said, the presidents have asked that they stay private. But we found that they made very serious, concrete progress there. They started

10 PANEL TRANSCRIPT moving in a very positive way: away from just concepts of how you might come about finding a path to peace, to concrete details on how that might be possible. It led the Minsk Group co- chairmen to start looking at preparing a new proposal, which we are now doing, that would build upon the direct dialog the presidents had, and bring in from the outside ideas that we had. So we are in a very different place in this peace process than we have ever been before. At the end of the meetings in Florida, both presidents said they felt that the prospects for peace were significantly heightened, that they may be closer to peace now than they have been in a decade. It does not guarantee that they will find it. And I think they made that clear. But it shows that the promise of peace is there. Let me say a little bit about prospects. I think there is a potential now, and we have seen it in Florida, that they could find peace at the table. What is not clear is whether they can find a peace that will instantly or readily be embraced by the people of the region. The presidents have, in effect, gone ahead of their people. They have met with each other; they have established a relationship. They have come to understand that without peace, their region can never be what they want it to be. But they have done that alone. They have not yet brought their people to the same point. A lot of their people still question the idea of peace and how peace could be achieved. They question what kind of compromises would be acceptable to gain peace. And the presidents of the region are now approaching a point where they will have to find out, “Can you find a peace solution at a negotiating table, with the help of the co-chairs, that the people will accept?” I think there is an understanding that that peace cannot be perfect; but that the peace must be better than what they have today. And, peace can guarantee a tomorrow that the status quo they have today can never deliver. But it will take enormous political skills and enormous courage to be able to move from a peace agreement that is reached at a table to get it to be embraced by people. So they need to be able to build popular support, and it is probably the biggest task that lies before them today. We are going to have peace negotiations again in June in Switzerland. We have already announced this. The presidents have asked that we repeat the negotiating format that we pursued in Florida. That will be our intent. But what looms on the horizon is this more difficult task: how do you go and present this to people so that they will accept it and understand it? I think it is understood that a peace proposal will make some people “pleased.” But it is even more understood that it will make many people “passionate.” It will make a lot of people “pissed off”: “How can you be negotiating peace when I have had to live in a refugee camp for the past seven years?” “How can you be negotiating peace when my brother gave his life to get that land; I feel my group has owned that land for a thousand years, but it was denied us. Now it is in our hands, and you say we give it back, or we change how it is handled.” It is a daunting task that lies ahead of these leaders. But it is one that, if you are a leader, is crucial. Because, how do you give the people what they need if you cannot guide them and show them that the promise of tomorrow that comes with peace is better than all the other options. What the leaders have found, and I think the last year has been telling in this, is very few people have come up with any other options. The only option you occasionally hear is to fight. Both countries have already seen that fighting got them very little. Fighting has not led to a situation where Azerbaijan can feel that it is comfortable. Fighting has led to a situation where hundreds of thousands of people are in camps. Fighting has not led to a situation where Armenians can say, “Oh now our country is perfect, in a stable situation with defendable borders and a healthy economy.” No. Fighting did not yield for either what they need or want. I think both presidents have come to understand that the only way to get that is peace. As I said, now they need to find a way to convince the people of the same.

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The bottom line here then is that peace is a prize. However, it is dependent not simply on presidents, but also on people — the populace of the South Caucasus - to make it a promise that can also be a reality. Thank you.

SHAFFER: I would like to thank Ambassador Cavanaugh. I think in all of the academic debates on the role of the individual and the place of history, Ambassador Cavanaugh is a great example in favor of the argument that the person can make a difference. You can tell by the depth of his words and his emotional attachment to them that he has played an important personal role in getting to the place we are today and the place we are hopefully going toward. With deep respect I would like to present Professor Hamlet Isaxanli. He is the founder and president of Khazar University. It is the first private university founded in Azerbaijan, which was at the time the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. At great risk, in a different political climate, Professor Isaxanli was really a pioneer in founding this university. He is in origin a mathematician. He received his Doctorate of Science from the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science. He worked in the Institute of Mathematics in Moscow. He has had more than 80 research articles in all fields: mathematics, education, a textbook for language study, and most importantly a book of poetry. From my knowledge of his work in Azerbaijan, I think he is a special figure in terms of combining academic research and excellence with practice—to build something in Azerbaijan. He is a man who is respected by both the government and the opposition, and is a real central cultural figure in Azerbaijan. I would like to hear your views.

PROFESSOR ISAXANLI: To discuss possible actions and behaviors of the political powers in Azerbaijan and of the intelligentsia on the Nagorno-Karabagh problem, and to discuss a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the current situation should be considered. I think the majority of Azerbaijani people today think that a peace agreement is good. But it should be a right, true and fair agreement. But, what is it? I think it is of course the art of compromise. The artists are the president of Armenia and president of Azerbaijan, the so-called Minsk Group, and of course first of all the U.S. and Russia. I believe the best way for a compromise will be finding a well-balanced power sharing distribution of competencies—mostly horizontal relations among the regions not only of Azerbaijan but also in Armenia and Georgia. But at the same time, there must be vertical links with the center because there is no state, even with democratic traditions, without center-region relations. The Azeri people, I think, have agreed upon a peace agreement that to a certain extent reflects these conditions. However, there are certain political and other powers, like the armed forces, that do not want any compromise concerning the real options for power sharing between Baku and Xankendi—Stepanakert—to name Azerbaijan and Armenians names. Unfortunately such a military frame of mind is increasing day by day in Azerbaijan, particularly after the Paris meeting of our two presidents. Maybe people are tired of uncertainty. And taking into account their patriotic feelings, they are ready to go after some war calls. I am afraid that Azerbaijan may become a quasi-military state. Mass media, political parties and other powers are doing their best in this direction. It may be the same for Armenia, I do not know exactly. Concerning the market of a possible peace agreement, I think that in Azerbaijan I can see that the signing of a peace agreement should be agreed upon first with opposition parties like Musavat, the Popular Front, the Azerbaijan National Independence Party and others, because they are fairly strong and influential. These political parties do not recognize the new parliament. Otherwise the situation after the signing of a peace agreement may become seriously unstable.

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My belief is that the best option for Armenia and Azerbaijan would be to build a common house in the near future, with transparency of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, trade development between the two countries, academic initiatives, and cooperative regional educational and cultural developments. Historical justification by all parties is important for the understanding of the political situation, but not in solving the problem. Let me give an example. In the 19th Century, Tbilisi, the capital city of Georgia, was mainly an Armenian city, then a Russian, then a Georgian and Azerbaijani city. In Baku, the Azerbaijani people were in the minority. Yerevan was a city more Azerbaijani than Armenian. What would we do now if we thought only about historical justification? I think history is for the humanities. It is for identity studies, but not for solving problems that need compromise. Thank you.

SHAFFER: We are very lucky to have Professor Ronald Suny with us here from the University of Chicago. He is a professor of political science. Professor Suny is really one of the leading academics today writing on the issues of collective identity and theories of identity. In addition, he is a foremost historian on the history of the Caucasus. In fact he has been very fair and has written a book on Georgia, a book on Armenia and a book on Azerbaijan. He is really an authority on the history of the region. He has written an important proposal for the resolution of the Karabagh conflict that appeared in recent years. And, something that is very important about Professor Suny is that he is outspoken; he has never been afraid to voice important and often minority opinions. It gives him a great moral authority in discussing these issues: Professor Suny.

PROFESSOR SUNY: Thanks. It has gotten me into a lot of trouble. Thank you for coming. This is obviously an extraordinarily important topic. I can see by the interest in this room that it is a vital issue for people in this area as well as in the Caucasus. I want to thank my two interlocutors here for coming, particularly Ambassador Cavanaugh who has been doing such extraordinarily important work in Key West and elsewhere. I am going to start at the end. I am going to read to you two paragraphs from the end of two papers I wrote on this problem and on the Caucasus. One was presented at a conference at the State Department. The other was published in Middle East Forum. They represent where I was at, and what I was thinking, say, a year ago. So I am going to start there and then try to move on from those positions.

First, the pessimistic side:

Politics in Armenia, Karabagh and Azerbaijan are elite politics, with the public sitting aside as spectators. Among politicians, politics is a war of attrition, infighting among parties and personalities for the spoils that come with power: everything from office space and apartments to connections, bribes, access to the influential. Quasi-democratic practices have given each of the regimes some authority. But these are formal democracies. These are delegative democracies. The status quo is ultimately maintained by those who control the means of violence. No one since the early days of independence has been able to establish legitimate authority in these countries, or create a hegemonic political culture that sanctions the ruling elites’ dominant position. The political order in Armenia, Karabagh and Azerbaijan floats above the ground—weak states with strong armies. The nation suffers. If they can, the people flee or live in camps, and hope evaporates.

Now the more optimistic side:

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Because of the interrelations of the economic, ecological and ethnic problems in the South Caucasus, regional solutions are essential (and it seems that the presidents of these republics have recognized that). These small states with their long history of interaction and dependency can only grow stronger with the end of these debilitating conflicts. Oil development in Azerbaijan can be maximized only after peace and stability is achieved; Armenia, Karabagh and Georgia as well, can only develop with open borders, invigorated regional trade and the reduction of military spending. The piping of oil and gas through Armenia and Georgia would only consolidate the economic and security interests of the three republics. The future need not reflect the recent past of unbearable ethnic horrors. Though Karabagh will be distinct from the rest of Azerbaijan constitutionally and demographically (in the future, in my view) the fact that Azerbaijanis and Armenians have lived together and will be able to live together, to return to their homes, perhaps, in what will be more bi-national or multinational states, suggests a renewal of older patterns familiar to Caucasians of interethnic, inter-religious coexistence. It is this optimistic scenario that we hope we can look forward to.

Now, much of my view of what goes on in the Caucasus, and why I think a solution to this conflict is possible, stems from a kind of epistemological philosophical, or if you call it, theoretical approach to the idea of the nation. I am just going to speak a moment about that. Some of you are familiar with these views. For others, it will be sort of counter-intuitive, new perhaps, and even nonsense. As many of you realize, in the academy for about the last, I would say quarter of a century, we have been talking about nations in ways different from the way journalists and nationalists themselves speak about nations. Journalists and nationalists, when they talk about nationalism, nations and nationality, talk of a fixed identity: something ancient that has come down through time, that is continuous, unbroken, or, in the words of academics - primordial. This ancient, primordial, continuous identity, something that is formed in history, in culture and often in blood—that is even in your racial and genetic makeup—is the way people see nations. And they argue that one nation and another are quite different, even if they have lived for decades, millennia, next to one another. In this university there are very prominent political scientists and others who argue that these people are fixed. The boundaries between them are quite different. And, that there is inevitably a clash of civilizations between them. This view we call primordialism. It is a view, by the way, which except at universities like Harvard and among some people here, you’ll forgive my insolence, is generally rejected and discredited. In the academy, another view has developed: a view that we can call the “modernist” view. That is a good way of saying it. It sounds positive. Or, a better term is “constructivism.” That is that these identities, the way people think about themselves and think about others, their own nation and their neighbors, are actually human constructions. They are built up over time in history, based on experience. They are based on understandings of what their past has been. They are based, very importantly on what they forgot their past was—memories that have been silenced and repressed. And new ways of thinking about identify have developed over time from ancient ethno- religious identities. The Armenian identity goes back 3,000 years. There have been records of Armenians: Pagans for 1,000 years, then Christians for another almost 2,000 years. But basically an ethno-religious identity that changed sometime in the late 18th and early 19th Century into what we would recognize as a modern, national identity based on secular culture, ethnic ties, language and other things.

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The point of this is that identity is changeable. The way people think about who they are and who others are actually has shifted over time. It has not been consistent for 3,000 years, or even for a couple of hundred years. Why would this be important? Why bother if people actually believe now, as they do out there in the field and in the real world, that there are ancient primordial fixed identities, that Armenians are fundamentally different from Azerbaijanis, that they have been fighting these people for centuries, and that there can be no love lost between them? Why does it matter if there is constructivism? Why does it matter whether these identities are actually primordial, rooted in nature, or biology, or deep culture, rather than being constructed more recently and changing over time? The point is, if they are fixed and primordial, then conflict is inevitable. Then these are, as the New York Times often tells us, or now Atlantic Magazine and Robert Kaplan particularly among them say: “These are ancient tribal struggles. They are things you cannot get over.” If they are constructed, they in fact may not be able to be deconstructed. We cannot forget everything that has happened. We cannot start all over again. But they can be, if not deconstructed, if not eliminated, they can be reconstructed. They can be thought of in new ways. Indeed, in our own experience in the 20th Century, Armenians and Azerbaijanis have gone through a number of phases of identity change, most particularly under the Soviets, in which they managed to live together. There was an officially sanctioned policy called Druzhba narodov, friendship of the peoples, enforced by the powerful Soviet State in which certain kinds of conflict and certain kinds of national differences and certain kinds of chauvinism…(end of tape)… Karabagh problem erupted. My argument is, and I have argued this in several places including at a talk I gave in Yerevan in 1997 and then had to be escorted from the room by security guards, but nevertheless, I hope I am in better shape here today… In any case, my argument is that we have actually experienced in the Caucasus—and I have been working in Caucasian history for almost 40 years—a Caucasian civilization. That is, there were relationships; there were cultural sharings, similar foods eaten; there were ways of dancing that were similar. For millennia, there were buildings built which you could not distinguish between being Armenian or Georgian. That is, there is something common to the Caucasus. There are all kinds of fractures and disputes, as we know now. People are ready to fight and die for these identities that have arisen in the last couple of hundred years. But nevertheless, underneath that, there are also shared cultural commonalities. The point is, we are fated as Armenians, as Georgians, and Karabaghtsy - and by the way my family is from Karabagh. I am a son of a Karabaghtsy from Shushi. We are fated, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Turks, Iranians and Russians, to live on a small part of the globe, next to one another. That is just a fact, unless we are going to have another genocide. And none of us want that. Armenians have suffered enough from that. In the last decade, Azerbaijanis have suffered from these deportations and forced refugee movements. Enough. We are going to live, somehow, on a very small part of the world’s territory. Together. Then the questions becomes: how are we going to do that? Is there a solution? As Ambassador Cavanaugh mentioned, there have been a number of different trials. I, myself, in various articles and with colleagues and others, have suggested what I think is a potential solution. I won’t go into details. One article is actually out there [sitting in the hall]. It is not important. It may be irrelevant by this point because I think the negotiations have gone in a slightly different direction. In my own view, one of the problems of the Karabagh conflict has been the very form of modern politics: what we call the nation-state solution. That is, the idea, somehow, that every nation, however it defines itself, ought to have its own state. And, the opposite—that every state ought to have one nation within it, or at least one dominant nation. That idea of trying to bring cultural groups called nations together with political boundaries and institutions called “states.”

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The fact that we think we can mesh those two and make them match has caused the trauma, the deportations, the ethnic cleansings and the genocide of the 20th Century. That is a utopian solution: in my view, more utopian than communism. It doesn’t work. And, we are still faced with it in the 21st Century. So we have a problem. How do we deal with this form of the state and this cultural- linguistic ethnic community called the nation? And, how do we manage to have these people live together? I am going to speak a bit theoretically at first and then I’ll be more concrete. My view is that we have to rethink the notion of sovereignty. From the 17th Century on, sovereignty meant that one group, the king originally, but eventually the nation, would have supreme power over a given territory. A state would have a single sovereign: the king or eventually the nation. What we are faced with in the Caucasus, and what we can be pioneering in the future is an idea of shared sovereignty: of multiple sovereignties, which by the way existed long before the modern era in that small area. So what we proposed, David Laitin and I, and others have said this, the international community, the Minsk Group, and indeed I think at one point in 1997 Ter-Petrossian, the first president of independent Armenia, and Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan came quite close to this: the idea that Karabagh, faithful to the principle of national self-determination, would be run by its own people, the absolute majority of whom are now Armenian. But, the second great principle of international affairs—territorial integrity and the non-changeability, immutability, of boundaries without mutual consent by two states—would also be respected. So formally, Karabagh would remain within Azerbaijan - very formally, perhaps a flag over the city hall or something of the sort. But it would be run and governed, fully as a newly independent state by the local people, namely the majority Armenians. Now it seems to me, as I understand from reading the press—and Ambassador Cavanaugh has not said much about this given his official position—the negotiations seem to have gone in a slightly different direction. The discussions in the last couple of years have been more about what is called negatively “territorial swaps” of one kind or another. My own view is that if you were actually going to swap territory, that is give Armenians Karabagh and Lachin, and give the Azerbaijani Meghri and the border with Iran, then that is a non-starter. That is not going to happen. And I don’t think that proposal, and I will be corrected, I am happy to be corrected, is on the table. What seems to be happening, and this is from a careful reading of the various press reports, but again, being a scholar not a diplomat, it is like reading the proverbial elephant blindly, is that there is some talk of linking Karabagh and Lachin directly to Armenia, and giving Azerbaijan some kind of connection through the…[tape unclear] Meghri end of Armenia. Some kind of sovereign road perhaps, linking Azerbaijan proper with Nakhichevan. Now, let us just suppose that something like that is the proposal now being negotiated. That brings us to Ambassador Cavanaugh’s second and most important question, “Can that be sold to the people of the two republics?” That brings me back to the very first point I mentioned, that politics in the Caucasus is elite politics. It is about leadership. These are not real, fully consolidated democracies. These are formal democracies, in which elites have tremendous control, and they manipulate populations. But, they manipulate them only within limits. You cannot fool all the people all the time. Though in some countries, you can do it a lot of the time. My view is that you have to have a solution that is saleable to these various publics. I think that Armenians could be convinced to accept a solution in which Karabagh and Lachin were formally part of Armenia, and no longer under Azerbaijani sovereignty, and even concede a sovereign road to Nakhichevan. I am very doubtful, and I hope that Professor Isaxanli will correct me if this is wrong, I am very doubtful that the Azerbaijani public will accept such a thing.

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My own reading of the press and so forth, and talking to people, has indicated that there is a much more bellicose and much more fiercely, I would call it patriotic or nationalistic, attitude in Azerbaijan than there was two or three years ago. So I am very doubtful about that. While I have raised a lot of issues, I have solved none of them. But then, no one else has either. And so I turn it over to Brenda.

SHAFFER: Okay, I would like to open the floor to your questions and discussions. A few rules of the game: when you are called upon, and only if you are called upon, please get the microphone from Emily. Please give your full name, and if you have an affiliation, we would like to hear it.

QUESTION: My name is Jason Sohigian and I am with the Armenian Weekly newspaper published here in Boston. I want to thank you for the presentation, and for allowing me to ask a question. One of my questions is about the makeup of your panel. I am not familiar with every panelist, but it seems like Ambassador Cavanaugh spoke with a lot of integrity, and then you brought two panelists. One sort of representing an Azeri position and one representing an Armenian position. And, neither of them is involved in the negotiations, the terms of which are kept secret from the public. So how is the public supposed to comment on or accept the propositions if they don’t know anything about them other than leaks to the New York Times or the Economist magazine? And I also would like to know why the presenters from these two ethnic groups were chosen, one is a mathematician, the other one as a few comments have made clear, does not really represent the viewpoint of most of the Armenians in Armenia or in the Diaspora.

SHAFFER: Thank you for your easy question. First, this is an academic forum and discussion and not the UN. There are no official positions. No one except for Carey is in an official position. Both of the professors were invited because of their knowledge of the Caucasus and not because of their specific ethnic background. We did not actually do “ethnic checks” on their ethnic background. I think what is interesting for us in this seminar in contrast to a lot of other seminars that are trying to deal with “who is right,” or even where the negotiations are, we are rather focusing on “what can you teach us about moving forward.” I think from their presentations they did give us important information in that area. In terms of the populations not knowing, or how the populations can judge, I would like to refer this to Carey. He can comment on the importance of leaks or lack of leaks in terms of the negotiations.

CAVANAUGH: Since I started with advice from my children, I should also highlight that my kids always say, “Don’t believe everything you read in the papers.” Leaks are not the best way to judge what is at play. I grew up in Florida where there was huge movement called “Sunshine Laws.” We thought the only way to deal with anything in government was that everything should be out in the open. In fact, most state and local governments in Florida are out in the open. There is the ability for every citizen to walk in and hear and see virtually everything that is done. That works in Florida, and it is helpful. But we did not have a big war in Florida. We haven’t had huge conflict where lots of people were killed, millions of lives changed, and there is a lot of passion about how you would deal with that. There has been a concern about secrecy—and we have responded to it positively—by the leadership of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It predates President Kocharian. The feeling is that it is very hard to have peace negotiations on this conflict out in the open. Woodrow Wilson used to talk about “open covenants openly arrived at.” A lot of people felt that was a big mistake too. After that, there has been more of a sense that a lot of the best covenants are arrived at in closed sessions, and then presented to people later.

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The leadership in the Caucasus has been making progress by having private discussions. And they feel that it has led them to be able to have a dialog that gives them a vision of the future. It does not tackle the problem you raise. And it is a problem I raised. How do you sell this to people? How do you convince people? But I will tell you that they look over their shoulder, and what they see today is the Middle East. And they see in the Middle East a lot of effort made to try to find a creative solution to an unbelievably vexing problem. What they saw is that the leaders in the Middle East came very close, and as elements of what they were discussing became public, those elements were ripped apart. To the idea of dividing the city of Jerusalem, people said, “How could you ever imagine doing that? That has been a basic position here forever. We would never divide the city of Jerusalem.” To changing the right of return for Palestinians, they said, “How could you ever think of doing that? We have always said all along we would never do that.” To dividing the Temple Mount where the top of the Temple Mount goes to one side and the bottom of the Temple Mount goes to another? “Who came up with this idea?” people said. But there was a feeling, and you hear it more and more today in the Middle East, that perhaps all those elements in fact came very close to a proposal that might have worked for everybody. If in fact Barak and Arafat could have come out to the people and said, “We have made incredibly difficult decisions. And we have made really hard compromises on both sides that touch core issues we have always felt couldn’t be changed or dealt with. But we have done this, and we believe if you agree to this, you have a different tomorrow right now. You have peace right now.” I don’t know if it would have worked in the Middle East. But I know that is where they were headed and what they were trying to do. What I can tell you about the Caucasus is that they have that same perspective. “If we can find something, we two presidents, with the support of the United States, Russia and France…” If they can find a package that they think their people can accept, they think they have a much better chance going to the people and saying after all these years, “This, we believe, is the best chance for peace. And it has serious compromise in it. But, if you agree, we think this works, and peace isn’t an imaginary thing. It is not a dream. It is tomorrow.” That is what they are trying to do, and that is why it is private.

SHAFFER: In going back to the Middle East examples, we can see one successful peace arrangement, and one—so far—not successful peace arrangement. The Camp David agreement was arranged when Moshe Dayan flew to Morocco, met the foreign minister of Egypt and basically signed a deal. Sadat came to Jerusalem after the deal was already made. A done deal was presented to the two peoples. There was nothing left to debate over. In contrast, the Oslo Agreement went on the idea of stages. Basically what it did was encourage the radicals on both sides that the real prizes, the end agreement is still out there. “Let’s all radicalize it. Let’s use terror. Let’s build more settlements. Let’s try to create the facts on the ground.” And it actually encouraged violence and extreme policy on both sides by leaving the jewels still to be taken. So we see two different techniques in negotiations.

QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Gonca Sönmez-Poole . I am actually a broadcast journalist and TV producer with a more recent interest in education through the use of new technology. I have a question for Mr. Suny. Correct me if I am wrong. I am very interested in your discussion related to the ways we think about “nation.” Am I to understand that maybe the solution lies more in terms of not making all these geographical changes and swaps, but maybe going back to the way it was in the area? I mean changing the way that the groups and minorities and peoples are dealt with in terms of rights and privileges of the people who live in that geographic area?

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SUNY: That is a hard question. First of all, let me say that I am not a spokesman for the Armenians. Absolutely not. I just happen to be Armenian. Born in the United States. Very often my students ask me, “Professor Suny, when you retire, are you going to go back to your homeland?” I say to them: “To Philadelphia?” Anyway, obviously I am happy to be an Armenian. It is a great country, with great people, great food, great music and all the rest. This is an important question. Basically, my sense is that there are a couple of different problems that prevent a solution. One is that we are not dealing with a democratic situation. That is, if there were a democratic situation, if people were choosing governments in a real way, if there were governments that were responsible to the electorate, if there were real guarantees of minority rights, and all the rest of it, then we would have a different universe. So, we are dealing with a very particular universe. Secondly, we are dealing with a universe that is post-Soviet, post-colonial, and post- imperial. The very word autonomy… for example, the Azerbaijanis suggest to Armenians: “You will have the fullest possible autonomy.” The word autonomy, or the word federation, federatzia in Russian, reeks with meaning. It has a Soviet meaning. Soviet “autonomy” was phony. The federation was phony in the Soviet Union. So Karabagh was autonomous in the Soviet period, which meant that it had no real rights. It was run from Baku and from Moscow. So all of these terms are suspect. You have a real language problem. I think it is very clear that Armenians, having won this war, and let’s face it, they won the war and occupied this territory, do not want any Azerbaijani authority over them. What I have been suggesting, and what I think I think is a potential solution, is that the “authority of Azerbaijan” over Karabagh would be merely formal. The actual running of Karabagh would be in the hands of the local population, which I hope would include Azerbaijani returnees as well. But it would have to be sold, and clearly Levon Ter-Petrossian was unable to sell it even to his closest comrades in 1998.

SHAFFER: If you could, please elaborate on this point, because I think it is crucial for thinking of something constructive. You said that most of the population is Armenian, but there were 35,000 Azerbaijanis who are now refugees from the same Shusha/Shushi that your father came from, and other cities. So, how do you envision some sort of role for these Azerbaijanis for whom Karabagh is also home?

SUNY: The thing is, once there is a solution, once there is a peace settlement, once government institutions are in place and so forth, then these other things can be worked out. But I guess my prejudice is that trying to establish homogenous ethno-national states so that all Armenians are on “this” territory and nowhere else, and all Azerbaijanis are over “there” is really historically impossible. That is, we live in a globalizing period with labor migrations. It is impossible in Europe in the first ethno-national states. It is becoming impossible in the Balkans as well. It seems to me that this is just holding things up. First, settle the problem, set up the institutions, etc. Bring peace to the area. Then, these problems, which are very important, will be resolved. If you tell me, Brenda, how we can both have a Palestinian State and the right of return of Palestinians to Israel proper, then I will give you a solution as well.

QUESTION: Garnik Nanagoulian, I am from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and in the meantime, one of those happy Armenians. I am from Armenia, but here I represent myself and maybe my kids as well. I have been trying to take advantage of Ambassador Cavanaugh’s unofficial presence here and ask you an unofficial question. Could I reformulate what you have said? The two presidents have intellectually committed themselves to some kind of a formula for the solution? And it is just a matter of selling that solution to the public?

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SHAFFER: I will add that Mr. Nanagoulian is also former Minister of Trade of Armenia.

CAVANAUGH: I wouldn’t put it in exactly those terms. I think the presidents have come to understand that the only way their countries will prosper in the way they want them to is to find peace. In the dialog, they have worked around a framework for a solution. What they worked on in Key West was taking a framework and making it more concrete. This is what the Minsk Group Co-Chairs are doing with them. But, we were not able to finish all that work in Florida. So, you cannot say it in the same way you did, which is more definitive than where they are today. But they are headed in that direction. And I think the most important thing is that they understand both the need for peace and the fact that the only way you get peace is with serious compromise. There is no situation at the negotiating table where either side can come and walk away with every single thing they wanted. That does not yield peace in this region.

QUESTION: Blanka Hancilova, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. I have several very short questions and I think that they are closely linked. I hope that it will be easy to answer them. I would like to ask whether the OSCE is the best mediator, or whether eventually there will be somebody else—another body or group of states? What do you think is the role of Russia and the United States in the mediation process? Do they help the process, or in fact could we say that sometimes they have not helped, because they had contradictory interests? And finally, why is it possible to see a settlement in sight now, and why wasn’t it possible two or three years ago? What has changed? Where are we now?

CAVANAUGH: That is a lot of questions. On the OSCE: when we bought our house in Virginia, we hired a real estate agent and a home inspector. Both were bad. They did not do good jobs. We paid more for the house than we should have. It had more problems than they alerted us to. But in fact we bought the house. Is the OSCE the best negotiator? I don’t know. I don’t know that anyone could say who is the best. Is the OSCE better than the United Nations? Is the United Nations better than Russia alone? I think what we have come up with is something that generally works and that the parties accept. And as I think I explained in terms of process, it has evolved. In many ways the negotiations, the mediation part, is being done by Russia, France and the United States, not by all 55 states of the OSCE. The expectation is that if an agreement can be found, the 55 states of the OSCE are going to be key in helping to implement it. But that will also draw upon other nations in the world and the United Nations. Regarding Russia and the United States. Yes, you can make a case that at different times we have had very different outlooks on how to resolve this problem. And that difference maybe did not help speed a solution. Today I would say that the outlook and perspective of Moscow, Washington and Paris are virtually identical. That has made for a much greater chance of finding a settlement and moving this forward. But that has also coincided with an understanding between the two presidents of the two countries in the region—that peace is needed, compromise is needed, and a better idea of how to move that ahead. So a lot of things have come together all at once that have put us in a better place for finding peace than before. That said, all of those things do not mean that peace will be achieved. And it doesn’t mean that that the political environment that has led to a coalition or coalescence of viewpoints and ideas will be maintained. It could disappear tomorrow. Already we have seen in the past, violence in this region that has set back peace efforts. There were major assassinations in the Armenian Parliament in October 1999 at another time when peace was moving quickly ahead. That made it very hard to move ahead. Other things could happen that would do the same thing. But I think there is a belief out there that there is a window of opportunity now, and that while that window is there, it should be taken advantage of.

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SUNY: Two small points. I agree with everything that the Ambassador said. After the fall of Ter-Petrossian, the new Armenian president believed that you could decouple the negotiations with Karabagh and economic development. That is, there were specific statements made. That went on for a couple of years. That clearly did not happen. So that idea, that policy, if you can call it a policy, did not work. And a realization that the country is actually dying, that this is a small country…Milan Kundera, the Czech writer, once said, “A small nation can disappear, and knows it.” And Armenians know that they can disappear. They have been on the brink before, and it can happen again. And that kind of realization has led to, I think, this more realistic approach. On Russia, this is extraordinarily important. I hope you heard what Ambassador Cavanaugh was saying. That is, there are all kinds of scenarios. You can use all kinds of logical and illogical schemes to create ideas of where Russia is going. We don’t actually know very well where Russia is going. But you can make a very plausible argument that Russia, given its own problems, not only internally but in the North Caucasus specifically, realizes that the time has come that they have got to settle this thing. Or settle something in the Caucasus. They have several different areas: Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabagh. They are playing from the same game plan as the United States, and that is a very hopeful sign.

SHAFFER: Could we say that there is a consensus among the speakers that one of the turning points that made these negotiations possible was cooperation between Russia and the U.S., where in the past those relations have actually been a rivalry that has escalated events in the Caucasus?

CAVANAUGH: I don’t know if I would say escalated events, but prevented being able to move forward quickly.

SHAFFER: Something that we are hearing from all of the speakers is that the status quo does not seem to be an option. The realization, I think it was Professor Isaxanli speaking about the idea that there is this other alternative, this voice in Azerbaijan, the possibility of war. And Professor Suny and Ambassador Cavanaugh have also spoken about the idea of the massive emigration from Armenia. So, we see it as consensus that status quo is not an option. How much are we in a threat of war if the negations fail?

CAVANAUGH: And this is part of Moscow, again, when you get back to “Why has the Russian perception perhaps changed in this region?” If the status quo cannot last forever, that means you face the prospect of renewed conflict. Look at the situation you have in the region where Russia, Turkey, and Iran come together; where Russia has a military relationship with one of the parties, Armenia, and where fighting would instantly draw Russian forces in. When Russia already has problems in the North Caucasus, with Chechnya. Russia already has problems with Russian soldiers coming back dead from a fight inside their country. The prospect of renewed conflict in the Caucasus cannot be something that would make anyone comfortable in Moscow. There is also, I think, an understanding—and it is one that has grown over time—that the economic stalling of these economies is not in Russia’s benefit. Russia would be part of any economic expansion in the Caucasus. Russian businesses are well located there, they have expertise there, they speak languages that are understood in the region—either the local languages or their own. The idea of an expanding Armenian economy, an expanding Azerbaijani economy is an opportunity for Moscow. The fact of them just being stalled, or collapsing, is a negative for Moscow. There are lots of reasons that lead to a different response from Moscow that is favorable.

QUESTION: Laurent Ruseckas with CERA consulting firm here in Cambridge. This is a big change in the way a lot of people see this. I think we have been hearing for years that Russia has a

21 PANEL TRANSCRIPT constructive approach. I think you hear it more, and people believe it more. But there are still a lot of people who don’t believe it. The argument against it is a pretty clear one: at least the status quo gives Russia a leverage that it wouldn’t have if there were peace, and if there were Armenian-Turkish friendship and normalization. Then Russia would have less leverage from a realist perspective. I find it interesting that we have a new administration that says “we are a realist administration.” They mean that, I think, not just in the realistic, but also in the political science sense. I wonder (and I don’t expect anyone to answer this) if Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld thinks that Russia has this trade-economic benefit, positive sum view of this, rather than a hard-line view on what Russia’s interests are. You have already gotten into the issue quite a bit, but were you saying that Russia would probably prefer the status quo to peace? That the fear of going back to war is worse? Would they prefer peace to the risk of further war? Would you agree that the status quo is bad for Russia as well?

CAVANAUGH: I think I have made clear that the status quo is not really helping anyone, and it is clear it will not last. Let me make a point that I think is important. It comes up in academic discussions a fair amount. As a device, it is easy to say “Russia believes” and “Russia feels.” But in fact Russia is millions of voices and lots of different bureaucracies interacting. There are people in Moscow who are probably delighted at the situation in the Caucasus. There are people in Moscow who wake up every day and hope something bad happens to Eduard Shevardnadze because they are never going to forgive him for bringing about, in their mind, the end of the Soviet Union. There are people in Moscow who wake up every day and say, “If only the Armenian economy was better, these people would leave the market and go back to Armenia and stop being competitors for me, trying to sell fruits and vegetables here. There are all different attitudes in Moscow. There are all kinds of different attitudes in Yerevan. But, there are trends. There was a perception four or five years ago in Moscow, that if all the countries on the periphery were unstable, then any time there was any trouble, they would turn to their old friends, their paternal relative in Moscow. I think there is an understanding that history has not borne that out to be true. When there has been trouble in some of these countries, several of them turned west. They turn in directions where there are people who can help them, and have the ability to help them, or where they see an ability to create balance and influence and different factors. But it has changed that attitude in Moscow. You will find fewer and fewer people who say, “Instability in these regions means they turn to us.” Just as Professor Suny said, there was an attitude in Armenia that if you just wait a while, people will forget about this war. International business is going to say, “Here is a great place to invest. There is a highly trained populace who are incredibly ingenious in high tech areas, computers, mathematics and medicine. They are going to pour money in here. New factories will open up and Armenia will prosper.” This didn’t happen. And, it isn’t going to happen. As many efforts are made to increase investment in Armenia -and there is a big one coming up, a big U.S. Trade Development Agency- sponsored effort in New York in May with World Bank participation. President Kocharian is coming for it. Jim Wolfensohn is the keynote speaker. But there is a feeling that it will not yield much investment unless you can find peace. Those trends have moved into a different direction.

ISAXANLI: I have a little different answer to this question. I think Russia has access to all the energy resources of the Caspian Sea just now, the pipeline investment in Azerbaijan and a strategic partnership with Armenia. That is why I don’t believe that Russia indeed is for real peace because Karabagh is such a good tool for the country. Russian diplomacy has two faces all the time. Speak one way and then act differently, I think.

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QUESTION: Miriam Lanskoy, Boston University. Last summer I remember there was talk of an aid package that would be tied to a peace deal. Is that still on the table, and what does it consist of?

CAVANAUGH: Last summer the Minsk Group brought together in Geneva representatives of a dozen international agencies to begin looking at what they would need to do if peace could be achieved by way of resettlement of internally displaced people, and the economic reconstruction of the region from the fighting. They have been working on that some independently. We are now looking, after Key West, at what steps to take again to reinvigorate that process, to get ready for a possible peace. It is clear that there is a dilemma in the international community on how we respond to peace. It is one you will probably never be able to get past, but governments are governments. They have budgets and plans, and it takes time. Congresses and parliaments appropriate money. And then, how do you have money for peace or emergencies when they arise? What we have tried to do here, recognizing that there is a chance for a peace settlement, is to jump start the international community in its preparatory work so that if the presidents and the Minsk Group can work together and find a peace that the people of the region will embrace, the international community can respond much more quickly. Part of this has grown out of other recent peace efforts where we have seen the international community responding effectively, but how hard it was to get the resources in time for people, because in the end these peace deals aren’t paper, but they are people. If you have a peace solution, that means that hundreds of thousands of people are returning home. It is very easy in a peace proposal to say, “In sixty days this happens.” But what you have is someone who has lived for seven years in a refugee camp, reads the newspaper and it says, “There is a peace settlement.” They pack up and start walking home. And the international community needs to be as ready as it can be that if they walk home and get there, you are there to help them. And you are not there saying, “We know you walked home, but in six months, we will have time to work through the budget process. We will get some people here on the ground.” We have started that process so that maybe in two to three months, if peace is achieved, you can have that happening.

QUESTION: Brian Mandell, I teach here at the Kennedy School. Do we need to think about reconceptualizing this concept of peace settlement? I am struck most recently by the difficulties being experienced by the Israelis and Palestinians for example. That the notion of going for the big comprehensive deal becomes problematic, including mobilizing the resources of the international community to support these peace packages or deals. In the conflict in whic h we are all concerned about here today, are incremental steps a better way to bring in the international community to commit fewer dollars at a time and fewer kinds of resources to create at least momentum and confidence building in the direction of these potentially larger agreements without having failure along the way?

CAVANAUGH: That is a good question. It is very dependent on particular conflicts. Some conflicts, in fact, lend themselves to incremental solutions and confidence building measures, moving toward a more gradual peace process. And the international community, as you said, in many ways can handle those more readily. The one we are talking about today, in fact, I think has gone past that. They are so much closer today to a comprehensive peace settlement, if it is one that can be embraced by the publics, that the other is not really one that people would consider working on. They have felt all along, that aside from establishing a cease-fire, which they did do about six years ago, this conflict was not well suited to incremental steps. In part due to the great number of people displaced and in part due to the amount of territory that is occupied. There has been a very strong reluctance to incremental steps.

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But that is often the case in big conflicts and particularly, in frozen conflicts: the ones that tend to be frozen or ones that are resistant to these smaller stages.

QUESTION: My name is Sossi Tatikyan. I am a student here on leave from the Armenian foreign service. You said that the presidents should be first, and they should persuade the population of their countries to change their mentality. How can it happen? I think you would agree that it is very difficult to notice any change of style in the opening statement of President Aliyev in Florida. It was exactly in the same style as it would have been ten years ago.

ISAXANLI: Maybe the statement of President Aliyev was the same as ten years ago because nothing has changed. We have the same situation: conflict, occupation, refugees. It hasn’t changed much.

CAVANAUGH: Let me say as a student, I am sure you have run into this already, and it is the dilemma that you have to look at this huge record to get a good perspective of what is going on. I think if you take one speech in isolation from any of these leaders, it is very hard to get a good feel of where they are headed and what they are thinking. If you look at the speech President Aliyev made in Florida, it does in fact sound a lot like speeches he gave several years earlier. If you look at the debates that took place in the Azerbaijani Parliament last month, I think you will find some very different things there. And if you start folding the comments President Aliyev made after the meetings in Florida and after his meetings with President Bush in Washington, and upon arrival in Azerbaijan, and couple those with the statements at the parliament, and then do the same with President Kocharian, you will see a very different trend line. You will see elements emerging in the statements of each that give you a clear indication that in fact in their minds, things are changing, and both of them are putting out messages. Maybe they are too subtle. I don’t know. I am not a politician from this region, so I don’t know how subtle you need to be in delivering messages to your people. But they are signaling their people to be ready for peace and to be ready for compromise and to start thinking about different outcomes, both positive and negative if peace does not work. There is a debate going on, or started, in both countries in the last three months that was not there a year or two years ago. I think it is easy to find. You can find it on the Internet. If you call up a lot of articles, you will see that there is a very different discussion going on today in Yerevan and Baku than before.

SHAFFER: I would like to add here that if you take the beginning of Aliyev’s speech, yes, it was something of the past: refugees, war and occupation. But if you look at the bottom line there, it was, “despite this, we have to move on.” I think that was the bottom line message. Also I think the same kind of critical thinking we use in America when you hear a senator stand up and say, “We must work for U.S. defense. We must build those ships,” and then you remember, “Oh, in his district he happens to have a shipyard. Now I know why he is talking about U.S. defense.” I think when we look at the Caucasus and the Middle East, we have to use that same critical thinking we use when we discuss American politicia ns. When they are discussing family values, what is the real program or money they are trying to get in a certain congressional district? We have to use that same clear critical thinking when we look at the Caucasus and the region. Some things that sound so ideological and so historical are billed for certain constituencies and certain political agendas.

QUESTION: My name is Elin Suleymanov, I am from the Embassy of Azerbaijan. I will ask Mr. Suny a question based on his previous comments. Mr. Suny, I tremendously enjoyed your presentation. It is very refreshing to hear that the nation-state in fact, and I personally cannot

24 PANEL TRANSCRIPT stand this idea… but the fact that states should not be ethnically based is a great idea. I am not speaking as a spokesman for the Azerbaijani Embassy. It is a personal observation. In all fairness, in all the imperfections of our societies as we try to build them, it is probably fair to say that in a way Azerbaijanis, at least in the beginning of all this independence movement did view and still hopefully view, at least some us, Azerbaijan as a multi-ethnic society and more citizenship based than ethnically based. Your comment was interesting about possible solutions of Nagorno-Karabagh: that Azerbaijan would have formal authority, but the real things would be run by the people of Karabagh. Of course. I don’t think anyone in Azerbaijan today views the solution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict as putting troops in Xankendi, if you call it Stepanakert. I think we are past that. Many people realize it, I think. And I think people realize it in Armenia as well. But my question is, since we don’t know the details of the confidential talks…

SHAFFER: But you were at the negotiations in Florida….

SULEYMANOV: I was riding my scooter around there. Maybe Mr. Suny, you can give us a hypothetical model. I was struck by one observation of yours. You mentioned Caucasian civilization—meaning the Caucasus, not white people. (In fact we are called “blacks” in Moscow.) But give us your view, if you could, about how you see the possibility of building this multi-ethnic society of the Caucasus. Conflicts are happening, not only between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also in Georgia and the North Caucasus. [….end of tape…] “Oh, I am happy to live next to an Armenian neighbor.” I am not sure it is the same today. I mean, the continuation of the conflict changes peoples’ addiction, let’s put it, to a multicultural existence. That is not only in Azerbaijan. We could see it Chechnya, Abkhazia, or everywhere. So if you could give us an idea of how you see the multiethnic societies living there. Whatever you say, I would support it, because I actually like that idea very much.

SUNY: When you speak about these things, it sounds terribly utopian. There are two stages. One is “Let’s get the architecture right first.” Let’s end the conflict, figure out what will be acceptable both to the elites and eventually to the people. Let’s figure out the final statuses of these places, etc. The reason I mention this idea of sharing sovereignty, if in fact Azerbaijan decides it is ready to give up Karabagh formally, for some corridor through Armenia or something, then we have moved to another stage. Because if both sides agree to a territorial arrangement, then it is perfectly legitimate. The dangerous thing of course was the idea that one side could dictate a territorial solution: that is, Karabagh could be independent or part of Armenia without Azerbaijani agreement. You have now gone down a very slippery slope. That is, now you have set a kind of precedent. First of all, the international community will not accept it because it could then be applied in Abkhazia, in Chechnya, in Kosovo, or Bosnia. This would be too dangerous. You would now have said that any group that effectively revolts and seeks the help of the international community would have the potential for this kind of solution. Clearly we are dealing with a multiplicity of problems. So that is impossible. In stage one, you get the architecture right. You start building confidence between various elements in the population. Then you allow what I would call almost natural or social processes to take place. Populations do move back and forth. People will come back if there is security, etc. Trade will begin to develop. You know, some entrepreneurial Armenian will go back to Baku because he lived there before and knows Azerbaijani. Other things like this may happen. My hope would be that eventually it would be possible for these peoples to return to their original homes and—this will sound very utopian and even will offend my Armenian comrades

25 PANEL TRANSCRIPT and compatriots—Azerbaijanis, who most Armenians remember supplied the best fruits in Armenia, would also return to their villages from where they were “encouraged” to leave. They weren’t shot at or killed, but trucks were provided. These things would also be possible. By the way, it is not the fault of the current regimes that these are ethnically homogenous republics. This was a policy that was already started during the Soviet period. I found information in the Archives—I am an historian so I am just going to share this with you—that Stalin in the late 1940s (’48, ’49) was moving Azerbaijanis out of the city of Yerevan into Nakhichevan. And he was moving Armenians from Nakhichevan into Armenia. In other words, these homogenizations of these republics, of these territorialized ethnic states, actually began under the Soviets as part of their policy. So the connection of politics, territory and ethnicity is an old practice, and it is very hard to unravel that process. But it seems to me, over the long term, it will happen. And I want to mention one thing, an example that I have given many times in my lectures to students, but it is worth remembering. People think that Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Israelis and Arabs will never be able to live together. “It is impossible. Too much has gone on. Too much killing. Too much hatred.” And I say to them, “Imagine it was 1945. Imagine that I told you in 1945 that within one or two generations, French and Germans would be contemplating political union, monetary union, the end of borders between them, free transit and so forth.” You would say, “You are utopian. This struggle has gone on since ancient Gaul. There have been two world wars, the Franco-Prussian War. How could such a thing be imaginable?” And it is imaginable. Certain architecture was created. Certain processes occurred and over time, people who didn’t have necessary conflicts or even if they had conflicts, learned to regulate them in more civilized way. The same can happen in the Caucasus, the same can happen in the Balkans. And I believe the same can happen in Palestine as well.

QUESTION: Robert Krikorian, Harvard University. Thus far in the discussion about a peaceful resolution to the Karabagh conflict, little or no mention has been made of negotiating with the authorities in Karabagh itself. The question is: how can a lasting peace be negotiated without the participation of Karabagh?

CAVANAUGH: Let me mention a couple things about that. I mentioned it earlier, in the Minsk Group, in fact, there were discussions with the Karabaghtsy. I spent a week in Vienna, for instance, about six years ago with Arkadii Ghukasian who was then nominally “foreign minister,” with Vartan Oskanian who at that time deputy foreign minister, and with Tofiq Zulfiganov who was also then Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister. All for a week, all together, trying to kick around ideas of how to move things forward. At different points, the Karabaghtsy have been heavily engaged in this. What changed and what has been different in the recent format, is the direct dialog between the two presidents. I think that this has been possible, and as utilitarian as it has been in part because of whom the Armenian president is. The Armenian president today used to be the leader of the community in Nagorno-Karabagh. And there is a confidence, I believe, today in Nagorno-Karabagh that he understands their interests. How could he not? There is an understanding that he is not likely to give up something that is fundamentally essential to them at the negotiating table. How could he when he came from there and he knows them? And in fact, if anything, the opposite is raised on occasion. In Armenia proper you hear concerns that maybe Robert Kocharian more represents Nagorno-Karabagh than he does Ichivan or Yerevan. “How does he know our concerns? He came from there and not from here.” I think that in a general sense, there is not an issue there. I would add that the Minsk Group co-chairs, whenever they go to the region and they go fairly often, always go to Stepanakert. There is a direct dialog between the Minsk Group co- chairs and Karabaghtsy representatives. We talk to them also when we are not in the region. We have regular communication with them outside of that.

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Also, whenever there is a direct dialog between the presidents, the practice has been that Robert Kocharian discusses what he is talking about with local leaders in Karabagh. So they are fully aware of what is at play. And they even know that they are fully aware because they may hear from Kocharian “This is what we talked about at the last meeting.” Then when they see me and my Russian and French counterparts, we tell them what we talked about at the last meeting. If Kocharian leaves something out, they will know as soon as they see us. So they are engaged in that process. Their interests and their views are reflected. They do not have to sit at that table to have their interests reflected.

QUESTION: Ramin Isayev, I am at Harvard University. I have two comments concerning Professor Suny’s speech. Professor Suny, you said that Armenia has won the war. I have taken International Relations 101 and it was taught by a professor from Chicago. I know that unless a peace agreement is signed, one cannot say that one side has won the war. Armenia has won the battle, but the war is not over yet. This was one comment. And, you said after the peace agreement is signed, Armenians may return to live in some Azerbaijani cities. But I would like to mention that there are over 70,000 Armenians living in the Karabagh region of the Azerbaijan Republic now. And there are also more than 20,000 Armenians living elsewhere in Azerbaijan. One of the greatest living political scientists Samuel Huntington has written the “Clash of Civilizations,” and he also touches upon the role of diasporas in resolving conflicts where the homeland of those diasporas are involved. My question is, what is the role of the Armenian Dia spora in resolving this conflict? My question to Ambassador Cavanaugh: you work exclusively with the political elites. Do you also plan to work with non-governmental organizations, with the general public, and with opposition parties? In my opinion, to have a lasting peace agreement, learning their opinion and engaging them would be quite useful.

SUNY: The question of the Diaspora is a very interesting one. First of all, from the outside, from Washington sometimes, the Armenian Diaspora seems very monolithic, organized and powerful. When you are inside it, it does not look so monolithic. That is, we, like any other people, have a dialog, discussions, and differences. Right? As you can see from some of the things that went on here today. That is, there are differences within the Diaspora. There are, however, effective political leaderships and groups like the Dashnatsutyun, like the Armenian Assembly and some other groups that are the effective voices on these issues. They are almost like Armenian lobbying groups, but they are not always united themselves. If you were to generalize about the Armenian Diaspora, keeping in mind that there are differences and fractures within it, you would have to say that the Diaspora in general, particularly its more vocal elements, has been more insistent, and more in a sense militant about the Karabagh or the Armenian Genocide issue than sometimes the population or even the government, particularly the first Armenian government. And, there have been differences between them. On the other hand, as you know, the Kocharian government has been closer to the Diaspora. It has adopted positions that are much closer say to the Dasnatsutyun, though I guess if you look very closely, you might see differences. I would say that at the moment, and this is a point I am ready to be contradicted on, this is again a reading of the tealeaves, reading the press. I would say that the Armenian government, Kocharian particularly, is ahead of the Diaspora. That is, he is moving more rapidly and more confidently toward a solution in ways that are leaving the Armenian political parties behind.

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CAVANAUGH: Let me answer both part of the question that Professor Suny was just answering and then the one directed at me. A few comments on the Armenian Diaspora. I agree with what he said. There is often a perception that it is monolithic. It is not. There is as wide a range of opinion inside that Diaspora as you find in Armenia. I think Armenia now has 98 political parties. I don’t think there are 98 sub-factions in the Diaspora, but you certainly can find 98 opinions on different things. What I have found is that the Armenian Diaspora has played a vital role in supporting Armenia. I think it would be hard to imagine the Armenian state today had the Diaspora not provided funds for basic support: food, medicine and fuel. The first year we had an American Embassy in Yerevan, I was in Georgia at the time, we had people calling because they were suffering from frostbite. There was no heat in the city, and we talked about whether we should pull them out. We did not. They in fact did not want to leave. They said that, “If the Armenian people are going through this, we will go through this.” But it was very bleak. The Armenian people made it in part due to the Diaspora, who opened their hearts and gave them a lot of money and support. They also made it in part due to the international community. The United States gave a lot of economic assistance to Armenia to help get them through that period. The basic attitude that I hear on peace among the Armenian community in the United States, and that is the one I deal with, is very strong. I think there is a realization in the United States in that community, and it is a strong, big community, that if there is not a peace solution found, they do not see how Armenia can make it. You have people living in the United States who came here in the tragic aftermath of World War I when their families were forced out of villages in Eastern Anatolia. They came to the United States. They have been dreaming of an Armenian state for a century. They felt that there was a chance for one briefly. It disappeared with the Soviet period. The borders were sealed. Armenia was in effect cut off. It reappeared ten years ago with the collapse of the Soviet Union. And with the conflict, was instantly cut off again. They hope to see that state make it. They have tried to help the state and the people with money, but they believe if you don’t find peace, the state doesn’t make it. So I think that you find basic support for a peace process among the Diaspora community in the United States more than people expect and more than you hear in the popular press. I am not saying you don’t find that in other countries. I just don’t have the same contact with the Armenian community in France, Argentina or Australia. But, I suspect that it is the same. They all look and see the same situation. I think that what Professor Suny said is also true though. The leadership of Armenia today is ahead of that Diaspora because it has to deal with those problems on a daily basis. It is one thing to help, and as I say that help has been crucial. It is another if you are the leader of Armenia and every day you look and go down to the train station and see the trains full when they leave and empty when they come back. And then you go to the airport and the planes are full when they leave and medium full when they come back—mostly with tourists. But you are seeing your people leaving. You are dealing with families that you cannot offer a brighter tomorrow. I have had discussions with the leader of the Armenian Church, the Catholicos, who says that part of his concern is how to care for widows of Karabagh—women raising kids, with no father at home, no job, and no hope of a job. And when the kids grow up right now, they have no hope of a job. He sees the need for peace. The president sees the need for peace. Moving and evolving into the other question that I was asked directly, I do not exclusively work with elites in these countries. I talk to all kinds of political leaders in Armenia. I talk to all the heads of the committees in the Armenian parliament. I have believed for a long time that if you are an American diplomat, the most fundamental mistake you can make is only dealing with the top elite in the country. We discovered this in Iran and in other countries. It is not the way to do the business of the United States. I sit down and talk to Robert Kocharian at length about the peace process, and when I get the chance, I go up to little villages in the north of

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Armenia and sit down with a family in their home and talk about both the peace process and their life. It is the only way to have a full picture of what is really needed. I do the same on the Azerbaijani side. My views on the situation in refugee camps in Azerbaijan don’t come from President Aliyev. They come from walking through refugee camps in Barda and Bilesuvar and Yeni Karkee and talking to refugees. If you are helping in negotiations, it is how you can understand and engage what pieces of this puzzle are really right and essential. Because, even there, I cannot rely on a political leader being fully in tune with his people. Maybe they are missing a piece. And if I am going to be a good negotiator, I will find out and know to add it to that mix so that when this proposal is presented to people, in fact it takes care of something I know the refugees are really concerned about. Or, it takes care of something I know that people in the village of Lachin were really concerned about when I went to church there and talked to them, and saw them, or talked to their kids at a school. So you have to do to the whole thing. Opposition is as important as the leadership if you are looking at how do you get the public to embrace a solution. So it is a comprehensive vision that you need. What is helpful here for this region, and let me go back again to the Diaspora, is that the Diaspora helps generate more political attention for this problem. The same holds for the Middle East. The same holds for Cyprus. Diaspora communities can help focus the attention of governments on a problem. It does not mean that the governments focus their attention there; I think the exact opposite. But it does help. It has helped in France. France has an enormous Armenian Diaspora community. The French president is directly involved today in these negotiations and in helping push them forward. The United States has an enormous Armenian- American community. We are directly involved. Russia in fact has enormous diaspora communities from both countries and is directly involved. I would add, though, that just because you have a diaspora community does not make you partial. Our government represents the interests of 275 million people . And a million Armenian- Americans are important, but there are 274 million other Americans. We are working on the interest of our entire country. When you look at this region, what motivates us primarily is humanitarian concerns and political concerns. We have a whole gamut of interests that include economic development for this region. But when we look at it in the basic terms, what is the driving factor to have the United States concerned about the Southern Caucasus? The prospect of renewed conflict, the fact that there are a million people dislocated, the fact that people continue to die, the fact that these countries cannot proceed with the political and economic development they need because of the lack of a peace there. That is what drives Americans to go in there. Does the Diaspora help? You bet. They help highlight the humanitarian concerns. But we see it on both sides. You don’t have the Armenian Diaspora getting us to look and say, “There are all these problems in Armenia and everything in Azerbaijan is rosy.” Exact opposite. It has the United States looking at this whole region, seeing how many difficulties there are, and looking for opportunities to help. I think we are running out of time… Let me say, because we see opportunities to advance them, we have gone very strongly into working on this process. Let me say one bit about the Bush Administration just because it is probably doing more on this now than people ever imagined. On the tenth day of this administration, George Bush was talking about Nagorno-Karabagh. He talked to French President Jacques Chirac about it. He was aware of it before that, but on the tenth day, you already have presidential dialog going on on this issue. The tenth week of this administration, you had peace talks in the United States. And not small scale peace talks, but peace talks in the United States that lasted a week, that were opened by the secretary of state of the United States. And, in the end both presidents flew to Washington to see the president. You have a high, high level of engagement here that I think people would not have expected. But it is reflective of

29 PANEL TRANSCRIPT the United States’ preparedness to assist and facilitate peace processes when the leaders are really working to move them forward. And, it is reflective of our belief that there is a chance here, now, to move this forward. If there were not a chance, we would never have invited these leaders to come to the United States. Even if the Russians and French said, “It is a great idea. Have them come to the United States,” we would not have. It was all three of us seeing a real prospect for moving peace forward that led us to bring them to the United States. If the two Presidents weren’t serious about peace, I do not believe you would find the president of the United States and the secretary of state of the United States engaged in the process the way they have been. I think if the two Presidents continue on this path, that same level of engagement will continue. You will see probably in the next weeks and months more contacts between the president of the United States and the president of France and the president of Russia on this issue. And, as I mentioned already, more negotiations in Switzerland in June on this conflict.

SHAFFER: First of all I would like to thank our audience for your tremendous participation. I apologize to most of you that we weren’t able to call on. Hopefully this is just a sign that we need more dialogs on this issue. I would like to thank Professor Suny, Professor Isaxanli and Ambassador Cavanaugh for being here and sharing their thoughts so frankly and eloquently with us. Thank you.

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