The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict and the Crisis in Turkey's Domestic

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict and the Crisis in Turkey's Domestic INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP) WORKING PAPER THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE CRISIS IN TURKEY'S DOMESTIC POLITICS by Arif ASALIOGLU International Institute of the Development of Science Cooperation (MIRNAS) VIENNA 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 3 II. ISOLATION LED ANKARA TO THE KARABAKH CRISIS ............................................................................. 6 III. THE ERDOGAN REGIME CONTINUES TO PLAY WITH FIRE AND TO SPREAD FIRE AROUND ITSELF .... 9 IV. “WE SENT MILITANTS TO AZERBAIJAN.” ................................................................................................. 11 V. MOST OF THE TIME IS WASTED ................................................................................................................ 12 VI. RUSSIA AND TURKEY MAY HAVE STRONG DISAGREEMENT ................................................................ 14 VII. CONCLUSION: THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY ................................ 16 1 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Arif Asalioglu is General Director of the International Institute of the Development of Science Cooperation (MIRNAS). Graduated from the faculty of foreign languages of the Kyiv State Linguistic University. From 2011 to 2014, General Director of the Turkish-Russian Cultural Center, Moscow. Since 2014, General Director of the International Institute for the development of Science Cooperation in Moscow; Expert of Russian-Turkish relations; Founder of the International meeting of Russian and Turkish intellectuals. 2 I. INTRODUCTION The Daily Sabah newspaper published an interview with the representative of Turkish President Recep Erdogan, Ibrahim Kalyn. 1 In the conversation, he said that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh will be resolved only if the illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenia ends. "Since Russia has a serious influence on Armenia and its armed forces are present there, we can discuss this issue with Russia. As a member of the Minsk group, Russia is also responsible. We shouldn't think just about today. We must take steps to end this occupation if we think of the future,” he said.2 Azerbaijan declared "martial law" amid ongoing clashes on the border with Armenia, which began on September 27. This has led to an escalation of tension in the region. Turkey's reports of its support for Azerbaijan raise questions about what calculations Ankara is making about the region. In this case, we may ask: taking into account that Azerbaijan may risk starting a war to change the status quo, what is the strategy or expectation that made Turkey rush at full speed with the slogan "one nation, two states"? Do they think they can bring this war to an end? Or is their goal to slightly oppress Russia in Libya and Syria with the fire kindled in the South Caucasus? In Turkey, the AKP-MHP (The Justice and Development Party - The Nationalist Movement Party) nationalist coalition is no longer able to solve problems inside and outside the country in usual ways. The South Caucasus has been added to the mechanism of conflicts in Syria, 1 https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/middle-east/rossiya-i-turtsiya-mogut- stolknutsya-s-ostrymi-raznoglasiyami/ 2 Ibid 3 Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. In view of the scale of direct and indirect issues with Russia, this can also be depicted as a Syria-Libya-South Caucasus triangle. Ankara took a step that drew sharp criticism. They sent militants to Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, the militants have become an instrument of Erdogan's foreign policy since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Turkey has been turned into a jihadist support country.3 Despite the fact that the transfer of militants between Syria and Libya made Turkey a member of the club of "abnormal countries", up to a certain point the situation developed in such a way that all sides were glad. Since 2012, Libyans have been fighting in Syria through the mobilization of jihadists, and now Syrians have been forced to fight in Libya as Turkey's reserve forces. 4 However, the problem of Nagorno Karabakh is fundamentally different. Sunni-jihadist militants were forced to fight on the side of Shiites, whom they considered 'enemies and kafirs (infidels)'. They confirmed this statement. One of the militants said: "We thought that we were going together with the Turks to the Turkish military bases on the border with Armenia. But the Turks are not with us, there is only the Azerbaijani army and they are all Shiites. This doesn't suit me. They are even greater enemies to us than the Jews and Christians. We will not fight with them or support them.". However, from now on, the militants are the elements of the interventionist foreign policy of the Erdogan regime.5 I would like to remind you that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan appealed to the international community to "use all your trump cards to prevent Turkey's intervention". This means that "if it is not stopped, the sides may be drawn into a war. If they do not return 3 https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3081045.html 4 https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/middle-east/rossiya-i-turtsiya-mogut- stolknutsya-s-ostrymi-raznoglasiyami/ 5 https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3081045.html 4 to diplomatic negotiations, then after a certain time we will talk about the danger of a clash between Turkey and Russia”.6 The picture of the causes and consequences of the 30-year conflict keeps both sides one step away from war. While this reality is obvious, Turkey's harsh policy of brushing aside diplomacy is irresponsibly teasing the parties. Hostility towards Armenians is the easiest issue to provoke. This is exactly what is needed for nationalist-heroic flywheels. 6 https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/middle-east/rossiya-i-turtsiya-mogut- stolknutsya-s-ostrymi-raznoglasiyami/ 5 II. ISOLATION LED ANKARA TO THE KARABAKH CRISIS If my observations do not deceive me, this new opening curtain contains traces of Ankara's strategic thinking and scenario. As the unsuccessful leadership of the AKP (The Justice and Development Party) has brought economic difficulties, the problems in domestic politics have reached a serious level. In addition, the foreign policy of the last 5-6 years has been severely criticized. In the following are some examples: With the logistical support of the Turkish and the jihadist armies, in July, Ankara, stopped the advance of the forces of Tobruk/Benghazi government and allowed its allied forces of Tripoli government to capture some cities and military points, suspended its activities, destroying the Vatiye airbase by the forces of the opposing side. When Erdogan said: "It is impossible without taking Sirte/Jufra", the incident completely changed course, the operation was interrupted by all parties without exception. This was not enough, and the parties began to negotiate. The essence of the promise is that Ankara's political influence and oil prospects remain in the air. This wasteful operation, which lasted for several months and received the tacit support of the opposition, brought many losses to the AKP government. Currently, the people in Tripoli are seeking to restore the military and civilian contracts of the order of 30-35 billion dollars that they imposed on Sarac.7 Let's look at the Mediterranean, the Aegean front. Although the front was not literally quieted, energy drilling activities and the warships accompanying the ships did not make any progress. On the contrary, the diplomatic efforts of two EU members, Cyprus and Greece, 7 https://ahvalnews.com/tr/savas/erdoganin-savaslari-yanina-kar-kalmiyor 6 which Ankara took against itself, led to additional support from Germany. If the EU and Greece start negotiations with Ankara, they won’t do that the way Ankara wants. In addition to the EU, the US will also make things more difficult for Ankara in Alexandroupoli and Crete.8 Search for fossil fuels in Cyprus, the nomination of Ankara's candidate Ersin Tatar in the TRNC presidential election, the opening of the Marash/Varosha coast – all these three steps not only strengthen the position of the Republic of southern Cyprus but also deepen Ankara's isolation in the international arena.9 Let's look at the Northern Iraqi and Syrian fronts. Now it is even forbidden to publically discuss the problem-related issues in media. It is clear that, despite the worsening situation, the desired goals were not achieved, and the goal to "eradicate the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers' Party)" is one of those. Before the storm, silence has reigned in Idlib since early March. The parties are constantly tense. Ankara is said to have 25,000 soldiers in the Turkish Armed Forces, in addition to tens of thousands of jihadists. There is no explanation other than the security statement coming from the PKK. In other words, things are not going as well in the occupied regions. Terrible things are happening in Afrin, al-Bab, Azaz, Ras al- Ain, Tel Abyad. Ankara is wisely trying to colonize these places. All government bodies of Turkey have tried to put down roots in the area. But it seems that love cannot be forced. And so a lot of money is wasted.10 In addition, the international press and reports of UN expert organizations track and record in detail huge violations of the human rights and laws of war on the occupied territories. All 8 https://www.setav.org/5-soru-abdnin-dedeagac-yunanistanta-askeri-us-kurmasinin-anlami-ve-turkiyeye- etkisi/ 9 https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-54204797 10 https://odatv4.com/turkiye-hangi-hatalari-yapti-ki-bu-kadar-yalniz-kaldi-21092004.html 7 the secrets have been revealed, and one day the offenders will have to answer for everything. In addition to all these disappointments, Turkey's reputation in international organizations has been damaged as a result of aggressive foreign policy (UN, OSCE, NATO, EU, Arab League). As soon as tension in Syria and Libya is increasing, and in addition to this Turkey had to yield to the requirements of the international community in Eastern Mediterranean, the crisis in the Caucasus may seem quite promising for Erdogan.
Recommended publications
  • Brief Analysis of the Situation in South Caucasus
    Brief Analysis of the Situation in South Caucasus Jimsher Jaliashvili, Professor Grigol Robakidze University, Tbilisi, Georgia Anna Shah, Master’s programme student Grigol Robakidze University, Tbilisi, Georgia Abstract Despite its small size and relatively small population, the South Caucasus occupies an important place in international geopolitics. Region is an important link between East and West that makes the world actors to give great attention to developing a strategy towards the region in order to maximize meaning of own presence in this important geo-strategic area. Above mentioned factors could contribute to the integration of the region for more effective joint action on the world scene as a union. However, to date, this bone of contention is a zone of low-intensity conflicts, the so-called "frozen conflicts" that threaten to "unfreeze" at any time. After the collapse of the Soviet Union over its entire territory ethnic conflicts became flare up. Some of them spilled over into the active full-scale wars. This is what happened in the South Caucasus in the regions of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. These conflicts still remain a stumbling block to normalization of relations of the Caucasian neighbor countries. I. The practice of international life continues to destroy the remnants of illusions associated with the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar configuration of the world1. Fukuyama's theory2 turned out to be insolvent and the multipolar world living in tolerance for the cultures and customs of each other, respecting the framework of law and morality, and solving ethnic conflict only walking in line of negotiation is just a good, distant fairy tale, an unattainable myth.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 ...The Khojaly Massacre Is a Bloody Episode. It Is a Continuation of The
    ...The Khojaly massacre is a bloody episode. It is a continuation of the ethnic cleansing and genocide policies that the Armenian chauvinist-nationalists have been progressively carrying out against the Azerbaijanis for approximately 200 years. These accursed policies, supported by the authorities of some states, were constantly pursued by Tsarist Russia and the Soviets. After the demise of the USSR these policies led to the displacement of Azerbaijanis from their homelands, exposing them to suffering on a massive scale. In all, two million Azerbaijanis have at various times felt the weight of the policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide pursued by aggressive Armenian nationalists and stupid ideologues of "Greater Armenia". ...Today the Government of Azerbaijan and its people must bring the truth about the Khojaly genocide and all the Armenian atrocities in Nagorny Karabakh, their scale and brutality, to the countries of the world, their parliaments and the public at large and achieve the recognition of these atrocities as an act of genocide. This is the humane duty of every citizen before the spirits of the Khojaly martyrs. An international legal and political assessment of the tragedy and proper punishment of the ideologues, organizers and executors are important in order to avoid in future such barbarous acts against humanity as a whole... Heydar Aliyev President of the Republic of Azerbaijan 25 February 2002 1 Background 7 Mass Media 13 The Washington Post, The Independent, The Sunday Times, The Times, The Washington Times, The New
    [Show full text]
  • The South Caucasus 2018
    THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 2018 FACTS, TRENDS, FUTURE SCENARIOS Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is a political foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Democracy, peace and justice are the basic principles underlying the activities of KAS at home as well as abroad. The Foundation’s Regional Program South Caucasus conducts projects aiming at: Strengthening democratization processes, Promoting political participation of the people, Supporting social justice and sustainable economic development, Promoting peaceful conflict resolution, Supporting the region’s rapprochement with European structures. All rights reserved. Printed in Georgia. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Regional Program South Caucasus Akhvlediani Aghmarti 9a 0103 Tbilisi, Georgia www.kas.de/kaukasus Disclaimer The papers in this volume reflect the personal opinions of the authors and not those of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation or any other organizations, including the organizations with which the authors are affiliated. ISBN 978-9941-0-5882-0 © Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V 2013 Contents Foreword ........................................................................................................................ 4 CHAPTER I POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION: SHADOWS OF THE PAST, FACTS AND ANTICIPATIONS The Political Dimension: Armenian Perspective By Richard Giragosian .................................................................................................. 9 The Influence Level of External Factors on the Political Transformations in Azerbaijan since Independence By Rovshan Ibrahimov
    [Show full text]
  • Forging the Future of the Caucasus: the Past 20 Years and Its Lessons
    Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference Evaluation Report Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference Evaluation Report Baku, Azerbaijan 2012 Joint Publication of Caucasus International (CI), Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) and Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ) Design/Production: Osman Balaban Printed by Moda Ofset Basım Yayın San.Tic.Ltd.Şti. Istanbul, Turkey All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be copied, redistributed, or published without express permission in writing from the publisher. The views reflected here are purely personal and do not represent the views of CI, SAM, or TPQ. CONTENTS Conference Organizers and Panelists 4 Introduction 6 Opening Remarks 7 Key Debates 1. Change and Continuity of Independence 8 2. Astronomic Expectations vs. Earthly Realities 10 3. South Caucasus: a malfunctioning region? 12 4. Small States and Big Neighbors – The Question of Alignments 15 5. Boundaries and Barriers: Relations with Neighbors 19 Summary: Highlights from the Speakers 27 Post-Conference Evaluation Report Conference Organizers and Panellists Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) The Center for Strategic Studies (www.sam.gov.az) is Azer- baijan’s first government-funded, non-profit and academically independent think tank, known as SAM (Strateji Araşdırmalar Mərkəzi in Azerbaijani). The mission of SAM is to promote collaborative research and enhance the strategic debate as well as providing decision-makers with high-quality analysis and innovative proposals for action. Through publications, brain- storming meetings, conferences and policy recommendations, SAM conducts rigorous research guided by a forward-looking policy orientation, thus bringing new perspectives to strategic discussions and contributing to informed decision making in Azerbaijan Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ) Turkish Policy Quarterly (www.turkishpolicy.com) is an Istan- bul-based journal published on a quarterly basis since 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • 1998 Presidential Election in Azerbaijan
    COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 234 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20515 (202) 225-1901 EMAIL ADDRESS: [email protected] INTERNET WEB SITE: http://www.house.gov/csce REPORT ON AZERBAIJAN’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Baku, Sumgait, Ganja A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe December 1998 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 234 Ford House Office Building Washington, DC 20515-6460 (202) 225-1901 [email protected] http://www.house.gov/csce/ ALFONSE D’AMATO, New York, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Co-Chairman JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan MATT SALMON, Arizona CONRAD BURNS, Montana JON CHRISTENSEN, Nebraska OLYMPIA SNOWE, Maine STENY H. HOYER, Maryland FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts HARRY REID, Nevada BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland BOB GRAHAM, Florida LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Executive Branch HON. JOHN H. F. SHATTUCK, Department of State VACANT, Department of Defense VACANT, Department of Commerce ________________________ Professional Staff MICHAEL R. HATHAWAY, Chief of Staff DOROTHY DOUGLAS TAFT, Deputy Chief of Staff MARIA COLL, Office Administrator OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor JOHN FINERTY, Staff Advisor CHADWICK R. GORE, Communications Director ROBERT HAND, Staff Advisor JANICE HELWIG, Staff Advisor (Vienna) MARLENE KAUFMANN, Counsel for International Trade SANDY LIST, GPO Liaison KAREN S. LORD, Counsel for Freedom of Religion RONALD MCNAMARA, Staff Advisor MICHAEL OCHS, Staff Advisor ERIKA B. SCHLAGER, Counsel for International Law MAUREEN WALSH, Counsel for Property Rights ii ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION (OSCE) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki pro- cess, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada.
    [Show full text]
  • Time for Armenian and Azerbaijani Diasporas to Talk to Each Other
    Time for Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas to talk to each other https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article6936 Nagorno-Karabakh Time for Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas to talk to each other - IV Online magazine - 2020 - IV551 - December 2020 - Publication date: Tuesday 8 December 2020 Copyright © International Viewpoint - online socialist magazine - All rights reserved Copyright © International Viewpoint - online socialist magazine Page 1/4 Time for Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas to talk to each other The 2018 changes in Armenia did not produce any revolutionary discourse concerning the Karabakh conflict. In Yerevan as in Baku, political elites do not seem able to imagine how to resolve this conflict. I call Diaspora Armenians and Azerbaijanis living abroad to make a bold initiative and start a new dialogue, may be they could move a process that is central in determining the future of their homelands, yet remains paralyzed for nearly two decades. It was 20 years ago, in June 1999, when I went to Baku with a group of journalists from Armenia, Karabakh, and Georgia. It was part of a project I had initiated in 1997 where I wanted to offer journalists in the South Caucasus a chance to see "to the other side" of the conflict line, to meet and exchange with colleagues and politicians of their neighbouring countries. Weren't they members of the same Soviet Union, I thought? By knowing the concerns, fears and hopes of the other, journalists could propose a more nuanced reporting, and therefore influence the public opinion towards mutual understanding and eventually contributed to conflict resolution. Our visit to Baku was the result of efforts of several years.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks Martin Malek *
    NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks Martin Malek * Introduction In 2002, NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson stated that, “for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Caucasus is of no special relevance.”1 Up until now, this attitude has not changed fundamentally, even though the region obviously attracts the Alliance’s attention more than it did in the 1990s. NATO’s stance toward the South Caucasus has always provoked much more and stronger reactions in Russia than in the political, media, and public realms of the Alliance’s member states. In 1999, within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), an Ad Hoc Working Group on Prospects for Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus was established, placing primary focus on defense and economics issues, civil and emergency planning, science and environmental cooperation, and information activi- ties. However, to date there is no overall comprehensive format for NATO cooperation with the South Caucasus that would even come close to its “strategic partnership” with the EU, its concept of “special relations” with Russia and Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue, or the South East European Initiative. Only in 2004—i.e., a full thirteen years after the dissolution of the USSR, which was closely followed by the independ- ence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—U.S. diplomat Robert Simmons was ap- pointed as NATO’s first Special Envoy for the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The prospects for joint initiatives with NATO are inevitably negatively influenced by the fact that the armies of all South Caucasian republics are far from meeting NATO standards and requirements, even though especially Georgia and Azerbaijan have been declaring that they hope to introduce and achieve these standards sooner rather than later.
    [Show full text]
  • Black Garden : Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War / Thomas De Waal
    BLACK GARDEN THOMAS DE WAAL BLACK GARDEN Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War a New York University Press • New York and London NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS New York and London © 2003 by New York University All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data De Waal, Thomas. Black garden : Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war / Thomas de Waal. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8147-1944-9 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 1988–1994. 2. Armenia (Republic)— Relations—Azerbaijan. 3. Azerbaijan—Relations—Armenia (Republic) I. Title. DK699.N34 D4 2003 947.54085'4—dc21 2002153482 New York University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and their binding materials are chosen for strength and durability. Manufactured in the United States of America 10987654321 War is kindled by the death of one man, or at most, a few; but it leads to the death of tremendous numbers. —Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power Mercy on the old master building a bridge, The passer-by may lay a stone to his foundation. I have sacrificed my soul, worn out my life, for the nation. A brother may arrange a rock upon my grave. —Sayat-Nova Contents Author’s Note ix Two Maps, of the South Caucasus and of Nagorny Karabakh xii–xiii. Introduction: Crossing the Line 1 1 February 1988: An Armenian Revolt 10 2 February 1988: Azerbaijan: Puzzlement and Pogroms 29 3 Shusha: The Neighbors’ Tale 45 4 1988–1989: An Armenian Crisis 55 5 Yerevan: Mysteries of the East 73 6 1988–1990: An Azerbaijani Tragedy 82 7
    [Show full text]
  • The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement
    The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement Chanda Allana Leckie Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts In Political Science Charles Taylor, Chair Scott Nelson Edward Weisband May 04, 2005 Blacksburg, Virginia Keywords: OSCE Minsk Group, geopolitics, conflict settlement The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement Chanda Allana Leckie Abstract----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Out of the violent conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the war over Nagorno- Karabakh is the most threatening to the future development of the region, both economically and politically, as it is no closer to a solution than when the fighting ended in 1994. This is regrettable as there are some opportunities that provide the warring parties enough flexibility to move forward in the negotiation process. This thesis analyzes the evolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group from 1992 to the present. It discusses not only the history of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict and what went wrong with the Minsk Group’s attempts to find a fair and objective solution to the conflict, but also the obstacles and opportunities for a settlement. From this discussion, suggestions to improve the Minsk Group’s performance are presented, and future predictions of a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will also be discussed. Acknowledgements------------------------------------------------------------------------- I wish to thank my committee chair Dr. Charles Taylor for his guidance, support, and collaboration on this thesis and throughout my time at Virginia Tech.
    [Show full text]
  • Nagorno Karabakh Geo-Politics: Interests and Politics of Outsiders
    The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict. Causes of the conflict and obstacles to conflict resolution. Item Type Thesis Authors Nikkar-Esfahani, Hamidreza Rights <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc-nd/3.0/"><img alt="Creative Commons License" style="border-width:0" src="http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by- nc-nd/3.0/88x31.png" /></a><br />The University of Bradford theses are licenced under a <a rel="license" href="http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/">Creative Commons Licence</a>. Download date 27/09/2021 12:21:20 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10454/5650 University of Bradford eThesis This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team © University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons Licence. The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Causes of the conflict and obstacles to conflict resolution Hamidreza Nikkar-Esfahani Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy October 2009 Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................... vi Acknowledgments: ...................................................................................................... vii Common Abbreviations ............................................................................................. viii Introduction
    [Show full text]
  • “Frozen Conflicts” in Europe Anton Bebler (Ed.)
    “Frozen conflicts” in Europe Anton Bebler (ed.) “Frozen conflicts” in Europe Barbara Budrich Publishers Opladen • Berlin • Toronto 2015 An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access for the public good. The Open Access ISBN for this book is 978-3-8474-0428-6. More information about the initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org © 2015 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0. (CC- BY-SA 4.0) It permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you share under the same license, give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ © 2015 Dieses Werk ist beim Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH erschienen und steht unter der Creative Commons Lizenz Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ Diese Lizenz erlaubt die Verbreitung, Speicherung, Vervielfältigung und Bearbeitung bei Verwendung der gleichen CC-BY-SA 4.0-Lizenz und unter Angabe der UrheberInnen, Rechte, Änderungen und verwendeten Lizenz. This book is available as a free download from www.barbara-budrich.net (https://doi.org/10.3224/84740133). A paperback version is available at a charge. The page numbers of the open access edition correspond with the paperback edition.
    [Show full text]
  • AZERBAIJAN in the WORLD ADA Biweekly Newsletter
    AZERBAIJAN IN THE WORLD ADA Biweekly Newsletter Vol. 1, No. 5 April 1, 2008 [email protected] In this issue: -- A Conversation with Vafa Guluzade on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy -- Parvin Darabadi, “Terrorism, Separatism, and the Future of the International System” -- Paul Goble, “New Book Outlines Baku’s Approach to Consular Affairs” -- A Chronology of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy -- Note to Readers A Conversation with Vafa Guluzade Former National Security Advisor to President Heydar Aliyev and Longtime Political Commentator March 19, 2008 Baku, Azerbaijan Azerbaijan in the World: How do you evaluate the United Nations General Assembly’s adoption of Resolution 10693 reaffirming Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories? Guluzade: That Azerbaijani diplomacy was able to push through the UN General Assembly a decision reaffirming the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the right of refugees to return, I consider a great success, although in all probability, achieving it was not in reality as difficult as some in Baku have suggested for the simple reason that all the provisions in this resolution are found in the four resolutions of the UN Security Council on Azerbaijan. But despite that, this achievement is significant. Why? Because it highlights and underscores the position of the new leadership of Azerbaijan – President Ilham Aliyev. 1 Prior to his coming to office, his predecessor, Heydar Aliyev, made several remarkable proposals including a suggestion in 1994 that he was prepared to offer the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of autonomy in the world. And as an example, he suggested to Levon Ter-Petrosyan that it could have a status like that of Tatarstan.
    [Show full text]