security and human rights 27 (2016) 442-466 brill.com/shrs Azerbaijan’s Perspectives on the osce Minsk Group Complicity in the Status Quo? Zaur Shiriyev Academy Associate at the Royal Institute of International Affairs ( Chatham House) in London Abstract The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (osce) led Minsk Group – the principal mediator tasked with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is often criticised by Azerbaijan, due to the stalemate in negotiations. The intensive period of engagement between 2006 and 2009 brought first the initial and then the “updated” Madrid Principles. This was the chief working document that set forth the basic principles for peaceful resolution. The inactivity of the Minsk Group is often con- ceded as the result of maintaining “minimalist goals” – preventing full scale war and trying to bring conflict parties to the negotiating table. The April war in 2016 tested the fragility of the first goal: preventing skirmishes from leading to larger scale conflict. Similarly, after the April 2016 war, the attempt to revitalise the second goal – i.e. bring- ing the parties to the negotiating table – also collapsed, due to the increased mistrust between the parties after the war. The article will evaluate the geopolitical changes and their impact on the Minsk Group’s work since 2008, the reasons for the demands to change the format of the Minsk Group, and finally Azerbaijan’s perspectives on the limitations of the Minsk Group’s current mandate and mechanisms. Keywords Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict – Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – fragile peace – April War * Zaur Shiriyev is an Academy Associate at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London. His areas of expertise include security issues and conflict resolution in the post-Soviet space, Turkish foreign policy, and the foreign and national security policies of the South Caucasus states, with an emphasis on the domestic determinants of such policies. © nhc, 2017 | doi 10.1163/18750230-02703016 Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 05:50:33AM via free access <UN> Azerbaijan’s Perspectives on the osce Minsk Group 443 Introduction In the last decade, the Minsk Group’s (mg) mediation efforts has seen ups and downs. The peak was the harmonisation of the Co-Chairs’ (us, France and Russia) work, whereby all Co-Chairs were all on the same page and shared the same goal of achieving the basic principles framework for the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This resulted in the Madrid Principles – the origi- nal version put forth in 2007, and the updated version in 2009, which aimed to provide the basic principles for a peace agreement. This represented a breakthrough following the silence since the end of the 1990s, when the Minsk Group produced three diffirent proposals: the ‘package solution’, the ‘step by step solution’ and the ‘common state solution’. Azerbaijan and Armenia could not agree on the same option. The Madrid Principles, unlike the 1990’s conflict resolution proposals, were aimed at substantive talks based on step-by-step agreement on the Basic Principles – thus solving all major problems via the Peace Agreement, and then the implementing the agreement step-by-step. This was a compromise; the implementation of the whole peace agreement will take longer, allowing the conflict sides to build trust, develop communica- tion channels, and move beyond the enmity. The introduction of the Madrid Principles and ongoing negotiation process led Baku to believe that the process was satisfactory and met expectations for progress on conflict resolution and that tangible results were on the horizon. However, the 2008 Russian-Georgian August War and annexation of Crimea in 2014 affected the Minsk Group’s mediation capabilities. This turn of events changed and weakened the intentions of the Co-Chair countries and their engagement with the negotiations. At the beginning, Russian mediation ef- forts during 2008–2012, in the trilateral format with Azerbaijan and Armenian Presidents, stimulated the Minsk Group’s work. But by end of 2009, Moscow’s mediation became a parallel process : a unilateral mediation effort separate to the Minsk Group’s activities, effectively paralyzing the role of the Minsk Group’s Co-Chairs to act as a mediating body. With the end of the Russian “trilateral format” in 2012, the Minsk Group Co-Chairs failed to bring conflict parties to the negotiating table. This led to changes in the “military status-quo” on the ground, namely by increasing the skirmishes between the Azerbaijani and Armenian armies. This resulted in rising disappointment in Azerbaijan, in particular regarding the approach of preserving the “military status-quo”, and waiting for the conflict parties to be ready to negotiate (i.e. putting the responsibility for the status of negotia- tions on the conflict parties alone). The failure to make efforts to convince the conflict sides to enter into substantive talks – even after the war in April 2016 – was very unsatisfactory to Baku. security and human rights 27 (2016) 442-466 Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 05:50:33AM via free access <UN> 444 Shiriyev The article aims to analyze Azerbaijan’s attitude towards the Minsk Group’s mediation efforts over the last decade, by analyzing the impact of geopolitical changes that effected the Minsk Group’s work and Azerbaijan’s perceptions of such changes. The second part of the paper looks at the rising demands to change the structure of meditation efforts – the Minsk Group’s format, ra- tionale, and perspectives. Finally, the Minsk Group’s work from Azerbaijan’s perspective are assessed, and policy recommendations are provided. Impact of Geopolitical Transformations on the Cohesion of the Minsk Group’s Mediation Efforts The August war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 came at a critical point in the Minsk Group’s mediation work. The introduction of the Madrid Prin- ciples in 2007 had marked a major achievement with regard to establishing the basic principles for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Following the August war, the initial concern in Azerbaijan emerged from the twin assump- tions that the conflict would destroy ties between Russia and the West, and damage the ongoing collaboration of Moscow and Washington. Baku saw the original Madrid Principles of 2007 as a us-backed process, in which Moscow had collaborated. According to Matthew Bryza,1 former u.s. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia (2005–2009), this process came “from an effort launched from the White House in 2004, which received personal and direct support from then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and by extension, President George W. Bush […] such top-level support was of great assistance in convincing the Russian Foreign Minister and President to play constructive roles”. The us impetus was in the interest of Azerbaijan at that point, considering Baku’s Westernised approach to foreign policy decision-making at that time, as indicated in the country’s first National Security Concept in 2007. However, the original Madrid Principles did not fully satisfy Baku. The Principles themselves were essential to striking a balance between the Helsinki Final Act’s fundamen- tal principles of the territorial integrity of states, self-determination of peoples, and the non-use of force. For Azerbaijan, the priority was territorial integrity – Baku sought to capitalise on this in the international arena by gaining support from international organisation. This led to tensions with the Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, who did not appreciate Azerbaijan’s way of presenting 1 E-mail interview with former Ambassador Matthew Bryza, nonresident Senior Fellow, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center and Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council, May 2017. security and humanDownloaded rights from 27 Brill.com09/30/2021(2016) 442-466 05:50:33AM via free access <UN> Azerbaijan’s Perspectives on the osce Minsk Group 445 this approach. These tensions emerged following the United Nations Gen- eral Assembly resolution number S/62/243 in March 2008, which reaffirmed Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories.2 The Minsk Group Co-Chair countries voted against the resolution. Baku was deeply dismayed by this; in response, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Araz Azimov, simply stated that “Azerbaijan will work with [the] Minsk Group [and their proposal] based on the position that has been reaffirmed by United Nations”.3 However, until the August War, Azerbaijan did not see the differences within the Minsk Group Co-Chairs as a something that could potentially destabilise the mediation process. After the 2008 war, there were initial concerns about Russia’s attitude – the August War was followed by Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, deeply worrisome for Baku. After the war, Russia’s assertiveness in regard to playing a role in conflict resolution was questioned, as it entailed working with the Western Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group. How- ever, these concerns were assuaged via Moscow’s engagement with the peace process at the presidential level. This began with the November 2008 “Moscow Declaration”. The significance of the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Russian Presi- dents’ declaration was not just that it was the second document signed since the 1994 Ceasefire agreement, but also that it was based on the main provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and the core elements of the Madrid Principles: non- use of force, respect for territorial integrity, and the right to self-determination. Baku believed that Russia’s involvement was motivated by the fact that, after the August war Russia wanted to invest in “image building”. After the August war Moscow pursued an image demonstrating that Moscow was non- violent in regional affairs and a facilitator of peaceful processes – and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process under Russian President Dmitry Medvedevwas part of this.