Forging the Future of the Caucasus: the Past 20 Years and Its Lessons

Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons

Post-Conference Evaluation Report

Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons

Post-Conference Evaluation Report

2012 Joint Publication of Caucasus International (CI), Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) and Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)

Design/Production: Osman Balaban Printed by Moda Ofset Basım Yayın San.Tic.Ltd.Şti. Istanbul, Turkey

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be copied, redistributed, or published without express permission in writing from the publisher. The views reflected here are purely personal and do not represent the views of CI, SAM, or TPQ. CONTENTS

Conference Organizers and Panelists 4

Introduction 6

Opening Remarks 7

Key Debates

1. Change and Continuity of Independence 8 2. Astronomic Expectations vs. Earthly Realities 10 3. South Caucasus: a malfunctioning region? 12 4. Small States and Big Neighbors – The Question of Alignments 15 5. Boundaries and Barriers: Relations with Neighbors 19

Summary: Highlights from the Speakers 27 Post-Conference Evaluation Report Conference Organizers and Panellists

Center for Strategic Studies (SAM)

The Center for Strategic Studies (www.sam.gov.az) is Azer- baijan’s first government-funded, non-profit and academically independent think tank, known as SAM (Strateji Araşdırmalar Mərkəzi in Azerbaijani). The mission of SAM is to promote collaborative research and enhance the strategic debate as well as providing decision-makers with high-quality analysis and innovative proposals for action. Through publications, brain- storming meetings, conferences and policy recommendations, SAM conducts rigorous research guided by a forward-looking policy orientation, thus bringing new perspectives to strategic discussions and contributing to informed decision making in Azerbaijan

Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)

Turkish Policy Quarterly (www.turkishpolicy.com) is an Istan- bul-based journal published on a quarterly basis since 2002. TPQ has a 10-year track record of providing its global audi- ence with balanced, inter-disciplinary, and independent cover- age of developments in Turkey and its neighborhood. Aiming to create a constructive platform of policy debate, TPQ engag- es decision makers, opinion leaders, journalists, and academ- ics. All content can be accessed at www.turkishpolicy.com.

Caucasus International (CI)

Caucasus International (www.cijournal.org) is a foreign policy journal based in Baku and Istanbul. Published quarterly since 2011, the journal covers issues of politics, society and the economy pertaining to the Caucasus. CI is the first journal, in both substance and quality, to provide a platform for debate among scholars from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Tur- key.

The goal of the journal is to contribute to and encourage academic debate on a wide range of economic, political and social issues in the Caucasus region as a whole, as well as within the individual countries. CI’s focus on the region and its neighborhood is informed and guided by a strong awareness of the global context.

4 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference Conference Organizers and Panellists Evaluation Report

Panelists:

Dr. Alexander Rondeli Professor Rondeli is the president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GF- SIS). He is also a professor at Tbilisi State University. He has influenced decision makers and intellectuals in Dr. Gerard Libaridian Georgia and beyond over his 45 years of teaching. In From 2001 to 2012 Gerard addition, he played an ac- Libaridian was professor of tive role in national politics history at the University of throughout the 1990s, when Michigan, Ann Arbor. From he served as an adviser to the 1991-1997, he was the senior President. adviser to the first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Pet- rossian. In this role, he led bilateral negotiations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, Dr. Rasim Musabeyov among other responsibilities. Rasim Musabeyov is a He has published and lec- Member of Parliament for tured extensively, not only the Azerbaijani Republic. about the history of Arme- In early the 1990s, he acted nian nation, but also about as a parliamentary advisor the political developments in to the president of Azerbai- post-independence Armenia. jan. He is now a professor of political science, having worked previously as an independent political analyst and political commentator.

Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons 5 Post-Conference Evaluation Report Introduction

pproximately 20 years ago independence stalemates. The conference also benefited from au- brought both significant challenges and dience contributions to the discussion, including, great hope to the three South Caucasus for example, input from MP Asim Mollazade and A th republics. On the occasion of the 20 anniversa- Vafa Guluzade who served as National Security ry of independence in the South Caucasus, the Adviser to Azerbaijani presidents between 1991 Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies (SAM), and 1999. Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ) and Caucasus In- ternational (CI) organized a conference entitled Given the sensitive nature of the issues taken up– “Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past particularly in light of the public and media in- 20 years and its lessons” in Baku, Azerbaijan. terest following the conference – for the sake of transparency and hoping to spread the ideas more The aim of conference was to examine the future accurately and widely, the organizers decided to of the region through the lens of the lessons of the publish this post-conference report. In order to ful- past 20 years, from the illustrative perspectives of ly represent the speeches and comments, the report three experts: includes detailed reviews of each panelist’s talks, grouped into two main sections. The authors of the Gerard Libaridian, historian and former senior current report have used direct quotation wherever advisor to the first president of Armenia; possible. Pursuant to this objective, the report con- sists of a short introduction and two main sections; Alexander Rondeli, President of the Georgian in the first we present the key debates, while the Foundation of Strategic and International second section attempts to summarize the various Studies; conclusions drawn by the speakers.

Rasim Musabeyov, Member of Parliament for We would like to express our thanks to Nigar Gok- the Azerbaijani Republic sel, Editor-in-Chief of TPQ, and Gulshan Pash- ayeva, Deputy Director of SAM, for their help in Each of these three individuals played important organizing the conference; also Husrev Tabak, Sen- roles in their country’s respective struggles for ior Editor of CI and Celia Davies, Editor of CI for sovereignty, and could now reflect upon the goals their hard work in finalizing the conference report. set and strategies implemented on the three di- We are grateful to staff of TPQ and of SAM, who mensions of identity and governance, economic played a crucial role in making the conference a suc- restructuring, and positioning in the regional and cess. Special thanks also go to the panelists, whose global arena. Blending the practitioner perspective insightful and frank presentations were invaluable. with theoretical background, the platform intended to mark a milestone of regional debate. Based on We remain hopeful that our nations and societies the lessons of recent history, Libaridian, Rondeli, will learn from the experiences of the past 20 years, and Musabeyov – shared their views about how to and use this knowledge to render the region more foster regional integration and break out of current secure and more peaceful in the decades ahead.

6 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference Opening Remarks Evaluation Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. Zaur Shiriyev, Editor-in- Chief Farhad Mammadov, Director of CI, remarked that CI was es- of SAM, emphasized that the tablished with the aim to review South Caucasus countires (re) the developments of the past gaining independence following 20 years in the region, with a the collapse of the Soviet Union view to providing a fresh plat- is in itself a key achievement of form for academic-policy de- the past 20 years. He pointed bate. Shiriyev suggested that, out that protecting independ- broadly speaking, there are three perspectives on ence and managing transition from declarative in- the region. The West believes that the Caucasus dependence to a political, economic reality is the is synonymous with ‘conflict’, and that neither a main task for the next 20 years. Independence, he basis for talking about a region per se exists, nor argued, is fundamental to a nation’s ability to build regional development. Second, from within the re- a prosperous future. He touched upon the most gion, there is a sense that whatever happens can daunting challenges of the past 20 years – namely be explained as “This is the Caucasus”, with little the regional conflicts - and put forth his view that interest in further analysis of this self-referential the closed borders should be opened and conflicts dismissal. CI seeks to develop a third perspective, resolved, enabling all three regional countries to departing from the single-track discussion and achieve sustainable development. In this regard, transitioning to a dialogue. He argued that, “With the ongoing conflicts remain the biggest threat to each second, the future is becoming the past, and both security and resources, human and financial. if we focus too much on the immediate future, for example the elections next year, we risk losing perspective; the future will be the ‘prison’ of all Kemal Koprulu, publisher of those events. He concluded by pointing out that TPQ, reported that Turkish the development of a single country will not nec- Policy Quarterly was proud essarily contribute to a bright future for the region. to mark its 10th anniversary by co-hosting a roundtable in Baku with Caucasus Interna- Nigar Goksel, Editor-in-Chief tional and SAM. He gave a of TPQ and moderator of the brief outline of TPQ’s aims and event, emphasized that there accomplishments, notably how the journal has ex- are three fundamental questions panded its readership around the world in its cov- that seem to have shaped the erage of regional issues in the Caucasus. trajectory of each republic of the South Caucasus. The first is how to co-exist – in other words, conflict. The second was the choice of alignment, i.e. strategic positioning in the international arena. The third is how to meet the economic and political expectations of the public, which ties into institution building, democratic transition, and new economic development models. Twenty years on, all these questions are still relevant, she underlined.

Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons 7 Post-Conference Evaluation Report Change and Continuity of Independence

1. Change and Continuity of lack of strategic experience and strategic Independence culture damaged us a great deal, especially in the spheres of nation building and state The panelists began by offering a general building. The tendency is to think that assessment of the experiences of independence state building includes nation building. within their own countries. A common theme was But they do not go hand-in-hand; they are the huge challenges encountered by the transitional two different processes, albeit ones that are governments. In this sense, Alexander Rondeli intertwined. In the case of Georgia, this is at the very beginning of his speech expressed very important, because we are a multi- the critical assessment that “the problems which national and multi-confessional society. Georgia came across from the very first days of independence are still almost the same” even I think we made a mistake when we though the government “now knows the problems overlooked the importance of the potential better and perhaps deals with them better.” He state-minority clash, instead upholding described the struggle as a zigzag, “one step nation building as the number one problem forward and two steps back”. for Georgia. We are still struggling with the state-minority relationship, and we need to find the best possible formula for that in order for Georgia to survive.”

Professor Gerard Libaridian took up the idea that “nothing has changed” from a different angle, i.e., the continuation of Cold War dynamics:

“We thought the Cold War was over when the Soviet Union collapsed. But the end of the Soviet Union brought new troubles to the region. And it is very clear that the Cold Dr. Rondeli identified the overall challenges as the War did not end in the Caucasus, that there absence of a strategic culture. is a mini Cold War still ongoing in terms of outside influences and controls. “If we look back, we have to say that we lacked strategic culture. I think this was Science, literature, and states declare that the common for all countries of the former Cold War is over, and President George Bush Soviet Union. But when you become independent, you need an elite; you need people who know how to deal with foreign policy, how to deal with nation building, state building… we lacked any strategic understanding, experience, and culture of how to deal with the ethno-nationalism which almost destroyed Georgia.

Ethno-nationalism became a terrible disease against which we are still struggling. This

8 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference Change and Continuity of Independence Evaluation Report

Sr. declared that there is a new world order, “When I was working in the Presidential and there are indeed many areas in which Administration in the early 1990s, the Sovi- major powers talk to each other and resolve et Union was disintegrating, and when we problems together - such as nuclear weapons gained independence, I was involved in the in Belarus and Kazakhstan, etc. However, first meetings of the CIS - Commonwealth Russia continues to compete for control and of Independent States1, during which many influence over this region, including in terms Russian officials suggest that the CIS was of its resources.” temporary, and that after tasting the independence, we would come running back to According to Libaridian, the main problem is the Moscow. continuation of dysfunction within the Caucasus countries themselves, which invites outside But history has showed that despite significant influence rather than solving the problems amongst difficulties, we protected and strengthened each other. our independence, and today no one can cast a shadow over this independence. Today, “Independence came and it was supposed Georgia and Azerbaijan have fully escaped to resolve all of our problems… We wanted Moscow’s patronage, though of course still democracy and, in the spirit of the time, maintaining bilateral relations. Although market economy was tied to the democracy. western analysts talk about Armenia’s They two had to go together. dependence on Russia, I think Armenia too has strengthened its independence.” Changing the formal systems was much easier than changing people and changing The strengthening and consolidating of national patterns of behavior. The habit of not taking independence was the primary change highlighted responsibility for our actions, from the level by Dr. Musabeyov, accompanied by economic, of citizen to the level of prime ministers, military, and social changes. ministers, and presidents continues. “Over approximately nine years, from 2001 There was always someone else, somewhere to 2010, I conducted sociological monitor- else, who was making decisions, and because ing in Azerbaijan, and we did some com- we - the Caucasus states - are still looking for parative projects covering Georgia and outsiders to solve our problems. Before inde- Armenia. While the earlier results showed pendence it was Moscow, now it’s Moscow, that among the public, nostalgia for the old USSR and desire to return to the commu- Brussels, and Washington- our futures are nist regime existed, the more recent surveys still directly bound to this or that side, to this of 2008, 2009, and 2010 show that people or that power, to this or that economic force. prefer European integration, rather than As long as this does not change, the fate of deeper alliances with Russia. I think this the Caucasus nations will not change.” is because of their desire not to surrender their independence to anyone.” Dr. Rasim Musabeyov presented a different viewpoint, arguing that particularly in Azerbaijan independence has been gradually strengthening: 1 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991. At present the CIS unites: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons 9 Post-Conference Evaluation Report Astronomic Expectations vs. Earthly Realities

2. Astronomic Expectations vs. Earthly Realities

Though independence was costly, particularly in terms of the conflicts it gave birth to, was it worth- while? Has independence delivered the desired improvement in living standards, liberal democratic practices, and integration with the world?

From the economic perspective, Dr. Musabeyov set Azerbaijan apart.

“Until the end of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan made up 40-42% of the South Caucasus economy, but now this figure is more than 70%. Azerbaijan’s share is almost 90% of the export potential of the whole region, and nearly 100% of its financial potential – in terms of assets and Dr. Alexander Rondeli related the Georgian story liabilities - belongs to Azerbaijan… the economy as follows: of Azerbaijan is five to six times larger than the Georgian and Armenian economies. Of course, “…like the other Caucasian nations, – this is mainly thanks to the oil and gas factor, and and I have to be more critical about my we accept that.” own people – Georgians had fantastically high expectations about the future: no Dr. Musabeyov also explained Azerbaijan’s one thought about how we would feed strides with regard to infrastructure development, ourselves, stay warm, and so on. We were diplomatic activity, and military capacity. He sure that heating would come from heaven concluded his words in this section with a point and that we would be fed. We assumed about conflicts: everything would work out okay”.

“Over the past 20 years, Georgia has This thought derived from what Dr. Rondeli faced and continues to face problems characterizes as a form of national pride. regarding its territorial integrity, as has Azerbaijan. In this regard, Armenia seems “We told ourselves that we knew luckier. However, unfortunately, in many everything. We thought that billions of cases this is due to Armenia’s increasing dollars would come immediately because dependence on Russia, which ultimately we are the hub of the world, we are will not help Armenia’s development, nor the best: the most handsome, the, best that of Azerbaijan or Georgia. If there is drinkers… everything.” a threat of war, the development of the region will face challenges.” Dr. Rondeli proceeded to share an anecdote that reflected the mindset of the people at the time: 10 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference Astronomic Expectations vs. Earthly Realities Evaluation Report

“I remember well, it was the end of the Soviet Union and I took taxi and the driver was typical Tbilisian: Mixture of Armenian, Azeri, and Georgian. He was speaking Russian. There were many rallies in the street. I asked him: What do you think? What happens? He said: “everything is okay. We will all have Mercedes very soon”. So the expectation was that everyone would be driving a foreign car. Today, not everyone drives a foreign car. Some are very far from that. So expectations were very high and, as always happens, frustration sets in, So, the journey from independence to the then disillusionment, and what the people present day has been full of unexpected crave is the rule of a strong leader, because problems… Mostly it was the economy, disorders start, paramilitary groups appear, state building, nation building, foreign as in Georgia. It was classic case: the policy.” non-functioning of state institutions leads to the desire for a strong, single-origined The Rose Revolution was meant to be a solution to authority.” these problems, and it did solve some of them. But it brought with it new problems to, which Rondeli “The realities turned out to be much explains as follows: more difficult and tragic. [The situation deteriorated because] no one knew much “Only after what we call the ‘Rose about the democratic state building, even Revolution’ was a new government able less about creating a modern inclusive to install order. But they came with silent democratic nation. We knew everything only public endorsement for their authoritarian from the books, not how to do it in reality. actions. So this new revolutionary group We are still struggling with these problems.” came with more authoritarian rules than was expected. Because people expected [In Georgia, the reality was that] “from the order, people wanted order. They wanted very beginning… we could not understand less crime. Thus the government had carte what kind of economy we had to build. I think blanche, almost, to do whatever they most of the people here are people who went thought necessary. through this period as I did. We did not know what kind of economy to choose and then we They delivered a lot but, at the same understood that we were not choosing, in time, the problem remains that Georgia the sense that our will alone was insufficient must become a democracy, because to define a course of socio-economic it is multi-ethnic multi-confessional development. Market conditions were also state. Without democratic development at play, along with other contextual factors we will disintegrate. This is a national that shaped our choices. It is very difficult security problem. Now the problem is to to say whether we are trying to influence find the sweet spot between security and change or adapt to change. democracy, and it is not easy….

Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons 11 Post-Conference Evaluation Report Astronomic Expectations vs. Earthly Realities

So, many of the problems that we first When the Soviet Union collapsed we encountered with independence are still started using the term transition - transition on the agenda, and Georgia is trying to in two major ways: in terms of moving struggle with them - mostly with success, from a one party system to a democratic but we are always unhappy with what we political system; and secondly, from a have. I know many people in Georgia who centrally planned Soviet-style economy say: Oh, the Soviet Union was much better; to a market economy. When we use the we were secure, we knew who we were. I do term “transition” it is assumed that there not agree with that. I do not agree with it, was an identifiable starting point and a despite my age. I spent most of my time in clear destination. European and American the Soviet Union and I am a classic product involvement in institution building, in civil of the Soviet era, but I will not agree with society, in helping us to write constitutions the people who try to look back and try to and laws - all of that was based on the push us backwards. We have to live, and we assumption that it is inevitable that we have to live in the future, and our children would end up in one particular place, that have to live in the future.” we will be great democracies, great market economies. Well…we may have already finished the transition, and what you see is what you get.”

Armenia’s experience of independence and transition started off similar to Georgia’s. In Professor Gerard Libaridian’s words,

“Independence came and it was supposed to Dr. Musabeyov underlined the Azerbaijani resolve all of our problems. It felt like: you advantage of prosperity to enable the societies’ are in love, you love the other person and expectations from independence to be delivered, hopefully she loves you, but you still have though regional conflicts continue to create problems. The expectation is: once you get burdens and fuel frustrations. married the problems are over. In fact, that’s when the problems begin and you have to 3. South Caucasus: a malfunctioning start resolving these problems. We became region? independent and, to use Alex’s [Rondeli] anecdote, some of us are still not driving War, bloodshed, ethnic resentment, enmity, hatred, Mercedes, even in the United States. We and lack of empathy have prevailed over hopes for drive old beaten up Toyotas. So the high ex- peaceful co-existence and harmony throughout the pectations were problematic from the start. region. These experiences have generated a mutual

12 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference South Caucasus: a malfunctioning region? Evaluation Report distrust that is reflected in the panelists’ skepticism ourselves and minimizing the impact of the about the development of a ‘regional’ identity. The continuing mini-Cold War in this region, the argument that the South Caucasus does not function key is conflict resolution, and particularly the as a region was put forth by Dr. Professor Gerard Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While the South Libaridian but also endorsed by Dr. Rasim Musabeyov Ossetia and Abkhazian conflicts are wounds and Dr. Alexander Rondeli. Though all three were in the Georgian spirit and national con- skeptical about a region having been formed, they sciousness, they are not truly regional issues also deemed such a course to be necessary. given that the conflicts do not involve another South Caucasus Republic. The Karabakh Professor Gerard Libaridian explained: conflict is an intra-regional conflict, between Armenia, Karabakh and Azerbaijan.. And “I think sometimes words hide more than when you have that it is difficult to collective- they reveal. Is the Caucasus a region? ly imagine a joint future and develop a vision Yes, in terms of its history, it is a region, in for a better South Caucasus.” terms of its geography obviously, and for most outsiders, it is a region. But do we, the Libaridian interprets the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict people living here in Armenia, Georgia and as a source of regional distress, using it to affirm the Azerbaijan, the citizens and governments of importance of forming a self-reliant and cooperative those states, do we look at the Caucasus as region, whereby every factor that prevents its a region? Do these states function as if they realization is also a regional problem. constitute a region? Do they make policy as a region? Do they think of their future as a region? That is where I struggle with the Dr. Rasim Musabeyov also dismisses the idea that the concept of a region. We have not learned to South Caucasus is a region despite the fact that the think of this as a region. We are still looking level of economic integration between Georgia and for outsiders to solve our problems. If before Azerbaijan is at its peak. independence it was Moscow, now it’s Moscow, Brussels and Washington. We have “Dr. Libaridian said that although tied our futures to this or that side, to this or geographically it exists, politically and that power, to this or that economic future, economically there is no region. I agree. and still we are not looking at ourselves as There is no region. And this is because three a region.” small states cannot present a development model that relies only on their individual What drives Professor Libaridian to this conclusion visions. There needs to be a common choice is the inability of the Caucasians to speak with a regarding integration with Europe or Russia. common voice. By conventional measures, forming Unfortunately, we, in this small space, can such an accord seems a remote possibility in current see the contradictory interests. Azerbaijan real-politics. Nonetheless, Libaridian does not offer and Georgia have for the most part chosen regional coherence as a means to solve the problems European integration and cooperation with raised. On the contrary, it is the resolution of the Turkey. In some sense, we can say that a conflict that would bring closer the South Caucasus Baku-Tbilisi-Ankara axis has been formed. to act as a region: In complete opposition to that there is an “It is obvious that in going back to the orig- Armenia-Russia-Iran orientation. Thus in inal concept of the region, the concept of this sense the region cannot function as a developing the region and relying more on region.”

Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons 13 Post-Conference Evaluation Report South Caucasus: a malfunctioning region?

stan) we are ahead in terms of reforms, living conditions, and state building.”

Dr.Alexander Rondeli also admits that the definition of post-Soviet South Caucasus asa region is so far an illusion.

“We discussed this region. ‘Region’ is in an intellectual construction, if it lacks no real substance – economic content. Even during the Soviet era the so-called Transcaucasian economic region was not Dr. Musabeyov is not that pessimistic about the really an economic region, because the level of cooperation within the region, because he economic links among the three republics compares South Caucasus with other post-Soviet were not strong enough. If they had been regions: strong enough we would not have the problems we have now. Even conflicts “We should consider how our region states would be less likely; because in reality, compare with other post-Soviet republics in the past, we had stronger connections and what differences occur among the with Russia and other republics, rather South Caucasus states themselves. Look than among ourselves, as a region. If we at the Baltic States, which steer clear from had strong economic links in the region conflict and remain in close cooperation. we could pass this transitional period or They have successfully completed their transformation period more easily and transition period, and as members of the more peacefully. I think that the future lies European Union and NATO, have made with integration.” considerable progress. Amongst other things, this success is due to their moving forward through cooperation and similar Similar to his colleagues, Rondeli sees the potential choices. As for us, we do lag behind the for a regional identity via further integration. Baltic States, but at the same time, in com- Integration jumps out as the core principle in parison with the Central Asian republics forming and forging reliable and sustainable (with the possible exception of Kazakh- region relations. In his words,

14 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Small States and Big Neighbors – Post-Conference The Question of Alignments Evaluation Report

“We – Georgians - tactically gain from region. Then we have things to offer. As a this confrontation between Armenia and geopolitical region, we are less important; Azerbaijan. Politically, I must not say people will not care about our problems. that, but tactically we gain. But it is a false The international community does not victory, because the future is the region. care about small states that want to Our region is a hub at the international survive and live decently. So, how do we level. And it is failing to function because jump from geopolitics to geo-economics? of our stupidity and because of the actions We are at the end of the de-Sovietization of some of our neighbors. The reality is that process; perhaps we have even completed we have to pursue integration. But, firstly it – I don’t know. But I think Lenin and we have to develop cooperation. There is Stalin still are within us. We are still living tremendous potential in the environmental with the legacy of the Soviet mentality in sphere, which is already developing our governance and in our everyday lives. slowly, in transportation and energy. But this shift is not impossible to achieve.” These three spheres are just asking us to be more cooperative. But there are also many other spheres. We cannot escape this. We cannot escape because the whole world now is globalizing: cooperating and integrating. We cannot just remain in our own homes and send unfriendly messages. The future is with integration.”

However, the conception of the region also matters. The international tendency is to identify the South Caucasus as a geopolitical region. This geopolitical conception of the region forces the states to read intentions in terms of power politics, and thus the 4. Small States and Big Neighbors – language of zero-sum game prevails. However, The Question of Alignments economic relations can help out to smooth the process of integration. Interdependency becomes Dr.Rondeli explained the thinking in Tbilisi more apparent with economic concerns. Mutually after independence regarding foreign policy and satisfactory discussions become more likely and strategic choices as follows: indeed, this is what the South Caucasus needs. “In terms of foreign policy we were To address this, Dr. Rondeli suggested changing struggling with our complete ignorance: the conception of the region from a geopolitical We didn’t know where we were; we didn’t one to a geo-economical view: know who we were; politically we didn’t know how to play games in international “When Dr. Libaridian talked about relations. And even now many of us believe integration, he did not mention that we that we know everything, but at the same are generally regarded as a geopolitical time we make terrible mistakes sometimes. region; not many people look at us as a We underestimated Russia’s commitment geo-economic area or region. The only to stay in the South Caucasus, we all way to survive is to be a geo-economic overestimated the potential of Western

Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons 15 Post-Conference Small States and Big Neighbors – Evaluation Report The Question of Alignments

influence in the Caucasus, and we have is a struggle of, first, Gamsakhurdia – but come close to making strategic mistakes. the Gamsakhurdia period was very short, It looks like so far, we have survived. Small very crazy – then, Shevardnadze and now, states are developing in an environment Saakashvili. They are struggling to create that is full of hidden dangers, those beyond post-Soviet painkillers to quell anxiety the ones we can see. And we are coming and discontent, as a hoped-for means of across these dangers every day, despite developing the country.” our experience in how to avoid them. In terms of foreign policy our decision to Georgia has no other way [but] to continue, stay with the West is very dangerous, but to go on with a West-oriented way. We are there is no other way”. determined to do it, and whoever comes to power in Georgia, will have to follow Rondeli proceeded to explain the aspiration after this path, because the majority of our Georgia’s revolution in 2003 to align with the population wants that. It’s not the wish of West. To be accepted by the West as part of the one political group. Georgia’s choice is ‘family’, inevitably also means embracing liberal to join the West and to integrate with the democracy. West based on Georgia’s wish to survive, because if we go back under the Russian In the words of Dr. Rondeli, umbrella, we will continue to disintegrate and move further away from becoming an “The new revolutionary government [Mik- inclusive democratic nation and a viable heil Saakashvili’s government] took the state. idea of libertarianism as the main means of developing Georgia, because there Georgia is a multi-ethnic and multi- were no resources, and without resources, confessional society. If Georgia fails one has to rely on big investments. as a democratic society Georgia may disintegrate, especially with the help of But people cannot wait for the good life and some of our neighbors. So the only way for Georgians especially lack patience. You Georgia to survive and to become a viable cannot just feed people with expectations nation and modern inclusive democratic and tell them that there is a light at the nation is to be part of the Euro-Atlantic end to the tunnel. The tunnel is very long community.” and life is very short. So, many people are protesting against it and very frequently In the case of Azerbaijan, delicately balanced politics spills out onto the streets instead relations with the West and Russia, as well as of staying in parliament. Turkey’s constant support in foreign policy and the presence of rich underground sources has defined But this new revolutionary government the strategic choice. As for Armenia, neither the consolidated power in the hands of a small management of foreign policies nor the shape of group of people in order to be effective. the new state took place without the involvement Their decision may have been very rational of third parties. but at the same time they have no resources for so called ‘social anesthesia’. We have no painkillers to make people happy. And these twenty years after independence: it

16 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference Small States and Big Neighbors – Evaluation Report The Question of Alignments

*** Alexander Rondeli continued as follows: The panelists agreed that being small states renders the three Caucasus countries fragile and “The best remedy for all of that is to have vulnerable against third party manipulation. strong viable statehood. It is not easy after Although the panelists stressed the importance centuries of political subjugation to cre- of independence and the mistake of ‘inviting’ big ate strong, viable statehood. It is a seri- states to engage with local problems, this outcome ous task. To create a strong, viable state was also revealed as somewhat inevitable, from the we have to have to strong institutions and debates. As the speakers reflected, if, for example, also very good social political cohesion you have a neighbor like Russia, who is constantly within the country, within society. With a trying to interfere in domestic politics, and you multi-ethnic and multi-confessional socie- also happen to be at war with it, you may have ty this is not easy to achieve, and especial- to invite another powerful state to be involved ly when your neighbors are trying to take in order to balance your international position, advantage of your weaknesses. We are in despite the complications that this involves. this process of transformation and at the same time trying to adapt to a changing Alexander Rondeli explained this phenomenon as security environment, which still poses follows: multiple dangers to Georgia.”

“The biggest problem for any small country is to have a gigantic neighbor. Some say great neighbor; some say big neighbor, I think giant neighbor. This is the biggest challenge for any small country. If this neighbor is democratic then it can serve as a source of inspiration; you will be in the shadow of this gigantic democracy and you have to survive - but it will be easy to survive, at least politically. But when your neighbor is not democratic, still giant, and also vengeful, then it makes the problem of survival very acute.” Nonetheless, challenging a gigantic neighbor as a small state is a tough task requiring tactful han- Dr. Rondeli identified two key remedies to deal dling, according to Alexander Rondeli: with the “giant neighbor - small state” problem. The first one is having a foreign policy that main- “Our vision is that small states cannot tains strong ties with Euro-Atlantic countries at all make any strategic mistakes, because costs, and the second is being a democratic and such mistakes can be fatal. Georgia’s well-functioning state, which will guarantee im- decision to join the Euro-Atlantic family munity against ill-intentioned outsider involve- of nations was not just a fashionable ments. Counter-balancing Russia with the West idea that suddenly sprung to the minds of under these circumstances is a necessary evil, some crazy Georgians. Georgia is multi- though avoiding or lessening the harm is always ethnic and multi-confessional society. If possible. Georgia fails as a democratic society, it will disintegrate, especially with the help

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of some of our neighbors. So the only way major powers. And that relationship works for Georgia to survive and to become a both ways: Sometimes it is domestic issues viable and modern, inclusive democratic that dictate foreign alliances but sometimes nation is to be part of the Euro-Atlantic it is foreign influences that shape domestic community. forces. And what is happening in all the republics is that political parties have allianc- Dr. Rondeli also explained that Russia can not es and directions in a way that will increase clearly be identified as the sole problem. their advantages against other parties. That is, our political parties have encouraged the “Our wish to join the Euro-Atlantic com- involvement of external powers in domestic munity is not because of our hatred of affairs. It is not just that others - Russia or Russia, not at all. I speak fluent, native the US - come and say: we would like you to Russian; my mother was born in St. Pe- do this or that. We in are inviting outsiders tersburg and my first language was Rus- to come and involve themselves in domestic sian. My mother was Georgian but she affairs” spoke Russian better than Georgian. So we all grew up with Russian culture and In this way, small states shoot themselves in the foot, they got a lot from Russian culture and and their vulnerability and dependency becomes from Russia. And if we weigh things up, more acute. Nonetheless, Libaridian argued against you know, maybe the positive outweigh the the depiction of Russia as the only problem-causer. negatives. This is a question for research- According to him, the US also made use of their vul- ers, not for me. And when we try to escape nerabilities. Russia we are trying to escape modern Russia, revanchist post-2008 Russia. Thus “If everything was good during the Soviet pe- Georgia’s choice is to join the West and to riod, Abkhazia, Karabakh everyone was hap- integrate with the West because it wants to py, who created and maintained that peace? survive; if we fall back under the Russian You cannot bring Russia into the picture and umbrella, we will continue to disintegrate say that it is the Russians who are creating and we will not become an inclusive dem- all the problems. The Russians imposed the ocratic nation and viable state.” solution and they kept it for seventy years. Although it would be an oversimplification, In a similar vein, Professor Gerard Libaridian ar- I could turn the argument upside down and gued that small states cannot make mistakes, and say that it was the Russians who brought nor can they do whatever they want. Every move peace and it was us who brought the conflict. has to be well-planned. He further explained as Neither position is correct. It is a combina- follows: tion of factors and we have to be careful in our analysis of the role of others in the con- “We realized that independence doesn’t flict. Russia has a role, the United States has necessarily mean that you can do what a role. I remember there was a document you want, and Alex explained it very well. that Ambassador Kazimirov brought, upon The point that I want to add to what my which Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan colleague said is that in small states, the all more or less agreed. It was the Unites relationship between foreign relations, States that then said, you cannot do that be- foreign alliances and domestic issues is cause that solution would increase Russian much more intense than is the case for influence and decrease Western influence.”

18 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Boundaries and Barriers: Post-Conference Relations with Neighbors Evaluation Report

Dr. Rasim Musabeyov touched upon the vulner- operation in bilateral relations, intra-regional col- ability of small states’ in regard to the necessity laborations for security and confidence building, of regional integration. Dr. Musabeyov believes and finally integration with the world economy that “small states cannot present a development and politics as a regional bloc. model relying only on themselves”. Hence, Mus- abeyov considers regional integration as a reme- A historical evolution of the conflicts shows that dy to small state fragility; if the three states have there were chances to put an end to the disputes. good relations, third party involvements would be In this regard, the panelists communicated their prevented. Hence, a functioning, integrated region personal experiences in the ways the states have may build not only security, but also maintain the been dealing with those conflicts and the various confidence through which a secure environment missed opportunities in respect to resolution and for development could be established. conciliation.

There was consensus that the conflicts appeared roughly at the same time as independence. There were instances where peace was very close to being achieved. But the above-mentioned problems blocked successful conflict resolution. The conflict blocked the successful transition and peace building; consequently these have further deepened the conflict and created an isolated region with irresolvable problems.

Every state has its own experience and narrative. Alexander Rondeli tells Georgia’s story. To him, ethno-nationalism and failures in state and nation 5. Boundaries and Barriers: Relations building are the two core reasons for the conflicts. with Neighbors And there were opportunities to stop the bloodshed and divisions. The final topic was bilateral relations with neighbors, or – conflicts. Ultimately the most “Ethno-nationalism became like terrible important challenges today in the region are three disease against which we are still strug- protracted unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia, South gling… it was the time when provincial Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. historians and provincial literary critics dominated public opinion, shaping pub- These conflicts have tremendous influence over al- lic opinion… [consequently] we almost most every aspect of the overall landscape of the destroyed our country... So state-minor- three South Caucasian states, from identity forma- ity relations have been the problem from tion, cultural evolution and socio-economic devel- the beginning and we have been unable to opment to military doctrines, foreign policies and deal with issues … This ethno-nationalism geopolitical trajectories. The conflicts have stood and everything connected with it has had in the way of successful transitions from a social- a very negative influence on our develop- ist state system to well-functioning liberal democ- ment. racy, inclusive state/nation building for long-term Every small nation in the Caucasus has ethnic cohesion, politically and economically co- the same local interests and our interest

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is local, maximum regional. (…) The war agreement” which never was signed: with Russia showed us how fragile we first, Russia’s special rights in the conflict are. So, the challenge is to create a stable, regions of Georgia, and second, that the viable state and also to create a modern, parties will not allow any third country’s inclusive, and democratic nation, where military or military infrastructure on their everyone, including all minorities, will territory. We said, we understand that you feel themselves secure and happy. are afraid of someone else, so instead of ‘third countries’ let’s put ‘foreign troops’. We cannot see anything good in terms of They refused and so we rejected these conflict resolution, because South Ossetia two wishes of Russian government, which is practically cut off from Georgia. It is would have breached our sovereignty. a military garrison there; villages with thousands of years of history, for example Georgia’s choice is to join the West and to Kamarasheli, have been renamed. How integrate with the West, to survive. Still, can this be tolerated? And all Georgians many people say that turning to the West have been expelled. It is ethnic cleansing. was a strategic mistake… Now the Russians are improving the tunnel to make further aggression easier to enact. Dr. Rondeli is not so optimistic about the future Abkhazia is a slightly different problem of Georgia’s relations with Russia. The remedy but it is also a case of ethnic cleansing. of integrating with Euro-Atlantic community and The problem is how to reintegrate these enhancing democratic sufficiency in the country areas. President Saakashvili made a very may bring the intra-societal conflict to an end, but important statement in the European a reliable plan to develop relations with Russia has Parliament, namely a commitment that yet to be developed. Georgia will never use force to regain these two territories. But Russia says: sign the With a similar conclusion but a different story, agreement with the Abkhazians and South Professor Gerard Libaridian believes that the Ossetians. We said: if Russia signs it, so Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno- will we. But we won’t counter sign with the Karabakh will continue if states carry on sitting Abkhazians, because we are not fighting around the table with maximum demands. Hence with them – that is the false impression to him, the demands for a zero-sum solution will Russia is trying to create. So unfortunately prevent the two countries from reaching a positive there is a stalemate, and we don’t see any conclusion. Alternative solutions have to be way out. The Georgian government’s brought onto the agenda. program for reintegrating these two areas is working slowly, but quite effectively in “We have reinterpreted the past only in the medical sphere. Thousands of people terms of legitimizing the power of repub- come for medical support and medical lics; that legitimacy comes from nation- help, and in very serious cases, free alism. The governments’ legitimization of charge. Now, however, the de facto of power started with the manipulation of Abkhazian authorities prohibit Abkhazian that aspect. The problem was, of course, citizens from coming to Georgia for that state boundaries and administrative medical assistance. boundaries have always been a problem From the very beginning Moscow wanted in this region. But once independence two clauses in the so-called “frame came it was not clear that state bounda-

20 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Boundaries and Barriers: Post-Conference Relations with Neighbors Evaluation Report

ries corresponded to ethnic demographic replied, the future is clear – it is the past I boundaries. And, of course, that produced am not sure about, because, it is constantly conflict. The conflicts were sometimes mil- changing. itarized, sometimes not. But it is obvious that these were challenges that we did not During the conference, a member of the Nagorno- handle properly. Karabakh Community of the Azerbaijani Republic and one of the victims of Nagorno-Karabakh “Some years ago, I did an experiment conflict, who had lost most of his family inthe in the course I was teaching on conflict war, Mr. Eyvaz Huseynov, posed question to and diplomacy in the Caucasus at the Dr. Libaridian regarding his personal role in the University of Michigan. I developed a conflict: “Mr. Libaridian, from 1991 to 1997, lecture which could be given either in 50 you served as the advisor to the President of the minutes or in a two week seminar, and I Armenian Republic and, of course, you advised presented that at Alex’s center (GFSIS) either the president or the state in the occupation of in two lectures, in Baku here with some Nagorno-Karabakh. It is obvious how our people, friends, NGOs and some academic either in Azerbaijan or in Armenia, have suffered colleges in a three-hour workshop, in from this over the last 20 years, as the result of the Yerevan and also in Istanbul and Tehran. occupation. I want to know if you have any regrets In Istanbul it was a mini course at Sabancı with regard to the advice you gave, which led to University. In Tehran it was two-week mini the continued occupation of our lands.” course at the Caspian Institute. But the lectures were boring to me, because I was repeating myself. What was interesting was that in each location, I was more critical about that particular government. That was the slight variation. There were questions, answers and discussions and inevitably there was one comment that came usually toward the end of question and answer period. When I pushed my critique of that particular government - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Iran - inevitably someone would say: “But sir, look at the neighborhood we are living in.” So in Baku my colleagues were blaming Iran, Armenians, Georgians, and In answer to this question, Professor Libaridian Russians; the others were the problem. In explained how the narratives of both sides about Armenia: Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, the conflict had developed differently. Iran were the problems; and in Georgia it was Russia ,Armenia, etc. In Turkey it was “There are a few issues regarding which the same. No one talks of the neighborhood I am not sure about the wisdom of the as our neighborhood; that is very serious advice I gave the President. I still think problem.” about these and struggle with them. But “One Soviet leader or intellectual was none of them relate to the Karabakh asked “what does the future hold? He, conflict.

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There are number of questions regarding Again, I don’t want to bring all that up; it’s the Armenian positions regarding the just to point out that when we characterize current status of the Karabakh conflict. I events, if we are doing it for rhetorical do not wish to get into a battle over the reasons, political reasons, I understand. facts but I want to point out that each side But I cannot accept that as history. It’s like has a narrative and in the narrative of asking a person “are you still beating up each side there are parts that are wittingly your wife?” There is no good answer to and unwittingly forgotten. Each one that. If he says “yes”, then both in the past, picks from the past those facts that fit a in the present, he is beating up his wife. If comfortable and convenient present. he says “no”, at least he was beating his wife in the past. If the questions are going The fact is, the conflict of Karabakh to lead to a possible solution, they have to was militarized in April-May 1991 by be formulated in a way that is not based the Soviet Azerbaijani OMON 2and the on forgotten facts and wrong assumptions. Soviet army with attacks on 14 Armenian That is what I have to say.” populated villages in the north of Karabakh. Some people say that Soviet “..if the conflicts are not resolved… in troops were responsible – true, but they this respect I think that Armenia is the were acting under President Mutalibov’s most vulnerable of the three countries. orders or, at the least, with his consent. Azerbaijan can go on, will go on Then elected President Elchibey continued developing and so will Georgia, without the militarization of the conflict. There South Ossetia, Abkhazia. Here I should was a blockade of Karabakh, the use of remind you that the debate in 1997 Azerbaijani air force against Armenian between Levon Ter-Petrossian and those civilian populations, the use of artillery who forced him to resign was over exactly in Shushi/Shusha to bomb, Stepanakert, that. Levon Ter-Petrossian and myself and which Azerbaijanis call Khankendi. Has others were saying that there are limits anyone here taken responsibility for to how much Armenia can develop, how the militarization of the conflict and its quickly it can become a normal state, how consequences which you are describing?3 sustainable its economic development can be. And the main reason was that we were in conflict with two of our four 2 OMON (Russian: Otryad Mobilinii Osobovo Naznacheniya, neighbors: Turkey and Azerbaijan. And Special Purpose Mobile Unit) is a generic name for the system of special units of Police. this was limiting our normal economic development. So, we were saying that 3 The Azerbaijani account of the starting point for the militarization of the conflict and of the 1991 events to which Dr. Libaridian refers we really have to go and find peace, not is different. According to the Azerbaijani version, the conflict was not militarized in April-May 1991 with attacks on Armenian villages, just a ceasefire. And there were some in and the security measures taken by the Soviet Azerbaijani OMON the government who opposed that and were not sudden or baseless acts of aggression against 14 Armenian- populated villages. It was a legal security measure by the Azerbaijan forced Ter-Petrossian to resign. They said SSR government, in response to attacks on Azerbaijani populated yes, the blockades are hurting Armenia villages by Armenian villagers. The Soviet Azerbaijan OMON was a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in other words a paramilitary but there are other bigger reasons for not police force along with Soviet troops whose responsibility was to maintain stability, order and rule of law in the area in which they developing so quickly, and Ter-Petrossian were located. The current conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan had to go in order to bring in a new policy. did not start on April-May 1991 but rather in November 1987, when the Azerbaijani population of the Gafan district of Soviet Armenia I think we were right. was violently expelled, with dozens of fatalities, before the Karabakh events started.

22 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Boundaries and Barriers: Post-Conference Relations with Neighbors Evaluation Report

“The parties to the conflict are thinking not remember Karabakh being within time is on their side or they are not really Azerbaijan. This is very hurtful for you to dealing with reality. Now, there are hear maybe but that is the case. And that different ways of counting time and I can is the part of the reality you have to deal make a great argument that the time is on with… Even if Azerbaijan has more money the side of the Azerbaijanis. I can also and a better economy and controls this make a good argument that is on the side of and that, the conflict is still blight on the Armenians…. The arguments can be made. country. Because so much of that money But I need to point out a couple of things. has to go to the army, military training, One is that calculations are not always military equipment, and so on. And finally, correct. There are always unpredictable in all of these cases governments use conditions that come and may disrupt the threat of war and continuation of the things; if Azerbaijan is thinking about a conflict to limit democracy and human military solution, we should remember rights. It justifies the securitization of that war itself is unpredictable. You may the state - so more security services, decide that you have a better army and more army, more police, fewer and fewer you have more people, you certainly individual rights. And that is a cost that have more oil, and that Armenia is weak. Azerbaijan is paying as much as Armenia But you never know. There are so many and Karabakh are.” factors in war. Wars are not just money and calculations and numbers. So there “So what I am arguing is that if we are is a problem there. But there is also looking for a solution we have to stop something else, and more fundamental. thinking in terms of formulae, we have While the passage of time may seem to stop thinking in terms of creating a to give an advantage to Azerbaijan, narrative that is good for us. If you do not that same time is also producing a new know what really happened in the past generation of Karabakh Armenians who and do not take responsibility for your do not remember Karabakh being part of mistakes, then there is no way out. Azerbaijan and if they do, they remember being bombed. So if you are looking for a And I would also say, the reliance on solution, that solution must be with those one of side on the principle of territorial people. How are you going to convince integrity, and the other side’s reliance them? You are not even talking to them? on the principle of the right to self- How are you going to make that generation determination are blocking solutions. different, more open to Azerbaijan? How They do not resolve any problems. These are you going to force them into anything? are just words behind which we hide and They do not understand. This is something refuse to make basic compromises. What that you have to consider, the president we need to do to solve these problems is has to consider, the political forces have to refrain from hiding behind principles to consider. These are real people in and secondly, to step out from behind Karabakh, not abstract entities. Now, maximum demands. Maximum demands unless you imagine Karabakh without are the easiest to formulate and present; Armenians, which is a very different maximum demands can make me appear issue, then these are the people you a super patriot. I want this, this and this. I need understand. People under thirty do want this kind of solution and we will not

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accept anything else. Negotiations cannot succeed if you are going there with only maximum demands and without a clear understanding of your minimum demands and minimum needs. Negotiations succeed when you focus on your needs rather than wants.

In all negotiations that I have conducted on many levels, confidential, secret - and my partner is here, Vafa Guluzade - I always found my discussions with Karabakh Dr. Libaridian also noted the Georgian policy of leaders and negotiations between Yerevan talking to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, raising and Stepanakert or Khankendi were the the question about whether Baku might consider most difficult. The most difficult thing talking to Karabakh Armenians in a constructive was to get the other side, Karabakh or manner. Azerbaijan, to define their minimum needs rather than maximum ones. In his presentation, Dr. Rasim Musabeyov placed more emphasis on the role of Azerbaijan’s And another thing I have found in those non-Caucasian neighboring states (Turkey and negotiations is that direct negotiations Iran) in regional politics. Musabeyov particular- are the best. Mediators can come and go, ly emphasized Turkey’s counter-balancing role mediators have usefulness but I can tell against Russia. Leaving aside the debates regard- you - and I am proud to have Vafa here - ing whether Turkey or Iran can be considered as the ceasefire that is there, that was initially South Caucasian states, Dr. Musabeyov dedicat- negotiated by Ambassador Kazimirov was ed a large part of his speech to Turkey’s possible seen as a temporary ceasefire. The actual contributions to the conflict resolution and secure ceasefire on which we are functioning neighborhood building. today came in July between direct negotiations with Vafa, when a second Assessing threats from Iran and Russia, Dr. document was produced that uses the Musabeyov said: term “permanent ceasefire.” That has not been mentioned often. And, also, I think “When we talk about the future, I think, in there is no better person than the party the first place the existing risks should be to the conflict who can define what that assessed. Of course, the biggest risk today party can give up and what it cannot give is Iran and the situation around it and, up. I do not trust mediators, personally. eventually, the increasing pressures of I prefer direct negotiations. And I think Russia on the region. As you know, now it this has to be considered if we are going is not only about the Eurasian project; at to go forward with any solution. But we the same time, troops are gathered on the have to be careful, asking questions that Azerbaijani and Georgian borders. There lead to solutions, not questions that block. are rumors that if operations in Iran are We have to be careful about international launched, Russia will open a corridor to principles and standers that do not lead us Armenia through Georgia. These are very to any compromises.” dangerous suggestions.” 24 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Boundaries and Barriers: Post-Conference Relations with Neighbors Evaluation Report

are 5,000 Russian troops in Armenia and However, in the long-term, believes Dr. Musabey- further limited presences in Ossetia and ov, the situation would be reversed due to Turkey’s Abkhazia. All this demonstrates that, if we increasing power in the region. look at the global tendency in the region, Russia - although still influential as a big “Russia’s influence in the region decreases state and permanent neighbor – is losing year by year, while Turkey’s increases. At its influence, while Turkey’s influence and the turn of the previous century, when the influence of the West in the region are Turkey and the Soviet Union were being increasing.” created, the population of Russia was 130 million and of Turkey 13 million - today Turkey’s increasing role will inevitably benefit Turkey’s population is 80 million and Azerbaijan, according to Musabeyov. Azerbaijan Russia’s 145 million. Russia’s economy maintains good relations with Turkey and has was almost 10 times bigger than Turkey’s established strong economic links with Georgia but today Turkey’s economy is equal to as a grand strategy of surrounding Armenia with 60-70% of the Russia’s economy, and its Azerbaijani allies, the consequences of which annual growth is 8-10% whereas Russia’s would force Armenia to take a step back and end development depends on the price of the its occupation. Also, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and oil. We can also see that in the 1950s Turkey as a regional block may diminish Russia’s and 60s, more than 1 million Russians negative influence on Georgia. were living in the South Caucasus. Today, there are less than 200 or 250 thousand “...The integration between Azerbaijan Russians in the South Caucasus. From and Georgia is important to South Cau- the economic perspective, Russia’s trade casus integration. It has developed to the turnover with Azerbaijan, Georgia and level that Georgian President Saakashvi- Armenia was more than 80%. Today, yes, li proposed the creation of the Azerbai- Russia is still important, but its share in jan-Georgian Confederation. That is not Azerbaijan’s trade turnover is less than about the uniting the states, of course, but 8%. It is almost, more or less, the same is the reflection of the desire to develop in- with Georgia and Armenia. From the tegration to the highest level. In a sense, military perspective, the Transcaucasian Armenia is excluded from the integration military district’s power was enough processes. And, to be honest, I don’t con- to fight wars with Turkey and Iran and sider this a positive factor. It is negative, almost occupy to them. But today there because the neighbor that is isolated from

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the integration processes is both a dan- ger to its neighbors and for itself. It is not about the complete resolution of the conflict. I think it is groundless to speak about the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the near future. But if we can ensure positive changes towards the resolution and involve Armenia into the integration processes, I think the South Cau- casus would benefit greatly and be a more secure area.”

With regard to Armenia-Azerbaijan integration, nor imperialism. It is democracy, and we will Mr. Asim Mollazade stated that, “more than 75% fight for democracy. I hope that the future of the of the economy in the South Caucasus is the econ- Caucasus will be like the future of the European omy of Azerbaijan. We are currently investing bil- countries. For example, in Europe there are now lions in neighboring Georgia, and if we were not no boundaries. Boundaries are only symbolic. I in conflict with Armenia, we would be investing hope that in the South Caucasus boundaries will there too, which would help reduce Yerevan’s de- also be symbolic.” pendence on Russia, maybe free Armenia, or give more independence and stop conflict.”

Former diplomat and political scientist Vafa Guluzade, on the other hand, put the blame on Russia as a responsible party for the conflicts. According to him, “In the last 20 years Moscow has been the earthquake and tsunami in our region that destroyed our state, our country, our home. That is why there is a conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. We lived in the Soviet Union as one family. But after collapse of the Soviet Union, after these earthquakes, we are still fighting each other.”

Mr. Guluzade expressed uncertainty about Euro- pean integration as well, explaining that “we don’t know truly what will be our future: will we be a democratic state, flourishing like Europe? Will we live like them in peace, in tranquility, or it will be something else? It is very important to know, what is coming to us and how we must behave this new ideology, because we don’t know anything about it”.

However, Mr. Guluzade continues to express his confidence and reliance on democratic values.“The new ideology of our century is not communism,

26 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons Post-Conference Summary: Highlights from the Speakers Evaluation Report

Summary: Highlights from the Speakers problems is strong and viable statehood.

Below are some remarks capturing key arguments Georgia has to become a democracy, be- presented by each speaker: cause it is a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional state. Without democratic develop- Alexander Rondeli ment we will disintegrate. The only way to survive is to be a geo-eco- The problems Georgia has today are al- nomic region rather than a geo-political most the same as the ones it encountered one. during the very first days of independence. I think Lenin and Stalin still are within us. We lacked the strategic understanding, We are still living with the legacy of Soviet experience, and culture required to deal mentality in our governance, in our every- with the ethno-nationalism which almost day dealings … destroyed Georgia. South Ossetia is practically cut off from The idea of a ‘region’ is an intellectual Georgia… It is just a military garrison of construction. Russians.

During the Soviet era, the so-called Tran- Georgia’s only option is to join the West scaucasian large economic region was not and to integrate with the West, given its really an economic region, because the push for survival. If we slip back under connections and economic links between the Russian umbrella, we will continue to the three republics were insufficient. If disintegrate. they had been strong enough, we would not have the problems we have now. Gerard Libaridian Georgians may seem to benefit from this conflict between Armenia and Azerbai- We are still looking for outsiders to solve jan… But it is a false and empty victory; it our problems. Before independence it was is not good for us. Moscow; now it is Moscow, Brussels and Washington. In the South Caucasus, the future lies with integration. The Cold War did not end in the Cauca- sus. There is a mini Cold War going on in Twenty-two years after independence, terms of outside influences and controls. survival remains the number one problem for Georgia. The 2008 war with Russia Independence doesn’t necessarily mean showed us how fragile we are. that you can do what you want.

The only instrument of our foreign policy It is not just that others – Russia or the is diplomacy. US – come and say: we would like you to do this or that. Our domestic jockeying for The best remedy for dealing with a power causes us to invite outsiders to be- non-democratic neighbor and ethnic come involved in national affairs.

Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons 27 Post-Conference Evaluation Report Summary: Highlights from the Speakers

The key is the resolution of the conflicts, mainly chosen European integration and and particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh cooperation with Turkey, while Armenia conflict. The difference with other con- displays a Russia-Iran orientation. flicts is that this is an intra-regional conflict, involving Armenia and Azerbaijan, The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Supsa, in addition to Karabakh. and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline projects freed Azerbaijan from dependency Governments use the threat of war and on Russia and have done the same for continuation of the conflict to limit de- Georgia. mocracy and human rights. It justifies the securitization of the state, so there are more security services, more military, Compared to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ar- more police, and fewer and fewer individ- menia are ahead in terms of implementa- ual rights. tion of reforms.

Reliance on the principle of territorial Georgia and Azerbaijan face threats to integrity or on the right of self-determi- their territorial integrity, and in this re- nation of peoples is blocking solutions... gard Armenia seems luckier. However, in Maximum demands are the easiest to for- general this is due to Armenia’s increas- mulate but negotiations cannot succeed if ing dependence on Russia. you are going there with only maximum There is increasing integration between demands, and without a clear understand- Azerbaijan and Georgia… it has devel- ing of your minimum demands and min- oped to the level that Georgian President imum needs. Negotiations succeed when Saakashvili proposed the creation of the you focus on your needs rather than your Azerbaijan-Georgian Confederation. wants. Broadly speaking, Russia’s influence In my seven years of working as an ad- in the region is decreasing year by year visor to Ter-Petrossian and working on while Turkey’s is increasing. negotiations, there were moments when Azerbaijan and Armenia both missed opportunities.

Rasim Musabeyov

20 years have strengthened independence among the regional countries.

Although the nostalgia for the USSR still exists, people no longer want to be part of Russian-sponsored structures; they prefer integration with Europe.

The regional states have contradictory interests; Azerbaijan and Georgia have

28 Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons

On 28 June 2012, Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ), the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies (SAM), and Caucasus International held a conference entitled “Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons” in Baku. The event was chaired by TPQ editor-in-chief Nigar Goksel, and began with brief welcoming remarks by Farhad Mammadov (Director of SAM), Kemal Koprulu (publisher of TPQ), Zaur Shiriyev (Editor-in-chief of Caucasus International).

Following this, the three panellists were introduced:

Gerard Libaridian, historian and senior advisor to the first president of Armenia (1991-1997);

Alexander Rondeli, President of the Georgian Foundation of Strategic and International Studies;

Rasim Musabeyov, Member of Parliament for the Azerbaijani Republic

The speakers, all of whom are prominent scholars with experience in decision-making, shared their insights about the expectations and burdens of independence in the Caucasus, and the lessons learned over the years. This report seeks to create a public archive of the invaluable discussions and significant conclusions drawn in the conference.

ISSN: 2222-1433