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Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received As of 19:30, 21 February 2019 | OSCE

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Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received As of 19:30, 21 February 2019 | OSCE 2/22/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 February 2019 | OSCE Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 February 2019 KYIV 22 February 2019 This report is for the media and the general public. Summary Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasere violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region. Houses sustained damage caused by gunre in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. The Mission recorded ceasere violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area and near the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non- government-controlled area of Luhansk region. The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasere to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region and demining activities in Donetsk region. Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.* Ceasere violations[1] In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasere violations, including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 475 explosions). The majority of ceasere violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol); south-east, south and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk); as well as in areas south, west and north of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasere violations, including, however, fewer explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (about 135 explosions). The majority of ceasere violations were recorded in areas south and south-west of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas below). Houses in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka sustained damage caused by gunre At 6 Dundycha Street, within a residential area in the south-eastern part of Zolote- 5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a broken south-facing window pane on the ground oor of a two-storey house and scorch marks to the south-facing side of the same house. It also saw remnants of ammunition, assessed as a tailn of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) 2-4m south of the house. The https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/412241 1/6 2/22/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 February 2019 | OSCE SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by the explosion of a rocket propelled grenade (RPG-7) red from a north-north-westerly direction. At 4 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw three holes in a north-facing window on the ground oor of a two-storey house. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by rounds of small-arms re. At 4 Poshtova Street, within a residential area on the northern edge of Zolote- 5/Mykhailivka, the SMM saw two broken south-eastern-facing windows on the ground oor of a two-storey house. It also saw remnants of ammunition assessed as an infantry ghting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1, 73mm) round about 10m south of the aforementioned windows. Disengagement areas[2] On the evening of 20 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst at an assessed range of 4-5km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 21 February, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, as well as four shots and about 30 bursts of small-arms re at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-west and south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3] Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government- controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation. Withdrawal of weapons The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines Non-government-controlled areas 21 February The SMM saw: two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk). Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites Non-government-controlled areas ten tanks (ve T-72 and ve T-64) and a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 21 February 2019) and https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/412241 2/6 2/22/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 February 2019 | OSCE 20 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk). 20 February The SMM saw: seven tanks (two T-72 and ve T-64) in a training area near Myrne (28km south- west of Luhansk). Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region[4] 21 February The SMM noted that: eight howitzers (D-30) were present and 30 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), seven towed howitzers (D-30) and 24 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were again missing. Weapons permanent storage site At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region 21 February The SMM noted that: six tanks (ve T-64 and one T-72) were again missing. At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region 20 February The SMM noted that: ten towed howitzers (nine D-30 and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), 14 self- propelled howitzers (2S1) and ve MLRS (BM-21) were again missing. Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5] Government-controlled areas 20 February An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted: three IFVs (BMP variants) south-east of Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). An SMM mini-UAV spotted: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/412241 3/6 2/22/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 February 2019 | OSCE two IFVs (BMP variants) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). 21 February The SMM saw: an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BREM variant) and six IFVs (BMP-1) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 20 February 2019) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). Non-government-controlled areas 20 February An SMM long-range UAV spotted: ve armoured recovery vehicles (three BTS-4A and two VT-55), six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP-2), nine APCs (seven MT-LB and two BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in compounds in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk city and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk). 21 February The SMM saw: an IFV (BMP-1) in Luhansk city; an IFV (BMP variant) in Hryhorivka (68km south of Donetsk); and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). Presence of mines and remnants of ammunition On 20 February, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 11 anti-tank mines (nine TM-62 and two probable TM-62) laid across road H21 about 70m east of the bridge in Shchastia and six anti-tank mines (four TM-62 and two probable TM-62) laid across the same road 50m west of the bridge (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 9 February 2019). SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasere to enable inspection and repair works to water pipelines of the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government- controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and water pipelines in Donetskyi (non-government- controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable demining activities in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). Border area outside government control https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/412241 4/6 2/22/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 February 2019 | OSCE While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw three cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a bus entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 11 covered cargo trucks (four with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw at least 200 stationary empty cargo wagons. The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv. *Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fullment of its mandate The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day.
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