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United Nations A/71/138 General Assembly Distr.: General 14 July 2016 English Original: English/French/Russian/ Spanish Seventy-first session Item 97 (g) of the preliminary list* General and complete disarmament: transparency in armaments United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Report of the Secretary-General Summary The present report, which is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/43, contains information received from Member States on the export and import of conventional arms covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, including “nil reports”, as well as additional background information on military holdings, procurement through national production and international transfers of small arms and light weapons for the calendar year 2015. As at the date of submission of the present report, the Secretary-General had received reports from 27 Governments. * A/71/50. 16-12115 (E) 090816 010916 *1612115* A/71/138 Contents Page I. Introduction ................................................................... 3 II. Information received from Governments ........................................... 4 A. Index of information submitted by Governments ................................. 4 B. Reports received from Governments on conventional arms transfers................. 5 III. Information received from Governments on military holdings and procurement through national production ............................................................. 30 IV. Information received from Governments on international transfers of small arms and light weapons .................................................................. 43 Annex Views received from Governments ................................................ 82 Cuba ......................................................................... 82 Japan ......................................................................... 85 Senegal ....................................................................... 86 2/86 16-12115 A/71/138 I. Introduction 1. The present report is the twenty-fourth consolidated report on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms issued by the Secretary-General since the establishment of the Register.1 The General Assembly, in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 (a) of resolution 68/43, called upon Member States to provide their data and information on international transfers of major conventional arms covered by the Register, including “nil reports” and additional background information, on an annual basis. 2. On 4 March 2016 the Secretariat sent a note verbale to Member States requesting them to submit their reports no later than 31 May 2016. Reminders were sent on 9 June 2016. The replies received are reproduced in sections II to IV and in the annex below. Any further national reports and additional information received from Governments will be issued as addenda to the present report. 3. The percentage of Member States using the online reporting tool in filing their national reports with the Register has been rising since its introduction, from 20 per cent in 2012, to 46 per cent in 2015. 4. The originals of the submissions by Member States are available to Governments from the Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2 The annual reports and other relevant information are available from the website of the Register. 3 __________________ 1 The first 23 reports were issued under the following symbols: A/48/344 and Corr.1-3 and Add.1-3; A/49/352 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-4; A/50/547 and Corr.1 and Add.1-4; A/51/300 and Add.1-5; A/52/312 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-4; A/53/334 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-2; A/54/226 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6; A/55/299 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6; A/56/257 and Corr.1 and Add.1-2; A/57/221 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-3; A/58/203 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-2; A/59/193 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-2; A/60/160 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-3; A/61/159 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-3; A/62/170 and Add.1-3; A/63/120 and Add.1-3; A/64/135 and Add.1-3; A/65/133 and Add.1-5; A/66/127 and Corr.1-2; A/67/212 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1-2; and A/68/138 and Add.1; A/69/124 and Add.1; and A/70/168 and Add.1. 2 Contact [email protected]. 3 www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register. 16-12115 3/86 A/71/138 II. Information received from Governments A. Index of information submitted by Governments Background information Views on the Procurement International transfers Register/ Report Data on Data on Military through national of small arms and national State received on exports imports holdings production light weapons policies 1. Albania 15.06.2016 √ √ nil nil √ 2. Belarus 17.06.2016 √ nil nil nil nil 3 Bhutan 08.04.2016 nil nil nil nil nil 4. Canada 20.06.2016 √ √ √ √ nil 5. Chile 12.05.2016 √ √ nil nil √ 6. Cuba 26.04.2016 nil nil nil nil nil √ 7. Cyprus 07.06.2016 nil nil nil nil nil 8. El Salvador 27.04.2016 √ nil √ nil nil √ 9. Germany 29.06.2016 √ √ √ √ √ 10. Hungary 17.06.2016 √ √ √ √ √ 11. Japan 31.05.2016 nil nil √ √ nil √ 12. Mexico 07.06.2016 nil nil nil nil √ 13. Monaco 13.04.2016 nil nil nil nil nil 14. Netherlands 07.06.2016 √ √ √ √ √ 15. Portugal 23.05.2016 √ √ nil nil √ 16. Romania 03.06.2016 √ √ √ √ √ 17. Russian Federation 07.06.2016 √ √ nil nil √ 18. Senegal 31.05.2016 nil nil nil nil nil √ 19. Serbia 31.05.2016 √ √ √ √ √ 20. Singapore 24.06.2016 √ √ nil nil nil 21. Slovakia 07.06.2016 √ √ √ √ √ 22. Slovenia 03.06.2016 nil √ √ √ √ 23. Sweden 07.06.2016 nil nil nil nil nil 24. Ukraine 27.05.2016 √ √ nil √ √ 25. United Kingdom of Great 30.05.2016 √ √ √ √ √ Britain and Northern Ireland 26. Uruguay 29.03.2016 nil √ nil nil nil 27. United States of America 01.06.2016 √ nil √ √ nil 4/86 16-12115 A/71/138 B. Reports received from Governments on conventional arms transfers Albania Original language: English Calendar year: 2015 Background information provided: yes Date of submission: 15 June 2016 National points of contact: yes Exports A B C D E Remarks Number State of origin Intermediate Category (I-VII) Final importer State(s) of items (if not exporter) location (if any) Description of item Comments on transfer I. Battle tanks nil II. Armoured nil combat vehicles III. Large-calibre Bulgaria 50 China 120 mm mortars artillery systems 150 China 82 mm mortars Czech Republic 52 China 120 mm mortars 156 China 82 mm mortars Iraq 78 China Anti-tank missiles Donation to international coalition against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. United Kingdom 1 China Anti-tank missiles IV. Combat aircraft nil V. Attack nil helicopters VI. Warships nil VII. Missiles and (a) nil missile launchers (b) nil 16-12115 5/86 A/71/138 Imports A B C D E Remarks Number State of origin Intermediate Category (I-VII) Exporter State(s) of items (if not exporter) location (if any) Description of item Comments on transfer I. Battle tanks nil II. Armoured Italy 4 Italy Shellproof vehicles combat vehicles (none armed) III. Large-calibre nil artillery systems IV. Combat aircraft nil V. Attack nil helicopters VI. Warships nil VII. Missiles and (a) nil missile launchers (b) nil 6/86 16-12115 A/71/138 Belarus Original language: Russian Calendar year: 2015 Background information provided: yes Date of submission: 17 June 2016 National points of contact: yes Exports A В C D E Remarks Final importer Number State of origin Intermediate Category (I-VII) State(s) of items (if not exporter) location (if any) Description of items Comments on transfer I. Battle tanks II. Armoured combat Slovakia 19 Russian Federation BTR-70 vehicles Sudan 28 Russian Federation BTR-70 III. Large-calibre Angola 18 Russian Federation D-20 artillery systems Angola 22 Russian Federation 2S7 Slovakia 11 Russian Federation BM-21 IV. Combat aircraft Iraq 3 Russian Federation Su-25 Sudan 2 Russian Federation Su-24М V. Attack helicopters Sudan 2 Russian Federation Mi-24P VI. Warships VII. Missiles and missile launchers 16-12115 7/86 A/71/138 Canada Original language: English Calendar year: 2015 Background information provided: yes Date of submission: 20 June 2016 National points of contact: yes Exports A B C D E Remarks Number State of origin Intermediate Category (I-VII) Final importer State(s) of items (if not exporter) location (if any) Description of item Comments on transfer I. Battle tanks II. Armoured combat Belgium 2 (2b) Transfers are for vehicles Peru 32 (2b) police and military Qatar 1 (2a) purposes Saudi Arabia 336 (2b) Singapore 1 (2a) III. Large-calibre artillery systems IV. Combat aircraft Germany 8 Transfers are for military purposes V. Attack helicopters VI. Warships VII. Missiles and (a) Oman 12 Transfers are for missile United Kingdom 6 military purposes launchers (b) Note: For commercial sales, it should be noted that the numbers represent total quantities authorized for export under permits issued during the 2015 calendar year. For military sales, reports reflect actual transfers. 8/86 16-12115 A/71/138 Imports A B C D E Remarks Number of State of origin Intermediate Category (I-VII) Exporter State(s) items (if not exporter) location (if any) Description of item Comments on transfer I. Battle tanks II. Armoured combat United States 9 (2b) Transfers are for vehicles military purposes III. Large-calibre artillery systems IV. Combat aircraft V. Attack helicopters VI. Warships VII. Missiles and (a) missile launchers (b) 16-12115 9/86 A/71/138 Chile Original language: Spanish Calendar year: 2015 Background information provided: yes Date of submission: 12 May 2016 National points of contact: yes Imports A B C D Remarks State of Number Intermediate Comments on transfer Category (I-VII) origin of items location (if any) Description of item (purchase order/release) I.
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