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Saddam's Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq SADDAM’S GENERALS Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana M. Venegas SADDAM’S GENERALS SADDAM’S GENERALS Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana M. Venegas Institute for Defense Analyses 2011 Final July 2010 IDA Document D-4121 Log: H 10-000765/1 Copy This work was conducted under contract DASW01-04-C-003, Task ET-8-2579, “Study on Military History (Project 1946—Phase II)” for the National Intelligence Council. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of the Agency. © 2010 Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000. This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (November 1995). Contents Foreword............................................................................................................................................ vii Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 1 Summary and Analysis........................................................................................................................ 5 Background ................................................................................................................................... 6 Origins and Planning for War ....................................................................................................... 7 Saddam’s Education in War........................................................................................................ 13 The Adaptation of Iraqi Military Forces to the Reality of War................................................... 15 Technology, Intelligence, and the War ....................................................................................... 19 Final Comments .......................................................................................................................... 22 Historical Context and Timeline........................................................................................................ 25 Interview: Lieutenant General Ra’ad Majid Rashid al-Hamdani ...................................................... 29 Section 1: Senior Leadership . Foreign Assistance . Officer Corps . Saddam’s Personality . First Gulf War .................................................................................................................... 29 Section 2: Chemical Weapons . Conditions and Events Leading to the Iran-Iraq War . Military Training................................................................................................................ 45 Section 3: Personal Interactions with Saddam . Senior Leadership ........................................... 57 Section 4: Officer Corps . Loss of Fao (1986) . Recovery of Fao (1988) . Intelligence Capabilities . Fourth Battle of Basra (1986) . Fifth Battle of Basra (1987) ......................... 67 Section 5: Expansion of Iraqi Military . Military Training . End of Iran-Iraq War................... 76 Interview: Major General Mizher Rashid al-Tarfa al-Ubaydi ........................................................... 87 Section 6: Personal Background . Attitudes toward Iran . Expansion of Iraqi Intelligence ...... 87 Section 7: Loss of Fao (1986) . General Military Intelligence Directorate . Iranian Intelligence Capabilities . Deception Operations.................................................................. 93 Section 8: Senior Leadership . SIGINT . Foreign Assistance . Attitudes toward Iran ........... 100 Interview: Major General (ret) Aladdin Hussein Makki Khamas ................................................... 111 Section 9: Personal Background . Saddam’s Personality . Senior Leadership . Events Leading to Iran-Iraq War . Preparations for Iran-Iraq War................................................. 111 Section 10: Battle of Allahu Akbar Hill . First Battle of Basra (1982) . Battle at al-Amara . Second Battle of Basra (1984) . Battles at Abadan and Ahvaz (1980) . Battle at Susangard (1980) ............................................................................................................. 119 Section 11: Adaptation in Iraqi Military . Combat Development Directorate . Military Training.............................................................................................................. 133 Section 12: Chemical Weapons . NCO Corps . Iranian Operations and Tactics . Saddam’s Personality........................................................................................................ 145 v Interview: Lieutenant General Abid Mohammed al-Kabi ............................................................... 151 Section 13: Personal Background . History of Iraqi Navy . Expansion of Naval Involvement in Iran-Iraq War . Preparation for Iran-Iraq War . Foreign Technology ....... 151 Section 14: Defensive Naval Operations (1980–82) . Offensive Naval Operations (1982–86) . Naval Operations after the Loss of Fao (1986–88) . Intelligence Capabilities and Bombing of USS Stark .................................................................................................. 159 Section 15: Shatt al-Arab . Attacks on Iranian Oil Terminals . Loss of Fao (1986) . Bombing of USS Stark . Recovery of Fao (1988)........................................................... 160 Section 16: Intelligence Capabilities . Development of Navy and Naval Operations . Significance of Iranian Operations . Saddam and Senior Leadership ............................. 177 Interview: Major General ‘Alwan Hassoun ‘Alwan al-Abousi ....................................................... 185 Section 17: Personal Background . State of Iraqi Air Force Readiness . Initial Air Strikes (Fall 1980) . Planning and Training . Foreign Technology . Saddam’s Personality . Intelligence and the Bombing of Osirak Reactor ................................................................. 185 Section 18: Long-range Strikes . Military Cooperation . Foreign Technology . Chemical Weapons . Intelligence ........................................................................................................ 199 Section 19: Attitudes toward the Air Force . Air Defense Systems . Bombing of USS Stark ..................................................................................................................................... 204 Section 20: Senior Leadership . Foreign Assistance . Iraqi F–1s Shot Down by Saudi F– 15s during First Gulf War . Evacuation of Iraqi Fighters to Iran during First Gulf War . War of the Cities .................................................................................................................. 207 Appendix A: References ..................................................................................................................A-1 Appendix B: Place Names Index and Reference Maps ................................................................... B-1 Map 1. Iraq, with North, Central and South regions outlined. .................................................. B-2 Map 2A. Southern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980. ........................................................................ B-3 Map 2B. Southern Iraq. Extent of Iraqi advances, 1981–82; Iranian offensives; Extent of Iranian advances during the war; Basra defenses 1982–87.................................. B-4 Map 2C. Southern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1988. ........................................................................ B-5 Map 3A. Central Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980............................................................................ B-6 Map 3B. Central Iraq. Extent of Iraqi advances, 1981–82; Iranian offensives; Extent of Iranian advances during the war........................................................................... B-7 Map 3C. Central Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1988............................................................................ B-8 Map 4A. Northern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980. ........................................................................ B-9 Map 4B. Northern Iraq. Extent of Iraqi advances, 1981–82; Iranian offensives; Extent of Iranian advances during the war......................................................................... B-10 Map 5. Persian Gulf, Tanker War ........................................................................................... B-11 Map 6. Persian Gulf, Air raids on Iranian islands. .................................................................. B-12 Map 7. Persian Gulf, Attack on Larak Island with mid-air refueling...................................... B-13 Appendix C: Index of Themes......................................................................................................... C-1 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... C-2 vi Foreword Perhaps the only thing less insightful than the history of a war written solely by its winner is one written exclusively by nonparticipants. The complex mix of drivers, decisions, and perspectives that animate a war’s senior leaders are often lost or obscured under the best of circumstances. This problem is exacerbated when
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