Iraq Horrific Scenes in the Streets of Ramadi

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Iraq Horrific Scenes in the Streets of Ramadi 10 February 19, 2016 News & Analysis Iraq Horrific scenes in the streets of Ramadi Nermeen Mufti anti-ISIS campaign in November or as a tactic to free them from ISIS. 2015 led by the Kurdish peshmerga “The retreating militants de- forces and backed by coalition air stroyed houses, demolished bridg- Ramadi strikes. es, public buildings and the main Iraqi forces are likely next to set university here before they fled.” treet scenes in the liberat- their eyes on Falluja, an ISIS-held He pointed out that Iraqi forces ed districts of Ramadi look city in Anbar east of Ramadi. Fal- seized Ramadi’s general hospital, horrific. It is a ghost town luja’s recapture is crucial to cut trapping ISIS fighters inside. littered with debris and supply lines from Syria into Iraq, “We refrained from attacking smashed concrete with de- primarily to Mosul, Iraq’s second the building but ISIS militants set Sstroyed vehicles and burned shop- largest city in the north under ISIS explosives to the first floor as they fronts. Stray cats nibbled on human control. escaped,” he said. bodies. Army units were on guard In the streets of Ramadi, scenes as bomb squads hastened to clear “The retreating were excruciating. The city was de- homes and streets of explosives. serted of inhabitants. Houses were The city and its suburbs, the capi- militants destroyed damaged or destroyed. Palm trees tal of the vast Anbar province, is in houses, demolished that once decorated the streets ruins and chaos. The area, which bridges, public were burned, as were cars, trucks witnessed the humiliating defeat buildings and the and other vehicles. Piles of rubble of Iraq’s army at the hands of the were everywhere. Islamic State (ISIS) in May 2015, was main university.” Signs warned of landmines and mainly seized back after a gruelling some booby-trapped buildings bore offensive backed by 600 US-led co- In an army-escorted tour of Ram- the letter “X”, signalling to bomb alition air strikes in December. adi arranged for The Arab Weekly, squads the locations where explo- Ramadi is significant because it is Major-General Sami al-Aredhi, sives needed to be defused. an hour’s drive west of Baghdad, the commander of the 3rd Division Big, stray cats were everywhere. seat of power for Iraq’s Shia-domi- of Iraq’s elite Counter-Terrorism Hussein, a CTF agent, played a vid- nated government. The province’s 2 Forces (CTF), better known as the eo clip on his cell phone showing million inhabitants are mostly Arab Golden Brigade, said it was not yet cats eating dead bodies in Ramadi. tribesmen of the rival Sunni minori- decided if Falluja or Mosul would ty, one of the largest concentrations be next. It is a ghost town of Sunnis in the country. Iraq is deploying thousands of Some tribes in Anbar sided with soldiers south-east of Mosul for littered with debris ISIS to take revenge against Iraqi operations aimed at cutting supply and smashed governments that ostracised the lines linking it with areas further concrete with Sunnis on grounds they were affili- south, which will set the stage for destroyed vehicles ated with insurgents from the dis- direct efforts to retake the city. banded Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party The battle over Ramadi began De- and burned under the regime of Iraqi dictator cember 22nd and ended eight days shopfronts. Saddam Hussein. later with the recapture of 95% of the city. In early February, the army In Baghdad, Iraqi Defence Min- Iraqi Education announced that all of Ramadi, in- ister Khaled al-Obeidi said 80% of Minister Mohammed cluding its city centre and suburbs, Ramadi was destroyed, either by Iqbal said 260 was rid of all pockets of resistance ISIS or during battles to recapture (Exclusive photo by Nermeen Mufti) by ISIS militants. it. He said ISIS set off at least 56 Debris litters the streets of Ramadi’s city centre, which was schools in Ramadi Aredhi spoke of “horrors” in the huge explosions across the city dur- recaptured in an Iraqi Army offensive in December 2015. were destroyed. battle to seize Ramadi from ISIS. ing the battles. He told The Arab Weekly that CTF Obeidi said the Iraqi Army killed Ramadi’s liberation was won at evacuated 3,922 civilians from at least 813 ISIS fighters. Despite the destruction, some of tribes’ alliance with ISIS, Qaissi said the cost of the extensive damage Ramadi’s city centre before launch- Iraqi Education Minister Mo- Ramadi’s residents said they were it was “unfortunate that we, the which characterises operations ing the massive operation to liber- hammed Iqbal said 260 schools in eager to return home. people of Anbar, once trusted those against ISIS militants who rig hous- ate the area. Ramadi were destroyed. “We need Zuhair al-Qaissi, a PhD student who called themselves the revolu- es with explosives in the face of “The operation went slowly to at least $500 million to rebuild the and teacher in the University of tionaries and the men of religion”. looming offensives. protect civilians trapped inside and schools,” Iqbal said. Anbar who lives in Baghdad, said Much of the city of Sinjar, the used as human shields by ISIS,” Anbar’s provincial council esti- he hoped to go back “as soon as the Nermeen Mufti, based in Baghdad, ancestral homeland of the Yazidi Aredhi said. “We stopped (the bat- mated that $4 billion was needed to security situation allows”. has been covering Iraqi affairs for minority, was flattened during an tles) at times to help the civilians, rehabilitate Ramadi. Reflecting on some of Anbar three decades. Iraqi government pressured by Iran-backed militias Muhanad al-Hussam from their homes,” Abu Ahmed by The Arab Weekly in Baghdad International’s Middle East and Sheikh said. said, speaking to The Arab Week- declined to comment on acts com- North Africa Programme. “Militia leaders are even trying to ly by telephone from a relative’s mitted by Shia militias — a sign that The Muqdadiya killings and ar- become powerful in foreign affairs Baghdad house in the remote village he fled few politicians dare to speak out re- sons are the latest sign of the weak- to shape Iraq’s foreign policy,” to. garding the heavily armed groups ness of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Some militia leaders openly oncerned over the safety Abu Ahmed said most of those whose duty is to ensure that Iraq’s al-Abadi’s government and Iran’s criticised the Iraqi government’s of his family, Abu Ahmed killed were chosen by name, not Shia-dominated government con- significant influence in Iraq. The decision to allow the reopening fled his Iraqi home town killed at random in the street, tinues to reign. militias rose to power after dicta- of the embassy of Saudi Arabia, of Muqdadiya hours af- which indicates they were target- The London-based watchdog tor Saddam Hussein was toppled in Iran’s regional foe. They vowed to ter Shia militias launched ed. “The militias are being used by Amnesty International has accused the US-led invasion of 2003. resist plans to expand the US mili- Creprisal attacks against his Sunni some Shia politicians to settle old Iraqi authorities of ignoring the Under Saddam, the country’s tary presence in Iraq, even if those community following explosions scores with the Sunni community,” revenge attacks by Shia fighters in Shia majority — divided in alle- plans were at the invitation of the that killed scores of people at a café he said. Muqdadiya. giance to Iran or to its Arab roots — Baghdad government. in a predominantly Shia district. The head of the Sunni Endow- “Instead of holding Shia militias was completely sidelined. The rival Security forces did not provide ment, cleric: Abdul-Latif al-Hi- to account, the authorities have Sunni minority had the final say in Despite their vital protection to stop the rampage by maim, said Shia militias were no turned a blind eye to this shock- all matters, although the regime role in the war powerful Iran-backed Shia militias, different from Islamic State (ISIS) ing rampage. In some cases, ab- was largely secular, having been widely known as al-Hashd al-Shaa- militants. “Both groups are terror- ductions and killings took place in affiliated with the Arab Ba’ath So- against ISIS, the bi, Arabic for Popular Mobilisation ising and killing innocent people,” full view of local authorities, who cialist Party. militias represent a Forces, which acts as a state within he insisted. failed to intervene,” said James Now, militias control almost eve- serious danger to the a state. Several Sunni lawmakers reached Lynch, deputy director of Amnesty rything in Iraq. Their presence is With absolute loyalty to Iran, heavy at the Interior Ministry and state. they are funded, trained and in the intelligence service. Their equipped by Tehran. They have men take the lead in the fight Clearly, the process of taking a their own units, vehicles, leaders against ISIS, which captured more higher profile in the state has start- and uniforms. They set up road- territory in Iraq as the Shia-led Ira- ed. A few months ago, two pow- blocks, separate from those of the qi Army capitulated in 2014. erful Shia militia leaders — Hadi army and police, to control neigh- Since then, militias have played al-Amiri and Abu Mahdi al-Mu- bourhoods. When they arrive in a crucial role in recapturing ter- handis — complained in a meeting troubled areas, police show up only ritory in central and western Iraq with Abadi about insufficient state after they leave.
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