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Conflict Records Research Center Saddam Hussein Collection Summary and Index Saddam Hussein Collection Summary Category # of Records in Section # Pages in Collection # Hours of Audio Baath Party Correspondence 36 2,214 Fedayeen Saddam 13 514 Iraqi Air & Air Defense Force 16 1,520 Iraqi Al‐Quds Army 5 330 Iraqi Armed Forces General Command 8 1,010 Iraqi Army 57 5,062 Iraqi Directorate of General Security 31 2,464 Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate 145 9,214 Iraqi Intelligence Service 71 3,740 Iraqi Military Industrialization Commission 16 836 Iraqi Ministry of Defense 13 1,374 Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 14 722 Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate 1 12 Iraqi Navy 1 12 Iraqi Republican Guard 22 1,734 Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council 17 760 Iraqi Special Security Organization 2 114 Saddam Regime Miscellaneous 104 7,094 Saddam Tapes 207 3,983 200 Saddam's Ministry of Defense 6 336 Saddam's Personal & Political Correspondence 47 2,286 Saddam's Presidential Diwan 99 7,286 Saddam's Special Security Organization 3 20 Totals 934 52,637 200 Page counts include the Arabic originals and full English translations of the records. Conflict Records Research Center: Saddam Hussein Collection Summary and Index Saddam Hussein Collection Index CRRC Number CRRC Doc Date CRRC Document Description SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐095 04 Mar 1985 Memorandum from Iraqi military sources enclosing letter with telegram forms regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Cairo, Bucharest, Amman, and Tehran. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐138 11 Jul 1987 to 13 Operations manuals for 3rd Air Defense Sector, entitled “Air Defense Command of the Naval and Coastal Jan 1988 Defense Force Command.” SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐209 19 Nov 1998 to 26 Iraqi Air Force meeting with Chief of Staff regarding the UN inspection and how to move documents related to Nov 1998 chemical agents and weapons. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐228 25 Dec 1981 Correspondence between the Air Force, the Air Defense Command and the General Military Intelligence Directorate concerning reports on Iranian Air Force capabilities during the Iran‐Iraq War. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐396 05 Nov 1991 A dossier regarding the role of the Iraqi Air Force in the First Gulf War, including planning, preparation, and management of the war. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐569 26 Dec 1998 to 11 Miscellaneous reports about conferences held by the Iraqi Department of Defense regarding ways to improve Apr 2002 its capabilities and readiness. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐597 01 Jan 1990 to 31 Overview of Iraqi Army basic tactics and military organization. Dec 1990 SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐747 1 Jan 1984 to 22 Reports on Iraqi and Iranian military preparation and plans during the Iraq‐Iran War, including Iranian Air Force Jan 1985 activities and preparations. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐750 Jun 2002 Al‐Qadisiyyah Chemical Platoon security procedures and duties, entitled “The Local Defense Plan” and “The Static Orders.” SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐881 Jul 1990 “Index of Vital Kuwaiti Targets Documented Via Arial Surveillance Imaging,” prepared by the Directorate of Air Intelligence, 3rd Division. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐966 11 Jul 1990 to 21 Iraqi Air Force Intelligence report on gas pumping station in Barqan Oil Field, Kuwait, including aerial Jul 1990 reconnaissance photographs. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐979 29 Jun 1993 to 20 Correspondence among the Office of Presidency, the Ministry of Defense and the General Military Intelligence Aug 1993 Directorate; forwarding reports on the American spying aircrafts. SH‐AADF‐D‐000‐999 01 Jan 1987 to 31 Air Force Intelligence Directorate reports about an oil tanker and commercial ships damaged during the Iraq‐ Dec 1987 Iran War. SH‐AADF‐D‐001‐001 1979 Annual Intelligence Report for 1979 on Israel, including a snapshot of Israeli air defense capabilities and a summary of movements within Israeli leadership. SH‐AADF‐D‐001‐147 Circa 1990 to 1994 A letter from a Defense Flight Lieutenant to Saddam Hussein explaining an incident that occurred in the Gulf War. SH‐AADF‐D‐001‐148 16 Jun 1991 A memorandum from the 2nd Air Defense Sector regarding a $450 reward for shooting down two aircrafts. SH‐AFGC‐D‐000‐094 01 Nov 1983 to 06 Memoranda chain between the Iraqi Armed Forces General Command and General Military Intelligence Jun 1984 Directorate regarding the use and effects of chemical weapons. SH‐AFGC‐D‐000‐393 07 Jan 1981 Minutes of a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Armed Forces General Command regarding military 2 Conflict Records Research Center: Saddam Hussein Collection Summary and Index CRRC Number CRRC Doc Date CRRC Document Description considerations for the Iraqi Forces in the First Gulf War and suggestions for commanders. SH‐AFGC‐D‐000‐647 05 May 1988 Memorandum regarding financial rewards for eight officers who participated in the planning and implementation of the first and second Anfal operations. SH‐AFGC‐D‐000‐686 04 Feb 1984 to Operations guide issued by the President and Commander‐in‐Chief of the Armed Forces. approx. May 1985 SH‐AFGC‐D‐000‐694 14 May 1981 to 09 Iraqi Armed Forces General Command study regarding behavior in captivity and becoming a prisoner of war. Aug 1981 SH‐AFGC‐D‐000‐731 24 Mar 1988 Minutes of a meeting between Saddam Hussein, the Minister of Defense, and the Supervisor of Military Manufacturing regarding operational supplies. SH‐AFGC‐D‐001‐141 06 Jul 1990 “Emergency Plan for Dealing With Enemy Landing Operations on Chosen Targets,” 42nd Armored Brigade Group, General Staff, Yafa 26th Tank Battalion. SH‐AFGC‐D‐001‐168 31 May 2001 Report regarding the capabilities and military doctrine of Iran, Including military ideology, size and structure, troop mobilization, and nuclear and chemical capabilities. *SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐014 Undated Articles written by Islamic preachers and Sheikhs regarding the legal Islamic opinions of martyrdom operations, such as suicide bombings. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐066 27 Jan 2000 Letter from Ba'ath Party Governorate to State Secretariat regarding call for volunteers to fight in Chechnya and status of Jalal Talabani opposition groups. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐092 Undated Ba'ath party operational plan for attacking and defending against hostile airborne forces. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐144 23 Jan 2003 Praising Saddam and some of his aphorisms; lists of top leadership names, Ba'ath Party main principles and meeting minutes during 2003. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐159 30 Apr 2002 to 17 Ba'ath Party memos with meeting minutes for security committees. Dec 2002 SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐197 21 Feb 1996 File about Hussein Kamil (Saddam's son‐in‐law) and his desire to return to Iraq. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐204 27 Mar 2003 to 06 Ba'ath Party memorandum regarding volunteers for Party Emergency Plan Commandos Operations and Apr 2003 offering rewards for catching spies. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐206 30 Dec 1978 Correspondence to Saddam Hussein regarding proposed integration of the Iraqi and Syrian Ba'ath Parties and notes regarding the Ba'ath Party structure. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐219 Aug 1973 to Sep Letter from the State Secretariat Director to Director of General Security regarding organizations formed to 1973 back up the Palestinian Liberation Organization. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐297 28 Jun 1999 Saddam Hussein speech to Ba’ath Party commanders expressing appreciation for their bravery in the war and encouragement to endure the economic sanctions. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐300 Feb 1987 Lecture by the Manager of the Political Affiliation Department of the Ba’ath Party to the cultural representatives regarding Iran’s attempts to divide the Iraqi Governorate. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐306 14 Nov 2002 to 31 Correspondence from Ba’ath Party, Egypt Organization Office regarding personnel issues concerning al‐Wihda 3 Conflict Records Research Center: Saddam Hussein Collection Summary and Index CRRC Number CRRC Doc Date CRRC Document Description Dec 2002 al‐Arabia Section Command, including training courses, promotion courses, and members’ inventory. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐313 Undated Pamphlet issued by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party Military Office containing the establishment of the military intelligence commands section in the Ba'ath Party office, including information regarding high ranking commanding officers in charge of the Military Intelligence Section. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐324 16 Feb 1991 to 13 Memorandum to Ba'ath Party Secretariat Section Command regarding battle stages to combat the enemy, Oct 2002 including preparation, opposite air‐bombing, and land battle. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐325 08 Jul 1999 Saddam Hussein speech to Ba'ath Party officials regarding upcoming Party plans. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐350 03 Oct 2001 to 01 Meeting minutes of Ba'ath Party officials and Saddam Hussein regarding cabinet sessions and Saddam Jul 2002 Hussein's recommendations. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐354 18 Feb 2003 Meeting minutes of Ba'ath Party Al‐Rayyah Cell regarding the current political and cultural situation, as well as the probable attack against Iraq. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐405 08 Apr 1999 to 07 Document regarding plan to handle emergencies in Iraq, including procedures, orders, supply of daily bread Apr 2002 and water during battles, earmarking ambulances and field hospitals. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐441 09 Sep 1990 to 14 Letter to the Northern Organization Bureau regarding access to prohibited lands for Kurdish farmers to till the Oct 1990 ground and letter from Mosul Governor Taher Tawfiq al‐Ani to Saddam Hussein regarding his loyalty and talks with tribal leaders. SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐474 29 Mar 1995 to 06 Study on Ba'ath Party principles and Iraqi and Islamic history, including duties, objectives, and slogans. Jan 2003 SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐492 01 Jan 1990 to 31 Study of Ba'ath Party Division Command members regarding the economic sanctions and their effects on the Dec 1990 social values of Iraqi society.
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