C O R P O R A T I O N STACIE L. PETTYJOHN The Demand for Responsiveness in Past U.S. Military Operations For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR4280 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0657-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: U.S. Air Force/Airman 1st Class Gerald R. Willis. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The Department of Defense (DoD) is entering a period of great power competition at the same time that it is facing a difficult budget environment. The joint force remains unprepared for a great power war because for the past two decades it has been focused on wartime counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, while remaining committed to expensive legacy modernization programs that do not solve the operational challenges that a great power adversary would present. The combination of high and continuing operational demands with reduced resources has greatly stressed the joint force as near-term readiness increasingly competes for funds with programs needed to meet future challenges. To address these and related policy issues, this study identified four questions for analysis: (1) What has been the historic demand for joint force responsiveness over the last sixty years? (2) What are the responsiveness demands associated with current U.S. strategy, operational plans, and planning scenarios? (3) What lessons can be learned from the New Look Era when airpower was widely viewed as the cornerstone of U.S. national security? (4) How have U.S. Air Force public narratives and popular attitudes toward airpower evolved over the last century? This report presents findings from research exploring historical demands for responsiveness. Other forthcoming reports address the other three questions. The research reported here was commissioned by U.S. Air Force (USAF) Quadrennial Defense Review Office (HAF/CVAR) and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the USAF’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the USAF with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: http://www.rand.org/paf. This report documents work originally shared with the USAF January 2014. The draft report, issued December 2014, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and USAF subject-matter experts. iii Contents Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iii Figures ............................................................................................................................................. v Tables ............................................................................................................................................. vi Summary ....................................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... x Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. xi 1. The Link Between Responsiveness and Readiness ..................................................................... 1 2. Responsiveness in Ten Cases ...................................................................................................... 5 3. The Demand for Simultaneous Operations ............................................................................... 14 4. Responsiveness and Force Size ................................................................................................. 18 5. When Is Responsiveness Needed? ............................................................................................ 21 6. Enablers, Obstacles, and Risks of Rapid Employment ............................................................. 28 7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 32 Appendix A: Case Studies ............................................................................................................. 35 Appendix B: Operations Included in Simultaneity Analysis ........................................................ 58 References ..................................................................................................................................... 68 iv Figures Figure 2.1. Level of Responsiveness in Ten Cases ......................................................................... 6 Figure 2.2. Number of Sorties Completed in Operation Nickel Grass (1973) ................................ 8 Figure 2.3. Army Units Deployed in Desert Shield ...................................................................... 12 Figure 2.4. U.S. Air Force Deployments, Operation Desert Shield, August 7–November 9, 1990 ................................................................................................. 13 Figure 3.1. Simultaneity Events by Year ....................................................................................... 16 Figure 3.2. Number and Size of Simultaneity Events by Decade ................................................. 16 Figure 4.1. Approximate Level of Responsiveness and Size of Force Employed ........................ 18 Figure 4.2. Level of Responsiveness and the Number of Aircraft Employed ............................... 19 Figure 6.1. The Political Timeline to Deploy Forces in Ten Cases .............................................. 29 v Tables Table 1.1. Cases Examined ............................................................................................................. 4 Table 5.1. Summary of Cases ........................................................................................................ 26 Table B.1. Operations in Simultaneity Analysis ........................................................................... 58 vi Summary The 2018 National Defense Strategy made “rebuilding readiness” a priority as a step toward “build[ing] a more lethal Joint force,” and the Trump administration has used low levels of readiness to justify increased defense spending in the FY 2019 budget.1 This raises two questions: What is readiness, and why is it important? At the most basic level, readiness means that forces are able to carry out their designated missions and responsibilities.2 Most importantly, when they are called on, ready forces are able to quickly mobilize, deploy, and execute an operation. Because the relatively high level of readiness across the Department of Defense (DoD) is its single greatest expense, there are those that question whether readiness needs to be improved or whether the specter of a hollow force is one that is raised to justify increased defense expenditures. One counter to these arguments is that readiness is a critical factor that enables the U.S. military to be highly responsive, which is something that is expected of it. This report aimed to contribute to this debate on readiness by exploring the requirement for responsiveness across time. This historical analysis has several components. First, I examine ten cases to determine the level of responsiveness and what role, if any, responsiveness played in achieving the U.S. military and political objectives. These cases, which are listed in Table 1.1, were chosen because they varied on several key dimensions, including the type and location of the operation, the date on which they occurred, and the level of responsiveness.3 The cases, therefore, cover a broad range of past demands and present differing outcomes. Because this work was done for the U.S. Air Force (USAF), particular attention is paid to the role of airpower in each of the cases.