THE FUTURE OF IRAQ DICTATORSHIP, DEMOCRACY, OR DIVISION? Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page i THE FUTURE OF IRAQ This page intentionally left blank 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page iii THE FUTURE OF IRAQ DICTATORSHIP, DEMOCRACY, OR DIVISION? Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page iv THE FUTURE OF IRAQ Copyright © Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, 2004. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS. Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–6354–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Anderson, Liam D. The future of Iraq : dictatorship, democracy, or division? / by Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–6354–1 hardcover 1. Iraq—Politics and government—1958- 2. Iraq War, 2003. 3. Democracy—Iraq. 4. Iraq—Ethnic relations. I. Stansfield, Gareth R. V. II. Title. DS79.65.A687 2004 956.7044’3—dc22 2003058846 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Letra Libre, Inc. First edition: February 2004 10987654321 Printed in the United States of America. 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page v To our parents This page intentionally left blank 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page vii CONTENTS Acknowledgments ix Maps xi Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Iraq 1920–1958: The Hashemite Monarchy 13 Chapter 2 Iraq 1958–1968: Revolution, Republic, and Renaissance 31 Chapter 3 Iraq 1968–1988: The Ba’ath Regime 49 Chapter 4 1988–2003: The Destruction of Iraq 83 Chapter 5 The Shi’a 117 Chapter 6 The Sunnis 139 Chapter 7 The Kurds 155 Chapter 8 The Democracy Dilemma 185 Epilogue 225 Notes 237 Index 255 This page intentionally left blank 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS THE INITIAL IMPETUS TO WRITE A BOOK FOCUSING on the instabilities inherent within Iraq came in the latter half of 2001, particularly after the ap- palling events of September 11. By this time, we had been discussing Iraq and watching its development for several years, starting from a Kurdish orienta- tion for one of us, and a political science outlook for the other. Our idea of Iraq being characterized by the existence of strong sectarian and ethnic identi- ties was not new, but was certainly “untrendy” as academics particularly re- mained focused on the unifying strength of an “Iraqi” identity. As such, our proposal commenced life as controversial to say the least, and almost certainly remains so today in 2004. However, it is now perhaps tinged with a height- ened degree of realism as Iraq continues forlornly to struggle to find some form of stability as a plethora of forces governed by, at times, exclusive agen- das emerge from within the state to either make Iraq in their own image, as is the case of the Shi’a and Sunni, or to make something new, as, perhaps, the Kurds may try. In undertaking the research and writing of this book, we have received the support of many individuals. Indeed, the controversial nature of our argument and the highly charged atmosphere surrounding anything to do with Iraq from 2001 onwards meant that we needed wise counsel and “sounding boards” at very regular intervals. This is not to say that our supporters necessarily agree with the arguments we’ve developed, but more to recognize the need of such arguments to be aired in public and contribute to the ongoing debate re- garding the future of Iraq that promises to dominate world affairs for some time to come. In particular, we would like to thank our editor at Palgrave Macmillan, David Pervin, who kept us focused on the job at hand, showing an unswerving faith in our convictions and cutting through the fogs of conceptual ambiguity which occasionally threatened to limit our vision with brutal logic. Similarly, Professors Ewan Anderson and Tim Niblock remained constant 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page x x The Future of Iraq fonts of advice, always willing to perform the role of devil’s advocate for our ideas. In the UK, we benefited from being associated with one of the leading centers of study on Iraq at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the Uni- versity of Exeter where the input of several staff and students (and especially Lise Storm Grundon, John Measor, and Hassan Abdulrazak) provided a most fertile environment for honing our ideas. Similarly, the members of the Mid- dle East Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), and especially Ali Ansari, Toby Dodge, Mai Yamani, and Rosemary Hollis, provided an unparalleled critical venue for us to discuss and develop the ideas behind this book. Nearly last, but by no means least, we would like to thank those who helped in background research and turning our rough pages into a finished book. Thanks to Heather Wiehe, Rosemary Baillon and Lise Storm Grundon, and Azos Rashid for always being available with up-to-the- minute breaking news and shrewd analysis, and Alan Bradshaw at Palgrave for putting it all together. Finally, we reserve our greatest thanks for our parents, Sian and Ewan An- derson, and Lynn and Roy Stansfield. They have been our greatest supporters and it is to them we dedicate this book. 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page xi 01 anderson fm 12/15/03 11:57 AM Page xii 02 anderson intro 12/15/03 11:58 AM Page 1 INTRODUCTION “OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM,” a U.S. and British military invasion of Iraq to remove from power the regime of Saddam Hussein, began on Wednesday, March 19, 2003. Barely three weeks later, coalition forces arrived at the gates of Baghdad to find that Saddam’s forces had simply melted away. The military phase of the conflict was over; what remained was the far more daunting chal- lenge of occupying and reconstructing an Iraq that had been devastated by decades of sanctions and war. Five months earlier, in mid-November 2002, support among the Ameri- can people for “the use of force to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein” hovered around the 68 percent mark—down from a previous high point of 70 to 75 percent, but a respectable majority nonetheless. At the same time, a troubling survey conducted by National Geographic magazine revealed that only one in seven Americans aged 18 to 24 were able to locate Iraq on a map of the world. Intrigued, the British Daily Mirror newspaper dispatched a reporter to the streets of New York to investigate. The Mirror’s ad hoc poll of 100 New Yorkers yielded similar results; of the 100 polled, 80 “didn’t have a clue where Iraq was.”1 These included a New York cop who selected Austria as the new Iraq, and others who placed Iraq in France, Albania, northern Italy, and South Africa. One respondent, described as a “burly construction worker,” probably captured the sentiments of many with the words, “don’t know, don’t care, there’ll be nothing left of it soon anyway.” No doubt similar results could have been obtained from any major West- ern city. However, that a significant majority of Americans supported over- throwing the regime of a person whose country they could not locate on a map is indicative of a deeper reality. Most Americans may have known little about Iraq the country, but they would almost certainly recognize the name of its for- mer leader, Saddam Hussein. Demonizing the “Butcher of Baghdad” was scarcely a daunting challenge; there was ample ammunition to draw on; his 02 anderson intro 12/15/03 11:58 AM Page 2 2 The Future of Iraq authorization of the repeated use of chemical weapons against the Iranians dur- ing the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s; the gassing of his own countrymen—the Kurds of northern Iraq—at Halabja in 1988; the widespread use of torture and rape as instruments of political control; and so the list could go on. Lurid, though not necessarily reliable, accounts of life under Saddam’s regime penned by recent defectors merely added fuel to the fire. Personalizing a conflict through the demonizing of the target country’s leader has one great advantage: it makes conflict much easier to sell to a potentially skeptical public. The goal of military action becomes to rid the world of an evil dictator and to liberate his oppressed people. The target of such an attack is not the country itself, or its citizenry, but a single individual and his attendant regime. But the personaliza- tion of conflict has at least two important drawbacks. First, the demon himself must be caught before victory can be considered complete. Osama Bin Laden is still “wanted, dead or alive,” but until a dead body is produced, two thirds of the American people will not accept the war on terror as won.