Executive Summary Preface Major Thornton of JCISFA in coordination with Dr. John Fishel from the University of Oklahoma, Dr. Marc Tyrrell of Carleton University, and Mr. Mark Lauber also of JCISFA sat down to write the Mosul Case study with the goals of considering the requirements generated in the pursuit of policy and military objectives in complex conditions, and making some observations and recommendations about how DoD might better address those requirements. To this end the Case Study is built around a specific place, Mosul, Iraq over a short period of time, 2006-2007. The Case Study is designed to give the reader both an understanding of content and context of the environment, and of the objective and the subjective nature of the participants. Within the study we found there are areas across DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development and Education, Personnel and Facilities) that might be adapted in such a way that reduces risk at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, as well as risk to the institutions which must consider the broad range of roles, missions and capabilities required of them. Principal to this is the understanding that you can not improve our capabilities to conduct these types of missions by simply addressing one aspect of DOTMLPF. In fact, to attempt to do so usually results in unintended consequences in other areas, some of which may not be known until they have manifested themselves as critical deficits. The Mosul Case Study raises some questions about the nature of how we see ourselves as an institution, what we value, and how those values translate into enabling capabilities. One of the questions the study considers is the value of individual personalities and skills apart from context of collective leadership. The Case Study and the interviews show that one size does not fit all, cookie cutter solutions and approaches generally produce problems not solve them, and that personality may matter as much or more than other skills and attributes. This study challenges that in order to do this better, we must find ways in our personnel system to not only recruit, train, educate and retain the best talent, but given the element of human dimension we must consider that not all leaders of a given rank are equally suited. This is not simply a convention change, but a cultural and philosophical one. It should not be taken lightly, for at its core it is about how we view our ability to provide relevant and ready military power to achieve political ends. Summary • Chapters 1 – 3 - Chapters 1, 2 and 3, provides the reader with an overview of the environment, U.S. operational history, and then provides an understanding of SFA as it pertains to the environment, and how it relates to broader issues. The methodology used to organize the case study chapters employs a stair step approach which progressively builds understanding in order to give the reader a set of tools with which to better evaluate the larger ideas. o Chapter 1 gives a detailed list of the case study’s origins, the concept behind it, its objectives, and some descriptions of those interviewed so the reader can better relate where they fit in the broader framework. o Chapter 2 provides the reader definitions and explanation on just what SFA is, and how it relates as an enabling capability to objectives and lines of operation. o Chapter 3 offers the reader insights into Mosul as an operating environment. This not only means an overview of geography, history and culture, but also an appreciation for its significance to U.S. military and policy objectives though a brief recount of events beginning in 2003. • Chapter 4 (To be published at a later date) - In Chapter 4, Dr. Marc Tyrrell examines the experiences contained within the case study from an anthropological perspective, i.e. the study of man and how people interact. This chapter orients the reader on the human dimension, providing the reader gains an appreciation for why we have an “Art” component to war, versus strict adherence to a “Science” of war. • Chapter 5: John Fishel looks at SFA in terms of selection of advisors, training, organization, and application and places those functions in several historic contexts. In each, he compares the past with the present using counterpoints from the Mosul Case Study. A number of important consistencies arise, some bad - like the "hey you" method of selection - some good - like SF and FAO training practices - which can and, possibly, should be adapted when using GPF in a SFA role. • Chapter 6: Major Rob Thornton provides a Battalion level advisor perspective of how decisions and actions across the levels of war produce a range of consequences, some of which create new conditions and unanticipated outcomes. • Chapter 7: What did we learn from the Mosul Case Study? This chapter explores a broad range of observations and recommendations drawn from the study. More specifically it serves as the start point for a discussion on the rationale for change, and the need to understand how the requirements should drive our ability to generate capabilities. • Appendix A: These are some of the most relevant source interviews which were conducted in support of the SFA Case Study. The participants include BCT leadership and staff, PRT leadership and team members, MiTTs at all levels across the 2nd IA Division in Mosul and a DOJ contractor working at Badush Prison just outside Mosul. These interviews provide additional perspective on the role of personality in facilitating unity of effort. • Appendix B: Mark Lauber explores the reasons why SFA should be added to our lexicon, how it fills a gap and how it enables existing terms to better fulfill our military and political objectives. Rob Thornton JCISFA MAJ, USA Acknowledgments JCISFA would like to extend its thanks to those interviewed in support of the Mosul Case Study. In every case, the participants’ primary concern was to make their experience available to others and to improve the institutions and our ability to prepare those who conduct missions on behalf of U.S. policy objectives in the best possible manner. The conclusions and observations contained within the body of the case study are neither exclusive to JCISFA, nor are they reflective of the points of view of any one participant. They are not meant to be indicative of service or position. As will be shown in the case study, there are many different perspectives that evolve along with the understanding of the complex, interactive environment where these activities take place. While I've tried to portray the essence of the challenges associated with operating in this environment to broaden understanding, each reader is encouraged to consider what they read against their own experiences. Behind the body on the electronic editions of the case study, the full transcribed text of the interviews will be included in an appendix. While there are some holes in the transcriptions because some interviews were conducted over the telephone, the vast majority of relevant insights are preserved for the reader’s reference. In that vein, there was some discussion about whether to include the interviews with the case study. As we conducted more interviews, we realized that there was value in both and each one provided relevant context to the other’s content. I’d also like to acknowledge the use of other people’s hard work and ideas outside of the participants. Either directly or indirectly, there is an existing body of SFA related knowledge and an emerging body that the community is applying existing knowledge in new ways to help us find better ways of doing things. Special thanks to Dr. John Fishel, and to Dr. Marc Tyrrell for volunteering their time and talents to this effort. Both have helped me a great deal and continue to be of service to the community at large through their personal work and their public activities on Small Wars Journal. Marc was my “anthro- reach back” while I was deployed to Iraq as an advisor, and John has forgotten more about advising then many will ever know. The chapters these two professionals authored provided a great deal of context to the overall study, and will provide the reader with the relevant tools to consider the cased study as a whole. We’d also like to thank the Small Wars Journal (SWJ) for publishing the Case Study. SWJ is a forum that is accessible in a way that builds new knowledge and truly flattens the curve of adaptation. SWJ provides a community where content can be considered against the context of policy, all the levels of war, and the institutions that support them. Robert Thornton MAJ, FA 59 1 Strategic Context “We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. … Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior — of friends, adversaries and most importantly, the people in between.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates----2007 Developing Foreign Security Forces and building partner capacity (BPC) as a component of a broader and balanced approach have emerged as a tenet of our 2008 National Defense Strategy. While we have incorporated aspects of these into our activities in the past, events in the world have changed the way the United States sees it role and responsibilities with regard to the global community, and this has increased the value of BPC. While the moral basis that defines our vital interests for our grand strategy remains rooted in the principles upon which our republic stands, the scope of our policies and commitments continues to grow.