Iraq's New Battlefront
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IRAQ’S NEW BATTLEFRONT: THE STRUGGLE OVER NINEWA Middle East Report N°90 – 28 September 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: A FRONTIER SOCIETY............................................................... 1 II. LOSING NINEWA (2003-2009)....................................................................................... 4 III. POLITICAL RESHUFFLING......................................................................................... 8 A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AL-HADBAA’S TRIUMPH ..........................................................................9 B. THE DANGERS OF GOVERNMENTAL PARALYSIS ........................................................................12 IV. DISPUTED TERRITORIES .......................................................................................... 16 A. THE TERRITORIAL STAKES.........................................................................................................16 B. A BROADER POLITICAL TUG OF WAR ........................................................................................20 V. MANIPULATING MINORITIES................................................................................. 23 A. THE CHRISTIANS OF THE NINEWA PLAIN....................................................................................24 1. A fragmented community ..........................................................................................................24 2. Increased vulnerability...............................................................................................................25 3. Between Baghdad and the Kurdistan regional government......................................................27 B. THE YAZIDIS..............................................................................................................................30 1. Origins and beliefs .....................................................................................................................30 2. Location and social organisation................................................................................................30 3. Ethnic and religious dynamics ...................................................................................................32 C. THE TURKOMANS ......................................................................................................................33 D. THE SHABAKS............................................................................................................................34 VI. OUTLINE OF A POSSIBLE DEAL.............................................................................. 37 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 41 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ...................................................................................................................................42 B. MAP OF DISPUTED DISTRICTS IN NINEWA GOVERNORATE ...............................................................43 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................44 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2006...45 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................47 Middle East Report N°90 28 September 2009 IRAQ’S NEW BATTLEFRONT: THE STRUGGLE OVER NINEWA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Violence in much of Iraq is at lower levels than in years and, largely thanks to the Sunni Arab boycott of the past but, in Ninewa, the carnage continues. In August 2005 provincial elections, they established political and September 2009, large-scale, horrific attacks target- dominance in the governorate. ing minority communities took scores of lives. Arabs and Kurds are locked in a political deadlock. The At the same time, Ninewa proved fertile ground for a bloodshed and institutional paralysis are symptoms of Sunni-based insurgency, fuelled by the governorate’s the country’s shifting battle lines: from an essentially strong Arabist, military and (Sunni) religious tradition Sunni versus Shiite sectarian struggle, mainly centred and propelled by growing anti-Kurdish and anti-Shiite in the capital, to a predominantly Arab against Kurdish resentment. Groups taking up arms against U.S. troops ethnic fight playing out along an extended axis of fric- and Kurdish fighters exploited the long, often un- tion. It will be near-impossible to resolve the crisis guarded Syrian border and a history of cross-border without tackling outstanding nationwide political issues. trade, while finding ready recruits among former offi- But Ninewa cannot wait. Urgent interim steps are cers, Baathists and an increasingly destitute youth to needed to achieve equitable local power sharing and impose their rule over predominantly Sunni Arab areas. joint security patrols between Arabs and Kurds in dis- From 2003 to 2008, Ninewa appeared caught between puted districts, as well as to ensure better minority Kurdish dominance and Sunni insurgents. protection. All this requires a continued and active U.S. role. Washington might be on its way out, but its Gradually, the political landscape shifted. Insurgents – hands will be full even as it heads for the exit. especially the more Islamist – overplayed their hand; U.S. and Iraqi forces re-energised efforts to stabilise For Arabs and Kurds, the real prize remains Kirkuk, Ninewa; and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sought to where emotions run highest and oil reserves are rich- push back Kurdish territorial advances. Perhaps most est. But, precisely because of these stakes, Kirkuk also importantly, Sunni Arab leaders entered the political is where much national and international attention has fray, coalescing around a resolutely nationalist, anti- turned and efforts undertaken to, if not resolve the con- Kurdish platform. flict, at least freeze it. Not so in Ninewa, where local factors have brought the dispute to a head and which The 31 January 2009 provincial elections brought the has become the focal point of the ethnic battle. new phase in the Arab-Kurdish tug-of-war to a head. Four years earlier, Sunni Arabs had boycotted the polls, Ethnic relations in Ninewa have a chequered history. viewing the entire political process as illegitimate. They The struggle between Arab and Kurdish nationalisms were not about to repeat the mistake. United around the has been especially acute, notably in the capital, Mosul, al-Hadbaa National List (Qaemat al-Hadbaa al-Wata- home to deeply rooted Arabist feelings. The Kurds niya), they triumphed, waging a campaign focused on have paid a heavy price. The state has made aggres- two key points: Ninewa’s Arab identity and the invio- sive attempts to contain or suppress their national aspi- lability of the Baathist-era de facto boundary line that rations. The Baathist regime in particular engaged in has separated the governorate from Kurdistan since forced displacement and discriminatory resource dis- October 1991. The elections were a demographic cor- tribution. Kurds saw a chance for redress in 2003 and rective. Kurdish parties won roughly a third of council seized it, launching an offensive to rewind the clock seats under the banner of the Ninewa Brotherhood List and undo the effect of past practices. This too had a (Qaemat Ninewa al-Mutaakhiya); this was as they had cost. Operating largely in an ad hoc manner, without anticipated given their population share. But though due process and by dint of force, they took control of they accepted their significant electoral decline, they several districts, including many towns and villages, feared al-Hadbaa’s virulently anti-Kurdish rhetoric, re- seeking to incorporate them into the Kurdistan region sented its efforts to diminish Kurdish military, admin- Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa Crisis Group Middle East Report N°90, 28 September 2009 Page ii istrative and cultural influence and insisted on sharing engaging in politically costly compromise, however power. When al-Hadbaa rejected this demand, they urgent the need. At the governorate level, however, boycotted the provincial council. steps could be more realistic. Arabs and Kurds should agree on an interim arrangement that gives the latter a The resulting local government paralysis, coupled with legitimate share of power while allowing the former al-Hadbaa’s decision to reassert provincial government to govern; Kurdish military and police forces should rule over disputed territories heretofore under Kurdish be formally incorporated into federal army units and control, has led to an alarming rise in tensions. Con- Ninewa’s security police, respectively, under joint com- flict chiefly has occurred where Arabs and Kurds vie mand and with joint patrolling. Minority groups should for administrative control and where Iraq’s army and be given far greater protection and subjected to far Kurdish peshmergas face off across an increasingly fewer attempts at manipulation. The idea, floated by tense divide. On several occasions, these forces have some U.S. officials, of temporarily inserting American come perilously close to head-on collision. Further con- soldiers in joint army-peshmerga patrols is interesting tributing to the governorate’s growing instability and and not only because it might produce immediate tinderbox quality is the vast array