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Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak stephen t. hosmer Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for public release, distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contracts F49642-01-C-0003 and FA7014-06-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hosmer, Stephen T. Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak / Stephen Hosmer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4016-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Iraq War, 2003– 2. Iraq—Armed Forces—Operational readiness. 3. Iraq— History—1991–2003. I. Title. DS79.76.H68 2007 956.7044'3409567—dc22 2007014369 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002 Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were able to take down Saddam Hussein’s regime in less than three weeks, at the cost of relatively few Coalition casualties. This monograph draws on infor- mation derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials, to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. The research focused on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the Coalition’s task more difficult and costly? These two questions encompass a number of related issues. The monograph examines the battlefield consequences of Saddam Hussein’s strategic misjudgments and preoccupation with internal threats, the poorly designed and executed Iraqi military strategy and operations, the weak motivation and morale that permeated all ranks of the Iraqi military, and the superiority in combat capability enjoyed by the Coalition forces. It concludes with observations about why decisionmakers should be careful about the lessons they may seek to draw from OIF, how OIF paved the way for the insurgency that has followed in Iraq, and how OIF may influence the behavior of future United States adversaries. The monograph is intended for the use of military and civilian officials concerned with the management, planning, and conduct of U.S. operations to deter and counter threats to U.S. interests from enemy regimes and other hostile actors. iii iv Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak The research for this monograph was sponsored by the Direc- tor, Plans and Programs, Headquarters, Air Combat Command, and was part of a larger study of OIF conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE. The research find- ings also supported a larger study of OIF conducted within the Strat- egy, Doctrine, and Resources Program of RAND Arroyo Center. The Arroyo Center research was cosponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corpo- ration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and develop- ment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aero- space forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Aerospace Force Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Manage- ment; and Strategy and Doctrine. Additional information about PAF is available on our Web site at http://www.rand.org/paf. RAND Arroyo Center The RAND Arroyo Center is a federally funded research and develop- ment center sponsored by the United States Army. Additional information about RAND Arroyo Center is available at http://www.rand.org/ard. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments .............................................................. xxi Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 The Weak Iraqi Resistance ........................................................ 1 The Iraqi Failure to Exploit More-Effective Defensive Options .............. 3 Sources .............................................................................. 4 Organization of the Monograph ................................................. 5 CHAPTER TWO Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations..................................... 7 Saddam Was the Only Decisionmaker Who Mattered ....................... 7 Saddam’s Decisionmaking Was Seriously Flawed.............................. 9 Saddam’s Decisions Were Distorted by Optimism and Overweening Self-Confidence ............................................ 9 Saddam Had a Limited Grasp of International and Military Affairs.....11 Saddam’s Advisers Were Uninformed, Timid, and Sycophantic ..........13 Saddam Had a Record of Strategic Blunders ..................................15 Saddam Made Several Strategic Miscalculations in 2003....................18 War Could Be Avoided.........................................................18 Any Attacks Would Be Limited: Iraq Would Not Be Invaded ............21 His Regime Would Survive an Invasion .................................... 22 v vi Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak The Consequences of Saddam’s Strategic Misjudgments .................... 27 CHAPTER THREE Saddam’s Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses Against External Attack ...................................................31 Saddam’s Personal Security Measures Were Extreme.........................32 Iraq’s Forces Were Shaped to Forestall Coups, Uprisings ....................33 The Consequences of Saddam’s Fixation on Internal Security ............. 36 CHAPTER FOUR Iraq’s Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed ................................................................41 Saddam’s Military Strategy Was Flawed .......................................41 Regular Army Units Largely Remained in Prewar Deployment Areas........................................................................ 42 The Republican Guard Was Deployed Outside Baghdad................. 43 Militia Forces Were Positioned Inside Cities ................................45 Saddam’s Military Strategy Had Shortcomings and Vulnerabilities......47 Iraqi Defensive Operations Were Poorly Managed and Executed ..........55 Iraqi Command Arrangements and Practices Were Dysfunctional ..... 56 Iraqis Had Warning of Hostilities, but Situational Awareness Was Poor ................................................................... 60 Iraqi Forces Were Poorly Positioned for Defense............................65 Iraqi Forces Were Poorly Trained .............................................69 Iraqis Had to Operate with Reduced Inventories of Old Equipment.......74 CHAPTER FIVE Poor Motivation and Morale
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