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THE IMPACT OF THE ON ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTION By Jonathan Spyer*

Abstract: This article deals with the effects and implications of the , and the current situation of insurgency in that country, on Israel's perception of its national security. Specifically, it examines the extent to which the war has impacted on and transformed the three tiers of threat facing Israel--namely the irregular, conventional and non-conventional levels of warfare. The article outlines the nature of each of these three levels of threat, observing the impact of the Iraq War on it. It then moves toward some general conclusions on the Iraq War of 2003 and the events that have followed it as viewed through the perception of Israeli thinking on the region. In each area, this article observes the responses emerging from the Israeli strategic and policymaking echelon to the new situation opened up by the war of 2003. In this regard, it considers Israel's current unilateralist turn in the context of the broader view of current political trends in the region which prevails in the Israeli policymaking echelon.

Israel is a country unique among members same dispensation, the same regimes, the of the modern states' system in that the same prevailing ideas, often even the same basic legitimacy of its existence as a individuals (or their sons) dominate the sovereign body is rejected by its neighbors. region as did so in the late 1970s. The dominant political currents of the The region remains stymied by Middle Eastern region place the perception economic stagnation, and the failure of the of Israel as a foreign, illegitimate implant in regimes to develop the potential of the the Middle East somewhere near the center populations under their control. Middle of their view of the world.1 The struggle Eastern economies are in poor shape: against Israel, of course, takes many forms, growth is slow, corruption rampant. not all of them military, but all of them with Economic stagnation is matched by high significance to Israel's strategic perceptions. population growth and educational failure. In order to grasp Israel's national security The societies of the Middle East are largely stance, it is crucial that this basic existential closed systems.3 The ideas of nationalism predicament of the country be kept in mind. and politicized religion remain dominant, In this regard, it is also important to bear with liberal reform movements very weak. in mind the unique nature of the Middle For these unelected regimes, legitimacy is a East state system as a whole and the central issue. In the key ideological systems security environment in which Israel of Arab nationalism and , rejection operates. The Middle East is the most of the right of Israel to existence is an heavily armed region of the world.2 It is an important factor.4 The use of slogans and area which has proved until now propaganda against Israel is thus a remarkably impervious to the waves of widespread phenomenon. Developmental political change which have swept the failure, however, limits the ability to pursue world in the last decade and a half. The aggressively anti-Israel strategies.

34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) The Impact of the Iraq War on Israel's National Security Conception

The rest of the article will observe in Israel has since 2000 been involved in a low detail the specific security challenges which intensity conflict with Palestinian irregular Israel faces and its responses. formations in the West Bank and Gaza areas, and to a lesser extent within Israel ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY proper. There is evidence both of CONCEPTION: THE BACKGROUND involvement by non-Palestinian groups There does not exist in the public (Hizballah) and of state support (, domain a definitive statement of Israel's and Saddam's Iraq) for Palestinian national security doctrine. There are a paramilitary groups. An emerging number of explanations for this: firstly, additional threat is that constituted by the considerations and traditions of secrecy in a organizations of the global jihad. country still in a situation of conflict prevent the open discussion of key matters The Israeli-Palestinian Situation: conflict by individuals involved in policymaking in management, not conflict resolution this area. Secondly, long-term strategic Israeli strategists are unconvinced of the thought and consideration have not current feasibility of conflict resolution in traditionally been the main concern of terms of reaching a final status accord to Israel's defense establishment, which has an end the pivotal conflict with the inbuilt respect for matters of immediate and Palestinians.7 Given the essential tangible relevance. This has traditionally incompatibility remaining in important gone hand in hand with a mistrust of elements of the Israeli and even the "intellectualism."5 moderate Palestinian conception of how a These elements notwithstanding, there final status agreement would look-- exists a large body of academic literature particularly on such matters as the demand attempting to isolate key conceptions for return of and their underlying Israeli thinking regarding the descendants, or future arrangements in challenges facing the country in the field of Jerusalem--it is considered that some form defense policy. In addition, statements and of "conflict management" is likely to written work by policymakers and remain a necessity for the foreseeable strategists past and present enable the future. This notion of conflict management tracing of clear trends and perceptions in currently stands at the center of Israel's Israeli thinking in this area.6 strategic perceptions. 8 Israel faces strategic challenges and Israel has developed a number of threats on three basic levels. These three measures for the implementation of conflict levels cannot be seen as hermetically sealed management. The Disengagement Plan from one another. from the Gaza Strip and part of the northern West Bank was an example of a measure THREAT #1: IRREGULAR, deriving from the strategy of conflict GUERRILLA, AND TERRORIST management. The Disengagement Plan was OPERATIONS above all an attempt to regain the initiative, Since 1973, this threat has accounted to prevent a static situation in the conflict, almost exclusively for actual loss of Israeli which would not be considered to be to life deriving from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel's advantage for a number of reasons--

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Jonathan Spyer centrally, because of the ongoing attempts should be borne in mind that hardly any to delegitimize Israel internationally, and successful infiltrations from Gaza took because of the worrisome demographic place throughout the four years of conflict challenge to Israel's desire to remain both a since September 2000.13 The Strip is Jewish and a democratic state.9 surrounded by a fence which has proved a Israeli policymakers sought to very effective measure in frustrating the demonstrate to the Palestinians that ability of Gaza-based paramilitaries from violence will not bring them the ability to reaching into Israel to attack Jewish dictate terms to Israel. Nor will they be communities. permitted to benefit from a general descent The trial of strength which emerged into chaos leading eventually to a situation between Israeli security forces and the of inter-communal violence throughout the Hamas organization in the weeks following area of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza (the the implementation of Disengagement was scenario advocated by Palestinian thus not unexpected. In this period, Israel supporters of the so-called "one state sought to demonstrate to the Palestinian solution.")10 Rather, Disengagement was organizations that in the post- intended to allow Israel to use its military Disengagement context, Israel would superiority to dictate an arrangement on the respond to attacks by inflicting a response ground to its own liking. so harsh that it would make the launching The Disengagement Plan--which was of attacks not worthwhile.14 At the moment, implemented between August 15 and it is too early to say if Israel has succeeded --developed in such a way as to any degree in achieving this desired to lead to the de facto drawing in of deterrence vis-a-vis paramilitary into the process, in addition, of course, to organizations in the Strip. The achievement the extensive involvement of the United of such a balance, in the absence of a States.11 The full ramifications of the meaningful political process of any kind, withdrawal, however, still remain open to will constitute a decisive factor in question. In the first place, as events in the determining the success or failure of the short period since the implementation have Disengagement.15 The round of Qassam already amply demonstrated, the absence of attacks by Hamas in the days following the an Israeli security presence in Gaza may Disengagement, and the unilateral decision result in increased Palestinian attacks, using by the movement to return to ceasefire after mortars and rockets developed in a Gaza a determined Israeli response indicates that Strip now empty of Israelis, or smuggled in a certain level of deterrence has been through the southern border of the Strip. achieved. The Hamas leadership have sought to In the wake of the Disengagement, a interpret Disengagement as constituting a debate within policymaking circles may be victory for the tactics of violence adopted discerned regarding the likelihood and since 2000.12 According to this advisability of further unilateral moves. interpretation, while a decade of Palestinian Recent comments by key strategists, involvement in negotiation failed to bring including Military Intelligence commander about the dismantling of a single settlement, Aharon Ze'evi and IDF Planning the tactics of violence have forced Israel to Directorate Head Udi Dekel indicate that undertake a strategic retreat. Additionally, senior figures in Israel's defense regarding the actual likelihood of a decline establishment now favor the adoption of in terror as a result of the Disengagement, it additional unilateral measures.16 This

36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) The Impact of the Iraq War on Israel's National Security Conception thinking is based upon pessimistic barrier in the area in question has not yet expectations regarding the likelihood of been built or is incomplete.19 The barrier diplomatic progress emerging from has not, of course, achieved 100% results negotiations, given the widely divergent even in the areas protected by it, as recent basic positions of the sides, and what Israel successful bomb attacks in Hadera and increasingly regards as the inability of the Netanya indicate. Nevertheless, it has Palestinian Authority's leadership to impose undeniably contributed to Israel's achieving its will upon the totality of actors on the a steep drop in the number of successfully Palestinian side. executed terror attacks in 2004 and 2005, The recent comments of these senior compared to preceding years. commanders have been echoed by The route of the barrier is problematic, influential voices in the political echelon, and has led to legal proceedings both in the including Finance Minister Ehud Olmert, Israeli Supreme Court and in the prime ministerial adviser Eyal Arad, and International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the former Prime Minister Ehud Barak.17 Much Hague. The ICJ ruling has been rejected by will depend, as noted above, on Israel's Israel as politically-motivated. The ruling ability or inability in the months ahead to dismissed Israel's claim that the barrier is a impose a continued decision by rejectionist necessary means of self-defense. The court Palestinian groups to refrain from large- maintained that self-defense would be an scale violence against Israel. Additional admissible justification only in a conflict unilateral moves, however, are in any case between sovereign states. Furthermore, the unlikely in 2006, a year of elections in both ICJ maintained that other less disruptive Israel and the Palestinian Authority. means were available to Israel to safeguard A second, complimentary means of its security, though it refrained from giving conflict management conceived of by Israel any specific examples.20 The Israeli is the security barrier. Though the Supreme Court, meanwhile, accepted the construction of the barrier has not yet been justification for building the barrier, but has completed, and this project has led to Israel ruled in favor of the claimants in certain being subjected to unprecedented areas, requiring that it be re-routed to take condemnation by much of the international better account of the needs of the local community, the effectiveness of the barrier Palestinian population affected by its as a security device--at least for the short to construction. 21 medium term--is apparent. In areas where it A third notable aspect of Israel's strategy has been completed, it has reduced has been the use of targeted assassinations successful Palestinian incursions to close to of senior members and operatives of zero. Attacks on Israeli communities close Palestinian organizations engaged in the use to the Green Line, such as Hadera, Afula of terror. These have attracted particular and Netanya, a frequent occurrence since controversy because of occasions, such as September 2000, have been sharply reduced the assassination of senior Hamas operative since the completion of the northern section Salah Shehadeh, when civilian bystanders of the barrier.18 Successful incursions, such have also been killed as a result of IDF as the suicide bombing in Beersheva on operations.22 Such assassinations take place August 31, 2004, were possible because the when the of suspects is operationally

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Jonathan Spyer impossible or would likely endanger large in gains for radical Islamists rather than the numbers of civilians and IDF soldiers. IDF tiny liberal and democratic forces in the practice requires effort to ensure correct Arab world is also a factor in Israeli targeting and minimal risk to bystanders, thinking. Beyond the Palestinian sphere, goals which have been achieved in the however, Israel is largely a spectator with majority--though not all--of the operations regard to such developments. of this kind carried out in the course of the last four years of conflict. Israel and the Global Jihad Other than the disappearance of the The threat posed by international terror financial support offered by Saddam to the networks not emerging from among the families of Palestinian shahids (martyrs), Palestinians has also become a factor the immediate physical results of the war in demanding the attention of Israeli Iraq on this tier of conflict are minimal. strategists and policymakers. The al-Qa'ida None of the insurgent organizations network cites "the Jews" as one of its involved in low intensity conflict with central targets in the document that Israel, (with the exception of the tiny articulated the aims of its campaign of Palestine Liberation Front) was a direct international terror in 1998.25 A recent client of Iraq. As such, the launching of the document captured by U.S. troops in Iraq Iraq War, the conclusion of its conventional suggests that war against Israel is seen as a phase, and the insurgency that has followed, central goal for the movement, but one to have had little tangible effect either on the be postponed to a later stage, after the resources available to Palestinian "" has already taken over some organizations, or on their willingness or Arab states, and is in a position to wage a otherwise to continue their fight with Israel. conventional war.26 The authenticity of that It is important here to consider the larger document, however, has been questioned.27 implications, however, of the U.S. strategy The network has carried out attacks in Iraq. The war was presented in part as an against Jewish and Israeli targets, including element of a larger attempt to root out what the bombing of a hotel where a large were perceived as the sources of number of Israelis were staying in in the region. To this, the Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002, and added support for democratization in the the attack on a synagogue in Djerba, Arab world.23 , in April of the same year. Israeli thinking remained skeptical Nevertheless, al-Qa'ida's main foci have throughout regarding any likelihood of been the Gulf, its war on the West, and now rapid political transformation toward also Iraq. The network thus appears to view democracy in the Arab states as a result of operations against Israeli and Jewish targets western action in Iraq. In the Israeli view, at this stage as an important, though empirical evidence to date for such a subsidiary element in its strategy. It is process taking hold is minimal. The noteworthy that the specific Israeli- working assumption is that for the Palestinian issue only began to feature foreseeable future, the region's current prominently in al-Qa'ida propaganda regimes and ideas are likely to remain starting with Bin-Ladin's broadcast dominant.24 The issue of ideas is of following the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qa'ida is significance here: given the strength of aware of the mobilizing value of the Islamist oppositional movements in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Arab and region, the likelihood of upheaval resulting broader . Thus, despite its

38 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) The Impact of the Iraq War on Israel's National Security Conception main focus on other areas, Israel's security terrain for training, and operations forces are engaged in countering the threat, conducted there hit not only the Egyptian in cooperation with allied Western regime, but Israel and the West as well by countries.28 targeting large numbers of tourists in the There have also been reports of efforts area.32 by al-Qa'ida to build networks in the West Israeli and western researchers have Bank and Gaza Strip.29 Israel is particularly recently identified a growing concerned with the possibility of infiltration within the ranks of the Sunni global jihad, by al-Qa'ida and other terror elements into of potential importance to Israel. There is the Gaza Strip via the inadequately policed widespread criticism of the tactics being border separating the Gaza Strip from the adopted by the jihadists in Iraq led by Abu Sinai Peninsula. Since Disengagement, Musab al-Zarqawi. In particular, the large large amounts of weaponry and explosive numbers of Muslim deaths, and the materials have entered Gaza via this increasingly sectarian (anti-Shi'a) character border.30 Israel is currently concerned both of the insurgency in Iraq have been at the possibility of al-Qa'ida conducting condemned by significant, senior figures attacks against Israel from Gaza, but also at within the global jihadist movement. the network's potential for subverting the Particular attention is being paid to recent Palestinian Authority itself, harming hopes statements by individuals influenced by the for a return to the diplomatic process.31 writings of Abu Musab al-Suri, a senior Recent reports of activities by a group in ideologue of al-Qa'ida, of Syrian origin. Al- the Gaza Strip calling itself al-Qa'ida in Suri has condemned the current direction of Palestine should be seen against this the insurgency in Iraq as alien to the background, although the extent to which principles of the global jihad, as formulated this group is in operational contact with any by Abdallah Azzam. actual structure of the global jihad movement is not yet clear. Lebanese Hizballah Beyond its attempts to attack Israeli An additional, separate international targets using Palestinians in the West Bank terrorist challenge facing Israel is that posed and Gaza, the al-Qa'ida network itself is the by the Shi'i Islamist movement Hizballah. prime suspect in the triple bombing that This movement, which is backed by Iran, is killed at least 64 people in July 2005 at known to have extensive practical Egypt's popular Red Sea resort of Sharm al- involvement with Palestinian paramilitary Sheikh on the southern tip of the Sinai. This cells in the West Bank and Gaza, in attack came 10 months after bombings at particular those affiliated with the Islamic two other Sinai resorts near the Israeli Jihad movement and the Fatah al-Aqsa border, Taba and Ras al-Shitan, which Martyrs . Israel considers killed more than 30 people. Israeli analysts Hizballah to be an instrument of Iran, believe that the Sinai will continue to be a determined to disrupt any possibility for favored area for the launching of new jihad progress in the diplomatic process between operations, designed to hit at western and Israelis and Palestinians. Hizballah operates Israeli targets with maximum propaganda in close cooperation with -based effect. The Sinai offers prime geographical operatives of the Iranian Revolutionary

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Jonathan Spyer

Guards , dominating southern 2003, Iraqi forces had suffered a severe Lebanon and maintaining training facilities decline in both equipment and manpower. in the Bekaa Valley. 33 As such, it is questionable whether Region-wide terror networks such as al- Saddam's Iraq constituted a significant Qa'ida and Hizballah stand to benefit from threat to Israel on the eve of the war of regional instability and strife. Israel is 2003.34 acutely aware of the threat represented by For the immediate future, the war of these organizations, and in addition to work 2003 clearly further decreased the on the security and defense level, strives to likelihood of conventional, state-to-state focus international attention on the general conflict between Israel and neighboring threat to the western democracies posed by states. In effect, it freed Israel (for the international Islamist terror groups. foreseeable future) from the threat of conventional conflict against a combination of Arab armies on its eastern front. The THREAT # 2: CONVENTIONAL ARAB possibility of an Iraqi-Syrian MILITARY FORCES entering and threatening Israel had Conventional military contests, of been a central scenario occupying course, formed the main element of the strategists prior to 2003. The removal of Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1948-73 period. Saddam put an end to this.35 However, Throughout, Israel has sought to offset its since the final outcome of the 2003 War is quantitative inferiority vis-a-vis the Arab still uncertain, with the future dispensation states (in terms of territory, geography, and that will emerge in the area that once population) by the maintenance of a constituted Saddam's Iraq far from clear, it qualitative edge, credible deterrence, and a would be premature to conclude that the secure supply of quality arms--most notably War in Iraq has had a conclusively from its domestic defense industries. Since beneficial effect from the point of view of the end of the and the collapse of the conventional threat facing Israel. This is the Soviet Union, the Israeli advantage in particularly so given the volatile internal this regard over its neighbors has been state in Iraq, and the question of growing widening. This, combined with the treaty- Iranian influence in the internal affairs of based peace arrangements achieved with that country. 36 two of Israel's four immediate neighbors, The disappearance of the Ba'thist regime greatly reduced the perceived likelihood of in Iraq also has implications regarding conventional confrontation between Israel Syria. Relations between and and any combination of Arab states in the Damascus had been warming since the period preceding the 2003 Iraq War. accession to power of Bashar al-Asad. The Prior to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, fall of Saddam removes Syrian strategic the Iraqi military had been seen as one of depth, leaving the country now faced by the most significant existing threats to rival states on three of its borders. Israel, given its 40 division-strong army, American anger at Syria's failure to and the very extreme anti-Israel rhetoric effectively control the passage of anti- employed by . Following American insurgents across its borders the in 1991, however, Iraqi further emphasizes the weakness and conventional strength was very significantly vulnerability of the regime. The growingly depleted. UN sanctions and isolation during isolated and beleaguered situation of the the decade that followed meant that by regime in Damascus is at the present time

40 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) The Impact of the Iraq War on Israel's National Security Conception one of they key effects of the Iraq War.37 It deriving from the Islamist ruling has brought about a decision by the regime gives the Iranian threat unique gravity. of strategic importance--namely to Israel is particularly vulnerable to attack withdraw its occupying forces from by weapons of mass destruction. The Lebanon--allowing for the latter to country is small--20,000 km2. Two-thirds of tentatively regain its sovereignty. The the population lives in three metropolitan future of the Bashar Asad regime no longer areas within a 75 km radius. Israel's small appears secure, particularly in the wake of population makes it very dependent on the the crisis following the murder of former rapid mobilization of reserve forces in time Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. of war--a process which could be Again, from Israel's point of view, the key devastated by the employment of non- question becomes what would be likely to conventional weapons.41 replace Bashar, a leader universally Regarding the effects of the Iraq war on regarded as weak and of mediocre the WMD threat to Israel, the toppling of abilities.38 It may well be that Israel would Saddam has obviously nullified the Iraqi prefer to see a weakened Bashar hold on to challenge. The failure to find WMD in Iraq power, rather than the uncertainty of a following the war, however, raises the wholly new dispensation emerging in question of the gravity or extent of the pre- Damascus.39 war threat, regardless of what was sincerely believed prior to the . Israeli THREAT #3: ADVERSARIES' strategists, certainly, were on record prior to ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP WMD the war as considering that Iraq possessed a CAPABILITY residual quantity of WMD, and Israeli In this regard, in the period preceding citizens were issued with renewed gas the War of 2003, Israel perceived a threat masks and updated atropine (an antidote for from four neighboring states: Iraq, Iran, nerve gas) in the weeks leading up to the Syria, and . The willingness of war.42 Saddam's Iraq to employ non-conventional The decision by Libyan dictator weapons was made apparent in the Anfal Muammar Qadhafi in December 2003 to operations in in 1988.40 His dismantle his country's non-conventional desire to strike at Israel was also weapons program, and allow U.N. weapons demonstrated in 1991. Libyan hostility to inspectors access to key sites is a direct Israel and weapons of mass destruction result of the toppling of Saddam and is (WMD) ambitions were also well- another of the clearly beneficial outcomes documented. Israeli policymakers have long of the war for Israel and the West. During considered, however, that the central threat inspections by US and British experts, it in this regard emanates from Tehran. The was discovered that the Libyans had combination in Iran of long-standing developed their uranium enrichment nuclear ambitions (preceding the Islamic capability further than had been expected. revolution of 1979), an advanced scientific Libya was also found to have maintained and technological sector relative to the extensive stockpiles of chemical weapons, region, and extreme hostility to Israel including , and a fledgling nuclear weapons program. 43

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However, the war has had no effect on enrichment-related activities."46 The report Iranian WMD ambitions Israeli strategists set November 25 as the date for further regard this issue as perhaps the central review of Iran's nuclear posture. On threat facing the country. Iran is making November 22, Iranian Foreign Minister rapid advances in both missile technology Kamal Kharrazi announced that Iran was and WMD development. The Shihab-3 ceasing all enrichment activities, for a missile, with a range of 1300 km, is already three-month period, having reached operational. The development of the agreement on this with the EU-three.47 Shihab-4 and 5 is in progress. Iran Western sources suspect that Iran has possesses one of the most advanced stockpiled large quantities of uranium chemical warfare programs in the hexafluorode, a precursor to enriched developing world.44 uranium, in anticipation of the freeze. In The Iranian nuclear program is the most September 2005, the IAEA finally passed a serious source of concern. International resolution requiring that Iran be referred to Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors the UN Security Council for failing to were invited to inspect Iranian nuclear convince the international community of facilities in September 2003. The the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.48 inspections clearly revealed that centrifuges The IAEA's governing board approved the had been used to enrich two types of resolution in the face of Iranian threats to uranium to 20 percent or more. This is far curtail IAEA inspections and begin more than the two to three percent required enriching of uranium. The resolution was for the production of nuclear fuel, and non- drafted by the EU 3 and approved by the proliferation experts agree that uranium United States. The resolution failed, enriched to 20 percent could be used to however, to set a specific date for the make a very primitive nuclear device.45 The referral of Iran to the Security Council, discoveries thus place Iran in clear violation allowing for the matter to continue getting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty dragging out. The resolution was partly the (NPT), to which it has been a signatory product of the confrontational style adopted since 1970. The treaty allows for by the new hardline president, Mahmud signatories to develop nuclear energy for Ahmedinijad. Ahmedinijad addressed the peaceful purposes, but requires them to General Assembly on September 17, and declare all facilities and make them open to was expected to put forward a counter- the IAEA for inspection. proposal to EU proposals. Instead, the While ostensibly maintaining Iranian president used the occasion for a cooperation with the IAEA and the EU- discussion of historical grievances, and three (, UK and ), Iran has theories regarding the true perpetrators of refused to give up its independent nuclear the . He also bluntly fuel cycle production capability, which, as rejected attempts to create what he referred mentioned above, it maintains is for to as "nuclear apartheid."49 In an interview peaceful purposes only. with a UAE newspaper in early October, The IAEA's report of June 2004 was Ahmedinijad was quoted as asserting that if accompanied by trenchant criticism of Iran, Iran's case does in fact go to the Security and this was followed by the issuing of a Council, Iran may respond by "holding resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors back on oil sales or limiting inspections of on September 18, 2004, which openly our nuclear facilities." (Although the called on Iran to "immediately suspend all Iranians later denied that this interview had

42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) The Impact of the Iraq War on Israel's National Security Conception taken place.)50 the Saddam regime without bringing about The growing power of conservative and any deep paradigmatic shift in the nature of radical Islamist elements in the Iranian regional politics. The essential contours of regime, and the regime's ongoing support regional politics, of Israel's threat for proxies engaged in terror against Israel, perception, and the nature of its response is of deep concern to Israeli strategists and thus remain untransformed by the war. This policymakers. Israel's central fears relate said, in important specific areas (as outlined not so much to the prospect of an imminent above) its impact has been felt. launch by Iran of a WMD attack on Israel. Israel's national security posture is It is considered that the regime's own shaped by the combination of the rejection survival instincts are likely to be sufficient of its legitimacy, which still forms a key to make such a move improbable. Rather, aspect of regional politics, combined with the concern is that possession of nuclear the undisputed technological and military arms will embolden the Iranians and their superiority possessed by Israel, which allies in their already extensive use of low- makes the actual likelihood of conventional intensity and terror warfare against Israel, state-to-state warfare very low. Despite the setting the stage for increased uncertainty swift conclusion of conventional hostilities and volatility in the Middle East. in Iraq, the eventual outcome of the 2003 Possession of a nuclear capability by Iran invasion is still far from certain. A failure to would also tilt the regional balance of establish a stable, pro-western regime in power, encouraging other regional players Baghdad will be perceived as a victory for to enter alliances or closer relations with those regional forces hostile to Israel. But Iran. In addition, there is the possibility that whether this would substantially alter the Iran would become a distributor of nuclear direction of events of immediate relevance technology to countries with which it made to Israel is questionable. The emergence of alliances. Finally, there is near certainty that a stable, unified Iraq, would form a an Iranian nuclear capability would act as a significant contribution to regional stability. spur to other regional powers to pursue But again such an outcome--even were it to similar nuclear efforts.51 be achieved--is not expected to substantially alter the basic contours of CONCLUSIONS Israel's threat perceptions and responses to The operational doctrine of the IDF is regional challenges. currently in the midst of a process of transformation, reflecting advances in military technology, the changing nature of * Dr. Jonathan Spyer has served as a Israeli society, and the changing order of special advisor on international affairs to gravity of the three tiers of threat faced by Israeli Cabinet ministers. He is currently a the country. The conventional military research fellow at the Global Research in threat has declined, while the threat of International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, terrorism and WMD remain equally or even Herzliya, Israel. more worrisome. The Iraq war at the time of writing appears to have altered the strategic picture in the region by removing

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NOTES 6 For attempts to outline the key elements of 1 For a useful explanation of the role played Israel's national security conception, see by Israel in the political language of the Efraim Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New region, see , "The Orphaned Strategic Thinking," Political Science Peace," The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), Generation's Odyssey (New York: pp. 41-64; Gal Luft, All Quiet on the Pantheon Books, 1998), pp. 253-312. See Eastern Front: Israel's National Security also Edward Said, Peace and its Doctrine after the Fall of Saddam, Analysis Discontents (New York: Vintage Books, paper No. 2, Saban Center for Middle East 1995), and Barry Rubin, The Tragedy of the Policy at the , (March, Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge 2004.); David Horowitz, "The Israeli University Press, 2002). For an internal concept of National Security and the criticism of prevailing orthodoxies on both Prospects of Peace in the Middle East," in the Israeli and Arab sides, see Mohammed Gabriel Sheffer, (ed.), Dynamics of a Sid Ahmed, "Post-Zionism," Al-Ahram Conflict: A Re-examination of the Arab- Weekly, June 8-14, 2000. Israeli conflict (Jerusalem: Van Leer 2 , "Military Balance in Jerusalem Foundation, 1975), pp. 235-77; the Middle East, an analytic overview: Avner Yaniv, Deterrence Without the Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Bomb: the Politics of Israeli Strategy Major Arms by Country and Zone, and (Haifa: University of Haifa Press, 1987). Qualitative Trends," Center for Strategic 7 Giora Eiland, "Security, Peace and Israel's and International Studies, March, 2004. Strategy of Disengagement," Peacewatch # http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_mb_boo 456, May 13, 2004. Washington Institute k.pdf. for Near East Policy. 3 See the Arab Human Development Report http://www.washingtoninstitute.org. (AHDR) series for an in-depth detailing and 8 See Arnon Regular, "Hamas' Zahar: More discussion of the situation and trends in kidnappings if Israel doesn't release governance, society, and economy across prisoners," Haaretz, October 26, 2005. the -speaking world. http://www.haaretz.co.il. http://www.rbas.undp.org/ahdr.cfm. 9 Eiland. See also Ori Nir, "Demographics 4 See Kenan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: Drive Likud's Shifting Agenda," The War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab Forward, December 26, 2003. World (London: Penguin Books, 1994), pp. http://www.forward.com. 253-327 for an in-depth discussion of 10 This idea, which is in essence a return to prevailing political ideas in the Arab world, the pre-1988 PLO policy of the "democratic including a focus on the centrality afforded secular state" has re-surfaced in mainstream the notion of struggle against Israel, to the Palestinian debate over the course of the exclusion of more local concerns. last five years of strife between Israelis and 5 Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J.Eisenstadt and Palestinians. For an argument in its favor, Andrew J. Bacevich, "Israel's Military see Tony Judt, "Israel: the alternative," New Culture: Conservative Innovation," in York Review of Books, Vol. 50, No. 16, Knives, and Missiles: Israel's October 23, 2003. Security Revolution (Washington: http://www.nybooks.com; See also Michael Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Tarazi, "Why not two peoples, one state?," 1998), pp. 49-79. International Herald Tribune, October 5,

44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) The Impact of the Iraq War on Israel's National Security Conception

2004. For a rebuttal, see , http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/6307 "Israel, Palestine and the Return of the Bi- 80.html. National Fantasy," New Republic, October 17 Benn, "PM." 27, 2003. http://www.tnr.com. 18 According to figures produced by the 11 Dennis Ross, "Gaza Disengagement: The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. US Role in Ensuring Success on the http://www.mfa.gov.il. Ground," Peacewatch #508, Washington 19 Steve Gutkin, "Israel vows to hunt down Institute for Near East Policy, July 20, Hamas leaders," Irish Examiner, September 2005. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org. 2, 2005. 12 Chris Mcgreal, "Hamas celebrates victory http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/. of the bomb as power of negotiation 20 "West Bank barrier ruling: Key points," falters," , September 12, BBC Online, July 9, 2004. 2005. http://www.guardian.co.uk. http://news.bbc.co.uk. 13 David Makovsky, "A Fence that Makes 21 Molly Moore, "Israeli Court orders Sense," Los Angeles Times, February 24, Changes in Barrier," Washington Post, July 2004. www.latimes.com. 1, 2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com. 14 Amos Harel, "Cabinet okays options of 22 See Findings of the inquiry into the death shelling Gaza, assassinations," Ha'aretz, of Salah Shehadeh. http://www.mfa.gov. September 25, 2005. 23 For a variety of expert opinions on the http://www.haaretz.com. issue of Mid-East democratization, see 15 For an analysis of the likely effects of "Democratization in the Middle East: disengagement on the internal Palestinian Solution or Mirage," A GLORIA Center scene, written just prior to the evacuation, Roundtable discussion, Middle East Review see Shalom Harari and Mark A. Heller, of International Affairs, Volume 7, No. 1, "The Effects of Disengagement on (March 2003). http://meria.idc.ac.il. This Palestinian Politics and Society," Strategic article showcases widely differing analyses Assessment, Vol. 8, No. 2 (August 2005). in the period prior to the fall of Baghdad to http://www.tau.ac.il. For a summing up of U.S. forces. For a later in-depth discussion the choices facing Israel after the of Washington's Greater Middle East implementation of the plan, Shlomo Gazit, initiative, see Daniel Neep, "Dilemmas of "Two Roads Diverged: Israel's post- Democratization in the Middle East: The Disengagement Strategic Options," Jaffee 'Forward Strategy of '" Middle Center for Strategic Studies Strategic East Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3, (Fall 2004). Assessment, Vol. 8, No. 2 (August 2005). 24 For a representative and articulate http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss. expression of the views of the mainstream 16 Attila Somfalvi, "Al-Qaida is in Gaza," Israeli policy community on this issue, see Ynetnews, September 28, 2005. Shlomo Avineri, "On Democracy and the http://www.ynetnews.com/articles; and Pursuit of Peace in the Middle East," Aluf Benn, "PM: Despite rumors, no plan Lecture at the UCLA Faculty Center, for W. Bank pullout," Ha'aretz, September October 18, 2004. 29, 2005. http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.

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25 See text of the "Declaration of the World 37 Dina Ezzat, "Syria Under attack," Al- Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Ahram, March 3-9, 2005. the http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/. Crusaders," issued on February 23, 1998. 38 See Interview with Syrian Available at: http://www.fas.org. President Asad, Der Spiegel, August 29, 26 "US 'intercepts al-Qaeda letter'," BBC 2005. http://service.spiegel.de. Online, October 7, 2005. 39 Yoav Stern, "U.S offers beleaguered http://news.bbc.co.uk. Assad deal to end political isolation," 27 "Al Qaeda in Iraq: Letter to al-Zarqawi a Haaretz, October 15, 2005. Fake," CNN, October 13, 2005. http://www.haaretz.com. http://edition.cnn.com. 40 Makiya, Cruelty and Silence. 28 See Reuven Paz, "Al-Qaeda's Search for 41 Cameron Brown, "Israel and the WMD New Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi Activity Threat: Lessons for Europe," Middle East in Egypt and Sinai," GLORIA Center, The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, Project for the Research of Islamist No.3, (September 2004). Movements (PRISM) Occasional papers, http://meria.idc.ac.il. Vol. 3, No. 7, October, 2005. 42 Gold, "Wartime Witch Hunt." 29 Khaled Abu Toameh, "Al-Qaida Raises 43 Patrick E. Tyler, "Secret Diplomacy Won its head in Gaza," Jerusalem Post, October Libyan Pledge on Arms," New York Times, 9, 2005. http://www.jpost.com. , 2003. 30 "Worries about al-Qaeda in Gaza," CBS http://www.nytimes.com. News, September 15, 2005. 44 Brown, "Israel and the WMD Threat." http://wcbs880.com. 45 Charles Recknagel, "Circumstantial 31 Ibid. Evidence," Times Online, October 5, 32 See Paz, "Al-Qaeda's Search for New 2005. http://www.atimes.com. Fronts." Also see Bernard Heykel, 46 For full text of the IAEA Resolution of "Terminal Debate," New York Times, September 18, 2004, see BBC Online, October 11, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com, September 18, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk. and Bernard Heykel, "Islamic Debates over 47 Nazila Fathi, "Iran says it will halt the War in Iraq and Attacks on the West, uranium enrichment," New York Times, Muslims, and Martyrdom," Chatham November 22, 2004. www.nytimes.com. House. http://www.riia.org/. 48 See "Implementation of the NPT 33 Ely Karmon, "Hizballah as Strategic Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Threat to Israel," Heartland--Eurasian Republic of Iran," IAEA Resolution Review of Geopolitics, 2-2005 (July 2005). adopted on September 25, 2005. http://www.ict.org.il/. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Document 34 Dore Gold, "Wartime Witch Hunt: s/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf. Also see Blaming Israel for the Iraq War," Jerusalem "Iranian Nuclear Issue headed for UN Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 25, June 3, 2005. Security Council," ABC News Online, http://www.jcpa.org/brief/. September 25, 2004. http://www.abc.net.au. 35 Luft, All Quiet on the Eastern Front. 49 "Iran is resolved to pursue nuclear 36 Isaac Kfir, "Britain Blames Teheran for program," CNN, September 18, 2005. British Soldiers' Death," Institute for http://www.cnn.com. Counter Terrorism, October 6, 2005. http://www.ict.org.il/.

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50 "Newspaper stands by Iranian oil-threat story," Yahoo News, October 2, 2005. http://news.yahoo.com. 51 Ephraim Kam, "Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat: The Military Option," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Strategic Assessment, Vol. 7, No. 3 (December, 2004). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/.

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