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THE IMPACT of the IRAQ WAR on ISRAEL's NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTION by Jonathan Spyer*

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THE IMPACT of the IRAQ WAR on ISRAEL's NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTION by Jonathan Spyer* THE IMPACT OF THE IRAQ WAR ON ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTION By Jonathan Spyer* Abstract: This article deals with the effects and implications of the Iraq War, and the current situation of insurgency in that country, on Israel's perception of its national security. Specifically, it examines the extent to which the war has impacted on and transformed the three tiers of threat facing Israel--namely the irregular, conventional and non-conventional levels of warfare. The article outlines the nature of each of these three levels of threat, observing the impact of the Iraq War on it. It then moves toward some general conclusions on the Iraq War of 2003 and the events that have followed it as viewed through the perception of Israeli thinking on the region. In each area, this article observes the responses emerging from the Israeli strategic and policymaking echelon to the new situation opened up by the war of 2003. In this regard, it considers Israel's current unilateralist turn in the context of the broader view of current political trends in the region which prevails in the Israeli policymaking echelon. Israel is a country unique among members same dispensation, the same regimes, the of the modern states' system in that the same prevailing ideas, often even the same basic legitimacy of its existence as a individuals (or their sons) dominate the sovereign body is rejected by its neighbors. region as did so in the late 1970s. The dominant political currents of the The region remains stymied by Middle Eastern region place the perception economic stagnation, and the failure of the of Israel as a foreign, illegitimate implant in regimes to develop the potential of the the Middle East somewhere near the center populations under their control. Middle of their view of the world.1 The struggle Eastern economies are in poor shape: against Israel, of course, takes many forms, growth is slow, corruption rampant. not all of them military, but all of them with Economic stagnation is matched by high significance to Israel's strategic perceptions. population growth and educational failure. In order to grasp Israel's national security The societies of the Middle East are largely stance, it is crucial that this basic existential closed systems.3 The ideas of nationalism predicament of the country be kept in mind. and politicized religion remain dominant, In this regard, it is also important to bear with liberal reform movements very weak. in mind the unique nature of the Middle For these unelected regimes, legitimacy is a East state system as a whole and the central issue. In the key ideological systems security environment in which Israel of Arab nationalism and Islamism, rejection operates. The Middle East is the most of the right of Israel to existence is an heavily armed region of the world.2 It is an important factor.4 The use of slogans and area which has proved until now propaganda against Israel is thus a remarkably impervious to the waves of widespread phenomenon. Developmental political change which have swept the failure, however, limits the ability to pursue world in the last decade and a half. The aggressively anti-Israel strategies. 34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) The Impact of the Iraq War on Israel's National Security Conception The rest of the article will observe in Israel has since 2000 been involved in a low detail the specific security challenges which intensity conflict with Palestinian irregular Israel faces and its responses. formations in the West Bank and Gaza areas, and to a lesser extent within Israel ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY proper. There is evidence both of CONCEPTION: THE BACKGROUND involvement by non-Palestinian groups There does not exist in the public (Hizballah) and of state support (Syria, Iran domain a definitive statement of Israel's and Saddam's Iraq) for Palestinian national security doctrine. There are a paramilitary groups. An emerging number of explanations for this: firstly, additional threat is that constituted by the considerations and traditions of secrecy in a organizations of the global jihad. country still in a situation of conflict prevent the open discussion of key matters The Israeli-Palestinian Situation: conflict by individuals involved in policymaking in management, not conflict resolution this area. Secondly, long-term strategic Israeli strategists are unconvinced of the thought and consideration have not current feasibility of conflict resolution in traditionally been the main concern of terms of reaching a final status accord to Israel's defense establishment, which has an end the pivotal conflict with the inbuilt respect for matters of immediate and Palestinians.7 Given the essential tangible relevance. This has traditionally incompatibility remaining in important gone hand in hand with a mistrust of elements of the Israeli and even the "intellectualism."5 moderate Palestinian conception of how a These elements notwithstanding, there final status agreement would look-- exists a large body of academic literature particularly on such matters as the demand attempting to isolate key conceptions for return of Palestinian refugees and their underlying Israeli thinking regarding the descendants, or future arrangements in challenges facing the country in the field of Jerusalem--it is considered that some form defense policy. In addition, statements and of "conflict management" is likely to written work by policymakers and remain a necessity for the foreseeable strategists past and present enable the future. This notion of conflict management tracing of clear trends and perceptions in currently stands at the center of Israel's Israeli thinking in this area.6 strategic perceptions. 8 Israel faces strategic challenges and Israel has developed a number of threats on three basic levels. These three measures for the implementation of conflict levels cannot be seen as hermetically sealed management. The Disengagement Plan from one another. from the Gaza Strip and part of the northern West Bank was an example of a measure THREAT #1: IRREGULAR, deriving from the strategy of conflict GUERRILLA, AND TERRORIST management. The Disengagement Plan was OPERATIONS above all an attempt to regain the initiative, Since 1973, this threat has accounted to prevent a static situation in the conflict, almost exclusively for actual loss of Israeli which would not be considered to be to life deriving from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel's advantage for a number of reasons-- Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 35 Jonathan Spyer centrally, because of the ongoing attempts should be borne in mind that hardly any to delegitimize Israel internationally, and successful infiltrations from Gaza took because of the worrisome demographic place throughout the four years of conflict challenge to Israel's desire to remain both a since September 2000.13 The Strip is Jewish and a democratic state.9 surrounded by a fence which has proved a Israeli policymakers sought to very effective measure in frustrating the demonstrate to the Palestinians that ability of Gaza-based paramilitaries from violence will not bring them the ability to reaching into Israel to attack Jewish dictate terms to Israel. Nor will they be communities. permitted to benefit from a general descent The trial of strength which emerged into chaos leading eventually to a situation between Israeli security forces and the of inter-communal violence throughout the Hamas organization in the weeks following area of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza (the the implementation of Disengagement was scenario advocated by Palestinian thus not unexpected. In this period, Israel supporters of the so-called "one state sought to demonstrate to the Palestinian solution.")10 Rather, Disengagement was organizations that in the post- intended to allow Israel to use its military Disengagement context, Israel would superiority to dictate an arrangement on the respond to attacks by inflicting a response ground to its own liking. so harsh that it would make the launching The Disengagement Plan--which was of attacks not worthwhile.14 At the moment, implemented between August 15 and it is too early to say if Israel has succeeded September 12 --developed in such a way as to any degree in achieving this desired to lead to the de facto drawing in of Egypt deterrence vis-a-vis paramilitary into the process, in addition, of course, to organizations in the Strip. The achievement the extensive involvement of the United of such a balance, in the absence of a States.11 The full ramifications of the meaningful political process of any kind, withdrawal, however, still remain open to will constitute a decisive factor in question. In the first place, as events in the determining the success or failure of the short period since the implementation have Disengagement.15 The round of Qassam already amply demonstrated, the absence of attacks by Hamas in the days following the an Israeli security presence in Gaza may Disengagement, and the unilateral decision result in increased Palestinian attacks, using by the movement to return to ceasefire after mortars and rockets developed in a Gaza a determined Israeli response indicates that Strip now empty of Israelis, or smuggled in a certain level of deterrence has been through the southern border of the Strip. achieved. The Hamas leadership have sought to In the wake of the Disengagement, a interpret Disengagement as constituting a debate within policymaking circles may be victory for the tactics of violence adopted discerned regarding the likelihood and since 2000.12 According to this advisability of further unilateral moves. interpretation, while a decade of Palestinian Recent comments by key strategists, involvement in negotiation failed to bring including Military Intelligence commander about the dismantling of a single settlement, Aharon Ze'evi and IDF Planning the tactics of violence have forced Israel to Directorate Head Udi Dekel indicate that undertake a strategic retreat.
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