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Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy

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Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy ADELPHI PAPER NO. 53 Y. Karkabi is a retired senior officer of the Israel Defence Forces who now teaches at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He has been directly concerned with the Arab-Israel conflict, in the capacity of Chief of Military Intelligence from 1955 to 1959; this is now his field ofacademic research. In 1968 he was a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Strategic Studies for four months. This paper was completed in the autumn of 1968. CONTENTS Additional copies of this paper may be ordered from the Institute at the cost of 5s (75c) each, post free. r. Introduction page I 2. Preparing for War 2 3. Fatah's Doctrine 6 4. Debate and Action 17 5. Fedayeenafter the Six-day War 25 6. Guerrilla Warfare and the Nc\v Arab Strategy 3' 7. Living with the Conflict 33 Notes 38 Preferences .. 42 . Note: The numbers in the text refer to the notes to be found on p. 38 and following. They are grouped within chapters. All references to The Institute for Strategic Studies is a non-governmental research centre Arab sources are to be found under references on p. 43, again concerned with the study ofthe problems of war, conjlict and arms control grouped within chapters. on an international basis. The purpose ofthe Adclphi Paper scries is togive hospitality to a wide range of analytical work; the papers which form the series are not intended to express the views or the policyof the Institute itself which is not the advocate of any nationalposition or anyparticular school of thought. Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy 1. Introduction theories and arguments expounded by Arabs in their politicalliterature. In the West,Arab leaders The object of this paper is to examine Arab are frequentlysuspected of beingcarried away by Fedayeen* guerrilla warfare against Israel, its exuberance. Arab internal publications, being guiding concepts, its role within Arab strategy products of long deliberation, are freer from againstIsrael, and its prospects. For the sake of such suspicion. The opinions they present are simplicity, the discussion will concentrate on the more considered. In essence they do not differ Fatah as the main Fedayeenorganization, though from the leaders' position: they explain, elaborate it should be stressed that the Fatah is only one and supplement the leaders' announcements. organization among many.1 However, the dif They can in fact serve as a fairly trustworthy ference in their basic approaches has not been so guideto the thinking of Arabs on their position in marked that the use of Fatah as a generic term to the conflict. From a methodological viewpoint, include them all distorts the general account. the use of this literature as the main research Fatahfirst developed its ideas as a reaction to a material has the merit that it may reveal how the policy advocated by President Nasser, namely, Arabs themselves sec their problems, how they that, though war against Israel was inevitable, discuss and analyse their difficulties, and especi the Arabs should first prepare themselves ally how they grapple with their dilemmas. thoroughly, and should not precipitate a war The Arabs have published copious material on prematurely. This policy was endorsed at the the Arab-Israel conflict.* This literature deals at Arab Summit Meeting in 1964-65, and became great length with the Arabs' basic position, the the official position of most Arab governments. justification of theircase, andwhy, asa matter of Thus, in order to be understood, Fatah ideas must principle, they cannot agree to the existence of be seen in the context of the Arabs' general think Israel. Much less space has been allotted to the ing on their programme of action against Israel. problem of how to achieve their objective in the Public opinion outside the Arab countries conflict, or to their programme of action. This is tends to acquire its knowledge of Arab attitudes not unusual, for political movements tend to and policies from the declarations of Arab concentrate more on criticism of the situation leaders. However, these declarations are only the they aspire to remedy, and on the elaboration of tip of an iceberg, or an abridged expression of their goal, than on spelling out how it will be reached. Such imbalances can be found, for * Fedayeen is the name in common use in Arabic for Arab instance, in Socialism or Zionism. Marx dealt irregulars acting against Israel. This word comes from the more with criticism of Capitalism than with how root 'sacrifice', i.e. those who sacrifice themselves or as it would be superseded by Socialism. The main sume a suicidal mission. Historically, this name was given current in Zionist programmatic thinking con in the twelfth century to those selected to assassinate the centrated more on how to develop assets which enemies of the Isma'ilisect (the Assassins). In the context of the Arab-Israel conflict the name Fedayeen became famous in 1955 when the Egyptian authorities organized * There are about seven hundred books in Arabic dealing and dispatched into Israel 'irregulars' on subversive with the different aspects of the Arab position in this missions. conflict. would help to achieve Jewish statehood than on more, educational projects have to be launched in Preserving the Palestinian Entity ward mentality, egoism, narrow and conflicting how the state would be brought into being. all Arab countries with the purposeof inculcating To keep the conflict ablaze necessitates the exis interests, improvisations, lack of a scientific Discussion by Arabs of the programmatic in all Arabs the conviction that the issue is tence of a Palestinian Arab people for whom the approach, (it is interesting to note that after the aspects of their policy towards Israel developed central to their lives, and decisive for their private 'complete restoration of the lost homeland' will 1967 debacle a similar analysis of defeat as due late, mostly in the 1960s. But they are detailed and nationalaspirations, so that theywill be pre be achieved (Preamble to Covenant ofthe PLO). to basic flaws in Arab society was aired by the enough to enable us to analyse and portray the pared to concentrate all their efforts on the The Arab League meeting of 30 August i960 literati, while the official tendency was to impute Arabs' thinking on their policy. The Arabs struggle against Israel. decided 'all Arab states should preserve the it to technical mishaps and to focus responsibility realized that preparations for the showdown with Palestinian entity and avoid whatever might on the military command.) The Arab-Israel con Israel must embrace a wide spectrum ofactivities, bring its assimilation'. Article 5 in the Covenant flict is described not merely as a political con political, educational and military. of the PLO goes further and defines the Pales frontation between states, its results on the mili tinian personality as 'a permanent and genuine tary and political levels are predicated on relative Educationfor hostility characteristic that does not disappear. It is trans strengths and weaknesses in the social structure; The theme that the Palestinian problem is of the ferred from father to son.' Thus, by definition, it is a 'clash between civilizations'.8 gravest consequence for the future ofall Arabs is the Palestinian personality is perpetuated, and the President Nasser explained: 'Backwardness is constantly stressed in Arab political publica activities of organizing the Palestinian Arabs, in the only thing that guarantees Israel remaining on 2. Preparing for War tions. Ncver'before have the Arabs been so starkly order to preserve them as an entity, are described our land for ever. The danger from Israel will exposed to danger.1 Article 13 of the Covenant of as giving only an outer expression to an inner weaken even before the decisive military battle is Keeping the Issue Alive the Palestinian Liberation Organization specifies reality. fought if the Arab Nation can succeed in extricat Arabs used to express their apprehension that the (official translation): 'The destiny of the Arab It is true that the activities concerning the ing itself from the backwardness that Imperialism stagnation that afflicted the Palestinian problem Nation and even the essence ofArab existence are Palestinian entity were part of inter-Arab rival has imposed on it and which now the reactionaries for years would eventually cause its erosion. firmly tied to the destiny of the Palestine ques ries." Nevertheless, the organization of the endeavour to maintain' (22 May 1965). Israel would be allowed to become established, tion'. King Hussein in a speech from the throne Palestinians, even if instigated by some Arab All-embracing reforms are mandatory, no: the outside world would get used to the status quo on 1 December 1962, said: 'Without Palestine, states for reasons outside the Arab-Israel con only political but also cultural and social. Miss and the Palestinian Arabs, despairing of ever Arabs cannot possess real freedom and genuine flict, has its own raisond'etre. Its importance has Leila Kadi concludes her book: 'The Arabs will returning, would resign themselves to their fate, unity or even a good life.' In other words, the grown in recent years since the conflict has come recover Palestine only in so far as they deserve it. and would gradually incorporate themselves into existence of Israel does not allow the Arabs to to be described in some Arab quarters as embody and they will never deserve it unless they clean up the Arab countries. To counteract these trends achieve any of their other national objectives. ing a 'War of National Liberation'. their own house first.' Arabs should preserve the 'vitality' of the Pales It ought to be impressed upon all Arabs that To preserve the Palestinian entity was not con Mr liasanein iieikal referred in an article to tinian problem as an unresolved issue inexorably Palestine is the central issue in Arab nationalism.
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