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Fedayeen -- “Men of Sacrifice”

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Fedayeen -- “Men of Sacrifice” APPROVED FOR RELEASE ‘ DATE: MAY 2007 DIRECTORATE OF I INTELLIGENCE I FEDAYEEN -- “MEN OF SACRIFICE” Reference Title -- ESAU XLV6IH -. I- - .. ._.. - __ 1 - i ,I I No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem ~ WARNING contain3 c1assific.d ii~tormationaff wtmg the States \vithin thc nicaning of tlw cspionagr 793. 794. and T9S. / ROUP 1 ATIC I FEDAYEEN -- "MEN OF SACRIFICE" I PREFACE I This essay addresses itself especially to the ~ outlook for unity among the various fedayeen groups I and to their individual relationships with Arab, Soviet, and Chinese support. The essay concludes that effec- tive or lasting unity among the fedayeen -- whether subversive, military, or political -- faces a myriad oi divisive forces, but that as individual groups or in ~ temporary alliances the fedayeen will nonetheless con-, tinue to represent a seriously disruptive element in Middle East politics. I I Constructive comment on this essay has been I received from the Officejof National Estimates, The ~ Office of Current Intelligence, and The Clandestine Service. In view, however, of the complexities of the fedayeen question, the quickly-changing scene, and the uneven quality of available intelligence, the judgment of this initial study of the subject should be conside provisional. Any comments on its data or judgments should be addressed to the essay's author, Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, and to this Staff. ,~ Similarly, a companion SRS Annex is being pub- i lished separately, discussing the many fedayeen organizations in some detail: their origins, ideologi a1 leanings, strategy and tactics, organization and fundi g, and their ties to Arab sources of support. 4l This present essay -- and the Annex -- contain , information available through 1 November 1970. I Hal Ford I Chief, DD/I Special Research staff^ FEDAYEEN -- "MEN OF SACRIFICE" Con tents -Page SUMMARY. .................... .ii I. THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT The Origins of the Fedayeen. .......1 Fatah Strength and PLO Respectability. - 3 Fedayeen Groups Multiply.. ........7 Artificial Fedayeen Creations. ......9 Fedayeen Tactics -- The Use of International Terror ..........11 Arab Aid to the Fedayeen ........ .15 The Fedayeen Threat to Jordan and Lebanon. ............... -18 11. THE QUESTTON OF FEDAYEEN UNITY The Fatah/PLO Merger ........... -20 Creation of Palestine Armed Struggle Command ........... .21 The Challenge of the Unified Fedayeen Command ........... .22 Compromise -- the PLO Central Committee. ...............24 111. COMMUNIST DEALINGS WITH THE FEDAYEEN Soviet Policy Toward the Fedayeen From FIOstility to Tolerance. ......29 Shift to Stronger Pro-Fedayeen Line. .32 Practical Effects of Propaganda Shift. 34 Relations in Flux. .......... -36 Al-Ansar (The Partisan Forces) , Support of Arab Communists for Fedayeen ............... .38 Establishment of Partisan Forces . ,40 Chinese Policy Toward the Fedayeen ...-42 SUMMARY Of the many explosive Middle East has heightened the romantic cause of tion" and the prestige of its protagonists, the fedayden. The subsequent political potency of the fedayeen move ment, despite its unimpressive military capabilities performance, is thus based largely on the emotionalis of the Palestine issue among Arab populations, the faqt that such anti-Israeli sentiment is about the only unqfy- ing force in the Arab world, and the resulting reluctqnce of Arab regimes to move against this force. I I Accordingly, since the 1967 war the PaPestiniad Arab resistance movement has risen from the status of (an unimportant and somewhat pathetic movement, totally subservient to a few Arab states, to become a largely1 independent, if heterogenous, force capable of signi- 1 ficantly affecting Middle East politics. The fedayee movement has won treatment as a near-equal by many Ar b states and has compelled the rest of the world to tak its grievances and claims seriously. Fedayeen prospe ts will to some degree depend on the extent to which thl emotional backing persists in a war-weary Arab world nd continues to be manipulated successfully by Yasir Ara at, chief of:Fatah, the most significant group, and by ot er, lesser fedayeen leaders. Nonetheless, individual I This paper relies primarily on cl particularly for the internal struct the various fedayeen organizations. 1 1 The repor political aspecrs 01: Gnu subject SUC of the fedayeen groups, their intern ideological and tactical views. How is more scanty on such important mat armed men in each group, the sources and mechanics of funding, and details of the sources and methods of delivery of arms shipments to the fedayeen. I I I I attempts to impose its will on its smaller competitors. To a considerable extent what prospects exist for SUCC~SS are linked to Arafat’s talents, and his fall or demise would be a serious blow indeed to Fatah. But in any case, the Palestine resistance movement is simply diviied on so many scores -- differing compositions, ideologies, personal ambitions, strategic views, tactics, ties wit1 this and that element within this and that Arab state, stands vis-a-vis Communist revolutionary aims, and iii I advance their own interests. But such promises have generally exceeded actual contributions for a number of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, the inability of these states to control the fedayeen has made them reluctant to donate generously. Financing the Pales- tinian resistance is not of immediate practical advantage to many of them, particularly those more remote geographically and less involved politically. The various fedayeen groups have also looked to1 the Communist world for both material support and political recognition, each generally seeking to enhan its own stature at the expense of its competitors, alb within a general desire for international support of the broad fedayeen cause. Since 1969 the Soviet Union1 has become more receptive than previously to dealing I with the fedayeen, both because the Sedayeen have I become a stronger and more important element in the Middle East, and because the Soviets are anxious to I prevent the Chinese from gaining influence. The OSSR ~ is hindered in its ability fully to embrace the Palestinian cause, however, by the practical considera ' tion that the fedayeen groups are not amenable to I Soviet control. The USSR is also hindered by its recognition of Israel's right to exist, and its sup- port for the 1967 UN resolution. and by MOSCOW~S commitment to the interests of the UAR, which are themselves often in conflict with those of the fedayeen. As of the autumn of 1970, relations between the ~ Soviets and the fedayeen are not so close as might be expected, in spite of Soviet promises of material supp rt and propaganda concessiod-- including some vague Sovi t movement toward acceptance of the Palestinian Arab rigi t to establish a national state on some unspecified port on of Palestinian territory, The fedayeen are particularlyi displeased at present by the degree to which the USSR seems still interested in exploring a general negotiat d settlement, and by the failure of the Soviets to follo through on private indications that they,would supply 41 materiallaid directly to the fedayeen. While several Palestinian groups have for two years purchased Soviet-, made arms from East European .countries and received the from Arab army stocks, they are anxious for the increa ed supplies and recognition which direct, publicly-acknow edged deals with the USSR would entail. The Soviets, for th ir part, want to increase their influence with the fedaye n but are reluctant to be tied too closely to them. Mos ow's attitude will probably retain this ambivalence, the So iets trying to maintain good relations with these groups si h- out committing themselves to positions incompatible wi h broader Soviet interests. The Chinese have not been fettered by such 1 barriers, cesponsibilities, and conflicting commitment$ and have thus been much freer to embrace the Palestini n cause. This suppokt has been unlimited only in the realm of propaganda, Chinese material aid being large1 confined to providing training assistance and limited 1~ quantities of small arms. Peking's main interest is id doing *hat it can, through encouragement of the fedayeqn, to help maintain enough tension in the area to embarraqs the Soviets and undercut them in the Third World, and o prevent a settlement and a U,S.-Soviet Middle East agr e- ment. The scope of increased Chinese support is like1 to remain limited, but the Chinese will doubtless cont nue to get a lot for their money, in the way of presence a d disruption. For their part, the fedayeen appreciate the brasI moral support given them by the Chinese, and some -- p ticularly Arafat:-- have sought to play the Soviets of against the Chinese. Most fedayeen leaders recognize, however, that in the long run the attitude of the Sovi Union is much more important to them than that of Chin For unlike China, the Soviet Union is a super power wh military forces are directly at hand, and the USSR wil inevitably be involved in any negotiations affecting t future of the area. I I I I I I. THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT I The Origins of the Fedayeen I The fedayeen -- literally, men of sacrifice -- Arabs to their homeland. They represent many different political philosophies, strategies, and tactics. Some war, the fedayeen have emerged since then as a markedly instable element in a particularly explosive part of the world. Their success has been primarily political, a 1 result of their psychological impact in the Arab world. 1 The fedayeen receive some degree of support from ~ every Arab state, since anti-Israel sentiment provides one of the few unifying issues in the divided Arab worl This sentiment is magnified by the plight of the 700,OO Palestinians* who were displaced by the 1948 Arab-Israe war and resettled in improverished UN refugee camps, mostly in Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. Their 1 fellow Arabs have made little effort over the years to absorb the refugees, but have preferred to use them ~ instead to dramatize Israel's "illegitimacy" and "inhu- mani t y .'' The dispersal of the Palestinians was reflected qn the initial fragmentation of their leadership and the weakness of their organizations.
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