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Home , Arab Liberation Front, Fedayeen, Palestinian fedayeen

APPROVED FOR RELEASE ‘ DATE: MAY 2007

DIRECTORATE OF I INTELLIGENCE I

FEDAYEEN -- “MEN OF SACRIFICE”

Reference Title -- ESAU XLV6IH

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No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem ~

WARNING contain3 c1assific.d ii~tormationaff wtmg the States \vithin thc nicaning of tlw cspionagr 793. 794. and T9S. /

ROUP 1 ATIC I -- "MEN OF SACRIFICE" I

PREFACE I

This essay addresses itself especially to the ~ outlook for unity among the various fedayeen groups I and to their individual relationships with Arab, Soviet, and Chinese support. The essay concludes that effec- tive or lasting unity among the fedayeen -- whether subversive, military, or political -- faces a myriad oi divisive forces, but that as individual groups or in ~ temporary alliances the fedayeen will nonetheless con-, tinue to represent a seriously disruptive element in Middle East politics. I I Constructive comment on this essay has been I received from the Officejof National Estimates, The ~ Office of Current Intelligence, and The Clandestine Service. In view, however, of the complexities of the fedayeen question, the quickly-changing scene, and the uneven quality of available intelligence, the judgment of this initial study of the subject should be conside provisional. Any comments on its data or judgments should be addressed to the essay's author, Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, and to this Staff. ,~ Similarly, a companion SRS Annex is being pub- i lished separately, discussing the many fedayeen organizations in some detail: their origins, ideologi a1 leanings, strategy and tactics, organization and fundi g, and their ties to Arab sources of support. 4l This present essay -- and the Annex -- contain , information available through 1 November 1970. I

Hal Ford I Chief, DD/I Special Research staff^ FEDAYEEN -- "MEN OF SACRIFICE"

Con tents

-Page SUMMARY...... ii I. THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT The Origins of the Fedayeen...... 1 Strength and PLO Respectability. - 3 Fedayeen Groups Multiply...... 7 Artificial Fedayeen Creations...... 9 Fedayeen Tactics -- The Use of International Terror ...... 11 Arab Aid to the Fedayeen ...... 15 The Fedayeen Threat to and ...... -18

11. THE QUESTTON OF FEDAYEEN UNITY

The Fatah/PLO Merger ...... -20 Creation of Armed Struggle Command ...... 21 The Challenge of the Unified Fedayeen Command ...... 22 Compromise -- the PLO Central Committee...... 24

111. COMMUNIST DEALINGS WITH THE FEDAYEEN

Soviet Policy Toward the Fedayeen From FIOstility to Tolerance...... 29 Shift to Stronger Pro-Fedayeen Line. . .32 Practical Effects of Propaganda Shift. . 34 Relations in Flux...... -36 Al-Ansar (The Partisan Forces) , Support of Arab Communists for Fedayeen ...... 38 Establishment of Partisan Forces . . ,40 Chinese Policy Toward the Fedayeen ...-42

SUMMARY

Of the many explosive Middle East

has heightened the romantic cause of tion" and the prestige of its protagonists, the fedayden. The subsequent political potency of the fedayeen move ment, despite its unimpressive military capabilities performance, is thus based largely on the emotionalis of the Palestine issue among Arab populations, the faqt that such anti-Israeli sentiment is about the only unqfy- ing force in the , and the resulting reluctqnce of Arab regimes to move against this force. I I Accordingly, since the 1967 war the PaPestiniad Arab has risen from the status of (an unimportant and somewhat pathetic movement, totally subservient to a few Arab states, to become a largely1 independent, if heterogenous, force capable of signi- 1 ficantly affecting Middle East politics. The fedayee movement has won treatment as a near-equal by many Ar b states and has compelled the rest of the world to tak its grievances and claims seriously. Fedayeen prospe ts will to some degree depend on the extent to which thl emotional backing persists in a war-weary Arab world nd continues to be manipulated successfully by Yasir Ara at, chief of:Fatah, the most significant group, and by ot er, lesser fedayeen leaders. Nonetheless, individual I This paper relies primarily on cl particularly for the internal struct the various fedayeen organizations. 1 1 The repor political aspecrs 01: Gnu subject SUC of the fedayeen groups, their intern ideological and tactical views. How is more scanty on such important mat armed men in each group, the sources and mechanics of funding, and details of the sources and methods of delivery of arms shipments to the fedayeen. I I

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attempts to impose its will on its smaller competitors. To a considerable extent what prospects exist for SUCC~SS are linked to Arafat’s talents, and his fall or demise would be a serious blow indeed to Fatah. But in any case, the Palestine resistance movement is simply diviied on so many scores -- differing compositions, ideologies, personal ambitions, strategic views, tactics, ties wit1 this and that element within this and that Arab state, stands vis-a-vis Communist revolutionary aims, and

iii I advance their own interests. But such promises have generally exceeded actual contributions for a number of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, the inability of these states to control the fedayeen has made them reluctant to donate generously. Financing the Pales- tinian resistance is not of immediate practical advantage to many of them, particularly those more remote geographically and less involved politically. The various fedayeen groups have also looked to1 the Communist world for both material support and political recognition, each generally seeking to enhan its own stature at the expense of its competitors, alb within a general desire for international support of the broad fedayeen cause. Since 1969 the Soviet Union1 has become more receptive than previously to dealing I with the fedayeen, both because the Sedayeen have I become a stronger and more important element in the Middle East, and because the Soviets are anxious to I

prevent the Chinese from gaining influence. The OSSR ~ is hindered in its ability fully to embrace the Palestinian cause, however, by the practical considera ' tion that the fedayeen groups are not amenable to I Soviet control. The USSR is also hindered by its recognition of 's right to exist, and its sup- port for the 1967 UN resolution. and by MOSCOW~S commitment to the interests of the UAR, which are themselves often in conflict with those of the fedayeen.

As of the autumn of 1970, relations between the ~ Soviets and the fedayeen are not so close as might be expected, in spite of Soviet promises of material supp rt and propaganda concessiod-- including some vague Sovi t movement toward acceptance of the Palestinian Arab rigi t to establish a national state on some unspecified port on of Palestinian territory, The fedayeen are particularlyi displeased at present by the degree to which the USSR seems still interested in exploring a general negotiat d settlement, and by the failure of the Soviets to follo through on private indications that they,would supply 41 materiallaid directly to the fedayeen. While several Palestinian groups have for two years purchased Soviet-, made arms from East European .countries and received the from Arab army stocks, they are anxious for the increa ed supplies and recognition which direct, publicly-acknow edged deals with the USSR would entail. The Soviets, for th ir part, want to increase their influence with the fedaye n but are reluctant to be tied too closely to them. Mos ow's attitude will probably retain this ambivalence, the So iets trying to maintain good relations with these groups si h- out committing themselves to positions incompatible wi h broader Soviet interests. The Chinese have not been fettered by such 1 barriers, cesponsibilities, and conflicting commitment$ and have thus been much freer to embrace the Palestini n cause. This suppokt has been unlimited only in the realm of propaganda, Chinese material aid being large1 confined to providing training assistance and limited 1~ quantities of small arms. Peking's main interest is id doing *hat it can, through encouragement of the fedayeqn, to help maintain enough tension in the area to embarraqs the Soviets and undercut them in the Third World, and o prevent a settlement and a U,S.-Soviet Middle East agr e- ment. The scope of increased Chinese support is like1 to remain limited, but the Chinese will doubtless cont nue to get a lot for their money, in the way of presence a d disruption. For their part, the fedayeen appreciate the brasI moral support given them by the Chinese, and some -- p ticularly Arafat:-- have sought to play the Soviets of against the Chinese. Most fedayeen leaders recognize, however, that in the long run the attitude of the Sovi Union is much more important to them than that of Chin For unlike , the is a super power wh military forces are directly at hand, and the USSR wil inevitably be involved in any negotiations affecting t future of the area. I

I I I I I. THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT

I The Origins of the Fedayeen I

The fedayeen -- literally, men of sacrifice -- Arabs to their homeland. They represent many different political philosophies, strategies, and tactics. Some

war, the fedayeen have emerged since then as a markedly instable element in a particularly explosive part of the world. Their success has been primarily political, a 1 result of their psychological impact in the Arab world. 1

The fedayeen receive some degree of support from ~ every Arab state, since anti-Israel sentiment provides one of the few unifying issues in the divided Arab worl This sentiment is magnified by the plight of the 700,OO * who were displaced by the 1948 Arab-Israe war and resettled in improverished UN refugee camps, mostly in Jordan, the , and Lebanon. Their 1 fellow Arabs have made little effort over the years to absorb the refugees, but have preferred to use them ~ instead to dramatize Israel's "illegitimacy" and "inhu- mani t y .'' The dispersal of the Palestinians was reflected qn the initial fragmentation of their leadership and the weakness of their organizations. Before the June 1967 ar, their two main political organizations were the Arab W Nationalist Movement (AM) and the Palestine Libaion ~ Organization (PLO). TEANM was founded bv Palestinian I

*This figure has since grown to almost one and a half million now registered with the UN Relief and Works Agenc y. i ISRAEL Adjacent Occupied Territories Occupied Territory L UNRWA camp, May 1967 I NEWrelugellencum camp . Isrsdl settlement. March 1970 AddIHWWlrmrp. In L&nonand SMa *" nry rhcnw.

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-M 7-70 TOP NCRET11 intellectuals in the late 19AOs, dedicated to a pan-Arab1 philosophy aiming at liquidation of the state of 1srael.l It established branches throughout the Middle East, each1 of which adapted to local conditions and became essentiaTly non-Palestinian local parties. The international ANM itself never achieved any real degree of cohesion or pow r and by the late 1960's had ceased to function. The PLO, on the other hand, was officially established by the 196 Summit Conference of the Arab states and for the next five years was largely a UAR puppet, operating rather ineffectually behind a facade of militancy. The only 1 actively militant group of any consequence in the immedizhteI pre-1967 war was Fatah, which depended at the time pri- I marily on Syrian favors for its existence.* ' I I The 1967 war gave the fedayeen the impetus they hgd lacked. The thousands of Palestinians who now fled from1 the West to the East Bank of the Jordan provided a fertije source of both new recruits and logistic support, The fact that , Jordan, and the UAFt had now also lost territory to Israel resulted in increased world-wide diplomatic support for a change in the Middle East statu quo and a rectification of existing boundaries. In addi4 tion, the Arab states had lost face once more as a resull of their humiliating defeat, and the Arab world was in 1 search of an heroic image to bolster its damaged pride. 1

Fatah Strength --and PLO Respectability Yasir Arafat, who rose to prominance after the wa as the chief spokesman for Fatah, was quick to see and s ize the opportunity. As the only group which has conducted commando operations into Israel with even a minor degreeI of success,** Fatah was in a position to capitalize on t

*A number of small groups did ineffectually, during the 1950's, some with Egyptian **Fatah commandos, operating from bases in Syria, filtrated first into Jordan; then teams of' four or had crossed the border into Israel where they conducted small-scale ambushes and bombings.

I - 3- I Arab yearning for military action and victories. The organization stepped up its raids into occupied territory, and when Israel retaliated with large-mate attacks 1 across the border, Fatah reaped the benefits of increa$ed prestige and more recruits. Although Fatah is a militqry organization, it appears to have a large number of " , I

"civilian" members who assist in its fund-collecting, ~ propaganda, logistic support, and so forth. Thus it 1 has made good use of its sympathizers in the Palestinian community. I

Fatah itself had been founded primarily by con-I servative Palestinians, including some members of the i ,* and had always received some finaq- cia1 support from wealthy Palestinians throughout the I Arab world, yet it relied at first primarily on SyPia I for material aid, as only the radically militant Syria were willing before the 1967 war to back guerrilla ope tions.** After the war, Arafat asked for and received additional financial aid from other Arab states, parti larly the conservative, oil-rich kingdoms of Saudi Ara and , but also the more radical , , a to a lesser extent the UAR. All of these states were anxious to capitalize on Fatah's incraasing prestige a hoped in the process to gain control of the organizati

*The Muslim Brotherhood is an organization dedicateq to unity based on Islam. Ideologically, it has always been highly conservative,if not reactionary, and furni hed much of the initial opposition, for example, to the ne Egyptian revolutionary regime in the 1950s. The Brothi r- ho6d has accordingly received financial support from t e conservative Arab world (especially and Kuwait). **The Syrians had also put Fatah in contact with Chi a, , and North ; some small arms and training assistance was accordingly provided by the Chinese befqre the war. jI I The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is most traditional of the Palestinian volitical/military grouDs. Completely the creature of the UAR, formally established by the Arab Summit Conference of 1964. This gave it a stamp of legitimacy and oolitica respectability not achieved by any of the The units of its military Army (w),have served as the armies of Syria, Iraq. militant before the June 1967 war, the PLO had done 1 nothing to fight Israel actively except to create its c+wn guerrilla wing -- the Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF].- When PLA units disintegrated during the war, PLO prestige sank. The organization tried to vu11 itself together during 1968, but it was divided into factions and no 1 effective leadership emerged. The guerrilla wing was I1 still not operating effectively and even the PLO's mentor. the UAR's Nasir, began to look increasingly to1 Fatah as the real Palestinian power. I

In February 1969 the PLO, anxious to survive, came to terms with Fatah, which was eager to acquire political legitimacy. Fatah essen- tially took control of the PLO's political apparatus.* Since then, as spokesman for both the most

Yair Arafat Chairman PLO Centra Committee and Fatah1I - *Fatah has had more trouble, however, in its attemp dominate the PLA. This military organization has clun stubbornly to its autonomy and receives support not on from the Fatah-controlled PLO but from the countries i whose armies PLA units serve.

-5- I powerful fedayeen group (Fatah)* and the only respectable Organization (PLO), Arafat has the foremost Palestinian leader and is Arab world as the virtual equivalent of a chief of stlate. His leadership of Fatah has not been unchallenged, h ever, and be will presumably continue to be pressed, particularly by left-wing elements in that

The PLO/Fatah organization is on porting establishment of a secular, democratic Pales inian state in which all -- , Moslems, Christians -- w 11 participate equally. Fatah statements have also pro ised that anyone currently living in Palestine as well asI those exiled from it will be entitled to Palestinian 1 citizenship, thus rejecting the contentions of some fedayeen that only those there before either the 1944 war or the influx of Jewish immigrants beginning in 1918 would be acceptable.** Arafat has said that prd-

*Fatah had an-estfmated 7,000 armed commandos in the fall of.1970, plus many thousands of supporters and t:rainees upon whom it could draw. The PLF, which employs similar tactics and often cooperates with Fatah, had an estimated 1,000, **In conflict with this public position, however, was the private consensus arrived at by the, September 1969 Palestine National Council (the legislative body for the PLO): the figure for a Jewish population must be basled on the 1948 Jewish populakion of Palestine.

-6- I Fedayeen Groups Multiply

After 1967, other Palestinian groups quickly jum ed on the bandwagon, and there was a mushrooming of lesser fedayeen groups reflecting a wide spectrum of political beliefs and military strategies. All the groups (with P the exception of the Communist Partisan Forces) agree o the basic goal: liquidation of Israel as a Jewish stat," and establishment of a new state in Palestine. They alho agree on the need to oppose any sell-out peace proposal1 which does not satisfy their demands for the"liberation1' of Palestine. They differ, however, on the not-so-minoS matters of how liberation should be achieved, what otheq. revolutionary events should accompany it, what form the1 new state should take, with whom they should be aligned, I and who the leader of the movement should be. I

Following the 1967 war, t$e Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) sponsored a fedayeen group, the 1 Popular Front for the Liberation -of Palestine (FLP), As indicat above, the ANM had advanced a pa Arab philosophy, and overtones o this have been passed on to its militant offshoots. Both the PFLP. which terms itself a revol tionary Marxist-Leninist group, and the splinter organization which seDarated from it in earlv 1969, the Popular Democratic for the Liberation of' (PDFm)- ,-t---a revolution 1 must occur throughout the Arab world, and that the battle for ~ the liberation of Palestine is part of this. However, the PFLP George Habbash leader, George Habbash, places Leader PFLP more emphasis on pushing now for1

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I the liberation of Palestine, while the PDFLP chief, Naif' Hawatmah.considered a Maoist, sees the Palestinian struggle as inseparable from that for world- wide "liberation" and calls for all-out, protracted "people's war." Both groups call for the eventual overthrow of "bourgeois reaction- ary" Arab governments which they list as practically all Middle East governments, including those gener- ally considered radical, but Lebanon and Jordan in particular. But, in spite of the similarity of their ideological positions, these two fedayeen groups and their leaders are bitter rivals. Naif Hawat ma( Another PFLP splinter, the Leader PDFLPI PFLP General Command, which broke with the PFLP in late 1968, considers itself apolitic 1 and has disavowed any desire to overthrow Arab govern ments or undermine their authority. This group, howe er, was among the most intransigeant about accepting a ce se- fire during the Jordan civil war of , possibly because it feared it would be eliminated by 11 Jordanian authorities. and possibly also because its ' leader, Ahmad Jabril, who is fanatically committed to the liberation of Palestine, now saw Jordan as obstructin this goal.* 4I

*In the fall of 1970 the PFLP had an estimated 1.0 0 armed members, the PDFLP had about 700, the PFLP Gene a1 Command probably no more than one or two hundred. Thi PFLP and PDFLP both have political ties to political groups derived from the old ANM organization and thusl have a number of political supporters, especially in Le banon.

-8- I A host of smaller* fedayeen groups espouse a variety of ideologies 1. The Arab Palestine Organization (APO),- TGlf a splinter of the PFLP General Command, was pro-Nasir and mesumably is still pro-UAR. 2. The Active Organization for the Libera- --tion of Pales tine (AmP),hich separated from Fatah in early 1969, is led by Isam Sartawi and is fiercely defensive of its independence. Although it considers itself pro-Baath and supports the pan-Arab, socialist views of the Baath Party, it is not tied to the Baathist rulers of either Iraq or Syria. 3. The Popular Strug- Leader AOLP 1 --gle Front (E)began as an indepen- I dent group, merged briefly with Fatah, then split again in late 1968; the group's leader, Bahjat Abu-Char )iya, has been termed a Marxist, but :he ideological leanings of the org iniza- tion are not clear. 4. The Pec -jles' -Organization for the Liberation -Of Palestine (POm israbidly Mar :ist- Leninist butnumerically insign .f i- cant.

Artificial Fedayeen Creations In addition to these inde )en- dent, essentially spontaneous Palestinian fedayeen groups, th !re are several organizations creat !d by outside forces with ulterior Bahjat Abu-Charbiya Leader PSF

*None numbers more than several hundTed members; s Irne probably have well under a hundred. motives. The largest of these is Saiqa,* the creaturb of the Syrian Baath.** Saiqa has parmated in some military operations against Israel, but its principal role has been as a subversive force in the neighboring ha countries of Jordan and Lebanon, particularly the lat er. Totally controlled from , it has apparently b en responsive to a Syrian Baath faction at odds with Syr an strongman Asad and at times has been given orders no approved by Asad. #sad is said to have feared that S iqa might be used against him by his Damascus enemies, an when after the Jordanian cfvil war Asad staged a couplto seize full power from those enemies he is reported to1 have used regular troops to disarm their Saiqa guards In the wake of this November 1970 coup there were indI ca- tions that Asad planned to crack down on Saiqa and possibly even to eliminate it as a semi-independent o gan- ization by forcing it to subordinate itself to Fatah, If Asad holds on to power and carries through with this nten- tion (both highly uncertain), Fatah's relative positi n would be considerably strengthened, since Saiqa conta ns some two to three thousand commandos, is the second 1 rgest fedayeen group, and thus is the chief numerical count r- balance to Fatah.

Less is known about the fedayeen organization reated by the rival Baath regime in Iraq. However, this groi p, the (ALF), is far smaller than aiqa and =probably desimesEtially to counter Saiqai and *Estimated to have some 2,000 armed men in the fa1 1970. ** The Baath Party is a pan-Arab orgaqization whose tical philosophy is rabidly Arab nationalist and soci It has established regional branches in many Arab cou Its mutually antagonistic branches in Syria. and ,Iraq gained power and are in competition for leadership of the whole Baath movement. advance Iraq's interests. Palestinians serve in both^ Saiqa and the ALF, and lip service is paid by the two1 organizations to the goal of liberating Palestine; bu both groups exist primarily to advance the Arab natio alist, socialist, pan-Arab views and private interest of their mentors.

from the other fedayeen groups on a number of issues.1 Tied to the formal positions of the Communist parties which created them, they have been forced to finesse heir position on the liberation of Palestine and eliminati n of Israel as a , inasmuch as the Soviet U ion and the Arab Communist parties recognize Israel's rig t to exist. The Partisans are also defensive on the qu s- tions of a peaceful settlement and support of the UN Security Council resolution of 1967, which thi both of Soviets ostensibly support. The Partisans probably n m- ber no more than several hundred, have not participat d in military actions against Israel, and exist primari y to advance the interests of the Arab Communist partiei . Fedayeen Tactics -- ---The Use of International Terror The fedayeen have relied traditionally on the of commando-type raids across the Israeli border by s teams of men, aimed primarily at military targets (ou posts, military vehicles, patrols), but also, in terr fashion, at Israeli civilian targets. This is still approach advocated by the larger, less radical groups (particularly Fatah), but it has been a singular fail The Israelis have killed and captured l'arge numbers o PFLP terrorists and Jordanian ioldiers pose in front of hijacked plane-Sep ,mber 1970.

Triumphant terrorists atop wreckage of hijacked plane

All that remains-September 1970. I

guerrillas and the latter have conducted few successjul operations of any significance. * I A number of the smaller fedayeen groups have ot had the manpower to throw into such a doubtful ventu e and have turned instead to the use of terror against targets other than Israel. While Hawatmah of the PD LP is theoretically more radical than Habbash, since hei calls for an immediate Maoist peoples' war, it is Habbash of the PFLP who has actually employed the most radical

I tics to date of any fedayeen leader. For it is the which has conducted most of the fedayeen internation terrorist operations, the most spectacular one being ithe successful hijackings of four airplanes in September I 1970. Habbash's principal objectives in this respec

to Israel, and to bolster the prestige of the PFLP and himself.

need to wait until it is strong enough to carry out sustained operations (i.e. protracted war). The PFL

tion of Palestine have also endorsed the use of terro

*Since the Jordan crisis of September 1970, the fe ayeen have been too immobilized and too concerned with thei own survival and reorganization to conduct much in the wa of operations. Jordanian army leaders have also indicat d that they would seek to prevent any such operations w ile the ceasefire with Israel continues. i

I TOP- -ET I I and have been responsible for one or two bombings eaclh; all undoubtedly hope to strengthen their own reputatilons through such spectacular operations.

But the use of such tactics is in a sense a sign of weakness, indicating that the organization involved is unable to muster more direct, traditional techniques to the task of changing the status quo. Neither Fatah n r the PLO's fedayeen wing (the PLF) has indulged in this kind of terror to date.* Arafat has consistently con demned its use as being counterproductive and damaginig to the Arab image, and in any event he has been too cpn- cerned to date with gaining international legitimacy and with his ad1 support and retaining existing backing to pt this tactic. Organizations backed by states vulnerable to Israeli retaliation or to international pressure, uch as Saiqa, the ALF, and the Partisan Forces, have also shied away thus far from international . g

to view the world in black and white terms -- life will be perfect when the dual goals of world revolution and the liberation of Palestine are achieved. Ahmad Jabril, leader of the PFLP General Command, is fanatically consumed by the single goal df liberating Palestine, 8s is Ahmad Zarur, leader of the pro-Nasir Arab Palestine Organization which broke with Jabril's group Isam Sartawi, leader of the pro-Baath Active Organization . for the Liberation of Palestine, also seems to have fanatic characteristics.

*There have been recurring reports that Fatah was considering terrorist operations, including assassina ions, but no such action has yet materialized. A 1968 hija king of an Israeli airliner, attributed by some rumors to Fatah, is believed to have been carried out by the PFi P.

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In contrast, Arafat operates in the real polikical world and deals in compromise. He is committed to n particular political philosophy and is willing to di cuss alternate approaches, even to the basic issues of' th nature and borders of the future . He can talk to both the Saudi Arabians and the Chinese, taking whatever he can from each and convincing eachi that he is their country's best hope for future infl ence over the fedayeen. This method of operation tends t make Arafat a less spectacular figure than the more ii explosive Habbash and at times he has lost headlineslto his competitdr. It is Arafat, however, not Habbash,iwho has built a large, fairly well-funded organization, gained sharply increased international influence in past three years, and comes the nearest to predomina within the fedayeen worlds,

----Arab Aid to the Fedayeen All of the Arab states support the fedayee extent. They are of course virtually compelled t by the emotionalism of the issue, although the de nature of their support varies considerably, some conservative and distant states (such as Tunisia) feeling little compulsion. to become direct involved, Other conservative states,,paeticularly Arabia and Kuwait, have made sizable contribution Fatah,* reflecting both the presence in these cou of large Palestinian communities and the hope of states that Fatah, more conservative at least ihi will exert a moderating influence on the fedayeen movement. In late 1970 there were indications th Arabia was becoming disenchanted with Fatah and w ting back at least temporarily on fund-raising ef

*Individual Palestinians in these countries have c In- tributed to other organizations as well but without government backlng.

I I I I II

The radical Arab states have supported the fedadeen enthusiastically, if not always generously, seeing the 1 movement as a potential force for change in the area a d hoping to subvert this force to their own particular interests. SyrYa, consistently the most militant of t 7e Arab nations, WAS the first in the immediate prewar years* to give meaningful support to the fedayeen move- ment, supplying Fatah with arms, training, and equipme t even before the 1967 war. When Fatah began to exercis some independence, the Syrians shifted their emphasis to their own organization, Saiqa. They have nonethele 4s continued to supply Fatah with some aid and training. 4 and to act as a conduit for arms aid from China.** I Syria also supports the Hittin Forces, the PLA brigade attached to the Syrian army which in turn supplies sup ort to the Palestine Liberation Forces in north Jordan. Syrians have flikted somewhat with Hawatmah and the PD P, probably because of the PFLP's courtship of Syriavs 4 rival, Iraq; and following the September 1970 Jordania crisis, Hawatmah and other PDFLP leaders were said to have fled to Syria and to have begun running the organi a- tion there. i from Iraq has supported a number of groups; it constantly tries to gain control of them and frequently drops them when they do not prove malleable. It vided intermittent assistance to Fatah and is probably reluctant to cut all ties with this powerful organizati in spite of Fatah's independence. Following the escape of George Habbash from a Syrian prison in late 1968, Iraq reportedly received him warmly and pons; only small quantities of arms have been

*The UAR had provided some assistance to small feday groups as early as the mid-1950's. **In return, Fatah reportedly supplies Syria, as well as Iraq and Jordan, with intelligence data from inside the occupied territories.

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Since joining the ranks of the radical Arab states in 1969, has stepped up its promises of assistance to various fedayeen groups, but it, Coo, has concentrated on Fatah. I 1

I I In any event, ibYa Y a strong supporter of Egyptian policy, is said to have ' stopped all payments to the PFLP in July 2970; on 4 August, the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council indica that it would continue to give arms and'funds to the liber'ation movement led by Fatah. The UAR's position with respect to the fedayeen has been somewhat ambivalent. Nasir saw the fedayeen a a potential threat to his own leadership in the Arab world and also realized that they were a disruptive for e, over which he had almost nb control. However, he also 4 realized that the movement was too popular to squelch and was useful as an outlet for the Arab desire for mil - tary action. Although the UAR supported the Arab i Nationalist Movement (ANM) for many years, it has not I supported the ANM's fedayeen offshoots to any extent. 1 In early 1969 it reportedly gave Habbash some small arm4 and medical supplies, but was soon disenchanted by the 1 PFLP's use of terror and stopped this support. The PLO~ was created in 1964, largely to provide a facade of militancy against Israel, and as noted above, was virtually an Egyptian puppet until Fatah gained control of it in early 1969. Nasir was not pleased with this developmen or with Arafat's rise but accepted both fairly grace- fully, and the UAR has continued to supply some aid to both the PLO and Fatah, particularly training assistanc . In the summer of 1970, however, when the fedayeen vigorously condemned Nasir's acceptance of the cease-fi e proposal, Nasir retaliated by denying them the use of radio facilities, halting fedayeen fund-raising activit es, and depoP,ting some Palestinian "extremists." He also indicated that he would suspend all aid to the fedayeen. So far as is known, the UAR's position with respect to the fedayeen remained essentially unchanged in the firs1 six weeks after Nasir's death.

The Fedayeen Threat to Jordan and Lebanon - - ,-. The issue of state/fedayeen relations in host Ara nations hinges on what the country involved wishes to do for or to the fedayeen. However, for Lebanon and Jordan

-18- i and particularly the latter, the question is more corn+- plex. Both countries have large Palestinian populati ns,* concentrated in rqfugee camps, and sizable contingent of fedayeen who operate outside the law and are capab e of mustering considerable civilian backing.** Furthe - more, fedayeen operations across the borders of these countries into Israel have brought reprisal attacks i which the Lebanese and Jordanian armies have been un- able to contain. The problem is further compounded b the potential and inclination of the radical states 0' Iraq and Syria to use the situation to subvert the i Lebanese and Jordanian governments and to threaten inber- vention, a threat fulfilled by the Syrians during thei September 1970 Jordanian crisis. I I I

*About half of JordanOs population of slightly ovek two million is Palestinian. There are about-250,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, out of a population of 2,75( ,000.

**In the fall of 1970, of an estimated 12,000 arrnec 9 combat-ready fedayeen, over 9,000 were said, to be stationed in Jordan, including almost all the Fatah, PLF, PFLP, and PDFLP forces. Saiqa had many commandc !3 in Lebanon and many more still in Syria. The actual numbers are elusive and vary considerably depending c n source and time. Arafat's estimate in the fall of 18 70 was that there wme 30,000 fedayeen militia in Jordan t the Jordanian estimate was 25,000. Both figures are probably inflated, but may include both commandos activated during the crisis and those still in train- ing, as opposed to other, lower estimate8,which inch 9e only full-time fedayeen.

-19-

I [ I I TOP XCRETI 1

11. THE QUESTION OF FEDAYEEN UNITY

-The Fatah/PLO Merger

Pressure for unification of the fedayeen move- ment has come from a number of sources: large fedayeen

framework of the PLO and has tended to increase the in- fluence and authority of Arafat. The main challenge to Arafat for leadership of the fedayeen movement has been George Habbash, who for a long time refused to participate in the joint fedayeen organizations created under Fatah and PLO sponsorship. Instead he called for a "truly unified," broad national front, in other words, for an organization not controlled by Fatah, and possibly receptive to his own more charismatic style of leader- ship.

I

-20-

TOPLET S I forcing acceptance of itB own slate of delegates to the Palestine National Council* scheduled to meet in February. Fatah had been assisted by the PFLP's relusal to participate in the preparations for the

Creation of Palestine Armed Struggle Command

While the political aspects of fedayeen unity are important in terms of the movement's leadership and its dealings with various states, the main emphasis in the drive for unity has been on creating a joint mili- tary coordinating body. This seems logical because tae ostensible raison d'etre of all fedayeen groups is a military one: to regain the Palestinian homeland through the use of force. In fact, however, the main purpose of such joint military bodies has been to protect their members from liquidation by Jordanian authorities. The larger fedayeen groups have backed such organizations to the extent that they could dominate them. The smaller groups have participated in them for their own protection.

*The Palestine National Council was the supreme bo the PLO as established by the summit conference of th states in 1964; it was the legally constituted and re Palestinian legislative body. It dispersed after the 1967 war and was resurrected by agreement of the PLO, Fatah, and the PFLP.

I -21- I of the Pu) Executive Committee, Arafat also became Commander-in-Chief of the PASC.* The functions of the

The Challenge of the Unified Fedayeen Command I I The PFLP frequently criticized the Palestine 1 Armed Struggle Command in the months following its I creation and called for the establishment of a "broaderi" national front. The Popular Democratic Front for the 1 Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) was also unhabpy with 1 the Command, as constitu&ed, and in December 1969 announced that it was "freezing" its relationship with the organization. It stated, however, that it still considered itself a member of all "joint action formul in other words, it still considered itself protected from King Husayn by the Command but not bound by its internal relations.

*The organization's Chief of Staff was Abd-al-Razza Yahya, soon also to be commander of the Palestine Libe a- tion Army (PLA). Appointed as Mafat's man to both PO ts, Yahya soon demonstrated his own independence, and he a d Arafat have since had a series of disputes. **Nor had the Active Organization for the Liberationi of Palestine, whose leader Isam Sartawi feared Fatah's doJin- ation more than Jordanian repression. Those who had j included Fatah, The Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF), Saiqa, the Arab Liberation Front'(ALF), €he Popular St Front (PSF), the Arab Palestine Organization (APO), th PFLP General Command, and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).

I . I

In February 1970 an attempt, probably spear- 1 headed by the PFLP, was made to undermine the Fatah- dominated PASC by establishing a new group outside thf PLO framework, to be called the Unified Fedayeen I Command (UFC). Formation of the Unified Command was I prompted by Jordan's 10 February 1970 issuance of a new law-and-order decree, designed to tighten control over the fedayeen. On the same day that Jordan issue these regulations, ten fedayeen groups issued a state ment in the name of the Unified Fedayeen Command,* ' asserting their unity and rejecting the decree. Faced with a united fedayeen movement which was in effect 1 threatenWgycivi1 war, King Husayn backed down and 1 suspended enforcement of the regulations. I This crisis had begun while Arafat was in Mosc and the Unified Command was established without his participation. PaTtly__ because of this, Fatah's posit in the new, more broadly-based organization was less dominant than it was in the Palestine Armed Struggle CommBnd. Arafat had clearly been outmaneuvered. Be- cause the Unified Command was widely credited with ha ling forced Husayn to retreat, Arafat could hardly dispute its existence. Instead, he accepted its formation, stating that it would complement the PASC.

Having gained their first victory, the groups wishing to undermine Fatah's predominanf position immediately began a campaign to have the Unified Feda: 'een

*The membership was the same as that of the Palest: ne Armed Struggle Colqmand but also included the PFLP, A01 IP , and eventually the Peoples Organization for the Liberr - tion of Palestine (POLP). **This was probably not a coincidence. It is like11 that King Husayn took advantage of Arafat's absence tc try to impose the new controls.

-23- 7 Command supersede the PASC. The PFLP went even furthe , urging that the PLO itself be eliminated, presumably t be replaced by a more formalized version of the Unifie Fedayeen Command, The proposal to abolish the PLO met1 heavy opposition not only from Fatah, but also from th Palestine Liberation Army, whose existence after all i dependent on that of the PLO. The PLA is said to have threatened to eliminate the groups causing disruotion if they did not desist.

a Central Committee which would be responsible to the Palestine National Council and would replace the Unified Fedayeen Command. The Council approved this proposal when it met in June. While the new PLO Central Commit*:ee was established within the PLQ framework and Arafat wat3 named its chairman, this organization had a far broade:? membership than had the PLO Executive Committee, and Fatah’s ability to impose its control was curtailed. “he Executive Committee was not abolished, however, and considerable ambiguity remained on the question of which organization was supreme. A similar problem existed in the military realm. The Palestine National Council at its June meeting also approved the creation of a Suprene Military Command, again headed by Arafat but with a more diffused leadership than that of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command and designed to replace the latter. However, the PASC apparently continued to function. Thus in mid-1970 a multitude of joint fedayeen organizations existed and no one was particularly happ

had been weakened somewhat, but Fatah, as the most power- ful group by far, was still dominant. The PFLP had succeeded in whittling away at Fatah, but was no more willing than before to submit to control, from another

\ 1 body. The PFLP immediately made it clear that despi membership in the new groups it retained the right t carry out independent operations. In September 1970 it

thus ignored Central Committee orders not to destrpy ~ the three planes it had hijacked and to release the tages it held. The Central Committee exerted its au briefly, suspending the PFLP from membership. Howev it readmitted the group after several days, thus dem strating that it did not have the power, or possibly will, to enforce its own regulations. I During the Jordan civil war of September 1970 the PLO Central Committee was recognized as the only leg ti- mate fedayeen bargaining body, and Arafat clearly em rged as its spokesman. What effect the Jordan crisis wou d have on the structure of the fedayeen movement was n t immediately apparent, although it appeared that the ore radical groups had suffered the most and that: Fatah ad emerged relatively stronger. Several reports soon a ter the crisis indicated that Fatah was trying to establ sh control over the entire movement. According to Isam 1 Sartawi, leader of the Active Organization for the L bera- tion of Palestine (AOLP) and a long-time Fatah oppon nt, by the end of October 1970, Arafat was issuing order for the whole movement in complete disregard for what an one else thought. Sartawi said that the PLO Central Co ittee at that point had not met for weeks. .j In mid-November, however, the Central Committqe announced that the fedayeen groups planned a formal

again to predominate.

-25- i I \- II

both internal and external, on the movement and the 'I individual assessments of the various groups of their own best interests. When threatened$ either indirectly as with the peace proposal of July 1970 or directly with military force, the fedayeen have tried tqo present a united.'front. Their reaction to the US plan was to issue a joint resolution of denunciation. Their reaction to threats to their survival has been to form joint military bodies designed to protect them through combined strength.

Such threats,tend to be transitory, however, and when they pass and the fedayeentlno longer feel threatened, the differences among them tend to come to the fore and the question revekts to one of power politics. Fatah has for the most part used the periods of crisis to its own advantage, skillfully manipulating the forces worki:ig for unity in order to increase its,own predominance witiin the movement. This success is largely attributable to ';he diplomatic skill of Yasir Arafat and the prospects for unity would.?undoubtedly suffer were he to be removed frym .

-26- I the scene, Arafat's ability (not unlike that of Nas r) to talk sympathetically and persuasively to widely v ried groups and countries as well as the prestige he has uilt up in the,pa;st several years have been instrumental n helping to forge the weak ties of unity that have th1 s far been created. Presumably, if Arafat now feels t at he can best enhance Fatah's control over the other :: fedayeen groups by discarding the mechanisms he has $0 laboriously constructed and by building new ones, he will do so. But unless Fatah grows strong enough forcibly to impose and then maintain its own control ~ over the other organizations, the long-term prospect of meaningful fedayeen unity are modest. si

-27- 8053 7-10 ..

Soliet Policy Towards the Fedayeen

From Hostility to Tolerance . The basic impediment to closer Soviet-fedayee relations has been the USSR's continuing recognition nof Israel's right to exist. This recognition is obvio incompatible with the claims of the Palestinians tha the land is theirs and that fsrael as a Jewish state must go. While Soviet commentators have at times s that Israel took more land than was stipulated in t Palestine Partition Plan of November thus implying that some readjustment of the 1948 bo might be called for, they have more commonly treate as an academic issue, not to be taken seriously. T Soviets have concentrated their demands for rectifi on the territories occupied in 1967; in so doing the have consistently supported the UN Security Council resolution of November 1967, which the Palestinians not accept. Thus, both Soviet recognition of the s of Israel and Soviet support for a peaceful solution based on the UN resolution stand in the way of a com plete Soviet-fedayeen alliance. In addition, more practical considerations, especially Soviet inabilit to control this very disruptive force, have worked against such an alliance.

In the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 w the Soviet position towards the fedayeen was one of hostility. Soviet commentators frequently condemned Arab 'textremistst' and their ttdestroy-Israell' slogans, and the Soviets generally viewed guerrilla raids int Israeli-occupied territory as being counterproductiv In the spring of 1968, however, the Soviets began to modify their line. This reflected the growing and popular appeal of the East, as well as Soviet concern influence with this potentially important force, T&& 'i;ets may also have reasoned that the immediate pras,pects of 9" gaining an acceptable solution to the Middle gast situ - tion were slight, and that some military pressure on t e Israelis might push the latter toward compromise. Sov et reporting on fedayeen activities was carefully limited, however, to operations in the occupied territories. T e Palestinians' right to repel the Israeli invaders from these lands was recognized, but not their right to reggin all of Palestine. I II

tities (never more than five percent of Fatah's total) of Soviet-made light arms, as the Syrians had been doing since 1965. Although a CPSU official later implied thJ$t the Soviets replenished these stocks, there is no way of knoyidg *if this was really intended as direct compensation for Egyptian and Syrian aid to the Palestinian,;guerril:Las.

is state- 'ment casts doubt on the existence of such a Soviet-UAR-f edayeen deal. Whatever the case, after the summer of 1968, the Soviets seem to have become more willing to allow the East Europeans to sell weapons -- for hard cash -- to Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Forces, Bulgaria first and ....Czechoslovakia .( were reported making such sales .-.I -'.. ,. ..' .

-30- T c

they remained concerned about the organization's Mus1 Brotherhood connections and its close ties to conservda- tive Arab countries. This distrust was and still is reciprocated by many Fatah leaders (including Arafat), who disapprove of Soviet support for a peaceful solution and doubt Soviet willingness to help them. In late Miarch 1969 Arafat is said to have met in Algiers with Sovie,t President Podgornyy. \

Because of this mutual distrust, the Soviets ktept open other channels of communication, primarily with the UAR-backed Palestine Liberation Organization through the

groups weapons directly, shipping them to Latakia, wh they were then routed to Jordan and Lebanon.

-31-

'I PLO's representative Shafiq Al-Hut. This dialogue continued throughout 1968 and early 1969 and may have been partly responsible for the Soviet decision to permit East European countries to sell weapons to Fatah and the PLO's fedayeen wing, the Palestine I Liberation- Forces.

The Shift to a Stronger Pro-Fedayeen Line

The Soviets seem to have respon- ded favorably both to the PLA/Fatah- Shafiq AI-Hut merger and to the creation of the Pal- estine Armed Struggle Command in early in Beirut 1969, seeing such unifying steps as simplifying the question of with whom to age of operat ions into t he occupied fit the same time a greater distinction began to be draw between the "moderate" fedayeen (presumably the "extremists" (probably the more for the Liberation of Palestine, which had refused to enter either of the new unified organizations).*

In the early fall of 1969. had recenti y aeciaea to increase cooPera=lon w th the fedayeen, probably for the same reasons that the Soviets had decided to talk with them in the first place: hope that this would put pressure on Israel, the growing strength of the fedayeen movement, and fear of being outmaneuvered by the Chinese. The Soviets may also have been influenced by the new

*The Soviets identified the "extremists" as those w use the slogan "the worse the better," thus trying to them to the Chinese. In fact, the Chinese were aiding Fatah and the PLO, not the PFLP.

-32- T

had to put their support for the Palestinian cause in terms strong enough to justify armed struggle.

Additional evidence soon confirmed that the use of the new formulation was a conscious, joint decision

\ -33- issue of what to do with whatever territory Israel wo Id be asked to relinquish -- whether to hand it over to the

but by and large Soviet public comment has dealt. dep::e- catingly with what is viewed as an Israeli desire for such a buffer state. However, there has been at leas.: one recent.' indication that the Soviets would be receptive to negotiations concerning a possible Palestinian sta'ke on the . In in October Kosygin is saij to onFy power capable of regaining the West Bank and (&dh, Arafat rejected the advice.

Practical Effects of Propaganda Shift

medical supplies. The remarks of the Soviet leaders

-34- I suggested continuing concern, however, that the USSR might be linked to fedayeen terrorist activities if the Soviet Union were publicly identified as suppjyi g arms directly to the fedayeen. Ponomarev also decl ed that the Soviets would hot establish direct relation between the CPSU and fedayeen, but would use such Soviet "mass organizations" as the Komsomol,, trade 4 unioqs,, and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity CommitJ, ee as intermediaries to make public contact with them. I Almost all subsequent official dealings between the Soviets and the fedayeen have in fact been handled 1 through the Solidarity Committee. I

In the fall of 1969, this committee invited t e PLO to send a delegation to the USSR. When originally issued, the invitation reportedly was extended only to Palestine Liberation Army representatives, but by December Arafat was added. Arafat himself was said to be reluctant to go, probably because he was skeptic 1 about Soviet willingness to provide meaningful aid, and possibly aEso because he did not wish to antagonize i1 either the Saudis or the Chinese. However, other bers of the PLO Executive Committee finally persu him that the mere fact of the visit would be a di victory for the fedayeen.

The concrete results of the delegation's t visit in February were unclear. The communique i after the visit included the apparently standard tion that the Soviet people support the "national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle" of the The Sovieks seem to have made additional vague pr of material support but may have linked them to t of further unification of the fedayeen movement. indefinite, their comments led to some wishful th on the part of the fedayeen. One member of the d said that the whole delegation came away convince Soviets kould suppZy achs directly to the resista movement and assist with training. However, he a that the Soviets had indicated they would deal on the Palestine Liberation Army because ,their arms we "conventional weapons for a conventional army." , himself admitted that no agreement on aid had bee but professed not to be disappointed because, he had expected no more than he got.

-35-

~ Relations --In Flux In the wake of this visit, several remarks made publicly by low-level Soviet officials in the spring of 1970 went well beyond any.previous Soviet statements on the Pa1estiniaq:issue. On 18 April, the Soviet charge in told Arab newsmen that the Soviet people supported the Palestinian struggle to "liberate" the occupied territory and to establish a "democratic Palestinian state." Two days later, the Soviet press attache in went Bven further, sayin r that the Soviet Union

supports the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state: and. . .supports every struggle aimed at toppling all regimes based on racist fanaticism such as the present regime in Israel. Although these statements were subsequently disavowed, they reveal the thinking of some Soviet officials and suggest that the question of how far to support Palestinian "national" rights was being debated in the Soviet Union..

In any event, by the summer of 1970 the Soviets seem to have pulled back somewhat from support of the Palestinian cause. In his 12 June election speech, Brezh- ney reaffirmed the right of Israel to exist, calling simply for assurances of the "legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine." This marked a return to the old formula on Palestinian rights which had been used before Shelepin and Kosygin in late 1969 implied that the Palestinian struggle was on0 fQr ;'tta&%'i~naI".ti.ghts. This statement was accompanied by other indications that the Soviets were dragging their feet on the fedageen issue. At this time. (see p.39)) they seemed to pull dlack from their previous position of support 'for the Partisan Forces, the.'Xedayeen group established by four Arab Communist Parties with Soviet approval in late 1969.. In addition, there was no indication as of the fall of 1,9?0 that the Soviets were yet supplying any dlrect material support to the Palestinians. Various fedayeen 1eade:rs

sing increased displeasure with the Soviets; these h,ave included Arafat and even such a normally pro-Soviet fedayeen leader as PLO Beirut representative Shafiq Al-Hut.

I

-37-

I ThET When the Soviets took a still stronger pro- fedayeen tack in mid-1969, the LCP decided to furthe:r modify its own position from verbal and logistic support of the armed struggle to actual participation in that struggle. In September 1969, the LCP proposed to thle Commun2:St Parties of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq the establish- ment of a coordinating committee to discuss some fern of joint participation in Palestinian guerrilla activities. Both the proposal and the subsequent agreement of thle three other parties probaibly had Soviet approval. In November representatives of the four parties met and agreed that they would establish a joint partisan organi- zation .but decided not to formalize such a body unt$l the spring of 1970.*

*In the meantime the individual

The LCP began in guerrilla tactics.

-39-

L In late December 1969, representatives of these Parties met in Moscow with CPSU Secretaries Suslov and Ponomarev 2nd were reportedly promised support. The timing of these preliminaries to sekting up a Communist fedayeen group coincided with the public statements being made by Shelepin and Kosygin, calling for support of the "national liberation strugglev1of the Palestiniai as well 2s with Sovbt issuance of an invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to send a delegation to Moscow.

Establishment of Partisan Forces In March 1970 the Communist Party of Jordan (CPJ) surprised the LCP, and probably the other Communist Parties as well, by jumping the gun on earlier arrange- ments and unilaterally announcing its establishment of Quwat Al-Ansar (Partisan Forces). The CPJ proclaimed that it was joining the armed struggle and moreover defended, contrary to Soviet policy, the right of the Palestinians to strive for what it termed the supreme goal of the resistance movement, "the liberation of Palestine." The CPJ's action was apparently prompted by panic, accompanied by internal dissension, and precipitated by the February 1970 crisis: in Jordan between the government and the fedayeen. In the wake of that crisis, dominant forces in the CPJ reportedly felt that the party must either take a strong position in support of the Palestinian resistance or lose still more local prestige. Because of the CPJ's unilateral action, the Partioan Forces appeared for some time to be 2 creature cbf i'l%'ksI.Pa~~jr.~alonej~~~~~~~a~~~~~~$~nt venture of the four parties. Early in the following month, represeptatives of the four participating Communist parties met' again in Iraq and agreed on various practical steps (such as fund raising 2nd establishing offices and bases) to be taken jointly in setting up the Partisan Forces. There was considerable debake over the political line to .be taken, and they-agreed to meet again to discuss this.

I -40- I C; C; I When the representatives delegate offered a draft the "liberation of Palestine," and of the four parties adopted it. It ever, that Neither the Parties have directlyx'nd liberation of Palestine, episode. * Following passage of this resolution, the Soviet attitude toward the Partisans grew notably-cooler. $n the summer of 1970 the Soviets indicated that they d d not wish to receive a delegation of the Partisan FOE"ie6 which was obviously in search of aid. While it is p s- sible that this simply reflected the increased Sovie caution about the Palestinian cause visible at the t me, it may also have indicated some reluctance to bei id nti- fied with a clear-cut endorsement of th6 "liberation of Palestine." It was not until September 1970 that a I1 Soviet journal (N4w-- Times) first-acknowledged the gr4up's existence. I

In any event, the Soviets have thus far seeme reluctant to supply aid directly even to these Commu Partisan Forces, although the Soviets have 'apparent1 not objected to such dealings being handled by the E Europeans. In the summer and fall of 1970 the Parti Forces were apparently receiving some material suppo from Bulgaria, Poland, and possibly East Germany.

*Only the CPJ, in its March 1970 announcement estct- blishing the Partisan Forces, has recognized the right i of the Palestinians to strive for the liberation of Palestine. The Soviets themselves have supported what liberation" rights, but have deliberately failed to ,Ief ine what they mean.

-41- I As of the fall of 1970, the Partisan Forces had not yet engaged in any anti-Israel operations, and apparently did not consider themselves strong enough to do so. They had several bases in Jordan and probably only several hundred armed men. At this time they were still in the process of organization and training. The Partisans are reported to have participated in the Sep- tember fighting against King Husayn and to have acquittt themselves well, although their entry into the fighting was belated because of a delay in receiving permission from their parent parties 2nd the Soviet Union. Althoul they suffdred considerable casualties and reportedly afterward retained only a few bases in north Jordan, thc political position relative to the other fedayeen group! previously extremely weak, may have been somewhat inproved by the civil war.

Chinese Policy Toward the Fedayeen

Unfettered by long-standing or involved relation- ships in the Middle East, not vitally concerned by reasc 1 of proximity or economics, and anxious to undermine bot1 U.S. and Soviet interests wherever possible, the Chines4 have given both vocal and material support to the Pales. tinian fedayeen. The Chinese do not have diplomatic relations with Israel and have referred to Israel as an "artificial creation of U.S. imperialism:'!'. They are thur not limited in their ability to support the Palestinian cause and are free to attack the Soviets both for cal- ling Israel"!:an independent national state" and f or supporting the 1967 UN resolution.

Palestinian struggle pnecisely because it is a "national

-42-

T

-. . .-- ...... -. .- ...... ---- ...... - ... - - . ~ I TO& RET 1 1 I 1 I II

organization rather than a class-based one. bnce the Palesti ian vicrory I wul~, a LL~JDDLLU~~LC WL!I~ ensue within Fatah for ~ ~ the "further development" of the revolution. I

As early as March 1965 the Chi- nese received Ahmad Shuqayri, then head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); and Peking there- after became the first non-Arab' capital to accredit a permanent PLO representative. Ever since then, the Soviets have denounced Shuqayri as "pro-Chinese. 'I Peking also began dealing with Fatah at about this time, and thereafter provided training to members of both Fatah and the PLO. During 1968 Fatah reportedly also be- gan receiving equipment. medical supplies, and some financial aid from China. Fatah may have had to pay for at least some of what it received, because in February 1970 Arafat Ahmad Shuqayri stated that Fatah used Saudi Arabian First PLO Leader money to buy arms from China.

In the five years since 1965. the Chinese have furnished training assistance within China to a maximum of' one or two hundred fedayeen annually. and since 1968 Chinese instructors are reported to have trained additional guerrillas in Syria. In the summer and fall of 1970 there were several reports that a few Chinese advisors were actually serving with fedayeen units, and that some were even captured in the September Jordan civil war.*

*While further confirmation of these reports is need their credibility is somewhat enhanced by the fact that Chinese advisors at this time were known to be particip ing in the Dhufar rebellion in the Sultanate of Muscat Oman. The Chinese Communists have thus proven themselv willing to commit a small number of their nationals to active role in an Arab "'national liberation struggle."

I ' -43- i

. - ,.... - .-- ...... - .___.. . -_- - I

Fatah's Arafat has not been hesitant about play ing the Soviets and Chinese off against each other. Following his return from Moscow in February 1970, he accepted an invitation to visit China, While it is no known exact1 what promises he received, Arafat himsel

hasenstated that the Chinese promised him arm 9 and 1 une 70 a shipment of rifles and spare parts reportedly did arrive in Latakia for Fatah from China. After his visit Arafat was effusive in his praise of t e Chinese -- in marked contrast to his lukewarm state- ments concerning the Soviets.

During this visit, the Chinese are said to have pressed krafat for further unification of the fedayeen movement and to have urged that the Palestinians begin to conduct more operations inside Israel proper and to operate from bases within the occupied territory, in accordance with Mao's strategy, They also reportedly expressed opposition to terrorist bombings and plane hijackings, calling these "amateur" .tactics. None of these points, however, seems to have been made a pre- condition to support for Fatah. Following Nasirss acceptance of the U.S. oease- fire proposal in July 1970, the PLO sent a delegation to Peking to discuss the situation. This delegation received whole-hearted support from the Chinese for their4rejection of the proposal, which was not surpris ng since Peking had already reportedly urged Arafat to attempt to persuade Nasir not to accept a peaceful settlement. has plausibly reported that at this time th fered further financial and military aid to the PLO, apparently additional to what had been promised to Arafat.

The Chinese desire to undermine an chance of stability in the Middle East is reported to have also led to a decision in Lasome minimal assistance to the radicale Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, despite good evidence of Chinese displeasure with the PFLP's tactic In September, the Chinese are said to have told the PFLP's leader, Habbash, that they disapproved of the

-44-

.. . - . . .. .__,_- - - . ., -. . . \- I I

sibly assist its current purposes in the Middle Eas . In September 1970, K'ang Sheng, a member of the Sta ding Committee of the Chinese Party's Politburo, summed p the present Chinese goal by stating that the Chinese are aiding the fedayeen in order to keep tension high in the area and to prevent a U.S.-Soviet agreement there.

Despite these various Chinese ties with ?sdayeen groups, certain key limitations exist. China's sup3ort in fact has been much more moral than material, con- sisting for the most part of only some training and some light arms. The Chinese do get a lot of political and prestige return for their modest input, but Chinese power is distant, Soviet power is not. This the various tinually express their thanks for the strong sympatietic support furnished by China, they have been careful to keep their options and channels of communication open to MOSCOW, know8bg 'that the future of the area will be far more influenced by Soviet military and political moves than by Chinese.*

*This belief has in fact at tant fedayeen leaders from public dealings with the In early 1968, PLO Beirut representative Shafiq Al- reportedly rejected an invitation to visit China, a then feared this might harm any chanoe of aid. More remarkably, Naif Hawatmah, ostensibly pro-Maoist Popular Liberation of Palestine, also rejected in early 1970 for the same reason. ABBREVIATIONS I

c

, Partisan Forces AL ANSAR .' ALF Arab Liberation Front .

Arab Nationalist Movement . ANM . 1. I' AOLP Active Organization for the Liberation of Palestine i

CPI Communist Party of Iraq . CPJ Communist Party of Jordan CPS Communist Party of Syria LCP Communist Party of Lebanon PASC Palestine Armed Struggle Command PDFLP Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLA Palestine Liberation Army

PLF Palestine Liberation Forces PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PNC Palestine National Council -PSF Popular Struggle Front I , ar Saiqa Vanguard Organization for the Popu Liberat Ion War I UFC Unified Fedayeen Command

-46- To\ ecret