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NO VICTOR, NO VANQUISHED the Yom Kippur War Edgar O'ballance

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NO VICTOR, NO VANQUISHED the Yom Kippur War Edgar O'ballance NO VICTOR, NO VANQUISHED The Yom Kippur War Edgar O'Ballance Contents List of illustrations List of maps Preface Acknowledgements 1 The Middle East Mirage 2 Operation Spark 3 Operation Badr 4 Fortress Israel 5 Storming the Bar Lev Line 6 Israeli Hesitation and Confusion 7 The Syrians Attack 8 The Egyptians Attack 9 General Reaction 10 Stalemate on the Eastern Front 11 On the West Bank 12 The Ruptured Cease-Fire 13 War in the Air 14 War at Sea 15 In Retrospect Illustrations Egyptians landing from rubber assault boats Ladders used to scale sand ramparts Capture of a Bar Lev Line fort Egyptian Rangers Israeli infantrymen in foxholes Knocked-out Syrian tanks near Red Ridge Israelis repair damaged tanks of Golan Plateau Egyptian armour crashing bridge Quay fort after surrender Egyptian infantrymen in the Sinai Israeli armour advancing toward Suez Canal Israeli armour on Golan Heights Israeli long-range artillery Jordanian soldiers on Golan Plateau Jordanian brigade commander and staff Israeli observation post Israeli armour near Deversoir Israeli soldiers at Sweet Water Canal Port Suez after Israeli bombardment Egyptian SAM-2 base Israelis recovering SAM-3 missile Egyptian MiG in flames Blazing oil tanks at Latakia Harbour Traditional broom on mast of Israeli missile boat Maps 1 The Concentrated Strike of over 200 Egyptian Aircraft, 6 October 1973 2 Egyptian Pictorial Presentation of Assault Crossing, 6 October 1973 3 Occupation of the Bar Lev Line Forts 4 Egyptian Penetration of the East Bank 5 Israeli Map Showing Plan for an Assault Crossing of the Canal 6 Israeli Counterattacks from 6 - 8 October 1973 7 The Syrian Attack on the Golan Plateau, 6-10 October 1973 8 Stalemate of the Syrian Front, 11-22 October 1973 9 Iraqi /Jordanian Objectives, 16 October 1973 10 Jordanian Participation in Combined Iraqi/Jordanian Attack, 16 October 1973 11 Combined Iraqi/Jordanian Attack, 16 October 1973 12 On the West Bank, 16-24 October 1973 13 Egyptian Pictorial Presentation of Positions at Start of Cease-fire, 28 October 1973 14 The Naval Theatre Preface The October War brought many surprises that jolted current military thinking out of its World War II rut and provoked wide-ranging reassessments. It was a war that was not wanted by either the Israelis, the Russians, or the Americans, but once it had begun, both America and Russia felt compelled to sustain their proteges for reasons of prestige and the superpower struggle. They sent replacement arms, ammunition, and equipment in quantities that escalated widely, as neither superpower wanted to see the side it was supporting defeated completely on the field of battle. Broadly speaking, perhaps the Arabs, who wanted the war, gained the most. Despite the fact that in a purely military sense it was a dream contest, it did serve to break the almost crystalised, stultifying state of No Peace, No War, which seemed to be to everyone's advantage except their own. This comprehensive account is compiled from the results of my interviews, researches, and visits both to the countries involved and the actual battlefields, where I "walked the course" with officers who had taken part in the fighting. With the second cease-fire, which seemed to bring more advantages to the Arabs than to the Israelis, came the myth-makers. Both Arabs and Israelis are now trying to convince themselves, and the world at large, that they won the war and, but for the intervention of the superpowers, would have won it more decisively. This is not exactly correct, and I cannot arrive at a deduction that is wholly favourable to one side or the other. Some would rather I had omitted certain information or comments, played down certain aspects and overemphasised others. This I was unable to do, as I wished to compile an accurate, contemporary, warts-and-all history, at this distance of time and in this myth-making atmosphere. There are still grey and disputed areas, contradictory reports which are difficult to reconcile, official silences on certain details, and overeffusive explanations on others. Lips are sealed on some matters while tongues wag incessantly on others, as so many of the personalities involved, aware that they have become historical figures, are anxious that the warts first be removed before the recording pen begins to write. Acknowledgements Most of the information contained in this book, some exclusive at the time of writing, has been personally gained during briefings, interviews, discussions, and visits to battlefields, centers of instruction, and units. However, I would like to make grateful acknowledgement to the authors, editors, compilers, and publishers of the following works which I have read or consulted with profit and pleasure: Deutsch, Andre. Insight on the Middle East War. London: Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1974. Glassman, Jon D. Arms for the Arabs. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1976. Heikal, Mohammed. The Road to Ramadan. London: Collins, 1975. Herzog, Chaim. The War of Atonement. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975. International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance and Strategic Survey. London: 1972-75. International Symposium. Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict. Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1976. International Symposium. Various papers. Cairo: 1975. Kalb, Marvin and Bernard. Kissinger. London: Hutchinson, 1974. Meir, Golda. My Life. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975. Pajak, Roger E. Soviet Arms Aid to the Middle East. Washington: Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 1976. Peres, Shimon. David's Sling. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970. 1 A MIDDLE EAST MIRAGE Damascus is only one hour's drive away, and Cairo perhaps two. Israeli saying pre-October 1973 The war between the Arabs and the Israelis, which broke out in the Middle East on 6 October 1973, is known to the Arabs as the "War of Ramadan," to the Israelis as the "Yom Kippur War," and generally to nonpartisans in the West as the "October War of 1973." This explosion, however, was only the most recent eruption in a history of simmering relations. Indeed, the Arabs and the Israelis have fought five wars against each other. The Israelis called the 1948-49 clash their "War of Independence,"which brought the state of Israel into being by force of arms as Britain relinquished the mandate for Palestine. Among the problems it created was the question of Palestinian refugees. The second war occurred late in 1956. President Nasser had nationalised and then closed the Suez Canal, which led to an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. Taking advantage of the Egyptian preoccupation, Israeli columns moved westward across the Sinai desert against light opposition and almost to the Suez Canal in "One Hundred Hours." A few months later pressure from the United Nations and especially America forced the Israelis to grudgingly withdraw to their former boundaries. The third outburst was the "Six Day War," fought in June 1967. After making a preemptive air strike on Arab airfields, the Israelis managed to destroy the air force of Jordan, almost destroy that of Egypt, and badly maul those of Syria and Iraq. Left without air cover, the Arabs were disastrously defeated. In the north, Syria lost the Golan Plateau. In the east, Jordan lost its West Bank, the more prosperous part of the Hashemite Kingdom. In the south, the Egyptians, their 90,000-strong army being routed and losing all their new Soviet weaponry and equipment, lost the Gaza Strip and the whole of the Sinai desert and peninsula. President Nasser later told Premier Mahgoub of the Sudan, "On the 9th June (1967) when I resigned, there were only 400 soldiers between Ishmailia and my house. Israeli troops could have entered Cairo if they wanted to." The fourth clash was President Nasser's "War of Attrition" which began in 1967 virtually as soon as the Egyptian armed forces had regrouped and had received more Soviet material. The ensuing battles were fought across the Suez Canal, now the dividing line between the Egyptians and the Israelis. The ground combat included heavy artillery and mortar barrages and many commando raids. In another dimension, aircraft were used by both sides, especially the Israelis, for strategic bombing and ground support. Yet a "war of electronics" quickly developed in the air. The Soviet Union supplied Egypt with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for defence against Israeli aircraft. The introduction of these effective missiles redressed the situation that had developed immediately after the June defeat in which Israeli pilots had freedom of Egyptian skies. Encountering SAMs in Vietnam, the Americans had developed Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) pods, which were fixed to the wings of planes and gave the pilots warning of oncoming missiles, enabling them to take evasive action. Soon a "mad scientists' war" developed as on-the- ground, radar-directional, searching and tracking equipment improved, and in the air more advanced ECM pods enabled the pilot to jam, counter-jam and even deflect missiles aimed at him. When the War of Attrition ended on 7 August 1970, it was very much a "drawn" contest. Israeli aircraft had been eased out from the air space over Egypt proper and their activities confined to the Suez Canal Zone. Not all observers reckon this as a "war," which accounts for the fact that some refer to the October War of 1973 as the "fourth" and others as the "fifth" Arab-Israeli war. In any event, a major transition in the Middle East came on 28 September 1970, when President Nasser died. His last political act had been to bring about a cease-fire in Jordan between King Hussein's troops and the Palestinian Fedayeen, Freedom Fighters. Nasser's successor was Anwar Sadat. The new Egyptian leader had graduated from the (then) Royal Egyptian Military Academy in 1938.
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