Israel: What Went Wrong on October 6?: The Partial Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the October War Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer, 1974), pp. 189-207 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2535473 . Accessed: 09/03/2015 16:05

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT

ISRAEL: WHAT WENT WRONG ON OCTOBER 6 ?

THE PARTIAL REPORT OF THE ISRAELI COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE OCTOBER WAR

[This was officiallyissued in Israel on April 2, 1974 as a reporton the mostpressing issuesraised duringthe generalinvestigation by the AgranatCommission of the prepared- ness of Israel for the October War. It comprisesa preface on the terms of reference and proceduresof the Committee(below); an account of the evaluationsmade by the Israeli IntelligenceServices up to October 6 (p. 192); conclusionsand recommendations on the functioningof the institutionsresponsible for meeting a militarycrisis (p. 196); and conclusionsabout officeholders which resultedin the resignationsof the Chief of Staff and senior intelligenceofficials (p. 200).]

CHAPTER 1: PREFACE

1. On November 18, 1973, the Cabinet of the Inquiry CommissionsLaw, 1968, adopted the followingresolution: excludingparagraphs (1) and (6) therein, "Resolved: and to requestthe approval of the Defence and Foreign AffairsCommittee thefollowing matters, namely: "A) That for this determination. " 1. The information,in the days pre- ceding the , concerning "E) To apprise the President of the the enemy's moves and his intentionsto Supreme Court of this resolution." open war, as well as the assessmentsand Following on this resolution,the Pres- the decisionsof the duly authorizedmili- ident of the Supreme Court, by virtueof tary and civilian bodies with regard to the powers vested in him under para. the aforementionedinformation; 4 (a) of the Inquiry CommissionsLaw "2. The Israel Defence Forces' deploy- 1968, appointed the Chairman and mentfor battle in general,its preparedness members of the Commission as follows: in the days preceding the Yom Kippur Dr. , President of the War and its actionsup to the containment Supreme Court, Chairman; Mr. Moshe ofthe enemy; "Are of vital public impor- Landau, Supreme CourtJustice, member; tance at this time requiringclarification. Dr. YitzhakNebenzahl, State Comptroller, "B) That an Inquiry Commissionshall member; Lieut.-Gen. (Res.) N.B. Yigael be set up to investigatethe aforementioned Yadin, Professorat the Hebrew Univer- mattersand reportto the Cabinet. sity, member; Lieut.-Gen. (Res.) Haim Laskov, IDF Ombudsman, member. "C) To determine,after consultation with the Presidentof the Supreme Court, 2. Afterdeciding on its procedure,the that the Commissionshall be composed Commissionon November25, 1973 started of five members. to hear evidence and up till now it has "D) To determine that the matters held 140 meetingsand heard 58 witnesses. which are the subject of the investigation In addition,much evidencewas submitted and the Commission's deliberations re- to the Commission in writing. At this quire secrecy,as laid down in section 23 juncture, the Commissionhas concluded

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 190 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

the hearing of testimonyand the receipt because of theirenormous scope. We shall, of otherevidence on some of the subjects therefore,concentrate on selectedaspects included in its terms of referencewhich of the questions as a whole, which seem are, in the followingorder: The informa- to us of particularimportance. tion, in the days preceding the Yom 3. In the presentationof the partial Kippur War, on the enemy'smeasures and report,in accordance with the authority on hisintentions to startwar; theassessment given to the Commission under clause of that information;the preparednessof 19 (a) of the law, we have not ignored the IDF in the days precedingthe war, two considerationsin favourof presenting up to the launchingof the enemyattack; a single reportto include all our findings the decisionsof the militaryand civilian and recommendationsregarding all the authorities, taken on the basis of this subjectsdetailed in the termsof reference information and its evaluation. This of the Commission.Those considerations partial report relates to these subjects are: a) these subjects, particularly the only.In it the Commissiondoes not discuss preparednessand deploymentof the IDF, subjectsrelating to thegeneral preparedness are interconnectedto a greater or lesser of the IDF (including matters of order degree; b) in regard to the evaluation and discipline,training and fightingdoc- of the behaviour of the holders of various trine,equipment and munitions,emergency offices,it would have been preferable stores and their operation, methods of not to splitup the considerationaccording mobilization and transportingtroops to to the *varioussubjects. On the other the front,analysis of the location,function hand, however, the Commissionrealized and objectivesof the strongholdsand out- that, because of the large quantity of posts and their functioningin practice) testimonysubmitted to it, its deliberations nor the conduct of military operations had already gone on for a long time until the point of the containmentof the and a considerable period would elapse enemy advance, even though the Com- its work. mission has already heard a great deal before it could complete The is entitled to learn as as of testimonyon these additional subjects public soon of the and recom- as well. In particular, we would like to possible findings mendations on those subjects on which stress already at this point that we are the Commissionhas concluded its delib- not yet discussing the painful problem erations and it is desirable that the of the stationingof the forceat the Suez be able to act in accord- Canal strongholds:This force, though it Governmentmay ance on them without foughtwith devotion and made its con- delay. tributionto the containmentof the enemy, Furthermore,this partial reportdoes was in factinsufficiently co-ordinated and not even contain all that the Commission trained. We shall be dealing with this has to say on thesubjects of the information themewhen we come to analyse the entire and its assessmentand the state of alert complex of problems reJating to the of the IDF, because the Commission functionsand purposes of the strongholds realizes that it would be preferable to and outpostsand their actual operation, publish as soon as possible its main con- since theseproblems are closelyinterwoven. clusionsand recommendationson theinsti- It emerges thereforethat, chronolo- tutionallevel and withregard to theholders gically, the Commission in this report of certain posts and offices.It has found deals with the two intermediatechapters it possible to do so because, afterlengthy (the informationand its evaluation; the and fullconsultation between its members, state of alert) and leaves fora later report it has already reached an opinion on such the other two subjects (the deployment conclusionsand recommendations,but the that preceded the state of alert, and the formulationof its detailed reasoning is battlesup to thecontainment of theenemy, likely to continue for some time. The whichbegan withthe endingof the period Commissionaccordingly found it advisable of alert). However, it should already be to publish these conclusionsand recom- stated now that when we come to discuss mendations first immediately,while the these additionalsubjects, we shall be quite full reasoning will be given in a further unable to consider them fromall aspects partial report.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 191

This reportcontains a general,very brief, deliberationswholly or partly in cameraif descriptionof facts,insofar as such a de- it findsthis necessary in order to preserve scriptionis needed for an understanding the securityof the State." In our case, the of the conclusions.In view of its contents, decision on complete secrecy, taken by this report may be published, whereas the Governmentin advance in accordance thefurther report, which contains a detailed withpara. 23 of the Law, was an absolute descriptionof the facts and a complete necessity,since the investigationshowed expositionof the Commission'sconclusions that the material presentedas testimony reached by the Commission,will contain includes a large amount of factsand in- manysecret facts,which in all probability formation of a most sensitive security will rule out publication in full. nature,which must not be publishedand 4. The Characterand Procedureof the thus become known to the enemy, with Commission the grave harm forthe State which would be involved. An analysisof the provisions of the Com- missionsof Inquiry Law, 1968 (hereafter 6. The Commission'sUse of Para. 15 of the Law) showsthat the Commissionhas theLaw a quasi-juridicalcharacter. Furthermore, We hesitatedover the correctinterpre- the fact that, in accordance with article tation of para. 15 of the Law and feel it 4 (a) of the Law, the compositionof the necessaryto prefacea fewwords of expla- Commissionis determinedby thePresident nation of the interpretationof this para- of the Supreme Court indicates there is graph thatwe adopted. no link betweenthe Commissionand the This paragraph states: Government,and thatit is not a "Govern- "a) If a Commissionof Inquiry finds ment Commissionof Inquiry." In other that a certain individual is liable to be words,by introducingthis special arrange- harmed by the inquiry or its results,the ment, the Legislatureintended to accord Chairman of the Commissionshall inform such a Commissionof Inquiry absolute him in what respect he is liable to be independenceand to ensure thatit should harmed and shall place at his disposal,in be independentin arrivingat its findings such manner as he sees fit,thetestimony and recommendations,and should have concerning the said damage and which the confidenceof the public. is in the poss ssion of the Commissionor 5. In its resolution,the Cabinet decided of anyone who has been assigned the task that "the matterswhich are the subject ofgathering material under paragraph 13. of the investigationand the commission's "b) A person who has been informed deliberationsrequire secrecy, as laid down under sub-para. (a) is entitledto appear in section 23 of the inquiry commissions before the Commission, eitherin person law, 1968, excludingparagraphs (1) and or throughan attorney,in order to pre- (6) therein,"and thisfinding was approved sent his case and cross-questionwitnesses by theKnesset Foreign Affairs and Defence even if they have already testifiedbefore Committeein itsresolution of November 19, the Commissionand the Commissionis 1973. Accordingly,the Commissiontook authorizedto permithim to submitproofs care to hold its deliberationsin camera provided they are in connectionwith the and to preserve meticulous secrecy re- said damage." gardingthe evidencepresented to it, bear- In our view,the purposeof thisclause ing in mindthat secrecyitself is indivisible. is to prevent an individual from being Generally it is better for a commission harmed as a resultof testimonyprsented of inquiry into "matters of vital public to the Commissionwithout his knowledge importance at the time and requiring in such a way thathe is denied the oppor- clarification"(in the terms of Para. 1 tunityto react to it. In view of this aim, of the law) to hold its deliberations we did not apply clause 15 when the evi- openly,and indeed the principleof public dence of an individualled to the drawing hearingsis laid down in detail in para. of conclusions to his detriment(in the 18 (a). Nevertheless,in thesame paragraph nature of a confession)or where such a the Legislature also accorded the com- conclusion emerged from a document missionof inquryitself the right"to hold to whichhe was a partyor fromminutes or

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 192 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

the record of deliberationsin which he documentsand other cxhibits.The Com- tookpart. But we drewno conclusionsfrom mission deemed it necessaryto seek the any documentsto the detrimentof any aid of the collectorsof material because witnesswithout his being given the oppor- of the large scope of the factual details tunityto make his own statementon the touchingon the said subjectsand because contents of the document. On theother of the many applicationsin writingthat hand,when it emergedfrom the testimonv reached the Commissionfrom army per- of another witness or from documents sonnel, pointing out various flaws and submittedby anotherwitness that evidence defectsthat theyhad encounteredin con- had been presentedwhich was detrimental nection with the arrangementsfor their to a certainindividual without his know- mobilization,the state of equipment,the ledge, we applied paragraph 15 with quality of the weapons at their disposal, regard to such testimony,and informed etc. Those appointed to gather material the personconcerned of his rightto cross- as aforesaid were: examine witnesseswho had already testi- Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Joseph Avidar - with fied orto submitfurtherevidence Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Moshe Goren the help of an attorney,if he so desire. Brig.-Gen.(Res.) Shimon Gilboa We are convinced that the inter- Col. (Res.) Yisrael Carmi pretationwe have given to paragraph 15 Col. (Res.) Yehoshua Nevo is in keeping with the requirementsof Col. (Res.) Moshe Tamir justice and has ensured a fair hearingfor any person who has appeared before The above have now in fact completed us and is mentionedto his detrimentin their task. Even though the major part thisreport. We are also convincedthat any of the verylarge amount of materialthey broaderinterpretation of this clausewould gathered pertains to the subjects which have stultifiedthe inquiry entirely,by the Commission has not yet begun to irreparablycomplicating its procedures. discuss,we would like to take this oppor- the reserve officerswho 7. The members of the Commission tunity to thank their themselvesquestioned the witnesseswho gatheredthe material for willingness out the tasks assigned to them, were invitedby it and appeared beforeit. to carry for the de- and theyall testifiedby solemnaffirmation. and express our appreciation manner in which they In addition to the testimonyand other voted and skilful evidenceheard by theCommission directly, carried out their task. it also, under the powers vested in it by 8. Consideration of the causes of the para. 13 of the Law, assignedto six senior errorsand mistakes,which it was essential armyreserve officers the taskof collecting to hold in order to clarifythe truthand complementaryfactual material on certain draw the necessaryconclusions regarding aspects of the readiness and deployment the future,should not detract from the ofthe IDF during the war, and its opera- recognitionof the decisive achievement tions until the containmentof the enemy. of the IDF, which overcame a surprise This materialwas gatheredby takingevi- enemyoffensive on twofronts and through dence, not under affirmation,from army its soldiers' great devotion and readiness personnelwho agreed to testifybefore the forsacrifice, repelled the attackand over- collectorsof material, and by obtaining came the enemy.

CHAPTER 2: THE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE SUBJECTS OF INFORMATION, ITS EVALUATION AND THE READINESS OF THE IDF

9. In our criticismof the evaluationsof and tried to view mattersin the light of the IntelligenceBranch at GHQ and other the situation as it was at the time the bodies, we exercised extremecaution not evaluations were made and the decisions o be drawninto "wisdomafter the event," taken.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 193

10. The opening of the war by Egypt not adequatelyreconsidered in viewof the and Syria on Yom Kippur, October 6, pressureof the changingpolitical circum- 1973, at approximately14.00 hours, took stances,and, in particular,on the basis oft the Israel Defence Forces by surprisein furtherinformation that reached the Di- that until the early morning hours of rectorof MilitaryIntelligence concerning that day the IDF's Supreme Command the build-up of enemy strength with and thepolitical leadership did notevaluate additionialarmaments systems. This "coIn- that total war was about to commence- ception"had, therefore,in practicebecomc and oll the morningof tlhatday, when it obsolete.Secondly, the Director of Military was already clear to them that the war Intelligenceassured the IDF thathe would would break out, the Supreme Command be able to give advance warning of any mistakenlyassumed that it would break enemy intentionto launch all-out war out only at 18.00 hours.Responsibility for in good time to allow forthe orderlycall- thesemistaken evaluations should be placed up of the reserves.This undertakingwas primarily on the Director of Military assumed as the firmfoundation for the Intelligence[DMI] and on his Principal defence plans of the IDF. We find there Assistant in charge of the Intelligence were no groundsfor giving the IDF such Branch's Research Department,which is an absolute undertaking. the only body in the countryengaged in the days preceding the intelligenceresearch. They failed by pro- Thirdly, in viding the IDF with totally insufficient Yom Kippur War, the IntelligenceBranch warning:It was onlyat about 4.30 a.m. on (Research) had receivednumerous warning Yom Kippur thatthe DM1I, on thestrength reports,supplied to it by the information- of fresh intelligence he had received, gatheringdepartment of the Intelligencc notifiedthat the enemy would open war Branchand by otherinformation-gathering at 18.00 hours on both fronts.This brief authorities in the country. The Research ofthe theDirector warning did not allow for mobilization Division Intelligenceand of the reservesin an orderlyfashion, and of Military Intelligencedid not correctly involved the hasty mobilization of the evaluate the warningscontained in these land forces,contrary to the regular time- reports,owing to theirdoctrinaire adher- tables and mobilizationprocedures. The ence to the "conception" and the fact the additional error of four hours, between that they were prepared to explain the 18.00 and 14.00, further reduced the enemy deployment along front intervalbetween the call-up ofthe reserves lines, which was without precedent in thesize ofthe forces and in theirorientation and theopening of fireby the enemy.This that second error caused furtherdisruptions towardsthe fronts,on the assumption in the readiness of the regular forces at all thistestified only to a defensivedeploy- the frontsand their correct deployment, mentin Syria and the holdingof a multi- arm "exercise" in Egypt,similar to exer- particularlyon the Canal front. cises held therein the past. 11. There were three reasons for the For this reason the Director of Mili- failure of the authoritiesresponsible for taryIntelligence also displayedexaggerated evaluation: Firstly,their obdurate adher- caution in the circumstancesby failing ence to what was knownas "the concep- to take additional measures that were tion," accordingto which a) Egyptwould at his disposal and which might have not launch war against Israel beforeshe revealed important complementaryin- had firstensured sufficientair power to formation.The enemy thus succeeded in attack Israel in depth, and in particular misleadingthe IDF and taking them by Israel's principalairfields, so as to paralyse surprise under the guise of an exercise the , and b) that Syria supposedly taking place in Egypt. Only would only launch an all-out attack on on the morning of Friday, October 5, Israel simultaneouslywith Egypt. We did the confidence of the Intelligence learned,on groundsto be detailed in our Branch in the correctnessof its evaluation furtherpartial report,that the firstand begin to be shaken, and then only when decisivepart ofthis conception, which may particularly clear reports were received well have been correctat one time, was whichit would have been hard to reconcile

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 194 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES withthe assumptionthat the enemybuild- enemy's intentionswere still not clear at up was no morethan a defencesystem and that time. an "exercise." And yet the correctconclu- Secondly, we have found that, in sion was stillnot drawn,and the summary total reliance on the IntelligenceBranch's ofthe evaluation of the IntelligenceBranch assurance that it could always give the continuedto be: "Low probability"and IDF sufficientwarning for orderlymobil- even "Lower than low" probabilityof the ization of the reserves, no defence plan enemy launching a war. Only early in properlyworked out in detailwas prepared the morningof Saturday, Yom Kippur, for the eventualitythat the regular forces afterfurther ambiguous reportswere re- would have to check, on their own, an ceived, did the Director of Military In- all-out attack by the enemyon the Egyp- telligencecome to the conclusionthat war tian and Syrian fronts simultaneously would break out the same day. - with the IDF being caught by surprise 12. In the evaluationof the information as they were. on the enemy's moves and his intention Thirdly, even after receipt of the to launch a war made by holdersof other warningon Saturdaymorning, the regular positions,the decisive influenceis evident armoured forceson the Canal frontwere of the Director of Military Intelligence not optimallydeployed in time,under the and the Research Division of the Intel- circumstancescreated, in accordance with ligence Branch, resultingfrom the fact the plan that existed for the defensive that they were the only centre for the deployment of the regular forces. Fur- evaluation of militaryintelligence in the thermore,no clear directive was given country,and that they were in control that morningto the GOC SouthernCom- ofthe total body of intelligenceinformation mand and from him also to the lower that had accumulated in their possession echelons,as to how theywere to prepare fromthe information-gatheringauthorities forthe attack,and lack of clarityprevailed of the IntelligenceBranch itself,from the in issuingoperational orders and ensuring secretintelligence services and fromother theirimplementation. information-gatheringauthorities, while 14. (a) At the meeting of the IDF the IntelligenceBranch disseminatedthis General Staff on September 24, 1973, information,as compiled data, to other the GOC NorthernCommand, Maj-Gen. authorities,with its own evaluation as Yitzhak Hofi, expressed concern at the "intelligence,"and it decided who should limitationsinvolved in receivingsufficient get the raw material and what material warningin viewof the dangeroussituation should be disseminated. on the Golan Heights followingincreased 13. The mistakes of the Intelligence Syriandeployment bv meansof an effective Branchwere not theonly mistakesdisrupt- anti-aircraftmissile . The Mini- ing the IDF's moves at the beginning ster of Defence was impressed by the of the war. In addition,there were errors GOC Northern Command's concern, in the workingof the state of readiness particularlyin view of the threatto the duringthe days precedingthe war. There Golan Heights settlementsposed by the was an unjustifieddelay in the mobilization Syrian deployment. On September 26, of the reserves.It is our opinion that, on the eve of Rosh Hashana, he visited the the basis of the data in his possession,the area in orderto gain a first-handimpression Chief of Staffshould already have recom- of the situation,and also issued a warning mended partial mobilizationof the land to the Syrians.A certain reinforcementof forcesat the beginningof the weekpreced- armoured and artillery deploymenton ing the war, to maintain the right pro- the Golan Heights was decided upon. portionsbetween the enemyforces, which (b) On the Ministerof Defence'sini- were at full alert and prepared foraction tiative, the Prime Minister decided to against us, and our own forces. At the convene, followingher return fromher very latest, he should have recom- trip to Strasbourgand Vienna on Sep- mended - in view of reports received - ex- tember 30 to October 2, a military-poli- tensive mobilization on the morning of tical consultationon October 3, with the Friday,October 5, even assumingthat the participation of Ministers Allon, Galili

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 195 and Dayan - as well as the Chiefof Staff At the end of this meeting the Prime and Brig.-Gen. Arye Shalev, the DMI's Minister announced that the security assistant(research), who was fillingin for situationwould be placed on the agenda of the DMI who was indisposed that day. the Cabinet sessionscheduled for Sunday, At thismeeting views were exchanged on October 7, and, should it be necessaryto the situation along the frontiers,parti- mobilizereserves before then, the Ministers cularly on the Golan Heights. Brig.-Gen. present authorized the Prime Minister Shalev gave an intelligencereport which and the Minister of Defence to decide concluded with the assessmentthat "the upon mobilizationof reserves.The Prime possibility of an Egyptian-Syrian war Minister also instructedthe Government does not seem likely to me, since there Secretary to ascertain the whereabouts has been no change in their assessment of the Ministers on the followingday, of the state of forcesin Sinai so that they in order to make it possible to summon could go to war." None of those present them on Yom Kippur in case of need. disagreedwith thisassessment. At the end 15. Early on Saturday morning, the of this consultationthe Prime Minister furtherinformation was received which decided to submitthe subjectof the situa- raised the opening of total war by the tion along the borders for discussion in enemy to a degree of near-certainty.The the Cabinet followingYom Kippur, at C-o-S consultedwith his senior aides, and the regular Cabinet meeting scheduled gave furtherpreparatory orders in anti- for Sunday, October 7. cipation of mobilization of the reserves. On the morningof Friday,October 5, In a discussion between the Defence following receipt of further disturbing Ministerand the C-o-S, the latterrecom- reportsand after a meeting between the mended mobilizationof the entirereserves Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff, to prepare for large-scalecounter-attacks, a furtherconsultation was held at the after containment of the enemy. The Prime Minister's, with the participation Defence Minister, on the other hand, of the Defence Minister,the Chiefof Staff favouredmobilization of the maximalforce and the DMI. The Chiefof Staffinformed which, in the opinion of the C-o-S, suf- the meeting that on Yom Kippur there ficed for defensivepurposes. A delay of would be an extremelyhigh state of alert about twohours occurred in a mobilization throughoutthe IDF, especiallyin the Air ofthe size agreedto bythe Defence M\linister Force and the Armour,and that the tank that morning in the discussion between forceson both frontswould be reinforced. him and the C-o-S, because the C-o-S At the end of thisconsultation the Prime awaited the Premier'sdecision on the full Ministerdecided to convene for that day mobilizationof the reserves. a meetingof the Ministerswho were then At 09.05 the Premier immediatelyap- in Tel Aviv. Held towards noon, the proved mobilizationof the defensiveforce, meetingwas attendedby Ministers Bar-Lev, and at 09.25 she decided in favourof total Dayan, Hillel, Chasani, Peres and Galili, mobilization as recommended by the as well as the Chiefof Staffand the DMI. C-o-S. At the same discussionat the Prime The latter's evaluation was still that we Minister's, it was decided for political were not facing total war, and the Chief reasons not to deliver a preventiveblow, of Staff supportedthis evaluation, while as proposed by the C-o-S. The Prime expressingthe opinion that therewas no Minister then conferred with the US proof that the enemy did not intend to Ambassador,in order to explain the situa- attack.He reiteratedthat he had declared tion to the US Government.After this a maximumalert within the regular forces, meeting a Cabinet session, beginningat but that"the mobilizationof reservesand 12 noon, was held. The Cabinet Ministers additional measuresare being held back voiced no opposition to the decision not until there are furtherindications." to launcha preventiveattack on theenemy.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 196 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

CHAPTER 3: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

16. According to the Basic Law: the back to the time when the late David Government,para. 29: "The Government Ben-Gurionserved both as Prime Minister is authorizedto carryout on behalfof the and Minister of Defence, and his strong State, in accordance with any law, any personalityaffected the lack of definition act whose implementationis not lawfully on thisimportant subject. One thing,how- entrustedto any other authority." This ever,is clear fromthe constitutionalaspect: impliesthat the Governmentis also entrus- It has never been decided thatthe Minister ted withthe managementof State security of Defence is a "Super Chief of Staff" affairs insofar as no other authorityis who is requiredto guidethe Chief of Staff empoweredto act in this sphere by any in the latter's area of responsibilityon other law: such as the authorityof the operational matters,or a kind of supreme Ministerof Defence regardinglaws whose commander of the IDF by virtue of his implementationis specifically entrusted being Ministerof Defence. The inadequate to him. definitionof powers prevailingin the pre- In accordance with para. 27 of the sent situationin the field of security,the same law, the Government is entitled vital importanceof which is unsurpassed, to act by means of Cabinet committees, hampers the effectivenessof the work, permanent, temporary, or for specified detractsfrom the focusingof legal respon- issues,and, in accordancewith para. 31 (a) sibility,and causes uncertaintyand frus- "'authorityentrusted to the Government tration amongst the public. by law may be transferredby the Govern- We have not considered it our duty ment to one of the Ministers." to enter in depth into the question of co- This means that the general authority ordinationof authoritybetween the three of the Governmentin accordance with the aforementionedsystems and willbe content, aforementionedsection 29, to carry out therefore,with pointingout the need for on behalfof the State, subject to any law, the Governmentand theKnesset to consid- any act whichis not entrustedto any other er this problem with a view to finding authority,is also within the category of a solution.We assumethat rigid definitions, the Government'sauthority which may be providing in advance for any situation transferredto one of the Ministers in that may arise, cannot be achieved, but accordance with para. 31 (a). even definitionsof a somewhat broad 17. We have learned fromthe evidence legal nature are preferableto no definition before us that there is a lack of clear whatsoever. definitionas to the division of authority, 18. It is particularlynecessary to clarify dutiesand responsibilitiesconcerning secu- who is authorized to order operationsto ritymatters amongst the three authorities be carried out in situationslikely to arise dealing with these matters: the Govern- in the face of a sudden threat,or in cases mentand the PrimeMinister; the Minister where speed is essential,such as the acti- of Defence; and the Chief of Staff,who vation of regular forces, mobilization of heads the IDF; and in the determination supplementaryreserves or any otherform of the relationshipbetween the political of mobilization,when there is no time to leadership and the IDF High Command. convene the Cabinet - as was the case Particularlyvital is such a clear definition early in the morning of Yom Kippur. of authorityin cases whereinthe initiative lies in thehands of the enemy. Furthermore, GovernmentProcedures on SecurityMatters we have foundno explicitauthority in the 19. We have learned that in the course law for the practice wherebythe Chief of of time there has been a malfunctioning Staffis appointed by the Governmenton in the performanceof the duties that the the recommendationof the Minister of Governmenthas to carry out in top-level Defence. The unclarity in all these re- discussionsand decisionson securityaffairs. spectsis evidentlyof historic origin-dating This malfunctioningis connectedwith the

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 197 disappearance of the Cabinet Committee on urgentmatters connected with the man- on SecurityAffairs in its original format, agementof thewar. This is also necessary limited in the number of its members. in order to enable the remainingMinisters Ever since the formation of a broad to continue to devote their full attention, coalitionin 1967, this Committeehas been even in timesof war, to the affairsof their expanded in order to ensure the represen- own ministries,so that these will not be tationof all partiesin thecoalition and even neglected, particularlyin times of emer- the factions within the parties. In the gency. The Deputy Prime Minister, or finaloutcome, 17 out of the Cabinet's 24 another Minister,could conduct regular members participated in the Cabinet Cabinet sessions in which other matters Committee. Under these circumstances, requiring a Cabinet decision at such a the special Committeehad in factceased time may be dealt with. Naturally,basic to exist, the entire Cabinet becoming issues, long-range issues, and issues of the "Cabinet Committee on Security special importance will continue to be Affairs"- and thisonly in orderto ensure, reservedfor discussion and decisionby the in this manner, top secrecy in its full Cabinet. deliberations. 22. IntelligenceCommunity - Intelligence 20. The adoption of correct decisions Evaluation. on mattersof supreme importance depends As on the receipt of current informa- a) noted above, the factualsituation tion and the receipt of full additional on the eve of the Yom Kippur War - and informationon the specific issue under over a period of many years before then discussion. According to testimonysub- - was that only one body in the intel- mittedto us, thereis a serious problemof ligence community,namely, the General leakage of information from Cabinet Staff's Intelligence Branch, engaged in sessions.This has, on occasion, prevented intelligenceevaluation, research and eva- the submissionof full informationto the luation of reports. This intelligenceeva- Cabinet. In theopinion of the Commission, luation was, thus, the only one submitted thisphenomenon must be overcomeby the to the Chief of Staff,the Defence Min- formationof a Cabinet Committeefor Se- ister,the Prime Ministerand the Cabinet. curityAffairs, with a really small number This system of evaluation in the intelli- ofmembers - and thisconsideration must, gence communityhad grave reflectionson in our opinion, be a decisive one in the the evaluation of the intelligence infor- the formationof such a committee- and by mation by governmental authorities meticulousobservance of the law and the on the eve of the war. Cabinet regulations designed to ensure It shouldbe notedthat a similarsituation secrecyin discussionson securitymatters. existed in part during the tenure of the Thus therewould no longerbe any excuse late David Ben-Gurionin the early 'sixties. fortransferring the focusof discussionson Dissatisfiedwith the lack of clarity in a securityor political-securitymatter from mattersrelating to subordinationand the the Cabinet or its Committeeto bodies evaluation functionsof the bodies in the established on an ad hoc basis and not intelligencecommunity, Ben-Gurion ap- authorized by the Cabinet. The Prime pointedin thefirst half of 1963 a committee Minister is of course entitled to consult, of two ( and Ze'ev Sharef) at any time and as she sees fit, other to define the subordinationand tasks of Ministersand holdersof relevantposts on thesebodies. This committeewas appointed mattersfor which they are responsible, by Ben-Gurionon the eve ofhis retirement so long as the authorityof the Cabinet to to Sdeh Boker, out of concern, interalia, discuss mattersand take decisions is not that this situation-which, by virtue of affected. his servingsimultaneously as both Prime 21. We also believe thatin time of war, Ministerand Ministerof Defence, generally it is appropriatethat the Cabinet should functionedsatisfactorily - mightdeterio- authorize the Prime Minister to form a rate. small ministerialteam of no more than b) On July 31, 1963, the Committee five members,headed by the Prime Min- submittedits reportto the PrimeMinister, ister, and responsiblefor taking decisions the late Levi Eshkol. The Committee's

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 198 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES reportwas based on fourbasic assumptions Prime Minister on intelligence matters. (para. 5 of the report),which in turnwere This special adviser must be a person of based on the primaryassumption that the high calibre, who would devote all his functionsof Prime Ministerand Minister time to the task and would be subordinate of Defence do not necessarilyhave to be only to the Prime Minister. concentratedin the hands of one person. "19. The fiunctionof the adviser would The firstand last basic assumptions,which be to assist the Prime Ministerin keeping concern our subject matter, are quoted in touchwith the activitiescarried out and hereunderin full: planned by the various secretservices. "(a) The Prime Minister must be in possession of a complete picture of all "20. His powers would be: the activitiesof the State's secretservices, "(a) He would participateregularly in namely:their current work plans, planning the Heads of Services' committee. for futureactivities, difficulties and limi- "(b) He would participateregularly in tations,aind so forth.... all meetingsof the Prime Mlinisterwith "(b) It is essentialfor the Prime Minister any of the Heads of Services, or in any to be in possessionof evaluationson polit- discussionof the Prime Ministeron secret ical, securityand othersubjects - balanced activities,or in a political and security and based on differentviewpoints and not discussion related to secret activity. stemmingspecifically from one channel." " (c) He would be entitled to deInand (c) In order to accomplish the afore- informationfrom every Service, either mentionedaims, the committeesubmitted directlythrough the Head of Service, or a number of principal recommendations, by direct contact with departmentsand relatingto both"research and evaluations" units of the Service (via the Head of (paras. 14-15 of the report) and the tools Service, of course). with which the Prime Ministershould be " (d) On theinitiative or with the approv- equipped for controlling these issues al of the Prime Minister, he would be (paras. 18-20): entitled to investigate the methods of "14. The committeeaccordingly recom- operation of an entire Service or a unit mends the examinationof the possibility thereof,and to review evaluations sub- of strengtheningthe Foreign Ministry's mittedto the Prime Minister- both by Research Departmentso that it should be talks with the submittersof evaluations, capable of presentingindependent polit- and by the receiptof raw materialwhere ical evaluations,both on Middle Eastern necessary." issues and on other political subjects, It is to be regretted that these two as required. principalrecommendations were not imple- "15. By strengtheningthe Research mentedin practice or systematically.The Department,a certain balance would be then Prime Ministerhesitated to appoint created forthe securityand political eval- a special adviser on intelligencematters uations,which are presentlymade almost both because of the difficultyof finding solelyby the Intelligence Branch's Research the right appointee and the "natural" Department." lack ofenthusiasm of the Heads of Services; The committeealso observed that "the and because it appeared that the holder continued existence of an intelligence of such an office would not be fully agency ('Israel's Secret Intelligence Ser- employed. vice'), in possessionof secretinformation- The gist of the committee'srecommen- gatheringinstruments, facilitates to some dationswas presentedby the Prime Minis- extent, the formationof an evaluation, terto theKnesset Defence & ForeignAffairs although limited in value." Committeeon Wednesday,September 1 1, " 18. On the strength of the basic 1963 (Protocol No. 37) and Monday, assumptions and our recommendations October 7, 1963 (Protocol No. 39). It for organizingthe services,the committee should be noted that the discussionin the regards as a matter of vital importance Committeedid not go into the subject the appointmentof a special adviserto the thoroughly,and was held without the

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 199

report having been submitted to the Servicesand thePrime Minister. The Com- membersin the original. Some members missionis aware of the fact that by virtue of the Defence and Foreign Affairs ofhis functions as definedabove, theadviser Committee(not divided along partylines) on intelligenceis likelyto comeinto contact shared the Prime Minister'shesitation to with officersof the Intelligence Branch appoint a special adviser on intelligence contraryto all rules of militarypractice; (bearing in mind the then sensitiveissue on the otherhand, it is convincedthat this of the Chief of the Secret Service), while is essentialfor the efficientfulfilment of his othermembers (again irrespectiveof party functions. divisions) thought the recommendations 2. To strengthenthe Foreign Ministry's should be considered. Research Departmentby its organization The ForeignMinistry's Research Depart- as an independentbody withinthe frame- ment was not sufficientlystrengthened in work of the Foreign Ministry,one of its line with the functionsproposed for it in principal aims being the carryingout of the aforementionedreport. The reasons an independentpolitical-strategic intelli- (budgetaryin the main) which the present gence evaluation, mainly on the basis of Commission heard from the Foreign the special material at its disposal; to Minister to account for the non-streng- reinforce the department with suitable thening - in fact, depletion - of the staff,qualitatively and quantitatively. ResearchDepartment did not convincethe Commission. 3. To lay down clear rules for dissem- ination and feed-back - both to the (d) We have reached the conclusion variousresearch bodies and to the Minister that the state of affairs which existed of Defence and the Prime Minister - of up to the Yom Kippur War - which the raw intelligencematerial collected by preventedindependent political, strategic, theinformation-gathering bodies inside and operational and tactical intelligenceeval- outside the IntelligenceBranch, regardless uations because of theirconcentration in of whetherit is theirprimary or secondary one organizationand under one authority task. on the one hand, and, on the otherhand, the absence of a special adviser to the 4. To effectsubstantial and fundamental Prime Minister on intelligenceto allow changesin the structureof the Intelligence for independent evaluation - played a Branch and the IntelligenceCorps them- major role in the inability to arrive at selves- ensuringthat the centre of gravity a trueintelligence picture from all aspects. of research and evaluation should be in thespheres of military, strategic, operational Accordingly,the Commission recom- and tactical intelligence(including reor- mends the immediate adoption of the ganization of Field Intelligence and its measures: following appropriaterepresentation at General Staff 1. To appoint a special adviser to the level), givingsuitable expressionand even Prime Minister on intelligence (not a encouragementto the expressionof various regulararmy man, although,of course,he and conflictingviews among the Research could be an officerin the reserves), his Department'sstaff in IntelligenceBranch functionsand powers to be as designated evaluations disseminated to the various in the report of the committeesubmitted bodies, appointingsuitable staff,including to the Prime Ministerin 1963. Actingin civilians, to the Research Departmentin concertwith this adviser there must be a accordancewith optimal routes of advance- small but high-level team which would mentand suitablerotation within and out- enable thePrime Miaister (and throughher side the Department,and ensuringregular theentire Cabinet) to effectan independent controlof intelligenceevaluations. political-strategicintelligence evaluation on thebasis of all thematerial in theposses- 5. An evaluation unit for the material sion of the various information-gathering collectedby the SecretIntelligence Service services. At the same time, it should be should be set up within the Service. made absolutely clear that this adviser All theaforementioned recommendations, mustnot be allowed to be a bufferbetween withoutexception, are designed to ensure the intelligence community'sHeads of pluralismin thevarious types of intelligence

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 200 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES evaluation,as well as to providethe Prime ligence community for the provision of Ministerwith the requisitetools to ensure warning, and analysis of their intelligencc the efficientfunctioning of the entireintel- evaluations.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OFFICE-HOLDERS

23. The Directorof MilitaryIntelligence, "During most of my years in the IDF Major-GeneralEliyahu Ze'ira, testifiedbefore I was not a staffofficer but a field com- us veryfrankly and showed himselfto be mander,and insofaras possiblemy charac- an officerof outstanding intellectual ability, ter does not lead me to pass on responsi- enjoyinggreat authorityover his subor- bilityupwards. For in the kind of process dinatesand highlyregarded by his superiors you... describe... it is like saying: Here in theIDF and thehigher political echelons. is a complex situation, you decide. So He had served in his position for only a I didn't feel like doing that. In general year beforethe outbreak of the war, and I very very seldom do things like that. was confrontedwith patterns of thought Things which fall within my sphere of which were determinedin the Intelligence responsibilityI don't usually bring up to Branch's researchbefore his appointment. my superiorsand tell them: Althoughit's But he adopted the "conception," which, my responsibility,I am passing on the throughits rigidity, deadened thenecessary responsibilityto you; you decide." openness and the willingnessalways to Our opinion is that in the light of his contendanew with the informationwhich serious failure Major-General Ze'ira can flowedinto the IntelligenceBranch, and no longercontinue to serve in his position he even played his part in strengthening as Director of MilitaryIntelligence. it. He displayed a prominenttendency 24. In the hands of Brigadier-General to take unqualified as decisions an officer AryeShalev, as assistantto the Director of stemmingfrom great self-confidence and MilitaryIntelligence in charge of research, readiness to act as final arbiterin Intel- was concentratedthe subject of research ligence matters in Israel. For example, and evaluation in the Intelligence at the meeting of the Knesset's Defence Branch - that subjectin which the Intel- and ForeignAffairs Committee on May 18, ligence Branch failed so grievously.He 1973, he said: had servedin thiscapacity, previously under "The Chiefof Staffmust decide, and his the titleof Head of the Research Depart- decisionsmust be clear. The best assistance ment, for a long time, since September- that the Director of Military Intelligence October 1967.He playedan importantpart can render the Chief of Staff- if it is in mouldingmethods of research,analysis, objectivelypossible - is to give him as evaluation and preparation of the infor- clear and sharpan evaluationas is possible. mation for distributionfrom this depart- It is true that the clearer and sharper ment in recent years. According to his the evaluation then,if it is mistaken,it is testimonybefore us his approach to the a clear and sharp mistake- but that is a 'cconception"was flexible:he was prepared risk the Director of Military Intelligence to assessits fundamentalvalidity from time takes." to time.But fromthe documentsproduced Thus, in his testimonybefore us, he by his departmentand from statements answered a question posed by a member made by him during various discussions, of the Commissionwhy he did not consult it is clear thathis evaluationsnever deviated the Chiefof Staffregarding a mostimpor- fromthe frameworkof the "conception." tant operational decision which he took He bears heavy responsibilityfor the most on his own responsibilityin a matter grievous mistake of the department he in which his superiorswere misled into headed and we thereforebelieve that he thinkingthat the matterunder considera- cannotcontinue to servein the Intelligence tion had been taken into account in the Branch. course of the Director of Military Intel- 25. Lt.-ColonelYona Bendman,the head ligence's evaluations: of the Egyptian Section in the Research

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 201

Department of the Intelligence Branch, a report entitled: "Movement in the co-ordinatedthe activitiesof the Section, Egyptian Army - the Possibilityof the which was the focus of the misleading Resumption of Hostilities, October 1, errors in evaluation and in the failure 1973," when the Command was already to warn of the Egyptiatnenemy's inten- on a footingof special alert. The report tions - those intentionswhich stood at presents,sums up and analyses the infor- the centreof the "conception." With him mationregarding the Egyptiandeployment the beliefin the "conception" reached its and the enemy's prepaiedness. On Octo- zenith. Prominentproof to this effectwe ber 3, Lt. Siman-Tov presenteda further find in the intelligenceprecis produced report entitled: "Situation Report in the in co-operation with his section on Egyptian Army, summarizing Septem- October 5, at 13.15. This preciscontains a ber 13 - October 2, 1973," which was long listof signs testifying to the Egyptians' fundamentallyan expanded and more offensivepreparations. BuLt at the end of detailed version of the report presented thechapter on Egyptappears paragraph 40, oni October 1. whichwas draftedby Lt. -Colonel Benidman: In these documents,the junior officer "Though the actual takingup of emer- pointed out a nunmberof importantfacts, gency positionson the Canal appears to which are not compatiblewith the inter- contain indicationstestifying to an offen- pretationof the Egyptiandeployment and sive initiative,according to our best eval- preparednessas a mereexercise, and there- uation no change has occurred in the fore assertedthat these factssubstantiated Egyptian assessment of the balance of theevaluation that the exercise was nothing power between their forcesand the IDF. but camouflage for actual operations Therefore,the probabilitythat the Egyp- planned by the Egyptians. tiansintend to resumehostilities is low." Accordingto Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah, the This sentencewas an importantfactor summaryof the situationin the documents in strengtheningthe mistakenview of the was also meant for distributionin his decision-makerson both the militaryand Command's IntelligenceDepartment, for political levels on that fatefulday. And the unitsand posts in the Command,and so he explainsin his testimonybefore us: for IntelligenceBranch at General H.Q. "... The firstversion of this precis I A scrutinyof the documentsshows that wrotewithout para. 40, and I felt before insteadof raising doubtsas to the evalua- writingit that I must add it... I feltthat tion of the Egyptiandeployment and pre- if I didn't writepara. 40, I was not doing as an exercise, as there was myduty. In otherwords, it was notenough, paredness reason to do in lightof the contentof the I was not asked only to point out the and submittingthese to the facts: I must give an evaluation of the documents, GOC Command and the Intelligence information.My evaluationwas thatfrom Branch, Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah erased the a purelymilitary viewpoint there were all penetratingquestions, which could have the signsthat you could wishfor indicating raised doubts as to the evaluation of the offensiveintentions; from the viewpointof Egyptian deployment and preparedness intentions,my evaluation remained,that as an exercise. Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah ex- theydid not regardthemselves as capable plained to the Commissionthat the evalua- of launching an attack. They attacked tion of the junior officerstood in contra- 24 hourslater, but thatis anothermatter." diction to the IntelligenceBranch's evalu- It is our opinion that Lt.-Colonel ation that an exercisewas taking place Bendman should not be employed in a in Egypt- an evaluationwhich was accep - positioninvolving intelligence evaluation. ted by him and by the GOC Southern 26. Lt.-ColonelDavid Gedaliahwas Intel- Command. To the questionof whyhe did ligenceOfficer of Southern Command from not accept the evaluation of the junior 1971until March 1974,having been moved officerhe replied: "It stemsfrom the final on the latter date to another position in evaluation that the Egyptians wouldn't the IntelligenceCorps. On October 1, 1973 begin a war and fromour being convinced an officerunder his command,Lieutenant that it was only an exercise." Thus he Benjamin Simnan-Tov,presented him with directedhis thinkinginto a vicious circle.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 202 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

He did not,therefore, do his obligationsas it eventuallyemerge that in these further an Intellligenceofficer to relate to every stages the Chief of Staffpersonally per- piece ofinformation and to everyevaluation formedmagnificently, this would notsuffice withoutprejudice, and did not bring this to erase the imprintof the initialmistakes. evaluation and that of the Intelligence We have given particular consideration Branch into written confrontationin a to the followingthings - and we stressthat distributed document. The documents we would not, accordingto each of them, were not distributed,without Lt.-Colonel have reached the conclusion arrived at, Gedaliah beingable to offeran explanation but it is their cumulativeweight that has for this. Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah's behaviour forcedus to it. here seems particularlygrave because the results of the aerial photographyof the In the matterof information,the Chief 4th of the month (the examination of of Staff had an evaluation of his own, which went on all night), which attested morestringent than thatof the Intelligence to the reinforcementof the Egyptiande- Branch, in the previousperiod of tension ployment in a threateningand warning during May 1973. The "victorv" of the manner, should have been given special Intelligence Branch, however, when this meaning in the light of Lt. Siman-Tov's state of alert passed withoutincident as evaluation. evaluated by the Intelligence,seemingly reduced the Chief of Staff'salertness in It is our opinion that Lt.-Colonel the days preceding the Yom Kippur Gedaliah did not fulfilhis duties as an War in such a manner as prevented Intelligence officeron the key front,in him from making a real effort to the days when it was particularlycrucial reach a commander's evaluation of his that the Egyptian enemy's intentionsbe own. The meansfor this were in his posses- assessed. Therefore, he should not be sion - interalia in the formof important employed any longer in Intelligence informationwhich was sent to his office functions. (a summary of military-technicalintel- 27. If thereare any otherofficers in the ligence), but which, apparently,was not IntelligenceBranch, among those who did correctlyevaluated by him. During the not appear before us as witnesses,who period of tension in the week preceding contributed to the incorrectevaluation, the war, he did not even visit the fronts, those in authorityshould decide which in order to get a personal feelingof what furtherpersonal changes should be made was happening there, to receive a first- in the ranks of the Intelligence Branch. hand impressionfrom the threateningsigns 28. The Chiefof Staff'sResponsibility: We discoveredby the observationswhich had have reached theconclusion that the Chief been made to elicit informationfrom the of Staff,Lt. -General , bears commandersin the field and to consult personal responsibilityfor what happened them. To the Chief of Staff's credit it on the eve of the war withregard to both should be recalled that he demanded the evaluationof thesituation and the question mobilizationof the whole body of reserves of the IDF's preparedness.We state this on Saturday morning.But in the existing with particular regret as it involves a conditionshe should already have recom- soldierwho has served the State with de- mended a partial mobilization of the votionand distinctionfor many years and reserveson October 1, when the Egyptian has splendid achievements to his credit "exercise" began, and at the latest on during and before the Six Day War. We October 5. We did not accept his expla- were also burdenedby the factthat in this nation that on- that day he did more partial report we do not yet deal with than enough by declaring the highest the issue of the fightingfrom the beginning state of alert in theregular army, incliding of the war until the containmentof the the Air Force (the cancellationof leaves, enemy...and it is commonknowledge that, duty rostersof officersat command posts despitethe grave crisisin the initial stages etc.), and puttingthe reservemobilization of the fighting,the Chief of Staffguided systemin a state of alert. the IDF throughthe holding battles up We also found that the IDF possessed to theenemy's gates. However, even should no prepared, detailed plan in the event

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 203 of an all-out,surprise enemy attack, based Chief of Staff.We are also of the opinion on a realistic evaluation of the enemy's that under the pressing circumstances forces,deployment and intentionsas against prevailingon Saturday morning,the Chief the IDF's forcesand plans. The Chief of of Staffshould, by meansof G (Operations) Staff was over-confidentthat we would Branch,have made sure thathis intentions always receive warning in sufficienttime would be translatedinto clear operative for the mobilizationof the reserves,be it commands. We have found that these even shorterthan that planned. To these procedureswere not sufficientlysupervised, assumptionswas added an exaggerated and so a lack of clarity,which could have confidencein the IDF's ability to repulse been avoided, was created. underall circumstancesa generaloffetisive In thelight of what has been statedabove by the enemyon bothfronts by theregular we regard it as our duty to recommend forcesalone, and in the IDF's ability,when the termination of Lt.-General David fullymobilized, to deploy fordefence and Elazar's appointment as Chief of Staff. to moveover rapidly to large-scalecounter- attack as a condition for the effective 29. The Responsibilityof GOC Southern defenceof the country.In this spirit,the Command: Chief of Staff,during the hours before Major-General Shmuel Gonen, who the outbreakof the fighting,dealt withthe servedin theperiod underconsideration as planning of counter-attacks,instead of GOC Southern Command, distinguished concentratingfirst of all on breakingthe himself as an excellent fighter,and as surprise impetus of the expected attack an armoured commander (7th Brigade) and stoppingthe enemy,by adjustingthe in the Six Day War. Since that time his plans to thesituation that had been created rise was rapid, firstas a divisional com- and instructingthe GOC's accordingly. manderand afterwardsas Chief of Train- In the dangerous situation created that ing Command, until on June 15, 1973 he morning,the Chief of Staffshould have was appointedto the extremelyimportant examined the deploymentof the forces post of GOC Southern Command. As in the field in detail with the GOC's an inexperiencedMajor-General, he was Command and seen to the best possible stillin the processof getting organized and deployment as early as possible after adjusted in his new positionuntiltheout- receiving the warning,and thus allowed break of thewar. But even takingthis into the GOC's enough time for the execution consideration,we have reachedthe opinion of his directives.In addition he did not thaton theday ofthe war's commencement, take into account the possibilitythat the and on the preceding days, he did not enemyattack would commenceand unfold properlyfulfil his duties,and that he bears gradually on a "count-down" method a major part of the responsibilityfor the duringthe daylighthours. Instead of this, dangerous situation in which our forces the Chief of Staffsummoned the GOC's were caughtin the South on Yom Kippur, fora consultationin themorning, and again when the Egyptian enemy attacked. As in theafternoon, and was contentto receive with the Chief of Staff,our remark that operatively unclear information from the total picture may change when we the GOC SouthernCommand. Thus our deal with the containmentbattles, also forceswere denied that measure of alertness applies to him. But what we have foundas and deploymentwhich they could have to his acts and mistakesin relationto (his) achievedin the difficultcircumstances that evaluation of the situation and the pre- had been created.The resultwas thatwhen paredness of his Command in the days the war broke out, the armouredforce in preceding the war, and particularlyon the south was caught inadequately de- the day the war broke out, are sufficient ployed, neitherin accordance with the to necessitatethe severeconclusion we have existingdefence plan nor in accordance reached regardinghim. with any clear improvisedplan, and so Much informationabout observations the-enemy gained initial advantage. Simi- conducted of the other side of the Canal larly, it must be noted that the GOC's by the soldiersin thestrongpoints and from had not yet returnedto their command- aerial photographsreached hiscommand- posts fromtheir second meetingwith the post, containingdata about the enemy's

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 204 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES preparednessand deployment,information vous,which could have caused a deterio- whichshould have generatedgreat anxiety ration in the situationeven unto an un- in the Commander with regard to the premeditatedopening of fire. From his enemy's intentions.He last reconnoitred testimonyit is unclearfronm what source he the Canal front(the Southernsector) oni drew this limitation.He furthelasscrted October2. On October4, whenan extreme- that he feared the launching of a con- ly importantphotographing mission was centratedartillery barrage on our tanks, executed,he was outside the area of his if these were deployed too early at their Command on a private visit. During the startingpositions. Thesc fears did not on wholeof the week until Saturday he accept- any couLntjustify, to our minds,the delay ed as correct the Intelligence Branch's in the optimaldeployment, because Major- evaluation: an Egyptian exercise, low General Gonen failed to convince us probabilityof enemy-initiated war. Despite that it was not possible to finda tactical the threat contained in the Egyptian solution forthe problem,such as the de- deployment,he did not demand that the ploymentof his tank forcein alternative Chiefof Staff should reinforce the mobilized or waiting positions in the proximity regularforce under his command,and man of the startingpositions. The lack of prop- it in a mannersuitable to the emergency er deploymentof the armoured force, situation,although even these forceswere accordingto the agreed plan, must there- inadequate withoutreinforcement by ad- forebe seen as a grave erroron the part of ding reserves.But his major failure was Major-General Gonen, because he did on the day of the war's outbreak: he left not do his best to prepare his best forces the armouredforces under his command, to break the surprise momentumof the whichaccording to the Command'sdefence enemy'sforces, in the situationour forces plan should have been deployed two- confrontedwith the opening of fire on thirdsforward, next to the Canal, and one the Canal front. thirdin the rear, in conversedeployment. The GOC told us that he ordered the At thisstage we are not profferinga final correctdeployment for two hours before recommendation as to Major-General the assumedhour of attack,in otherwords Gonen's capacity to fulfilfunctions in the (for) 16.00. Be that as it may, however, IDF, but we recommendthat he does not the operational documents of that day fulfilan active functionuntil the Commis- contain no such order, and it is a fact sion completesits investigationregarding that up to 13.55, when the enemyopened the containmentstages of the war. firealong the whole front,the forcefrom the rear,which should have deployedalong 30. Personal Responsibilityat the Govern- the front,had still not begun to move mentLevel forward.Moreover, according to the Com- In determiningthe responsibilityof the mand's orders the forwardforce was not Ministersfor acts of commissionor omis- deployed next to the Canal in time, sion in which theyplayed a personal part and when the firing started, part of it is our dutyto stressthat we deemed our- it was situatedat a distancefrom its final selvesfree to draw conclusionson the basis deploymentline. When our armourbegan of our findingsonly so far as direct re- advancing, it was met by an enemy in- sponsibility is concerned. We did not fantryambush, which had already taken consider it to be our task to express an up positions between our tanks and the opinion as to the implications of their Canal line, and had seized the ramps on1 parliamentary responsibility.It is true theeastern side ofthe Canal whichcontrol- thatin Israel, as in Englandfrom where we led the waterwayand its otherside. Anti- have taken thisprinciple, it is acceptedthat tank and artilleryfire poured down on a member of the Cabinet is responsible our armour, and so its operations were to the Knesset for all the administrative disrupted and it was severely mauled. acts of the staffof his ministry,even if he Major-General Gonen explained to us did not knowof themin advance and even the unfortunateorder not to deploy the if he was not a partyto them.But while it armourproperly in due time as stemming is clear that this principleobliges him to fromthe fear of making the enemy ner- report to the members of the Knesset

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 205 concerningthese actions (including mis- fallingwithin the domain of his respori- takes and failures), to answer questions sibility.In thismatter we tookinto account and to defendthese actions or state what the followingpoints: he has done in order to correctthem, yet (a) In evaluating intelligence infor- eveenthe experience gained in England mation he does not dispose of any "eval- shows that no hard-and-fastrules have uating apparatus" of his own but draws been laid down as to the cases in which upon the evaluation provided by GHQ. he must resignfrom his ministerialoffice: As forthe Golan Heights,when the GOC this depends on the circumstancesof each issued a warningat the GHQ meetingin individual case. The main reason forthis the presence of the Defence Minister,the is that the question of the possibleresig- lattershowed great concern and took the nation of a memberof the Government following steps: he visited the Golan in cases of this kind is a purely political Heightsin order to acquiainthimself with one and hence we believe that we should the situationin the settlements,he called not deal with this matter.See: S.E. Finer for reinforcementsto be sent to the area (1956) 34 Public Administration377; S.A. and both demanded and received an de Smith, Constitutionaland Administrative evaluation of the situation by the Chief Law (second edition), 170-171; R.K. Al- of the General Staff on October 3 in derman and J.A. Cross, The Tactics of preparationfor the discussionat the Prime Resignation4; Ivor Jennings,The British Minister's.As for the Egyptian front,he Constitution(fifth edition), 153-154; A. relied upon the evaluation of the GHQ, Rubinstein. The ConstitutionalLaw of the whichwas notcontradicted by any member State of Isradl (Hebrew), 207-208. of the General Staff(the Deputy Chief of Furthermore,we should point out that Staff;Major-General Tal, had already on we did not deem it necessaryto consider September30 expressedhis seriousreserva- yet anotherquestion that mightbe asked: tions to the Chief of Staff and to the namely,whether the special qualifications Director of MilitaryIntelligence concern- or personalexperience of any minister- in ing MilitaryIntelligence's soothing assess- thiscase Ministerof DefenceMoshe Dayan, ment,especially as regardsthe Syrian front; who had such qualificationsand experience however, he did not request the Chief by virtueof havinghimself served as Cbief of Staff'spermission to bring these reser- of the General Staff- can or should lead vationsto the Ministerof Defence's atten- that minister,within the domain of his tion, and he did not do so: as he claimed, responsibility,to arrive at a conclusion in viewof the proper standards of behaviour differentor opposedto whatis unanimously towards a superior officer). presentedto him by his professional experts. The DefenceMNinister was also influenced It seemsto us thata questionof thistvpe by the successfulassessment of the Intel- also falls outside the scope of the Inquiry ligence Branch in April-May 1973 in re- Commission,since correct governmental gai d to its ability to provide advance procedurerequires the applicationof uni- warningof war afterhe himselfhad taken formcriteria in determiningthe personal exception to its assessment.Although the responsibilityof any public officeholder IntelligenceBranch assessment in April- ratherthan a set of criteriatailored to the May was vindicated by the facts, the charactertraits of one individualor another Defence AMinisterwas rightin issuingthe who holds the post. followingguidelines to the General Staff 31. (1) With regard to the question of on Nay 21, 1973: the Defence Minister's direct personal "... I speak now as a representative of responsibility,we must point out that in the Cabinet and also on the basis of in- thispartial reportwe are consideringonly formation.We, the Cabinet, say to the the subjects of the informationand the General Staff: Gentlemen,please prepare stateof readiness and theDefence Minister's for war, those who are threateningto part therein. launch a war being Egyptand Syria." He (2) The main problem that arises is prefacedthis instructionby statingthat "a whetherthe Defence Minister was negligent renewal of war should be taken into ac- in the fulfilmentof his duty in matters count in the second half of thissummer."

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 206 JOUIRNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

(b) His confidencein the Intelligence ofthe DMI and theChief of Staff on Friday Branch's assessmentof "defensivedeploy- October 5, and thereaftertaken such steps ment in Syria, multi-arm exercise in as fullor partial mobilization of the reserves. Egypt" increased after the Director of On that morningthe Defence Minister Military Intelligence replied in answer already suspectedthat the Egyptianexer- to his questionon the morningof October cise mightbe a camouflagefor an attack. 5 that he was using everypossible source Accordingly,should the Ministernot have of intelligenceand warning (this reply taken a more serious view of a possible perhapsstemmed from a misunderstanding co-ordination between the Syrian front on the part of the Director of Military (which was causing great concern) and Intelligence but it was objectively the Egyptianfront? The followingday, misleading). Yom Kippur, was in any case criticalas a (c) As for the state of preparednesson day of total standstill.He had already the part of the IDF on the Egyptianfront, foreseenthe danger of war in the second the DefenceMinister felt confident, having part of 1973 in the spring of that year. been told that a regular army armoured On the other hand, the Director of force was in place according to plans. Military Intelligence and the Chief of So far as he knew fromthe General Staff Staff considered the likelihood of an discussions,this regular army force,inclu- enemy attack to be still low on the same ding the Air Force, was sufficientto stop day. Even after the ominous reportsre- even a massive enemy crossingpending ceived in the morning,an additional in- the mobilizationof the reserves.Opera- dication was due to come throughafter a tional details on the deploymentof this few hours from another source, as the forcewere not withinhis provincebut that Director of MilitaryIntelligence informed of the Chief of Staff. the Defence Minister(in fact, throughno (d) No requestor proposalwas submitted faultof the DMI, it onlyarrived in theearly to him forthe mobilizationof the reserves morning of the next day). NLeanwhile beforeOctober 6, as described above, or the Mlinisterwas entitledto rely on the for the replacementof the reservesin the strengthof the regulararmy, including the Canal strongholds. Air Force, to hold the enemy,as well as on statementmade (e) On the morningof Saturday,Octo- the to him by the Chiefof Staffthat the state of ber 6, the Defence Ministeragreed to the alert in the regular forces (cancellation of mobilization of everythingrequired for leaves on both frontsand in the Air defensiveaction in accordance with the Force, together with additional Chief of Staff'sassessment. The Chief of precautionarymeasures) declared of Staffrequested this additional reserve force by the Chief Staffwas fully adequate to meet thesituation on with a view to counter-attacks,but the thatday. Defence Minister wished to delay the We should point out here that we ques- mobilization of this additional force so tioned both the Defence Ministerand the that no friendlycountry might possibly PrimeMinister as to whethertheir decisions accuse Israel of causing a conflagration regardingthe mobilizationof the reserves by escalation,since thismight have harmed were influencedby the fact that the elec- Israel in the matterof essentialsupplies. tions forthe Knessetwere due to be held This was a clear-cut political argument at the end of thatmonth. They both vig- which one may or may not agree orouslydenied this on theirword of honour with-- but it certainlycannot be dismissed and we believethat it did notoccur to them as not being legitimate.At any rate,when to place party considerationsabove their the Prime Minister decided on the fill national duty in this vital matter. mobilizationof the reservesthe Defence (3) We have carefullyconsidered these MVinisterdid not continue to insist upon mattersand reached the conclusionthat, his opinion. by the criterion of reasonable conduct (f) The problem which particularly riequiredof the bearer of the post of Minister engaged us was whether the Defence of Defence, the Ministerwas not obliged Minister should have been required to to order additional or differentprecau- arriveat an assessmentdifferent from that tionarv measures[to] those recommended

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 207 to him by the General Staffof the IDF, for this arise during Yom Kippur. The accordingto the joint assessmentand the GovernmentSecretary was also asked to advice of the Director of Military Intel- be able to locate all the Ministersin order ligence and the Chief of Staff. that the Governmentcould be convened 32. Withrespect to the Prime Minister, wheneverthe urgent need for this arose. what we have stated above (para. 30) as It is greatlyto thePrime Minister's credit regardspersonal responsibilityat Cabinet that, under the circumstances,during the level likewise holds good. Accordingly, emergencyof Saturdaymorning, she made we had to considertwo principal questions: proper use of the authorityvested in her (a) WThatintelligence and what assess- to make decisions.She decided wisely,with mentswere submitted to thePrime Minister common sense and speedily in favour of and what were her actionsin thiscontext? thefull mobilization of thereserves, despite weighty political considerations,thereby (b) Should she have convenedthe entire performinga most importantservice for Governmentin order to discussand arrive the defence of the State. at a decisionregarding this situation in the days precedingthe war? Conclusion It would have been rightand properfor 33. In concludingthis partial report, the the Prime Ministerto provideinformation Commission considers itself bound to regardingthe situationon the borders at reiteratethat, despite the fact that it has the extraordinaryCabinet session that not yetconcluded the hearingof testimony tookplace on Thursday,October 4, when on everymatter relating to the conductof she reported on the results of her trip the war up to conclusionof the contain- abroad; moreover, she should not have ment stage, it is already in possessionof spared the Ministers not present in Tel much evidence clearly attestingthat in Aviv on Friday, October 5 (the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the IDF was con- Yom Kippur) the trouble involved. At frontedby one of the most difficultchal- the same time, this Commission is lenges which could possiblyconfront any convincedthat the PrimeMinister's actions army - and emergedvictorious. Despite during the critical days before the out- the difficultinitial position from which break of the war testifyto an approach the IDF startedout in thewar, and despite fittingthe gravityof theresponsibility with the errorscommitted at thisstage - partly which she was charged. Immediately detailed above, and partly to be detailed afterher return,as stated above, she con- in the reasoningon thisreport - not only vened the Deputy Prime Minister, the did it succeed in mobilizingthe reserves Defence Minister, Minister-without-Port- at unprecedentedspeed, with all their folio Galili, the Chief of Staffand Brig.- complex formations,but at the same Gen. Shalev for consultations mainly time it also blocked the massive invasion concerning the situation on the Golan of enemy armies which had planned and Heights. At the end of this consultation, trainedfor this onslaughtover many years she decided, on the basis of the assessment and, in the openingstages, had enjoyedthe of the situationpresented to her, to place benefitof surprise.The IDF's success was the subject of the border situationon the secured at the cost of heavy and irreplace- agenda forthe forthcomingweekly session able casualties,and thanksto the supreme of the Cabinet scheduled for Sunday, heroismof all ranks,the endlesspowers of October 7. On Friday, October 5 she improvisationof its commanders,and the decided, on the basis of ominous reports stabilityand strengthof its basic organiza- reachingher that day, to convene all the tional structure.These factsreinforce the Ministerswho were in Tel Aviv at the Commissionin its opinion that not only time. At this meeting, the Ministers does the IDF possess the capacity to presentauthorized the Prime Ministerand absorb criticism and draw the painful the Defence Minister to decide on the conclusionsimplied, but thatit will thereby mobilizationof reserves,should the need increase and enhance its strength.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions