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Israel: What Went Wrong on October 6?: the Partial Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry Into the October War Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol

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Israel: What Went Wrong on October 6?: the Partial Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry Into the October War Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol Israel: What Went Wrong on October 6?: The Partial Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the October War Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer, 1974), pp. 189-207 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2535473 . Accessed: 09/03/2015 16:05 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT ISRAEL: WHAT WENT WRONG ON OCTOBER 6 ? THE PARTIAL REPORT OF THE ISRAELI COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE OCTOBER WAR [This was officiallyissued in Israel on April 2, 1974 as a reporton the mostpressing issuesraised duringthe generalinvestigation by the AgranatCommission of the prepared- ness of Israel for the October War. It comprisesa preface on the terms of reference and proceduresof the Committee(below); an account of the evaluationsmade by the Israeli IntelligenceServices up to October 6 (p. 192); conclusionsand recommendations on the functioningof the institutionsresponsible for meeting a militarycrisis (p. 196); and conclusionsabout officeholders which resultedin the resignationsof the Chief of Staff and senior intelligenceofficials (p. 200).] CHAPTER 1: PREFACE 1. On November 18, 1973, the Cabinet of the Inquiry CommissionsLaw, 1968, adopted the followingresolution: excludingparagraphs (1) and (6) therein, "Resolved: and to requestthe approval of the Knesset Defence and Foreign AffairsCommittee thefollowing matters, namely: "A) That for this determination. " 1. The information,in the days pre- ceding the Yom Kippur War, concerning "E) To apprise the President of the the enemy's moves and his intentionsto Supreme Court of this resolution." open war, as well as the assessmentsand Following on this resolution,the Pres- the decisionsof the duly authorizedmili- ident of the Supreme Court, by virtueof tary and civilian bodies with regard to the powers vested in him under para. the aforementionedinformation; 4 (a) of the Inquiry CommissionsLaw "2. The Israel Defence Forces' deploy- 1968, appointed the Chairman and mentfor battle in general,its preparedness members of the Commission as follows: in the days preceding the Yom Kippur Dr. Shimon Agranat, President of the War and its actionsup to the containment Supreme Court, Chairman; Mr. Moshe ofthe enemy; "Are of vital public impor- Landau, Supreme CourtJustice, member; tance at this time requiringclarification. Dr. YitzhakNebenzahl, State Comptroller, "B) That an Inquiry Commissionshall member; Lieut.-Gen. (Res.) N.B. Yigael be set up to investigatethe aforementioned Yadin, Professorat the Hebrew Univer- mattersand reportto the Cabinet. sity, member; Lieut.-Gen. (Res.) Haim Laskov, IDF Ombudsman, member. "C) To determine,after consultation with the Presidentof the Supreme Court, 2. Afterdeciding on its procedure,the that the Commissionshall be composed Commissionon November25, 1973 started of five members. to hear evidence and up till now it has "D) To determine that the matters held 140 meetingsand heard 58 witnesses. which are the subject of the investigation In addition,much evidencewas submitted and the Commission's deliberations re- to the Commission in writing. At this quire secrecy,as laid down in section 23 juncture, the Commissionhas concluded This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 190 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES the hearing of testimonyand the receipt because of theirenormous scope. We shall, of otherevidence on some of the subjects therefore,concentrate on selectedaspects included in its terms of referencewhich of the questions as a whole, which seem are, in the followingorder: The informa- to us of particularimportance. tion, in the days preceding the Yom 3. In the presentationof the partial Kippur War, on the enemy'smeasures and report,in accordance with the authority on hisintentions to startwar; theassessment given to the Commission under clause of that information;the preparednessof 19 (a) of the law, we have not ignored the IDF in the days precedingthe war, two considerationsin favourof presenting up to the launchingof the enemyattack; a single reportto include all our findings the decisionsof the militaryand civilian and recommendationsregarding all the authorities, taken on the basis of this subjectsdetailed in the termsof reference information and its evaluation. This of the Commission.Those considerations partial report relates to these subjects are: a) these subjects, particularly the only.In it the Commissiondoes not discuss preparednessand deploymentof the IDF, subjectsrelating to thegeneral preparedness are interconnectedto a greater or lesser of the IDF (including matters of order degree; b) in regard to the evaluation and discipline,training and fightingdoc- of the behaviour of the holders of various trine,equipment and munitions,emergency offices,it would have been preferable stores and their operation, methods of not to splitup the considerationaccording mobilization and transportingtroops to to the *varioussubjects. On the other the front,analysis of the location,function hand, however, the Commissionrealized and objectivesof the strongholdsand out- that, because of the large quantity of posts and their functioningin practice) testimonysubmitted to it, its deliberations nor the conduct of military operations had already gone on for a long time until the point of the containmentof the and a considerable period would elapse enemy advance, even though the Com- its work. mission has already heard a great deal before it could complete The is entitled to learn as as of testimonyon these additional subjects public soon of the and recom- as well. In particular, we would like to possible findings mendations on those subjects on which stress already at this point that we are the Commissionhas concluded its delib- not yet discussing the painful problem erations and it is desirable that the of the stationingof the forceat the Suez be able to act in accord- Canal strongholds:This force, though it Governmentmay ance on them without foughtwith devotion and made its con- delay. tributionto the containmentof the enemy, Furthermore,this partial reportdoes was in factinsufficiently co-ordinated and not even contain all that the Commission trained. We shall be dealing with this has to say on thesubjects of the information themewhen we come to analyse the entire and its assessmentand the state of alert complex of problems reJating to the of the IDF, because the Commission functionsand purposes of the strongholds realizes that it would be preferable to and outpostsand their actual operation, publish as soon as possible its main con- since theseproblems are closelyinterwoven. clusionsand recommendationson theinsti- It emerges thereforethat, chronolo- tutionallevel and withregard to theholders gically, the Commission in this report of certain posts and offices.It has found deals with the two intermediatechapters it possible to do so because, afterlengthy (the informationand its evaluation; the and fullconsultation between its members, state of alert) and leaves fora later report it has already reached an opinion on such the other two subjects (the deployment conclusionsand recommendations,but the that preceded the state of alert, and the formulationof its detailed reasoning is battlesup to thecontainment of theenemy, likely to continue for some time. The whichbegan withthe endingof the period Commissionaccordingly found it advisable of alert). However, it should already be to publish these conclusionsand recom- stated now that when we come to discuss mendations first immediately,while the these additionalsubjects, we shall be quite full reasoning will be given in a further unable to consider them fromall aspects partial report. This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 9 Mar 2015 16:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SPECIAL DOCUMENT 191 This reportcontains a general,very brief, deliberationswholly or partly in cameraif descriptionof facts,insofar as such a de- it findsthis necessary in order to preserve scriptionis needed for an understanding the securityof the State." In our case, the of the conclusions.In view of its contents, decision on complete secrecy, taken by this report may be published, whereas the Governmentin advance in accordance thefurther report, which contains a detailed withpara. 23 of the Law, was an absolute descriptionof the facts and a complete necessity,since the investigationshowed expositionof the Commission'sconclusions that the material presentedas testimony reached by the Commission,will contain includes a large amount of factsand in- manysecret facts,which in all probability formation of a most sensitive security will rule out publication in full. nature,which
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