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THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION BETWEEN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM, 1969-1974: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND IMPLEMENTATION CONTENTS Contents ........................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................. vii A note on terminology ..................................................................................................................... ix Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ x Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1. 1969: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Rogers Plan’ ................................................................ 12 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 12 Entering the Arena: Nixon and the Middle East, January 1969 ................................................. 14 Early Invitations: Prelude to the Two-Power Talks .................................................................... 18 The First Draft ‘Rogers Plan’, February 1969 .............................................................................. 23 Nasser’s War of Attrition and Golda Meir’s Israel, March 1969 ................................................ 26 The ‘Striptease’: Revealing the ‘Rogers Plan’ to the Russians, March-May 1969 ..................... 31 The Phantom Menace, Summer 1969 ........................................................................................ 36 When Richard Met Golda, Autumn 1969 ................................................................................... 41 The Joint Working Paper, October 1969 .................................................................................... 45 A Lead Balloon: The ‘Rogers Plan’ Unveiled, December 1969 ................................................... 50 Conclusion: The Legend of the ‘Rogers Plan’ ............................................................................. 58 Chapter 2. Paradigm Shift or Coming Out? The Nixon administration, the War of Attrition, and the Jordan Crisis, January – September 1970 ......................................................................... 61 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 61 Deep penetration Bombing and Kosygin’s Warning, January-February 1970 ........................... 64 Operation Blossom ..................................................................................................................... 64 The Kosygin Letter ...................................................................................................................... 67 From Complacency to Apprehension: Soviet Intervention and Israeli Arms Requests in Abeyance, March – May 1970 .................................................................................................... 71 Stop Shooting, Start Talking ....................................................................................................... 80 The Jordan Crisis ......................................................................................................................... 88 The Hostage Crisis ...................................................................................................................... 96 Civil War ................................................................................................................................... 100 Syrian Intervention ................................................................................................................... 103 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 107 Chapter 3. Chasing Phantoms? The Failed Interim Agreement, 1971 ......................................... 111 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 111 A Post Nasser Middle East, Autumn 1970 ................................................................................ 114 The Jarring Interlude, January – February 1971 ....................................................................... 121 Reaching Out to the White House: Sadat’s Peace Initiative .................................................... 126 Rogers’ Middle East Tour and the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, May – June 1971 ....................................................................................................................... 131 Chasing Phantoms: The Failure of Interim Diplomacy, July – August 1971 ............................. 136 Meir Prevails? Winter 1971 – 1972 .......................................................................................... 146 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 154 Chapter 4. Misconceived Diplomacy February 1972 – October 1973: Bound to be Stillborn? ... 157 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 157 A Year of Decisions: 1972 ......................................................................................................... 159 The National Security Advisors: Ismail meets Kissinger ........................................................... 168 A Familiar Visitor ...................................................................................................................... 175 The Wolf at the Door: Summer 1973 ....................................................................................... 181 Superpower Crisis By Design? Sadat’s War Plans..................................................................... 191 Conclusion: Bound to be Stillborn? .......................................................................................... 199 Chapter 5. Taking Sadat Seriously: The October War ............................................................. 203 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 203 The View From Washington: American Considerations at the Outbreak of War .................... 206 Aligning with Cairo, 6 – 8 October ............................................................................................ 209 The Ceasefire/Resupply Dilemma, 9 – 13 October .................................................................. 213 The Failed Ceasefire and Nixon’s Resupply Decision ............................................................... 219 Interlude: The Oil Weapon ....................................................................................................... 228 De-Linkage – Kissinger’s Ceasefire, 19 – 22 October ............................................................... 229 The Endgame: Finalising the Ceasefire ..................................................................................... 234 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 242 Chapter 6. US - Egypt Common Strategy? Kilometre 101, The Geneva Peace Conference, and the First Disengagement Agreement ....... 248 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 248 Restoring Relations: Kilometre 101 and the Six Point Agreement ........................................... 250 Who’s Agreement and Whither Palestine? .............................................................................. 254 Together at Last: When Anwar Met Henry .............................................................................. 259 A Separate Peace Process: Preparing for Geneva, November – December 1973.................... 260 Assembling the Cast: Kissinger’s Second Middle East Tour ..................................................... 266 Egypt-Israel disengagement, January 1974 .............................................................................. 278 The Geneva Negotiations ......................................................................................................... 278 The Aswan-Jerusalem Shuttle .................................................................................................. 283 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 288 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 291 Bibliography .......................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. Primary sources consulted ....................................................................................................... 308 Archives ...................................................................................................................................
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