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S-0865-0003-04-00001
Expanded Number S-0865-0003-04-00001
Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East -1971 (see list of items appendix No. 7)
Date Created 01/01/1971
Record Type Archival Item
Container s-0865-0003: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East
Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit x/, 7
Selected Confidential Reports on OA-6-1 - Middle East 1971 Cable for SG from Goda Meir - 1 January 1971 2 Notes on meeting - 4 January 1971 - Present: SG, Sec. of State Rogers, 0 Ambassador Charles Yost, Mr. Joseph Sisco, Mr. McClosky and Mr. Urquhart t 3) Middle East Discussions - 5 January 1971 - Present: Ambassador Tekoah Mr. Aphek, Ambassador Jarring, Mr. Berendsen 4 Letter from Gunnar Jarrint to Abba Eban - 6 January 1971 x i Letter to Gunnar Jarring from C.T. Crowe (UK) 6 January 1971 *6 Notes on meeting - 7 January 1971 - Present: SG, Sir Colin Crowe 7 Notes on meeting - 7 January 1971 - Present: SG, Mr. Yosef Tekoah 8 "Essentials of Peace"(Israel and the UAR) - 9 January 1971 9 "Essentials of Peace" (Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordon - 9 January 1971 Statement by El Tayalt - 13 January 1971 Minutes of meeting - 13 January 1971 - Present: M. Masmoudi, El-Goulli, Mr. Fourati, Mr. Jarring, Mr. Berendsen^ Letter from William P. Rogers - 15 January 1971 Letter - Middle East - 15 January 1971 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 For The Establishment of a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East - 18 January 1971 C H-^-^ ?-«-r-"~) Comparison of the papers of Israel and the United Arab Republic 18 January 1971 L " Notes on meeting - 19 January 1971 - Present: SG, Ambassador Yost, USSR - 1 January 1971 - Middle East Communication from the Government of Israel to the United Arab Republic through Ambassador Jarring - 27 January 1971 France - 27 January 1971 - Middle East Statement by Malik Y.A. at the Four-power Consultative meeting - 27 January 1971 AideQMemoire - Lebanon's reply - 28 January 1971 The Situation in the Middle East - 30 January 1971 Further Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East - 1 February 1971 Further Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East - 1 February 1971 Further Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East - 1 February 1971 Aide-memoire - 1 February 1971 Aide-Memoire - 1 February 1971 Aide-Memoire - 2 February 1971 C_ ^ ft &. $>#-f>-<^ fe <^-~C*-(') Communication from the Government of Israel to be conveyed to the Government of Lebanon through Ambassador Jarring - 1 February 1971 30) Communication from the Government of Israel to be conveyed to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan through Ambassador Jarring - 1 February 1971 31) Further report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East - 1 February 1971 32 Aide-Memoire - 1 February 1971 33 Aide-Memoire - 1 February 1971 - continued - Selected Confidential Reports on Middle East 1971 - continued -
The Situation in the Middle East - 4 February 1971 Four Power Statement - February 4, 1971 - U.S.A. draft France - draft - 4 February 1971 USSR - draft - 4 February 1971 Statement by J.A. Malik made at the consultative meeting of the Four on the Middle East - 4 February 1971 The Situation in the Middle East - 4 February 1971 Aide-memoire - ^ February 1971 Suggestions for an Agreement between Israel and the United Arab Republic - 5 February 1971 Aide-memoire - 8 February 1971 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for the Establishment of a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East - 11 February 1971 C J-~~*-*- * )-~™~i) Notes on meeting - 12 February 1971 - Present: SG Sir Colin Crowe, Mr. Michael Weston, Mr. Urquhart Aide-memoire 15 February 1971 (fr**- t %r*~~~s> Comparison between the commitments requested in Ambassador Jarringrs aide-memoire of 8 February 1971 and the United Arab Republic aide-memoire of 15 February 1971 (c-ft-e. f^-^^jc^, fc Q-^s~f) Notes on meeting - 19 February 1971 - Present: SG, Ambassador Charles Yost., Mr. Urquhart Jewish Press - 19 February 1971 Meeting - 19 February 1971 - Present: SG, Mr. Scheel Note from Ambassador Jarring (conveyed to him by the P.R. of U.A.R) 22 February 1971 ( ^^^-*• tv—J=A. * fr~~^) Notes on meeting - 22 February 1971 - Present: SG, Mr. Colombo, P.M. of Italy, Mr. Moro, Minister of Foreign Affairs Middle East - 26 February 1971 C>iw>-~t- ^^^-z^~ •& $-*~W) Unofficial Translation - United Arab Republic, Cairo - 28 February 1971 Draft Four Power Statement USSR - 2 March 1971 Statement by official spokesman in Cairo - 2 March, 1971 Draft Communique - 3 March 1971 0>f< «*^f-f-) Unofficial Translation statement by official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran - 3 March 1971 (' Letter from President Nixon to SG - 3 March 1971 UK Mission to the UN - Middle East - 4 March 197X Draft Communique from P.R. of U.K.) 4 March 1971 Note from P.R. of Iran 4 March 1971 Draft Four Power Statement - 4 March, 1971 USSR O> Further Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East - 4 March 1971 From the P.R. of U.S.A. - 5 March 1971 Draft Communique from the P.R. of U.K. - 5 March 1971
- continued - Selected Confidential Reports on Middle East 1971 J. 65) Policy Background - The Components of a Secure Peace 66) Israeli Statement - 11 March 1971 67) Notes on meeting - 12 March 1971 - Present; SG, Ambassador George H. (^ Bush, Mr. Sam de Palma, Mr. Mewlin, Mr. Urquhart 68 Letter from F.M. of the Netherlands - 14 March 1971 ( s^T (}• 69 Statement by Ambassador Bush - 18 March Four Power Meeting (^ £ (• 70 Notes on meeting - 18 March 1971 - Present: SG, Abba Eban, Yosef Tekoah, David Rivlin, Mr. Urquhart 71) Text of what Israeli Press Officer read to correspondent - 19 March 1971 72) Editorial entitled "Jerusalem and Peace" from L'Osservatore Romano, 22-23 March 1971 73 "The Rogers and Jarring Initiatives" The Jewish Press - 26 March 1971 74 Letter to SG from Yosef Tekoah, P.R. of Israel - 30 March 1971 75 Letter from SG to the President of U.S. - 31 March 1971 "I s<^^- & 76 letter from SG to Ambassador Beorge Bush - 31 March 1971 ^ .1^ $# 77 Letter from Gunnar Jarring to SG 31 March 1971 C $-e^^~-£ &-^*~^ * \ *" 78 Notes on meeting - 5 April 1971 - Present: SG, Ambassador Tekoah, £>*} Mr. Cahana, Mr. Bunche, Mr. Urquhart ^)^r r « 79) Statement by Sir Colin Crowe at the Meeting of the Four on ~• ife
- continued -
*f life *.f\ J- C-0 C"
Selected Confidential Reports on Middle East - continued - 1971 Note on the Big Four Meeting on the Middle East - 24 June 1971 Letter to SG from Gunnar Jarring - 27 June_1_97_1 Message from Gunnar Jarring to Brian UrqutiarTT*"^ 5 July 1971 Letter to SG from Gunnar Jarring - 6 July 1971 Schedule of "Date of Arrival to Israel" - 2 August 1971 The Situation in the Middle East - 30 August 1971 Draft Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the Four Permanent Members of the Security Council - 27 September 1971 Notes on meeting - 27 September 1971 - Present: SG, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Sir Colin Crowe, Mr. A.D. Parsons, Assistant Under- secretary of State, Mr. J.A.N. Graham, Principal Private Secretary to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Ambassador Jarring, Mr. Berendsen Notes on meeting - 1 October 1971 - Present: Mr. Abba Eban, Yosef Tekoah, SG, Ambassador Jarring, Mr. Guyer, Mr. Urquhart, Mr. Berendsen ,- io8) Suez Proposal - P.R. of U.S.A. - 7 October 1971 \b? I 1 1
THE FOLLOWING CABLE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE ISRAELI MISSION OWING TO THE HOLIDAY:
HIS EXCELLENCY U THANT SECRETARY GENERAL UNITED NATIONS !
I AM SORRY THAT I HAVE I!0 TROUBLE YOU ON THE HOLIDAY AND WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY AND WISH YOU VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR, A YEAR OF PEACE FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. BUT EVEN ON A HOLIDAY I CANNOT REFRAIN FROM REFERRING TO THE NEGATIVE AND CRUEL ANSWER WHICH YOU RECEIVED FROM THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION CONCERNING OUR WOUNDED PRISONERS, A REPLY WHICH WAS IN RESPONSE TO YOUR ACTION WHICH I DEEPLY APPRECIATE.
I WOULD LIKE TO ASK FROM YOU AN EXTRAORDINARY ACT WHICH DEMANDS A GREAT EFFORT ON YOUR PART BUT AS IT IS WRITTEN "WHOSOEVER SAVES A . SINGLE HUMAN SOUL IS AS IF HE HAS SAVED A WHOLE WORLD" .
KNOWING YOUR AIMS AND EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO THE WORLD AND KNOWING THAT EACH AND EVERY LIFE IS IMPORTANT IN YOUR EYES I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ANEW THAT FOUR HUMAN BEINGS ARE IN GRAVE DANGER AND NONE OF US CAN KNOW WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN WITHIN THE COMING DAYS.
TAKING ALL THIS INTO ACCOUNT I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO GO TO EGYPT AND TRY AND IMPRESS UPON EGYPT'S LEADERS THE FACT THAT THEIR ACTIONS ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW, THAT THEY VIOLATE THE GENEVA CONVENTION AND THAT THEY ARE AGAINST THE HUMAN SPIRIT. I AM ASKING YOU THAT YOU INSIST TO VISIT THE PRISONERS PERSONALLY WHICH WILL ENABLE YOU TO CONCLUDE FOR YOURSELF THAT IT IS PLAIN CRUELTY TO KEEP THEM IN CAPTIVITY SINCE THEY CANNOT RETURN TO ANY MILITARY DUTY. 1 • I ' I ASK YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE CANNOT, ON ANY ACCOUNT, ACCEPT THE EGYPTIAN ANSWER AND CONTENT OURSELVES WITH IT. WE ARE IN THE MEANTIME NOT GIVING ANY PUBLICITY TO THE PROBLEM OUT OF A DESIRE NOT TO RAISE QUESTIONS OF PRESTIGE WHEN HUMAN LIFE IS AT STAKE, I AM ASKING YOU TO FULFILL OUR REQUEST AND ON OUR PART WE SHALL NOT MAKE THIS PUBLIC. j
I AMVTURNING TO YOU NOT ONLY AS PRIME MINISTER BUT ALSO PERSONALLY BASED UPON MY ACQUAINTANCE-WITH YOU FOR MANY YEARS AND KNOWING FULL WELL YOUR DEEP SENSITIVITY TO HUMAN LIVES. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IF YOU WILL UNDERTAKE TO ACT YOUR ACTION WILL BE CROWNED BY SUCCESS. IN THIS SPIRIT I ASK AGAIN OF YOU TO UNDERTAKE THIS REQUEST.
GOLDA MEIR
1 JANUARY 1971 1 I EAST 7OTH STREET
NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OO21
RETURN POSTAGE GUARANTEED
His Excellency U Thant The Secretary-General
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Notes on meeting between Secretary-General and Mr. Yosef Tekoah, Permanent Representative of Israel to the UN, held at the United Nations at noon on Thursday. 7 January 1971
Ambassador Tekoah, accompanied by Ambassador Rosenne, visited the Secretary-General at noon on 7 January 1971- Ambassador Tekoah raised the question of the four wounded Israeli prisoners in Cairo. This was a matter which was arousing very strong public feeling in Israel,and Mrs. Meir had asked him to stress to the Secretary-General how important it was that the question be solved before it created a grave obstacle to progress in other fields. Certainly two of the prisoners were in a very grave condition and were not receiving the best medical treatment. All four should have been returned under the Geneva Convention as invalids. Mrs. Meir urged the Secretary-General to continue his efforts and to go to Cairo. There were some in Israel who were already urging that the solution of the prisoner question be made a condition for the continuance of the Jarring talks. It was impossible for Israel to acquiesce in the continuance of the present situation. Ambassador Tekoah suggested that the Secretary-General might send a representative to Cairo to explain that this was a grave and urgent matter which might create additional difficulties at a time when efforts were being made to get peace negotiations going. The Secretary-General explained the Egyptian position on this matter and undertook to continue his good offices. -J
Notes on meeting between Secretary-General and Sir Colin Crowe, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN, held at the United Nations on Thursday. 7 January 1971. 11:50 a.m.
Sir Colin Crowe, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, visited the Secretary-General at 11:JO a.m. on 7 January to report on the latest meeting of the Four Powers, which took place on 6 January 1971• Sir Colin reported that he had announced his Government's intention to be available to help Ambassador Jarring in any way possible. The British Government regretted that the Four Powers had so far been unable to produce guidelines for Ambassador Jarring. The French representative agreed in general with the British statement. Ambassador Yost stated that the United States was doing all that it could to encourage Israel to discuss matters of substance in the Jarring talks. The United States Government had been somewhat surprised by Israel's invitation to Ambassador Jarring to go to Jerusalem. Ambassador Malik said that it was good that the talks had started and it was important that the Four Powers should get on with the guidelines. The Four Powers will meet again on 18 January. York, 6 January 1971
Sir, In your message, which I received in Moscow on 3° Becember 1970, you notified Be of the termination of the suspension of Israel's participation i» the talks under ugr auspiees. You also invited me to meet you in Jerusalem at ray earliest convenience. I sia nov in a position to accept your invitation to come fear a "brief visit to Jerusalem* In doing so, I && laindful of explanations given by Tekoah that the Prime Minister and yourself attadi importance to meeting with me ant that such Bseetings could lead to ray getting a better under- -^g%^ding of your Gcrimrranent's position. 1 regard this visit as a part of the tsi&s under sgr auspices which were f onaally restoaed here in Hew York on 5 JarSsgry' l#fl. I propose to stxrt?S^I^_i^ael on the aorning of S!riday» 8 January, and must te "back in Hew York *& the latest by the evening of Sunday, 10 January. I an ^cepting your invitation to meet you in Jerusalem on the sssisnptioB that ve shall be discussing the substance of the problems of the Middle East and in the hope that I shall be able to bring back with me some clear indications of Israel's position on a number of the questions involved. If Ety hopes are fulfilled, I "believe that it should be possible for the talks nnder my auspices to sake the
Ms. Excellency Mr* Abba Eban Minister for Foreign Affairs c/o Permanent Mission of Israel to the tftiited Rations 11 East TOth Street Mew York, M.Y. 100S1 progress, which I am eonvtneea is the desire of all the parties concerned. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Gunnar Jarring Special Representative ©f the Seerstary-General to the Middle East stated that lie would reply after further consideration* In the meeatlmej he was as&Uig all the representatives to pursue a line csf q^ui^ diplmaey. TekgaJfe said that he would do so,
3.0.20 a«ffl. «• 2 «• eliminated. Go the other hsxtd, the visit to the area might create an topression of delagr and heighten the feeling that there Should "be a Couaeil debate* Tekoafe reiterated that only a brief meeting at a Cabinet level was ©avisaged. It vo\&d hasten the process of the crystalllzaticsn of the Israeli C&vernment1© views a»d hence would hasten the pace of the discussions, said that he was not in a position to give a reply iKtaediately. At least a imtolmwm of three days -would be involved ia a visit to Israel* He usdsrstooa the Israeli views, but in view of the eouHtervailifcg factors he wuld have to weigh the matter very carefully and wuld give a reply only after he had sees the Arab representatives. It was itt^orfcaat to produce a- step forward in the situation before the deadline* Tekeah eaifi that it w^ very difficult to consider the cease-fire deadline as determining the whole pace of the discussions » although one was swsre that it -was to the bacfeground. / said that it vas desirable that the cease-fire should e Also present: ifinbassador Charles ¥. Yost, Mr. Joseph Sisco, Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Urquhart. Secretary of State Rogers said that he had come to pay his respects to the Secretary-General and was encouraged that negotiations on the Middle East were going to start. The United States would support Ambassador Jarring in every possible way but did not wish to appear to be too much out in front. He felt that 1971 was a year of decision and that there was some hope. He had discussed the Middle East recently with Prime Minister Heath, President Pompidou and Ambassador Dobrynin. He felt strongly that the parties themselves must actively seek a solution. He hoped that Ambassador Jarring would get into substantive matters right away. The Secretary-General said that it was important to get some movement in the talks in order to get an extension of the cease-fire and to avoid a Security Council meeting. If there was some movement in the first two weeks it would be possible for Ambassador Jarring to make a second report which would pave the way for an extension of the cease-fire without a Security Council debate. He had the impression that the UAR did not want a regular three-month extension of the cease-fire but some other period. Secretary of State Eogers said that he had no present plan to go to the Middle East and would only visit the area if it would be helpful. The important thing at present was to get the negotiations started. The Secretary-General asked about the nature of guarantees for a peace settlement. Secretary of State Rogers replied that in his view the immediate necessity was to get the talks going and to specify areas of agreement which could be reported by Ambassador Jarring. It would be premature to discuss security guarantees until these could be discussed by the Four Powers once the deadline for the cease-fire had been renewed. -2- The Secretary-General raised the question of Ambassador Jarring's security while he was in New York. Secretary of State Rogers undertook to ensure that appropriate measures were taken. Secretary of State Rogers also undertook to receive Mr. Michelmore in Washington next week. The Secretary-General said that a clarification of Israel's attitude on withdrawal would "be helpful and asked if the United States support of the idea of only minor rectifications to the former boundaries still stood. Secretary of State Rogers said that his whole statement was inter- related and that he was now suggesting starting the talks with the areas of agreement and postponing discussion of withdrawal for the time being. Of course, security guarantees were an important aspect of the problem of withdrawal. Mr. Sisco said that the United States statements of December 1969 and October 1970 had agreed that the Four Powers would join in a Security Council endorsement of a settlement. Israel's position was that no outside guarantees were required. Secretary of State Rogers added that Israel felt that the idea of outside guarantees, if discussed prematurely, would weaken her negotiating position. He himself felt that the negotiations, if successful, would in any case lead to the question of international guarantees. Israel wanted first of all to have a binding contractual agreement, to which guarantees would be a later addition. The Secretary-General felt that peace and guarantees should not be divorced from each other. Mr. Sisco said that the United States idea was to discuss various areas of agreement first, e.g., the recognition of Israel's sovereignty, Israel's agreement to the principle of withdrawal, and the question of freedom of passage. He felt that in discussing such matters the "peace language" in the Secretary of State's statements might be useful. Ambassador Jarring might be able to report that there was a general consensus on a number of points, some of which he proposed to take up in detail immediately. He -3- felt that such a report would provide the UAR with the necessary basis for agreeing to a prolongation of the cease-fire. He was convinced that if Ambassador Jarring could indicate that progress was being made, neither side would wish to disagree with him. Secretary of State Rogers added that the United States idea was to take the problem a step at a time and by this method to reverse the general impression that negotiations on the Middle East could not succeed. The Secretary-General agreed that Ambassador Jarring's next report should stress areas of agreement. Mr. Sisco suggested that on the first day Ambassador Jarring should talk about peace commitments only and try on the first and successive days to produce his own conclusions in a paragraph which would not be formalized but which would indicate consensus. Thus, at the end of two weeks, without any formal agreement Ambassador Jarring would be able to say that he was convinced that there were consensus and progress and on this basis propose the procedure for future talks. He was convinced that as long as a report by Ambassador Jarring was phrased in such a way as not to prejudice the position of any of the parties, the parties would not disagree with it because they were anxious to justify the extension of the cease-fire. It was essential for the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring to lead the parties on towards a successful negotiation. The Secretary-General mentioned briefly his efforts on behalf of the four wounded Israeli prisoners about whom the United States has also made approaches to Cairo. Mr. Sisco said that it was the impression of Mr. Burgess that the Egyptians were keeping an open mind on this subject and regarded the timing of any humanitarian gesture in this context as very important in the context of the talks. KIDDLE EAST DISCUSSIONS of the fourthjge^ing_with Israel held at United Hations Headquarters g January 1971» at 1Q«QO ,a.au Tekoah Mr, jftinbassador Jarring Mr, Berendsen Tekoah said that he bad returned i*i haste to Hew York before there had been time for the Israeli Government to crystallize its negotiating position in order to urge .Ambassador Jarring to visit Israel before the beginning of the actual discussions. He would have the opportunity to see the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister and to engage the Government at the Cabinet level. It "was important, moreover, that .Ambassador Jarring BhooLd get the feel of the area at the eve of an important, perhaps decisive, stage of the discussions. Ijabassador Jarring: agreed that one was now at a decisive stage. , It wae iarportant to catch the opportunity. He would, of course, consider the Israeli invitation. However, it might result in a long delay since he might well have to visit the other capitals in the region, Ambassador Te.koah said that he could not, of course, speak for the other Governments. It was not unprecedented, however, for Ambassador Jarring to meet with some of the Foreign Ministers without holding balancing meetings with the others. Moreover, -Ambassador Jarring had recently seen Foreign Minister Riad in Moscow. Mrs. Meir attached much importance to seeing jftjnfeassador Jarring. A visit of even one day's duration would be satisfactory and would not result in an undue delay. On the contrary, it would probably facilitate the subsequent discussions. J&ibassador Jarring said that the other side might well interpret this as a delay, particularly as there was such a short time before the cease-fire deadline. It was very important to start the discussions at once. There were furthermore those who felt that there would have to be a Security Council debate. If signs of progress were to become visible in the near future, the1 question of a Security Council debate could be A- 1 p. ^ _,. »^^^-__-_^__j:_^ ^^^^^^ -.r-Tr-r— ^ T* "^ i 5 1* f ; DECLASSIFIED f 9-"l.7T USSSfiTIALS OF PUACS (ISRALT, AITD THE UAR) The central purpose of the discussions between tn.e UAR and Israel is the establishment of peace between them0 All the provisions of tli<_ Security Council Resolution 242 are within the context of the ..-establi-.v".; of the just and durable jf>eace which is the paramount aim of this resolu'^ Israel regards peace with the UAS as a concept embracing ^.'~>a neighbourly relations and cooperation in accordance with the the 'United Nations. But whether or not peace receives i-cs full in the immediate future, there are certain indispensable essentials i.^ . which a situation cannot be regarded as a situation of peace. Peacv, involves amongst other things : 1 a The declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict as finally terminated. 2. Respect and acknowledgement by the parties in explicit t^. of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity ar.a political independence. 3. Establishment of secure, recognized and agreed boundaries. 4. Other additional arrangements for ensuring security. 5. Withdrawal of military forces from territories lying "jjy; positions agreed in the peace treaty. 6. Termination of all states of war and acts of hostility . belligerency. 7.» The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, <->- violence, by any organization, group or individual ori. i from or is committed in its territory against the pop., citisens or.property of the other party. 8. Termination of all maritime blockade, discriminations ,;* interferences, economic warfare in all i.s manifoatat:o _ including boycott. This obligation is not dependent o.. anything except the conclusion of the state of war. 9. Provisions laying down the obligations accepted by The _ .., towards the settlement of the refugee problem, after vv.icl neither party shall bo under claims from the other inc., s: with ita sovereignty. 10. Non-participation in hostile alliances and. the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of "belligerency against the other, 11. Non-interference in domestic affairs and non-interference in the normal foreign relations of the other party. 12. Peace must be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal law and precedent. 9.1.71 j By , UITATxCH, Date ESSENTIALS OF PEACE (ISRAEL AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN) The central purpose of the discussions between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Israel is the establishment of peace between them. All the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 242 are within the context of the establishment of the just and durable peace which is the paramount aim of this resolution. Israel regards peace with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a concept embracing good neighbourly relations and cooperation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. But whether or not peace receives its full expression in the immediate future, there are certain indispensable essentials without which a situation cannot be regarded as a situation of peace. Peace involves amongst other things: 1. The declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict as finally terminated. 2. Respect and acknowledgement by the parties in explicit terms of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. 3. Establishment of secure, recognized and agreed boundaries. 4. Other additional arrangements for ensuring security. 5. Withdrawal of military forces from territories lying beyond positions agreed in the peace treaty. 6. Termination of all states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency. -2- 7. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in its territory against the population, citizens or property of the other party. 8. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations including boycott. Support for the principle of the freedom of navigation and termination of discriminations or interferences. This obligation is not dependent on anything except the conclusion of the state of war. 9. Formulation with high priority of provisions laying down the obligations accepted by the parties towards the settlement of the refugee problem, after which neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty. 10. Arrangements concerning places of religious and historic significance. 11. Arrangements for Free Port and transit facilities. 12. Non-participation in hostile alliances and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the other. 13. Non-interference in domestic affairs and non-interference in the normal foreign relations of the other party. 14. Peace must be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal law and precedent. IT IS A .BACT THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO SUBMIT TO AMBASSADOR JARRING A PAPER OUTL: INING THE EGYPTIAN POS- ITION. THIS PAPER HAS NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO AMBASSADOR JARRING. OUR FIRST MEETING AFTER HIS RETURN WAS ABOUT THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO HIKM TO VISIT ISRAEL. THE ONLY MEETING HELD WITH AMBASSADOR JARRING AFTER HIS RETURN FROM ISRAEL WAS A SHORT ONE AT HIS HOTEL IN WHICH I WAS INFORMED ABPUT HIS VISIT TO ISTAEL. SUBSTANCE WAS NOT DISCUSSED. WHEN TALKS ON SUBSTANCE ARE RESUMED WITH AMBASSADOR JARRING, THE EGYPTIAN POSITION IS EXPECTED TO BE SUBMMITTED TO HIM. IN FULFILLMENT OF AN UNDERSTANDING WITH AMBASSADOR JARRING TO THE EFFECT THAT WHATEVER HE SUBMITS TO BS AND WHATEVER WE SUBMIT TO HIM SHOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL, I CANNOT CONFIRM OR NOT CONFIRM REPORTS SAID TO HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED BY AL GOUMHOURIA OR AL AHRAM OR REPORTS CARRIED BY AMERICAN BROADCASTING STATIONS. OTHER REI4PRTS INFILTRATI TP THE MASS MEDIA FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN US. THIS IS A MAlter TO BE REGRETTED, SHOULD THIS INFILTRATION CONTINUE, AS FOR EXAMPLE IN RESTON'S ARTICLE TODAY, WE WILL HAVE TO THINK OF A COURSE TO FOLO. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TOs A: The Secretary-General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS ENPARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION X POUR INFORMATION Date: FROM: DE: lit- Jan. 1971 Gunnar Jarring CR. 13 (11-64) SECRET Minutes of a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, H.E. Mr. M. Masmoudi held at United Nations Headquarters Wednesday, 13 January 19TU at 11.00 a.m. Present; Mr. Masmoudi Mr. El-Goulli Mr, Fourati Mr. Jarring Mr. Berendsen Mr. Masmoudi said that his President vas not in good health, but had asked him to see Ambassador Jarring and find out if there was any way in which Tunisia could help indirectly to assist the latter in his mission. The disturbed situation in the Middle East had lasted too long and the situation in Jordan risked frustrating Ambassador Jarring's peace mission at the very moment when it was being resumed with some hope of making progress. Perhaps that was not a coincidence. Mr. Masmoudi stressed the importance of taking the interests of the Palestinians into account in trying to make peace in the Middle East. An attempt to bring about peace which did not pay attention to the political aspirations and psychological point of view of the Palestinians could not be successful. Mr. Masmoudi knew that the mandate of Ambassador Jarring provided for contact with Governments. That did not, however, preclude discreet and informal contact with the Palestinians. For a durable peace, it was necessary that the Palestinians should have the impression that they had participated in the peace-making process and that peace had not been made by others at their expense. He suggested, therefore, that Ambassador Jarring might consider establishing contacts with the Palestinians, through the Tunisians, without obligation on either side. Mr. Masmoudi reviewed briefly the situation in the Arab world. On the threshold of possible peace-making, the Arab peoples in general wanted peace, but there were currents of demagogy which threatened to frustrate Ambassador Jarring's efforts. The current situation in Jordan, in particular, tended to unite opinion in the other Arab countries against Jordan. Of course, some Arab Governments which had not accepted - 2 - the Security Council resolution or the Rogers Plan were taking a demagogic line and others based their attitude on calculations of how it would affect the internal situation. However, the present Arab context lent itself to progress and there was a real will for a solution. It was known that Ambassador Jarring was opposed to procedural delays. Mr. Masmoudi saw a further reason for hope in that the Palestinians felt a certain embarrassment in having opposed the Jarring mission. They were passing through a crisis of confidence and were re-evaluating their position in the present dramatic circumstances. Nevertheless the account of recent events had been exaggerated, ans so had been their political exploitation. The fact that the Egyptians were threatening to intervene, that Kuwait had suspended its aid for a second time and that Syria and Algeria were also making statements caused him to suspect that there might be a second attempt to torpedo the Jarring mission. Some Governments might wish to seize the Security Council with the situation so as to give stricter instructions to Ambassador Jarring. Ambassador Jarring said that the question of contacting the Palestinians was a delicate one for him. In his mandate, it appeared only in the restricted aspect of the refugee question. Ke recognized that the question had greatly increased in importance and complexity. The Palestinians, beginning from 1968, had become an undoubted political force. Ambassador Jarring had, however, to approach the question with due regard to the sovereignty of Jordan. Contact with the Palestinians was not within his mandate. It was difficult for the United Nations to act in a way which might be interpreted as intervention in the internal affairs of a Member State. The desirable solution could be for Jordan to include Palestinians in its delegation. However, there were several factions amongst the liberation movements and no doubt the choice was difficult. Mr. Masmoudi said that he fully understood Ambassador Jarring's position. However, the Tunisians were not approaching the problems in a juridical framework. - 3 - Ambassador Jarring said that it would "be a very delicate matter for him to take an initiative to contact the Palestinians. ¥r. Masmoudi agreed. He suggested, however, that Ambassador Jarring should find an opportunity of telling King Hussein that he was thinking of doing so and should ask the King if he had any objection. It would be up to the King to agree or not. He noted that the King had already signed an agreement with Mr. Arafat and had recognized the existence of a Palestinian entity. Ambassador Jarring took note of the suggestion. However, he did not believe that the time1 had come to take such initiative arid he certainly could not do it secretly. He felt that it was rather for the Palestinians to approach him. Mr. Masmoudi replied that it was difficult for the Palestinians to take such a step. There was a vicious circle. Everybody including the United Nations tended to treat the Palestinians as refugees and hence as persons without responsibility. There was a consequent pressure on the Palestinians to act violently to show that they were a force to be reckoned with. For the moment they were a negative force sufficiently important that certain Governments could not make undertakings for peace without incurring grave risks. It was necessary to turn the Palestinians into a positive force. There was no magic solution to the question but one must pay careful attention to the psychological state of the Palestinians. Ambassador Jarring said that the statements by the Palestinians that there should be a multi-national Palestinian state were unrealistic. Israel would never accept such a solution. Mr. Masmoudi agreed. However, the Palestinians had already told the Tunisians that that was not their final position. Ambassador Jarring said that he tried to approach matters realistically but the final settlement of the Palestinian question must be an Arab problem. Mr. Masmoudi said that it risked being a question on which all the other Arab States would take a position against Jordan. Ambassador Jarring inquired whether Mr. Arafat was the recognized leader of the Palestinian movement and to what extent was that movement unified. Mr. Masmoudi said that the factions led "by Mr. Habbash and Mr. Hawatme and SAIQA were separate. The persons living on the West Bank were for the most part closer to Mr. Arafat than to the other factions, although they tended to be more moderate than Mr. Arafat. Mr. Arafat was in a sense a national symbol. The King had recognized him as a national leader. Mr. Arafat was pious and a believer and a moderate and thoughtful man, who sometimes acted in a contradictory fashion because he sought advice from many quarters. Ambassador Jarring expressed the view that the Palestinian question could not be solved simply by establishing the West Bank as a Palestinian state. That would not be viable. That was, moreover, a question which concerned Jordan. Mr. Masmoudi agreed that one could not truly solve the question in that way. However, if one envisaged a Palestinian state created in some measure at the expense of Jordan and Israel living together with those two States in a spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation, perhaps in some form of federation, one could have a valid and durable solution. Certain Palestinians were already speaking of such a solution and he thought that should be encouraged, not only as a durable solution but as a just and durable solution. Ambassador Jarring said he noted that information with interest. He then gave Mr. Masmoudi a short account of the nature of his meetings in Israel. They had been to some extent encouraging but now he was awaiting the reactions of the Arab States. The meeting rose at 11.^5 a.m. I/ 15 January 1971 It was quite clear that, when you started your mission, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242, its essential aim was to establish the necessary contacts with the parties concerned with a view to implementing this Resolution in all its parts in order to reach a just settlement in the Middle East. The United Arab Republic has accepted this Reso- lution from the outset, and informed you in explicit terms at the time that it accepted the Resolution and declared its willingness to implement it. At the same time Israel refused to implement the Resolution. In the course of discharging your mission, it became clear to you that it would be preferable, in order to achieve the implementation of the Resolution, that you direct specific questions to the parties based on the provisions of the Resolution. This emanated from your belief that the response of the parties would eventually lead to the full implementation of the Security Council Resolution. The United Arab Republic has answered in full your questions on 5 March 1969 as appears in the report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council( Document S/10070 ) dated 4 January 1971. Confirming its readiness to implement all the pro- visions which the Security Council's Resolution requires that it carry out,the United Arab Republic adopted a positive attitude in responding to all the questions. As for Israel's attitude, it was noted that it deliberately refrained from submitting answers to certain questions, » 2 - especially to those regarding its withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. Israel further declined to declare its willingness to implement the United nations resolutions on the Palestine Refugees, It is evidently clear that the Memorandum which Israel handed to you on 10 .January 1971 added no new element to Israells previous answers to your questions. In point of fact it continued to ignore the saost essential elements required for the attainment of a lasting and just peace namely s - Withdrawal from the Arab territories it occupied by its armed forces since 5 June 1967. - achieving a just settlement for the Palestine Refugees in accordance with the resolutions repeateiHy adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly since 12 December 1949. It is the belief of the United Arab Republic that any settlement, aimed at the realization of peace in the area, should 4fttp£ffi& the necessary elements to make it lasting. 2!his cannot be achieved unless it is founded on the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter and the scrupulous implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions. In order to reach such a settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council Resolution, it is necessary that: 1. The Israeli aggression be terminated and the Israeli armed forces be withdrawn beyond the 5 June 1967 lines, as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242 which reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security; 2. Israel declare its repudiation of the policy of territorial expansion which it has pursued at the ^expense of the neighbouring Arab States. This policy i« repeatedly expressed in the statements made by Israeli leaders. 3. A $ust settlement of the Palestine Refugees must be reached* This can only be realised through Israel*8 respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United nations resolutions, 4. 3be termination of all claims or states of belli- gerency and guaranteeing freedom of navigation in waterways, 5. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. €. Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area. The Security Council may decide upon the necessary arrangements which would provide security to all States in the area,, These arrangements may, inter alia, include: A. -The establishment of a united nations Peace- Keeping Force in -which the Four Permanent MeHfoers of the Security Council would parti- cipate. 3* The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders. The tJnited Arab Republic has previously stated its readiness to implement its obligations in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242* 'This was clearly manifested in the United Arab Republic answers submitted to you on - 4 - 5 Biarch 1969. You may recall that during our contacts over the last three years the United Arab Republic has frequently assured you of this intention. More- over, the United Arab Republic has declared in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, that to achieve a peaceful settlement it is indispeni&ble that ail the obligations provided for in the Security Council Resolution be fully carried out and that this is the essential pro-requisite for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the area* The United Aeab Republic reiterates anew its full readiness to carry out all its obligations as contained in Security Council Resolution 242, it is essential that Israel, on its part, fully carry out all its obli- gations under this same Resolution. After the lapse of wore than three years since the beginning of your mission,, it should be evident that Israel refuses to implement the Security Council Resolution. It continues to procrastinate in an attempt to escape the carrying out of its obligations co&tained in the resolution. Israel seeks to dictate it® conditions by relying on force and on the status quo. It submits notes containing nothing but mere repetition of its previous positions* attitude on the part of Israel does not only impede the achievement of the peaceful settlement. It continues to escalate the explosive situation in the Middle East* 'Shis constitutes a serious threat to inter- national peace and security. Th© situation in the area, therefore, cannot be permitted to deteriorate any further. Consequently, it is deemed necessary that the Security Council should exercise its responsibilities in the main- tenance of international peace and security. Motivated by its ardent desire to ensure the conti- nuation of your mission, essential to the implementation of Resolution 242 adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 22 November 1967, the United Arab Republic is of the opinion that the Security Council ad&pt all adequate measures in order to ogggfea you|to carry on the mission entrusted to you by the Jfeeretary<^Seneral in accordance with that Resolution. Notes on meeting between Secretary-General and Amb. Charles Yost, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN, held at the United Nations at noon on Tuesday. 19 January 19T1 Ambassador Yost came to report on the Big Four meeting on 18 January 19T1. Ambassador Yost had welcomed the resumption of talks and had noted that there seemed to be an intention to carry them forward in a serious manner. The documents submitted had certain common elements. It was important that nothing should be done to interrupt the talks and it would be especially unfortunate to have a Security Council meeting which could do damage if the debate was at all violent. The other three representatives welcomed the resumption of the talks. The representatives of France and the U.K. agreed that a meeting of the Security Council would be undesirable. The representative of the USSR did not specifically advocate a meeting of the Council but said that if one was called there would be nothing to worry about. On the question of discussion among the Four Powers on guarantees, the U.S. representative had stated that the U.S. was prepared to enter into substantive discussion of this question in the near future if the Jarring talks were not interrupted by a Security Council meeting. The representative of France proposed more frequent meetings of the Four Powers and the early discussion of guarantees. The representative of the USSR asked whether any guarantees adopted would apply to both sides equally, whether the guarantees would be endorsed by the Four Powers and whether there would be demilitarized zones on both sides and a peace-keeping force. The representative of France answered "yes" to all of these questions. The representatives of the U.S. and the U.K. answered "yes" to the first question and said that the others should be subject to discussion. The next meeting will be on 27 January 1971. USSR January 27, 1971 The participants of the; Consultative meeting - representatives of the Four powers - permanent members of the Security Council noting with satisfaction the resumption of the mission by the Ambassador Jarring Special representative of the Secretary- General in the Middle East/and the contacts established with him by the parties, express their unanimous opinion to the effect that peaceful political settlement in the Middle East in pursuance of Security Council resolution 242 for the purpose of achieving just and lasting peace in the area should be based on the strict adherance to the principle of the inadmissibillty of acquisition of territory by war and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories. They proceed from the fact that the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war provided for in resolution 242 according to which no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal, was endorsed and reaffirmed by the XXYth session of the UN General Assembly in its Declaration on strengthening of international security and in its resolution on the Middle East. (2628/XXV). */ r' January 1S71 COMMUNICATION FRpM tHS GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO THE imitBD ARAB REPUBLIC THROUGH AMBASSADOR mRHIHG On January 18 Ambassador Jarring conveyed a memorandum to the Israel Government on behalf of the United Arab Republic. This document has now bees studied and the following comments are offered in the hop© of promoting agreement on the establishment of a Just and lasting peace, are many points in the Israel communication of January 9, to which the United Arab Republic document makes no reference. It is presumed that the United Arab Republic will address itself to these points at an early stags, in the meantime $10 Government of Israel should now like to carry the discussion further on some of the points mentioned in the United Arab Republic document. 1 . the United Arab Republic document refers to the realisation of "peace in the area" , The Government of Israel proposed that this be spelled out 33 specifically and reciprocally applying between the United Arab Republic and Israel, Such general phrases as "peaes in the area" are inadequate in the context of efforts to attain a peace agreement between the two States, they have been used in the past in contexts which have not included peace between Israel and the Arab stales* It is evident that peace between Israel and the United Arab Republic will be an important contribution to peace in the area as a whole , 2, the same applies to "respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area" as referred to in the United Arab Republic document. It is proposed that this also be spelled out as specifically applying between the United Arab Republic and Israel. It is the invariable practice of Stated subscribing to a peace agreement to specify in explicit terms the reciprocal rights and obligations which are to govern their mutual relationships. 3. Similarly it is important that the United Arab Republic and Israel enunciate* specifically and reciprocally their respect for and acknowledgement of the rights of each other to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Israel stands ready to undertake such an explicit obligation towards the United Arab Republic. Other aspects of this obligation as mentioned in the Israeli document of January 9 , including secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal and additional arrange- ments for ensuring security, will be discussed in due course as negotiations go forward. r —2— 4. Regarding the termination of all claims of belligerency, it ts important that in the peace agreement the United Atab Republic should explicitly undertake the termination of all such claims against Israel and that Israel undertake an identical obligation towards the United Arab Republic. The Government of Israel has concentrated on the above four points at this stage because the willingness of the Parties to undertake specific, direct and reciprocal commitments toward® each other is a matter of such central importance that their acceptance will obviously affect the discussion of the othar points mentioned in the Israel and United Arab Republic -documents. The principle Is accepted that agreement on individual points will become binding when all outstanding issues are agreed and embodied in the final peace agreement to be concluded between the two Governments, Once $$reemgnt is reached 'on the above four points it wil! b© possible to move promptly to discuss others, including the refugee problem. In -the United Arab Republic document there is reference to such charges as "Israeli aggression-' and " policies of territorial expansion t( . Israel completely rejects these accusations, the 1967 conflict arose through the disruption by the United Arab Republic of the established international situation then prevailing in the area . There were open threats of what the late President of the United Arab Republic called "the destruc- tion of Israel" (May 27, 1967). Israel's position on this issue was stated in the Security Council on June 8, 1967 and in the General Assembly on June IB, 1967. Moreover, draft resolutions referring to so-called Israeli "aggression" were rejected to the Security Council (June 14, 1967) and in the General Assembly (July 4, 1967)'. The charge of Israeli "aggression1 has thus been internatlQfiaHy refuted. Israel cannot accept any arguments, charges, or claims based directly or implicitly on the allegation of "Israeli aggression" . Furthermore, the Government of Israel does not have a "policy of territorial expansion" » Israel's policy is to reach agreement by negotiation OK the establishment, for the first time, of agreed and secure boundaries with each of the neighbouring states. The Israel position on this question, as well as on the carrying out of the Security Council resolution in all its parts, and withdrawal of armed forces to secure, agreed and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreements , remains as decided by the Israel Cabinet, and approved by the Knesset, on August 4, 1970 and as conveyed to Ambassador Jarring two days kter, Government of Israel proposes that accusations, which unfortunately have been too common during the twenty-two years of conflict, should not be introduced into this discussion by either side and that both Governments address themselves to the points to be agreed upon. In the same spirit it is suggested that Israel and the United Arab Republic follow the practice of guiet and confidential diplomacy. Israel believes that in these circumstances the Parties are more likely than otherwise to exchange ideas and suggestions with the greatest possible candour, thus enhancing the prospect of agreement on a just and lasting peace. lit Th® representatives of th© F©ux power© mst nif on January 27 at 3OO p«m. at the French permanent mission* Welcoming the continuation of the talks under "the aegis of Ambassador Jarring, they ©sp^asssd the hope that the Secretary-General will, in hie next report to the Security Council, be in a position to acknowledge re&l progress. In order to be able to contribute to efforts to achieve a settlement in the Middle East, they decided from now on to resume their work within the framework of the quatripartite talks, ©specially OQ the issue of guarantees./. Statement made by MALIK Y. A. at the Four^power Consultative meeting held on January 27, 1971 Ten days have elapsed since the latest Consultative meeting. However no tangible results have so far been achieved in the talks held by the parties through Ambassador Jarring. q The states of affairs in the Middle Est continious to be tense, although the Arab side is taking serious efforts to avoid exacerbating the millitary situation and political emotions and to render maximum assistance to the talks on a peaceful settlement. Submitted to Jarring and later published by the Hew York Times, the Israeli proposals lack the essential t.e, they still contain no Israeli position on the question of the withdrawl of troops and ignore the principle oirthe in admissibility v of aqulsition of territory by war. That is why this document of Israel cannot serve to advance Jarring1 s talks in that it factually by passes the most important provisions of Security Council resolution 242, On the other hand, the UAR proposals, as contained in the document dated January !5, 197! and circulated in the Security Council under S/IOG83, embssce all the most important and key provisions of Security Council resolution 242, which are necessary for the establishment and maintenance of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East. They are especially constructive in nature. Any unbiased and objectively-minded, observer would attach a high value to this document containing a realistic approach on the part of the UAR towards the talks on a settlement in the Middle East. The USSR delegation is deeply convinced that we the paricipants of the Four- power consultations permanent members of the Security Council must give our support to such a realistic approach of the XJAR as an important effort of the Arab side on the road to a peaceful settlement in She fiddle East. To do so would be in the interests of helping bring about the peaceful settlement.in the Middle East, as well as in the interests of achieving success in Jarring's talks with the parties in conflict. 2. The comprehensive and clearcut Egyptian proposals on all the fundamental aspects in the Middle Eastern settlement present a good basis for Jarring to successfully fulm his mission. This UAR document deals with all the major provisions of Security Council resolution 242,1'&e withdrawl of the Israeli forces, the inadmissibility of territo- ral acquisition by war (paragraphs I and 2 in the UAR document) j the cessation of the state of war (paragraph 4) and securing of the freedom of navigation in water- ways (paragraph 4). The UAR proposals also provide for a solution o! the Palesti- nian refugee problem (paragraph 3), andiin clear language state the respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty of each state in the Middle East and. their i/ rights to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries jh_e,l. from threats or use of force, (paragraph 5). Finally the UAR document contains important and constructive proposals on the (juestion of peace guarantees, as well as the territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area, therefore the UAR document fully conrespends to the spirit and the letter of resolution 242. The Soviet Union renders its full support to the UAR position as expressed in this document. We consider this position a significant step forward in reaching e a political settlement in the Middle East, and we call upon all the participants in the consultations also to come out with their support to this constructive and realistic approach held by the UAR as regards the talks through Jarring to attain a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East. Such support would no doubt help advance the talks in the right detection and facilitate agreement between the parties on the basis of Security Council resolution 242. What else is needed to achieve accord on a permanent and just political settlement 4n tl^e • Middles' Eafet for the purpose of the establishment of a lasting and contining peace? It is obvious that what now is needed is the expression of the good will on the part of Israel and its genuine readiness to reach settle- ment with the Arabs, vvhat is also necessary is a serious intention to establish peace in the Middle East on the basis of the withdrawl of all the Israeli forces from all the ©ccupied Arab territories as well as the implementation of all the remaining provi- sions of Security Council resolution. 242 "in a package". The way the things are going on, when the UAR document has been submitted, the possibility of real progress in the process of settlement will be largly depen dent on how seriously will Israeli seek mutually of territorial aquisition by war in its relationship with fche -Arab states. However, everyone understands only too clearly that it is impossible to reach^ a wide \j settlement in the Middle- East without implementation of this principle. This principle is one of the basic principles ie Security Council resolution 242. However not only is this principle not accepted in the Israeli document for tmidance and exeution, as it may seem should be the case, but it is in fact rep- laced by a formula supporting territorial claims by Israel. Such an approach of the Israeli side is distinctly .opposed £o that of the UAR which in its document confirmed its readiness to carry out all the concrete provisions in resolution 242. Until that time when Israel accepts the principle of the withdravJ of troops and the inadmissibility of territorial aquisition tn th- terms and on the understan- ding as speiled-out in resotution 242, no one can in any serious way talk about Israel's readiness to work for a settlement, As fcS known, this principle was again endorsed and confirmed by fche 25-th General Assembly Session in its documents: the Declaration on the strengthening international security and the resolution 08 the Middle East as one of the most important international Suies to be applied in relations among states. . The Israeli-American side, if one can say so, and I think one can is clearly ' • making attempts to delay Jarring' s talks . Israel deliberatly complicates and holds i back Jarring* s talk as the United States is at every consultative meeting insistent on having the representative of the Four Povwers sit back -with hand folded, wait "t^tlM and see how events tesa and do nothing . What is more the American side is attempting to portay all this as some sort of "quiet diplomacy" . Although it's not hard to see that all this is anything but f "QuiF^_diplpmacy", it is a deliberate tactics to block the is-'ork of the representa- tive of the Four powers during theOonsutattive meetings on the Middle Eastern 4, settlement. The four pcwers are called upon to assist the Jarring mission in expediting a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East with the aim of a lasting peace in strict conformity with resolution 242. The position of the representative of the USA compromises the purpose of otsr consultative meetings. All this cannot but make oiie concern for the cause of peaceful political settlement in the Middle East. We all know that during ail the consultative meetings of the "four" held since the 25-th General Assembly session the three representatives have all the time insisted and continue to insist on the necessity to speed up the work in the consultative meetings, to have the work of the working group resumed at the level of deputies and to hold more frequent meetings at the level of representatives , The United States on the other hand has all the time been opposed to this and is actually blocking the work in the consultative meetings arguing that the four powers could become more active in promoting Jarring*s mission only if a need to do so arose. V'e are deeply convinced that the "four1* had a duty to activate its work from the very beginning. Furthermore now it becomes perfectly clear to all of us, including , we believe , the ITS representative that the time has come to do just that, Studying the documents presented by the U&R, Israel and Jordan repeals that unless Jarring is helped by the four powers, the talks on a peaceful political settlement may again move into a blind alley and bring no results. It being so because Jsraei continues fco ignore the il i principle ow the inadmisstbility of squiition of territory by war and refuses to make a clear and unambiguous statement on the withdrawal of its forces / from the Arab lands. At the previous consultative meeting the USSR delegation submitted its proposal on the two key issues of the settlement, i.e. on the state of peace and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. We insist on having these proposals considered. Having studied the USE, Israeli and Jordanian documents we have become thoroughly convinced in the need for the "four" to take immediate 5. measures to'render effective help to Jarring in the fulfillment of the latter*s noble mission. It is of necessity to all of us to launch.a joint -tk^r appeal to ambassador Jarring and the parties in conflict so tahf in the interests of a more rapid peaceful political settlement in the Middle East for the purpose of stable and lasting peace in the area based on resolution 242, the search for ways of the settlement be firmly grounded in the tmswerverlng adherence to the principle of the iaadmissibility of aquisUlon"of territory by war and the withdrawal of Israeli^' forces from Ihe .Arab territories it occupied. The USSR delegation draws the attention of the participants of the •v^eeM^S consuItativeVfo~the following draft of such an appeal. SECRET AIDE-MEMOIRE 1$ 1 1 1 1 \ AInsi qu'il a ete deja exposS a 1'Ambassadeur Jarring par lettre du 18 avril, 1969, la position du Liban dans le conflit du Moyen-Orient dans son ensemble et par voie de consequence dans lea conversations relatives a lf application de la Resolution 2lj.2 du Conseil de Securite, decoule de realites et de considerations juridiques et politiques particulieres . La guerre de juin, 1961, qui n'a pas affecte le territoire libanais, a ete a 1'origine de la Resolution du Conseil de Securite du 22 novembre, 196?. Bien qu'etant concerne par le conflit du fait des liens qui existent entre lui et les pays arabes, de 1'interet primordial qu'il attache a la reconnaissance des droits du peuple palestinien et en raison des menaces qu1 Israel ne cesse de faire peser sur lui, le Liban considere que 1'acte international qui regit actuellement ses relations vis-a-vis d1 Israel est la convention d 'armistice libano- israelienne conclue sous 1'egide des Nations Unies et avec leur participation active en date du 23 mars, 19l|9. Cette convention est toujours en vigeur pour des raisons qui ne restent plus a demontrer et que Monsieur Thant a exposees dans son rapport a I'Assemblee Generale en date du 19 septenibre, 1967. Le Liban et Israel sont lies par les engagements qu'ils ont contractes. Le Liban en ce qui le concerne a tou jours respecte ces engagements. Les dispositions de la convention d 'armistice couvrent la plupart des objectifs essentiels de la negotiation qui est engagee actuelle- ment sous 1'egide de 1'Ambassadeur Jarring. II reasort en effet de cette convention que les lignes d1 armistice entre le Liban et Israel l&a^iV^:- .,-, correspondent aux frontieres entre le Liban et la Palestine qul ont ete reconnues sans interruption par la communaute Internationale depuis plus de cinquante ans dans des documents diplomatiques bilateraux et multilateraux. D'autre part, la meme convention implique le non recours a la force militaire. Elle etablit une procedure precise et cree un organisme special avec la participation et sous la presidence des Nations Unies pour controler 1'execution de ses dispositions. II apparait ainsi que toute autre prise de position par le Liban serait a 1'heure actuelle sans objet. Si la situation evolue, le Liban, qui a toujours coopere pleinement avec les Nations Unies, s'inspirera de cet esprit de cooperation dans les attitudes qu'il pourra'it §tre appele a adopter. _<^ , le 2? janvieur, 1971 SECRET 30 January 1971 THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST The Secretary of State Rogers called me on the phone today at 6:30 p.m. and told me the following: In his view the U.A.R. does not seem to understand the true character of indirect talks now being conducted through Ambassador Jarring. He appreciates the statements of the Secretary-General regarding the situation in the Middle East and these statements were very helpful in regard to the conduct of the Jarring mission. It seems to him that it is absolutely necessary to submit a report to the Security Council, and if he can be of help, he is prepared to come to New York on Monday to talk with the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring. I told him that I have been in contact with Ambassador Jarring on the question of the report for the last week and that it is my intention to submit the report on Monday. I also told him that it was very kind of him to think of coming to New York on Monday, but in my view such a visit might not be necessary. When it will be necessary, I will be in touch with Ambassador Yost and transmit the request to him. Secretary Rogers asked me if I had seen his latest letter addressed to Foreign Minister Riad of the U.A.R. I told him that Ambassador El-Zajgafc told me the gist of the letter on Friday but I have not got a copy. I asked him if he could kindly make available to me a copy. He said he would contact Ambassador YOst. He also observed that Ambassador El-Zayyat seemed to be in low spirits and asked me if Ambassador Jarring was thinking of moving his headquarters to Cyprus at some future date. I told him that Ambassador Jarring, for the moment, was not thinking of moving his headquarters from New York. I also told him that Ambassador El-Zayyat had repeatedly assured me and Ambassador Jarring that he was fully authorized to speak for his Government. - 2 - Secretary Rogers asked me why the submission of ray report to the Security Council was held up till next week. I told him that the Government of the U.A.R. did not want me to use the expression "observe the cease fire" in my report. It would prefer some formulation such as "maintain calm", or "maintain quiet". Rogers said that since Israel prefers the use of the expression "observe the cease fire", U.A.R. objected to it. He suggested that if I can use such expression as "exercise military restraint", it would take care of both points of view. (In this connexion, Ralph Bunche telephoned me at 1:30 p.m. today that in the past, we have used the expression "to maintain quiet" in place of "to observe the cease fire". I did not mention this talk with R.Bunche to Secretary Rogers.) He ended the conversation by assuring me that he was willing and ready to come to New York whenever I sent word to him through Ambassador Yost. I thanked him for his kind thought. U Thant k>. * SECOND DRAFT ' lEB/md Distr. GENERAL S/10070/Add.l ORIGINAL: ENGLISH FURTHER REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST 1. On h January 1971> in submitting to the Security Council a report on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, my Special Representative to the Middle East, I was able to note that it had "been possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions under his auspices with Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them. 2. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and has pursued them actively. He has held a series of meetings with the representatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January 1971 at the request of that Government), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held a meeting with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, which is also a State directly concerned with a? Middle East settlement. 3. At an early stage in these meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the i! essentials for peace. Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan, having - 2 - received the respective Israeli paflo-rs, presented papers containing their views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (196?). These papers were in turn transmitted by Ambassador Jarring to Israel and the reaction of that Government is now awaited. k. Ambassador Jarring has informed me that a study and comparison of those papers reveal a number of points on whipfer'ffhe parties hold substantially the same position. However, the •e a number of points on which further clarification and e ration of the position of the parties is necessary before it can bedetermined that there Ls a clear prospect for agpoomonti and for a £cef ul settlement . \J$?'. While recognizing that the resumed discussions are still at an early stage and that much further clarification is required, I find grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that the parties have resumed their dialogue through Ambassador Jarring and that there has been some progress in the definition of their positions. la-Jjfae-hupu thai &uuli jjiugruap vill continue, I have. jTtPTPBSfd tho ctaff afc AiuTjj^ouClov Jarring fe disposal. I take this opportunity to appeal to the parties to pursue their role in the discussions in a con- structive manner, to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring in formulating the V^J£ Q-<— *^-£^_ ovv tt~ ^— -ai* *Y S.dr-«-i— €• ru*a • Distr. GENERAL S/10070/Add.1 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH FURTHER REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST s 1. On k January 1971? in submitting to the Security Council a report on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, my Special Representative to the Middle East, I vas able to note that it had been possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions under his auspices with Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them. 2. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and has pursued them actively. He has held a series of meetings with the representatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January 1971 at the request of that Government), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held a meeting with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, which is also a State directly concerned with the Middle East settlement. ^>. At an early stage in these meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the "essentials for peace". Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan, having received the respective Israeli views, presented papers containing their - 2 - own views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 2^2 (1967). These papers were in turn transmitted by Ambassador Jarring to Israel and the reaction of that Government is now awaited. k. While recognizing that the resumed discussions are still at an early stage and that much further clarification is required, I find grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that the parties have resumed their dialogue through Ambassador Jarring and that there has been some progress in the definition of their positions. I take this opportunity to appeal to the parties to pursue their role in the discussions in a constructive manner, to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring in formulating the necessary commitments for peace with justice on the basis of resolution 2k2 (1967) and, in this period of delicate discussions, to continue to observe the cease-fire now existing between them. J-.lf Distr. GENERAL S/10070/Add.l 1 February 1971 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH FURTHER REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST 1. On k January 1971* in submitting to the Security Council a report on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, my Special Representative to the Middle East, I was able to note that it had been possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions under his auspices with Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them. 2. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and has pursued them actively. He has held a series of meetings with the representatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January 1971 at the request of that Government), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held meetings with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, which is also a State directly concerned with the Middle East settlement. 3« At an early stage in these meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the "Essentials of Peace". Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan, having received the respective Israeli views, presented papers containing their own views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 2^2 (1967). These views were in turn transmitted by Ambassador Jarring to Israel, and the reaction of that Government to the views of the United Arab Republic has now been received. k-. While recognizing that the resumed discussions are still at an early stage and that much further clarification is required, I find grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that the parties have resumed the talks through Ambassador JarringTand that there has been some progress in the definition of their positions. Furthermore, 4U tin; parties, who have already indicated their willingness to carry out resolution 2U2 (1967), are now describing in greater detail their view of their obligations under that resolution. I take this opportunity to appeal to the parties to pursue their role in the discussions in a constructive manner, to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring in formulating the necessary commitments for a just and lasting peace * s. - oa tfee Cassis of isolation l&£ (19$?) sM, is this ^®siod of delieats to eontlsiate to efeBen?© ttos eaase-fir^ KOW existing 1, ife© Sis-rsstas^-S^essl ess ss$eyst«B3& th@ |K%es^at of tfes &feais®d In polet t ef tines 6i.d to sis -sa 1 'f&^mmyy 197i, tfeai therst has so pre is fc'fea (ifS?}# sisae® XSJPB®! Ims so fss? deeliaaA to iits pssitios %d.tfe segaM to tUs sitMrcmiJal [email protected] of fesl®0sf ift the 5u%ss3 ai esM© of Ms S^eel^l ifepresesfestife" feo tlse M lass fesi-s. g&s,e prcsgrsss is tto@ talks in tMt fcfee ;s ©siti©ps essS iiave sg?.'ss& t® the ttSQpl«ss5Q.fsti0s of sn to view ta S^2 (19&T) at tiis tiffiatsife sad firaeisl s ef feh stwaiaS ®zi€ to ? staee lags fos? the iB^^ ©f tJj« fire.* si3a«® It it s t-o tfes eontisiasd of ~->?itfe f te th-a is poi»fe II, tM ss-st-rtattfi. Massif gawaral apgaal for the off 2 {l9^T)# siaa« it hiss sat sy itfias.a ttf tla© es I® tMs soss3«Kioa> ae molr?j aMre-se-^1 to Gstte4 A eosaifers tlmt is essfiS-ffitt!' t&afc Ms Sfeeiti Rsp^ssattts.tt^e-.j, is tba sf Mai iis ©f st of cae ?ssafe,, fee sif£s? tlss' lissiti ff it flsass it 73s«!s«.s-arj- t® ouaeil fs ^i its mt tfe® t AlftE-MEMOIRS I. In the judgment of the United Arab Republic there has been no progress in the position of Israel as regards the implementation of Security Council resolution 2^2. There is also no change in the position of the United States of America. It appears, however, that Your Excellency is giving thought to an initiative for the prolongation of the'cease-fire which according to General Assembly resolution of h November 1970 expires at the fifth of this- month (February 1971). As I have repeatedly stressed in the past to Your Excellency, the indefinite prolongation of the cease-fire would lejad to the indefinite and unharrased occupation of Arab territories by Israeli forces of occupation. This is, of course, what the Israelis aim at. II. Should Your Excellency decide on taking such an initiative for the prolongation of the present cease-fire, what initiative regarding our demand for withdrawal from the occupied territories can be contemplated? Would Your Excellency recommend Israeli withdrawal at the same time you recommend the extension of the cease-fire? Would the request for the continuation of the cease-fire be indefinite or would it be limited to a period of one monthf What other steps would the Secretary-General undertake for the implementation of the Security Council resolution following this first direct initiative on his part? III. In case the Secretary-General deems, however, that the United Nations objectives would be best served by taking an initiative to prolong the cease-fire, the United Arab Republic trust that .the contemplated initiative would include the following points: 1. Calling upon the parties to abide by all United Nations relevant resolutions including General Assembly resolution of U November 1970 and to faithfully implement Security Council t resolution 2k2 requiring: i,V<-'- Aide Memoire - 2 - (l) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from * territories occupied in the recent conflict. (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. 2. Addressing an appeal to the Security Council and especially its permanent members to formulate adequate guarantees for peace in the area. 5. Recommending to the parties to extend the cease-fire for a period of one month in order to enable your Special Representative Ambassador Jarring to work out a program for the implementation of the Security Council resolution and to submit it to the parties. IV. Would it, finally, be the intention of the Secretary-General to report by the end of the contemplated month of cease-fire prolongation to the Security Council? SECRET February 1, 1971 COMTJKICATIGH FROM THE (KWSRMMBKT OF L3RA3L TO BJii COETftiYED TO THi3 (MVEHHEENT UJT LlfflAKQK THRGUG-H JAlfflfflG The G-overnment of Israel offers the following comments to the Lebanese memorandum conveyed to it by Ambassador Jarring on January 280 The Government of Israel cannot accept the Lebanese claim asserting the continued validity of the General Armistice Agreement concluded twenty-two years ago. It may be recalled that the Lebanon and other Arab states always regarded the armistice agreements as consistent with the existence of a state of war0 Israel and Lebanon have declared their acceptance of Security Council resolution 242 which gives no support to such concepts as "armistice", but on the contrary calls for the establishment of a just and lasting peace. Israel and Lebanon should undertake mutual obligations, in explicit terms, so as to apply towards each other the elements of the Security Council resolution, including the establishment of a just and lasting peace, termination of all claims of belligerency, respect for and acknowledgement of the political sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of both statesj and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. The Government of Israel; "therefore, invites the Government of Lebanon to reconsider its memorandum of January 28 in the light of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242, and of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is noted that the Lebanese Government undertakes to change its attitude if a certain evolution takes place* Discussions between states of the Middle Bast within the framework of Security Council resolution 242, are intended to bring about that evolution0 Therefore, Israel considers it important that Lebanon clarifies its views through Ambassador Jarring on the points contained in the Israel document of January 9> 1971« WW^^^if^r^^t^^^n^fsj£'^-¥?^^ t liimv<:':,-WlffaHl'-f-* t1*1 sw •'•*•>' ' ''' <' • J -3V i8M;;:.' 1, 19' TIL. 10 In r3ply to the memorandum from the Jordan (Joyernnunt of January 19? the following comments are offered in the hope of promoting agreement on the establishment of a juat raid lasting peace between Israel 1 • ''.I and Jordan. • 2« Israel snares the Jordanian view welcoming the resumption of Ambassador Jarring1s mission, but it re^reta that the important phrase "to promote agreement" has been omitted in the Jordanian document, despite the fact that this is how Security Council resolution 242 defines Ambassador Jarring( s mission,, to or does the Jordanian document contain any specific reference to Israel in the context of mutual obligations to be undertaken in the peace-making process0 5o There are many point;-.; in the Israel communication of January 9, to which the Jordanian document makes no reference. It is hoped that Jordan will address itself to each of them at an early stage. In the meantime, Israel would now like to carry the discussion further on some of the points mentioned in the Jordanian documento 4<> The Jordanian document refers to respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and to their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. iSuch general phrases have been used in the past in contexts which have not included peace between Israel and the Arab states. It is evident that peace between Israel and Jordan will be? an important contribution to peace in the area as a whole: but the agreement to be concluded between the two states should specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of them tov/ards the other. It is, therefore, important that this crucial point be spelled out by Jordan in relation to Israel, as well as by Israel in relation to Jordan. ,/5. The Government of Israel attaches importance to an undertaking by Jordaiv'in explicit terms that it will terminate all claims of belligerency against Israel, '''',:.•,;•. .;• Israel, on its part, stands ready to undertake an identical -...'•'',' V • i . obligation renouncing such claims against Jordan0 ••"••! ': " ' ' . . ' f^fiS^;'j . •;•• ;,••"'',,'•' , . Other aspects aa mentioned in the Israeli dbcument of January 9, **$'•'^'.1 J '>',„'i •'.' kyVt : '.'yi,-;-'*' ^> -; 7includin ' g the establishment qf secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal, ISSfcfe-'rl '•', ••'• •.''£&& 'iither additional arrangements for ensurin/j security, will be discussed in ^M^i5*1-ATii>i':''1-rJ5 ' '••"' ' ' ,' '' • ''"' '''"•'- •• -: • ' • i lf'll!|S|^'i!f\!''¥V': ^!^" Bourse, as the negotiations |jo forward„. •:•'•$$ v .:r,v^S .'-.'*..'. 'A--*. .VfC.ls- 6e Israel has concentrated on these points at tills stage becau3Q the vdllingtu'ss of the-; Parties to under take spocJIlc, direct ana reciprocal conmitBwntf-". towards each other ia u baalu and natural ; r^r^'.fiilrjite of peace. Tit? vdliim;nafJ8 to accept such commitments wdl. undoubtedly affect the diacu3i-.io.ris of tor., other pointfi inantvmed la t. ie Israel and Jordanian docuBiants,; amount which trie refuse problem ?.i;.r\U.' . 'l'h.«* oxperl'jvjco of t)ie pant tvo : i •? i -.;.!.• 1 -..-• f.r'^-rid thut the T Intores t.-; -»f t.tip jx»fuf.>?er, v/ouUl bo weivm-i rot hv jj-. jlor.,-; ' ,^ tht. Conflict p 5ji.At b;r th'.: •".wV'.b! i.-jnv.ient of a final petice betmjC'U V.. ,,-Mt>i t-n-i /ordaru . In lh'3 li;;.Ut of l;h«r'£- ocjnccuior'.'ilaoi-n Jsme! :iUi;epats that tiie first step mnto just and lasting peeow shouifi bo toni, tiis 'ilom^nts mention-.^d In tno Jordani'jjfi cloctunent UR t-ui].li.citly r? Li ted b,y .'Jordan and Israel to each Other* .Agroemeivf: on th.'La point would enable cifclior matters mentioned in .both document?? to ba promptly discussed* The principle in accepted that agreement on individual points will become bindixig when all outstanding jaaueo are af:x'eed and embodied in the final agreement to be concluded, 80 'I!he Jordond.an document charges Israel with "a policy of territorial expansion". This is not Israel's policy. Israel's policy is to seek agreement by negotiation on the establishment, for the first time, of agreed and secure boundaries with each of the neighbouring states. The Israel position on this question, as well as 'on the carrying out of Security Council resolution 242 in all its parts, including withdrawal of aimed forces to secure, agreed and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreements, remains as decided by the Israel Cabinet and approved by the Knesset on August 4, 1970(, and conveyed to Ambassador Jarring two days later* 9. In a statement mad© in the General Assembly of the United Kaiions on October 8, 1968, the Israeli Foreign Minister set out his Government's position on Jerusalem and the Holy Places,, The relevant extract from that document reads! "Israel does not seek to exercise unilateral jurisdiction. in the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam, we are willing in each case to work out a status to give effect ;j to their universal character. We would like to discuss appropriate agreements with those traditionally concerned,, •, Our policy is that the Christian and Moslem Holy Places ;-l should come under the responsibility of those who hold them : ; in reverence", v,-. • *' •..;' •*'&; *&*&?:.«* '4J ':!• : . • •;;* ;": * ;>1 •.,:-', ?; -. S^|IKi:;t.^:-?:" :i^^'^N|i/ti^; ^, ^/1"; "l^- ';••'• . |isy4^|^;^;-t ; ;v WSS^jK'iW Si:jy>-p;p ; : Mffii?raw*,.; ... ,• v.- • ^|4'-" ;-£, ' -5- ; ' :T ' lOo The circumstances in which Jordan launched hostilities against Israel on June 5, 1967, are too well known and documontad to need reiteration here* ' In any cace> it in proposed that accusations which have been all too common in the Ion;-: ye:,rs of conflict bi; not introduced into the discussions between the Parties uncier Ambassador Jarrin^'s auspices, and that both Governments address thsmaelves exclusively to the points to be a/jraed upon in the establishment of peace. In tho some spirit, it ic sutposted that the practice of quiet and confiJ.entir.'.l di[jioiaacy be followed. The Government of Israel believes that, in t-ucli circuittfJicea the Parties will be wore; likely than otherwise to exchange idear; :uid oujfestion;: :;itii the gTcatost possible c.'aidour. •.•i^'iBf '•"':-i ^'''' •f-'vi'^-.-isii :;:: :vp i-;-:;SW* , ;: *>•'•! -• i " •;• iv ^jv.^i-'--v,^ '• i • -'-•>••.'1 ! • ,• • • ' .•.-. -i^.L-.i's.ii^'waLia1; ''>.\ ti'. "J- ft*: .'^iife' ' -J'3' SECRET BMFP S/lQ070/Add.2 RJKEHER HEPOKD Blf THE SECHE^AKf-OEKERAL OK THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIBDK3 EAST 1. On 1 February 1971 I submitted to the Security Council a report on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, ray Special Representative to the Middle East, since the resumption on 5 January 1971 of the discussions under his auspices •tilth the parties to the Middle East conflict for the purposes of reaching agreement on a Just and lasting peace between them, In that report, I found grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that there had been some progress in the definition of the position of the parties and I appealed to them to pursue their role in the discussions in a constructive oianner, to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring with a view to the carrying out of Security Council resolution 2^2 (1967) and, in that very difficult and crucial stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which had prevailed in the area since August 1970. 2. In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a communique released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel would preserve the cease-fire on a mutual basisj in a speech to the National Assembly on k February, the President of the United Arab Republic declared the decision of the United Arab Bepublic to refrain from opening fire for a period of thirty days ending on 7 March. 3. In pursuing his mandate to promote agreement between the parties, Ambassador Jarring', while sharing my cautious optimism that the parties were seriously defining their positions and wished to move forward to a permanent peace, noted with growing concern that each side was insisting that the other Should make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions of a final peace settlement«• . - 2 - ^. On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments towards Israel that it would "be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agreement was reached on those points, it would "be possible to discuss others, including the refugee problemi such items as secure and recognized "boundaries, withdrawal and additional arrangements for ensuring security should be discussed in due course. 5. The United Arab Hepublic continued to regard the Security Council resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 19^7 • Furthermore in the view of the United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a Just settlement to the refugee problem. 6. fhe papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan relating to peace between these two countries showed a similar divergence of views. 7. Ambassador Jarring felt that he should at that stage make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful(and accepted)settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 2*& (1967)* which the parties had agreed to carry out in all its parts. He reached the conclusion, which I shared, that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the tJnited Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings - which seemed to Mm to be the real cause for the existing immobility - was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seemed to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, "but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question. 8. Ambassador Jarring therefore requested the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to him at that stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party made ita commitment and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of & peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem: 9» Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satis- factory arrangements are made for: (a) Establishing demilitarized aones; (b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm-el-Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiranj and (cj Freedom of navigation through the Suea Canal. 10. ffhe tlhited Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel,, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgements covering the following subjects; (a) ^termination of all claims or states of belligerency! (b) Respect £or and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political Independencej (c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundariesj (d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citiaens or property of the other party; and (e) Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. This request was contained in identieal aide-memoires handed to the representatives of the 0nited Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February 1971. 9« On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the representative of the United Arab Republic andf aide-memoire in which it was indicated that & the United Arab Republic vould accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution ShS (1967). If Israel would give, likewise, commitments covering its own obligations under the Security Council resolution, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaaa atrip and for the achievement of a 4«s"t settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 2*f2 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967. 10. On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli representative of the contents of the United Arab Hepublic reply to Ms aide-memoire, while not formally communicating the text. 11. On §6 February, Ambassador Jarring received a paper from the representative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated that it viewed favourably ttthe expression by the United Arab Hepublic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. Israel gave details of the undertakings which in its opinion should be given by the two countries in such a peace agreement, which should be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedents. Israel considered that both parties having presented their basic positions should now pursue the negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions* 12. On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israel position was that it would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli forces from "the Israeii-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to "be established in the peace agreement! Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 19&7 lines. 1$. jlt^asestor ^Tsxriag feas fern ws?y active ovtr tha past ssoatfe asd sfaa® farther fseogimse last® &©as ssa&a fe^mrds a peaceful soXutit® ©f fetus MldCte S&si- %nen9t£on. ^s psJS^Less t© fc© settled faav^ ^ssea BIOTO aleat OB tlief1©. Is g-aiisral fegrseasest* I ^is& m®y®QV®y to «ith ifttiBfeetloa tise f&sltl^s replj- glv^a % fete Psaitea Assfe to • barfing*s iaitiati'r&." Ito^gr^s*, tiie Israeli Sossims sc fay not respoaSsd to tbe »spe©t"o? lfsfes» Israel stressed the Importance of Jordan's giving en undertaking to enter iiito a peace agreement with it which would specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of them. Jordan emphasized the inadfflissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step towards peace lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories. lit-. Ambassador Pairing has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to b© settled have been more clearly identified and 0a some there is general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the Israeli Government has so far not responded, t© the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary ©f the United Arab Bepublie. 15. While 1 still consider that future prospects are hopeful if the present obstacle can be removed, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador barring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Israeli Government to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring*s initiative. 16, To give time for further consideration and in the hope that jfehe"~ way forward may be reopened, I ©nee more appeal to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970. Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been/identified •aed- To give time for further ^^consideration and in the hope that a favourable Israeli decision may reopen the way to peace, I once more appeal to the parties to withhold fire and to exercise military restraint. Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the Israeli Government has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic. I have been informed by the Permanent Representatives of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of their appeal to Israel to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarringfs request. I associate myself with this appeal. To give time for further consideration and in the hope that a favourable larqoli dooioion may reopen the way tolpeace, I once more appeal to the parties to withhold fire and to exetcise military restraint. „ • ^ AIDE-MEMOIRE I. In the judgment of the United Arab Republic there has been no progress in the position of Israel as regards the implementation of Security Council resolution 2^2. There is also no change in the position of the United States of America. It appears, however, that Your Excellency is giving thought to an initiative for the prolongation of the cease-fire which according to General Assembly resolution of k November 1970 expires at the fifth of this month (February 197l). As I have repeatedly stressed in the past to Your Excellency, the indefinite prolongation of the cease-fire would lead to the indefinite and unharrased occupation of Arab territories by Israeli forces of occupation. This is, of course, what the Israelis aim at. II. Should Your Excellency decide on taking such an initiative for the prolongation of the present cease-fire, what initiative regarding our demand for withdrawal from the occupied territories can be contemplated? Would Your Excellency recommend Israeli withdrawal at the same time you recommend the extension of the cease-fire? Would the request for the continuation of the cease-fire be indefinite or would it be limited to a period of one monthf What other steps would the Secretary-General undertake for the implementation of the Security Council resolution following this first direct initiative on his part? III. In case the Secretary-General deems, however, that the United Nations objectives would be best served by taking an initiative to prolong the cease-fire, the United Arab Republic trust that the contemplated initiative would include the following points: 1. Calling upon the parties to abide by all United Nations relevant resolutions including General Assembly resolution of k November 1970 and to faithfully implement Security Council resolution 242 requiring: Aide Memoire - 2 - (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict. (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. 2. Addressing an appeal to the Security Council and especially its permanent members to formulate adequate guarantees for peace in the area. 3. Recommending to the parties to extend the cease-fire for a period of one month in order to enable your Special Representative Ambassador Jarring to work out a program for the implementation of the Security Council resolution and to submit it to the parties. IV. Would it, finally, be the intention of the Secretary-General to report by the end of the contemplated month of cease-fire prolongation (! 'ti to the Security Council? /, 1 February Aide-me^moire 1. The Secretary-General can understand the Judgement of the United Arab Republic contained in point I of the aide-memoire presented to him on 1 February 1971, that there has-been no progress in the position of Israel as regards the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), since Israel has so far declined to define its position with regard to the withdrawal provisions of the resolution. Nevertheless, in the judgement of the Secretary- General and also of his Special Representative to the Middle East, there has been some progress in the talks in that the parties have further defined their positions and have agreed to discuss further matters concerned with the "implementation of the Security Council resolution". The Secretary-General therefore Intends to make an appeal to •. • / the parties to pursue their role in the discussions in a constructive manner, to co-operate with his Special Representative with a view to carrying out Security Council resolution 2^2 (1967) and, at t>he present very difficult and crucial stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970. This should not, however, be construed as an appeal for the indefinite prolongation of the cease-fire, since it is related to the continued progress of the discussions. 2. With respect to the request contained in point II, the Secretary-General has restricted himself to a general appeal for the carrying out of Security Council resolution 2^2 (1967), since it would be impossible for him to single out particular items of the resolution as having precedence over others. In this connexion, he has learned with satisfaction from the aide-memoire addressed to Ambassador Jarring that the United Arab Republic considers that the resolution should be implemented "as a package deal". The Secretary-' A.. General is confident that his Special Representative, in the pursuit of his discussions, will continue to seek commitments from Israel relating to the withdrawal provisions of the resolution. J. With respect to point III of the aide-me'raoire-, the Secretary- General, as noted above, intends to make his appeal to the parties in general terras. However, he is confident that-his Special Represen- tative will continue to give priority to seeking commitments from the parties for the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution which have been noted. As regards the suggestion that the Secretary-General should recommend the extension of the cease-fire for a period of one month, he would consider it more appropriate for the Government of the United Arab Republic to designate a specific time limit if it deems it necessary to do so. k. With respect to point IV, the Secretary-General would intend, as the discussions proceed, to report to the Security Council from time to time on their progress. He would in particular deem it appropriate to issue a further report to the Security Council at the end of the current month. SECRET k February 1971 THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST Ambassador Malik of the USSR reported to me today on the meeting of the Big Four at his Mission which lasted for 2 1/2 hours from 3 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. As Chairman, he spoke first (Annex A). After his statement he presented a draft statement for consideration and adoption by all Four (Annex B). Ambassador Yost who spoke next explained that he had no instructions to agree to the publication of any joint statement at this meeting. If the publication of a joint statement is considered necessary, he had instructions to present a short draft which was circulated to the other three representatives (Annex C). Sir Colin Crowe of the United Kingdom said that he needed instructions to agree to the Soviet draft, but he could go along with the United States draft for publication if the other representatives agreed. Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet of France who spoke last presented a compromise draft statement (Annex D) and explained at length why it is necessary for the Four Powers to come out with a substantive statement at this time. Ambassador Malik supported the French draft since it was substantive and positive. Ambassador Yost reiterated his position that he had no instructions to go along with any substantive draft declaration. Sir Colin Crowe spoke in favourable terms of the French draft, but he followed the line taken by Ambassador Yost and indicated that it would be better to leave the publication of a substantive statement to a later meeting. Ambassador Malik strongly criticized the United States draft as conveying no substance, and he said even the drafting was faulty. (He told me that in the United States draft 2 February was mentioned instead of 1 February as the date of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council. The last sentence does not make sense as the Parties chmSaco-operate fully with the appeal instead of with the Secretary-General.) After another round of discussions it was obvious that the United States representative had no instructions to agree to any Ambassador Malik - 2 - 4 February 1971 substantive statement so the Soviet representative suggested that the deputies meetings should be revived to consider a suitable draft or drafts for the next meeting of the Permanent Representatives. The United States delegate objected to it and suggested that the next meeting of the four Permanent Representatives should be on Tuesday, 16 February. The Soviet representative proposed that they should meet either on 10 or 11 February. At last it was agreed to have the next meeting on the morning of Friday, 12 February, at the residence of the British representative. (Ambassador Malik told me that he had been informed confidentially that the United States draft was sent from Washington earlier in the day and that Ambassador Yost argued with Mr. Sisco in Washington on the formulation of the draft, but without success.) O-S.-A- FOUR POWER STATEMENT FEBRL'ARY - The Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of Prance3 the USSR^ the United Kingdom and the United States met on February by 1971 and welcomed the appeal of the Secretary General to the parties contained in his report to the Security Council dated February 2., 1971, The Pour Powers support the Secretary General's appeal : r : ":^T- -'::;~"^ •' '-V--''I' 8,nci are of the view that the parties should cocperate____ .fully, with it. ' fe,: Statement by J. A, MALIK made at the consultative meeting of the Foiar on the Middle East February 4, 1. The parttigtpaats of the meeting are being welcomed tn the Soviet 2. At the present time the efforts to reach a Middle Eastern settle* ment have entered a specially important stage, $n which the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle Bast will be largely dependent. The situation mates it incumbent We are also $& agreement with TJ Than!;1 s opinion that the current period represents an especially difficult and decisive stags is disowssieis of the question ofr the Middle "1&g£em settlement through the Jarring mission* The Important feature of the appeal of the Secretary General is the inseparable Jink between the consent of the parties to the non-resumption of fir© and the necessary progress toward the substantial settlement in the Middle East. It goes without sayiag that what is meant is the necessity for the parties to implement all the provisions of Security Ceuaetl resolution 242, tactudtog its most important provisions - She inadmisslbiiiiy of territorial acqui- sition by war and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the .Arab territories occupied in 106? as well as the cessation of the state of v/ar and the establishment of a lasting and just peace. The question of peace guarantees in the area is also an integral part of the "package" seEtlemsui; in the Middle East. It is of utmost importance to actii^e ia a constructive manner the jarring mission a^^s'eii as the four -power consultations as the earliest possible date* la this respeet, 'inter alia, it would b© asoftil if Jarring imm©dialslf set up aud proposed to the parties a timetable for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in al! its aspects and provisions. IJvedently it would fee opportune to have the Secretary General submit a report on fch© progress of the Jarring mission by £he end of this month* Si die period to come when fire is withhold for a limited space of time, the Four powers- will used 'make active efforts to supply Jarring with agreed- upon recommendations. For this ptirpose the work of the representatives of these powers with an aim to produce recommendations for Jarring on the main questions of the settlement has to fee mad© more active. We continuously adhere to the view that the Four-power consultations can and must play an important constructive role in the Middle Eastern settlement. And in this regard what is utterly abnormal is that the instituted Four-power consultations have in fact been inactive lately because of the obstructing possltoa maintained by Ihe tISA, It stands to reason that more active work on the part of the Four will in no way hamper Jarrifttfs efforts ,who is holding contacts with the parties to conflict, in spite of at! attempts of the American side to prove the contrary. In fact it would b© the other way around* Activization of the Four1? sf<$ad consultations at the level of th© permanent representatives as well as -i •' • • -•--.! wlthln'cthe working groitp made of their deputies will assist Jarring in carrying-out the mission with which he was entrusted. •-39 r SECRET k February 1971 THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST Ambassador Malik' of the USSR reported to me today on the meeting of the Big Four at his Mission which lasted for 2 1/2 hours from 3-p-m. to 5.50 p.m. As Chairman, he spoke first (Annex A). After his statement he presented a draft statement for consideration and adoption by all Four (Annex B). Ambassador Yost who spoke next explained that he had no instructions to agree to the publication of any joint statement at this meeting. . If the publication of a joint statement is considered necessary, he had instructions to present a short draft which was circulated to the other three representatives (Annex C). Sir Colin Crowe of the United Kingdom said that he needed instructions to agree to the Soviet draft, but he could go along with the United States draft for publication if the other representatives agreed. Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet of France who spoke last presented a compromise draft statement (Annex D) and explained at length why it is necessary for the Four Powers to come out with a substantive statement at this time. Ambassador Malik supported the French draft since it was substantive and positive. Ambassador Yost reiterated his position that he had no instructions to go along with any substantive draft declaration. Sir Colin Crowe spoke in favourable terms of the French A- draft, but he followed the line taken by Ambassador Yost and indicated that it would be better to leave the publication of a substantive statement to a later meeting. Ambassador Malik strongly criticized the United States draft as conveying no substance, and he said eyen the drafting was faulty. (He told me that in the United States draft 2 February was mentioned instead of 1 February as the date of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council. The last sentence VA does not make sense as the Parties should co-operate fully with the appeal instead of with the Secretary-General.) After another round of discussions it was obvious that the United States representative had no instructions to agree to any Ambassador Malik - 2 - k February 1971 substantive statement so the Soviet representative suggested that the deputies meetings should be revived to consider a suitable draft or drafts for the next meeting of the Permanent Representatives. The United States delegate objected to it and suggested that the next meeting of the four Permanent Representatives should be on Tuesday, 16 February. The Soviet representative proposed that they should meet either on 10 or 11 February. At last it was agreed to have the next meeting on the morning of Friday, 12 February, at the residence of the British representative. (Ambassador Malik told me that he ha'd been informed -confidentially that the United States draft was sent from Washington earlier in the day and that Ambassador Yost argued with Mr. Sisco in Washington on the formulation of the draft, but without success.) A) Statement by J.A.MALIK made at the consultative meeting of the Four on the Middle East February 4, 1971 1. The participants of the meeting are being welcomed in the Soviet mission. 2. At the present time the efforts to reach a Middle Eastern settle- ment have entered a specially important stage, on which the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East will be largely'dependent. The situation makes it incumbent on all, not only on -the parties in conflict but on the Four permanent members of the Security Council as well , to activate their efforts to reach a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East. As is well known, theUAR/ one of the parties in conflict, maintain^ a fully responsible attitude toward the talks held through Jarring and has undertaken maximum efforts to meet the suggestions expressed to the effect that restraint be exercised and the tal'kg be approached in a business like manner. The UAR document, dated January 1$ containes a constructive position ^H opted by the UAR on all the most important questions of the settlement. This document,as has already been pointed out, constitutes a good basis on which to reach agree- ment on the Middle Eastern settlement. On the other hand Israel continues its stubborn refusal to carry out all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242. 3. The Soviet side regards in a positive light the appeal addressed by U Thant to the parties so that they approach the Jarring talks in a construotive manner and in this very difficult and crucial stage of the discussions withhold fire. The meaning of this is that the Secretory General appeals to the parties to withhold fire after Bebruary 5 for a limited period of time. The Soviet Bidets: expressing support to this appeal by U Thant on the understanding that the limited period of time suggested by U Thant should be withiir the space of one month. We are also in agreement with U Thant's opinion that the current period represents an especially difficult and decisive' sta'ge in discussion of the question of the Middle Eastern settlement through the Jarring mission. The important feature of the appeal of the Secretary General IB the inseparable link between the consent of the parties to the non-resumption of fire and the necessary progress tov.-ard the substantial settlement in the Middle East. It goes without saying that what is meant is the necessity for the parties to implement all the provisions of Security Council resolution 242, including its most Important provisions - the inadrnissibility of territorial acqui- sition by rvar and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from ths .Arab territories occupied in 1967 as well as the cessation of the state of war and the establishment of a lasting and just peace. The question of peace guarantees in the area is also an integral part of the "package" settlement tn the Middle East. It is of utmost Importance to activate in a eons tractive manner fche Jarring mission asr*^r*tt as the four -power consultations at the earliest possible date. In this respect, inter alia, it would be useful if Jan-ing immediately set yp and proposed to the parties a timetable for the {rank-mentation of the Security Council resolution in all its aspects and provisions. Evedently it vrauld be opportune to havs the Secretary General submit a report on the .progress of the Jarring mission by the end of this month. In the period to come v/hen fire is withheld for a limited space of time, the Four powers will need imalce active efforts to supply Jarring with agreed- upon recommendations. For this purpose the v.'orfc of tho representatives of these powers with an aim to procJucs recommendations for Jarring on the main questions of the settlement has to be made more active. 3.- We continuously adhere to the view that the Four-power consultations can and must play an Important constructive role in the Middle Eastern settlement. And in this regard what is utterly abnormal is that the Instituted Four-power consultations have in fact been inactive lately because of the obstructing possiton maintained by the USA. It stands to reason that more active work on the part of the Four v/ill in no way hamper Jarring1 s effcrts,who is holding contacts with the parties in conflict,in spite of all attempts of tho American side to prove the contrary. In fact it would, be the other way around, Activisation of tho Four? sided consultations at the level of the permanent representatives as well as ..Uhin the working group made of their deputies will assist Jarring In carrying-out the mission with which he was entrusted. n,.;.;..^.;,^.-:^-•• ."• '.i-v •-'•,•"••.• ••'••i"r>^ft$y*:j3* «r • ",:(..f^itiii^-ii',ig$s .;•••'•.."•'.,•••.• -#; •^^:<:-^t3r&^^y^^•^« ••-'••; - -:'^;....rV . ^ :^^' ^5n|»i . . .• ,V >V ', ' ••••• • - ,' '.'• , ' -'if >l'«i-«t*Pi •'•-. , .„ : •, . •. *3_i^J*«^T,4i..;;t9^H^:. „_..: ' t .-• -ojirtiti-,? .>'£_ ,*;.&^_ as •$S$^^ '•$*;t"&'-'."i'j4: V .^ •1i>':'""t'l^li'!:!1' : •"•' ". •'••.' ,/•'"'; ;t. i.f'. fesvrlftuldle' East is aoricuo, la UHi's ;£( jnplement'atif&h:^' 55ha -'af tfuriter'.' •0cSa,©i;| of t fyi*. ^ ^. ti iiifw&TX't of just and penes' Iri* the Eld4]je • " |;;^|||^-^^y^^;-:j of'the '"ifcourity 'Council: Resolutioai^/tta iri.'^!!;.^^ J ll Sl : s : pl$i"&"'tv<3fy'-S-}'.?teMi;f'^.f',-."V' •' 'i^' i.X "-' :'i'i 7''V« '-'i,Lt*"' 'Vrfwii-v•. '• ' ,'•;{•.-•'' !:'• •' ' '^-*'•.!•' ''•. ' ' •• •• • •••''.';•'• ',!"'-.'••:.' '• ' '••,'• ' <' • ' -:,','''•' '• •' .'•;••' ' ••", ' . .1.1• - ''''. •.- .-,- •"' ,.„.•"..">;'•• :(.'"''' :'.-#','?-> . ;.i*•'.••••.•••'if *,",!«•'? ( ; : : i i :i v fy;'W^^'^ >'^ba^5^^i'' :ah4' 'i^^^*^'* ^- "Sfhey-'ttro'conyineeedd thathatt' the' set'^lamensettlementt • ' shp^W'Jb«.>should. ' iffi'^tel^ 8 '"' ^&m .v.t.th e rprinciple o£ inadpiisibiJaty of- aequistt'icn : ofeg •.;,'•—' . v.- ,.--, • r..- .:.'•' ••-...•!.-•-: ••• ., >••• • •••••..;'^'i,':•!.',;.-''-r"-''^.^1' • ' '•"(.,' - v 1'- '''?•?? %Jjr i IrttshriMi.^ of the Israeli /forces. £VQ&;k,h 'ifflipw^ •"•••; :'- ' '-' - /;' •' •• '•>v»l*.-9^;'.1^ IfiSf^f^^'^P^^^^ 4s^-^aMc®'tg' the Special r«»res«mt»{iv*'^jc''iliejj lTO«-^*^.Til*'J>1-i™V' " lonuulate tt, 'v,,o,^.w.me oJ? Umplenisntation of tiie He solution .with ^^g^j ;^pi|||||||te; aim-to' rpach pro^^;^ ,,,. u>i« l^dle East aetttoment 'during; the ;next;ig||^ :^^||||||proceed^g. rii'tbo ^,, ,i,,t''t^ 'parties will not v., res^e ^4%f ^^ li^P^IISlS- period'and'thst^the-^.r.',,--:;;: General VJJL be in a poaitiotfto.rt iWSfe^^^^^^ -.;:•.-•'' " - • ' • :• ' - t .,:-.•' '•-,•;•; »;u;rV 1....- ;''^e •Seoi"1!^ Council by the end- of "t , l /'' '..-' ' ' •'. •' • '• J-";¥:t-hV-:?Jt:^''^ o-d place at least '^o^^.^f^lPM ,,-''! "3 hold, on February .«««'' » ^^^^,^.i^.^:-^ : : ; : ^iiliIi-:&-fefil-fii u*;.- ;/''ftj: ?^"'* ^ '-' 'i' ;-:^;-v'•' ' !•..•'•'••!•"• : SS^^ri^:v;v•^v•'">••^^'^>;'^1:vi^':.'^^ li?;»l«iM^:;^;^,:f:;::^^ : : ; J ; e^iW^^?^?^'''::/"?*--.^.-^::.-.-:.,.-li K-r•«»;•,;' i,• •'1 i "'•-• ': ...... V" '* ,••• VAi-> S"':"fi;i5iSS fe^i}f4^*'St>t'J.i:'V7f;£!- '>'^-^Vv'^•;/^f.ft"w ~ ; •\'--i-S''-'!'* .; •.-.•'•• > ^ • • ';i,;r, ^iKr.»aJ,ti^ifi£Sji ^^*i*«t^;,,i*.,;;'.r- > v;::;. ^v,-^. :,(:•••",.,.,•,: .:.;•••.,; '.,•:,! 'V;^.::'fi!s*«5j|if^| 7:'V"\>;::*iU^MH •«• '•• • -j' :-i'\-t-:;-v'i'.^:fe^felSjr :--;;::-',/:;::aill *i'-Vi lli^^^pjf;y%:..a??^^.'r:.'.vv^:--':rti.-.i[--itot». ; :>: |^-|fe|.p^'^- i/l i "'''.•''• " - '." '.-,;-' '."•••...• "V-'-; ;r ".'•.;,'/:•':>•• -'^ #ff':;£^?, if^Ptt"/?-^-!..^-.':;' :$«..*!!„,. . ;.;;• *••.;** rf^f-;^ '"-:•;.::^v^;.->'(2\. !M^ ^fci^T^^^^v.^ft«SP:^^ft vr / • . * •• '• . - ^J- •• . ^•a>> .:r-.t -..-••>:,>'. .^v; , " '• ." ^'^^••l '''*••."; '•'• '.'.-" ' •''. .: r • ••- ' ^tm,-y- .^.. A* -.,. • POUR POWER STATEMENT ffe'.^*K--.:, -'•:,: • ••' .. : Permanent Representatives to the United Nations • ^^^f^:J;S;:;>of'France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United.. "I "•s-raet on February 'I,'1971 and welcomed the appeal . • e Secretary General to the parties contained in' l^^^g.^;:;^ • hi3 report to the Security Council .dated February 2, 1971, '-.*ij«llB !*.'.l S.<^?;' - ,1 . " . "'.,' '.;.•.!*,-• - ' ..Pour Powers support the Secretary General's appeal ' . the view that the partion should cooperate '/ .V .;.... ••^;r,S*ii'.. ;V>;.:^^*:§* y-..fuiiy ..with it." ]•''•• •:--:t'l;..i'V^?^ • •• ;:. -^' •.. ^^r'-'f^'V^*'- Y:--V' ••;•?.• " •."'•••-•• ••,^;;.:,;,^-,iH, .'%- •• ••7 v,;<->^;^*;.- .r- -f«;^^ «S»?r-,v ^ :-:s.- ,. ,-.rf.. •Wi^^r-'j'±C -V' -•:.•."• '• --" -' • • ^JKiTV • ' ' uffitfvts of the Foar PoM-ers ef&e Stcnrtt d. met OK ui to* Ms of ih* rep,** £rJSfnt*g on febnwr? l ed m$ favourable reaction &f G&teral rscom ;^ m /*/« ver |p5^^;^f^^^Wfe«, M ,»,;„, -, ^^ces #AMbe9!sedor Jerritl, ^''• ^"';C'1^i.. -31 ' . .,.i/ • S&tf r'^v^^r ( ^^.jt^rA4w.^^; i •,• .^...i ^ -' •-'•'-^ . • •"-.•• •. . . : ' ,wf,',ti>3^: -t ,•' l;i'.¥ L;-^ ')V, 1' r-j ' 8., • rt 5 fo ;ti ?< ttpi:; - -. i.^'SS, . > -fj.? is.tS^i • . . : ^w?"/ Sfi^xs^fiU-SV^Si '• -_v * i:- i. c'f.;!-*'*"7 M f ^ v ''•...* "*, - " * - «^»'«»rf • »• wrt tbct«.« • «. - ' s^ l 1 7 -.--- : . :r i-.'^.^^^^V'v;./,;;i • <•, •• v'.- ^- >---..r ':.: »v^ite,.-.,t..»iia^/^* VR'«v^-^*rv-a'Vi^^^^ achieve r^el progress i>i the t&tsr future* They hops x?f{t>?33 oj OR i kit fall ®fd iddle- £a*i, ihs Hepresentstives vf fce 'four fthe qu^i m nljf: 1$ JUr" •'•: iRwfc s»i:cisl>^' rs^cU-»r.'?UTiS»"i-'.--va:-.--: ;,.;".'.'•'";;'• — ;">-'?;t^#f '•* -, / " -• • • •. ' • ' ' '.''-.".'•',, ''i'''- ' '- 1 •*'-Jr"'4? •* "-*'•;.:?• x':','!• v'"^•'•'•'• '•''•• 'V-'- '^ '• '•-"• •-''^'•.—•'5'1' 'V7*' '^''';,-'>.•-Y-,"}'^^^ *:*:"'- " ll»'in •*.?J^.iasJ»uV K^^J •S: ^«*A ., '. ; ,,•;'; "«:fe 0 : fejs; f««(i''d9' fain, r {;'•'}.£tt-.*1$ ' , -;' ...-*•. <:\.;' .r''&t*-\,£ «T W >- JR^'S ^at' 1170*, F%$f• Ve-f- - ! \.t* rr^Ox-^-:>-': ' •••'..celiM-al p-als-serrt s*:rq»Qf pioah«ic^.e*i:iJ<4-;aiffeJl«-3>^a ¥^r^^--''\^''-'-' •••'•• -' •'• - '-'• • ••"•' '-V---*- .^^^.^-''V.a^Ktf r : /; ^Si;S: ']-:-;^ ^ :"' ' 9 i® i^ptf^?S' S^;^ iHs^.en w^^^^'-^i^J^^r^^^ - : : v ? sJBI^S%^S^7'? 'T{ . -•-•••:'-•'H :...>-.-;••, ->'^ :-•-. •'--r''-^D ^f i^'SpSfp '^tt!S;tv-h:K^^;': "V £c* :noii^ sw«*. *u : f 1 :^ts5,.^.;--M , -s.-" .- ,'•• ...... ^,v.-v-":',' -, :- •- .• ^•^m'^'- F?« -ft^r^t6--'. ^:"^\^^->;^;iv:-^v.^ •'f •8^-^fe?1^1-',.,,.-;^'>'::., "^/"?^% 'Jcn.' ..!Ai: ;^ iV*,^^^ -t:^^' .^'* ?^ife.^^r£^i^./i^iS '" t J hare been folloid.ag with a mixture of restrained optimism stad growing concern the resumed discussions uaeter isy auspices for the purposes of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle Sast question. My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent peace. My growing concern is that each 0ide unyieldingly insists that the other Bake certaia commitments "before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement. Uhers is, as 1 see it, a serious? risk that ve shall find ourselves in the atame deadlock as existed during the first three years of tsy mission. I therefore feel that I should at this stage raaka clear my views on •what X believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a paaeefttl and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 2^2 (1967). I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the ianain<3nt deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic &9 to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings - ^Mch seems to in© to be the real cause for the present immobility -is for ae to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which goers feo be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement bet-ween them, Xt should thereafter be possible to proceed at onee to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered % the commitments,, but with equal priority for other topie&t and in particular the refugee question. SpecifiealS-y, I wish to request the ©ovemraents of Israel and the United Arab Bepublia to make to me the following prior commitments siraultaaeously and on condition that the other party makes its coraniitment and subject to tha eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the - a - refugee problem: Israel would give & ecsmsitEeat to vitMresr from the United Arab Bepublle territory occupied by itj The tJftitea Arab. E^ubljc veuld give a ecmEiitaent to enter into e peace agreeteeat with Israel s»& to isafce specif ically to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, the various msdertakings and acknowledgements mentioned in Security Council resolution 242 (1967)* In making the above-mentioned, suggestion I sm conscious that I am requesting both sides to ffi^ce serious commitments tot I aa convinced that the present situsffcioa requires me to t^ke this step. BBfiFg/ISB/sd FOB AS ABKEEHEffiT AMI TBE 08KED SEPUS&f 6 1. Isrmal aaS tfa® felted Assb Eepafeltc would agree to antes- into a peaee .agreasent tessd os tfe« application of the fQllo^iag principles: (i) ^itbdjmiirsl of IsrasH anaed fofe&s fro® the of the Halted Ami? Eepublie oeea|tiea siaee 5 (il) fei-aination of all clalta-sj or states of tjelligereney and 3?espsct for %tt& aeteovJledgeaest of tlse BOT^treigntjr, territorial integrity sad politiesl iatepenaeRee of each other sad the rigbt of esefe to live in psaee within secure s»4 3P®cogntaed t>oaada?tes free from threats or acts 9f force, 2. fgmlaRtiOB Qf e,teJiaa. pratatee of Xsmel axid the United Arab Eepublis womia agree that all elsisas or states of "bellig^reae^ fe@tv©enthe m are terminated, ^ey would underta&e in their yelatioas with eaeh other to settle disputes "by peaceful means to re£ min from tbe thneat or use of f©rce . They would undertake to tic all in tfeeir power to prevent seta of telliges^nay or hostility from originating or "being coHasltted from within their respective territories against eaeb other and w«M refrain from iaterveniag in eacls other's 3. Heajj^et n a^^askao^le^eggnt of apyereigntg;^ teygitoyisl^ Israel and the United Arab Eepisblie would undertake to respect snd the aovereigmty, territorial Integrity and. political independence other* 4 . Biit to liein ae ithiKsecmr aad aad the tJnited Ara"b Sepalslic t?oald aadertalce to respect the right of each other to live In peeee *??.*Mn secure and rec^aised "boundaries " 2 -r f %* ' "Itetermimtiea. of foaimtoies Israel wold agree to j^eeognisse that the eastern 8fedtea fixate lepufclic is tie international l5ooscferj bstweea the United Arab HepubMe and the f eases- issnd&ted tenitosy of Palestine . She United Aseib BepaMie tiould recognise tfcat it lias & common "boundary with Israel extending froa the Golf af Aqsfoa to the point ^bere the former armistice tiettresa Ismel aa& the tMted Arab Hepa&lie departed from the interactional of the Unites £mls Sepaiblie. fhe guestioa of the Gaza area would the suJ>4e of United. Amis Bepufelie tjoold mdertake that, in its exercise of sovereignty OVOT the Suez Caaal and in aeeorSance vith the Constaatinople of 1888,, tlie &fclps of all couatrieaj including lemel, shall the right of f rsedoni of navigation through the Canal without or intearfesrsnce. fhe tJaited 'Arab SepubliG vousld agrse that ths ships of all countries, Israel, have the aright' of fzsaedom of aspigatlon through the Straits of tifan anft the 0tOf of Aq.afca and tiould TiaSertaka not to interfara vitfe 'that right, fhe United Arsb iepuBlie vould agree to enter into an agreement with the Uaited Hatioas under •which the Sfeara-sl-Shsikh ayea %-oal Israel and tfee United Atab Bepttblis wowld agree that a plan g*r the settletseat of the rsfogse parablem should, fee worked out and should "be the 9«ib4ect of a subsequent agreaaent. ^heyyfegree that the aceeptaace of such a plan by ths parties thereto and the declaration of their- intention to implement it ia good fsitfe constitute sufficient irapleraeatation of that provision of Security Council resolution 3^2 (196?) to justify the irapleman- tatioa of the ot&er provisions of the peace agreement "between Israel and the United AasaJb Bepiablic. 8. Measures f gg^gim^ateeiag^thg tg^it^^al.^inyielaMlity^ an& ^politieal "She tfnited Arab Itepufelie TOuld agree tliat a strip of land along Its eastern frontier viih a width of kilojisetres should be demilitarised and wold agree that a Waited llatioas force should 'be stationed for a period of years In that ctemHit&ri&@d aoas for the purpose of* ensuring Its deKiiitari^ed etssmeter. Israel •would agree that & zone irarying is width fro© kilometres at the northern end of its eoamoa f roatiar with tha Halted Arab Heputblle to a vidtb of metres at the sout&era end of Its common frontier with the United Arafe Hspufelie should "bs demilitarised and would agres that a United Bations fora© stoouM tie stationed, for a peric^L of years IB that dsffillitarisssd aone for tbs farpose of ensariag its demilitarised. and the United Jtra^ lepubliG wouM agree that the fiaal peswse agreetaebt together vith the agreements: with the Salted Mat loss relating to the demilitarises sones (insludlsig the Sharra«ei~Sheikh sraa) should be spjcifically su"bmittect to the Seetirity Council for its endorssmeat aad for the provision sad seeeptsraee of guarantees for the territorial inviolability and political IndepsnSsnce of Israel sad the United Arab Republic. t ogee ; of .i r the^ groylgi.oas egresmont would enter into forss on signature by the parties deposit with the United Satloss or by sueh other procedures as smy be tautually 10, Israel •would undertake to vitMraw its forces from territory of the United Arab Ssjsofcllc upon the entry into force of the agreement according t$. the follofclag achedule: (a) Within a •priM of days fros a soas "withia kilometres of thes Sa&s Gaaelm (b) Within a period of days from all oeeuplod territory. Alternatively ^ the dates for the td.thdraval of Israeli forces jsartially or totally from the territory of the Waited Arab Espablic might bs determined In a separate agreement or. agreements. >*••*•><«• SECRET 8 February 1971 Aide-memoire I have "been following with a mix-ture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussions untfer ray auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question. My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent peace. My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the -other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement„ There is, as I see it, a serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock as existed during the first three years of my mission,, I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be trie necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 2*4-2 (1967), which the.parties have agreed to carry out in all ita parts. I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings - which seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility - is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them,, It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the coinsiitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question. Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitment and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the - 2 - refugee problem: Israel would give a .commitment to withdraw its forces from' occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British-Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satis- factory arrangements are made for: * (a) Establishing demilitarized zones; (b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm-el-Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the 'Straits of Tiran; and (c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgements covering the following subjects: (a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency; (b) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence; (c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; (d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and (e) Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step. I interpret practical security measures in the Sharm-el-Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran to mean arrangements for stationing a United Nations force in the area for this purpose. Notes on meeting between Secretary-General and Sir Colin Crowe, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN, held at the United Nations on Friday. 12 February 1971. at 3:00 p.m. Present: Secretary-General Sir Colin Crowe Mr. Michael Weston Mr. Urquhart Sir Colin Crowe reported on the meeting of the four permanent members. All four permanent members were very satisfied with Ambassador JarringTs current activities. The main object of the meeting was to discuss guarantees and the main points which should be examined in this connexion. The United Kingdom's view was that a binding peace agreement was a basic necessity, but that guarantees would be necessary especially in the early stages of such an agreement when suspicions were running high among the parties. The question of demilitarized zones, of United Nations forces and of observers should be carefully examined. The demilitarized zones would be at sensitive points, such as the Golan Heights and Sharm-El-Sheikh, and might include United Nations garrisons. Other demilitarized zones along borders could be dealt with by mobile patrols or observers. The West Bank was a particularly difficult problem since it would probably have to be partly demilitarized, although it might be necessary to allow Jordan police or paramilitary personnel to function on the West Bank in order to control the fedayeen. The United Kingdom felt that the function and composition of forces should be discussed later, since to discuss it now would merely bring the question into the whole peace-keeping controversy. The United States felt that the basic guarantee must be a binding commitment to peace. It was important for the Four not to go too fast and get ahead of Jarring. Some United States views on guarantees were contained in the October and December documents. The basic agreement should be deposited at the United Nations and endorsed by the Security Council. The United States idea was first to look at international guarantees and then to discuss various peace-keeping options, such as contacts between Israel and the Arabs on the borders, United Nations -2- observers with liaison officers from "both sides, and United Nations forces with or without the participation of the Four Powers. The United States did not wish to discuss demilitarized zones at the present time since these were a part of Jarring's negotiations. France agreed that the first essential was a basic agreement but that guarantees should be an integral part of such go. agreement as well as part of the resolution 2^2 package. Even if Sadat's proposal on the Canal were accepted, some guarantees and United Nations forces would be necessary. France raised a number of questions on demilitarized zones. Would they be on both sides of the borders? Would they be in the same depth on both sides? Would they cover the entire border? What were the sensitive points where garrison forces would be necessary? In what areas would overflights be forbidden? In what areas would artillery be forbidden? As regards forces, France asked the following questions: Would they be established by the Security Council? For what period? Would they be subject to periodic review by the Security Council? Modalities would also have to be discussed, including composition, size a*et* directives and command of the force. The Soviet Union said that the Four should first concentrate on guidelines for Jarring. As far as guarantees were concerned, should the Security Council take the decisions on all important aspects of UN forces? What would be the major principles for the establishment and command of these forces? What would be the role of the Four? What numbers of troops would be required? What aspects of guarantees would have to be agreed among the parties? What would be the Security Council role? What would be the duration of the guarantees? The Soviet Union's view was that the Four should work on withdrawal and the commitment to peace. Since the United States opposed the revival of deputies meetings, it was agreed that the Four should examine the kind of international guarantees to be decided upon by the Security Council. It was agreed that the Four should meet more often and the next meeting will be held in one week's time. L 'U-n/* ( '? £**• °± 3-«r- (>• Notes on meeting "between Secretary-General and Arab. Charles Yost, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN, held at the United Nations, 10:15 a.m. on Friday, 19 February 1971 Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Charles Yost Mr, Urquhart Ambassador Yost reported on the meeting of the four permanent members of the Security Council which took place on 18 February. Ambassador Yost had expressed at the outset the satisfaction of the United States at Ambassador Jarring's initiative and the positive response which had been received from one side. The United States hoped that further positive response would be received and was cautiously optimistic. The United States felt that the initiative should remain with Ambassador Jarring and the parties, and that any- thing done by the Four Powers should be supplementary and should move parallel to Ambassador Jarring's efforts. The United States, therefore, urged that the discussion on guarantees should focus primarily on the role of the Security Council in any agreement on the Middle East that might emerge from Ambassador Jarring's talks. The Four might discuss such questions as: Should the Security Council endorse the agreement? Should there be separate or parallel action by the Four Powers? How would the Security Council and the Four Powers deal with breaches of or threats to the agreement? In other words, they should consider the political and legal guarantees required for whatever settlement might emerge. As to guarantees on the ground, the United States believed that it would not be possible to go very far in this matter until the shape of the settlement was known. There was a danger that theoretical attempts to elaborate a blueprint for guarantees would be unrealistic in relation to the requirements of the parties. The representative of France referred to the questions asked by the USSR at the previous meeting and said that the Security Council should decide on all vital aspects of the functioning of the United Nations Force. -2- The United States anticipated that there was danger of getting into the arguments concerning the relative responsibilities of the Security Council and the Secretary-General which had preoccupied the Committee of Thirty-Three, and therefore urged a pragmatic approach. The representative of Prance asked what ""basic principles" really meant and suggested that the Four Powers might be constituted as a subsidiary body of the Council under Article 29 of the Charter in order to supervise the carrying out of the final agreement. The United Kingdom made a similar suggestion, which had also been suggested by the United States in the Committee of Thirty-Three. Both France and the United Kingdom considered that it would be premature to talk about the numerical strength of the Force, although, obviously, it must be large enough to maintain calm and order in the area, to supervise the agreement and to act as a buffer between the regular forces of both sides. The representative of France stated that the parties themselves would have to be consulted on demilitarized zones, garrison areas, the mandate of the Force, the nationalities to be included in it, its duration and the method of co-operation with the parties. The Security Council would also have to decide on the method of financing. The representative of France said that the functions of the Force would have to be agreed upon among the Security Council and the parties and that it should be set up for a minimum of five years. The USSR praised the UAR for it's positive response to Ambassador Jarring's initiative and condemned the negative statements emanating from Israel. As to guarantees, the Security Council should take all necessary measures to prevent conflict up to and including measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Four Powers should consult with the parties on preventing threats to the peace in the area. The Middle East settlement should be embodied in binding and irrevocable documents to be endorsed by and deposited with the Security Council. The demilitarized zones should be astride the frontiers and should give no advantage to either side. The despatch of the Force and observers was -3- the function of the Security Council. The USSR asked: (l) Whether the Four Powers agreed that the United Nations presence should consist of a Force or observers, or both. (2) Whether the function of the Force, which should be on both sides of the line, would be first to supervise withdrawal and then to maintain various arrangements, such as demilitarized zones. (3) Whether the Force should consist of the Four Powers only or what principles would govern the selection of other contributing states. (4) What would be the regulations for the restriction of activity in the demilitarized zones? (5) What would be the respective roles of the Security Council and the parties in supervising and maintaining the demilitarized zones. The United Kingdom gave similar answers as France to the Soviet questions. The United Kingdom saw the Security Council role as establishing the overall size and the function of the Force, while the Secretary-General would be responsible for the day-to-day direction of the Force, reporting of course to the Security Council. The United Kingdom recommended the UNFICYP command system as a model. The United Kingdom supported the notion of the Four Powers as a subsidiary body under Article 29. It would be impossible to estimate the numerical strength of the Force at present. The parties should give binding undertakings at the outset to accept and maintain the Force and to co-operate with it for a minimum period of five years. The demilitarized zones should be on both sides but with differing depth, according to the nature of the ground, and not necessarily covering all boundaries. There would be garrison forces in particularly sensitive areas. The United Kingdom had no objection to the participation of the parties in peace-keeping on the ground, but thought that international guarantees would be essential as well. France proposed a draft communique noting and supporting Ambassador Jarring"s initiative and expressing the hope that the parties concerned would respond as soon as possible. The USSR endorsed this idea but suggested that since the UAR had already responded, the communique should express the hope that Israel also would respond positively. -4- The United States objected to the communique "because the United States had made known its support for Ambassador JarringTs initiative and the President had already commented favorably on the UAR response. The United States would support a Four-Power communique if it thought that it would help, "but since Israel was very negative to the Four Powers, the United States "believed that a Four-Power statement at this point, associating Ambassador Jarring with the Four Powers,.would be likely to have a negative effect in Israel and would, therefore, be unwise. This view had nothing to do with the strongly held United States position that positive replies were most essential. The Four will meet again on the afternoon of 25 February. With the Compliments of (he Representative of (he United Stales of America to the United Nations JEWISH PHSS8 * . 19 FEBRUAHSf 1971 "IF ONLY THEKB WEHE PEACE..,.n THE HIGH PRICE OF DEKGNSB "In these tense days of cease-fire deadlines and peace talks it Is not surprising that so many people in the Middle East and throughout the world are hopefully dreaming of a real peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. But for Israelis who took a close look at the Government budget for 1971-72 which was presented to the Knesset early last month, these dreams of peace take on an economic dimension as veil* This is because almost half of this 13*2 billion lira budget is earmarked for direct and indirect defense expenditures. Israel, vhich employs about a quarter of its manpower resources for defense purposes, spends a higher proportion of its budgets for security than almost any land in the world. In order to appreciate why the nation must spend six billion Lira this year on defense an information booklet Issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture lists some of the items upon vhich this zaoaey is spent : Israeli Lira US A (approx)/ A Hiantom Jet and replacement parts 20 million A iFuga-Magister plane I/a million A Skyhawk plane 2-1/2 million y Super-tfrelon helicopter 5 million Training of a pilot 1/2 million One hour's flight in fighter-$lane 3 thousand One hour1a flight in helicopter 1-1/2 thousand "Hawk" missile battery 28 oillion Single Hawk missile DtQ thousand Medium aerial bomb 5 thousand Minute's worth of machinegun fire of a Mystere 5 hundred Patton Tank 1 million Armor-piercing shell 6 hundred One hour operation of a tank 1 thousand Expenses for annual maintenance of a soldier in regular army 2 thousand "Uzsi" submaehlne-gun & hundred 3*4 day clash at Suez; during "War of Attrition" 6 million 20 February 1971 Meeting of the Secretary-General with Mr. Scheel, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany on Friday 19 February 1971 The Secretary-General welcomed Mr. Scheel and regretted that he had learned too late about his visit to New York to change a luncheon which had been arranged on the last day of the meeting of experts on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race. Common Market Integration Mr. Scheel said that very good progress had been made during the last year in European economic integration. Consi- derable progress in particular had been made in monetary integra- tion. One could now foresee that in ten years hence, there might be a European currency. He had discussed the question of European integration with the American authorities during his visit to the United States. "While there was gratification at the progress made, there was also concern in some quarters. The development of a giant Western European market was a source of preoccupation to certain US circles. The Minister underlined, however, that the creation of the Common Market had led to a substantial increase in exports from the United States to that market. Since 1958, American exports to the Common Market increased by l80 percent, while its exports to EFTA increased by 140 percent, and exports to the rest of the world increased by 120 percent only. There is obviously a necessity to enlighten American public opinion and the economic sectors of the OS about such advantages. Berlin The Minister said that the Berlin negotiations were making good progress and that, in his view, an agreement would definitely take place before the end of the year and perhaps even earlier. Until recently, it had not even been recognized that negotiations were taking - 2 - place, but as a result of the good progress made, the communiques now issued refer to talks as negotiations. The talks are taking place for the moment at the counsellor and expert levels. The Ambassadors will meet again in April. Not much progress should be expected before that time, since elections will take place in West Berlin and the Communist parties will convene in Moscow in March. The meeting will probably endorse the policy of detente initiated by the USSR. The three fundamental objectives which are being sought in the negotiations are: 1. Improvement of internal movements within the city. 2. Free access to West Berlin. 3. Recognition of certain political activities by the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin. The outcome of the negotiations will be a written agreement guaranteeing the factual situation resulting from the negotiations. As soon as the agreement is concluded the Government of the Federal Republic will submit the treaties with the Soviet Union and with Poland for ratification by Parliament. It is very clearly understood in the Soviet Union that the treaty will not be submitted for ratification unless there is agreement on Berlin. After this step, negotiations will begin with Czechoslovakia and diplomatic relations are to be established next year with Hungary and Bulgaria. The Secretary-General remarked that according to some Western observers the discussion between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic might have made greater progress if the negotiations had been conducted directly between the Federal Republic and the USSR. The Minister said that the negotiations with the USSR had ended with the signing of the agreement between the two countries. Progress between the two Germanies depended entirely on the detente which could be achieved as a result of the Berlin negotiations. An agreement on Berlin will mean ratification of the German-Soviet treaty and this, in turn, will influence the course of discussions between the two Germanics. The main problem for the GDR is its concern that improved communications between the two Germanics may affect and even undermine the Eastern German political regime. For its part, the Federal Republic firmly believes that detente can have real meaning only if there is an improvement in the actual relations between the two Germanics. The- Secretary-General asked whether the statements by a number of prominent people in the US expressing doubt about the course taken by the Federal Republic were of,real concern to his Government. The Minister said that a policy such as the one initiated by Chancellor Brandt could not be expected to please everybody. Of real importance only was the fact that the policy of the Federal Republic had the support of all its allies and in particular that of the US, with which the Government was in constant consultation. The UATO countries in a joint declaration had publicly stated that this policy was a welcome step towards European detente. The Secretary-General asked whether there was still a possibility that both Germanics might enter into the United Nations before the end of the year. The Minister said that this was definitely out of the question. The negotiations were slow and required a considerable amount of patience. Entry of the two Germanics into the United Nations will be the ultimate phase of the present course of events. The time of that ultimate event depended entirely on the pace of the present negotiations and these will require time. Negotiations regarding the entry of the two Germanies will also be complex and will have to cover a broad area of problems, since -there will be need for the recognition of the special relationship between the two Germanies. The question of representation of the two Germanies will have to be examined with regard to political and security matters, the different international organizations, etc. The Secretary-General had expressed last year the hope that on the occasion of one of his visits to Europe he might have the opportunity of inviting the Minister of Foreign Affairs to luncheon in Geneva, in a totally private capacity, and to invite thereafter the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic. He wondered whether he could still have such hope in connexion with his visit to Europe at the end of April. His only objective was to do everything he could to be briefed by both parties on this very important matter before the end of his mandate as Secretary-General. The Minister said that his position remained unchanged. The GDR tries incessantly to obtain international recognition through a variety of means. Whenever it registers some progress the talks between the two Germanies mark a regress. His Government had received a wide understanding for this problem. Even a country like India had fully recognized it s position. It was necessary not to impede the progress which the Federal Republic attempted to make in the talks between the two Germanies. International recognition of the GDR must be accompanied by the settlement and international recognition of the special relationship between the two Germanies. It is therefore preferable to wait until more progress is made in the present negotiations. The Secretary-General informed the Minister that he would also go to Geneva early in July for ECOSOC. The Minister said that he would remain in touch with him to review the matter sometime in May. The Secretary-General thanked the Minister for his very valuable briefing and asked him to convey to Chancellor Brandt his deepest gratitude and admiration for the historical initiative he had taken. Middle East The Secretary-General informed the Minister that after the resumption of Mr. Jarring's mission in January he had been forced on 1 February to submit a negative report to the Security Council, although he had obtained a cease-fire without calling it that name. A period of three years and three months had elapsed since Mr. Jarring had started his role as an intermediary between the parties concerned. Mr. Jarring had offered to present his own proposals to - 5 - the UAR and to Israel within the context of resolution 2U2 of the Security Council. The Secretary-General had agreed and on 8 February Mr. Jarring communicated to both parties his written proposals. Of course, these proposals were based very largely and sometimes literally on the proposals which the United States had submitted to the Big Four in October 1969. On 15 February a very favourable answer was received from the UAR. The reply for the first time speaks specifically of a peace agreement with Israel recognized as a sovereign State. The Israeli cabinet had already met once and will meet again this coming Sunday. Ambassador Rabin who has seen Secretary Rogers is on his way back to Tel Aviv. The main problem is that Israel insists on a peace agreement before accepting any discussions of a territorial nature. The Secretary-General also informed the Minister that some real progress was being made in the discussions of the Big Four where active consideration was being given to a peace-keeping force for the Middle East. The force is to include troops from the Big Four and some of the members even envisage that the force should be placed under Chapter VII of the Charter which would mean authority for enforcement, if necessary. He himself did not favour an "active" participation of the two super-powers in the force, meaning a stationing of their troops astride the border. The traditional position of Israel has always been not to accept the stationing of UN troops on its side of the border. Troops from the two super-powers would only complicate the matter. He personally believed that the participation of the two super-powers should rather be in logistics, telecommunications, including even manning of command posts. The Secretary-General further holds the view that the minimum duration of the peace-keeping operation should be specified. To a question of Mr. Scheel the Secretary-General replied that the problem of Jerusalem had not yet been discussed since it involved Jordan. The talks so far concern only Israel and the UAR. - 6 - The Minister said that the Middle East question was important to his Government since his country had become a mediterranean country as a result of membership in the Common Market. His Government was anxiously in favour of pacification and stabilization in the mediterranean area. The Federal Republic was prepared to participate in a plan for economic aid for the Middle East once the conflict had been settled. He said that a committee of experts of the European Economic Community was considering such an economic aid plan. Guinea The Minister expressed his Government's gratitude for the Secretary-General's good offices and intervention in favour of the two German experts who had been arrested and one of whom was condemned to life sentence in Guinea. The problem of appropriate guarantees for foreign aid personnel working abroad needed to be given serious consideration. The Government had done its best to restrain public opinion over what had happened in Guinea. The Secretary-General said that he did all he could and that the matter of guarantees was being given active consideration by Mr. Paul Hoffman. Question of Internal Subsidies The Secretary-General expressed concern at the damaging effects which internal subsidies given in the advanced countries to agriculture were having on exports from the less developed countries. He wished to have the Minister's view on that subject. The Minister recognized that this was a serious and also very complex problem. The question of internal subsidies to farmers was not only an economic, but also a social and political problem. The members of the Common Market were much aware of its effects on the developing countries. Unfortunately, there was no ready or easy solution. It was indeed regretful that on the one hand the advanced countries were giving foreign aid and on the other hand, by giving internal subsidies, were damaging the exports from the developing countries. He thought that UHCTAD would be the best forum for active discussion of this problem. The Secretary-General expressed regret at the departure of Ambassador Bttker and wanted the Minister to know how much he had always appreciated his close and kind co-operation. The Minister said that his Government had learned with great regret the Secretary-General1s decision not to seek a renewal of his mandate. He expressed his Government's deep appreciation and admiration for the Secretary-General's accomplishments and efforts in his very difficult position.